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Filling Federal Court Vacancies in a Presidential Election Year

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FILLING FEDERAL COURT VACANCIES IN A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEAR

Carl Tobias *

Scholars and politicians who closely track the federal judicial selection process appreciate that confirmations slow and ultimately halt over presidential election years, a phenomenon which has greater salience in a chief executive's last administration. That policy comprises numerous strands. Important are the conventions—which have permitted the approval of many superb, uncontroversial district court nominees routinely through the fall of most presidential election years and in certain lame duck sessions—while allowing a number of capable, mainstream appellate nominees to manage consideration until the August Recess. The traditions derive from respect for voters' preferences expressed in the elections, the incoming chief executive, who should have the opportunity to fill vacant judicial posts, and new senators, who must discharge their constitutional responsibility to provide advice and consent on selections.

Nevertheless, GOP members have not always followed these customs and other venerable conventions throughout President Barack Obama's years. For instance, Republicans automatically hold over Judiciary Committee votes on able, moderate candidates for a week, and the GOP leadership denied talented, centrist appeals court nominees' final ballots after mid-June 2012. Ever since winning the upper chamber in November 2014, Republicans have incessantly promised to duly effectuate "regular order" again.¹ However, the Senate confirmed merely eleven jurists in 2015, which is the fewest since Dwight Eisenhower was Presi-

* Williams Chair in Law, University of Richmond School of Law. Thanks to Peggy Sanner and Katie Lehnen for fine ideas, Leslee Stone for excellent processing as well as Russell Williams and the Hunton Williams Summer Endowment Fund for generous, continuing support. The data in this piece were current when the piece went to print on April 25, 2016. Remaining errors are mine.

1. See *infra* Part I.B.

dent.² Because the United States in fact confronts seventy-four openings (thirty-two “judicial emergencies”), which plainly undermine the delivery of justice, and the GOP will keep stalling and ignoring customs applied over presidential election years, 2016 court appointments merit scrutiny.

The first section of this article canvasses selection in Obama’s tenure, ascertaining that Republicans cooperated little and contravened numerous traditions, especially after the party captured a majority. Thus, section two analyzes why the GOP did not collaborate and the consequences. Because that obstruction—which undercuts justice and regard for the coequal branches of government—will actually continue across 2016, the piece surveys devices, which could rectify or ameliorate those critical impacts this presidential election year.

I. JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

A. *The First Six Years*

Selection proceeded well Obama’s first term and a half when Democrats controlled the Senate, particularly in contrast to 2015. He aggressively consulted home state politicians, seeking their guidance and requesting proposals of fine, mainstream candidates, advice which Obama usually followed.³ These endeavors promote cooperation, as senators defer to colleagues in jurisdictions with vacancies because of mutual respect, and they can and do halt processing by not returning blue slips—a tradition which permits consideration to advance. Despite solicitous, persistent White House cultivation of all lawmakers, many failed to coordinate, slowly adopting processes or submitting prospects, while some have not even tendered picks.⁴

2. Jennifer Bendery, *Congratulations, GOP. You’re Confirming Judges at the Slowest Rate in 60 Years*, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/obama-judicial-nominations_55faced7e4b08820d9178a5c.

3. Carl Tobias, *Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection*, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2233, 2239–40 (2013) [hereinafter Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*]; see Sheldon Goldman et al., *Obama’s First Term Judiciary: Picking Judges in the Minefields of Obstructionism*, 97 JUDICATURE 7, 13–16 (2013).

4. Goldman et al., *supra* note 3, at 17; John Cornyn and Ted Cruz’s *Texas: A State of Judicial Emergency*, ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, <http://www.afj.org/our-work/issues/judicial-selection/texas-epicenter-of-the-judicial-vacancy-crisis> (last visited Apr. 15, 2016); see also

Republicans cooperating with the arranging committee every three weeks, nominations and effectively. However, the GOP committee votes one way 350 excellent, moderate

Republicans slow-bates, if warranted consensus selection petitioned for cloture and numerous debates or, uncontroversial agreement without opposition Senate floor time.⁸ meant openings re-decade following A-ed.⁹

In the 2012 presidential election and increased.¹¹ discussions and ballots records, and mandated controversial designees while pellate votes cease

161 CONG. REC. S6151 (daily)

5. Goldman et al., *supra* note 3, at 2242–43.

6. It found most fine fifteen were for the Arizona District of Arizona Vacancies, Arizona Vacancies].

7. Goldman et al., *supra* note 3, at 2243–46.

8. Tobias, *Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Logjam*, THE HILL (2013) (http://www.thehill.com/policy/obama/249196-juan-williams-judicial-confirmations).

9. U.S. COURTS, ARCHIVE (2013), <http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-nominations> (accompanying text).

10. Tobias, *Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Logjam*, *supra* note 8, at 24 and accompanying text.

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Republicans cooperated with the Democratic majority in swiftly arranging committee hearings at which five nominees testified every three weeks, carefully questioning them in the panel sessions and effectively posing later written queries when indicated.⁵ However, the GOP automatically held over discussions and committee votes one week for all choices recommended but fifteen of 350 excellent, moderate nominees.⁶

Republicans slowly agreed to most possibilities' chamber debates, if warranted, and yes or no ballots, requiring exceptional, consensus selections to languish across months until Democrats petitioned for cloture.⁷ Republicans also demanded roll call votes and numerous debate minutes yet used virtually none for superior, uncontroversial prospects, many of whom captured appointment without opposition, thereby needlessly consuming precious Senate floor time.⁸ Those procedures stalled confirmations and meant openings remained close to ninety for much of the half decade following August 2009, numbers that were unprecedented.⁹

In the 2012 presidential election year, these strategies continued and increased.¹⁰ The GOP regularly held over committee discussions and ballots for one week, rejected prompt floor vote records, and mandated roll call ballots for accomplished, noncontroversial designees who easily secured confirmation, while final appellate votes ceased in mid-June.¹¹ With Obama's re-election,

161 CONG. REC. S6151 (daily ed. July 30, 2015) (statement of Sen. Schumer).

5. Goldman et al., *supra* note 3, at 16–17; Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2242–43.

6. It found most fine. Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2242–43. Six of the fifteen were for the Arizona District that was an emergency. Carl Tobias, *Filling the District of Arizona Vacancies*, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. SYLLABUS 5, 5–6 (2014) [hereinafter Tobias, *Arizona Vacancies*].

7. Goldman et al., *supra* note 3, at 26–29; Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2243–46.

8. Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2244; see also Juan Williams, *The GOP's Judicial Logjam*, THE HILL (July 27, 2015, 6:00 AM), <http://thehill.com/opinion/juan-williams/249196-juan-williams-the-gops-judicial-logjam> (discussing Republican obstruction of judicial confirmations).

9. U.S. COURTS, ARCHIVE OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES (2009–14), <http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies>; see *infra* note 44 and accompanying text.

10. Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2246; *supra* notes 6–8 and accompanying text; *infra* note 24 and accompanying text.

11. Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2252.

Democrats hoped that Republicans would actually enhance collaboration, but they did not, and this recalcitrance culminated in June 2013 when he proffered three well qualified, mainstream, diverse recommendations for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the nation's second most important court.¹² The GOP refused each a floor ballot, and frustration with incessant obstruction provoked Democrats to cautiously exercise the "nuclear option," which limited filibusters.¹³ The measure's November 2013 implementation, which Republicans asserted violated tradition, enabled the 113th Congress to approve 134 jurists, including twenty-seven persons in the 2014 lame duck session.¹⁴ After that mechanism's explosion, Republicans forced Democrats to invoke cloture on all nominees until 2015.¹⁵

B. Selection in 2015

Once the GOP became the majority,¹⁶ this lack of cooperation persisted and eclipsed that when Republicans were the minority. The leadership has constantly said that it would dutifully restore the world's greatest deliberative body to regular order.¹⁷ Members duly recited this litany to describe reinstatement of the normal processes which ostensibly governed the chamber before Democrats subverted them. Early in January 2015, Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), the new Majority Leader, proclaimed: "We need to return

12. See Carl Tobias, *Filling the D.C. Circuit Vacancies*, 91 IND. L.J. 121 (2015); Jeffrey Toobin, *The Obama Brief*, NEW YORKER (Oct. 27, 2014), <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/27/obama-brief>.

13. Paul Kane, *Reid, Democrats Trigger 'Nuclear' Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters on Nominees*, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html.

14. U.S. COURTS, ARCHIVE OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES (2013-14), <http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicialvacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies>.

15. 161 CONG. REC. S3223 (daily ed. May 21, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy); Carl Tobias, *Judicial Selection in Congress' Lame Duck Session*, 90 IND. L.J. SUPP. 52, 56 (2015) [hereinafter Tobias, *Lame Duck Session*].

16. Jerry Markon et al., *Republicans Win Senate Control as Polls Show Dissatisfaction with Obama*, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-control-at-stake-in-todays-midterm-elections/2014/11/04/e882353e-642c-11e4-bb14-4cfea1e742d5_story.html; Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, *Riding Wave of Discontent, G.O.P. Takes Senate*, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2014), <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/05/us/politics/midterm-elections.html>.

17. See, e.g., 160 CONG. REC. S4679, S4681 (daily ed. July 22, 2014) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("It is past time to restore the Senate's rightful place in our constitutional order.").

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18. 161 CONG. REC. S3223 (daily ed. May 21, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy).

19. *Id.* at S155 (daily ed. May 18, 2015) (statement of Sen. Grassley); see also commentators have noted *Has the Senate Really Turned?*, WASH. POST (June 24, 2015), <http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/06/24/has-the-senate-really-turned/>.

20. See *Hearing on the Senate's Role in the 114th Congress* (Jan. 21, 2015), <http://www.uscourts.gov/recordings/2015/01/21/2015-01-21-114th-congress>; David Catanese, *Cloture*, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2015), <http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/01/21/cloture/>; 161 CONG. REC. S6151 (daily ed. July 22, 2014) (statement of Sen. Hatch).

21. Most Presidents *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 19.

22. Goldman et al., *supra* note 19.

23. U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL VACANCIES, www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicialvacancies; SENATORS OF THE 114TH CONGRESS (2015), www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicialvacancies.

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to regular order,”¹⁸ and he directly reiterated that phrase over subsequent months.¹⁹ Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), the Judiciary Committee Chair, propounded analogous views. Emblematic was his January 21 statement that the Committee would deploy regular order in assessing judicial nominees.²⁰ Despite many pledges, the GOP has failed to expeditiously offer suggestions for presidential review, committee hearings and ballots or chamber floor debates, when required, and final votes.

