8-1988

Political Instability in the Arab Middle East

Delores M. Moses

Political Instability in the Arab Middle East

by

Delores M. Moses

MASTER OF ART

in

Political Science

University of Richmond

August, 1988

Thesis Director, Dr. Sheila Carapico

The objective of this thesis is to prove that the Middle Eastern

States, excluding Israel, experience political instability because

the people lack state nationalism. State nationalism is defined as

pride on the part of the people in their state to the extent that

they transfer their primary loyalty from their village, ethnic, or

religious group to the national government. The people will share

a sense of oneness and a common identity with the government if they

possess state nationalism.

The methodology used in this paper was to apply the indigenous

theory of Christopher Clapham to historical events and the political,

social and economic institutions of Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt. Clapham's

theory explains that political instability of third world states,

which includes the Middle East, is the result of domination by western

powers; lack of legitimacy of state government; distribution of political

power within the state; lack of a broad power base of the government;

lack of a shared value system between the government and the people;

and the manipulation of state economic resources by government.

The application of Clapham's theory to Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt proved that the people lack state nationalism as a result of the characteristics identified by Clapham's theory and has resulted in the political instability of each state.

Dr. Sheila Carapico

Dr. John W. Outland

Political Instability in the Arab Middle East

by

Delores M. Moses

B.A., Glassboro, University, 1970

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty

of the University of Richmond

in Candidacy

for the degree of

MASTER OF ART

in

Political Science

August, 1988

Richmond, Virginia

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. WHY IS THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST POLITICALLY UNSTABLE?

The Middle East appears to be a powder keg ready to explode.

The national nightly news invariably includes reports of street battles

between different groups in Lebanon, embroiled internal struggles

in Iran and Iraq, as well as their continuing eight year cross border

conflict. Leaders in Egypt and Lebanon have been assassinated during

the past 10 years and the rulers and leaders in most of the Middle

Eastern countries are continuously threatened by attempted coups and

assassination attempts. These are all signs of political instability.

Before attempting to explain the cause of the political instability

experienced by the Middle East in the 20th century, it is necessary

to define the terminology being used.

Political instability refers to the inability of a country to

maintain a governmental system capable of providing a legal and peaceful

transition in national leadership as well as in the composition, leader-

ship and operation of the institutions of government to meet the needs

and expectations of its citizens in a manner consistent with the pre-

vention of violent conflicts between groups or by groups against the

government.

The Middle East, as used in this paper, refers to Egypt, countries

of the Arabian peninsula, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Lebanon. Israel is

not included because it is predominantly Jewish and is not confronted

by internal political unrest among its citizens. Israel does experience

daily unrest in the occupied Palestinian areas of the West Bank.

One of the major reasons Middle Eastern countries experience political instability is because they lack state nationalism. What is state nationalism? The term state nationalism used in this paper refers to the development of a sense of unity as one people on the part of the people within the geographic boundaries of a state. The people share a common identity and a sense of pride in their state and its identification as an independent entity of the world. State nationalism develops only after the people's pride in their state takes precedence over their ethnic or religious group membership. For example, a citizen of Lebanon would consider himself to be a Lebanese. The fact that he is a Christian, a Muslim, or an Arab is not of primary importance.

Political scientists have tried to develop theories to explain the political and economic underdevelopment of third world states since the 1960's. Of the theories developed, Clapham's indigenous theory which advocates a study of the total internal composition of a state, its history and way of life, most completely explains the causes of the underdevelopment and resultant political instability in third world states.

The development theory of Samuel P. Huntington is not sufficient to explain political instability in third world states because he sees

the political structure within a state as being the primary criterion.

Huntington states the lack of a single effective national authority,

either democratic or dictatorial, prevents the establishment of political

institutions and gradual incorporation of the people into the political

system. The lack of political institutions and the exclusion of the

people from participation in government, according to Huntington, is

responsible for third world state political instability.[2]

The dependency theory of Andre Gunder Frank is also insufficient

in explaining political instability in third world states because he

sees the development of capitalism during the colonization period and

its continuation after independence as the culprit. Frank explains

how capitalist economic systems developed an elaborate satelite-metro-

politan center system in third world states with the rural areas dominated

by and furnishing raw materials to the urban areas who exported the

raw materials to the dominant world capitalist powers. The exportation

of raw materials to world capitalist powers prevented the industrial-

ization and economic development of third world states leaving them

dependent upon economic aid and loans from international monetary funds

for survival. According to Frank, the economic inequality within third

world states and their lack of economic development explains their

political instability.[3]

Clapham does not reject Huntington's and Frank's theories; he

simply feels they are not sufficiently comprehensive. Clapham incorporates

Huntington's developmental theory and Frank's dependency theory into

his own theory and adds additional criteria. Clapham states the history

of the third world states is very important because most of them were

held as colonies of the western powers or were under the control of the western powers after World War I because of the League of Nations Mandate System. The League of Nations Mandate System and colonization allowed the western powers to create states and establish the system of government within those states according to their (western powers) desires rather than those of the people within the states.

Clapham identifies five additional characteristics within third world states which in many instances resulted from domination by the western powers and account for their underdevelopment and political instability. These characteristics include the manner in which political and economic power is divided within the state, the lack of legitimacy of the government, the lack of a broad political base by government, the lack of shared values between government and the people and the manipulation of the state's economic resources by government.[4]

Most of the Middle Eastern States have their own political, social and economic characteristics separate and distinct from other states. Therefore, the theory developed by Clapham must be used in order to correctly establish the determinants of the political instability of the Middle Eastern States. Each of the six characteristics established by Clapham as explaining the causes of political instability in third world states which includes the Middle East will be explained in the pages that follow.

1. Domination by Western Powers

Clapham explains that most third world states, including the Middle Eastern States, were dominated by the western powers before and after World War I. The western powers drew the geographic boundary lines

without considering the ethnic, religious or cultural background of

the people incorporated into the state. For example, Lebanon was created

by France from the old Ottoman Empire and included Shiite and Sunni

Muslims, Druze, and several Christian religious groups. The political

and economic structures of third world states were established and

controlled by the western powers consistent with their own interests

and desires rather than the inhabitants of the state. The western

powers also selected the leaders within the states they had created.

For example, Great Britain imported the King of Iraq during the Mandate

period from another area in the Middle East and used military force

to require King Farouk to select a prime minister favorable to England.

The economic system in the third world states was controlled by the

western powers in such a manner as to benefit them monetarily. For

example, Great Britain forced Iraq to give British companies control

over the exploration and drilling of Iraqi oil. The ruling elites

which had developed while under western domination attempted to continue

the political and economic systems established by the western powers

after gaining independence. The quest for control of the political

and economic systems by members of the ruling elite and by those excluded

from power by the ruling elite has led to tremendous civil disorder

within third world and Middle Eastern States.[5]

2. Division of Political Power Within The State

    According to Clapham, third world state power is usually strongly

hierarchial, with power radiating from the capital through a set of

territorial subdivisions. The type of political authority most prevalent

in third world states is called "Patrimonialism" and is defined as a

system in which authority is ascribed to an individual who is firmly
anchored in a specific social and political order. The concept which
underlies this type of authority is that of a father over his children.
In this system, those down the political heirarchy are not subordinates
but vassals or retainers whose position depends upon the leader to
whom they owe allegiance. Neither the leader nor his followers have
defined powers since what matters is not the amount of power but on
whose behalf power is exercised. The system is held together by oaths
of loyalty or kinship ties. A government official considers his position
to be personal property and his underlings to be personal subordinates.
Clapham states the political system of the third world states today
is more accurately called neo-patrimonialism since they are not feudal
societies and officials in bureaucratic organizations do have defined
powers. Thus the political system does have a rational legal basis.

The division of political power in the states of the Middle East
very closely fits the description given by Clapham. The countries
are ruled by dictators supported by the military or monarchs. Some
have tried to portray themselves in the manner described by Clapham.
For example, Nasser was a very charismatic leader and Sadat tried to
portray himself as a father to his people.

3. Legitimacy of State Government

According to Clapham, third world state governments lack legitimacy
because they are not based on a widespread commitment to a form of
government that can select and sustain political leaders.

Many third world states inherited constitutions drawn up by a colonial
power prior to the granting of independence. However these constitutions
were discarded or changed to suit the needs of the incumbent govern-
ment which had the effect of placing the power of the state in the
hands of a ruling elite rather than the people. Constitutions drawn
up after independence by the incumbent governments have not survived
because the division of power was not based on the consent of the people
but on the desires of the incumbent government. Bureaucracies and
institutions of government do exist in third world states to provide
benefits for the citizens and operate the institutions of state government.
However, all power of government is held by the ruling elite and results
in large amounts of personal and political corruption. In many instances
various ethnic groups are included in the government but are excluded
from power positions. Many third world states disallow any political
party other than the ruling party. [6]

Some of the Middle Eastern countries have written constitutions
but do not allow the provisions of the constitutions to be followed.
For example, the Egyptian parliament has been powerless since its creation
and has been used by Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak to rubber stamp their
policies. A ruling elite is present in all the Middle Eastern countries
and it is within that elite that many of the power struggles occur.

4. Lack of Power Base of Government

Clapham explains that the person who rules a state possesses all
power. Therefore, competition occurs in third world states between
organized political parties, if parties are allowed, between different

factions within society or on the part of the military to gain control

of the state. The ruler of a state will either try to manipulate opposition

groups by playing them off against each other or will simply destroy

his rivals. Some rulers try to portray themselves as prophets who

are trying to achieve some public and national goal. Other leaders

may simply be tyrants whose personal desires dictate government action.

A ruler must establish some type of coalition in order to stay

in power. He may base his coalition on ethnicity, but this can prove

to be dangerous if the excluded minority groups gather sufficient strength

to successfully revolt. Serious and major revolts usually occur in

countries ruled by a minority group. Leaders in countries which are

predominantly one ethnic group may be overthrown by persons within

their group who desire to gain control of the power of the state. Charismatic

leaders whose dynamic personality helped them to gain power have appeared

in some third world states but were unable to stay in power due to

an insufficient power base.

Some rulers of third world states attempt to base their coalition

on residents of urban or rural areas. It appears the most successful

leaders have been those able to gain the support of urban dwellers

especially the professionals, students, trade unions and most importantly,

the army.

Since the governments in the Middle Eastern countries are dic-

tatorships, they lack a broad power base. Generally the ruler has been

able to stay in power as long as he could retain the backing of the

military. When dissention occurs among the people, rulers have used

various tactics to retain control. Sadat attempted to use the religious

extremists in Egypt to rid himself of trouble from the Nasserites which eventually led to his assassination. The leader of Iran is also the religious leader and advocated a return to a Muslim religious state as a method of gaining power. The power base of President Mubarak of Egypt appears to be the old traditional rural elites rather than the urban masses or peasants.

5. Lack of Shared Value System Between Government and People

According to Clapham, the Neo-Patrimonial authority system per-petuates a political system based on the personal power of an individual whose power base is kinship ties or oaths of loyalty. This type of authority system prevents a shared value system between government and the people. It allows the official to return to the pre-colonial system in which one did not distinguish between his private and official self. A neo-patrimonial authority system has the same characteristics as tribal societies in which loyalty to one's group is the primary social value. This prevents the development of a national self identity or state nationalism. The artificial national communities created by the 19th century colonial powers and the incorporation of these societies into a global economy prevented a sense of common value, formation of a national self identity and development of a shared value system among the citizens of each state.[7]

The lack of a shared value system between the government and the people is very evident in the Middle Eastern States. Since the governments are dictatorial, persons in government positions obtain and retain their positions and source of wealth by being loyal to the ruler. Loyalty to one's ethnic group as a primary value is particularly evident

in Lebanon and has led to the destruction of the government.

6. Manipulation of Economic Resources By Government

Clapham states that third world state economic development policy is state development policy. The first priority of the state is to maintain political control through the use of force or economic manipulation. The most profitable and easily controlled area of economic activity is that concerned with external trade and export production. All economic planning is done from the standpoint of political gain and the state becomes the broker between domestic and external interests. Many third world state leaders unfortunately are not concerned with correcting underdevelopment problems but with staying in power and must not endanger the consumption pattern of the urban area whose support is essential. Therefore economic concerns and funds are shifted from the countryside to the cities. Showpiece development projects are carried out which are politically rather than economically advantageous. Foreign aid is often used not to eliminate hunger and promote health but to help government maintain control. Most third world states are dependent upon international trade to generate revenues which are used to control the country and stay in power. Usually the economy is based on the extraction of commodities such as oil, minerals, etc. for trade on the world market. Many states have allowed large multinational cor-porations to actually extract the goods for a share of the profits. Being tied to the exportation of goods usually results in importation of goods for domestic consumption rather than the development of domestic industries. When world markets decline, the exporting countries find themselves short of funds and borrow from international funds such

as the International Monetary Fund which has the effect of intensifying

their economic problems and underdevelopment.[8]

All economic planning in the Middle Eastern States, with the exception

of Lebanon, is done by the dictatorial governments in order to retain

power. Since the Lebanese government is currently powerless, the factions

militarily controlling specific areas of the state control the economic

activity with their own area.

The six characteristics identified by Clapham as being responsible

for political instability in third world states are applicable to the

countries in the Middle East. Some characteristics are more evident

than others in various countries, but the total theory of Clapham does

explain why the people of the Middle Eastern States have failed to

develop state nationalism and are therefore politically unstable.

I have chosen to apply Clapham's theory to case studies of Iraq, Lebanon,

and Egypt with emphasis on developments within these countries since

World War I. I will demonstrate how each of the characteristics described

by Clapham had the cumulative effect of preventing the people of each

state from uniting together as one people and therefore prevented the

development of state nationalism. The people of Iraq and Lebanon place

their first priority on loyalty to their ethnic or religious group

rather than the state which has resulted in continuous political instability

and unrest and in the case of Lebanon, political chaos. The people

of Egypt are of the same ethnic and religious background. However,

Clapham's theory is still applicable because the political power structure

and economic manipulation he described was and is present. The people

are not united as one people and do not share values with the governing

elite. State nationalism is not the primary value of the governing elite nor among all political and religious groups in the country.

II. INSTABILITY IN IRAQ

Present day Iraq has experienced nine years of relative stability in government. Can the stability continue? Only future events will answer the question, but several factors such as the military's displeasure with President Hussein's handling of the Iran-Iraq war, serious economic problems resulting from the war, and the unrest among the people as a result of the war raise serious doubt about the continued longevity of the Hussein regime.

Why is political stability a problem in Iraq? Because the people of Iraq like those in most third world states have not developed state nationalism because of the factors described by Clapham as being present in states who are politically unstable. What are these factors which are responsible for lack of state nationalism and the resultant political instability. According to Clapham's indigenous theory, a study of Iraq's history and the internal composition of its political, economic and social structure will answer the question. The reasons for Iraq's lack of state nationalism and political instability will be explained in accordance with Clapham's theory in the remainder of this chapter.

Current day Iraq (once known as Mesopotamia) was part of the Persian Empire until 636 when it became part of Arabia. During the period of Arabian domination, the people were forced to convert to the Islamic religion and adopt the Arabic language. The period from 750 to 1258 was known as the Golden Age of Islam due to tremendous advances in Science, Literature and Art. The people were split into Shiite and Sunni Muslims as a result of the schism which occurred

in the Islamic religion following the death of Muhammed regarding

the legitimate religious base of leadership succession and the correct

interpretation of the Koran. In 1258, Julagu, the grandson of Genghis

Khan, invaded Baghdad and destroyed five centuries of achievement.

