2016

Inequity in Private Child Custody Litigation

Dale Margolin Cecka
University of Richmond, dcecka@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications

Part of the Family Law Commons

Recommended Citation

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
INEQUITY IN
PRIVATE CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION

Dale Margolin Cecka†

INTRODUCTION ........................................... 204

I. DEMOGRAPHICS OF MARRIAGE AND PARENTHOOD IN
2016 .......................................................... 206

II. STRUCTURE AND CULTURE OF FAMILY COURT .... 208
A. History .................................................. 208
B. Current Structure .................................... 211
C. Common Themes ..................................... 212
   1. Litigants in Family Court ....................... 213
   2. Exploding Dockets ............................... 214
   3. Status and Reputation in the Legal Profession 215

III. DISCRETIONARY NATURE OF CUSTODY MATTERS .... 218
A. Best Interest of the Child ......................... 219
B. Unclear and Controversial Role of Guardians ad Litem 220

IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE JURISDICTIONAL DIFFERENCES ON
CUSTODY MATTERS ........................................ 223
A. New York ............................................. 223
   1. Different Rules & Procedure ................... 224
   2. Use of Child’s Attorneys in New York Family
      Court .............................................. 225
   3. Use of Court Ordered Investigations by ACS
      in Family Court ................................ 227
B. Virginia .............................................. 229
   1. JDR Is Not a Court of Record ................ 229
   2. Use of Guardians ad Litem .................... 230

V. CONCLUSION ........................................... 232

† Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Jeanette Lipman Family Law
Clinic, University of Richmond School of Law, J.D., 2004, Columbia Law School; B.A.,
1999 Stanford University. The author would like to thank Roxanne Millan and Adam
Rellick for their invaluable research and support. The author has practiced for over
14 years in trial courts in New York and Virginia. The author was a student attorney
for Juvenile Rights Practice (JRP) of Legal Aid in Manhattan Family Court from 2002-
2004, then an attorney for JRP in Bronx Family Court from 2004-2006, and then operated
a legal clinic representing children in Queens Family Court and Nassau Family
Court from 2006-2008. In Virginia, the author has practiced since 2008 in Juvenile
and Domestic Relations District Courts and Circuit Courts in the City of Richmond,
Chesterfield County, Henrico County, and Hanover County, and has made occasional
appearances in the City of Petersburg, York County, and Clarke County.
INTRODUCTION

Woody Allen and Mia Farrow were never married. When they separated, Allen sought custody of their children. Because their custody dispute was not a matrimonial matter, it should have been heard in New York Family Court. Family Court hears child abuse and neglect, juvenile delinquency, paternity, and other matters such as Persons in Need of Supervision (i.e. “incorrigible children”). New York Family Court is the court of pro se clients, the court where people wait all day for their cases to be called, the court where there are no paper towels in the public bathroom. It is the court that most lawyers avoid even if someone can pay them to take their case. But Allen, through his Manhattan attorneys, actually filed his custody petition in Supreme Court. In New York’s Supreme Court, he would have the opportunity to take depositions and to have a multi-day trial utilizing the rules of evidence. He would also be issued a written opinion, formally written by a judge, instead of one that is typed (or handwritten) on a boilerplate form at the end of the hearing. There would also be paper towels in the public restroom at Supreme Court.

How and why was Allen able to get his case in to Supreme Court, even though jurisdictionally, since it was not a matrimonial matter, it belonged in Family Court? The author is actually unable to find how, exactly, Allen achieved this procedural impossibility, because the file is sealed.

1 A Person in Need of Supervision (PIN) is defined by the Family Court Act as “A person less than eighteen years of age who does not attend school . . . or who is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient[.]” N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712 (McKinney 2014). Citywide in 2001, the most common allegations on PINS petitions were incorrigible behavior. ERIC WEINGARTNER ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, A STUDY OF THE PINS SYSTEM IN NEW YORK CITY: RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 8 (2002), http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/159_243.pdf [https://perma.cc/JWU3-2EWQ].

2 “Supreme Court” is the trial-level court of general jurisdiction in the New York State Unified Court System. It is vested with unlimited civil and criminal jurisdiction. See generally N.Y. CT. R. §§ 202.1-70. In most states, this is known as “Circuit Court.”


well as the appellate decisions, mention only that the matter came to Supreme Court as “a special proceeding.” But the reason he (and his attorneys) wanted to be in Supreme Court instead of Family Court is clear. By all measures, it is a higher status court.

This article explores the history and implications of a two-tiered system for adjudicating matrimonial—as opposed to non-matrimonial—custody matters. As the author uncovered by calling every clerk’s office in every major city in the country, matrimonial matters are under a different jurisdiction or part of court in nine states. This differential treatment has implications for the outcome of private custody cases. It also reflects a bias in the administration of justice, based on race and socioeconomic class. Perhaps most importantly, it causes the government and other outside parties (such as court appointed guardians ad litem) to be more involved in the private lives of poor families and families of color than they are with middle and upper-middle class families.

Part I of the article discusses the demographics of marriage rates, showing that the majority of unmarried parents with custody disputes are poor and/or are people of color. This is in contrast to married parents with custody disputes, who are more likely to be white and middle or upper middle class. Part II starts by exploring the history behind the two-tiered system for adjudicating matrimonial versus non-matrimonial custody matters, and then describes the current lay of the land. Part II also paints a picture of the cul-

6 “In the underlying special proceeding herein, commenced in August of 1992, petitioner sought to obtain custody of, or procure increased visitation with, the infant children . . . .” Allen v. Farrow, 626 N.Y.S.2d 125, 126 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). “In this special proceeding commenced by petitioner to obtain custody of, or increased visitation with, the infant children . . . we are called upon to review the IAS Court’s decision . . . .” Allen v. Farrow, 611 N.Y.S.2d 859, 860 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). The author surmises that Allen was able to get the matter into Supreme Court by filing a writ of habeas corpus. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 70(a) (McKinney 1988). According to subsection (a) of the statute, “Where a minor child is residing within this state, either parent may apply to the supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus to have such minor child brought before such court; and on the return thereof, the court, on due consideration, may award the natural guardianship, charge and custody of such child to either parent for such time, under such regulations and restrictions, and with such provisions and directions, as the case may require, and may at any time thereafter vacate or modify such order.” Dom. Rel. Law § 70(a). Prior to state laws regarding child custody and the development of the “domestic relations exception” in federal court, this was also a way to get a matter regarding custody of a child before a federal court. See Paul J. Buser, Habeas Corpus Litigation in Child Custody Matters: An Historical Mine Field, 11 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. 1, 3-4 (1995).
7 See Appendix, infra.
ture of Family Courts throughout the country. Part III is an overview of the substantive nature of private child custody cases, including the best interest standard and the use of guardians ad litem. Part IV takes two states, New York and Virginia, to show how jurisdictional difference manifests itself in practice in private child custody cases. Part V concludes that our country’s family law “system” is reflective of bias against poor families and families of color. The jurisdictional differences between matrimonial and non-matrimonial custody cases are not based on the best interests of the child and should be eliminated. All custody matters in every state should be heard by the same level of state court.

I. DEMOGRAPHICS OF MARRIAGE AND PARENTHOOD IN 2016

Marriage is a very different institution, in most respects, than it was less than a century ago. According to recent data from the Centers for Disease Control, 40.2% of all births in 2014 were to unmarried women. The percentage of non-marital births varies widely among ethnic groups; among black mothers, the non-marital birth rate is 70.9%, in contrast to the non-marital birth rate among whites, which is 29.2%. Among Hispanics it is 52.9%, and Native Americans, 65.7%. Parents of color make up the vast majority of non-married parents.

Among African American men, the differences are extreme. Of all male populations, a black father is the least likely to be married to the mother of his children. There are numerous institutional explanations for this, which are beyond the scope of this article. Black men are six times more likely than white men to be incarcerated, and Black men’s underemployment may also de-

---

8 The term “Family Court” is used throughout the article to mean the courts that hear child dependency, delinquency, custody, paternity, Child/Person in Need of Supervision (CHINS/PINS) and other matters. As discussed throughout this article, some of these courts also hear divorce, but many family courts do not have jurisdiction over divorce matters.


10 Id. at 40.

11 Id. at 40-41.

12 Id. at 41.

13 Id. at 7.

crease their ability and desire to get married.\textsuperscript{15}

The rate of marriage also varies across socioeconomic groups.\textsuperscript{16} It has been steadily declining among the less educated for decades, creating a class divide.\textsuperscript{17} A 2011 study by the Pew Research Center found that, although 64\% of college-educated Americans were married, fewer than 48\% of those with some college or less were married.\textsuperscript{18} “In 1960, the report found, the two groups were about equally likely to be married.”\textsuperscript{19}

In other words, educated, high-income adults are still marrying at high rates, but lower income adults are not. In fact, only women in the top 10\% of Americans in earnings saw their marriage rates increase between 1970 and 2011, whereas women in the bottom 65\% in earnings saw their marriage rate declining by more than 20 percentage points.\textsuperscript{20} In the words of economist Justin Wolfers, marriage has become “an indulgence” for the “well off.”\textsuperscript{21}

Numerous other studies have shown that, after marriage, both women and men tend to be much better off financially than those who are unmarried.\textsuperscript{22} The median income for single-mother families is $25,493, just 31\% of the $81,455 median income for two-parent families.\textsuperscript{23} The poverty rate for children in single-parent families is triple the rate for children in two-parent families.\textsuperscript{24} In 2011, 42\% of single parent households experienced at least one “hardship,” such as unpaid rent or mortgage, phone disconnection, utility disconnection, and unmet medical and/or dental

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Id. (citing D’VERA COHN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., BARELY HALF OF U.S. ADULTS ARE MARRIED — A RECORD LOW 8 (2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/12/Marriage-Decline.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4LF-PTZ5]).
\item \textsuperscript{19} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Yarrow, supra note 16.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Id.
\end{itemize}
needs.\textsuperscript{25}

All told, approximately 60\% of children in this country living in single-mother homes are impoverished.\textsuperscript{26} The Department of Children and Families further estimates that, as of 2013, at least one-third of all American children live without their biological fathers present in the home, up from 22\% in 1997.\textsuperscript{27} Moreover, the federal government reports that the many of the one million parents it serves through its Access and Visitation program are both low-income and unmarried.\textsuperscript{28}

Single parenthood is clearly on the rise, but only for those on the bottom of the economic ladder. When single parents cannot settle custodial matters on their own, they seek help from our justice system. They need custody, visitation, and child support orders, but not property settlement and divorce decrees. There are procedural and substantive implications to this difference which we cannot overlook any longer.