1. The District Court Process

a. The Nomination Process

Obama has continued to assiduously consult, seeking proposals from home state officers about well qualified, consensus picks, which he normally used by selecting them, as moderation and competence are Obama district possibilities' hallmarks.²¹ Notwithstanding his insistent cultivation of all legislators, many Republicans have declined to coordinate, slowly establishing procedures or forwarding candidates, and a few have chosen none.²² In early January 2016, thirty-six in forty-three (eight of nine appeals courts) openings lacking nominees and eighteen in twenty-one vacancies without them—which the U.S. Courts Administrative Office (“AO”) dutifully classifies emergencies—were in jurisdictions that at least one GOP senator represents.²³

18. 161 CONG. REC. S28 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2015).

19. *Id.* at S155 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 2015); *id.* at S2767 (daily ed. May 12, 2015). This approach has encountered some criticism from across the aisle. *See, e.g., id.* at S2949 (daily ed. May 18, 2015) (statement of Sen. Reid); *id.* at S3223 (statement of Sen. Leahy). Other commentators have noticed the decline in judicial confirmations as well. Jim Manley, *Has the Senate Really Turned a Corner?*, WALL ST. J., (June 24, 2015) <http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/06/24/has-the-senate-really-turned-a-corner/>.

20. *See Hearing on Judicial Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 114th Cong. (Jan. 21, 2015) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley) [hereinafter *Jan. 21 Hearing*]; David Catanese, *Chuck Grassley's Gavel Year*, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 28, 2015), <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/01/28/chuck-grassleys-gavel-year> (stating Grassley's desire to maintain traditional protocol for nominations). *But see* 161 CONG. REC. S6151 (daily ed. July 30, 2015) (statement of Sen. Schumer).

21. Most Presidents tap able centrists. Goldman et al., *supra* note 3, at 15–17; Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2240.

22. Goldman et al., *supra* note 3, at 17; ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, *supra* note 4.

23. U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL VACANCIES: JUDICIAL EMERGENCIES (2015), <http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/judicial-emergencies>; U.S. SENATE, SENATORS OF THE 114TH CONGRESS (2015), <http://www.senate.gov/senators/contact>. The

The clearest example is Texas, which has the most U.S. openings, notwithstanding approval of three excellent, uncontroversial jurists by May 2015. In early January, it faced two circuit and seven district court vacancies, all lacking nominees with eight comprising emergencies, and for many of which the recommendation process had yet to begin or had stalled.²⁴ Texas is not alone. Most crucial were Pennsylvania's two empty Third Circuit seats and Western District openings in three of ten positions without nominees for multiple years,²⁵ while Georgia had two unfilled Eleventh Circuit slots and the Northern District had a third of posts vacant several years before politicians reached a "deal" with Obama to fill them.²⁶

b. The Confirmation Process

i. Judiciary Committee Hearings

Similar, but exacerbated, problems infect confirmations. Grassley set the first hearing on January 21, 2015, promising he would analyze strong, mainstream nominees under regular order.²⁷ The

AO, the administrative arm of the federal courts, premises emergencies on dockets' large magnitude and vacancies' protracted length. *Judicial Emergency Definition*, U.S. COURTS, <http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/judicial-emergencies/judicial-emergency-definition> (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).

24. ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, *supra* note 4; *accord*, 161 CONG. REC. S2104 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy). This derives from senators' slow responses to current vacancies and not foreseeing future ones, slow selection panel scrutiny, differences on picks among Democratic House members and between them and the senators and slow White House action. *But see* Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Nominates Six to Serve on the United States District Courts (Mar. 15, 2016), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/15/president-obama-nominates-six-serve-united-states-district-courts> (nominating five Texas District Court nominees); Sylvan Lane, *Senate Fills South Texas Judgeship; First Confirmation Since GOP Takeover*, DALL. MORNING NEWS: TRAIL BLAZERS BLOG (Apr. 13, 2015, 6:10 PM), <http://trailblazersblog.dallasnews.com/2015/04/senate-fills-south-texas-judgeship-first-confirmation-since-gop-takeover.html>.

25. U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL VACANCIES: CURRENT JUDICIAL VACANCIES (2015), <http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/current-judicial-vacancies>.

26. *Id.* (2011–14); *see* Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2261; Lauren French, *Lewis Opposes Boggs Nomination*, POLITICO (May 19, 2014), <http://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/john-lewis-michael-boggs-oppose-judge-nomination-georgia-106839>; Dan Malloy, *The Delegation Georgians in D.C.; Woodall Does Balancing Act in House GOP Post*, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 20, 2014, at 14A.

27. *See* Jennifer Jacobs, *Grassley's Checklist of Priorities*, DES MOINES REG. (Jan. 7, 2015), <http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2015/01/07/grassley-checklist-priorities-judiciary-committee/21394233>.

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Chair alleged the public should expect no "discernible difference" between how the panel operates with GOP rather than Democratic leadership, suggesting it would provide hearings every few weeks that Congress was in session, a policy ex-Chair Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) ably instituted the last three Congresses and Grassley, the Ranking Member over the 112th and 113th, helped effectuate.²⁸ Disparities rapidly materialized, however. For instance, the next hearing occurred *seven* weeks after the first and the third *eight* weeks later, while the fourth and fifth came in June and July with the latest on September 30, October 21, and December 9.²⁹ The March hearing was conducted for a pair of nominees and the summer hearings for three each, in comparison with the five Leahy typically evaluated.³⁰

In the April 20 debate on a Texas re-nominee, Grassley proclaimed Republicans matched the Democratically led Senate over President George W. Bush's seventh year,³¹ because at the identical juncture, the "committee had held three nominee hearings for a total of 10 judges," while the panel "already held 4 nomination hearings" [on] 6 judges.³² Harry Reid (D-Nev.), the Minority Leader, countered that the 2015 panel was "not having any hearings to speak of;" by June 8, 2007, "Democrats confirmed 18 judges, including 3 circuit court judges."³³

ii. Judiciary Committee Discussions and Votes

Despite Grassley's pledges, which he repeated at the February 12 meeting, the Chair held over votes from that session until Feb-

28. Compare Jan. 21, 2015 Hearing, *supra* note 20, with *Hearings on Judicial Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 113th Cong. (Jan. 23, Feb. 13, 2013, Jan. 8, 28, 2014); see Catanese, *supra* note 20.

29. *Hearing on Judicial Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 114th Cong. (Mar. 11, 2015); *id.* (May 6, 2015); *id.* (June 10, 2015); *id.* (July 22, 2015); *id.* (Sept. 30, 2015); *id.* (Oct. 21, 2015); *id.* (Dec. 9, 2015).

30. Compare *Hearings on Judicial Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 114th Cong. (Mar. 11, June 10, July 22, 2015), with *Hearings on Judicial Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 113th Cong. (Jan. 28, Sept. 9, 2014); see *supra* text accompanying note 24 (noting many senators' failure to tender picks for judicial nomination).

31. 161 CONG. REC. S2264 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 2015).

32. *Id.* He said four executive nominees, including for Attorney General, testified and that Obama's nominees had been treated "extremely fairly," as he named 309 judges versus 273 for Bush. *Id.* But see *supra* note 29, *infra* notes 33, 42, 44, 52.

33. 161 CONG. REC. S3850 (daily ed. June 8, 2015). But see *supra* notes 28, 31–32 and accompanying text.

ruary 26,³⁴ retaining a practice the GOP used during Obama's first term and a half.³⁵ Those delayed were five superb, moderate U.S. Court of Federal Claims re-nominees whom the panel duly reported last year on unopposed voice votes³⁶ and four superior, consensus district re-nominees, two for emergencies, with powerful support of the Republican party home state panel members: John Cornyn, Ted Cruz, Orrin Hatch, and Mike Lee.³⁷

iii. Floor Debates and Votes

McConnell concurred on few quick nominee debates and votes when he was the Minority Leader Obama's initial six years,³⁸ thus requiring Democrats to pursue cloture on numerous selections and eventually change filibusters.³⁹ However, McConnell pledged additional cooperation in his new role as Majority Leader, while scheduling nominee floor debates and chamber ballots afforded a constructive opportunity for respecting this promise.⁴⁰

34. *Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 114th Cong. (Feb. 26, 2015) [hereinafter *Feb. 26 Executive Business Meeting*]; see also *Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 114th Cong. (Feb. 12, 2015); Josh Voorhees, *Procedural Purgatory*, SLATE (Mar. 29, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2015/03/loretta_lynch_confirmation_mitch_mccconnell_and_the_gop_have_delayed_it_but.html; *supra* text accompanying note 20.

35. See, e.g., *Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 113th Cong. (Sept. 11, 2014); *Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 114th Cong. (Nov. 13, 2014); see also *supra* note 6.

36. *Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 113th Cong. (Nov. 20, 2014); see also *supra* note 24.

37. *Jan. 21, 2015 Hearing*, *supra* note 20 (showing four District Judge nominees on the agenda); *Feb. 26 Executive Business Meeting*, *supra* note 34 (voting on judicial nominees). Grassley eschewed weekly meetings, unlike Leahy. See, e.g., *Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 113th Cong. (June 12, 19, 26, 2014) (providing statements from Leahy during weekly meetings).

38. 158 CONG. REC. S8375 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2012) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3; Burgess Everett & Seung Min Kim, *Judge Not: GOP Blocks Dozens of Obama Court Picks*, POLITICO (July 6, 2015), <http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/payback-gop-blocks-obama-judge-picks-judiciary-119743>.

39. 159 CONG. REC. S8418 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013); see Jeffrey Toobin, *Reid Changed the Federal Courts*, NEW YORKER (Mar. 27, 2015), <http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-harry-reid-changed-the-federal-courts>; Carl Hulse, *Reid to Retire from Senate in 2016*, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2015), <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/28/us/politics/senator-harry-reid-retire.html>.

40. See Neil Eggleston, *Judicial Nominations: Accomplishments and the Work that Lies Ahead*, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Dec. 17, 2014, 3:39 PM), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/12/17/judicial-nominations-accomplishments-and-work-lies-ahead>.