From 1258 to 1534, when it was taken from Persia by the Ottoman Turks,

Iraq experienced constant turmoil due to fighting by the Sunni Muslim

tribes of Northern Iraq, Kurdistan and part of Baghdad and the Shiite

tribes of Southern Iraq and Baghdad. Iraq was ruled by the Ottoman

Turks from 1534 to 1918. The Ottomans exercised little political

control over Iraq and were primarily concerned with the collection

of taxes. In order to effectively collect taxes, the strongest tribal

chiefs were appointed by the Turks as governors of the provinces. The

Turkish failure to develop unified political institutions or a central

administration caused Iraq to become fragmented and created cleavages

between the Sunni and Shiite Muslims, urban and rural populations,

and the Arabs and Kurds. Constant local uprisings by the less powerful

Shiite tribes in the south and the Kurds in the north occurred during

this period.[9]

Great Britain became interested in establishing trading posts

in Iraq during the 17th century and accomplished this goal in the

18th century with the establishment of a British East India Company

trading center in Basra. The company used the trading center for

direct intervention in non-commerical affairs. For example, they

loaned the Pasha of Baghdad six ships to quell rebellious tribes,

helped to appoint and unseat governors and arbitrated disputes between

local chieftain. Although the region was legally part of the Ottoman

Empire, British power was supreme and by the 19th century a British

diplomatic mission was established in Baghdad. The missions in Basra

and Baghdad were considered vital to the protection of British interest

in both Iraq and India as they feared Russian and German penetration

into the area.

1. Domination by Western Powers

Since the Ottoman Turks were allied with Germany, Great Britain

occupied Southern and Central Iraq when World War I began to prevent

German occupation of Iraq which would threaten British trade in Iraq

and India which was a British colony. By the end of the war, Great

Britain was administering Iraq like a British colony with tight control

over all government functions. According to Peretz,the British Acting

Civil Commissioner in Iraq,Sir Arnold Wilson, believed it was England's

peculiar mission to bestow its gift of efficient administration,

impartial justice, honest finance, and security on a backward people.[10]

Sir Wilson said the Iraqis who demanded self government were ungrateful

extremists and should be firmly repressed. In 1918-1919, Wilson arranged

a plebiscite to determine whether the population favored a single

Iraqi Arab country under British tutelage. He instructed the British

officials to conduct plebiscites only when public opinion was likely

to be in accord with the British desire for an single state under

their control. None of the tribal unrest, Shiite demands for a theocratic

Muslim state or Arab nationalist sentiments were reflected in the

plebiscite results.

Great Britain received the League of Nations Mandate in 1920

to oversee the establishment and operation of government in Iraq.

The boundary lines of Iraq as drawn by Great Britain in 1920 included

the provinces of Basra and Baghdad and included a diversity of people

whose previous history indicated an inability to peacefully coexist.

Southern Iraq was inhabited predominantly by Shiite Muslims (40% of

total population) who were less educated and much less prosperous

than the Sunni Muslims who inhabited Northern Iraq (35%). The Arab

Sunnis had been educated and given preferential treatment by the Sunni

Ottoman Turks. In addition, the country included a variety of Christian

denominations and Jews.

British High Commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, after replacing Sir

Arnold Wilson in 1920, organized a provisional state council with

the Baghdad Sunni leader as prime minister. Government posts were

given to influential Iraqi families (mostly Sunni) and religious sects

from various districts with each official guided by Cox, who had the

final word in all matters. The British selected their wartime ally,

Amir Faisal, a non-Iraqi Sunni Muslim and son of Sharif Hussan of

Hejaz in Arabia, to be the leader of Iraq. By means of threats and

political pressure, Sir Percy Cox obtained a unanimous vote for Faisal

by the Iraqi Provisional Council and a 96% popular vote in a controlled

plebiscite. In August, 1921, King Faisal I was crowned as the ruler

of Iraq. Great Britain withdrew its acceptance of the League of Nations

Mandate and incorporated the mandate principles into the 1922 Anglo-Iraqi

treaty of alliance which gave Great Britain final control over Iraqi

foreign, military, financial and judicial affairs and provided for

the establishment of British military bases in Iraq. Using pressure

tactics, High Commissioner Cox forced the Iraqi Constitutional Assembly

to ratify the treaty in 1923.

From 1920 to 1925, Great Britain and Iraq disputed the owner-
ship of the oil rich province of Mosul with Turkey. In 1925, the
province was awarded to Iraq by the League of Nations on the condition
that Great Britain guarantee minority rights to its residents until
1950. The inclusion of Mosul would prove to be very troublesome in
the future because it included a large number of Kurds who are Sunni
Muslims of Persian descent with their own language and culture. The
Kurds who constituted about 15% of the total population refused to
cooperate with the Iraqi government and demanded an independent Kurdish
State.

In 1930, Great Britain and Iraq signed a new 25 year treaty which
became effective in 1932 and granted Iraq independence as a sovereign
state. The British retained control of the Iraqi military and foreign
affairs and maintained military bases in Iraq. Great Britain continued
to play a dominant role in Iraq until the 1958 revolution which overthrew
the King. [11]

2. Division of Power Within the State

The first government of Iraq was a limited constitutional monarchy
system. The King's power was extensive. He convened, adjourned,
and dissolved the legislature; appointed Senators (delegates were
elected); acted as Commander and Chief of the military; and appointed
all government officials, including the prime minister and cabinet.

King Faisal was supported by a group of Iraqi military officers
who had served under him in World War I. They were placed in high

government positions to prevent the power of government from being
concentrated in the hands of the wealthy landowners, many of whom
were tribal sheikhs. He appointed 14 different cabinets from 1922
to 1932 in an attempt to keep the government running and stay in power.[12]
According to Peretz, the governing elites considered their government
positions to be their personal possessions and used them to further
their own personal ambitions rather than to help and serve the people.[13]

King Ghazi succeeded his father in September, 1933 and ruled
until his accidental death in April, 1939. He maintained the political
system utilized by his father but was young (21) and inexperienced.
He was unable to control the rivalry among the politicians. He appointed
six prime ministers and 12 cabinets during his six year rule. During
the 1920's the Iraqi Army had steadily gained power and by 1937 was
the deciding factor in the rise and fall of virtually all cabinets.

King Faisal II (infant son of King Ghazi) ruled Iraq from 1939
until the military coup in 1958. His uncle and regent actually made
all decisions until 1952 when King Faisal II reached age 18. Nine
prime ministers and 22 cabinets were appointed during the period.

Iraq was militarily occupied and controlled by Great Britain
during World War II because they feared Iraqi cooperation and alliance
with Germany and Italy. The creation of Israel as a nation at the
expense of the Arab Palestinians, the overthrow of the monarchy in
Egypt, Nasser's successful expulsion of the British from the Suez
Canal, Iraq's ill advised joining of the Baghdad Pact in which Great
Britain was a member, the U.S. involvement in Lebanon under the Eisenhower
Doctrine, and the joining of Syria and Egypt in the United Arab

Republic had the effect of intensifying the distrust and hatred of

the people of Iraq against the western powers and the Hashemite regime

which had been pro-British except on the issue of the creation of

Israel.[14]

The Free Officers of the Army under Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassim

carried out a military coup on July 13 and 14, 1958 and placed the

country under martial law. Brigadier Qassim became the prime minister

and Col. Abdul Salem Muhammed Arif the deputy prime minister.

Qassim was overthrown by a coalition of pro-Syrian and pro-Nasser

Baathists both of whom favor pan-Arab unity and Arab socialism, in

February, 1963. Brigadier Ahmad Hasan Al Bakr became prime minister

and Col. Abdul Salam Arif became the new president. In November,

1963, Arif led another coup, banned the Baathist Party, set up the

Iraqi Socialist Party as the only legitimate party, sought union with

Egypt and made the office of the presidency superior to all others.[15]

The army took control of the government on July 17, 1968 and

Field Marshal Ahmed Hasan Al Bakr became the president of Iraq and

commander of the military. He set up the Revolutionary Command Council

as the governing unit of the country and placed the country under

pro-Syrian Baathist Party control. He appointed his nephew, Saddam

Hussein al-Tahriti as vice chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council

and in November, 1969, Saddam became the vice president of the country.

Political parties who did not cooperate with the government were abolished.

All government officials who were not members of the Iraqi Baath Party

and all civil servants considered to be unfriendly to the party were

removed.

The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) whose members must be members of the Iraqi Baath Party, is the top decision making body of the State of Iraq and exercises all executive and legislative power. The RCC is headed by the chairman who is also the president of the country. He supervises the work of the cabinet and all institutions of government. President Al-Bakr held all power of government. He was president, prime minister, commander of the military, president of the RCC, president of the Iraqi Baathist Party and head of all branches of government.[16]

Saddam Hussein succeeded to the presidency in July, 1979. Immediately upon gaining power, Saddam ordered a purge of the Baathist Party executive, the Revolutionary Command Council, cabinet and upper echelon of the government bureaucracy. Twenty-two men were executed and 33 were sentenced to prison. In essence, Saddam eliminated all those whom he saw as a threat to his control of the government. Saddam accused Syria of instigating a plot against him and ordered the Syrian embassy closed. This had the effect of terminating a year long attempt by Iraqi and Syrian Baathist parties to merge, reconcile their differences, and achieve a partial union. Saddam effectively ended any prospect of a challenge from within the Baathist Party.[17]

Since 1958 the army has been in control of the government of Iraq and even though a written constitution exists, the governmental system is in reality a military autocracy. The military has set aside constitutional law, ruled by decree and substituted coups for elections. The system used by each president since Qassim to maintain control of the army is to promote loyal officers to upper level jobs, transfer

those who are questionable to unimportant positions or to arrest and execute those vehemently opposed to the president.

The preceding pages have described the extent of political instability within Iraq since the state came into being and has outlined how the power of government has always been held by the elites within the country. During the period when Iraq had a constitutional monarch system of government, persons who supported the King and after 1930's found favor with the army were able to hold influential positions in the state and prosper economically. Since 1958, all power of government has been held by the military but this did not promote stability because even the military was split between various factions who sought to gain and maintain power and place their policies into effect. At no time during the brief history of the State of Iraq has power of government been made available to all the citizens of the state. The Sunnis have held supreme power even though they are a minority in the country.

3. Legitimacy of State Government

The first Iraqi government lacked legitimacy because of the manner in which it was created by Great Britain. They chose a non-Iraqi monarch and manipulated a referendum of the population for approval of the King. The various minority groups, Shiite Muslims, and Kurds boycotted the election because they were opposed to the British interference in their country and feared rule by the Sunni King.

King Faisal appointed Sunni elites to the top positions in government and ruled without a parliament until 1924. The first constitution of Iraq, was a result of a compromise between Great Britain and King Faisal I. It established a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral legislature but the king could rule by decree in the absence of the

legislature. Islam was the official state religion and Arabic the

official language. The Muslim legal system was divided between Sunni

and Shiite religious courts. Voting was not direct. Male subjects

over 21 years of age who paid taxes could vote for district electors

who in turn, chose representatives to the National Chamber of Deputies.

This electoral system allowed the leading Sunni families, Shiite religious

leaders and tribal sheikhs to control the voting and place their own

hand picked candidates in parliament. The Assyrian Christians and

Kurds were denied positions of influence in the government.[18]

The structure and operations of the Iraqi government remained

as previously described until the military coup in July, 1958 with

the exception of the gradual accumulation of a large portion of gov-

ernment power by the military. The military started the accumulation

of power in the mid 1920's and by the mid 1930's was the dominant

group since the monarch required their support in order to retain

the throne.

The government officials had repeatedly used the military to

rid themselves of opposition and to repress the numerous Kurdish re-

volts. Thus, the military gradually realized their importance and

ultimate power.[19]

The military coup of July, 1958 ended the pretense of parliamentary

government because elections have not been held since that time. A

Provisional Constitution adopted within two weeks of the July, 1958

coup did not include provisions for a return to representative government.

The military placed the Revolutionary Command Council and the Iraqi

Baath Party in control of the government in July, 1968. The 1968

constitution issued by President Al-Bakr was never put into effect

and the RCC, of which Al-Bakr was president, ruled by decree.[20]

The Provisional Constitution of 1970 proclaimed Iraq as a

sovereign People's Democratic Republic dedicated to the ultimate reali-

zation of one Arab state and to the establishment of an Arab socialist

system. Islam was designed as the religion of the state but since

the Baathist Party is secular, Islam is not the basic source of law.

The constitution created three branches of government; the Revolutionary

Command Council (RCC), the National Assembly and the Judiciary. The

RCC is composed of 22 members elected by the majority of the Regional

Command of the Baath Party. The National Assembly is to include 100

members but the manner of their election was not stated and therefore

has never been established. The Judiciary is to be appointed by the

president. Since the president is the head of the three branches

of government, he holds absolute power as long as he retains the backing

of the military. [21]

According to Clapham, a state government lacks legitimacy if

it does not have a widespread commitment to a form of government that

can select and sustain political leaders. Iraq's past history of

frequent changes in government officials and numerous coups proves

the country does not possess the necessary commitment to select and

sustain its political leaders. Iraq has not conducted the government

according to the provisions of its constitutions. The constitutions

did not include provisions which would enable the selection of leaders

based on the consent of the people. Therefore, the government of

Iraq does lack legitimacy.

4. Lack of Power Base of Government

Since King Faisal I was not an Iraqi but a British import, he

attempted to establish a base of power by appointing fellow Sunni

elites and military officers who had served under him, to important

positions in government. By the mid-1920's, two opposing groups had

formed in Iraqi politics. One group, the Ahd party, stressed Iraqi

nationalism and the importance of economic and political development

of the Iraqi state. They affirmed Arab brotherhood and solidarity

with other Arab states but not to the extent of interfering in the

affairs of other Arab states. This group also supported friendly links

with Great Britain. The second group, the Ikhwa party (National Brotherhood),

espoused a militant, extremely intolerant Arab nationalism which was

opposed to the League of Nations Mandate and British interference

as well as democracy. The Ikhwa party opposed King Faisal for his

readiness to mediate with the British government and other outside

influences.

The 25 year treaty with Great Britain in 1930 which recognized

Iraqi independence but granted military privileges to Britain such

as the establishment of two air bases near Basra to be manned by British

troops for five years was vehemently opposed by the Ikhwa.[22]

After gaining independence as a state in 1930, the King attempted

to form a coalition cabinet but the Ikhwa refused to participate since

they refused to accept the British treaty. A transition government

was then formed but was so severely attacked by the Ikhwa that the

King appointed one of its leaders to head up a new government.

During the reign of King Faisal's 21 year old son, Ghazi (1933-1939),

the Ikhwa successfully undermined any government appointed by the

King which was not headed by an Ikhwa leader. The Ikhwa was able

to use the Southern Iraqi tribal resentment of the national government's

central authority to stir up rebellion against the government. The

leaders of the southern tribes had been excluded from power by the

government. The Ikhwa also manipulated incidents which would renew

Sunni-Shiite clashes. Tribal land disputes during this period further

complicated the issue along with Shiite grievances regarding the mandatory

1934 conscription laws and their exclusion from power by the Sunni.

All of these events led to 12 days of revolts among all the tribes

in the southern part of the Middle Euphrates in 1934.

The King finally appointed members of the Ikhwa party to head

up the government led by Prime Minister Yasin Al-Hashimi. Independent

politicians and power hungry Baghdad officials used the Ikhwa's own

strategy and again stirred up the tribes but this time the revolts

were directed against the Ikhwa Party. General Bakr Sidqi resorted

to martial law, put down the rebellion and disposed of the opposition.

Al-Hashimi quickly concentrated power in his own hands, dissolved

the Ikhwa Party and said he represented all groups in the country.