II. Structure and Culture of Family Court

A. History

Before the mid-twentieth century, it was very difficult to obtain a divorce in the United States.\textsuperscript{29} Divorces were only granted if one of the parties was at “fault.”\textsuperscript{30} Because the grounds were so hard to prove, case law regarding remedies developed slowly, if at all.\textsuperscript{31} The “innocent” spouse would usually just get everything: the children,

\textsuperscript{25} Id.


\textsuperscript{28} Id. at 1.

\textsuperscript{29} Id.

\textsuperscript{30} Id. at 1.

\textsuperscript{31} Id. at 1.

\textsuperscript{25} Id.

\textsuperscript{26} Id.

\textsuperscript{27} Id.

\textsuperscript{28} Id.

\textsuperscript{29} Id.

\textsuperscript{30} Id.

\textsuperscript{31} Id.
property, and alimony. The appellate courts had little need to address issues regarding the placement of children or parenting abilities under this “winner take all” result.

No-fault divorces, which emerged in 1970, suddenly increased the number of divorces and opened up a Pandora’s box of legal issues. The courts were now forced to separate “fault” from child custody, child support, alimony, and property disposition. Moreover, it quickly became clear that the issues of child custody and child support were substantively and procedurally different from dissolution of marriage, in that they required ongoing contact and possible modification, at least until the child reached age 18. Principles of res judicata and contract law were upended.

Prior to the first no-fault divorce law, juvenile courts had already been established in all states to handle juvenile delinquency and status offenses. In the early twentieth century, some states decided that other children’s issues, such as dependency, would be heard in juvenile courts as well. By the 1970s, as divorce proliferated,

---

33 Id. at 288-89.
34 California’s Family Law Act of 1960—the first such statute—took effect in 1970. See Wilcox, supra note 30, at 81 (explaining that California was the first state to allow no-fault divorce).
35 See, e.g., Wilcox, supra note 30, at 81-82.
36 In all states custody and child support orders are modifiable until a child is 18. See, e.g., 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 899 (2016) (“Orders in divorce proceedings as to the custody of minor children are not final in the sense that they are not subject to change, but are, in their nature, interlocutory and subject to modification at any future time during the lives of the parents and the minority of the children . . . .”).
37 For example, in all states child custody orders can be modified based on a change in circumstance, up until a child is 18. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 20-108 (2011). Spousal support matters can also be modified based on new circumstances, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 20-109 (2001), and spouses retain the right to seek a new spousal support order even after a final decree of divorce, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 20-107.1(D) (2016).
39 See, e.g., GREGORY J. HALEMBA ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, OHIO FAMILY COURT FEASIBILITY STUDY: SUMMARY OF MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (1997), http://www.ncjj.org/pdf/OhioFCFeasibilitySummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5JQ-VRSE] (footnotes omitted) (“The first evidence of this is in a 1912 enactment of the New Jersey legislature which vested county juvenile courts with jurisdiction to hear and determine all domestic relations disputes. Ohio followed in 1914 with a court consolidation from the domestic relations side when their legislature passed a bill that
ated, some states subsumed all domestic matters into one court. But other states kept divorce and its multiple issues separate from all of the other child-related causes of action. In those states, this meant, for example, that juvenile and Family Courts decided custody matters regarding unmarried parents, while the traditional trial courts decided matrimonial custody matters.

From the beginning, specialized Family Courts were different from other courts because they were so informal. This is true even though family and juvenile matters are often “quasi-criminal.” For example, civil “findings” of abuse and neglect against parents can strip a parent of physical and legal custody of a child; an order terminating parental rights is considered the “death sentence” of child welfare. A child adjudicated a “delinquent” is subject to imprisonment. Progressive-era legal reformer Reginald Herbert Walker Smith reflected on the paradox:

The domestic relations and juvenile courts . . . are rapidly eliminating the traditional forbidding aspects of a criminal trial...
by informality of procedure, by using the summons instead of
the arrest, by having the attending officers in plain clothes, and
by having the parties sit around a table with the judge instead of
standing in cages or behind bars, nevertheless the machinery of
the criminal law is more and more being used.\textsuperscript{47}

Even as a proponent of specialized juvenile and family courts,
Smith could see the conundrum of adjudicating fundamental
rights, such as family integrity and liberty, using ambiguous stan-
dards of substantive and procedural due process.\textsuperscript{48}

B. Current Structure

Today each state’s Family Courts use their own terms of art and
follow their own rules.\textsuperscript{49} There is also wide disparity in how
Family Courts are organized and administered.\textsuperscript{50} In many states,
even localities have their own practices and lingo.\textsuperscript{51} These differ-
ences are very unclear from the information that is available to the
public.\textsuperscript{52} In fact, the only way the author was able to get the answer
to the simple question of whether unmarried parents file custody

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[47] REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE PRESENT DENIAL
OF JUSTICE TO THE POOR AND OF THE AGENCIES MAKING MORE EQUAL THEIR POSITION
BEFORE THE LAW WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO LEGAL AID WORK IN THE UNITED
STATES 75 (1919).
\item[48] The controversy over substantive and procedural due process in child-related
matters is beyond the scope of this article, but much has been written on the subject.
See, e.g., Jane M. Spinak, Reforming Family Court: Getting it Right Between Rhetoric and
\item[49] See Appendix, infra.
\item[50] See e.g., HALEMBA ET AL., supra note 39, at 3 (“There is wide diversity in the
jurisdictional inclusion of family courts, their operations, and the management struc-
ture within which they exist.”).
\item[51] For example, in the Richmond, Virginia Juvenile and Domestic Relations (JDR)
Courts, all petitions and motions are written on court forms, available online. In con-
trast, the bordering county of Henrico has an entirely different custody form, which
must be obtained in person. In Henrico any motions after the first petition must be
filed on Henrico’s own “Miscellaneous Motion,” also obtained at the courthouse. Un-
like JDR Courts in Central and Eastern Virginia, Fairfax County and Prince William
JDR in Northern Virginia use “Model Discovery.” The examples of varied practices
and terminology in Virginia JDR courts are endless.
\item[52] For example, the webpage for the Superior Court for Indianapolis, Indiana, says
that “[t]he Circuit and Superior Court exercise concurrent jurisdiction over all civil
issues[,]” and only notes that the Superior Court Civil Division handles “domestic
relations matters.” Circuit and Superior Courts of Marion County: Marion Superior Court,
Pages/Home.aspx [https://perma.cc/4R73-SBFA] (last visited Nov. 13, 2016). The
webpage for the Circuit Court specifies that it hears civil matters only. Circuit and
Superior Courts of Marion County, CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS & MARION CTY., http://www.indy.gov/eGov/Courts/Circuit/Pages/home.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z45C-
KN1Z] (last visited Nov. 25, 2016). Neither webpage notes a difference between mar-
trimonial or non-matrimonial matters.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
petitions in the same courthouse as married parents was by having a research assistant call clerks’ offices in every major city in every state of the country. The research assistant actually had to call two clerks’ offices in most states, one in the “general” trial court and one in the family/juvenile court or division. The results were that in nine states—Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Tennessee, and Virginia—non-matrimonial custody matters are separate from matrimonial matters. In these nine states, this means that either the non-matrimonial matters are heard in a separate division of the same level of court, or they are heard in a juvenile/family court with an entirely different jurisdictional mandate and court rules.

C. Common Themes

Family Courts are notoriously known as the “stepchildren” of the legal system. Family Courts share many physical commonalities: they are often in crowded, dilapidated buildings with a pervasive sense of chaos. They also have normative similarities. Courthouses are informal; forms, instead of formal pleadings, are used. There is also widespread use of non-legal professionals (social workers, psychologists) to “evaluate” and inform the court about families and children. Lastly, civil and criminal issues and consequences are intertwined within Family Courts.

53 For the results of these efforts, see Appendix, infra.
54 Id.
55 Again, in this article, the generic term “Family Court” refers to any court that hears dependency, delinquency, custody, paternity, CHINS/PINS, and other juvenile matters. Some of these “Family Courts” also hear cases involving divorce. But, as will be discussed in Part III infra, many “Family Courts” do not have jurisdiction over matrimonial matters.
57 Id. at 5 (“Family courts in most states conjure up overcrowded facilities lacking the veneer of civility, let alone majesty, whose chaotic site itself speaks volumes to the frequently downtrodden and almost always traumatized families that pass through them.”).
58 Matthew I. Fraidin, Decision-Making in Dependency Court: Heuristics, Cognitive Biases, and Accountability, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 913, 972 (2013) (“[T]he use of ‘form orders’ discourages reason-giving. These orders are primarily forms with check-boxes and fill-in-the-blank spaces. Where space is allowed for explanation and reason-giving, it is very limited.”).
59 See Hill, supra note 44, at 537-38.
60 For example, aside from juvenile justice, there are numerous examples of criminal and civil intersection in the domestic relations realm. Family protective orders, which are “civil,” are issued every day in family courts, but violations of them often
amount of literature has described these themes. 61

1. Litigants in Family Court

Family Court litigants are generally poor. 62 People of color make up a disproportionately high number of litigants in Family Court. 63 Many of these people are pro se. 64

In a survey conducted by the New York State Unified Court System, 84% of self-represented litigants in Family Court reported being people of color. 65 Significantly, only seven percent of the pro se litigants in the New York survey identified themselves as white, as compared to ninety-two percent that identified as African-American.

---

61 See, e.g., Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People’s Courts, 22 Geo. J. Poverty L. & Pol’y 473, 487 (2015) (footnotes omitted) (“Today there remain many variations among family courts in terms of organization and administration, there nonetheless exists a shared institutional history and culture among family courts. This includes a common origin and philosophy that manifest in three interrelated features: interventionism (e.g., use of social workers and mental health professionals to conduct evaluations of litigants), informalism (e.g., simplification of procedures and forms, and efforts to resolve disputes outside of the litigation process), and intersecting systems, including the enduring interrelationship of criminal and civil procedures in family courts.”).

62 In West Virginia in 2001, some estimate that 90-95% of family law litigants fell below the poverty level. Warren R. McGraw, Family Court System Awarded $1.3 Million Federal Grant to Help Families, W. Va. Law., Oct. 2001, at 8; see also Joy S. Rosenthal, An Argument for Joint Custody as an Option for all Family Court Mediation Program Participants, 11 N.Y. City L. Rev. 127, 132-33 (2007) (citing Office of the Deputy Chief Admin. Judge for Justice Initiatives, Self-Represented Litigants in the New York City Family Court and New York City Housing Court 3-4 (2005)) (“It is well documented that most people who appear in New York City’s Family Courts are poor people of color. According to the New York State Unified Court System’s Office of the Deputy Chief Administrative Judge for Justice Initiatives (DCAJHI), 84% of self-represented litigants in New York Family and Housing Courts are people of color, and 83% reported a household income of under $30,000 and 57% reported household income of under $20,000.”).