Nevertheless, I the four districts. the panel approve he finally convene debate and ballot.⁴¹ the Ranking Member contravened precede tinized Bush pick responsibility to presidency's final tion of the Judiciary ships to provide th responded to Gra the 2014 lame du this year" by argu firmed consensus ing "Democrats w instruction had le Obama's] first six

McConnell failed or five Court of Nonetheless, he co prompting Leahy' ment, which clear vealed the earlier ation of the "slow When the Senate

41. The delay trouble S2104-05 (daily ed. Apr.

42. 161 CONG. REC. S rists during Bush's last none in 2015. *Id.*

43. 161 CONG. REC. S Apr. 20, 2015); see U.S. J arm bases proposals on co

44. 161 CONG. REC. S proval, see Goldman et al from Circuit Judge Nomi ARK. L. REV. 217, 292 (2 VACANCIES, *supra* note 9;

45. 161 CONG. REC. S en judges in the 2014 lar cluded, 2015 is like 2007.

during Obama's superb, moderate from the panel duly and four superior, cies, with power- e panel members: Lee.³⁷

debates and votes l six years,³⁸ thus nerous selections McConnell pledged ity Leader, while ballots afforded a nise.⁴⁰

Judiciary, 114th Cong. see also *Executive Business* (Feb. 12, 2015); Josh www.slate.com/articles/ch_mcconnell_and_the_

on the Judiciary, 113th. *Comm. on the Judiciary*,

Judiciary, 113th. Cong.

istrict Judge nominees on voting on judicial nomi- e.g., *Executive Business* 2, 19, 26, 2014) (provid-

t of Sen. Leahy); see To- n Kim, *Judge Not: GOP* <http://www.politico.com/> 743.

y Toobin, *Reid Changed* www.nyorker.com/news/news- to_Retire_from_Senate_in_03/28/us/politics/senator-

ents and the Work that www.whitehouse.gov/ ies-ahead.

Nevertheless, McConnell actually set no fast consideration on the four districts, and the five Claims Court, re-nominees whom the panel approved with February 26 voice votes. A month later, he finally convened a lone district re-nominee's April 13 floor debate and ballot.⁴¹ This seemingly treated the contention by Leahy, the Ranking Member, that the absence of 2015 nominee votes contravened precedent and contrasted with how Democrats scrutinized Bush picks.⁴² He asserted that the Senate's constitutional responsibility to give "advice and consent" does not end with a presidency's final two years and carefully urged swift authorization of the Judicial Conference proposal for seventy-three judgeships to provide the bench resources for delivering justice.⁴³ Leahy responded to Grassley's idea that eleven nominees appointed in the 2014 lame duck session must "count towards confirmations this year" by arguing that prior "Congresses have always confirmed consensus nominees" ahead of lengthy recesses, maintaining "Democrats were only forced to do so because Republican obstruction had left judicial vacancies close to [ninety across Obama's] first six years."⁴⁴

McConnell failed to publicly say when the other three district or five Court of Federal Claims aspirants would have votes. Nonetheless, he confirmed one trial level re-nominee on April 20, prompting Leahy's contention this was only the second appointment, which clearly proved that GOP "delay and obstruction" revealed the earlier Obama years was continuing, and his denunciation of the "slow trickle," which harms courts and the public.⁴⁵ When the Senate Republican leader denied rapid ballots for the

41. The delay troubled Leahy, as the GOP proposed all four. *See* 161 CONG. REC. S2104-05 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy).

42. 161 CONG. REC. S2029-30 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2015). They approved sixty-eight jurists during Bush's last two years and fifteen by the end of March 2007, in contrast to none in 2015. *Id.*

43. 161 CONG. REC. S2028-30 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2015); *accord, id.* at S2264 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 2015); *see* U.S. JUDICIAL CONF. PROCEEDINGS 18 (2015). The courts' policymaking arm bases proposals on conservative caseload estimates.

44. 161 CONG. REC. S2029-30 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2015). For consensus nominees' approval, *see* Goldman et al., *supra* note 3, at 13-14; Michael Shenkman, *Decoupling District from Circuit Judge Nominations: A Proposal to Put Trial Bench Nominations on Track*, 65 ARK. L. REV. 217, 292 (2012). For the ninety vacancies idea, *see* ARCHIVE OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES, *supra* note 9; Goldman et al., *supra* note 3, at 13.

45. 161 CONG. REC. S2263-64 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 2015). Grassley said approving eleven judges in the 2014 lameduck session violated "standard practice." When they are included, 2015 is like 2007. 161 CONG. REC. S2264 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 2015).

last two district re-nominees, Reid compared the pair of jurists the GOP approved the entire year with sixteen over 2007, while he mentioned twenty nominees were pending in committee, emergencies doubled this year, and Republicans' disregard of their constitutional responsibility was an "injustice to the American people."⁴⁶ These efforts seemingly provoked McConnell to schedule floor consideration near the Memorial Day Recess for the district re-nominees. In their debates, Leahy charged that both persons enjoyed September nominations and January hearings with unanimous February panel reports, yet had languished on the floor for almost three months,⁴⁷ contending José Olvera would fill one of six district emergencies in Texas.⁴⁸ He alleged Republicans persistently tendered excuses for nominee obstruction⁴⁹ and criticized their "delay for delay's sake" which miss[es] the bigger picture" of the responsibility to fill openings.⁵⁰ When the Senate approved a lone nominee in July, Democrats pursued multiple unanimous consent requests on votes that were denied.⁵¹ For example, Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) aptly contrasted the 2008 appointments results with this year, pleading for three designees' consideration, but Grassley reiterated his notions about the 2014 lame duck session confirmations, which violated regular order, and how this year was like 2007, urging his colleague to "put that in your pipe and smoke it."⁵²

46. 161 CONG. REC. S2659 (daily ed. May 6, 2015). Continuing GOP inaction led Reid to repeat the earlier concerns and focus on Texas's seven emergencies. *Id.* at S2949 (daily ed. May 18, 2015).

47. *Id.* at S3223 (daily ed. May 21, 2015).

48. It had eight openings at that time. 161 CONG. REC. S3223 (daily ed. May 21, 2015).

49. 161 CONG. REC. S3223 (daily ed. May 21, 2015). He refuted Grassley's claim that only eighteen judges were confirmed in 2007, as they were held over from 2006, by urging he failed to say nine judges "were not . . . left pending" on the floor at 2006's end. *Id.* at S3223 (emphasis added); see *supra* text accompanying notes 43-44; *Editorial: Grassley Joins Race to Bottom*, DES MOINES REG. (Aug. 1, 2015), <http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/editorials/2015/07/31/grassley-joins-race-bottom-political-rhetoric/30963785/>.

50. 161 CONG. REC. S3223 (daily ed. May 21, 2015). After much home-state politician praise, both nominees had 100-0 votes. *Id.* at S3223-24.

51. See 161 CONG. REC. S4678 (confirming the nomination of Kara Stoll).

52. 161 CONG. REC. S6151-52 (daily ed. July 30, 2015); see *id.* at S6999-7000 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2015) (Sen. Leahy summarizing dismal 2015 record, contrasted to 2007); *id.* at S5047-48 (daily ed. July 14, 2015) (statement of Sen. Coons) (requesting unanimous consent). *But see id.* at S5048-49 (statement of Sen. Cotton) (objecting).

c. Summary

Despite repeated prominent GOP le January until Apr with only four ahe granted merely th the panel correspo Claims re-nominee 23.⁵⁴ This desultory in Obama's first si instance, the strong controversial recon mation in 2007, an jurists before lengt

2. The Appellate C

Both parties exa the selections are c policy, which offer Obama mustered n Court of Appeals f Felipe Restrepo to cuit.⁵⁶ He marshal cause GOP senator sent circuit vaca

53. ARCHIVE OF JUDIC

54. See *supra* notes 3 the judiciary committee in the summer of 2015); *infra* nees was again stalled in 1

55. U.S. COURTS, AR judges-judgeships/judicial (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2015) (clear option, seemed to ext

56. WHITE HOUSE, OF *Serve on the U.S. Cour VACANCIES: CURRENT JU ships/judicial-vacancies (n Circuit); U.S. COURTS, JU uscourts.gov/judges-judges nandez Stoll as confirmed PRESS SEC'Y, Presidential*

the pair of jurists over 2007, while g in committee, ans' disregard of tice to the Ameri- ed McConnell to l Day Recess for hly charged that nd January hear- et had languished ding José Olvera xas.⁴⁸ He alleged nominee obstruc- e" which miss[es] openings.⁵⁰ When democrats pursued at were denied.⁵¹ ntrasted the 2008 r three designees' as about the 2014 ed regular order, ague to "put that

g GOP inaction led Reid cies. *Id.* at S2949 (daily

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(Kara Stoll). *Id.* at S6999-7000 (daily contrasted to 2007); *id.* (requesting unanimous ing).

c. Summary

Despite repeated declarations of the regular order mantra by prominent GOP leaders since winning the chamber, from early January until April 12, 2015, they confirmed no district judges, with only four ahead of July.⁵³ Before June, the committee also granted merely three hearings and one included two nominees; the panel correspondingly allowed four district and five Court of Claims re-nominees' ballots on February 26 and two more April 23.⁵⁴ This desultory record contrasts with Democratic endeavors in Obama's first six years and even over Bush's presidency; for instance, the strongest precedents were thirty-four of his fine, uncontroversial recommendations for districts, who realized confirmation in 2007, and Democrats' systematic consideration of trial jurists before lengthy recesses.⁵⁵

2. The Appellate Court Process

Both parties examine appellate nominees very closely because the selections are comparatively fewer, while they articulate more policy, which often has ideological effects. In November 2014, Obama mustered nomination of Kara Farnandez Stoll to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and District Judge Luis Felipe Restrepo to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.⁵⁶ He marshaled no other appellate designees, primarily because GOP senators represent most jurisdictions that have present circuit vacancies without nominees, and they have

53. ARCHIVE OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES (2009-14), *supra* note 9.

54. *See supra* notes 30, 36, 38 and accompanying text (discussing delayed voting by the judiciary committee in late 2014 and hearings conducted for nominees in March and the summer of 2015); *infra* note 52 and accompanying text (noting that voting on nominees was again stalled in March 2015).

55. U.S. COURTS, ARCHIVE OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES (2007), <http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies>; 161 CONG. REC. S2029-30 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Democrats' acts, such as using the nuclear option, seemed to extend the "confirmation wars." *See source cited supra* notes 3, 12.

56. WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC'Y, *President Obama Nominates Two to Serve on the U.S. Courts of Appeals* (Nov. 12, 2014); *see* U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL VACANCIES: CURRENT JUDICIAL VACANCIES (2015), <http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies> (noting Luis Felipe Restrepo as unconfirmed nominee to the Third Circuit); U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL VACANCIES: CONFIRMATION LISTING (2015), <http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing> (noting Kara Farnandez Stoll as confirmed appointee to the Federal Circuit); WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC'Y, *Presidential Nominations Sent to the Senate* (Jan. 7, 2015).

coordinated little.⁵⁷ Stoll was an experienced, mainstream Federal Circuit practitioner, and Restrepo is a stellar, centrist jurist, and each is Latina/o.⁵⁸ Neither received Committee hearings in 2014, as Obama proffered both following the 2014 elections.