Hikmat Sulayman, former Minister of the Interior under King Faisal I,

who had been excluded from power in the Al-Hasimi government negotiated

with General Bakr Sidqi and other army officers to overthrow the govern-

ment. By this time the army had become extreme nationalists and its

officers believed a strong military regime was necessary to eliminate

foreign control. The army desired to establish pan-Arab solidarity,

to help sister Arab countries, especially Syria, trying to gain inde-

pendence from imperial domination and to bring about the necessary

reforms for the establishment of law and order. The army basically

controlled the government and the prime minister until 1942 when the

British militarily occupied and controlled the country.[23]

The post World War II period was particularly turbulent and the

people of Iraq were at the mercy of the groups attempting to gain power in order to implement their ideas and policies. The groups vying for power included the old conservative oligarchy, the Arab nationalists, liberals who wanted to establish democracy and ranking military officers who wanted to control the government. In addition to these groups, the country experienced continued tribal unrest and Kurdish revolts.[24]

On July 13 and 14, 1958, a military coup occurred which placed the country under military control and in 1968 another coup placed the country under military and Pro-Syrian Baathist control. Iraq is currently a military and Baath Party autocracy.[25]

According to Frederick W. Axelgard, political pressures against President Saddam Hussein's rule are reaching an intense level. He has been able to stay in power by manipulating the Baath Party Congress. In 1982, Hussein was able to shift the blame for the major defeat and subsequent retreat of Iraqi forces from Iranian territory to the Revolutionary Command Council. He used the same tactic following the 1987 Iraqi's defeat in Mehran, Iran. The events which have prompted opposition to Hussein in addition to Iraq's major military defeats in its' eight year was with Iran are the severe economic strains the war has placed on the Iraqi economy, dissatisfaction of Iraqi military officers with Hussein's leadership and tremendous social unrest as a result of the war and its economic consequences as well as the continuous Kurdish revolts.[26]

As has been indicated in the preceeding pages, the government
of Iraq has since 1920 lacked a stable and broad base of power. When
King Faisal I selected his fellow Sunnis to high positions, he placed
a minority of the population in control of government. The Sunnis
were not in agreement about the policies of government and very quickly
split into factions. The King's attempts at coalition government
was a total failure because of the opposition of the Ikhwa Party and
its deliberate agitation of the tribal groups in the Middle Euphrates.
By the end of the 1930's, the army had become the power base of the
government. However, this did not provide stability in government
because the army was also divided into factions. Some military officers
were pro-Nasser and others were pro-Syrian. If the military were
a united group, the power base of the government would still be very
insecure and would not provide stability because the military is Sunni
dominated and does not represent the interest of the people. Those
in power are simply determined to maintain power in order to serve
their own self interest. Accordingly, Clapham's theory that the lack
of a broad power base of government does contribute to the political
instability in the country is accurate. This is thoroughly demonstrated
by the number of changes in government leadership which have occurred
along with the coups and periodic revolts. The historical data cited
demonstrates the constant quest for power among various factions in
Iraqi politics.

5. Lack of Shared Value System Between Government and People

Since the first King of Iraq was from Arabia, he did not have

a common identity with the people of Iraq except that he was a Sunni

Muslim which was also the religion of the minority but elite class.

The people of Iraq did not possess a common national or state identity

because the country as created by Great Britain included a religious,

ethnic and tribal conglomerate of people. Under the Turks, the people

had lived in tribal groups and developed a sense of tribal or ethnic

group loyalty. King Faisal I excluded from power all groups except

the Sunni elites who considered themselves as superior to all other

groups. Those excluded from power had no incentive for cooperating

with or to shift their loyalty to the government.[27]

Forty percent of the people were Shiite Muslims, the Arab Sunnis

constituted 35% and 15% were Kurdish Sunnis who did not identify nationally

or culturally with the Arabs. The Arab Sunnis had been educated by

the Turks and had for centuries enjoyed greater power and economic

prosperity than the Shiites. The Arab Sunnis used that power to keep

the Shiites educationally, politically, socially, and economically

inferior. Obviously, the Shiites strongly resented the position of

prominence which the Sunnis enjoyed. Also,within Iraq was a small group

of Assyrian Christians who were disliked by all Muslims because they

were pro-British. The Kurds hated the Assyrians because they had

cooperated with and been used by the British to put down Kurdish revolts

during World War I.[28] In 1930, about half of the population were nomadic

or seminomadic tribes, about one third of the populations had settled

on farms and about 12% were urban dwellers (mostly Arab Sunnis).

Among the tribal groups, loyalty to their tribe and tribal leader

was their first priority rather than religion.

Within 10 years of gaining power, the Sunni elites were divided

between those who wanted to develop their own country economically

and politically and share a common identity with all fellow Arabs

and those who wanted to join with other Arab countries to become one

large Arab state. According to Penrose, nationalism in the fullest

sense probably existed among a small number of educated people who

had some knowledge of European governments.²⁹

Another factor which prevented the development of a united state

with a sense of common identity as one people was the role Great Britain

played in Iraq after the state was created. The 1922 agreement between

King Faisal and Great Britain allowed British advisors to ·emain

in Iraq and tutor Iraqi officials. However, the advisors exercised

considerable power especially until 1930 when Iraq was gran.ed independence

and membership in the League of Nations. The people of Iraq felt

they were but a colony of Britain, and resented foreign interference.

The British presence had the effect of causing the people to turn

against the King and those in power because of their cooperation with

the British. The Shiite and Sunnis did cooperate with each other

briefly in 1920 in an attempt to prevent the British from taking control

under the League of Nations Mandate but this was not based on nationalistic

feeling. They simply shared a common anti-British sentiment. The Shiites wanted to prevent the establishment of any type of central authority because they feared Sunni domination.

The emergence of the Ikhwa Party in the early 1930's was another decisive force because they were strongly anti-British, anti-Faisal and deliberately agitated the powerless tribal groups to create revolts and thereby force the King to give in to their demands for leadership positions in government.[30]

The numerous appointments of prime ministers and cabinets by the Kings from 1922 to 1958 did not in any was unify the country or help to create a sense of oneness among the people. Basically the shifts in government leadership were the result of quests for power among the Sunni elite.

All power of government in Iraq has been in the hands of the military since the coup in July, 1958. Again this did not unify the country. It simply shifted power to a different group among the Sunni elite. At no time has serious consideration been given to granting proportional or equal power in government to the Shiites, Kurds, and other minority groups. To do so would invite disaster for the Sunnis because they are a minority in the country.[31]

The three million Kurds in Iraq share a common identity with the eight million Kurds in Turkey and the five million Kurds in Iran. The Kurds consider themselves to be a distinct ethnic group who can trace their heritage to 614 B.C. when they ruled over Central Asia

in a tribal group called Medes. They feel they are entitled to the
right of self determination and desire that all Kurds be allowed
to form a separate state. According to Nader Entessar, the Kurds
possess ethnic nationalism because they share a common language (Kurdish),
religion (Sunni), race (Persian nationality) and territory (mountain
regions of Iran, Iraq and Turkey).[32]

Successive Iraqi governments have tried unsuccessfully to acculturate
the Kurdish people by suppressing Kurdish culture, education and political
institutions. The Kurds resorted to guerilla warfare and refused
to intermarry with non-Kurds since the 1920's in order to preserve
their way of life. Faced with a war it could not win, the Iraqi government
under President Hasan Al Bakr offered a new plan for Kurdish autonomy
in March, 1974. The Kurds rejected the offer because they were militarily
strong and receiving monetary and military assistance from the Shah
of Iran and the United States. When the Shah signed an agreement
of cooperation with Iraq in 1975, in an effort to save his own regime,
and the United States shifted its priority to obtaining the Egyptian-
Israeli Sinai agreement, the Kurds were forced to reconsider. The
acceptance of the 1974 Autonomy Law by the Kurdish Democratic Party
under the leadership of Hashim Hassan Aqrawi caused a split for the
first time in the Kurdish people. Two Kurdish groups, the Kurdish
Democratic Party Provisional Leadership and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan,
continued to fight against the Iraqi government and their fellow Kurds.
The Autonomy Law allowed the Kurds to control their own provincial
government but the legislative and executive members who were Kurds

were appointed by President Saddam Hussein. The dissenting groups

finally consented to cooperate with the Iraqi government in 1983 because

they felt they could negotiate with President Saddam Hussein whereas

20,000 of their fellow Kurds had already been killed by Khomeni in

Iran. The Kurds simply were no longer able to continue the fight.

The instability in the Iraqi government and any future changes in

leadership may again alter the Iraqi-Kurdish peace.[33]

Irregardless of settlement of the Kurdish Revolt problem, no

attempts have been made by the Sunni elites and President Saddam Hussein

to truly unite the peoples of Iraq.

6. Manipulation of Economic Resources by Government

During the Ottoman period, land among the Shiite tribes in Southern

Iraq was the property of the entire tribe who farmed it as a group.

About 1900 the nomadic tribal system began to break down as large

numbers of tribesmen settled permanently. To encourage permanent settlement

and political stability, the British during the 1920's, King Faisal and

his descendents in the 1920's and 1930's, passed legislation that turned

tribal lands over to the sheikhs. The sheikhs became the legal landowners and

the tribesmen were reduced to sharecroppers. By 1958, the tribesmen had

become virtual serfs who had to pay five sevenths of their earnings to the large

landowners. Much of the land in the north belonged to urban merchants who

gained their wealth through inheritance or through confiscation of

peasant land for non-payment of debts. Land was owned by a very few

large owners. Several estates were over 100,000 acres and the two

largest were 250,000 each. The large landowners controlled not only

the agricultural economy, they were also the group who possessed political

power. The King needed their support to stay in power and thus they

were allowed to control the peasants a virtual serfs.[34]

Great Britain used its League of Nations Mandate and subsequent

Anglo-Iraqi agreements in 1922 and 1930 to obtain a strong control

of Iraq's oil resources. The inclusion of the province of Mosul in

the State of Iraq was the result of an agreement between France and

Great Britain. France agreed to give up their claim to Mosul in exchange

for British concessions in Syria and a share of Mosul oil concessions.

After King Faisal I was placed on the throne, serious negotiations

began to govern the exploration of Iraqi oil. The United States insisted

that she be given a share of the oil concession because of her con-

tribution to the defeat of Germany and that Iraq be open to all companies

who wanted to participate in the oil exploration. France had already

claimed the German 20% of the Turkish Petroleum Company, Great Britain

had claimed 70% and given 10% to the native government.

The final agreement signed in 1925 set up 24 plots (each of which

was 8 square miles) to be used for 75 years by the Turkish Petroleum

Company with a set royalty rate to be paid to the Iraqi government

for the oil taken from their land. Within four years Iraq was to

select 24 additional plots and make them available for bid to any

oil company. The oil concession given to the Turkish Petroleum Company

covered all of Iraq except an eastern area called Khanaquin and Basra.

Therefore, any company obtaining a lease for oil paid the lease purchase

price to the Turkish Petroleum Company (now called Iraq Petroleum

Company) but the royalties went to the Iraqi government. In 1931

additional agreements were worked out between the Iraqi government

and the Iraqi Petroleum Company to provide lump sum taxes to Iraq

rather than an actual tax on the profits from the oil. By 1941 the

Iraqi Petroleum Company working through subsidiaries had acquired

a monopoly on all Iraqi oil. [35]

Iraqi government revenues rose from 4 million dinars a year in

the period 1931 to 1935 to nearly 28 million dinars in the period

1946 to 1950 about 12% of which was from oil, 25 to 26% from import

duties and the remainder from indirect taxes, including an agricultural

tax. Exports of cereal, dates, cotton and other agricultural products

plus the oil exports allowed for increased imports. Until the 1950's,

government revenues were insufficient to finance large engineering

works necessary to control the Tigris-Euphrates Rivers and to set

up irrigation projects to improve agricultural production. By 1950, about

two thirds of the land titles of Iraq (excluding southern Iraq and

the desert lands) had been settled. The transfer of land from tribal

to private ownership placed much of the land in the hands of wealthy

tribal sheikhs and town merchants who served as landlords over the

peasants. Farming was done on a sharecrop basis. Basically, agriculture

and industry during the monarch period in Iraq was a spoils system.

Those who supported the government were given the opportunity to own

and operate the farms and industries and accumulate wealth. Industrial

investment was very small and out of 60,000 employed industrial enter-

prises in 1950,only 2000 worked in modern industrial plants. The govern-

ment expended considerable amounts of money on urban amenities and

the larger towns changed rapidly but by 1950 only 40 towns had piped

water. No town had municipal sewage but electricity, which was British

owned, was widely available.[36]

By 1950, only 20% of the people had attained a standard of living

that would be described as healthy or comfortable and only a very

few could afford or had access to luxury items. After the overthrow

of King Faisal II in 1958, the government attempted to bring about

agrarian reform modeled after the program in Egypt. The land reform

law called for the expropriation of 75% of privately owned arable

area, limited the amount of land one person could own, and stated

the expropriated land would be redistributed to small owners. The

land reform program was never completed and less than one third of

the land was ever redistributed. The remainder of the land was placed

under the control of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and farmers cultivated

it based on agreements with the ministry. In 1961 the Iraqi government

expropriated 99.5% of the land granted to the Iraqi Petroleum Company

and in June, 1972 nationalized the Iraqi Petroleum Company. By 1973,

Iraq had complete control of its own oil for the first time.[37]

In 1970 new agrarian reform laws further reduced the amount of

land which could be privately owned and sought to bring agriculture

and industry into government hands. A 1975 law broke up the estates

of tribal landowners. Currently the government intention is to develop a

very capital intensive collectivized agriculture with farmers working on

state land as state employees. The same policy has been implemented

with reference to industry. Industry was nationalized in 1964 and

all large industries are now owned and operated by the government.[38]

In 1970, 90% of Iraq's Gross Domestic Product was the result
of oil revenues. The Iraqi government has used these revenues to
purchase equipment, building materials, etc. from foreign suppliers
rather than develop domestic industries to supply the needed products.[39]

Iraq's eight year war with Iran has drastically reduced its oil
revenues and thereby its Gross National Product. In 1980 oil revenues
were $26.1 billion a year or 66% of their Gross National Product.
By 1984, oil revenues had declined to $10.4 billion a year or 34.3%
of their Gross National Product. The decline is the result of the
closing of many Iraqi ports which required them to transport the oil
overland to Turkey, Jordan, and Kuwait.[40] Iraq's prolonged war with
Iran has forced it to borrow from foreign nations. Iraq's estimated
debt in 1987 was between $40 and $60 billion at least half of which
was owed to Arab states.[41]

Conclusion

The historical data presented in the previous pages concerning
political and economic developments in Iraq from 1920 to the present
explain why political instability is and has always been a problem.
The basic reason for the political instability is that the people
of Iraq lack state nationalism. They are not united with a sense
of oneness and do not consider themselves Iraqis above any other loyalty.
The people still give their loyalty to their religious, ethnic or
tribal group rather than the government which represents all of them.

The reasons for the lack of state nationalism are in accordance
with the criteria established by Christopher Clapham. The people

and government of Iraq were controlled by Great Britain from 1920

to 1930 under the League of Nations Mandate and subsequent Anglo-Iraqi

treaties. Great Britain imported a King from Arabia and established

a government which was Sunni dominated and friendly to them rather

than one which would be consistent with the needs and desires of the

people. The distribution of power in government has always been among

the Sunnis who are a minority in the country. The Sunnis had power

under the monarch system from 1921 to 1958 and still retain power

under the military autocracy. The government of Iraq has lacked legitimacy

from its inception. The monarch system was created by Great Britain

and forced on the people in 1921 and the current government is the

result of a military coup in 1958. At no time have the citizens of

Iraq been given a legitimate voice in government or been consulted

about its formation. Great Britain did manipulate a referendum when

the monarchy was created but that could hardly be considered legitimate.

Although Iraq does have a written constitution, the government does

not abide by its provisions.