63 See Rosenthal, supra note 62, at 132 (explaining that a New York City Family Law study found that 84% of self-represented litigants in New York State Unified Courts are people of color).

64 Id.; see also Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 Fam. Ct. Rev. 36, 36 (2002) (footnotes omitted) (“The surge in pro se litigation, particularly in the family courts of every common law country, is reported in official reports and anecdotally by judges and court managers and in systematic studies.”); Gerald W. Hardcastle, Adversarialism and the Family Court: A Family Court Judge’s Perspective, 9 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol’y 57, 121, 121 n.152 (2005) (“The family court has invited the pro se litigant. The pro se litigant has accepted the invitation in droves.”).

65 Rosenthal, supra note 62, at 133.
can or Hispanic. This explains why, according to family court lore, while visiting a Philadelphia family court, a lawyer from Apartheid-era South Africa asked, “[w]here’s the white juvenile court?”

2. Exploding Dockets

Family Courts are also notorious for being overcrowded, underfunded, and understaffed, by both judges and support staff. Each year a higher proportion of civil cases across the country involve family problems. In the last few years, domestic relations cases alone made up between 25% and 30% of all state trial court filings. In 1995, the National Center for State Courts emphasized that domestic relations cases were the “largest and fastest-growing segment of state court civil caseloads.” In 2013, state trial courts heard approximately 5.2 million cases involving domestic rela-

66 Id. at 131 n.10.
67 This story was related to Martin Guggenheim, renowned family and child welfare scholar, by one of his colleagues, Bob Schwartz. Id. at 133-34. Professor Guggenheim repeated this story at CUNY School of Law’s 2003 Symposium. Symposium, The Rights of Parents With Children in Foster Care: Removals Arising from Economic Hardship and the Predicative Power of Race, 6 N.Y. City L. Rev. 61, 72-73 (2003) (“One cannot address the subject of children in foster care in the United States, and especially in New York City, without staring at a shocking truth of a system that a veritable Martian couldn’t help but recognize to be apartheid.”).
68 Rosenthal, supra note 62, at 134.
69 Ross, supra note 41, at 5.
70 See Hill, supra note 44, at 544 n.64 (“Family Court caseloads are growing faster than caseloads of other courts; caseloads tripled between 1980 and 2000.”).
tions.73 Judicial appointments lag behind.74 Referees (attorneys who are not judges) are used to preside over cases across the country.75 In other words, “[j]udges in such courts at best merely keep cases moving along.[76] For example, “[i]n Chicago, each judge hears sixty cases a day.”77 The average Brooklyn Family Court case receives “slightly over four minutes before a judge on the first appearance, and a little more than 11 minutes on subsequent appearances[…]”78 Across the country, because of lack of staffing and turnover, record keeping is described as “primitive” and disorganized.79 “Family courts in most states conjure up overcrowded facilities lacking the veneer of civility . . . .”80

3. Status and Reputation in the Legal Profession

As discussed above, most litigants in Family Court are pro se. If they have representation, it is court-appointed, but very few jurisdictions appoint lawyers for indigent parties on private family matters.81 Moreover, family law and court appointments are not areas

73 LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., 2013 STATE COURT CASELOADS, supra note 71, at 7.
74 See Rosenthal, supra note 62, at 131 (footnotes omitted) (“Although filings have increased steadily, the number of Family Court judges in New York City (47) has not changed since 1991.”).
75 See Hill, supra note 44, at 532 (“[In New York Family Court,] practices include officially sanctioned shortcuts like the ever-expanding use of court attorney referees to preside over cases . . . .”); id. at 532 n.12 (citing Merrill Sobie, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 121 (McKinney 2006)) (“The use of court-attorney referees to address exploding caseloads is not unique to the New York City Family Court. In part because of the legislature’s failure to authorize additional judges, family courts throughout the state have relied on these non-judicial employees.”).
76 Ross, supra note 41, at 11.
77 Id.
79 Ross, supra note 41, at 11.
80 Id. at 5; see also Hill, supra note 44, at 531 (“That the Family Court is ill-equipped to address the needs of the hundreds of thousands of cases handled therein is not news.”).
81 For example, in Virginia, parties in private civil custody matters are not entitled by statute or in practice to court-appointed lawyers if they are indigent. The only indigent parties who are entitled to court appointed lawyers for civil family matters in Virginia are non-custodial parents who are facing jail time as a result of failure to pay child support, and parents in termination of parental rights proceedings brought by the state. New York City is the only jurisdiction the author is aware of in which, by discretion (not statute), judges appoint counsel for indigent parents in private custody matters. However, in order to receive a court appointment, the party must be at
that elite law graduates pursue.\textsuperscript{82} Family Courts judges usually have limited prior judicial experience—appointment or election to Family Court is often the judge’s first judicial post.\textsuperscript{83} Family Courts are “viewed as the ‘despised, entry-level ‘kiddie court’ from which many judges wish to escape.”\textsuperscript{84} Many lawyers, judges, and legal scholars dismiss cases involving child custody “as having little theoretical legal significance.”\textsuperscript{85} This perception is not helped by the fact that, for various reasons,\textsuperscript{86} the rules of evidence and ethical boundaries are ignored in Family Court.\textsuperscript{87} As one Judge reports: “I try to make my courtroom informal. If I think it will help in reaching a settlement, I invite them to my office rather than staying in the courtroom.”\textsuperscript{88} Scholar and practitioner Leah Hill perfectly summarizes the experience of this author,\textsuperscript{89} and likely countless or below the federal poverty line. See Rosenthal, supra note 62, at 137 (footnote omitted) (“Most working people are not entitled to court-appointed assistance. Although some unions offer Legal Assistance Programs, free legal services for custody and visitation cases are virtually non-existent for others. Thus, a large income gap separates people who are eligible for a free, court-appointed attorney, and those who can afford to pay normal attorney’s fees, which, at $250-$500 per hour, could add up to $5,000 or $10,000 per case.”). See also generally Natalie Anne Knowlton et al., Inst. for the Advancement of the AM. Legal System, Cases without Counsel: Research on Experiences of Self-Representation in U.S. Family Court 2, 12-15 (2016), http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/cases_without_counsel_research_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/XF2R-KFT5] (“Self-represented litigants in family court largely desire legal assistance, advice, and representation but it is not an option for them due to the cost and having other financial priorities. Attorney services are out of reach, while free and reduced-cost services are not readily available to many who need assistance.”).

\textsuperscript{82} See generally David Wilkins et al., Urban Law School Graduates in Large Firms, 36 Sw. U. L. Rev. 433, 489-92 (2007).

\textsuperscript{83} David J. Lansner, Abolish the Family Court, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 637, 638 (2007) (“The Family Court is generally a place that people want to escape. Judges move from family court to supreme court and federal court, but almost never the other way.”).

\textsuperscript{84} Ross, supra note 41, at 5; see also Lansner, supra note 83, at 637 (“The Family Court was established as an ‘inferior court,’ and it has lived up (or down) to its classification.”).

\textsuperscript{85} Ross, supra note 41, at 4.

\textsuperscript{86} Many judges employ techniques that skirt traditional rules of evidence with good intentions, trying to accommodate and understand the needs of pro se litigants. But the lack of decorum and procedure also has negative consequences, some of which are discussed below, and some of which are beyond the scope of this article. In any event, the informality of Family Court is striking to any lawyer who practices in other civil and criminal courts.

\textsuperscript{87} See generally Jessica Dixon Weaver, Overstepping Ethical Boundaries? Limitations on State Efforts To Provide Access to Justice in Family Courts, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2706 (2014).


\textsuperscript{89} The author was a student attorney for Juvenile Rights Practice (JRP) of Legal
other lawyers and social workers who tread the waters of the New York City Family Court System each day:

The New York City Family court is a unique breeding ground for informal practices that perpetuate the appearance of impropriety and undermine litigants' faith in the court. In addition to the frenzied pace and unimaginable caseloads, the casual familiarity that inevitably develops among institutional players and the legacy of closed proceedings, have shaped the court into a world unlike any other.90

In many jurisdictions, family matters are heard on a lower “level” of court than other civil matters (for state-by-state jurisdictional differences see Appendix, infra). For example, in Virginia, custody and juvenile matters are heard on the same level of court as small claims and traffic tickets.91 But even in other states, such as New York, where Family Courts are on the same level as other trial courts, they are not given the same respect.92 The vivid words of Joy Rosenthal perfectly encapsulate the author’s daily experience in the five boroughs of New York City.93


91 While both Courts are technically “District” courts by name, they are wholly different entities. One is a “General District Court” while the other is a “Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court.” See Virginia’s Court System, VIRGINIA’S JUD. SYS., http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/home.html [https://perma.cc/U26K-JNNS] (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).

92 Rosenthal, supra note 62, at 130-31 (noting the differences between Supreme Court and Family Court in New York, discussing the discrepancy between the two courts, calling family court the “poor person’s court,” and noting that Family Court judges hear more cases than supreme court judges).

93 “New York City Family Court calendars are unbelievably congested. Nearly all litigants are told to come to court when the court opens at 9:30 A.M. They are not given specific appointments. It is not unusual for an attorney to appear on ten cases a day divided among different courtrooms on different floors of the courthouse. Nor is it unusual for judges to hear over 80 cases each day (sometimes just for administrative matters, sometimes for actual hearings). With calendars like that, judges must hear
III. DISCRETIONARY NATURE OF CUSTODY MATTERS

Child custody cases between private parties are known to be extraordinarily challenging for judges. There are a number of reasons for this. Child custody litigants are emotional and acrimonious. By the time they reach a trial, the parties have usually been battling over the most important issues of their lives for years. It is often said that “there are no winners in family court.” With a stranger making personal decisions for them, and with hurtful or embarrassing things inevitably aired in court, parties are unlikely to be completely happy. On the judge’s end, there is fundamental distrust of the parties. Judges do not feel that they can get an accurate depiction of the facts from anyone: “There is an almost knee-jerk reaction by the judges that parents cannot be trusted to provide the court with all the information necessary to reach the best resolution of disputes involving children.” Just as most lawyers shy away from family law, many judges are adverse to custody

whichever case is ready, meaning having all of the litigants, attorneys and witnesses present and prepared to appear. As a result, litigants often must wait hours for their case to be heard, even if their case is only on the calendar for return of service. . . . Both the Bronx and Manhattan courthouses are dilapidated, filthy and depressing. In the Bronx Family Court, for instance, litigants must often wait in line for hours to get into the building because the buildings’ elevators are routinely broken or being repaired. Often only one elevator is in use to carry roughly 3,000 people a day up to the court, where the courtrooms are on the 6th, 7th and 8th floors. If litigants are not present, their cases cannot be called. As a result, judges must adjourn cases, often for months at a time, delaying justice and litigants’ day in court. This all adds up to give the family courthouses the milieu of a welfare office rather than a representation of justice. Once inside the courtroom, cases are often rushed or adjourned, if they are heard at all. Cases may be adjourned for weeks or even months at a time, and litigants may be told to come back again and again. This is frustrating for those who have to work or have child-care responsibilities because they have to take a whole day off each time they must appear in court, and/or arrange for others to take care of their children. Parents have told me that they have used all of their vacation time for the year waiting in Family Court. One parent told me that she lost her job because of required Family Court appearances.” Id. at 135-36 (footnotes omitted).