Stoll's March hearing proceeded smoothly,⁵⁹ yet the panel only voted her to the floor on April 23 where she languished for a number of weeks.⁶⁰ McConnell neglected to publicly declare when the superior prospect would be considered, but on June 4, he suggested that the GOP would halt final ballots on more Obama appeals court nominees.⁶¹ After press outlets reported this idea, a McConnell staffer proclaimed: "We're going to continue to do judges. [There's] not a shutdown. We probably will have a circuit court nominee."⁶²

On June 8, Reid accused the Majority Leader with drastic obstruction—namely rejecting chamber ballots for appellate picks, which contravened his duty—by invoking McConnell's floor speeches that pled for quick votes on all Bush 2008 circuit selections, while Reid alleged the GOP had yet to confirm one appellate possibility—"not even a consensus nominee such as Kara Stoll," and urged her prompt consideration.⁶³ As the Senate departed on the July 4 Recess without considering any person since late May, Leahy protested the inactivity, canvassed the dismal 2015 results and demanded expeditious votes for those on the floor, notably Stoll, which might have provoked her 95-0 July 7 ballot.⁶⁴ If few circuit aspirants win confirmation, this would fla-

57. Russell Wheeler, *With Senate Control, Will the GOP Stop Confirming Circuit Judges?*, BROOKINGS: FIXGOV BLOG (Nov. 16, 2015, 1:51 PM), <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2015/06/10-circuit-court-confirmations-wheeler>; see Toobin, *supra* note 39; *supra* notes 22–26 and accompanying text.

58. See sources cited *supra* note 56.

59. *Hearing on Judicial Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 114th Cong. (Mar. 11, 2015).

60. *Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 114th Cong. (Apr. 23, 2015).

61. See Steve Benen, *McConnell's Silent Governing Failure*, MSNBC (June 5, 2015), <http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/mcconnells-silent-governing-failure>; Nick Gass, *McConnell Vows to Slow Judicial Nominees*, POLITICO (June 5, 2015), <http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/mitch-mcconnell-judicial-nominations-118674>.

62. Alexander Bolton, *McConnell Backs Away from Shutdown Talk*, THE HILL (June 6, 2015), <http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/244196-mcconnell-backs-away-from-judicial-shutdown-talk>.

63. 161 CONG. REC. S3849–50 (daily ed. June 8, 2015).

64. 161 CONG. REC. S4591 (daily ed. June 24, 2015). Leahy reiterated much data and

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65. See *supra* notes 5

66. *Benched! History*
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67. Press Release, O
of Judge Luis Felipe Re
2014), <http://www.caseyof-judge-luis-felipe-restrepo>

68. See 161 CONG. 1
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<http://articles.philly.com/president-obama>.

69. 159 CONG. REC. 1
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70. See Press Release

71. No nominee was
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72. Jennifer Bendery
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ed, while the Democratic majority helped approve ten Bush cir-
cuit jurists his ending two years.⁶⁵

Restrepo's process tellingly illuminates stalling, as the fine,
noncontroversial jurist waited more than 200 days for a hearing.⁶⁶
Obama chose Restrepo with the avid endorsement of Pennsylva-
nia Senators Bob Casey (D) and Pat Toomey (R).⁶⁷ However, the
Committee only set a hearing for June 10, principally because
Toomey did not return his blue slip until May 14, although Casey
furnished his in November.⁶⁸ Both Senators had previously desig-
nated Restrepo for the Eastern District bench, and the chamber
feliculously approved the selection in a June 2013 voice vote.⁶⁹ The
legislators promoted his elevation with a strong press release in
which Toomey contended he would "make a superb addition to
the Third Circuit."⁷⁰ Nevertheless, the aspirant was excluded from
a May hearing on four trial level prospects.⁷¹ The day before that
session, the press queried Toomey, who claimed he remained
supportive and confident about 2015 confirmation.⁷² Grassley

the GOP duty. *Id.*; see *supra* notes 42–44, 50 and accompanying text; see also *id.* at S4678
(daily ed. July 7, 2015) (Stoll vote).

65. See *supra* notes 42, 46, 63–64 and accompanying text.

66. *Benched! History Shows "Regular Order" Means Appellate Court Confirmations*,
ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, <http://www.afj.org/blog/benched-history-shows-regular-order-mea-ns-appellate-court-confirmations> (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).

67. Press Release, Office of Robert P. Casey, Jr., Casey, Toomey Applaud Nomination
of Judge Luis Felipe Restrepo to U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Nov. 12,
2014), <http://www.casey.senate.gov/newsroom/releases/casey-toomey-applaud-nomination-of-judge-luis-felipe-restrepo-to-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-third-circuit>.

68. See 161 CONG. REC. S6369 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 2015). Saranac Spencer, *Toomey
Submits Blue Slip, But Will Restrepo Get a Hearing?*, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (May 19,
2015), <http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/printerfriendly/id=1202726785818#>; Jonathan
Tamari, *A Judicial Nominee Waits; Toomey Gets Blamed*, PHILA. INQUIRER (May 9, 2015),
[http://articles.philly.com/2015-05-09/news/61952388_1_toomey-luis-felipe-restrepo-
president-obama](http://articles.philly.com/2015-05-09/news/61952388_1_toomey-luis-felipe-restrepo-president-obama).

69. 159 CONG. REC. S4516 (daily ed. June 17, 2013); Spencer, *supra* note 68. He was
then a magistrate judge of this district. All modern Presidents elevate judges from lower
courts. Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2258.

70. See Press Release, Office of Robert P. Casey, Jr., *supra* note 67.

71. No nominee was picked before him. *Hearings on Judicial Nominees Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary*, 114th Cong. (May 6, 2015).

72. Jennifer Bendery, *Pat Toomey Is Blocking His Own Judicial Nominee, for Some
Reason*, HUFFINGTON POST (May 5, 2015) [hereinafter Bendery, *Pat Toomey Is Blocking*],
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/05/pat-toomey-luis-restrepo_n_7214790.html;
Tracie Mauriello, *Confirmation Vote on Pennsylvania Jurist Awaits 'Blue Slip' From
Toomey*, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (May 7, 2015), <http://www.post-gazette.com/local/2015/05/06/Toomey-holding-up-confirmation-of-Pennsylvania-jurist-he-supports/stories/2015>

pledged he would set a hearing once Toomey provided the blue slip.⁷³ A panel aide said it was evaluating the nominee's background under "regular order."⁷⁴ On the chamber floor the day the May hearing occurred, Reid deftly repeated Toomey's laudatory descriptions of Restrepo while asking if Pennsylvanians wonder why the lawmaker failed to explain the talented nominee's slowing "by his own party."⁷⁵

Toomey later denied he was stalling Restrepo, and declared the committee was analyzing him but would only conduct a hearing after that concluded and promised to return the blue slip then, unless pertinent concerns surfaced.⁷⁶ On May 14, Toomey yielded, producing his blue slip, ostensibly due to the inquiry's end.⁷⁷ The June 10 panel hearing was seamless, as Toomey voiced powerful support and Restrepo clearly answered questions.⁷⁸ The candidate was held over yet won approval on a July 9 unopposed voice

05060171; Saranac Spencer, *Political Maneuvers Hold up Nominee for Third Circuit*, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (May 6, 2015), <http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=1202725590790/Political-Maneuvers-Holding-Up-Nominee-for-Third-Circuit>.

73. Bendery, *Pat Toomey Is Blocking*, *supra* note 72; Mauriello, *supra* note 72. Grassley's pledge and failure to broach an ongoing inquiry undercut Toomey's excuse for waiting six months.

74. Spencer, *supra* note 72 (emphasis added). She said members may hold blue slips until vetting ends, as questions can arise in that process. Mauriello, *supra* note 72; accord Jennifer Bendery, *Pat Toomey Insists He's Not Holding up a Judicial Nominee He's Holding up*, HUFFINGTON POST (May 13, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/13/pat-toomey-judge-restrepo_n_7277332.html.

75. 161 CONG. REC. S2660 (daily ed. May 6, 2015); see *Hearings on Judicial Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 114th Cong. (May 6, 2015) (statement of Sen. Grassley).

76. Pat Toomey, *I Am Not Delaying Judge L. Felipe Restrepo*, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (May 18, 2015), <http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/letters/2015/05/13/i-am-not-delaying-judge-l-felipe-restrepo-s-3rd-circuit-nomination/stories/201505130068>; see Tamari, *supra* note 68; see also *supra* notes 72-74 and accompanying text (discussing Toomey's claims that he remained supportive of Restrepo, despite his failure to return the blue slip).

77. *Hearings on Judicial Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 114th Cong. (June 10, 2015); Tracie Mauriello, *Toomey Signs Off On Nominee for Federal Appeals Court*, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (May 14, 2015), <http://www.post-gazette.com/local/region/2015/05/14/toomey-signs-off-on-nominee-for-federal-appeals-court/stories/201505140325>; Williams, *The GOP's Judicial Logjam*, *supra* note 8 (reiterating criticism of GOP for delay).

78. Senators posing queries seemed satisfied. *Hearings on Judicial Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 114th Cong. (June 10, 2015); *Hearing Examining the Federal Regulatory System to Improve Accountability, Transparency, and Integrity Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 114th Cong. (June 10, 2015) (statement of Sen. Grassley urging 2015 circuit hearings and approvals to mirror 2007); Tracie Mauriello, *After Hearing, Philadelphia Judge Close to Third Circuit Confirmation*, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (June 11, 2015), <http://www.post-gazette.com/news/politics-nation/2015/06/11/After-hearing-Philadelphia-judge-close-to-3rd-circuit-confirmation/stories/201506110112>.

vote.⁷⁹ Given how Grassley's July 10 June 4 allusion Restrepo's final ball

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3. Summary of D

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79. *Executive Business* (June 25, July 9, 2015); *ary*, 114th Cong. (Apr. *Judiciary*, 114th Cong.