The government of Iraq throughout its history always operated

without a broad base of support and used force and control of economic

resources to stay in power. Since government power has always been

in the hands of a Sunni minority who constitute only 35% of the popu-

lation, it has been necessary to use force to stay in power.

Since the state of Iraq was created from three provinces of the

Ottoman Empire and included a conglomerate of people, they do not

and have never shared a common value system and have not developed

a common identity or sense of oneness as a people. The Sunni dominated

government has always excluded all other groups from power and economic
prosperity and has thereby prevented a sense of nationalism.

The economic resources of Iraq have been under the complete control
of the monarch until his overthrow in 1958 and under the control of
the military since that time. In the 1920's, 1930's and 1940's, most
of the oil resources were actually controlled by foreign owners (primarily
British). The agriculture and industry were basically controlled
by the King and those who supported him (spoils system). Since 1958
and 1964, agriculture, land and industry respectively have been govern-
ment owned and operated. The oil industry was nationalized in 1972
and is now government owned and operated. Basically the system in
Iraq could be called Arab Socialism because the government owns and
operates the means of production and the state plans the entire economy.
Iraq's eight year war with Iran has had severe economic consequences
with a resultant huge foreign debt. This has added to the unrest
in the country and has the potential for creating additional political
instability in Iraq.

Political stability in Iraq can be achieved over a period of
time only if the political leaders change their policies. They must
stress Iraqi nationalism instead of Arab nationalism. They must grant
equality to the people and gradually incorporate them into the political
system. Only then will state nationalism and political stability
develop.

III. CHAOS IN LEBANON

A civil war has been raging in Lebanon since April, 1975 and
at the current time seventeen different groups are vying for power
in the state. Lebanon is not a united state but is fragmented to
the extent that it is most accurately described as several mini states
within a state. Why does chaos exist in Lebanon? Because the people
do not possess state nationalism which means they are not loyal to
their state national government. Instead they are loyal to their
specific ethnic or religious group. A study of the history of Lebanon
and its internal political, economic and social institutions reveal
that Clapham's indigenous theory is applicable and does explain the
causes of the instability and chaos in Lebanon. An examination of
the six basic characteristics delineated by Clapham as being responsible
for instability in third world states, as they appear in the history
of Lebanon, will be presented in the remainder of this chapter.

Lebanon is the only country in the Middle East, except current
Israel, which was not predominantly Muslim inhabited. The area was
originally occupied by Phoenician merchants until the 7th century
when the Arabian armies invaded. The Arab Muslims were never able
to gain total control of the northern mountain regions. The mountains
became a refuge for Christians with the Maronite Christians being
the dominant group. Arab customs and social values did penetrate
the Christian areas and Arabic became the adopted language by the
13th century.

By the end of the 11th century, Maronite Christians, Shiite Muslims,
and Druze dominated the Lebanese mountains. Maronites were predominant
in the north and Shiite Muslims formed the majority in the remainder

of the region. During this period, followers of Egyptian Fatima Caliph
al-Hakim (985-1021) entered the area led by the disciple Darazi.
They joined with local Lebanese and formed the distinctive community
known as the Druze.

The European Crusaders invaded Lebanon in the 12th century. The
large French contingent among them established ties with the Maronite
Christians that would serve as the basis of the future special relation-
ship between France and Lebanon. The failure of the Egyptian Fatima
in Cairo, who had gained control of Mount Lebanon from the Sunni Caliphate
in Baghdad, to protect the Shiites from the crusaders led to the decline
of their influence in Lebanon. Sunni Muslims organized and drove
the Crusaders from the Middle East. Thereafter, the Sunnis dominated
Egypt, Syria and Lebanon and attempted to force the Shiites and Druze
in Lebanon to become Sunnis.

In 1516 the Ottoman Turks (also Sunni Muslims) conquered Lebanon
and controlled the area for four centuries. The Ottoman Turks continued
the Arab policy of allowing a local Lebanese notable to rule a semi-
autonomous state. The Druze Ma'an and Shibab princes ruled the area
until 1840 when Bashir Shibab was exiled for forming an alliance with
Egyptian leaders against the Turks. During this period, the Maronite
Christian community, with the support and assistance of France, grew
in population and prosperity and moved southward. The Turkish Sultan
had allowed Louis XIV of France to adopt and become the special guardian
of the Maronites in 1649.

In an effort to prevent Christian-Muslim conflicts in the area,
the Turks divided Lebanon into two districts. The northern district

was to be placed under a Christian subgovernor and the south under

a Druze. The period 1840-1861 was marked by constant turmoil as the

Christians supported by France and the Druze supported by Great Britain

clashed. Following direct European intervention, Mount Lebanon was

reunited and made a semiautonomous governorship. The governor was

a non-Lebanese Ottoman Christian appointed by the Sultan with the

approval of the European powers. The governor was aided by an elected

administrative council with each religious group equally represented.

This system remained in effect till the end of World War I when the

area came under the control of France by virtue of a League of Nations

Mandate. [42]

1. Domination by Western Powers

When the American King-Crane Commission visited Lebanon in 1919,

they learned that the Maronite Christians desired close ties with

France because they feared control by Arab Muslims who were the dominant

group in the Levant (Syria and Lebanon). The Arab Muslims opposed

separating Syria and Lebanon. The commission recommended that Lebanon

be given a degree of independence as an autonomous government within

the Greater Syrian State. The League of Nations Mandate assigned

both Lebanon and Syria to France with the condition they be governed

as separate parts of one political entity.

In order to establish a base of French influence in the Muslim

Middle East, France separated Lebanon from Syria with the Maronite

Christian dominated Mount Lebanon as the heartland of the State. They

tripled the area of Lebanon by adding the cities of Beirut; Tripoli

in the North; Sidon in the South and the fertile Biqa Valley in the

East. Southern Lebanon was predominantly Shiite; Maronite Christians

dominated the North; and the remainder of the country was a mixture

of Muslims and Christians. According to Peretz, the Muslim areas

were included to justify the continuation of French control of the

area.[43]

France tightly controlled Lebanon until the end of World War

II through a high commissioner who held absolute power and was usually

an army general. According to Peretz, the governmental system was

dual in nature because the French felt the native population must

be educated and prepared for independence and self government.[44] The

native government was assigned specific duties by the French and was

staffed by Lebanese. The high commissioner organization was staffed

by French political and military officers who took charge of the departments

of security, education, public works, antiquities, and an organization

for Beduoin affairs. The high commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction

over customs, communication and transportation, and if he was a military

person, he commanded the Lebanese army. In the event the native government

proved deficient, the high commissioner would correct the mistakes

and could impose martial law if deemed necessary. A staff of information

officers operated in every district in Lebanon and kept the high com-

missioner informed of political sentiments. French administrators

and technical advisors were hired (not part of the high commission

organization) and attached to various native government departments

with status as Lebanese government officials.

According to Peretz, government officials (French) were often

corrupt and operated in an arbitrary manner.[45] Local employees were

not chosen wisely, properly trained, or given an appropriate measure of responsibility. Consequently, public services were poorly developed.

The first native government was elected and established in 1919 based on the old Ottoman Central Administrative Council. However, it was soon abolished by the French and replaced by a more pliant appointed administrative commission which consisted of 15 members and included all religious groups. Six members were Maronite Christians, three Greek Orthodox, two Sunnis, two Shiites, one Druze and one Greek Catholic. When the appointed commission was replaced in 1922 by an elected representative council, this religious proportionment was maintained.

Under the direction of the French, a constitution was written and implemented in 1926 which established a Lebanese republic with a president and cabinet responsible to a bicameral legislature. Both houses of the legislature were joined into a unicameral system in 1927. This system of government was called the confessional system and continued the division of power with the government on the basis of religion. By unwritten tradition, the president was always a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni and the President of the Chamber of Deputies a Shiite. Foreign affairs was Christian controlled and defense was usually in the hands of a Muslim or Druze chief. The French commissioner retained ultimate control over the native constitutional government.

The dual French High Commission and native Lebanese governmental
system stayed in effect till the outbreak of World War II in 1939.
At that time, France abolished the Lebanese government and constitution
and assumed total control.

When the French were defeated in 1940, Lebanon was occupied by
the Italians until June, 1941, when it was liberated by allied Free
French and British forces. From June, 1941, until December, 1946,
a constant political battle existed between Great Britain and the
Free French under General Charles de Gaulle because of Free French
efforts to regain Mandate control of Lebanon. Only the threat of
military action by Britain forced the Free French to withdraw. By
1947, Lebanon was a free and independent state.[46]

2. Division of Political Power Within the State

The National Pact of 1943 governmental system in Lebanon was
negotiated by Christian Maronite leader Bishara al-Khoury and Sunni
Pan-Arab leader Rijad Solh. It allowed the Maronite Christians to
retain control of the presidency; the premiership was reserved for
a Sunni Muslim; speaker of the parliament was to be a Shiite Muslim;
the deputy speaker of the parliament was to be a Greek Orthodox Christian;
and the Army Chief of Staff a Druze. Parliament was to be divided
according to a 6 to 5 Christian-Muslim ratio and the same ratio was
to be maintained in the cabinet and bureaucracy.[47]

The National Pact political system in Lebanon preserved the power
of the various ethnic, religious and communal leaders and prevented
the development of a parliamentary political system which would cut
across communal and religious boundaries. For example, if a specific

office was to be filled by a Sunni, the Sunni leadership felt they had the right to clear the candidate for the office. Consequently, the traditional patron-client system evolved into one of personal and family gain and the exploitation of the community by its elites. Widespread corruption and nepotism occurred which prevented new leadership groups from emerging. The entire system caused the further polarization of the political system along religious and ethnic lines rather than the development of the sense of oneness as Lebanese.

President al-Khoury (1943-1952), who was supported by the old wealthy Maronites, ignored Lebanon's internal problems and the need for fundamental social reform. Nearly all political activity was concerned with private affairs. The political corruption began to arouse popular feeling as scandal after scandal was reported in the press. Al-Khoury retained political control through manipulation of election lists, bribery, threats, buying off and beating up of journalists and the paying off of the judiciary. A rigged election in 1947 provided a parliament of al-Khoury's supporters who adopted a constitutional amendment permitting the president to succeed himself. The constitution provides for a single six year term of office. A coalition of nine parliamentary deputies, who had resisted al-Khoury's threats, led by Druze leader, Kemal Jumblatt, and progressive independent Maronite, Camille Chamoun, organized an unlawful public rally against al-Khoury. When the army refused to back al-Khoury, he resigned in 1952.

The National Pact system stayed in effect in Lebanon until the beginning of the current civil war in April, 1975 when the political

system began to disintegrate. Although the structure of the government today is still maintained, it is a hollow shell. Various ethnic group leaders still occupy the positions of president, premier, speaker of the parliaments, etc. but the offices are powerless because the power within Lebanon belongs to the different groups who militarily occupy specific communities within the state and control all activity within that community.[48]

President Camille Chamoun (1952-1958) began the process which finally led to the destruction of the National Pact system. Chamoun lost the support of Jumblatt when he refused to consider social and constitutional reform and concentrated instead on building his own political machine. He pushed election reforms through parliament which excluded the traditional Sunni, Shiite and Druze leaders from government and stacked parliament with pro-Chamoun Muslims. This resulted in Lebanon's first civil war as ousted leaders rallied their followers against the government. In addition, strong Arab Nationalist sentiments had developed in Lebanon due to Nasser's emergence as a hero to the Arab world following his expulsion of the British from the Suez Canal. Nasser called for a union of all Arabs. The Druze supported the revolution for their own political reasons. Syria gave financial and military supply support to their fellow Sunnis. At the request of Chamoun, President Eisenhower sent U.S. Marines to Lebanon to restore peace. They did not become militarily involved but their presence helped to neutralize the situation and preserved the political system. Parliament elected General Fuad Shebab to replace Chamoun.

President Fuad Shebab (1958-1964) was supported by the traditional

leaders. He was able to calm the situation and adopted a pro-Nasser
foreign policy which appeased the Muslims. Shebab disrupted the delicate
balance of power in government by adopting a paternalistic centered
political policy which concentrated all power in his hands and a trusted
kitchen cabinet headed by Elias Sarkis. Shebab used the military
intelligence bureau to maintain control and sponsored the formation
of the Phalange Party, a countryside Maronite radical political orga-
nization, which rapidly surplanted the traditional patron-client re-
lationship of the Maronite oligarchy based on clan or village.

Charles Helou (1964-1970) was a very weak president. His weakness
and that of the national government allowed the interference of other
states and organizations in the internal affairs of Lebanon. The
1967 Arab-Israeli War resulted in the immigration of 400,000 Palestinians
and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) leaders to Lebanon.
The PLO commandoes used Lebanon as a staging area for raids against
Israeli settlements which resulted in Israeli retaliatory raids into
southern Lebanon. The actions of Israel in or toward Lebanon since
1967 have had a very detrimental effect upon the stability of the
government. When the Lebanese army finally made an attempt to control
the PLO, the Muslim leaders in Lebanon invited President Nasser of
Egypt to negotiate an agreement between the PLO and the Lebanese government.
The Cairo Agreement worked out by Nasser gave the PLO autonomy in
Lebanon while maintaining the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon.
However, the real outcome of the Cairo Agreement was the official
sanction of another decisive force, the PLO, in Lebanon. The Phalange

Party felt they had been betrayed and proceeded to build a strong militia to defend themselves.

In 1970 a coalition of Maronite leaders elected Suleiman Franjieh as President of Lebanon. Franjieh was a traditional Maronite from Northern Lebanon, who had his own private army. He ha previously used it against agitators who threatened to involve the country in clashes with Iran. Franjieh was associated with the Chamounists and blamed former President Helou for allowing the Palestinian guerillas to threaten the sovereignty of Lebanon. Franjieh excluded Druze leader Jumblatt from power in the government. Jumblatt immediately organized the National Movement, a coalition of radical and leftist parties, who began to call for the dismantling of the National Pact system. The National Movement formed their own militia. In 1970 Jordan expelled the PLO and they immediately set up headquarters in Beirut. This led to intense fighting between the PLO and Israel and eventually to the destruction of the power of the Lebanese.

From 1973 to 1975 continued clashes between Sunnis, Shiites, Druze and Maronites along with the continued PLO raids and Israeli reprisals caused the deterioration and final disintegration of the Lebanese political system. The Syrian Army entered Lebanon in 1976 in support of the PLO and to help control the violence in Lebanon. Syria had been intervening since 1969 through the pro-Syrian Palestinian guerilla group, Saiga, by giving political and economic support to various factions within Lebanon.

The 1973 Arab Oil Embargo gave not only wealth but tremendous

power to the Arab states and greatly increased the confidence, pride

and feelings of power of the Arab Muslims in Lebanon. The assassinations

of Maanuf Saad, Sunni leader of the Populist Nasserite Organization,

the assassination of two bodyguards of Maronite leader, Pierre Gemayel,

and the resulting massacre of 27 Palestinians by the Maronite militia

in 1975 ended the National Pact system of government. The civil war,

which is still raging today, started at that time.[49] According to Norton,

the power of the national government has been totally destroyed and

is now held by the seventeen factions who control all political and

economic activity within the area of Lebanon over which they have

military control.[50] The powerlessness of the state national government

is demonstrated by the fact that when Syria attempted to negotiate

a ceasefire and solution to the violence in Lebanon in December 1985,

the persons included in the conference were the leaders of the various

militias rather than the President, Amin Gemayel, and other traditional

leaders.[51]

The division of political power within the government of Lebanon

from the beginning of the Mandate period until the civil war began

in 1975 meets the definition given by Clapham as being present in

third world states who are politically unstable. The Confessional

and National Pact system divided the power of government on the basis

of religion. This system concentrated power is the hands of the traditional

leaders of the various religious communities who were able to call

upon village and family loyalties to win elections. Because the central

government was based on a coalition of the religious groups within

the country and could only function effectively with a consensus,

it was a weak government. This allowed government officials to develop

tremendous personal power because they dispensed public services to

their constituents and thereby solidified their personal power base.