94 “[J]udicial decision-making in these cases is viewed as extremely difficult . . . .” Hill, supra note 44, at 534; see also Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child Standard in American Jurisprudence, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 337, 373 (2008) (noting that the “best interest of the child” standard often does not give the judge any guidance for her ruling and therefore the judge’s decision making process is unbridled and subjective).

95 Hill, supra note 44, at 534.


97 Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 32, at 288.

98 Id.
cases. Indeed, the difficulty of custody cases was demonstrated in a 2005 Alabama custody ruling that had seven different opinions written by six judges.

A. Best Interest of the Child

In order to grapple with the exceedingly complicated issues of custody, in the mid-twentieth century states across the country developed “best interest of the child” (BIC) tests and incorporated them into statute. Every state now has a BIC statute. These statutes have been the subject of an enormous amount of literature. As described by Lidman and Hollingsworth:

[The best interest standard] was and still is a highly indeterminate test. It is often devoid of significant legislative guidelines and instead invites the court to explore the fullest range of the family’s prior history and philosophy of child-rearing. The courts become embroiled in the sifting and winnowing of a multitude of factors and are called upon to exercise exceedingly broad discretion on a case-by-case basis. At the same time this wide discretion has nearly exempted the trial court from appellate review. Many authors have argued cogently that the best interest standard should be revised.

Numerous scholars conclude that BIC statutes provide judges with little concrete guidance and force judges to make inherently bi-

100 Ex parte G.C., Jr., 924 So.2d 651 (Ala. 2005). Justice Parker, in his dissent, noted: “neither the applicable child-custody laws nor the relevant legal precedents appear to be particularly unclear or inconsistent. . . . After considerable reflection, I have concluded that the primary cause of the Court’s varied and often conflicting opinions in this case is disagreement over foundational issues that underlie the more visible custody issues.” Id. at 674 (Parker, J., dissenting). His dissent quite competently proceeds to set out those foundations.
102 McLaughlin, supra note 101, at 117, 117 n.19.
103 Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 32, at 289-90 (footnotes omitted).
104 June Carbone, Child Custody and the Best Interests of Children—A Review of From Father’s Property To Children’s Rights: The History of Child Custody in the United States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 721, 723 (1995) (book review) (“Even putting aside the possibility of judicial bias, judges lack a basis on which to evaluate the best interests of a particular child in the absence of guiding principles.”). For example, these are the factors Virginia’s statute lists, with no other guidance in how to use or rank them: “1. The age and physical and mental condition of the child, giving due consideration to the child’s changing developmental needs; 2. The age and physical and mental condition of each parent; 3. The relationship existing between each parent and each child, giving due consideration to the positive involvement with the child’s life, the ability to accurately assess and meet the emotional, intellectual and physical needs of the child; 4.
ased decisions.105

B. Unclear and Controversial Role of Guardians ad Litem

Because of the gravity and difficulty of making custody decisions, in the mid-twentieth century family courts and legislatures developed another “tool”: the guardian ad litem (“GAL”).106 Again, an enormous amount of literature has been written about the ambiguous and highly controversial role of the GAL in private child custody disputes,107 which is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that no consensus exists on either the duties of the guardian ad litem or the form of advocacy one should use.108 In

The needs of the child, giving due consideration to other important relationships of the child, including but not limited to siblings, peers and extended family members; 5. The role that each parent has played and will play in the future, in the upbringing and care of the child; 6. The propensity of each parent to actively support the child’s contact and relationship with the other parent, including whether a parent has unreasonably denied the other parent access to or visitation with the child; 7. The relative willingness and demonstrated ability of each parent to maintain a close and continuing relationship with the child, and the ability of each parent to cooperate in and resolve disputes regarding matters affecting the child; 8. The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of reasonable intelligence, understanding, age and experience to express such a preference; 9. Any history of family abuse as that term is defined in § 16.1-228 or sexual abuse. If the court finds such a history, the court may disregard the factors in subdivision 6; and 10. Such other factors as the court deems necessary and proper to the determination.” Va. Code Ann. § 20-124.3 (2012). For other critiques of the factor-based BIC approach, see, for example, Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1987); Linda Jellum, Parents Know Best: Revising Our Approach to Parental Custody Agreements, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 615 (2004); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 L. & Contemp. Probs. 226, 226-27 (1975).

105 Kohm, supra note 94, at 337 (quoting Martin Guggenheim, What’s Wrong With Children’s Rights 40 (2005)) (“The best interests standard necessarily invites the judge to rely on his or her own values and biases to decide the case in whatever way the judge thinks best. Even the most basic factors are left for the judge to figure out.”).


108 See, e.g., Jean Koh Peters, Representing Children in Child Protective Proceedings: Ethical and Practical Dimensions 40-41 (3rd ed. 2007) (“I had expected to find a discrete number of prevailing models on representing children and thought that I might be able to present sets of minority and majority views on how the role had spontaneously evolved in the different states as a result of the sudden requirement of guardians ad litem in CAPTA. In the end we could find no trends; not even two states matched in theory and practice.”); Barbara A. Atwood, Representing Children Who Can’t or Won’t Direct Counsel: Best Interests Lawyering or No Lawyer at All?, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 381,
some states a guardian *ad litem* is not even an attorney or advocate at all.\(^{109}\)

The guardian *ad litem* has been defined as any and all of the following: a court-appointed investigator who makes recommendations to the court about who should have custody; a lawyer who represents a child; an advocate for the “best interest” of the children; and a facilitator/mediator.\(^{110}\) The GAL is sometimes called the “eyes and ears of the court.”\(^{111}\) In some states, GALs are allowed to provide facts and opinions to the court without taking the witness stand or being subject to cross-examination.\(^{112}\) Consequently, everything they are asked to report to the court about their conversations with children and parents is hearsay. GALs serve “a quasi-judicial role . . . cloaked in judicial immunity.”\(^{111}\)

Because of this role, parents’ attorneys advise their clients to be cooperative with GALs, as GALs’ recommendations carry a tremendous amount of weight.\(^{114}\) But many scholars consider it paradoxical that the court appoints a GAL because of the court’s inherent distrust of parents (discussed above),\(^{115}\) yet then the GAL invariably gathers most of her “facts” and forms her opinions based on interviews with parents.\(^{116}\)

The GAL essentially serves as an expert witness without any expert qualifications and without having to be a witness. First of all,

---

\(^{109}\) See, e.g., *Conn. R. Sup. Ct. Fam.* § 25-62 (2016) (“Unless the judicial authority orders that another person be appointed guardian *ad litem*, a family relations counselor shall be designated as guardian *ad litem*. The guardian *ad litem* is not required to be an attorney.”); *Ohio Rev. Code Ann.* § 2151.281(H) (LexisNexis 2016) (“If the court appoints a person who is not an attorney admitted to the practice of law in this state to be a guardian *ad litem*, the court also may appoint an attorney admitted to the practice of law in this state to serve as counsel for the guardian *ad litem*.”).

\(^{110}\) *Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra* note 32, at 256.

\(^{111}\) *Id.* at 257.


\(^{113}\) *Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra* note 32, at 257.

\(^{114}\) *Id.* at 257-58 (“All attorneys will caution their clients to give *guardians *ad litem* the utmost cooperation because this person’s recommendation carries much weight with the court.”).

\(^{115}\) See notes 97-98 and accompanying text, *supra*.

\(^{116}\) In the Author’s experience representing hundreds of parents in child custody cases where GALs are appointed, the parents are the primary source of facts and witnesses for the guardian *ad litem*-investigator. Rarely does the guardian *ad litem*-investigator seek out witnesses or information sources other than those identified for them by the parents.
a GAL cannot be qualified as an “expert” because there is no such thing as a lay or attorney “expert” in custody cases.\textsuperscript{117} And unlike child custody evaluators, who are frequently psychologists,\textsuperscript{118} GALs are not required to possess any specific credentials.\textsuperscript{119} There is not even a consensus on the appropriate “training” for GALs.\textsuperscript{120} In most states, the way to get on the “list” for appointments is to attend a continuing education course,\textsuperscript{121} agree to accept assignments, and then continue accepting assignments.\textsuperscript{122} GALs become experts by default: “The more often a particular individual performs that role, the more likely that the trial court will rely on him [or her] as if he [or she] were an expert.”\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{117} See Heistand v. Heistand, 673 N.W.2d 541, 550 (Neb. 2004) (“Qualification cannot occur in guardian ad litem situations because no recognized area of general expertise with regard to ‘custody’ or ‘child placement’ exists.” (quoting Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 32, at 275)).


\textsuperscript{119} Ducote, supra note 107, at 111, 138 (noting that Guardians have no training requirements and that Guardians are the least trained about domestic violence of any actors in the civil justice system). See also Hollis R. Peterson, Comment, In Search of the Best Interests of the Child: The Efficacy of the Court Appointed Special Advocate Model of Guardian Ad Litem Representation, 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1083, 1083, 1083 n.4 (2006) (“Given the nature and importance of this role, it is disturbing that many guardians ad litem have very little training or education in children and families, receive little compensation for their work, and often are reported to provide substandard representation to their child clients.”).

\textsuperscript{120} Ducote, supra note 106, at 111-16 (describing the many states that formed oversight committees to evaluate Guardians and how their recommendations diverged).


\textsuperscript{122} This is the Author’s experience of “getting on the list” as a court appointed attorney in New York and Virginia, and has been reported to me by my colleagues in many other states.

IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE JURISDICTIONAL DIFFERENCES ON CUSTODY MATTERS

Because of the ambiguous and discretionary nature of child custody law and practice, what type of court decides a particular case truly makes a difference. This is not the same as saying it matters which judge you get. And this is not just because Family Courts have a different physical and cultural atmosphere, as described above, from other trial courts. There are statutory and common law differences between Family Courts and other trial courts. Two states, New York and Virginia, exemplify this.