80. 161 CONG. REC. Restrepo's); see John Tamari, PHILA. INQUIRER (Dec. 9 ate-schedules-vote-on-lo on scheduling the Janu (re-nominees with much

81. See *supra* text leaving unclear why he district court service. T CONG. REC. S21 (daily e

82. Merely four dis confirm three circuit an (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2015)

83. See *supra* notes

84. See Russell Wh *the Obama Administra* (Aug. 18, 2015, 8:00 AM federal-judges-confirmation

85. See *supra* notes many nominees. See 161 Leahy).

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 Lauriello, *After Hearing*,
 POST-GAZETTE (June 11,
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vote.⁷⁹ Given how long most 2015 nominees waited coupled with Grassley's July tirade and McConnell's cryptic discussion of his June 4 allusion to circuit votes, it is not surprising that Restrepo's final ballot was not conducted until January 11, 2016.⁸⁰

No defensible idea supports Restrepo's protracted delay, because Obama first made the jurist's nomination in 2014 for an emergency opening. His lengthy wait contrasts to Stoll, proposed the same day, who had a March hearing and April Committee report.⁸¹ Observers also insistently contended partisanship explained slow processing.⁸²

3. Summary of District and Appellate Processes

Reid and Leahy continuously and convincingly addressed Grassley's claims with applicable data on confirmations and hearings.⁸³ The Chair's figures were rather persuasive, especially when, for instance, he employed analogous metrics, but in some respects they can lack pertinence, as data support numerous concepts.⁸⁴ Essential is assiduously fulfilling the constitutional duty to express advice and consent and place talented, consensus aspirants in many vacancies, specifically emergencies.⁸⁵ The most

79. *Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 114th Cong. (June 25, July 9, 2015); see *Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 114th Cong. (Apr. 23, 2015); *Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 114th Cong. (Mar. 11, 2015).

80. 161 CONG. REC. S8443 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2015) (confirmation vote, but *not* Restrepo's); see John Tamari, *Senate Schedules Vote on Long-Delayed Pa. Nominee Restrepo*, PHILA. INQUIRER (Dec. 9, 2015, 9:22 PM), <http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/capitolinq/Senate-schedules-vote-on-long-delayed-PA-nominee-Restrepo.html> (confirming the agreement on scheduling the January 11 vote); *supra* notes 59–64 (Stoll's wait); *supra* notes 44–50 (re-nominees with much GOP support took ninety days from panel to final votes).

81. See *supra* text accompanying notes 44–45, 50. She lacked his prior full inquiry, leaving unclear why he took six months, especially with his full 2013 canvass and later district court service. The Senate finally confirmed Restrepo 82/6 on January 11. 162 CONG. REC. S21 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 2015).

82. Merely four district judges won 2015 approval in contrast to Democrats' helping confirm three circuit and fifteen district judges by April 2007. See 161 CONG. REC. S2104 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy); Bendery, *supra* note 74.

83. See *supra* notes 33, 42–50 and accompanying text.

84. See Russell Wheeler, *Confirming Federal Judges During the Final Two Years of the Obama Administration: Vacancies up, Nominees down*, BROOKINGS: FIXGOV BLOG (Aug. 18, 2015, 8:00 AM), <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2015/08/18-obama-federal-judges-confirmation-wheeler>.

85. See *supra* notes 43, 46, 49, 63 and accompanying text. GOP senators proposed many nominees. See 161 CONG. REC. S2104–05 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy).

relevant precedent is Democrats' 2007–08 effort, which confirmed almost seventy Bush court picks.⁸⁶ In sum, the 2015 processing record—approving one circuit and ten trial jurists—sharply contrasts to Democrats' work at a comparable juncture.

II. THE REASONS FOR AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROBLEMATIC SELECTION PROCESS

A. Reasons

The explanations for appointments' problematic condition are complex. Scholars and politicians robustly debate whether selection has always been troubled,⁸⁷ but a number trace the modern "confirmation wars" to the pitched fight about Judge Robert Bork's Supreme Court nomination three decades ago.⁸⁸ Writers contend the process is effectively on a downward trajectory summarized by partisanship and serial obstruction in which the parties ratchet down the regime, while both consider any concession unilateral disarmament.⁸⁹ For example, the most recent iteration derives from Republican accusations that Democrats stymied confirmations during the ending pair of Bush years and retaliated for that with unprecedented stalling in Obama's tenure.⁹⁰ Democratic frustration eventually provoked the nuclear option's invocation that spurred Republicans to contend Democrats had abrogated the rules.⁹¹ Mandating cloture on all prospects concomitantly fueled Democrats' endeavors that rapidly approved numerous ju-

86. Ten were circuit picks. See *supra* text accompanying note 42.

87. Michael Gerhardt & Michael Ashley Stein, *The Politics of Early Justice: Federal Judicial Selection, 1789-1861*, 100 IOWA L. REV. 551, 553 (2015); Orrin Hatch, *The Constitution as the Playbook for Judicial Selection*, 32 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1035, 1038–39 (2009); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, *The Golden or Bronze Age of Judicial Selection?*, 100 IOWA L. REV. BULLETIN 69, 70 (2015), http://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/files/ilr.law.uiowa.edu/files/ILRB_100_Shugerman.pdf.

88. See generally ETHAN BRONNER, *BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA* (1989) (explaining that Robert Bork's nominations was contentious); MARK GITENSTEIN, *MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF AMERICA'S REJECTION OF ROBERT BORK'S NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT* (1992) (discussing the epic struggle that took place between senators, the press, staff, and civil liberty organizations over Robert Bork's nomination).

89. Doug Kendall, *The Bench in Purgatory: The New Republican Obstructionism on Obama's Judicial Nominees*, SLATE (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2009/10/the_bench_in_purgatory.html.

90. See *supra* notes 6–10 and accompanying text.

91. See *supra* notes 12–14 and accompanying text.

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B. Implications

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92. See *supra* notes

93. FEDERAL JUDIC (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2015) *the Civil Cases Pile up*, courts-civil-cases-pile-up

94. See sources cited

95. See *Senate Grid* 21, 2015) (statement of S

96. Kendall, *supra* (Dec. 17, 2012), <http://ing-on-hold?slreturn=20Costs of Judicial Confir> tic.com/politics/archive/2delays/261862/.

97. See U.S. COURT (1997, 2002); Tobias, *Se Judges Are Burned Ou* POST (Sept. 30, 2015), h _55d77721e4b0a40aa3aa

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rists over 2014's lame duck session to which the GOP responded by profoundly delaying 2015 choices.⁹² In short, rampant partisanship and many severe paybacks seem to epitomize the process.

B. *Implications*

2015 inaction leaves the courts with seventy-four Article III judgeships empty, while the AO identifies emergencies for twenty-eight circuit and district court positions, a statistic which Republicans permitted to double since January of last year.⁹³ Open posts were essentially at ninety for much of the five years which commenced in August 2009; the courts were only able to experience the comparatively low figure of seventy-four vacancies *after* Democrats had unleashed the nuclear option which prevented Republicans from mounting successful filibusters.⁹⁴ However, 2015 inactivity can yield one hundred openings and perhaps fifty emergencies next year.

Slow confirmations have many deleterious impacts.⁹⁵ They require fine, uncontroversial nominees to place lives and careers on hold and dissuade myriad remarkable candidates from entertaining bench service.⁹⁶ Protracted Senate assessment deprives tribunals of judicial resources which they critically need, impedes prompt, economical and fair case disposition, imposes substantially greater pressure on already overburdened jurists and compels litigants to wait years on resolution.⁹⁷ These detrimental ef-

42.
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Orrin Hatch, *The Consti-*
PUB. POL'Y 1035, 1038–39
of *Judicial Selection?*, 100
les/ilr.law.uiowa.edu/files/

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92. See *supra* notes 14–83 and accompanying text.

93. FEDERAL JUDICIAL VACANCIES (2015), *supra* note 56; 161 CONG. REC. S2029-30 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see Joe Palazzolo, *In Federal Courts, the Civil Cases Pile up*, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2015), <http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-federal-courts-civil-cases-pile-up-1428343746>.

94. See sources cited *supra* notes 12–14, 39, 44.

95. See *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2253; 161 CONG. REC. S3223 (daily ed. May 21, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy).

96. Kendall, *supra* note 89; Todd Ruger, *Nominees Are Living on Hold*, NAT'L L. J. (Dec. 17, 2012), <http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202581557603/Nominees-are-living-on-hold?slreturn=20151106194656>; see Andrew Cohen, *In Pennsylvania, the Human Costs of Judicial Confirmation Delays*, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 9, 2012), <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/in-pennsylvania-the-human-costs-of-judicial-confirmation-delays/261862/>.

97. See U.S. COURTS, YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7–8 (2010); *id.* (1997, 2002); Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2253; Jennifer Bendery, *Federal Judges Are Burned Out, Overworked and Wondering Where Congress Is*, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/judge-federal-courts-vacancies_55d77721e4b0a40aa3aaf14b; Wheeler, *supra* note 84.

fects have also undermined citizen regard for selection and the government's coordinate branches.⁹⁸ The above propositions suggest that proposals for improving confirmations warrant scrutiny.

III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The appointment of merely eleven court nominees in 2015 and other problematic phenomena show that the process will face serious complications over the 2016 presidential election year. Most important, approvals can gradually slow and come to a halt, and the judiciary could have nearly one hundred unfilled positions, almost half emergencies, were 2015 inaction to continue. Accordingly, Obama, the chamber, and members should now pledge to fulfill the shared constitutional duty for appointments, thus providing the bench sufficient resources to deliver justice, with meaningful cooperation throughout the nomination and confirmation procedures. GOP senators and party leaders ought to effectuate the regular order construct again by carefully deploying multiple ideas used at the close of Bush's Administration, reinstating strategies that expedite consideration and formulating new promising concepts, which directly fill the ample vacancies with highly qualified centrists.⁹⁹

All selection participants must canvass and implement numerous ways of ending or tempering the "confirmation wars." Integral will be stopping or ameliorating the vicious cycle of paybacks and strident, counterproductive partisanship which the majority's rhetoric and corresponding delay exemplify, namely the June suggestion by McConnell that few appellate nominees would receive confirmation and Grassley's petulant July denial of chamber votes until fall. Strikingly ironic about 2015 GOP conduct was the failure to even match approvals in numbers of recent presidential election years.¹⁰⁰

98. See Cohen, *supra* note 96 (explaining the "real-life consequences of delay" due to "justice delayed syndrome"); Palazzolo, *supra* note 93 (noting citizens' discontent with civil cases piling up due to slow judicial appointment process); Ruger, *supra* note 96 (describing judicial appointment delay as having large impact on public).

99. For many specific ideas, see Shenkman, *supra* note 44, at 298-311; Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2255-65.

100. See 161 CONG. REC. S3849-50 (daily ed. June 8, 2015) (statement of Sen. Reid); Carl Tobias, *Filling Judicial Vacancies in a Presidential Election Year*, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 985, 996 (2012); Everett & Kim, *supra* note 38.