Members of parliament maintained support by the distribution of funds

to buy votes, bribes, bringing voters in from other districts, etc.

Another factor which was very important and detrimental to the stability

of the Lebanese government was the continuation of Maronite Christian

domination of the political system after independence, usually through

corrupt means, which resulted in the further polarization of the country

along religious lines. Since the civil war began in 1975 the country

has been continuously splintered into factions based on religion and

ideology. All of these factors prevented the people from developing

an identity as Lebanese. Instead, they remained primarily Shiites,

Sunnis, Druze, etc.

3. Legitimacy of the National Government

Of the states in the Middle East, Lebanon's early government

most closely correlated to Clapham's definition of a state which possesses

legitimacy because it did have a system of government with a written

constitution designed to select and sustain political leaders. The

1926 constitution was continued by agreement between the Maronite

Christian and Sunni Muslim leaders after gaining independence in 1946.

Several factors prevented the Lebanese system from being truly legitimate

because they prevented the government from being created by the consent

of the people which resulted in discord and eventual civil war. First

was the decision by France to separate the areas which constitutes

current Lebanon from Greater Syria based on their desire to create

a French dependency in the Middle East rather than the desires of

the people of the area. Second was the creation of the Confessional

system of government which was drawn up by the Maronite Christian

and Catholic leaders under French supervision rather than representatives

from the various ethnic and religious groups. Third was the Sunni

refusal to accept their share of the power of government or participate

in government because they wanted to be part of Syria which was also

predominately Sunni. The Shiites refused to support the Confessional

system because they were leary of Sunni reaction since they were dominated

by the Sunnis who are a large majority in the Muslim world. The Sunnis

feared domination by the Maronite Christians who were the single largest

group and feared the Maronites would try to make Lebanon a Maronite

national homeland.[52]

By the mid 1930's the Muslims were participating in the government

but the seeds of discord remained. Although many disputes occurred

between the Muslims and Christians and within each group, they were

able to keep the government functioning until 1958. However, the

Christian-dominated government did not provide the same level of government

services and projects to the Muslim communities, particularly the

Shiite communities, as were provided for the Christian communities.

This widened the gap between the Christians and Muslims.[53]

The first civil war occurred in 1958 because the Christian President,

Camille Chamoun, attempted to seize more power by excluding influential

Muslims from power. Arab Nationalist sentiments had also grown strong

among the Muslims. From 1958 to 1975, the Christian and Muslim groups

within Lebanon became more divided and formed additional parties

and militias. Since 1975 the government has been unable to function

in a manner consistent with maintenance of control and protection

for its citizens and has been unable to prevent interference from the PLO, Syria and Israel. Syria presently dominates activities of the government in Lebanon to the extent that the president is not consulted about developments within the country.[54] President Gemayel's term of office expires in September, 1988. It is not possible to determine at this time whether an attempt will be made by the Lebanese parliament to fill the vacancy.

4. Lack of Power Base of Government

The Lebanese government did not have a firm and large base of power from its inception because the Muslims, both Shiites and Sunnis, refused to participate or support the government and Christians were divided over the issues of pan-Arabism. The Greek Orthodox who were the second largest Christian group supported the Sunni idea of union with Syria. They had been able to peacefully coexist in the urban areas alongside the Sunnis for centuries and did not fear a Sunni Muslim government. The Maronite Christians and other small Christian groups established and dominated the government.[55]

The Muslim and Christian leadership who set up the National Pact system of government in 1943 did so to reorganize the political and economic system for their own benefit. The political leaders considered their government position to be a personal possession and used it to benefit themselves at the expense of their communities. Therefore, each individual developed a personal power base which prevented the development of a broad power base for the central government as a cohesive unit. According to Owen, the system would have remained stable

only if the Sunnis and Maronites had continued to cooperate; if the
leaders had been able to retain the backing of their respective com-
munities; and if the other communities, particularly Druze and Shiites,
had been willing to claim their share of the power and cooperate with
the system.[56] Since none of these conditions were met, the political
system did not remain stable and began in 1958 to come apart.

The National Pact system was put into effect during the al-Khoury
Administration (1943-1952) with al-Khoury, a Maronite Christian, as
president, and a Sunni Muslim as prime minister. Both were the dominant
figures and beneficiaries of the system. The speaker of the delegates,
a Shiite, was primarily a ceremonial rather than a political job.
Intense rivalry developed among the sect leaders for a share of the
political power and resulting economic benefits. Al-Khoury tried
to create a balance between his Christian followers and the Arab popu-
lation. In order to appease the Muslims, he adopted a pro-Arab foreign
policy. Al-Khoury's admission of 150,000 Palestinian refugees to Lebanon
following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War was a fatal mistake with
reference to the future stability of the government of Lebanon. Al-
Khoury's administration was noted for its nepotism and corruption.
He resigned only when the army refused to militarily back his attempt
to stay in power as a result of election fraud.

According to Khalidi, the population of Lebanon had doubled by
1956, but the Christian dominated government refused to conduct a
national census after 1932.[57] A great disparity existed between the
Christian and Muslim communities with reference to services provided
by the government and living conditions because the Maronites dominated

government basically took care of its own communities. The incorporation
of the coastal cities of Beirut, Tyre, Sidon, and Tripoli into Lebanon
in 1920 meant the presence of a large urban Muslim group and a large
Shiite Muslim group in Southern Lebanon. When Nasser successfully
ejected the British from Egypt in 1956 and became the hero of the
Arab world, the Muslim masses and their leaders in Lebanon adopted
a pro-Nasser attitude and began to demand a union of Lebanon with
Egypt. President Chamoun's election reforms which effectively elimi-
nated the traditional Sunni, Shiite and Druze leaders from power in
1958 further splintered the power base of the government and destroyed
the fragile coalition between Muslims and Christians under the National
Pact system.

The final destruction of the Muslim-Christian coalition occurred
during the Shebab administration (1958-1964) when he took power of
government in his own hands and used the military intelligence to
control the dissenters in the country. Shebab also started the Phalange
Party with its own militia which prompted the other Christian Maronites
to organize their own party, Kata'ib,   with its own militia.

Charles Helou (1964-1970) was a very weak president and had no
power base of his own. He was controlled by former President Shebab,
the military intelligence, and the Phalange Party. During his adminis-
tration, the PLO gained a strong foothold in Lebanon and additional
political movements with supporting militias were formed.

In 1967, the Lebanese Parliament approved the establishment of
the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council with Imam Musa al-Sadr as president.
With the backing of Syria he built a powerful movement within five

years called the Movement of the Disinherited which undermined the

traditional Shiite leadership. Al'Sadr demanded the Shiites be given

a larger share of the power of government and that previously neglected

Shiite communities be developed. His place was taken by Nabih Berri

in 1978 when al-Sadr disappeared in Libya, and Berri now controls

the strong Shiite militia, Amal, which controls portions of the Shiite

communities.

Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Druze, formed a coalition of radical

and leftist parties in 1969 called the National Movement which immediately

called for the deconfessionalization of the Lebanese political system

and the dismantling of the National Pact of 1943. A pro-Syrian Pal-

estinian guerilla group, Saiga, was formed in 1969 with the backing

of the Syrian military.[58]

Since the beginning of the civil war in April, 1975, several

additional groups and organizations have emerged in Lebanon both Christian

and Muslim. The National Liberation Party is a coalition of non-Maronite

Christians; Marada is the militia of ex-president Franjieh; the Lebanese

Force is a coalition of Christian militias; and the Lebanese army

has split into two factions. Major Sa'ad Haddad leads the Lebanese

Army Militia which is supported by and cooperates with Israel in the

security zone between Israel and Lebanon. The Lebanese Arab Army

split from the regular Lebanese army in 1976 and established headquarters

in the Biqa Valley and is supported by Syria.[59]

The Shiite Muslims have split into three major factions. Amal

(hope), led by Nabih Berri, is the largest group and calls for a pluralistic

state in which the Shiites would enjoy their rightful proportional

share of power. The Hezbullah (party of God) has close ties with

Iran, advocates the creation of an Islamic state, and is believed

to be responsible for many extremist car bombings and other terrorists

acts. The Islamic Jihad (holy war) is a shadowy extremist group about

which very little is known but which takes credit for assassinations

and suicide attacks. [60]

The Sunni community is urban, well educated and trustee of the

prime minister position in the government. It is the most politically

fragmented of all the ethnic and religious groups in Lebanon. Each

area, mostly urban, is controlled by its Sunni leader and his own

private militia. No united or large Sunni group exists except the

PLO which is not Lebanese but exiles from Jordan and Israel. The

PLO is split into four camps. Yasser Arafat's Fatah group is the

major conservative group while the Popular Front for the Liberation

of Palestine and the Democratic Party for the Liberation of Palestine

are both extreme Arab Nationalists. Both call for the overthrow of

the traditional regime in Lebanon and the establishment of revolutionary

proletariat power.[61] The PLO Fatah Uprising group led by Saeed Masa

is Syrian backed and since 1983, has fought against Arafat's group

for control of PLO areas in Lebanon.[62]

The Druze are the only group in Lebanon that is not fragmented.

They are firmly controlled by Walid Jumblatt who heads their militia

and is the president of the Progressive Socialist Party. Jumblatt

is backed by both Libya and the Soviet Union. According to Norton,

Jumblatt clearly aspires to dominate the political system in Lebanon.[63]

Syria militarily occupied the Biqa Valley in June, 1976 when
political initiatives failed to stop the civil war in Lebanon. The
Arab League sent in a deterrence force (ADF) to impose a cease fire
but its composition was 80% Syrian. Israel invaded Southern Lebanon
in March, 1978 and the alignment of the Christian militias with Israel
against the PLO placed the ADF on a collision course with the Christian
government. When intense fighting between the ADF and Lebanese Christian
militias continued, President Elias Sarkis asked the Arab world to
resolve the conflict. All Arab forces except Syrian left Lebanon.
By the end of 1978, various groups had begun to claim and militarily
occupy parts of Lebanon resulting in the fragmentation of Lebanon
into eight zones of military occupation.

In June, 1982, Israel carried out a massive invasion of Lebanon
with the intent of driving both the PLO and Syria from Lebanon and
the re-establishment of a government friendly to Israel. They success-
fully ejected the PLO and although inflicting a humiliating defeat
on the Syrian army, stopped their military drive at Beirut.[64]

According to Deeb, it appeared peace was in sight when Bashir
Gemayel, who had united the Christians and seemed to be able to command
the respect and cooperation of the Arab Muslim communities, was elected
president in 1982.[65] His assassination in September, 1982, shattered
all hopes of a united Lebanon. His brother, Amin Gemayel was elected
president one week later by parliament. Negotiations to settle the
civil war dragged on until September, 1983 when Israel decided to
withdraw from Beirut to the Awwali River and establish a military
security zone between Israeli and Lebanon. Intense fighting erupted

between various Christian and Muslim groups in order to occupy the

areas vacated by Israel.

Syria re-entered the arena in May, 1984 and tried to re-establish

itself as the mediator in Lebanon. The Shiites and Druze fear Syrian

intervention as it may prevent them from turning military gains into

political gains. The Christians were opposed to the Syrianization

of Lebanon but later came to realize Syria was the only group capable

of safeguarding their rights.

The PLO re-established itself in the Palestinian refugee camps

in Beirut and Sidon in the mid-1980's. It has an underground force

in Southern Lebanon which strikes against Israel and has friendly

relations with a number of the Lebanese factions. However, it has

not regained the power it had in the late 1960's and early 1970's

and has been prevented by Syria from re-establishing itself in the

Biqa Valley.[66]

Syria currently occupies a large portion of Lebanon and attempts

to negotiate a peace. According to Norton, Damascus has tried to

bolster the Lebanese elements that serve its interests and can exercise

effective control over parts of Lebanon.[67] Each faction in Lebanon

appears to want peace but on its own terms. Leadership struggles

within the Shiite, Sunni and Maronite communities continue as well

as intersector fighting. Lebanon today is a fragmented and partitioned

state whose official government is totally ineffective.

The historical data presented in the foregoing pages dramatically

demonstrates Clapham's assertion that one of the characteristics re-

sponsible for political instabilty in third world states is the government's

lack of a broad power base. The development of a power base by each

government official in his own community and among his religious group
prevented the development of a broad power base of the national government.
The fragmentation of the political system into seventeen militarily
controlled areas by various groups and factions within each group
indicates the powerlessness of the national government as well as
the lack of a sense of state nationalism on the part of the people.

5. Lack of Shared Value System Between Government and People

Clapham's theory states that one of the reasons for political
instability is the fact that the people do not have a common value
system. Why do the people of Lebanon lack a shared value system? Because
the state was created from a conglomerate of ethnic and religious
groups who still place their loyalty to that group over loyalty to
the state.

In the original area known as Mt. Lebanon, the Druze chieftains
held power as early as the 13th century. By 1840 a large Christian
middle class had emerged as the educated and professional group due
to French support and the Christian missionary educational systems.
By 1861, Mt. Lebanon had become an autonomous province within the
Ottoman Empire under the administration of the Christians. This gave
them a sense of pride in their identity and of national achievement,
particularly among the Maronite Christians who saw the autonomous
province as a step toward full Christian Lebanese nationhood. Lack
of ports and suitable agricultural land restricted the economic potential
of Mt. Lebanon and Christian Lebanese nationalists began to solicit
international help, particularly from France, for the enlargement

of the territorial boundaries of Mt. Lebanon to include the coastal

cities of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon and Tyre along with the Biqa Valley.

The French Mandate in 1918 enabled the Christian Maronites to achieve

their goal. However, the incorporation of the predominantly Muslim

coastal cities into the new state of Lebanon, rather that providing

the economic prosperity envisioned by the Christian Maronites, es-

tablished a politically fragmented society. The first loyalty of

the people of Lebanon remained with their ethnic or communal group

on whom they depended for daily support, stability and services.

The Christian Lebanese Maronites felt that when Lebanon was created

in 1920 it possessed certain fundamental attributes which differentiated

it from the rest of the Arab world and justified its independent status.

One of the major contributors to the Lebanese Confessional system

of government, Michel Chiha, stressed the Phoenician background of

the people and stated the country was the legitimate heir to the Phoenician

tradition. Christian writers began to call for a Phoenician Renaissance.

The writings of Chiha and others provided grounds for disassociating

Lebanon from Arabism and appealed to the Christian middle class because
[68]
it promoted the image of Lebanese as traders. According the Entelis,

the Christians considered Lebanon to be a territorial refuge for Christians

which would protect them from Muslim attempts to subjugate and disperse

them.[69] As a minority people living is an Islamic state (under Ottoman

Turks), a "persecutionists" mentality developed among the Christians

which served to unify them. Although a homogenous nationalistic attitude

did not exist among all of them, the Maronite community did manifest

a community consciousness. The Maronites did possess distinct

ethnic characteristics, a single religion and a long history as a

compact minority.

A second ideology prevalent among the Lebanese Christians was

Mediterraneanism which sought to link Lebanon's physical and cultural

origins to a Mediterranean basis as a means of distinquishing it from

the Arab world. Both Phoenicianism and Mediterraneanism ideologies

were strong during the 1930's and 1940's and although supported on

a limited basis by organized groups, they were strongly supported

by militant Lebanese Maronites. Both movements were concerned with

countering Arab nationalism and Syrian nationalism rather than develop-

ing a viable Lebanese nationalist ideology which would make Lebanon

a cohesive state.