A. New York

The contrasting cultures of New York Supreme Court and Family Court124 have been described above and in countless articles by scholars and practitioners over the past thirty-plus years.125 In fact, it has been almost twenty years since the revered Chief Justices of New York’s highest court, the Hon. Judith Kaye and the Hon. Jonathan Lippman, published a scathing report on the state of New York’s Family Court system and proposed vast improvements to Family Court, including streamlining all domestic relations matters.126 Under Chief Justice Kaye’s proposal, matrimonial matters would be heard in the same place as other family matters.127 But nothing has happened in those twenty years, despite repeated calls for reform.128

---

124 New York’s version of “circuit court” in other states is called Supreme Court. It is the trial-level court of general jurisdiction in the New York State Unified Court System. It is vested with unlimited civil and criminal jurisdiction. Despina Hartofilis & Kimberly McAdoo, Reply, Separate But Not Equal: A Call for the Merger of the New York State Family and Supreme Courts, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 657, 657 (2007).

125 See, e.g., id.; Hill, supra note 44; Caroline Kearney, Pedagogy in a Poor People’s Court: The First Year of a Child Support Clinic, 19 N.M. L. REV. 175 (1989).


127 Id. at 145, 147.

1. Different Rules & Procedure

First of all, as discussed in the introduction, the rules of New York Family Court and Supreme Court are different.\textsuperscript{129} This has been clearly stated and upheld by appellate courts.\textsuperscript{130} One major difference between these two courts is the lack of requirement of a preliminary conference in family court.\textsuperscript{131} Therefore, non-marital families have fewer opportunities for settlement of their custody issues, increasing the probability that a judge (with the help of other outside parties, discussed further below) will make the ultimate decisions about a family’s life.

There are also a number of other procedural differences. There are rarely depositions in New York family court,\textsuperscript{132} meaning all evidence is a surprise. Because there is no pre-trial opportunity to explore the evidence, it is more likely for traumatic and embarrassing things to be disclosed in open court.\textsuperscript{133} The lack of deposi-

\textsuperscript{129} Compare Uniform Civil Rules for the Supreme Court and the County Court, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 202.1-.71, with Uniform Rules for the Family Court, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 205.1-.86.

\textsuperscript{130} See Lansner, supra note 83, at 642, 642 n.21 (“These due process violations are compounded by the lack of effective appellate review. The appellate courts have made review largely meaningless, often ignoring pervasive violations of the Constitution, New York statutory and decision law, and rules of evidence as harmless error.”). For examples of appellate court case law on the role of law guardians, see Nancy S. Erikson, The Role of the Law Guardian in a Custody Case Involving Domestic Violence, 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 817, 824-25, nn.32-35 (2000).

\textsuperscript{131} See Erikson, supra note 130, at 821.

\textsuperscript{132} This assertion is based on the Author’s experience. Although discovery is permitted in New York Family Court custody proceedings, because the proceedings are designated special proceedings, discovery must be requested and the movant bears the burden of proving that “the requested discovery was necessary and that providing the requested discovery would not unduly delay [the] proceeding[.]” Bramble v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 4 N.Y.S.3d 238, 240 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015); accord In re Dominick R. v. Jean R., 2005 WL 1252573, *3 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Feb. 14, 2005) (“Custody proceedings brought pursuant to the Family Court Act are ‘special proceedings’ rather than ‘actions’ and, as such, are governed by Article 4 of the CPLR. Unlike CPLR 3102(b), which provides for ‘disclosure by stipulation or upon notice without leave of court,’ CPLR 408 specifically provides that ‘leave of court shall be required for disclosure’ in a special proceeding.”).

\textsuperscript{133} The embarrassment may be compounded by the fact that matters regarding juveniles are open to the public in N.Y. Family Court. See Alan Finder, Chief Judge in New York Tells Family Courts to Admit Public, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/19/nyregion/chief-judge-in-new-york-tells-family-courts-to-admit-public.html [https://perma.cc/TGU9-GLMJ]. But see William Glaberson, New York Family Courts Say Keep Out, Despite Order, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/18/nyregion/at-new-york-family-courts-rule-for-public-access-isn-heeded.html [https://perma.cc/ADP6-D62V]. Even if these proceedings were not open to the public, there are still judges, caseworkers, and witnesses present to hear family intimacies. See New York City Family Court Overview, NYCOURTS.GOV,
tions further decreases the likelihood of settlement for families.\textsuperscript{134} Written opinions are rare in Family Court,\textsuperscript{135} aside from those drafted on forms immediately following a hearing.\textsuperscript{136}

2. Use of Child’s Attorneys in New York Family Court

Another major difference is the appointment of “child’s attorneys” (the rough equivalent of GALs, and previously called “Law Guardians”) in New York Family Court, which does not occur in Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{137} Although the Family Court Act does not expressly mandate appointment of child’s attorneys in custody cases, judges in New York City assign them to every case.\textsuperscript{138} The author is not personally aware of the practices in Upstate New York;\textsuperscript{139} however, it is safe to assume that the child’s attorneys are appointed in custody cases with frequency. This is because child’s attorneys are present in almost every other case in New York Family Court\textsuperscript{140} and

\textsuperscript{134}Without discovery or depositions, the parties must resort to trial.


\textsuperscript{137}NY. Family Court Act section 241 states that “minors who are the subject of family court proceedings or appeals in proceedings originating in the family court should be represented by counsel of their own choosing or by assigned counsel.” N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 241 (McKinney 2010). As a practicing attorney in New York, the Author was called a “law guardian” for many years, but the terminology was changed to “child’s attorney” or “attorney for the child” in all statutes by a 2009 bill. Assemb. 7805, 2009 Leg., 232nd Sess. (N.Y. 2010). Prior court opinions and literature used the “law guardian” term, and the transition to the new terminology is still occurring in practice.

\textsuperscript{138}This assertion is based on the Author’s experience. The Children’s Law Center (“CLC”) in Brooklyn is contracted to take on custody cases in New York City. Legal Aid and Lawyers for Children also take some cases.

\textsuperscript{139}The author did take occasional cases in Nassau County Court, and this was the practice there, too.

\textsuperscript{140}See Nolfo v. Nolfo, 149 Misc.2d 634, 635 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (“Historically, law guardians are appointed in Family Court abuse and neglect proceedings where the rights of children in delinquency proceedings (Article 3), supervised proceedings (Article 7) and child protective proceedings (Article 10) are at issue. Proceedings to terminate parental rights under Social Services Law section 384-b, and to place children in protective custody under Family Court Act section 158 and to continue children in placement or commitment under Family Court Act section 249(a) all require the appointment of a law guardian to protect the interests of the subject children.”); \textit{see also In re Orlando F.}, 40 N.Y.2d 103, 112 (1976) (“Consequently, although no statute currently so provides, we hold that, in the absence of the most extraordinary of circumstances, at the moment difficult to conceptualize, the Family Court should direct the appointment of a Law Guardian in permanent neglect cases to protect and represent the rights and interests of the child in controversy.”).
can quickly be called to a case.\textsuperscript{141} Child’s attorneys’ offices are located inside New York Family courthouses.\textsuperscript{142}

This stands in stark contrast to Supreme Court, which is not subject to the Family Court Act.\textsuperscript{143} Child’s attorneys are also not part of the daily life in Supreme Court. In fact, courts have indicated that child’s attorneys are unnecessary in matrimonial actions.\textsuperscript{144} As one court concluded, “the appointment of law guardians in matrimonial actions is comparatively rare. Counsel cites but one reported case . . . in which a law guardian was appointed in a divorce action. . . . The court there found a clear danger to the children, which justified the appointment of a law guardian.”\textsuperscript{145}

To be clear, the author is not necessarily opposed to appointing law guardians in private custody matters. This author, a former law guardian,\textsuperscript{146} certainly endorses the appointment in child protective matters, using the New York standards of client-directed advocacy.\textsuperscript{147} But appointing law guardians in private custody matters is an entirely different substantive issue.\textsuperscript{148} In private custody matters, the state has not made any allegations against parents or intervened in family life against the will of the child and/or parents.\textsuperscript{149} In private custody matters, the parents retain legal custody and therefore decision-making power over their children. Child preferences regarding parents are analyzed differently and

\textsuperscript{141} This is again based on the Author’s experience. Note that CLC only represents children in custody cases.
\textsuperscript{142} This is true in all five boroughs of New York City and also in Westchester County, New York. In other parts of the country, the same is true: in Denver, Colorado, the Colorado Office of the Child’s representative is located at 1300 Broadway Street, which is the courthouse in Denver. This is also true in Salt Lake City, Utah (450 State St, Salt Lake City, UT 84114), as well as in Fayetteville, North Carolina (117 Dick Street Fayetteville, NC 28024).
\textsuperscript{143} Robert M. Elardo, Equal Protection Denied in New York to Some Family Law Litigants in Supreme Court: An Assigned Counsel Dilemma for the Courts, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1125, 1125-27 (2002) (noting that the Family Court Act does not apply in supreme court and therefore that the right to counsel in the Family Court Act for indigent parents is unavailable in supreme court).
\textsuperscript{144} Nolfi, 149 Misc. 2d at 635 (“Family Court Act section 249 does not mandate such an appointment in divorce actions in which a custody dispute is but one of the elements in controversy.”).
\textsuperscript{145} Id. at 636.
\textsuperscript{146} As noted, the Author was a law guardian in New York State from 2004-2006.
\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Rules of the Chief Judge}, N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs., tit. II, § 7.2(d)(2) (“If the child is capable of knowing, voluntary and considered judgment, the attorney for the child should be directed by the wishes of the child, even if the attorney for the child believes that what the child wants is not in the child’s best interests.”).
\textsuperscript{148} See Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 32, 293-94, 304-06.
\textsuperscript{149} Cf. id. at 293-94 (describing the state’s role in abuse and neglect proceedings).
given different weight than in child protective matters.\textsuperscript{150}

In any case, no matter what one’s position on the use of law guardians in private custody matters, the bottom line is that law guardians are regularly appointed in New York Family Court on custody matters, but not in Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{151} Why should unmarried parents and their children be treated differently than married ones?

3. Use of Court Ordered Investigations by ACS in Family Court

Another enormous difference between New York Family Court and Supreme Court is the use of court-ordered, non-forensic evaluations,\textsuperscript{152} which are done, in the case of New York City, by the state’s child protective agency.\textsuperscript{153} The Family Court Act, again, authorizes this.\textsuperscript{154} The practice is so common that it is explained to clients and the public on numerous law firm websites.\textsuperscript{155} The par-


\textsuperscript{151} See notes 137-145 and accompanying text, supra.