A. Selection in Motion

Because 2016 is the first year that the judiciary has developed, relative to the executive branch, a major tradition has been that confirmation processes slow, particularly in the case of a particularly grind to a halt, and the process for voter preference is slow. The incoming chief executive has the opportunity to proffer candidates.

The tradition has been that a consensus trial level of confirmation through lame duck sessions, particularly the twenty-two Bush Administration and President Bill Clinton's confirmation in June 2000; a pair of lame duck sessions combined with eight lame duck sessions in 2008; and fourteen lame duck sessions could reveal Democratic confirmation of many variables such as chamber majority and confirmation analysis.¹⁰³

The tradition continues to be that late nominees to the Supreme Court occasionally later. The tradition whose First Circuit confirmation of Strom Thurmond in 1980 defeat of President

101. DENIS STEVEN RUTENFRANZ, *THE CONFIRMATION AND CONFIRMATION OF LOW COURT JUDGES* (2008); Russell Wheeler, *Judicial Confirmation* (Mar. 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2012/03_judicial_wheeler.pdf.

102. U.S. COURTS, ARCHIVE (2012), <http://www.uscourts.gov/pressroom/2012/03/20120301> (discussing lame duck sessions); ARCHIVE (2012).

103. Wheeler, *supra* note 101, at 3-4, 51-53.

104. SHELDON GOLDMAN, *THE CONFIRMATION OF JUDGES* (2012), *supra* note 101, at 7-8.

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Year, 46 U. RICH. L. REV.

A. Selection in Modern Presidential Election Years

Because 2016 is one such year, for which peculiar conventions have developed, relatively diverse approaches could enjoy success. A major tradition has been that the nomination and confirmation processes slow, particularly at second terms' conclusion, and ultimately grind to a halt.¹⁰¹ This custom is mainly based on respect for voter preferences expressed in the November elections and for incoming chief executives and senators, who deserve the opportunity to proffer candidates and contribute advice and consent.

The tradition has allowed consideration of many accomplished, consensus trial level nominees into most autumns but rarely through lame duck sessions. For example, the chamber approved twenty-two Bush *père* choices in 1992 after June; seventeen of President Bill Clinton's over 1996 following June with eight after June 2000; a pair of Bush submissions later than June in 2004 combined with eight recommendations after this month over 2008; and fourteen Obama candidates across 2012.¹⁰² Those data could reveal Democratic Presidents' nominees fared better, yet many variables such as nomination timing, which party held a chamber majority and the review's narrow scope, complicate analysis.¹⁰³

The tradition concomitantly permits strong, moderate appellate nominees to garner votes past the Memorial Day Recess, but occasionally later. A dramatic illustration was Stephen Breyer whose First Circuit nomination Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) persuaded Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) to promote after Ronald Reagan's 1980 defeat of President Jimmy Carter.¹⁰⁴ More recently, the Sen-

101. DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS & KEVIN M. SCOTT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NOMINATION AND CONFIRMATION OF LOWER FEDERAL COURT JUDGES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEARS (2008); Russell Wheeler, *Judicial Confirmations: What Thurmond Rule?*, 45 BROOKINGS 1 (Mar. 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2012/3/judicial-wheeler/03_judicial_wheeler.pdf.

102. U.S. COURTS, ARCHIVE OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012), <http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies>; *id.* (2002, 2010, 2014) (approving 20 Bush, and 19 and 23 Obama, picks in mid-term lame duck sessions); ARCHIVE OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES, *supra* note 9; Wheeler, *supra* note 101.

103. Wheeler, *supra* note 101, at 4 (identifying variables); see RUTKUS & SCOTT, *supra* note 101, at 3–4, 51–53.

104. SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES 261 (1997); RUTKUS & SCOTT, *supra* note 101, at 7–8.

ate approved eleven Bush *père* circuit aspirants during 1992 (six following June); two of Clinton's in January 1996 with eight across 2000 (one later than June); while five Bush choices won approval over 2004 and four were confirmed in 2008 (none after that month either year).¹⁰⁵ Five Obama 2012 jurists were appointed, but no candidate after mid-June.¹⁰⁶ These figures show that both parties' nominees met similar resistance, yet the GOP needs to greatly enhance the pace should it hope to equal the late Bush years' performance.

In short, much consensus attends the conventions that nomination and confirmation processes slow and eventually halt in presidential election years, while circuit appointments conclude sooner, involving fewer approvals. However, considerable disagreement remains about the traditions' exact contours, including when appointments could taper off and stop, while McConnell recently conceded that "there isn't any particular official or unofficial cutoff date."¹⁰⁷ Those phenomena explain why the customs apparently have been different over time, honored in the breach and employed to capture partisan advantage.

B. *Traditional Selection Measures*

In this milieu, numerous tools can apply with more or less success. Politicians ought to seriously consider reinstating a number of traditional measures, which proved efficacious during the last two Bush years, but that achieved checkered 2015 results witnessed by GOP inactivity.¹⁰⁸ General examples abound. The President should continue assiduously consulting and quickly nominating prominent, mainstream candidates whom numerous

105. U.S. COURTS, ARCHIVE OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008), <http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies>; Wheeler, *supra* note 101.

106. McConnell agreed on no final votes after June 12, making five able, consensus picks wait until 2013. See ARCHIVE OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES (2012), *supra* note 9; *infra* text accompanying note 119.

107. Jennifer Bendery, *Mitch McConnell Will Finally Let Some Judges Get Confirmed. Next Year*, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 15, 2015, 7:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/republicans-obama-judicial-nominees_567055e0e4b0e292150f6690; see RUTKUS & SCOTT, *supra* note 101, at 3-4, 51-53; Wheeler, *supra* note 101, at 1.

108. The GOP must expedite with more hearings and faster panel and floor votes on consensus nominees. See *infra* notes 132-36. However, 2015 inaction shows the ideas lack promise for 2016. See *supra* notes 52, 61.

home state officers respect the conventional leagues and Obama their preferences a dered or whom they ties to keep moving close and voting of these conventions s experience in Com promising.¹¹⁰

Many specific no even more insistent open posts surface t must supplement c numerous accompli tion panels, which plicants for vacant states have provide whom they advise closely scrutinize d nia and Wisconsin p ble aspirants over tuning initiatives.

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109. Goldman et al., *su Federal Judiciary*, 106 NW. with Obama can suggest pr

110. See *supra* notes 28-

111. See *supra* notes 3-4

112. Jessica M. Karma nounced, LEGAL NEWSLINE members-of-texas-judicial-e Casey Unveil Selection Pro <http://standardspeaker.com/1.1138220>; see *supra* note 2-

113. Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, VACANCIES (2010-15), *supra*

114. 28 U.S.C.A. § 371 (2) Stras & Ryan Scott, *Are Sen Tobias, Senate Gridlock, sup*

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home state officers diligently propose. Lawmakers must again re-
spect the convention of abundantly deferring to home state col-
leagues and Obama, who has cultivated the legislators, heeded
their preferences and sent a number of people Republicans ten-
dered or whom they favored.¹⁰⁹ Other general customs are the du-
ties to keep moving able, consensus suggestions at a presidency's
close and voting on cohorts of the aspirants near recesses, yet
these conventions seem to be honored in the breach, and the 2015
experience in Committee, but particularly on the floor, was un-
promising.¹¹⁰

Many specific notions also could apply. The President should
even more insistently consult senators from jurisdictions where
open posts surface to accelerate nominations' pace. Those officials
must supplement cooperation by especially promptly submitting
numerous accomplished, uncontroversial prospects.¹¹¹ Merit selec-
tion panels, which canvass, interview and effectively choose ap-
plicants for vacant court seats in Pennsylvania, Texas, and other
states have provided help, but the commissions and lawmakers
whom they advise can act slowly.¹¹² Thus, politicians need to
closely scrutinize diverse, promising models, such as the Califor-
nia and Wisconsin panels that efficiently yielded numerous capa-
ble aspirants over Bush's tenure,¹¹³ while concomitantly fine-
tuning initiatives.

Senators also could move very expeditiously when judges prof-
fer notice of intent to assume senior status and cautiously antici-
pate future empty positions by, for instance, respectfully com-
municating with jurists once they become eligible.¹¹⁴ Another

109. Goldman et al., *supra* note 3, at 16–17; Carl Tobias, *Justifying Diversity in the Federal Judiciary*, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 283, 296 (2012). GOP senators who differ with Obama can suggest preferable choices.

110. See *supra* notes 28–54, 57, 60–86, 108 and accompanying text.

111. See *supra* notes 3–4, 21–27 and accompanying text.

112. Jessica M. Karmasek, *Members of Texas Judicial Evaluation Committee Announced*, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Apr. 17, 2013), <http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510515096-members-of-texas-judicial-evaluation-committee-announced>; Borys Krawczeniuk, *Toomey, Casey Unveil Selection Process for Federal Judges*, STANDARD SPEAKER (Apr. 27, 2011), <http://standardspeaker.com/news/toomey-casey-unveil-selection-process-for-federal-judges-1.1138220>; see *supra* note 24; see also *supra* notes 66–69 and accompanying text.

113. Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2256. *But see* ARCHIVE OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES (2010–15), *supra* notes 9, 56 (showing Wis. 7th Cir. vacancy open since 2010).

114. 28 U.S.C.A. § 371 (2012) (eligible if sixty-five and fifteen years service); see David Stras & Ryan Scott, *Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?*, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 453 (2007); Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2256.

concept is a mechanism enlisted in states that possess split delegations, notably Pennsylvania, which enables the senator from that party lacking the White House to submit able candidates.¹¹⁵ Other profitable solutions include presenting Obama multiple submissions and clearly ranking preferences, which enlarge his flexibility and cabin the necessity to start anew when Obama differs on the lone pick sent, a luxury the United States cannot afford in presidential election years.¹¹⁶

If GOP lawmakers remain unreceptive to White House cultivation by acting slowly or forwarding minuscule possibilities,¹¹⁷ Obama could designate with no Republican delegation support; however, this proves unproductive.¹¹⁸ The Administration can also strike compromises about the kind of accomplished, moderate nominees whom Obama prefers. For example, he could rely more upon diversity vis-à-vis (1) age by championing older selections, as with Circuit Judge Andrew Hurwitz, the last 2012 confirmer;¹¹⁹ (2) ideology or party affiliation, especially Republicans or Independents, namely a few Toomey candidates;¹²⁰ (3) experience, such as prosecutors or civil defense lawyers;¹²¹ and (4) confirming administration, specifically Bush, with Circuit Judge Henry Floyd's elevation.¹²² All modern Presidents capitalize on the last tradi-

115. Toomey picks one in four whom Casey and he suggest. PENNSYLVANIANS FOR MODERN COURTS, *Western District May Be Filled in 2015* (Mar. 2015); see *supra* note 69; sources cited *infra* note 142.