One of the strong factors which divided Muslims and Christians

was the strong Christian attachment to western and Christian ideas

and systems.

The Muslim masses, on the other hand, have a strong psychological

attachment to a pan-Arab nationalist identity because it satisfies

their need to retain a Muslim identity. Pan-Arab nationalism stresses

both the Arab and Islamic components of the Muslim identity. The

Muslim identity not only includes a sense of being Arab and belonging

to the Arab nation but also the political unity and a sense of being

a part of the wholeness of the Arab world. The Muslim communal attachment

serves not only parochial needs but also the individual's daily support

because the religious organizations provide services such as medical

care, etc. This weakens the dependence of the Muslims on the central

authority of the national government and the link between the individual

and the state. This decreases the chances of creating a unified state.

The Sunni Muslims considered Lebanon to be ethnically,

culturally, historically and geographically Arab. They desire to
incorporate and rejoin Lebanon with Syria and thereby become part
of the Arab world. Since the Arab world is 85% Sunni, they would
be among people with whom they share a common identity. The Sunnis
suffered a loss of prestige and recognition when incorporated into
the Christian Maronite dominated Lebanon because they had been the
dominant and privileged group under the Ottoman Turks. They strongly
resented their minority status in Lebanon.

The Syrian nationalists also deny Lebanon's separate political
existence and seek to reintegrate it as a subordinate unit of the
Syrian nation.[70]

The Shiite Muslims were initially content with the Confessional
system established by the Christians but did not participate in the
government until the mid 1930's because they feared Sunni retaliation.
However, during the 1940's and 1950's, the Shiites began to demand
additional shares of government power in accordance with their increased
population and a fair share of government services, programs and develop-
ment projects. The Shiite communities had been ignored by the Sunnis
and Christians and as a result were far behind in development.

The Druze constitute about 7% of the Lebanese population and
are also disgruntled about the 1943 National Pact because it permanently
blocks them from holding top government jobs. They argue that they
have historically played an important role in the history of Mt. Lebanon
and cannot accept being relegated to a secondary and insignificant
role in government. The Druze basically feel they should be able to
retain their own ethnic culture and govern affairs within their own area
(Shouf Mts.) and should have an equal voice in the national government.

The primary value among Christians, Muslims and Druze throughout

the history of Lebanon has been loyalty to one's ethnic or religious

group. The Confessional and National Pact system intensified rather

than reduced the ethnicity of each group. As the Muslim population

in Lebanon increased, the Christians feared they would become a minority

group in a predominantly Sunni Muslim world and began to manipulate

the political system to insure their continued domination in Lebanon.

The Muslims reacted to Christian seizure of power with violence after

negotiations failed. As the Christian-Muslim-Druze schism deepened,

radical and fundamentalist groups have emerged and placed a portion

of Lebanon under their military control. Extremists Shiite groups

are now calling for the creation of Lebanon as an Islamic state.

Entelis suggests that four possible options are now open to the

Lebanese as a way of solving their dilemma. The first option would

be assimilation, in which the cultural traits of minority communities

would be eliminated and replaced by an Arab nationalist culture.

It is very doubtful the Druze and Christians would agree to this.

The second option would be a policy of separatism in which each ethnic

group would retain control over its own province, which is essentially

the status of most of Lebanon except that specific boundary lines

for each group are not established. The third option would be a policy

of segregation according to ethnic group which is favored by feudal

chieftains and local bosses. The final option would be a pluralistic

society in which state nationalism would be the first priority of

all groups.[71] All of these options would require a consensus among

the people of Lebanon which will be very difficult, if not impossible

to achieve at this time.

6. Manipulation of Economic Resources by Government

The Confessional and National Pact political system in Lebanon
was responsible for the Maronite Christian domination of the economy
with a five to one control over commerce and industry. A patron-client
system was retained in which the political leaders saw their government
position as personal property and handed out government jobs, services
and development programs to their supporters and ethnic groups. Since
the Christian Maronites retained all the important and influential
government positions, they were able to not only control the economy,
but bring about the development and prosperity of the areas inhabited
by their ethnic and religious group. The Shiite Muslim and Druze
communities, because of the minimal power of their leaders in the
Lebanese government, did not share in the development and prosperity.
The Sunnis had a share of the prosperity but not an equal share because
they did not have an equal share of government power.

The economy of Lebanon was very prosperous prior to the 1975
civil war. It was one of the most prosperous non-oil producing countries
in the Middle East with a per capita income higher than oil rich Iraq.
Seventy percent of the nation's income was from tertiary sources such
as real estate, tourism, and international banking which not only
created an inflation problem for Lebanon but spelled economic disaster
when the civil war prevented the continuation of these enterprises.[72]

A substantial amount of Lebanon's income was due to the exportation
of manufactured and agricultural goods to Saudia Arabia. About three
to four billion dollars a year was received from Lebanese working

abroad, and large sums entered the country in the form of subsidies

to the Palestinians and various militias. The civil war disrupted

the export business. The Israeli invasion of 1982 destroyed valuable

assets such as orchards, warehouses, etc. in Southern Lebanon, particu-

larly in Shiite communities, and prevented the marketing of goods.

Israel also subsidized businesses of Lebanese Christians who supported

them which not only destroyed Shiite ability to compete but resulted

in a Saudia Arabian embargo on Lebanese goods on the grounds they

might be coming from Israel. The fighting in Southern Lebanon has

caused a great deal of destruction to Shiite and Palestinian refugee

camps. Over 25,000 buildings were severly damaged and 500,000 Shiites

were displaced when the Lebanese Army bulldozed their shantytowns

in the suburbs of Western Beirut. The enforced evacuation of the

PLO leadership in August, 1982 from Beirut and Tripoli in November,

1983, caused the loss of most of the factories, schools and clinics

which produced some of the jobs of Palestinians and deprived all of

them of general welfare programs.[73]

The Lebanese pound faltered only slightly until the Israeli in-

vasion in 1982. It plunged from 3 pounds per U.S. dollar in 1982 to

21 pounds per U.S. dollar by mid 1985.[74]

The economy of the State of Lebanon today is as fragmented as

its political system because the economic activity of each area of

the country is controlled not by the national government but by one

of the seventeen groups who militarily controls all activity within each

sector.

Conclusion

The validity of Clapham's indigenous theory is proven when applied
to Lebanon. Basically, Clapham's theory states you must study the
history and political, social and economic institutions of third world
countries in order to ascertain the reasons for their political in-
stability. Clapham identified six characteristics present in third
world countries which explain the reasons for their instability.
The first characteristic identified by Clapham was the domination
of third world states by the Western powers. Lebanon was totally
dominated by France from 1919 until 1943. The French established
a dual governmental system but the native government was totally sub-
servient to France. The most critical development during the period
of French domination was the establishment of native governmental
positions on the basis of religion. This deeply entrenched the religious
polarization already present among the people and prevented the develop-
ment of state nationalism or a sense of oneness among the people.
The French established the native government is such a manner as to
give dominant power to the Maronite Christians who were very pro-French
because they (French) desired a base of influence in the predominant
Muslim Middle East.

The incorporation of the predominant Muslim cities of Beirut,
Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre; Biqa Valley; and predominant Shiite Southern
Lebanon into the new State of Lebanon was the first major mistake.
The new state began its existence populated by people with divided
sympathies. They were divided along religious and ethnic lines.
The nature of the power structure of the political system in Lebanon
which was based on ethnicity and religion rather than a national consensus
contained the built-in elements necessary for self-destruction. The

domination of the government and economic resources by the Christian

Maronites with the resulting denial of equal or proportional power

to the Muslims and Druze destroyed the legitimacy of the government.

According to Clapham, a government is not legitimate unless it is

designed to select and sustain political leaders. Although the early

government of Lebanon meets the basic definition, it was not le-

gitimate because the government was imposed upon the people by France.

It was not established based on the consensus of the people and did

not operate according to the desires of the people because it allowed

the Maronite Christians to dominate all other groups. The distribution

of government power on the basis of religion and ethnic groups enforced

and intensified a value system in which one's first priority was his

ethnic or religious group. This prevented the development of state

nationalism or a sense of oneness among the people. State nationalism

was present among the Christians, particularly the Maronites, who saw

Lebanon as their national homeland. The Muslims considered Lebanon

to be ethnically, culturally aad historically Arab. They possessed

Arab nationalism and considered themselves to be a part of the whole

Arab Muslim world.

The Maronite Christian population decreased due to emigration

and low birth rates and the Muslims, particularly the Shiites, increased

in population. The Christians became a minority with a severly de-

creased power base for the government they dominated. The Confessional

and National Pact political system is Lebanon gave the Maronite Christians

predominant (5 to 1) control of the economy. They used that control

to maintain power and to benefit their own group. Government jobs,
public services and developmental programs were primarily designed
to benefit the Maronite Christians. The Sunnis had a share of the
prosperity but not an equal share. The Shiite and Druze communities,
because of their minimal power in government, did not share in the
government programs and the prosperity of the country.

All of these factors led to the civil war which began in 1975.
Each group in Lebanon became fragmented except the Druze. Each faction
militarily confiscated a share of the political and economic power
in Lebanon. The civil war which is still raging has destroyed the
sovereignty of the state of Lebanon because the government was so
weak it could not prevent the intervention of foreign groups and powers
such as the PLO, Israel and Syria. Syria today is the predominant
power in Lebanon. Each of the individual seventeen sects who are
continually vying for power within Lebanon totally controls the sector
of the state they occupy. The future of Lebanon as a viable state
appears to be hopeless unless the warring factions can be made to
realize they must form a new government based on the cooperation and
recognition of the rights of all groups. They must become a united
country and the people must be willing to give their primary loyalty
to the national government. The must develop state nationalism.

IV.   IS EGYPT A POWDER KEG?

Egypt has been an independent state only since 1952 when the

Free Officers of the Army took over the government. The military

coup did not bring lasting stability to Egypt as the country has ex-

perienced riots, a presidential assassination, and almost continuous

violence and civil disorder involving religious extremists, students,

urban poor, etc. Egypt appears to be a country ready to explode at

any time. The continued rule of President Mubarak appears to be in

serious doubt.

Why is Egypt a country ready to explode? Why does it appear

that President Mubarak's rule may be overthrown? Because Egypt is

currently experiencing political instability. Why does Egypt experience

political instability? Because the people of Egypt lack state nationalism.

The lack of state nationalism on the part of the Egyptian people differs

significantly in nature from that in Iraq and Lebanon. The people

of Egypt are of the same ethnic background and are Sunni Muslims.

Very small and insignificant numbers of Christian Copts and other

religious groups exist in Egypt. The lack of state nationalism in

Egypt is not due to a lack of unity as one people as was true in Iraq

and Lebanon where a great political and economic disparity existed

among the different religious groups to whom the people gave their

primary loyalty. The Egyptians are one people ethnically and religiously,

but a lack of shared values and incongruity between the goals of the

governing elites and that of the people has resulted in a lack of

state nationalism in the sense that they do not function as one people.

For example, the primary goal of the President of Egypt is to retain

power rather than to develop Egypt in a manner most beneficial to

the people. Therefore, the people and the government are not working

together to achieve common goals. The people's dissatisfaction with

the goals being pursued by the government results in civil disorder

and instability in government. The masses consider themselves to

be Egyptians and are proud of their heritage but do not give their

primary loyalty to the government leadership. Many of the people,

especially the poor, urban residents, and students support groups

such as the fundamentalists whom they feel would provide leadership

most beneficial to them and their country.

The cause of political instability in Egypt does correspond to

the six characteristics identified by Clapham. The results of a study

of the history and internal political, economic, and social institutions

which are presented in the remainder of this chapter validates Clapham's

theory and my thesis.

In ancient times a series of great kingdoms, ruled by pharoahs,

developed in the Nile River Valley of and made important and long

lasting contributions in the fields of science, architecture, politics

and economic. The ancient kingdoms provided a base for the development

of the modern Egyptian political system. Throughout its history,

Egypt has remained essentially a united entity ruled by a single government.

From the sixth century B.C. until 642 A.D. (2500 years), Egypt was

ruled by Persia, Greece, and the Byzantine empire which resulted in

the introduction of the Christian religion. Egypt was conquered by

the Arabs in 642 and since that time has been an Arab and Islamic

nation. The country fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1517 and was ruled

by them until 1798 when it was conquered by Napoleon.[75]

The last ruling dynasty of Egypt started in 1805 and stayed in
power until 1952. It was founded by Muhammed Ali, the commander of
Albanian forces in the services of the Ottoman Turks, who helped to
drive the French from Egypt. As governor of the loosely held Ottoman
province of Egypt, Ali began to modernize and develop the country's
resources. He is recognized as the Father of Modern Egypt. During
Ali's reign, a distinctive Egyptian national character was encouraged
and the first seeds of twentieth century nationalism was planted in
the junior ranks of the army and the middle class. The Turks recognized
Ali's family as the hereditary rulers of Egypt. The political power
structure of one man rule established by Ali stayed in effect until
1952 when the monarchy was abolished.[76]

1. Domination by Western Powers

In 1840 the Western powers used military force to gain special
trading privileges for western manufacturers and required Ali to abolish
Egyptian manufacturing. Ali's grandson, Ismail, sold shares of the
Suez Canal stock, a joint Egyptian-French project, in 1875 to Great
Britain to satisfy foreign debts. Ismail was removed from power by
the Turks to meet the demands of the European powers. He was succeeded
by his son, Tewfik. Tewfik was overthrown by the minister of war
in an attempt by the army to rid Egypt of foreign interference. Great
Britain intervened, disposed of the minister and returned Tewfik to
power. From 1882 until 1952, the Egyptian Kings and politicians were
forced to share power and ruled with the consent of Great Britain
who made it a protectorate in 1882 but ruled it like other British
colonies.

The British Consul Generals (called High Commissioners after

World War I) dictated financial and domestic policy in Egypt with
the backing of British troops.

2. Division of Power Within the State

The division of political power in Egypt before and after the
military coup of 1952 is identical to Clapham's patrimonial and neo-patrimonial
system in which all power is held by the leader of the country to
whom all subordinates and officials owe their loyalty.

Prior to the French invasion in 1798, political power in Egypt
was divided among feudal lords. Napoleon placed the country under
the control of military governors during his five year occupation
of the country. When Muhammed Ali seized power in 1805, he personally
retained all political and economic power and used a network of appointed
provincial governors to preside over the villages. The governors
were directly responsible to Ali who had established Cairo as the
center of his regime. Ali's descendants maintained his political
system and it remained in effect after the British occupied and controlled
the government of Egypt. British domination of Egypt resulted in
the development of strong anti-monarch and anti-British feeling among
the people and had the effect of uniting them behind the Free Officers
of the army who had strong Egyptian nationalist sentiments.

A British constitutional expert formalized the Egyptian political
system with the writing of the Organic Law of 1883. It provided a
two chamber parliament who possessed only advisory power except for
the approval of new direct taxes. The King could enact legislation
without the approval of parliament. The Organic Law also established
provincial councils to handle local affairs each headed by a Cairo
appointed governor. Each provincial governor was supplied with a

British advisor. The Egyptian King and provincial council system was under the ultimate control of the British Consul General who was backed by the occupying British army.

The Organic Law system stayed in effect until 1922 when Britain officially ended the protectorate state of Egypt. However, British troops remained and the British High Commissioner retained almost absolute power. At the insistence of the British, King Fuad appointed a commission to draft an Egyptian constitution.