\textsuperscript{152} Non-forensic evaluations are those not done by a qualified “expert” such as a child custody evaluator. For details on child custody evaluators, see Alan M. Jaffe & Diana Mandeleew, Essentials of a Forensic Child Custody Evaluation, L. TRENDS & NEWS (Am. Bar Ass’n, Chicago, Ill.), Spring 2011, http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/law_trends_news_practice_area_e_newsletter_home/2011_spring/forensic_custody_evaluation.html [https://perma.cc/2WYP-BJRU].

\textsuperscript{153} See, e.g., Court Ordered Investigations in NY Family Court Cases, SPODEK LAW GROUP: LEGAL BLOG (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.spodeklawgroup.com/court-ordered-investigations-in-ny-family-court-cases [https://perma.cc/YM7D-24JF] (“In a litigated custody or visitation case, the parties are often subject to forensic investigations. These are mental health investigations of the parties to the litigation and their collateral contacts. In addition to the forensic reports, the parties might also be asked to submit to court ordered investigations (‘COI’) These are court ordered investigations of the parties, and their homes [sic] and can be done by the Administration for Children’s Services (‘ACS’), the Probation Department and other third party agencies that are affiliated with the New York Family Court system.”); Law & Mediation Office of Darren M. Shapiro, P.C., How Are Child Custody Cases Affected by Abuse and Neglect Claims?, LONG ISLAND FAM. L. & MEDIATION BLOG (May 31, 2014), http://www.longislandfamilylawandmediation.com/2014/05/31/child-custody-cases-affected-abuse-neglect-claims [https://perma.cc/RL77-3N5P] (“In a child custody or parenting time case, a referee or judge might ask Child Protective Services, for Long Island cases, or Administration for Children Services, for New York City to perform what is called a
ties are asked to consent to the investigation and allow the agency to report its findings to the court confidentially. The reports are delivered directly to the judge and made a part of the court file before the hearing on the merits of the case.

This practice is shockingly “problematic on a number of fronts[,]” particularly to anyone who has worked within the child welfare system and to any parent who has feared getting a visit from CPS. ACS is not a “neutral” investigator; its legal charge is to investigate abuse and neglect and “protect children.” Not only could ACS investigations in private child custody matters lead to unnecessary interventions, which have not come about by proper protocol, but this practice also implies fault and demonstrates lack of respect for Family Court litigants’ privacy. This is parallel to the cultural and physical atmosphere of Family Court, described in Section III, which gives Family Court litigants the impression that their family problems are not worthy of respect. Moreover, it is quite striking that, from the author’s experience, New York City Family Court judges are often highly dissatisfied with the investigations and services that ACS provides. For Family Court judges to turn around and use ACS as a reliable and trustworthy gatherer of “facts” in a private case is ironic and further reinforces the message that Family Court litigants are not worthy of respect.

Court Ordered Investigation. The investigation’s purpose is to determine whether the children involved in a child custody case are being exposed to abuse or neglect. What happens in the case is that a CPS or ACS worker will visit and speak with the children and the parents and make a report back to the court.

156 Hill, supra note 44, at 537 (citing Kesseler v. Kesseler, 10 N.Y.2d 445, 456 (1962)).
157 Id. at 539-40.
158 Id. at 540.
161 See Hill, supra note 44, at 540-41 (“To be sure, this atmosphere of suspicion is not lost on Family Court litigants who understand all too well the power of ACS to disrupt family life.”).
162 This experience is echoed by Leah Hill. Id. at 543 (“As a group, Family Court judges have an inside view of the deficiencies at ACS and many have voiced their frustration with the agency’s sometimes inept handling of cases in Family Court.”).
163 Id. at 543-44.
In Supreme Court there are no non-forensic evaluations. A Supreme Court judge can order a forensic evaluation, but that is vastly different. A forensic evaluator first has to be qualified as an expert. A forensic expert is also subject to rigorous cross-examination. "This two-tier system begs the question, why do we need non-expert investigations in Family Court?"

B. Virginia

1. JDR Is Not a Court of Record

In Virginia, there are also statutory and practical differences between custody cases heard in Circuit Court (matrimonial actions) versus in Juvenile and Domestic Relations ("JDR") Court (non-matrimonial actions). Interestingly, the Virginia Code provides the circuit court and JDR court with concurrent jurisdiction over custody disputes when the parents of the child are separated, but not divorced. This means that unmarried parents must always go to JDR, but married parents have a choice when they also intend to file a divorce. In the author’s experience, if a party has an attorney, that party is almost always advised to file their custody case in Circuit Court.

---

164 Id. at 546 ("[T]here isn’t a supreme court rule that parallels the Family Court rule governing court-ordered investigations.").


166 Testimony given by experts in matrimonial actions or proceedings is subject to the rules of evidence, which allow for cross-examination. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 690.12 ("The applicant shall be given an opportunity to call and cross-examine witnesses and to challenge, examine and controvert any adverse evidence.").

167 Hill, supra note 44, at 546.

168 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-244(a) (2003) ("[W]hen a suit for divorce has been filed in a circuit court, . . . the juvenile and domestic relations district courts shall be divested of the right to enter any further decrees or orders to determine custody, guardianship, visitation or support . . . and such matters shall be determined by the circuit court unless both parties agreed to a referral to the juvenile court.").
petition(s) concurrently with their divorce (when possible) so that they can have their whole case heard in Circuit Court.

Like family courts in New York, JDR courts in Virginia are subject to entirely different rules than Circuit Court. For example, discovery is only permitted in JDR court if a party makes a motion to a judge and shows “good cause.” Even if discovery is granted, JDR prohibits depositions. In reality, the author finds that JDR parties rarely utilize any of the tools of discovery, besides subpoenas ducès tecum. Moreover, there are no pre-trial settlement conferences in JDR, unlike in Circuit Court, and surprise witnesses are par for the course. A party is not even required to mail a copy of a witness subpoena to the opposing side.

Most shockingly to the author upon admittance to Virginia, JDR is not a court of record. Whatever happens in JDR can be appealed “de novo” to Circuit Court. A second trial subjects JDR litigants to one more layer of litigation and court intervention, and also requires them to prove their case, and air their troubles—twice. The numerous differences between courts of record and Circuit Court in Virginia are beyond the scope of this article. However, it is important to note that pro se parties rarely actually “appeal” their cases to Circuit Court because they either do not know it is an appeal of right, or they do not have the time or energy to do so.

2. Use of Guardians ad Litem

Another major difference is the use of guardians ad litem

170 VA. SUP. CT. R. 8:15(c).
171 Id. (“In all other proceedings, the court may, upon motion timely made and for good cause, enter such orders in aid of discovery and inspection of evidence as permitted under Part Four of the Rules, except that no depositions may be taken.”).
173 In practice, the author always does this, but it is not required. VA. SUP. CT. R. 8:13(e) (“This Rule does not apply to subpoenas for witnesses and subpoenas ducès tecum issued by attorneys in civil cases as authorized by Virginia Code §§ 8.01-407 and 16.1-265.”).
174 Statutes governing the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Courts are under Title 16.1, “Courts Not of Record.”
175 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-296(A) (2009) (“From any final order or judgment of the juvenile court affecting the rights or interests of any person coming within its jurisdiction, an appeal may be taken to the circuit court within 10 days from the entry of a final judgment, order or conviction and shall be heard de novo.”).
176 Based off of author’s experience and interviews.
In Virginia, guardians ad litem are statutorily obligated to investigate for the court and recommend what is in the child’s “best interest” in private custody cases. They are not subject to cross-examination. They may submit written reports prior to the hearing. In fact, appellate courts uphold and sanction the role of GAL as a virtual court employee with carte-blanche to investigate, It is the guardian ad litem who retains the ultimate responsibility and accountability to the court in carrying out his or her role in the manner required by the court, as well as the applicable statutory and judicial mandates. . . . [W]e find no error in the court’s order directing [parents] to permit the guardian ad litem and a member of his staff to visit their homes on an unannounced or announced basis, for the purposes stated in the court’s order.

Guardians ad litem are appointed by statute in JDR courts. In some JDR courts, GALs are appointed in every custody case. This is as opposed to Circuit Courts, where they are appointed infrequently. And just as in New York, GALs are usually present in JDR courthouses all day long (in private offices and attorney workrooms) and are immediately available for appointment. GALs do not have such a presence in Circuit courthouses, where the entire range of civil and adult criminal matters are heard each day.

The practice of appointing GALs in what are more likely cases where the litigants are poor is essentially codified in Virginia law. Virginia Code section 16.1-266(F) provides that the JDR court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the child in contested custody cases,

---

179 Id. at S-9, S-10.
181 Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-266(F) (2005) (“In all other cases which in the discretion of the court require counsel or a guardian ad litem, or both, to represent the child or children or the parent or guardian, discreet and competent attorneys-at-law may be appointed by the court. However, in cases where the custody of a child or children is the subject of controversy or requires determination and each of the parents or other persons claiming a right to custody is represented by counsel, the court shall not appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the child or children unless the court finds, at any stage in the proceedings in a specific case, that the interests of the child or children are not otherwise adequately represented.”).
182 This is consistent with the author’s experience, especially in the City of Richmond JDR Court.
183 This is consistent with the author’s experience. The author also conducted interviews with family law attorneys in Fairfax, Norfolk, and Clarke Counties (on file with the author), which confirmed this practice.
with the caveat that, if both sides are represented by counsel, the court
must first make a determination that the interests of the child are
“not otherwise adequately represented.” Therefore, if both parties
have counsel (in other words, financial means), the court has
to determine whether a GAL is necessary before appointing one.
The judge cannot automatically appoint a GAL as she would when
both parties are pro se.

Again, the debate over the appropriateness of the use of GALs
in private custody cases is beyond the scope of the article. How-
ever, it is well documented that GALs are tasked to, and do, make
judgments about families every day. These “subjective opinions
on the fitness of a parent” are often questionable, at best. The
reality is that subjective opinions about families are utilized much
more often in JDR than in Circuit Court in Virginia.

V. Conclusion

For various cultural and historical reasons, our country has an
extremely varied system for adjudicating matters of the family. As
only uncovered by dozens of calls to clerks’ offices, the system is
especially confusing regarding the differences between matrimon-
ial and non-matrimonial custody matters. These differences in
jurisdiction may not have started out as intentionally biased against
poor people of color, but the disparate impact is clear. Given the
highly subjective and controversial methods for deciding private
custody matters, adding one more layer of potentially biased judg-
ment is unfair to poor families of color. The “best interest” of a
child, however loose of a legal standard, is not different if the
child’s parents are married or not. All custody matters in every
state should be heard at the same level of state court.