116. GOP senators more often send one. Joseph Morton, *Obama Nominates Omaha Attorney Rossiter to Federal Bench in Nebraska*, OMAHA WORLD HERALD (June 12, 2015), http://www.omaha.com/news/crime/obama-nominates-omaha-attorney-rossiter-to-federal-bench-in-nebraska/article_7517dc5c-1084-11e5-9f03-eb447e9aaa07.html. But see Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2251.

117. See *supra* notes 4, 22–26 and accompanying text.

118. He rarely uses it, as home state GOP members can retain blue slips and end processing. Goldman et al., *supra* note 3, at 16–18; Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2261; see *supra* notes 65, 71–72, 75–76.

119. 158 CONG. REC. S4108 (daily ed. June 12, 2012) (Hurwitz was sixty-six); 149 CONG. REC. S12,127 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2003) (Carlos Bea was sixty-eight when Bush tapped him).

120. See, e.g., 158 CONG. REC. S8380 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2012) (Judge Matthew Brann); 160 CONG. REC. S1747 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2014) (Judge Edward Smith).

121. For appointee experiential data, see ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, *BROADENING THE BENCH* (2015).

122. 157 CONG. REC. S6027 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2011). Obama elevated Justice Sonia Sotomayor, whom Bush *père* named to the S.D.N.Y. and Clinton elevated to the Second Circuit. 155 CONG. REC. S9063 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 2009); 138 CONG. REC. S12,417 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1992); 144 CONG. REC. S11,310 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1998).

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123. Tobias, *Senate G* accompanying text.

124. 160 CONG. REC. May 20, 2014) (Costa).

125. For example, B tomayor. See *supra* note

126. That was contro at 2251 (nominating fro is a custom, not a rule). I

127. Shenkman, *supr* 2261; *supra* note 118.

128. Goldman et al., at 2250–51.

129. A study found th *cancies: An Examination* 332–333 (1994); Tobias, J

130. Tobias, *Filling J* at 995.

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tion.¹²³ For instance, Obama has aptly nominated some of his low-
er court appointees, like Judges Gregg Costa and Robert Wil-
kins,¹²⁴ and even certain jurists three predecessors approved, a
dynamic gesture of bipartisanship.¹²⁵ Obama might correspond-
ingly invoke "trades," which he apparently employed in filling
lengthy Georgia vacancies.¹²⁶ Obama can as well use confronta-
tional tools, which hold senators responsible by publishing the
status of pre-nomination negotiations or mustering nominations
for all open slots, which could dramatize and publicize how chron-
ic vacancies eviscerate justice.¹²⁷

Obama should in turn expedite the process before and once
home state politicians send choices. Illustrative would be accord-
ing nominations higher priority or greater resources.¹²⁸ Moreover,
the chief executive should hasten American Bar Association candi-
date analyses, Federal Bureau of Investigation background
checks, and White House evaluations and nominations of the per-
sons selected.¹²⁹ The President also must continue seeing ideology
narrowly and emphasizing merit by comprehensively pursuing
and naming superb, mainstream nominees.¹³⁰ Because most of his
prospects have been competent and uncontroversial, Obama
should not have to choose between proposing the type of submis-
sions whom he prefers and filling court vacancies at 2016's com-
mencement, as that salutary custom has governed early in many

123. Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2258; see *supra* notes 68–69, 122 and ac-
companying text.

124. 160 CONG. REC. S283 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2014) (Wilkins); *id.* at S3125 (daily ed.
May 20, 2014) (Costa).

125. For example, Bush appointed Floyd, and Bush *père* and Clinton named So-
tomayor. See *supra* note 122.

126. That was controversial. See *supra* note 26; Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3,
at 2251 (nominating from state in a circuit other than one where a vacancy occurs, as this
is a custom, not a rule). *But see* 28 U.S.C.A. § 44(c) (Supp. 2014).

127. Shenkman, *supra* note 44, at 299–300; Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at
2261; *supra* note 118.

128. Goldman et al., *supra* note 3, at 11–13; see Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3,
at 2250–51.

129. A study found the many steps take time. See Gordon Bermant et al., *Judicial Va-
cancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions*, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 319,
332–333 (1994); Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2235.

130. Tobias, *Filling Judicial Vacancies in a Presidential Election Year*, *supra* note 100,
at 995.

Presidents' eighth year, a system which the Bush initiative epitomizes.¹³¹

For its part, the Committee should provide greater numbers of hearings with more nominees while offering faster discussions and ballots.¹³² The Committee ought to survey additional productive notions that foster comparatively efficient review. A helpful approach, which Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) practiced when Judiciary Chair during the Bush years, was mounting abbreviated hearings for talented, centrist nominees.¹³³ One illustration of this measure was the June 10 session for Restrepo and two district nominees, which entailed less than one hour with probing queries and frank, complete responses.¹³⁴ Another solution that merits careful investigation would be holding discussions and votes the first time the panel considers nominees, specifically for emergencies, rather than delaying them a week, as happened with more than 350 Obama candidates, in particular Restrepo.¹³⁵

The Majority Leader needs to substantially expand floor debates and ballots. For instance, he could reestablish a valuable procedure which Democrats applied over Bush's concluding years: having final votes regarding every strong, moderate district nominee on the floor before prolonged recesses, as Leahy cogently urged, and maybe clear them near the 2016 Memorial Day, July 4, or August Recesses.¹³⁶ McConnell concomitantly ought to illuminate his June discussion of appellate candidates, because appointing very small numbers over a President's last years would be unprecedented.¹³⁷ Should he remain unresponsive, Democrats can attempt protesting with unanimous consent requests to hold expeditious final votes, which succinctly publicize and dramatize obstruction's harmful impacts, yet Republicans flatly denied two

131. See *supra* notes 9, 44; see also *supra* text accompanying notes 102, 105.

132. See *supra* notes 27–37 and accompanying text.

133. Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2263; Neil A. Lewis, *Senate Panel Backs Appeals Court Nominee*, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2003), <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/30/politics/30CND-JUDG.html>.

134. *Hearings on Judicial Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 114th Cong. (June 10, 2015); *supra* text accompanying note 29; Shenkman, *supra* note 44, at 303–05 (urging abolishing hearings that add little substance and changing questionnaires to omit “completeness traps”).

135. See *supra* notes 6, 34–37, 80 and accompanying text.

136. See *supra* notes 44, 46–47.

137. He did allow Stoll's July 7 final vote. See *supra* notes 61–64 and accompanying text.

reasonable July 20 recommendations.

C. Pragmatic Poli

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138. See *supra* note 52 rather dramatic, confront accountable. Senators mig *infra* note 145 and accomp

139. Chris Cillizza, 10 (June 7, 2015), <https://www.itch-parties-in-2016-election.html>; Heather Haddon, *F* ST. J. (Dec. 23, 2015, 7:4 ublican-worries-over-sena in Polls Because GOP Pri <https://www.washingtonpo s-in-polls-because-gop-pri>

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reasonable July 2015 Democratic petitions urging floor ballots on recommendations.¹³⁸

C. *Pragmatic Politics*

Even if the constitutional duty of furnishing advice and consent and the responsibility to a coordinate branch for delivering adequate judicial resources do not persuade the GOP to collaborate more, some pragmatism, self-interest and political realities should dictate compliance with numerous traditional, modest approaches. For example, the party's sizeable presidential field inspires little confidence that anyone from this group will become the next chief executive, while over 2016 Republicans will defend twice as many chamber seats as the opposition.¹³⁹ These prognostications suggest, for instance, that Republicans could prefer a number of the fine, mainstream nominees Obama will marshal at his tenure's conclusion to submissions whom a new Democratic President might appoint, especially should Republicans not maintain the chamber. If the GOP wins the presidency, the figures above show Democrats will probably capture the Senate, which means the less the Republican party cooperates now the more likely that action will spark Democratic conduct as problematic or worse once 2017 begins.¹⁴⁰

138. See *supra* note 52 and accompanying text. If delay persists, Democrats can apply rather dramatic, confrontational notions. Obama may use the bully pulpit to hold the GOP accountable. Senators might protest with panel session boycotts. See *supra* notes 105, 109; *infra* note 145 and accompanying text.

139. Chris Cillizza, *10 Senate Seats Most Likely to Switch Parties in 2016*, WASH. POST (June 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/10-senate-races-most-likely-to-switch-parties-in-2016-elections/2015/06/07/d9215fbc-0d13-11e5-9726-49d6fa26a8c6_story.html; Heather Haddon, *Presidential Battle Fuels Republican Worries over Senate*, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 23, 2015, 7:41 PM), <http://www.wsj.com/articles/presidential-battle-fuels-republican-worries-over-senate-1450917553>; James Hohmann & Elise Viebeck, *Trump Leads in Polls Because GOP Primary Voters Don't Value Electability*, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2015), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/08/04/the-daily-202-trump-leads-in-polls-because-gop-primary-voters-dont-value-electability/>.

140. Even if Republicans win the presidency and chamber, Democrats may adopt pay-back strategies akin to concepts the GOP used in Obama's first six years. See *supra* notes 3-83 and accompanying text.

D. *More Dramatic, Controversial Approaches*

Nevertheless, were GOP senators to resist Democrats' overtures or reject collaboration, Obama may actually consider additional dramatic, controversial alternatives. He can rely on the bully pulpit to hold GOP legislators accountable for slowly choosing picks, tendering few aspirants or delaying the confirmation regime following nomination or make openings an election issue.¹⁴¹ The chief executive and lawmakers can agree to drastically revamp the system through inauguration of a bipartisan judiciary whereby the party lacking executive control might designate specific percentages of nominees, a technique several legislators have adopted.¹⁴² Congress may package this idea with bills authorizing seventy-three judgeships, which could take effect over 2017, thus advantaging neither party.¹⁴³

If the situation becomes egregious, comparatively radical devices might be indicated. For example, Obama always can recess appoint designees, yet he wisely refrained from capitalizing on that notion because thorny legal and political concerns trouble the solution's application.¹⁴⁴ Democratic members could also boycott committee nomination hearings and meetings, while the caucus may analogously treat chamber floor activity, thereby confounding attempts to conduct panel and Senate business.¹⁴⁵

E. *The Judiciary*

Finally, the Constitution assigns the political branches greater responsibility for selection than the courts, but they might apply numerous mechanisms. For instance, Chief Justices William Rehnquist and John Roberts deployed Year-End Reports to ex-

141. See David Stras & Ryan Scott, *Navigating the New Politics of Judicial Appointments*, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1869, 1902–06 (2008) (discussing the benefits of “going public” and using the “bully pulpit” to ensure a smooth path to confirmation for judicial nominees); Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2261.