The 1923 constitution retained the extensive power of the King. He had the power to dissolve the parliament and rule by decree if he found parliament to be uncooperative. All government officials were appointed by the King as well as two fifths of the senators. The remainder of the senators and the Chamber of Deputies were elected. However, only large property owners could qualify as candidates. The 1923 constitutional monarch system under the ultimate control of the British stayed in effect until the 1952 military coup by the Free Officers of the army.[77]

The Free Officers had been formed in 1949 to rid the country of a corrupt monarch and British domination. They announced they were seizing power of government for the people not for the military or a political party. After six months of civil rule, the Free Officers forced Prime Minister Ali Mahir to resign, placed the country under military rule with General Mohammed Neguib as the prime minister and Gamal Abdul Nasser as the deputy prime minister. Other government positions were filled by military officers. On February 23, 1953, Neguib was forced to resign because he had attempted to return the country to the old parliamentary system utilized under the monarch system. Parliamentary elections were indefinitely postponed and on April 18, 1953, Nasser became prime minister and he and the Revo-

lutionary Command Council (RCC) and elites of the Free Officers, became

the absolute power in Egypt.[78]

From 1953 to 1956, the RCC and Nasser held sole authority in

the country and said elections were not being held in order to prepare

for the transition to democracy. In January, 1956, Nasser and his

colleagues drafted and issued a new constitution establishing a presi-

dential governmental system with a strong executive to whom all ministers

were responsible.[79] Nasser surrounded himself with a highly secret

group called the "Vanguard" which included governors, ministers and

about 30 Marxists ideologists. Persons in high positions placed their

political cronies in offices of importance. The system used by Nasser

is also in compliance with the political power system in third world

states described by Clapham because government positions were obtained

and maintained based on oaths of loyalty and kinship ties.[80]

Upon Nasser's death in September, 1970, Anwar Sadat (vice-president)

became the president. With the backing of the army (he was a member

of the Free Officers), Sadat arrested and removed 90 of the top govern-

ment officials, including the vice-president, replaced them with his

own people and within one year had complete control of the government.

He maintained the parliamentary system as a rubber stamp for his policies.

Sadat retained absolute control and on many occasions did not consult

his cabinet or prime minister before issuing new directives or programs.[81]

Vice president Hosni Mubarak became president when Sadat was

assassinated on October 1, 1981, and was elected president the following

year. He has retained the political system used by Sadat and Nasser.

Mubarak has tried to retain the backing of the Nasserites and the

Sadatists. As opposition to the political system has grown; he has

identified himself more closely with the Sadatists. Mubarak was re-

elected president on October 5, 1987 and still firmly controls the

government.[82]

The political power structure in Egypt fits the system described by Clapham as being prevalent in third world states because the power of government is held by one person. The destruction of the monarch system by the military coup simply replaced one patrimonial system with another. Nasser and Sadat held absolute power as does the current president, Mubarak. All government officials obtain and retain their positions by oaths of loyalty or kinship ties to the leader.

3. Legitimacy of State Government

According to Clapham, the government of a state lacks legitimacy when its political system cannot select and sustain political leaders. Most third world states maintain a political system in which rule is by a small elite group rather that the consent of the people. Prior to 1807, a national government did not exist in Egypt. Twenty four feudal lords held power over the area they militarily occupied. They seized and maintained power through the use of force and the bulk of the people were virtual slaves.

Muhammed Ali established a central government in 1805 but he was an Albanian, not Egyptian. He too used force to stay in power as did his descendants until 1952. Until 1883, the system established by Ali was an absolute monarch system. After 1883, the system would be described as a limited constitutional monarch system because the king had to share power with the British who militarily occupied the country and an elected parliament was served primarily as advisors. The Constitution of 1883 was written by the British and maintained the monarch system. Although a constitution existed, the king held dictatorial powers over all matters, with the consent of the British, except for new direct taxes which must be approved by the legislature.

The national government of Egypt from 1882 to 1952 was not legitimate

according to Clapham's definition because the constitution was imposed

upon them by Great Britain. In addition, the ruling dynasty was Albanian.[83]

The military coup in 1952 allowed Nasser to establish a military

dictatorship. He ruled for three years without a parliament. In

1956, Nasser and his colleagues wrote a new constitution which established

a presidential system of government with a strong executive and all

ministers of state directly responsible to the president. The people

approved the constitution by 99.9% of the votes cast. The constitution

provided for a national assembly with 350 seats but candidates had

to be screened by the National Union Executive Committee. The National

Union had been established in May, 1957, to replace all political

parties in order to control all aspects of public activity and to

be a focus of public loyalty to Nasser and his regime. An administrative

structure which spread down to the local level from the higher executive

committee was appointed and headed by Nasser. It was meant to exclude

other groups from political power and to be a liason between the government

and the people. Since a 50 pound fee was required to file for candidacy,

only the well to do citizens could run for office. The National Union

was used by Nasser as a rubber stamp for his policies and had no clear

function other than to provide a forum for Nasser and his colleagues

for policy announcements. Hopwood states Nasser felt the need to

establish a political framework even if he had no intention of giving

it any real power.[84]

The legitimacy of the Egyptian government from 1952 until Nasser's death in September, 1970 rested in the hands of Nasser. He became more autocratic the longer he stayed in power and used his cabinet as an audience rather than advisors. Nasser controlled the intelligence bureau, army, government, ASU (only political party) and thus was able to retain absolute power.

The system created by Nasser did provide for a smooth transfer of power and upon his death, Vice-President Anwar Sadat immediately became president. Sadat continued the political system created by Nasser. He simply purged the government and military of Nasser's people and replaced them with his own. Sadat presented a new constitution in September, 1971, in which he claimed true democracy would be returned with a legal system to protect the rights of the individual. It did create a national assembly which was allowed to criticize and debate more freely. He temporarily retained the ASU as the one political party although he placed it under civilian rather than military control. Sadat dismantled the ASU and formed his own party, the National Democratic Party in July, 1978. Sadat dismantled parliament and had new elections held in June, 1979. His party won by an overwhelming victory. In May, 1980, Sadat had the parliament amend the constitution to allow him an unlimited number of terms.[85]

When Sadat was assassinated in October, 1981, Vice President Hosni Mubarak became president. He has retained the same political structure used by Nasser and Sadat but allowed the existence of political parties except for religious extremists. Mubarak set up a

new electoral procedure for the parliamentary elections in May, 1984.

The voting districts were reduced from 176 to 48 and allowed for pro-

portional representation and voting by party slate instead of election

by absolute majority in the traditional two member district. This

procedure resulted in the increase of seats in parliament from 382

to 448 and appeared to give all people and groups representation in

government. However, two clauses in the new procedure were designed

to insure Mubarak and the NDP continued control of the government.

The distribution of parliamentary seats were set up in such a manner

as to give dominant power to the rural areas in which Mubarak has

his strongest support. If no party receives 8% of the popular vote

in an area, the NDP is alloted the parliamentary seat. Mubarak's

party won an overwhelming majority of the seats in the 1984 election.

Mubarak has attempted to create a facade to mask his autocracy. Like

most third world states, the legitimacy of the government rests with

the autocratic ruler, not the people, and is upheld by military force.

The political structure does not allow the people to select their

leaders as elections are manipulated by those in power. Therefore,

the government of Egypt lacks legitimacy.

4. Lack of Power Base of Government

In Iraq and Lebanon, the power base of the government is ethnicity

and religion. The people of Egypt are of the same ethnic and religious

backgrounds and the power base of their government has always been

class or organization membership.

Under the monarch system of government before 1882, the power

base of the king's rule was the small but rich landowning class. After

1882, the monarchs ruled not only by the consent of the rich landowners,

but also the British government. The bulk of the people, peasants, had no voice in government.

The Free Officers seized power on July 23, 1952, and established a military dictatorship. All political parties were abolished, civilian and parliamentary government was dismantled and a single legal political organization, The Liberation Rally, was established. It was not a political party but a means of rallying the people round the new rulers, an organization to mobilize popular support and to squeeze out political opposition. The program of the rally promised everything for the Egyptian citizens including a new constitution, an equitable social system, a fair economic system and the forced withdrawal of British troops. The Free Officers traveled around Egypt soliciting the support of the masses for their military regime. By the end of 1953, the Liberation Rally boasted of a membership of two million and the military regime appeared to have the support of the people because it had rid them of the old corrupt monarch system which did not meet the needs of the people.

By the end of 1954, Nasser and the RCC had total power. Personal loyalty to Nasser became the key to obtaining and retaining power. In July, 1956, Nasser became not only a hero to Egypt but to the entire Arab world when he nationalized the Suez Canal. In May, 1957, Nasser established the National Union (NU) as a replacement for the Liberation Rally and instead of any political parties. The NU was used to control all aspects of public activity and to be a focus for public loyalty to Nasser and his regime.

In order to defuse the appeal of Muslim extremists and to insure
the support of religious leaders, Nasser ordered the establishment
of the Islamic Congress with vice-president Anwar Sadat as secretary
general. The appeal to Islam was intensified after the Egyptian defeat
in the 1967 Arab-Israel war. Basically, Nasser used the tactic throughout
his rule of diverting the attention of the people from a problem in
the country. He used mass rallies throughout his rule as a demonstration
of the support of the masses. After Nasser's popularity began to
decline in the mid 1960's, rural village residents were brought to
Cairo at state expense to participate in the rallies. This conveyed
the impression of mass support. However, his support drastically
declined in the 1960's because of military setbacks and brutal suppression
of opposition.

When Sadat became president in September, 1970, he continued
the same system used by Nasser. He abolished the centres of power
prevalent under Nasser and replaced them with persons loyal to him.
Sadat had been a member of the Free Officers and had the support of
the military. He placed his own people in key positions in the military.
Sadat used national referendums which he controlled, as a method of
showing support for his regime. Sadat's attempt to gain religious
support for his rule proved to be a fatal mistake. He manipulated
the religious extremists against the Nasserites and leftist groups.
Sadat's attempt to suppress the extremists and regain control of them
led to his assassination in October, 1981.[87]

Vice President Mubarak became president upon the death of Sadat.
He was also a Free Officer and to date has the backing of the military.

Mubarak has attempted to stay in power by steering a middle course

between the Nasserites and Sadatists. The last election results show

Mubarak's support is in the rural areas and not among the traditional

elites.[88] His lack of support in urban areas may prove to be very detri-

mental in the future. Reports from Egypt in 1987 and 1988 indicate

an alarming increase in the strength of the religious fundamentalists.

As opposition to Mubarak has increased, he has resorted to the re-

pressive measures of Sadat and Nasser.[89] He does not appear to have

rid the regime of rivals and pressures from the extremists continue

to mount. Mubarak's continued rule appears to be in doubt.

In accordance with Clapham's theory, the government of Egypt

does lack a broad base of power. The power base of the government

throughout its history has been limited to a small ruling elite. Prior

to the 1952 military coup, the power base was the rich landowners.

Since 1952, the power base has been the military.

5. Lack of Shared Value System Between Government and People

According to Clapham's theory, the people in third world states

do not share the same value system as that of the government because

they are not allowed to participate in the political system. To allow

the participation of the general population would pose a threat to

the ruling elites' continued dominance of government. Usually the

majority of the population is in a second class position within society.

Therefore, a sense of oneness does not develop between the general

population and the ruling elite. State nationalism does not develop

because the loyalty of the general population differs from that of

the government officials and leadership.

In Egypt, the government leadership's major goal has been to retain power and the primary loyalty of government officials is to the ruler rather than the country in order to retain their positions. The people's loyalty has traditionally been to their country but in the twentieth century has become divided because of dissatisfaction with government policies.

Muhammed Ali became the ruler of Egypt in 1805, and was not liked by the people because he was a foreigner (Albanian). He used brutal suppression and forced enslavement of the peasants to prevent serious resistance for several decades. His goals and values were centered around his continued rule. Ali did develop the country economically but used force to do so. By the time King Tewfik ascended to the throne in 1879, four distinct groups had emerged in Egypt. One group consisted of a small number of wealthy landowners who supported the king and favored the British intervention in 1882 because it protected their economic interests. The second group was a vigorous Islamic movement opposed to foreigners. The third group consisted of wealthy landowners who desired independence. The final group was an army clique of anti-foreign junior officers who saw the king as a tool of the Turks. The junior officers were primarily from rural areas and their activities led to the development of Egyptian nationalism in their native villages. The young officers, led by the war minister, successfully overthrew King Tewfik in 1882 but were subsequently defeated by the British. Egyptian nationalism declined until the 1890's when it was revitalized by Mustafa Kamil's al-Watani (fatherland) party. The al-Watani party, whose membership was primarily middle class, was anti-religious and zealously anti- British. They were very nationalistic.

The death of Kamil and World War I ended the al-Watani party.

By 1918, the Wafd al Misri (Wafd) party of Saad Zaghdul emerged. Its members were primarily middle class but its anti-British position enabled it to initially gain the support of the masses. Failure of the party to call for social and agrarian reform prevented its support by the peasant masses until the 1940's. The Wafd party received the approval of the British and the monarch because they showed a willingness to compromise. They had a voice in parliamentary events and their leader was prime minister several times during the 1923-1952 period.

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Bana. It advocated the end of secular Egyptian government, a return to Islamic social justice, explusion of the hated British and removal of the corrupt king. The Brotherhood found a large following among the peasants, lower middle class of the urban areas, and students. The leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood advocated the use of assassinations and other violent methods to achieve their goal.

The Young Egyptians were active in the pre-World War II period. They were a fascist group who also used terrorist tactics in an attempt to enforce their ideology on the country. The Nazi defeat in World War II saw the decline of their power.

The country was divided by 1950 into factions, some pro-British and pro-monarchy and others anti-British and anti-monarchy. The latter groups possessing Egyptian nationalist sentiments but an even stronger

Arab nationalist sentiment as they considered themselves to be part of the whole of the Arab Muslim world. The anti-British and anti-monarchy groups formed committees, presented demands to the government, held almost daily strikes, demonstrations, burnings and riots, and attacks against British forces. The anti groups were united in their goal of expelling the British from Egyptian soil, but not in their ideology. The wide disparity between the lifestyle of the rich and foreigners who supported the king and that of the peasant and urban dwellers added fuel to the explosive situation.

Egyptian defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, for which King Farouk was blamed, and the daily civil disorder gave the Free Officers the opportunity to seize the government in 1952. They did so with the backing of most of the people. Only the Muslim Brotherhood opposed them. Many of the Free Officers, including Nasser and Sadat, were from middle and lower class families and the people felt an identity with them. Had the Free Officers lived up to their original statements and instituted a government of the people, they could have truly unified the people of Egypt with the government. The Free Officers were initially supported by the bulk of the people and it appears likely they would have been proud of their heritage as Egyptians and developed a sense of oneness as a people. They would have developed state nationalism with loyalty to the government being their first priority.

Nasser's establishment of a military dictatorship, with government positions and power based on personal loyalty to him, destroyed Egypt's chance for unity and the development of state nationalism. Nasser's quest to become the leader of the Arab world, exemplified by his brief

union with Syria into the United Arab Republic, further destroyed

the probability of the development of state nationalism or of a true

unior between the government and the people. Nasser stressed Arab

nationalism which was already strong in the country and in 1962, ordered

the establishment of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) as the only political

party in Egypt. The ideology of the ASU was the Arab heritage of

Egypt and Arab Socialism. The ASU was organized into 7000 units in

villages, factories, schools, and urban areas under the control of

appointed officials who were answerable to the national congress and

Nasser. Nasser's Arab nationalist policies were very detremental

to Egypt's economy. His involvement of the Egyptian military in the

1964 and 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the civil war in North Yemen resulted

in severe economic problems as well as the demoralization of the military.

Arab nationalism was stressed until Nasser's death in 1970.