185 Under Virginia law indigent parties in JDR court are entitled to have counsel
appointed only in cases brought by the state. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-266(D)(2)-(3)
(2005). However, there may also be persons who proceed pro se because they do not
meet the indigence threshold, see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-159 (2008), but are nonetheless
unable to afford private counsel. See note 81 and accompanying text, supra.
186 See, e.g., Lihman & Hollingsworth, supra note 32.
187 See, e.g., Jennifer Sumi Kim, A Father’s Race to Custody: An Argument for Multi-
(“The adjectives used to describe [Dad] (‘unassuming,’ ‘mild mannered’) and
[Mom] (‘pushy,’ ‘difficult’) are striking and of little relevancy in a custody case.”).
This is also the experience of the author with GALs and was recounted in interviews
with family law attorneys, on file with the author.
188 See notes 53-54 and accompanying text, supra, and Appendix, infra.
## APPENDIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>City contacted</th>
<th>Separate part of court for matrimonial v. non-matrimonial cases?</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The Domestic Relations Division of the Circuit Court hears matrimonial cases. The Family Court Division of the Circuit Court hears non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>Anchorage</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Superior Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases. Contested cases are heard by judges, while uncontested cases are heard by magistrates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Court Division of the Superior Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>Little Rock</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Domestic Relations Division of the Circuit Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Law Division of the Superior Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>Denver</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The Domestic Relations Division of the District Court hears matrimonial cases. The Juvenile Division of the District Court hears non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>Bridgeport</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The Family Division of the Superior Court hears matrimonial cases. The Family Support Magistrate Court hears non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>Wilmington</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>Jacksonville</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Division of the Circuit Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Division of the Superior Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>Honolulu</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>Boise</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The District Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Domestic Relations Division of the Circuit Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>Indianapolis</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The Superior Court hears matrimonial cases. The Circuit Court hears non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>Des Moines</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Civil Division of the District Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Matrimonial</td>
<td>Division/Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>Wichita</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Law Department of the District Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>Louisville</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Court Division of the Circuit Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Domestic Division of the Civil District Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>Portland</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Division of the District Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Division of the Circuit Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Springfield</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Probate and Family Court Department of the Trial Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>Grand Rapids</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Division of the Circuit Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>St. Cloud</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Court Division of the District Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>Jackson</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Chancery Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>Kansas City</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Court Division of the Circuit Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>Billings</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The District Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>Omaha</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Division of the District Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>Las Vegas</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Division of the District Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Division of the Circuit Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>Newark</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The Dissolution Section of the Family Division of the Superior Court hears matrimonial cases. The Non-Dissolution Section of the Family Division of the Superior Court hears non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>Albuquerque</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Court Division of the District Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>New York City</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The Supreme Court hears matrimonial cases. The Family Court hears non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>Charlotte</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Court Division of the District Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table of Court Divisions for Matrimonial and Non-Matrimonial Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Matrimonial</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>Fargo</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The District Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Columbus</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The Domestic Relations Division of the Court of Common Pleas hears matrimonial cases. The Juvenile Division of the Court of Common Pleas hears non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>Oklahoma City</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Court Division of the District Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases. The Family Court Division of the Circuit Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Portland</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Court Division of the District Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases. The Family Court Division of the Circuit Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Domestic Relations Branch of the Family Division of the Court of Common Pleas hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>Providence</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Domestic Relations Division of the Family Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>Charleston</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>Sioux Falls</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Circuit Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>Memphis</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Both the Circuit Court and Chancery Court hear matrimonial cases. The Juvenile Court hears non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Court Division of the District Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>Salt Lake City</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The District Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>Burlington</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Division of the Superior Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>Virginia Beach</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The Circuit Court hears matrimonial cases. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court hears non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Court Division of the Superior Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>Charleston</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Family Court Division of the Circuit Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>Cheyenne</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The District Court hears both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AFTERWORD

Matthew L. Fraidin†

That family defense lawyering has reached a stage of maturity at which it can be “reimagined,” is, well, hard to imagine. Our day together at CUNY School of Law, and this extraordinary volume, represent a vision of the future of family defense. The Symposium and the collection of articles in this volume give but a hint of the ever-growing strength and vitality of lawyers’ commitment to seeking justice for families.

Over the course of the day, more than one hundred attendees heard from more than a dozen speakers. Speakers included academics, practicing lawyers, and parents previously entangled in child welfare who now advocate for change. To fully appreciate the vision of the future conveyed by Symposium participants and the authors represented in this volume, we must look to the past to understand our trajectory and to the present for context. We see that clinical legal education, legal services, legal scholarship, policy, and activism all are covered in family defense fingerprints. Nowadays, no credible conversation can be had, in any realm of child welfare, without a family defense lawyer in the room. More and more, the needle is moved throughout child welfare by our respect for parents and families, and our insistence on justice.

In perhaps the clearest signal of a sea change in the field of family defense, CUNY’s was but one of two symposia centered on family defense held in the same city in the same week, NYU School of Law having celebrated just the day before its Family Defense Clinic’s 25th Anniversary Celebration Symposium.1 Two separate symposia convened on the subject of parent representation. Enough scholars with something to say about family defense to fill two days’ worth of panels and events, hosted by two law schools renowned nationwide for their cutting-edge clinical education programs and pursuit of justice.

Indeed, developments in clinical legal education with respect to family defense have been instrumental in the development of

† Professor of Law, University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law (UDC-DCSL). Thanks to the CUNY Law Review staff for convening the Symposium, and for excellent editorial assistance.

the field and augur well for the future. Establishment in 1991 of
NYU’s Family Defense Clinic was followed up by the University of
the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law—17 years
later. Since 2008, however, family defense practices have
mushroomed throughout the world of clinical legal education.
This volume alone includes important work by Professor Kara
Finck of the University of Pennsylvania and Professor Amy Mulzer
of Brooklyn Law School. Professor Mulzer’s co-author, Tara Urs,
previously served as a law professor and has published several im-
portant pieces in our field. In recent years, representation of par-
ents in child welfare cases has become an important component of
law clinics at the University of Michigan Law School, Howard Law
School, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, and the University of Illi-
nois College of Law. We are more than a handful (yes, in every
sense of the term), and our ranks are growing.

Our law schools produce family defense civil rights lawyers: en-
ergetic, creative, and fierce warriors who admire their clients’
strengths and who know that justice is their clients’ due. The new
lawyers minted in these clinical programs understand that some-
thing big can be brewed in family court and that family defense
provides an important pathway for change. Change can be made in
our courtrooms, and justice pursued. New York City alone is home
to three institutional providers with city contracts to serve family
defense clients. The Bronx Defenders, Brooklyn Defender Ser-
dices, and Center for Family Representation are populated by rav-
enously justice-hungry family defense lawyers, whose fervent
advocacy honors the vital nature of this practice. Many of those
lawyers participated in the Symposium and a number are repre-
sented in this volume. Now, in addition to filling criminal defense
courtrooms and pursuing racial and economic justice in education
and through prison reform, servants of justice seek in Family
Court—that most-reviled of venues, long-despised by judges and
lawyers alike—opportunities to make change.

Law graduates looking to family defense as a route to creating
lasting social change now can find a home in the American Bar

---

2 Katherine S. Broderick, The Nation’s Urban Land-Grant Law School: Ensuring Jus-


Association’s National Alliance for Parent Representation. Celebrating its 10th anniversary in 2016, the Alliance is a safe harbor for lawyers across the country who have long known, individually, that too many families were being broken and too many children destroyed, too many communities ravaged and too-little justice done in dependency courtrooms. Our colleagues and friends nationally long have labored for little pay and with even less respect. The louder their cries about the emperors’ nakedness, the more hostile the reaction.

Lawyers across the country who need the favor of trial judges to secure appointment to cases risk their very livelihoods by insisting that judges follow the law. They risk their livelihoods by insisting that their clients are three-dimensional humans, not inhabitants of the crass racist stereotypes assigned to them. Lawyers risk their livelihoods by asking for even a few moments to read court documents before responding, or a few moments to meet—let alone to counsel—their clients before helping their clients make the most important decisions of their lives. Our colleagues and friends are demeaned and derided for putting the government to its paces: how many times have we been scolded, in the very words rejected by the Supreme Court in In Re Gault, that these are not adversarial proceedings even though it sure felt adversarial when they took our client’s children?

The ABA Alliance is the hub of a movement to turn the tide. It is a cozy clubhouse for family defense lawyers—small, but ever-expanding. We have a national listserv with hundreds of members, and we send emails asking each other questions and sharing stories of outrages and triumphs. Under the Alliance’s auspices, we gather for national conferences every two years. The Alliance sponsors trainings and influences policy nationwide. The Alliance supports lawyers in states where we are still mistreated and disrespected—in

---


7 See CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA NATIONAL PROJECT TO IMPROVE REPRESENTATION FOR PARENTS (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/child_law/ParentRep/At-a-glance%20final.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RSE-A7[C].

8 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967) (“[T]he child was to be ‘treated’ and ‘rehabilitated’ and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be ‘clinical’ rather than punitive. These results were to be achieved, without coming to conceptual and constitutional grief, by insisting that the proceedings were not adversary, but that the state was proceeding as parens patriae.”). Gault concerned juvenile delinquency proceedings.
other words, just about everywhere—and shines a light on states who remain, in this day and age, still uncommitted to even appointing a lawyer for a parent faced with the permanent loss of her child.9 When we are disoriented and fatigued from—as Professor Martin Guggenheim put it in his 2006 keynote address at the first ABA parent conference—"being polite to people who do despicable things" to our clients and their children, the ABA Alliance helps us find each other.

Our role in seeking justice has not escaped the notice of the National Coalition for Child Protection Reform (NCCPR).10 Directed by a non-lawyer, the organization’s child-protection platform is built, perhaps improbably, on due process planks. In NCCPR’s “Due Process Agenda,” three of its “child protection” recommendations focus on the irreplaceable value of lawyers.11

In contrast to the D.C. City Council member who once told me that lawyers have ruined child welfare, NCCPR argues that “[q]uality legal representation must be available to all parents who must face CPS.”12 NCCPR agrees with us that lawyers should be appointed and start working as soon as a child is removed from a parent’s care, and that all lawyers should act like lawyers, instead of pretending, in the guise of law guardians and guardians ad litem, that we can guess at a child’s best interests.13 It is a new world when lawyers infiltrate child protection advocacy and are seen for the indispensable cleansing agents that we truly are.


9 See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-201(2) (2016) (“If the court determines that a parent or guardian who is a party in an abuse, neglect or termination of parental rights proceeding is indigent, the youth court judge may appoint counsel to represent the indigent parent or guardian in the proceeding.”) (emphasis added); Joni B. v. State, 549 N.W.2d 411, 417-18 (Wis. 1996) (“[A] circuit court should only appoint counsel after concluding that either the efficient administration of justice warrants it or that due process considerations outweigh the presumption against such an appointment.”).