142. See Michael Gerhardt, *Judicial Selection as War*, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 688 (2003); Carl Tobias, *Postpartisan Federal Judicial Selection*, 51 B.C. L. REV. 769, 790 (2010); *supra* text accompanying notes 68, 115.

143. Tobias, *Filling the D.C. Circuit Vacancies*, *supra* note 12, at 140; *supra* note 43 and accompanying text. If selection fails to improve, more judgeships will not help.

144. Stras & Scott, *supra* note 141, at 1906; *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2261.

145. See *supra* note 138 and accompanying text. These may slow Obama nominees.

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plain how openings directly undercut the courts and harm liti-
gants while reprimanding both parties for stalling confirma-
tions.¹⁴⁶ Individual jurists or the bench as a whole, through enti-
ties, notably the Judicial Conference, may publicly and
dramatically register opposition to delay in selection. For exam-
ple, particular jurists or institutions have criticized, and should
continue emphasizing, the pressures which numbers of vacancies
impose and even testify before Congress or lobby it and each leg-
islator on matters like increased judgeships.¹⁴⁷ Nonetheless, cer-
tain actions might elicit concerns about separation of powers or
judicial independence, specifically over the presidential election
year.¹⁴⁸

CONCLUSION

If minuscule 2015 confirmations—resembling the few approv-
als seen during presidential election years—represent the new
majority's definition of regular order, this nascent leadership in-
spires de minimis confidence about 2016 court appointments. Es-
pecially ironic has been that the regular order trope suffuses
much GOP discourse, even while the party has continued to un-
dermine this order in the approval system. Recalcitrance and not
honoring the chamber's duty have acutely undercut the coordi-
nate judiciary's attempts to fulfill essential constitutional respon-
sibilities. Thus, during 2016, Obama and senators must again
implement regular order derived from traditions used over recent
presidential election years, namely district confirmations until
autumn and the conventional appointments record compiled
across 2007–08. Only then may the courts better deliver justice.

146. YEAR-END REPORTS, *supra* note 97.

147. See *supra* notes 44, 97, 143 and accompanying text. Some judges enjoy cordial re-
lations with senators and urge them to fill vacancies. Tobias, *Filling Judicial Vacancies in
a Presidential Election Year*, *supra* note 100, at 1003.

148. Stephen B. Burbank, *The Architecture of Judicial Independence*, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
315, 316–17 (1999); see Tobias, *Filling the Judicial Vacancies in a Presidential Election
Year*, *supra* note 100, at 1002. Unorthodox ideas, such as changing life tenure or electing
judges, can apply but need legislation or constitutional amendment and, thus, are not fea-
sible for 2016. Carl Tobias, *Dear President Bush: Leaving a Legacy on the Federal Bench*,
42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1041, 1054 (2008).

EPILOGUE

Unfortunately, the Senate, especially the Republican majority, has managed to ignore my cogent suggestions for filling the many vacancies in the 2016 presidential election year. The process began slowly in 2016, a circumstance exacerbated by Justice Antonin Scalia's vacancy which arose in mid-February¹⁴⁹ and the concomitant GOP refusal to consider U.S. Circuit Judge Merrick Garland, whom President Obama nominated on March 16.¹⁵⁰ This year, the Judiciary Committee accorded *one* district court nominee a hearing before April 20¹⁵¹ and has held over two district nominees for months without reasons.¹⁵² Five nominees won confirmation before President's Day,¹⁵³ although under regular order, they deserved 2015 votes. It remains unclear how long the GOP will use failure to consider Judge Garland as one critical excuse for also declining scrutiny of the fifty lower court nominees.

Obama promptly nominated a stellar pick for the Supreme Court, and the Constitution's phrasing, policy, practical and political considerations, history, and custom show that the Senate should expeditiously and carefully review the nominee.¹⁵⁴ On March 16, Obama nominated Garland, who has been a D.C. Circuit member for nineteen years and its Chief Judge since 2013.¹⁵⁵ However, quickly after Justice Scalia's death was reported, Senator McConnell announced that the chamber would not consider any Court nominee until after the November elections, a position

149. Adam Liptak, *Justice Scalia Who Led Court's Conservative Renaissance, Dies at 79*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2016, at A1; see Jonathan Martin, *G.O.P. Unites Against Obama*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2016, at A23.

150. Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, *Nomination Sent to the Senate* (Mar. 16, 2016), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/16/nomination-sent-senate>; see Michael Shear et al., *Obama Pick Engages Supreme Court Battle*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2016, at A1; *infra* notes 156-57.

151. *Hearings on Judicial Nominees Before the S. Judiciary Comm.* (Jan. 27, 2016; Apr. 20, 2016).

152. *Hearing on Judicial Nominees Before the S. Judiciary Comm.* (Dec. 9, 2015). Robert Colville and John Younge had their Senators' support at a 2015 hearing. *Id.*

153. U.S. COURTS, ARCHIVE OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES (2016), <http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies>; see, e.g., Agreement on Restrepo Nomination, U.S. SENATE DEMOCRATS (Dec. 9, 2015, 5:50 PM).

154. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2; Tobias, *Senate Gridlock*, *supra* note 3, at 2236.

155. See sources cited *supra* note 150.

that the Majority Senator Grassley, in arguing for Garland,¹⁵⁶ would make a finality.¹⁵⁸ A few GOP majority have de jurist.¹⁵⁹ Thus, a s of a hearing, muc

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156. Press Release, S //www.mcconnell.senate/42F5-B8F0-F4244B9D772B&Group_id=0fd6ddca ed. Feb. 23, 2016) (stat (statement of Sen. McC Sen. Reid).

157. Press Release, S Court Justice Antonin S releases/grassley-statem CONG. REC. S897 (daily S1661 (daily ed. Apr. 5, tion to a Nominee, But S at A12; Kelsey Snell, *Wh liberals More Than Demo com/news/powerpost/wp/ nomination/*.

158. Burgess Everett POLITICO (Feb. 16, 2016 preme-court-219320; Ma Court Nominee Battle, N politics/senator-charles-g erett, *Conservatives Poun politico.com/story/2016/0-*

159. See Emmarie H tends a Hard Path, N.Y. tics/merrick-garland-coll erett, *Conservatives Poun politico.com/story/2016/0-*

160. This is especially William Ty Mayton, *Re COMMENT*, 515 (2004) (di

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that the Majority Leader has steadfastly defended ever since.¹⁵⁶ Senator Grassley has concomitantly refused to schedule any hearing for Garland,¹⁵⁷ although the Chair had initially stated that he would make a final decision after learning the nominee's identity.¹⁵⁸ A few GOP Senators have interviewed Garland, but the vast majority have declined White House invitations to meet with the jurist.¹⁵⁹ Thus, a standoff currently appears to govern the prospect of a hearing, much less any final consideration.

Should Republicans persist in refusing to consider the President's nominee, Obama could institute several actions. If he cannot persuade Republicans to change their minds, Obama might recess appoint Judge Garland, but that concept is fraught with legal, practical, and political difficulties.¹⁶⁰ Obama could also use the bully pulpit to cajole the GOP by, for example, withdrawing Garland's name and tapping other nominees to focus public attention on Republican obstruction.

156. Press Release, Sen. Mitch McConnell, *Justice Antonin Scalia* (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.mcconnell.senate.gov/public/?p=PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=8E6839F9-181B-42F5-B8F0-F4244B9D7927&ContentType_id=C19BC7A5-2BB9-4A73-B2AB-3C1B5191A72B&Group_id=0fd6ddca-6a05-4b26-8710-a0b7b59a8f1f; see 162 CONG. REC. S925-26 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2016) (statement of Sen. McConnell); *id.* at S1775 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 2016) (statement of Sen. McConnell). *But see id.* at 1776 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 2016) (statement of Sen. Reid).

157. Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, *Grassley Statement on the Death of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia* (Feb. 13, 2016), <http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-statement-death-supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia>; see also 162 CONG. REC. S897 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 2016) (statement of Sen. Grassley); *id.* at S1647, S1661 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 2016) (statement of Sen. Grassley); Michael D. Shear, *An Invitation to a Nominee, But Simply to Explain Why No Is the Answer*, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2016, at A12; Kelsey Snell, *Why Won't Grassley Hold Supreme Court Hearings? He Fears Republicans More Than Democrats*, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2016), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/04/04/grassley-sticks-to-republican-script-on-supreme-court-nomination/>.

158. Burgess Everett, *Grassley Won't Rule Out Hearings on Obama SCOTUS Pick*, POLITICO (Feb. 16, 2016), <http://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/chuck-grassley-obama-supreme-court-219320>; Mark Landler & Jennifer Steinhauer, *President Raises Stakes in Court Nominee Battle*, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/us/politics/senator-charles-grassley-hearings-supreme-court-nominee.html?_r=0.

159. See Emmarie Huetteman, *Court Nominee's First Meeting with Opposition Portends a Hard Path*, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/us/politics/merrick-garland-collins-boozman-grassley.html?_r=0; Seung Min Kim & Burgess Everett, *Conservatives Pounce Over Garland Meetings*, POLITICO (Apr. 4, 2016), <http://www.politico.com/story/2016/04/kelly-ayotte-meet-merrick-garland-supreme-court-221538>.

160. This is especially true after *NLRB v. Noel Canning*, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). See William Ty Mayton, *Recess Appointments and an Independent Judiciary*, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 515 (2004) (discussing constitutional issues surrounding recess appointments).

So long as the GOP continues to refuse any Supreme Court nominee processing, Republicans should process the fifty lower court nominees. Even if they relent on Garland, plentiful time remains to consider him *and* numerous lower court nominees. Grassley might promptly set panel hearings and votes for all well qualified consensus nominees every few weeks for the session's remainder. McConnell should concomitantly schedule robust floor debate, if needed, and final ballots for all nominees expeditiously after the panel reports them. The GOP should follow its vaunted regular order, but Republicans might also want to prioritize by, for instance, considering nominees for emergency vacancies first.

President Obama has discharged his constitutional responsibility for nominating excellent, mainstream prospects for the Supreme Court, the appeals courts and the district courts. The Senate majority now must fulfill its constitutional duty to provide advice and consent on those nominees.

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