12 Id. at 5.

Cases: Advice and Guidance for Family Defenders. But it’s not just a book. It is a user’s guide, a practice manual for family defense lawyers. What could be duller than a “how-to-lawyer” book? What could be less-exotic or more mundane than yet another practitioner’s guide, with chapters and sections and sub-sections? The book is a veritable connect-the-dots collection of best practices. But in its mundanity, our book is everything. Most importantly, our standard-issue practice manual means that there is an audience. That there are lawyers who want to read the book. It means that there is a large-and-getting-larger community of lawyers who are a credible force for justice and change.

We have been out in the cold rain and snow for many years, underpaid and overburdened, victimized by case-appointments practices that deprive us of dignity and which seek to deprive our clients of humanity. Now we send a signal that we are real, that We Cannot Be Messed With. This is a field we love. This is where we want to be. The book serves notice to prosecutors, to judges, to other lawyers, to our clients, and even to ourselves, that far from “ruining” child welfare, we plan to fix it.

As family defense lawyers, we still face degradation and obstacles which pale only in comparison to those faced by our clients. Our clients are no-less-reviled than ever; the fuel of the “foster care-industrial complex,” to use NCCPR’s memorable phrase, remains poverty and racism. In this volume, Mulzer and Urs’s indictment is succinct:

By now, it is well known that the child welfare system disproportionately touches the lives of families of color, particularly Black and Native American families. The child welfare system separates more children of color from their families and communities, keeps them separated for longer periods of time, and more often permanently ends those families by terminating disproportionately more of their legal relationships. It is also well cata-

14 REPRESENTING PARENTS IN CHILD WELFARE CASES: ADVICE AND GUIDANCE FOR FAMILY DEFENDERS (Martin Guggenheim & Vivek S. Sankaran eds., 2015).
ologed that, even more than race and Tribal affiliation, poverty is the single greatest predictor of a child welfare case. The child welfare system is fully focused on the lives of poor families, and especially focused on poor families of color. The flip side is that families with financial means and white families are far more likely to be left alone by the system despite experiencing the very same concerns that lead to child welfare intervention for low-income families of color, such as mental illness, alcoholism, recreational or habitual drug use, or domestic violence. People of means are less likely to be touched by the system or to know people touched by the system.  

Subjugation remains the fundamental characteristic of child welfare. There is much work to do.

But in some states, we have slowed the rates of child-removals. We continue to fight against the Adoption and Safe Families Act’s reckless, oppressive destruction of children, families, and communities. And yes, we publish law review articles and we gather for conferences and symposia. We have a listserv. We have that practice manual now, just like housing lawyers and bankruptcy lawyers and antitrust lawyers. There are jazzed-up lawyers across the country reading the book voraciously in unstinting effort to be better, run further, jump higher. Students dive into family defense in law school clinics, and, truly against all odds, see family defense as an inviting career choice. CUNY School of Law, with its grand legacy of service and justice-seeking, gathered us together for a day of celebration and to look to the future. That is a big deal.

But as we reflect on the past, cheer our progress, and charge ahead into the future, we must assess the present with hard heads and clear eyes. We see promise and see also that challenges remain.

Perhaps the most revealing and important depiction of the current state of child welfare law and practice can be found by see-
ing through the eyes of judges. These, after all, are the decision-makers in our clients’ lives. It is the judges who hear our clients or don’t. It is judges who apply law capriciously or fairly, whose actions vindicate or degrade the Constitution, who resist or are captured by stereotypes of the low-income women of color who disproportionately are entangled by governmental interventions.  

Are judges keeping up with the changing culture being built—surely, if slowly—by family defense lawyers allied with their clients?

Some of the evidence is positive. Only two months after the Symposium, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (NCJFCJ) promulgated new “Enhanced Resource Guidelines” for use in child welfare court practice. Although a mixed bag, there is much to applaud in the Guidelines, which convey the NCJFCJ’s most-current statement of goals, priorities, and recommended practices.  

On one hand, the “Key Principles” of these Guidelines are fundamentally flawed, arguing that judging in “juvenile and family court is specialized and complex, going beyond the traditional role of the judge. Juvenile court judges, as the gatekeepers to the foster care system and guardians of the original problem-solving court, must engage families, professionals, organizations, and communities to effectively support child safety, permanency, and well-being.”

Our experience as lawyers suggests to the contrary, namely that the best decisions can be made by judges who fulfill the traditional role of judges: hear evidence, find facts, apply the law—including by ordering social work agencies to fulfill their roles and holding them in contempt when they fail to do so. In addition, the Guidelines are far too sanguine about the purported benefits of “best interest” guardians ad litem and Court-Appointed Special Advocates.

Instead, our experience tells us that children and families would be best served by a genuine adversarial system, not the quarter- and half-measures that have long been the mark of family

20 MILLER & ESSENSTAD, supra note 16, at 15-17 (highlighting the need for comprehensive and multifaceted efforts to address racial disparities in the child welfare system, including by engaging judges).


22 Id. at 14 (emphasis added).

23 Id. at 43.
courts. In *Ambivalence About Parenting* in this volume, Lisa Beneventano and Colleen Manwell point out that:

Focusing on . . . standards and rules can be especially helpful in defending a case centered around expressions of ambivalence, where no actual harm or injury to the child is alleged. In cases based solely on a parent’s expression of parental ambivalence, the child protective agency is often missing an essential element of their case: proof the child faced actual harm or imminent risk of harm.  

Would that Beneventano and Manwell’s lament about the lawlessness of child welfare proceedings were an isolated phenomenon, limited to the consideration by judges and case workers of expressions of parental ambivalence. But we have heard countless warnings and complaints about the pervasive deviation in child welfare from the ordinary guideposts of procedural regularity, such as hearings closed to the press and public, underpaid lawyers, overburdened judges, lack of rules of evidence, lawyers and CASAs who purport to know what is “best” for a child—and judges who undertake activities, such as engaging families, professionals, organizations, and communities, that are outside their competence.

Nonetheless, the NCJFCJ has long supported process-oriented positions on some issues—they have supported open courts for many years, for example. And fundamental to these Guidelines are pervasive strands of thought that are consistent with important principles of our work as lawyers for parents. If implemented widely, the Guidelines will minimize the harm inflicted on children and families by the administration of justice.

For example, the Guidelines recognize that, “[j]udicial determinations to remove children from a parent should only be made based on legally sufficient evidence that a child cannot be safe at

---


26 The NCJFCJ issued a 2005 resolution urging that “our nation’s juvenile and family courts be open to the public except when the juvenile or family court judge determines that the hearing should be closed in order to serve the best interests of the child and/or family members.” NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF PRESUMPTIVELY OPEN HEARINGS WITH DISCRETION OF COURTS TO CLOSE 1 para. 7 (2005), http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/resolution%2520no.%25209%2520open%2520hearings.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AFT-JBBL].
And, further, it recognizes that “[j]udges are responsible for ensuring that parties, including each parent, are vigorously represented by well-trained, culturally responsive, and adequately compensated attorneys...”

Moreover, in a chapter titled “Access to Competent Representation,” the Guidelines insist that:

Because critically important decisions will be made at the very first hearing, parents should be represented by counsel as early in the process as possible. Few parents will be able to afford to hire an attorney on their own. The court should work with counsel who practice before the juvenile and family court to develop a system for appointment sufficiently in advance of the preliminary protective hearing to permit meaningful consultation and preparation.

The Guidelines say that the “nucleus” of the document itself are “benchcards” for use prior to and during every child welfare hearing. The rigor and routine imposed by benchcards can promote a constructive predictability. And a stunning innovation, with potentially dramatic significance, is that every benchcard includes a recommendation for pre-hearing preparation techniques designed to promote internal reflection to prevent bias:

As a measure of recommended practice, to protect against any institutional or implicit bias in decision-making, judges should make a habit of asking themselves:

- What assumptions have I made about the cultural identity, genders, and background of this family?
- What is my understanding of this family’s unique culture and circumstances?
- How is my decision specific to this child and this family?
- How has the court’s past contact and involvement with this family influenced (or how might it influence) my decision-making process and findings?
- What evidence has supported every conclusion I have drawn, and how have I challenged unsupported assumptions?
- Am I convinced that reasonable efforts (or active efforts in ICWA cases) have been made in an individualized way to match the needs of the family?
- Am I considering relatives as a preferred placement option as long as they can protect the child and support the

27 GATOWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 14.
28 Id. at 16.
29 Id. at 42.
30 See id. at 20.
The Guidelines’ recognition that judges, like all of us, can be prisoners of our implicit biases, is especially important because of the same Guidelines’ unfortunate doubling-down in the “Key Principles” and throughout on a vision of family court in which judges engage in so many non-judging tasks. When judges do more and less than simply apply the law—when they call social workers on the telephone to urge referrals, or contact housing providers to check on a litigant’s housing prospects, or advocate with a drug treatment provider to find a bed for a litigant—they are doing so with big hearts and the very best of intentions. But those activities diminish the already-limited role that law plays in family court proceedings and erode the quality of information on the basis of which family court decisions are made.

As Beneventano and Manwell point out, and as we have seen again and again, the less constrained judges and other humans are by law and process, the more that stereotypes and biases can creep in. When judges learn about cases via ex parte phone calls, “trainings,” and without rules of evidence, the information generated is less-reliable than that generated the old-fashioned way. There is a reason that we still, in law school, repeat the hoary maxim that cross-examination is the greatest legal engine for truth ever invented.

Unreliable information and limited information are canvases on which assumptions, guesses, and implicit biases find a home. For that reason, the benchcards’ express recommendations for methods judges can use to combat bias are a very welcome and very promising development.

We can find, then, in the past decades, unmistakable signs of progress. But challenges and outrages remain. On the front end of the child welfare system, the Constitution is flouted by the removal of thousands of children not in danger, churned in and out of foster care, removed for a few days and then returned home as if, like furniture moved from one room to another, no harm was done.

And on the back end, thousands of termination proceedings pro-

---

31 Id. at 67.
32 See generally id. at 14-17.
33 Beneventano & Manwell, supra note 24, at 160-64 (in this volume).
34 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (James H. Chadbourne et al. eds., rev. 1974).

In this context, it is of no small moment that NCJFCJ cogently has articulated commitments to fundamental principles and practices that create possibilities for change. As family defense lawyers, it is our privilege and responsibility to work hand-in-hand with our clients to leverage those commitments.

The Symposium was an occasion to imagine a future. And as Professor Delgado tells us, we build the future we imagine: “We participate in creating what we see in the very act of describing it.”\footnote{Richard Delgado, *Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative*, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2411, 2416 (1989).} The very convening of this Symposium signals that the newly-imagined future, so brilliantly-described in the pages of this volume, will be one in which family defense lawyers play an important role in ensuring that our courts live up to their promises.