Sadat's continued the policies of Nasser with regard to government

structure and the ASU until 1978. He did stress the Egyptianess of

the country rather than the pan-Arab position taken by Nasser. However,

his economic and foreign policy further separated the people of Egypt

from the government. The Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel

and Sadat's pro-western politics resulted in Egypt's isolation from

the Arab world. Severe anti-Sadat sentiments among several groups,

particularly the religious extremists, developed. By 1977, it had

become necessary to almost triple the Central Security Force (crowd

patrol group formed by Nasser). Sadat's attempt to curtail the extensive

socialist general welfare programs such as the food subsidy program,

resulted in urban riots on several occasions. Sadat had been directed

to curtail social spending by the IMF in order to correct Egypt's

severe foreign deficit problem. Sadat's opening of the country to

foreign investors also caused resentment.

In July, 1978, Sadat dismantled the ASU and started his own political

party, the National Democratic Party (NDP). He said the NDP would

stand for democracy and socialism. His control of the political system

and suppression of any opposition or criticism prevented the develop-

ment of democracy and preserved his dictatorship. All of these factors

plus the belief by the religious extremists that Sadat was sining

against the Muslim faith led to daily civil disorder and Sadat's assas-

sination.[91]

Mubarak insists he is neither a Sadatist or Nasserite but continues

the policies of each which he considers to be best for the people

of Egypt. His continuation of the political system used by Nasser

and Sadat has prevented the people from developing a sense of oneness

because the political system is still based on loyalty to Mubarak

rather than one in which the people have a voice in government. Mubarak's

attempt to stay in the middle and appease all groups has resulted

in an ineffective economy and a very shaky and explosive political

situation. According to Ansari, Egypt is on the brink of a terrible

upheaval as is indicated by strikes, bomb explosions in Cairo attributed

to the Muslim militants, and the insurrection of paramilitary police

recruits in February, 1986.[92] All of these incidents indicate a rising

tide of organized violence against the government. Mubarak has promoted

corrupt capitalism alongside wasteful socialism in the public sector.

Any attempt to reduce social programs result in violent strikes and

riots. Mubarak's liberalization of the political system has allowed

opposition groups to gain tremendous momentum. Currently five political

parties are allowed to legally exist and although the Muslim Brotherhood

is officially outlawed, they do operate openly. Opposition groups,

particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, have gained tremendous strength

among the urban poor and students which presents a threat to Mubarak's

rule.

As violence and opposition to Mubarak has mounted, he has allied

himself more closely with Sadat's party.[93] Since the bulk of the people

do not share the power of government, they have not developed unity

with the ruling elite. State nationalism is not present because the

people and the government leaders do not share common values and goals.

As indicated by Clapham, when the people and the ruling government

do not have a shared value system, political instability occurs.

The exclusion of the Egyptian people from participation in government

has caused them to become dissatisfied with the government leadership

and policies. The civil disorders and popularity of opposition political

parties and groups is evidence of the lack of unity between the government

and the people.

6. <u>Manipulation of Economic Resources by Government</u>

As stated by Clapham, third world states leaders must control

the political system through the use of force or manipulation and

retain economic control in order to finance the political system.

Egypt's entire history, both ancient and modern,conforms to Clapham's theory of economic control and manipulation of the economic resources by the rulers. From 1805 to 1882, the economic system of Egypt was controlled by the autocratic ruler. He distributed land to his supporters. Over one fifth of the land was owned by the monarch and the royal family. From 1882 to 1952, the monarch shared economic control with the British. From 1850 to 1920, Egypt's economy was based largely on the growing and exportation of cotton which integrated the country into the world capitalist system. The British occupation and control after 1882 allowed them to buy Egyptian cotton for British factories and use Egypt as a market for British manufactured goods. Britain discouraged industrialization in Egypt and encouraged the government to adopt a laissez-faire attitude with reference to the economic activities of businesses. As long as the kings received the economic and political support of the rich landowners, they did not interfere. Foreign business owners and foreign residents were given privileged positions in Egypt and were exempt from Egyptian law.

From 1920 to 1952, Egypt's economy shifted to import substitution industrialization (producing goods locally from imported raw materials). During the 1920's and 1930's, a severe slump in the demand for cotton pointed up the weakness of Egypt's economic reliance on one crop.

The educated elites began to call for industrialization as a means
of modernizing the country and the nationalist groups saw industriali-
zation as a means of gaining independence. As a result, several in-
dustries such as building materials, insurance, transportation and
banking developed. Many of these industries were foreign owned. World
War II stimulated the Egyptian economy by about 25% because the allied
troops used Egyptian products and services. An increase in population
from 10 million in 1897 to 19 million in 1947 caused overcrowding
on the inhabitable land. Rural migration to the cities resulted in
a large urban poor class. The life of the poor rural resident did
not improve during this period.[94]

When the Free Officers gained power in 1952 a severe inequality
in land ownership existed. The large owners, which included the state,
royal family, rural rich landowners and urban absentee landlords,
owned 72% of the agricultural land. The majority of the rural population
was landless and worked as laborers.[95]

In order to remove power from the rich landowners, not only because
they controlled important resources but to prevent their challenge
to the new regime, Nasser and the RCC introduced three land reform
measures between 1952 and 1969. The 1952 Land Reform Law limited
maximum individual holdings to 200 feddans (one feddan = 1.038 acres).
Land above that amount would be expropriated by the state and redis-
tributed to landless tenants in plots of two to five feddans. The
original owners were to be compensated over a 30 year period. In
1961, individual land holdings were lowered to 100 feddans and in

1969 to 50 feddans. In 1963, all foreign owned land was expropriated

and retained by the government.

From 1956 to 1961, the government eliminated the power of industrial

owners by expropriating and nationalizing all major industries. Follow-

ing the Suez Canal War in 1956, the government nationalized all foreign

owned industries. Very few were transferred to private ownership.

At no time was collectivization or the end of private ownership con-

sidered.

The land reform program cannot be called a success because redis-

tribution of the land did not keep pace with expropriation. By 1971,

nearly one million feddans had been redistributed to almost 350,000

families. However, by 1978, 95% of the landowners who possessed fewer

than five feddans held less than half the agricultural land which

left 5% of the medium and big landowners with nearly 50%. In 1970,

Sadat allowed big landowners to reclaim their land and they have become

very prosperous.

In addition to the land reform and nationalization of industry,

the government plans the entire Egyptian economy. This had led to

widespread corruption as persons in key government positions use their

position to increase their personal wealth. The regimes of Nasser

and Sadat were noted for extreme corruption.

Nasser labeled the economic system of Egypt as Arab Socialism

(not Marxist Socialism) which he defined as socialism adapted to meet

the needs of the Egyptian people. Because of the constant migration

to the cities and high birth rates among the urban and rural poor,

it was necessary to institute social programs such as food subsidies,

medical care, etc. From 1956 to 1964, the Egyptian economy gave the
appearance of being prosperous but during the same period it had ac-
cumulated a large foreign debt which is still undermining the economy.

As a result of the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the western
powers refused to finance Egyptian projects or sell them arms. Nasser
turned to the Soviet Union for assistance. With Nasser's alignment
with the Soviet Union, the U.S. and other western powers stopped all
aid to Egypt. Nasser borrowed from the Soviet Union to purchase arms,
subsidized domestic industries, imported needed foods and financed
the construction of the Aswan Dam. Egypt still owes over $3 billion
dollars to the Soviet Union.[96]

Until 1972, Egypt still used the Import Substitutions Industriali-
zation program. Nasser had agreed to a partnership with the Soviet
Union in which Egyptian factories were built with Soviet funds and
used important raw materials from the Soviet Union. The manufactured
products were sold to the Soviet Union at a price set by them (not
market value) which resulted in a growing trade deficit for Egypt.[97]

By the end of Nasser's regime, the economy of Egypt was in disastrous
condition due to his socialist program, the importation substitution
industrialization program with the Soviet Union, high deficit spending
on military arms, wars with Israel in 1948, 1956, 1964, and 1967 as
well as his ill advised war in North Yeman on behalf of the rebels
against the monarchy. The urban areas experienced periodic riots,
demonstrations and strikes brought about by the poor economy and living
conditions among the urban poor.

When Sadat became president in 1970, Egypt's oil fields were under Israeli occupation, the Suez Canal was closed, massive foreign debts existed, and industrial and agricultural production was falling along with the per capita income. After gaining firm control of the government, Sadat introduced his own economic program to replace Nasser's socialism. He announced Egypt would have a mixed economy and would have an open door (Infitah) to foreign investors. However, he retained government ownership of major industries and control of the planning and operation of the economy. The one million state bureaucrats, who carry out the government program, owed their loyalty and government position to Sadat. This gave him additional political control. Sadat continued the government social programs; increased the minimum wage several times; and gave tax exemptions to low income persons and small farms in an attempt to diffuse civil unrest. He introduced incentive programs for farmers in an attempt to increase production. Sadat was not successful in his incentive program and it was necessary to increase imports each year to provide the necessities for the people. When he attempted to raise prices on imported goods or decrease subsidies in an attempt to reduce the foreign debt of Egypt, serious riots occurred in the major cities. Major civil disorders occurred in 1971, 1972, 1975, 1977 and 1981.

The results of Infitah appear to be a stagnation of the public sector. It cannot compete with the private sector and by 1981 the public sector provided only one tenth the nation's productivity. By 1980, Egypt was dependent upon aid from the U.S. and European countries for its survival. Egypt receives over three billion dollars a year

from the U.S. and Europe.[98]

When Mubarak became president in 1981, he inherited not only

a chaotic political system but also severe economic problems. Egypt

has a $40 billion foreign debt plus $3 billion owed to the Soviet

Union. In 1985, the Gross Domestic Product shrank by 2% while the

population increased by 3% to over 50 million persons. Mubarak's

continuation of capitalism along with a welfare oriented socialist

system created inflationary problems along with a severe balance of

payments problem.[99] Egypt imports 40% of its food requirements and

its food subsidy program costs $2 billion a year. The subsidy program

is available to all individuals including the affluent. Agricultural

production is impeded by parallel markets. One is a free market for

cash crops and the other is the traditional government regulated field

crop program for which the price is kept below free market prices.

Farmers do not want to participate in the government program.

The government is caught in a seemingly incorrectable economic

bind. Any attempt at reform would threaten the economic prosperity

of the ruling elite and any attempt to reduce subsidies or increase

prices to control the foreign debt problem result in riots. Egypt

is dependent upon continued U.S. aid and since repairing relations

with the Arab world, now receives substantial aid from Saudia Arabia.[100]

Basically, the government does manipulate and control the economy.

According to Waterbury, the bureaucracy through which the economy

is controlled has become an entity in itself held together by the

source of income and promotion.[101] It appears the bureaucracy to some

extent controls the leaders.

Conclusion

The data presented in the foregoing pages proves the validity
of Clapham's indigenous theory when applied to Egypt. Egypt was dominated
by Great Britain from 1882 until 1952 to the extent that Great Britain
controlled both the political and economic systems. The political
power of government was held by the absolute monarch from 1805 until
1882 and from 1882 until 1952, he shared that power with the British
government. Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak have held all power since the
military coup in 1952. The system is structured such that all political
power is based on one's personal relationship and support of the ruler.
Persons in high government positions have been able to develop their
own power base and use that position to gain wealth. This power structure
allows for enormous corruption in government. The government in Egypt
since 1805 has lacked legitimacy because the political system is not
designed to allow the people to select leaders and support them.
Leadership in Egypt has always been obtained and maintained by force.
The monarchs before and after British occupation and the presidents
since 1952 have used military and police force to stay in power.
From the 1952 military coup until 1981, Egypt basically maintained
a one party political system. Mubarak has allowed additional parties
to exist but through election reforms has made them totally ineffective
with reference to their influence on government.

The power base of the government of Egypt from 1805 to 1952 was
the small rich landowning class. Since 1952 it has been the military

and the ruling elite loyal to the president. Nasser was able to obtain

the backing of the masses for much of his rule because of his success-

ful elimination of the hated monarchy and British domination. His

unsuccessful military operations, severe economic problems and severe

repression of critics had diminished his popularity by the time of

his death. Sadat's rule was also based on the support of the military

and a ruling elite. His attempt to manipulate his rivals, particularly

the religious extremists, led to his assassination. Mubarak has retained

the system of both Sadat and Nasser but has tried to stay in the middle

between the two groups which has weakened his power base. Since 1987

Mubarak has aligned himself more firmly with the Sadatists.

Egypt's government since 1805 has been a dictatorship in which

the ruling elite gives their loyalty to the ruler. The government

officials and leaders have not developed a common value system with

the people of the country. The primary concern of the president of

Egypt and the ruling elite is the maintenance of political power not

the development of the state or meeting the needs of the people beyond

that which is necessary to maintain order. Civil disorder during

the rule of Sadat and Mubarak has been more violent and persistent

that during the rule of Nasser. It appears that each ruler has further

divided the people rather than uniting them with the government.

Nasser missed the opportunity to unite the people when he first gained

power because he had the backing of the masses and extreme popularity

at that time. Instead of developing a oneness as Egyptians between

the government and the people, he concentrated his efforts on becoming

the leader of the Arab world and stressed Arab nationalism.

Since 1805, the Egyptian economy has been controlled and manipu-
lated by the ruler and his appointed bureaucracy. Nasser made Egypt
an Arab socialist country. Due to severe economic problems and pressing
foreign debts, Sadat attempted to institute a mixed economy with both
socialism and capitalism and opened the country to foreign ownership.
Mubarak has not been a forceful leader. It appears his middle of
the road policy has left him in a political and economic quagmire.
If he attempts to reform or dismantle the corrupt bureaucracy, which
is draining the country of valuable wealth and resources, he will
jeopardize his political support. Mubarak's strong alignment with
the New Democratic Party, and electoral reforms which prevent access
to power for other political parties while allowing them to exist,
presents a serious threat to his continued rule. The continued and
increasing violent activities of the religious extremists, which Mubarak
appears to be unable to control or prevent, is the most serious threat
to his future rule. The serious economic problems of Egypt only add
to the political crises which exists. If Mubarak attempts to reduce
government spending or subsidies in an attempt to reduce the foreign
debt of Egypt, he risks total chaos in the cities on the part of the
urban poor who give their support to, and cooperate with, the Muslim
Brotherhood. He cannot eliminate the large government owned industries
or sell them to privately owned businesses without displacing the
state bureaucracy which supports his regime. Mubarak appears to be
in a position from which he cannot extricate himself. News reports

over the past two years have indicated a tremendous increase in militancy by the extremists and urban dwellers. According to Clapham, dictators cannot survive without the support of the urban dwellers, professional trade associations and university students.

As the concluding portion of this chapter indicates, the six characteristics identified by Clapham as being present in politically unstable third world states, are present in Egypt. The power structure of the government in which a small ruling elite controls political and economic activity has prevented the development of a sense of oneness on the part of the people with the government. The primary goal of government leaders is to stay in power rather than to adopt policies most beneficial to the country and the people. Until the general population of Egypt is allowed to participate in government, they will not develop a common identity with it. Only after the people and the ruling elite give their first loyalty to their country (Egyptian nationalism), can the government become stable.

V. CONCLUSION

The preceding three chapters have traced historical developments in Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt in order to demonstrate the roots of political instability in the failure to develop state nationalism, a sense of unity as one people on the part of the people within the geographic boundaries of a state in which people share a common identity, and a sense of pride in their state and its identification as an independent entity of the world. State nationalism develops only after the people's pride in their state takes precedence over their ethnic or religious group membership and after the people and the government officials share common values and goals. Political instability in third world states according to Clapham is due to western domination; distribution of political power within the state; government is not legitimate; absence of a broad power base of the government; lack of a shared value system between government and the people; and manipulation of economic resources by government. The historical data concerning developments in Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt prove the validity of Clapham's theory and my thesis.

Clapham argues that domination by the western powers during the colonization period before or the mandate period following World War I is partially responsible for third world state political instability. During this period of western domination, colonial and mandate powers drew political boundary lines without regard to the ethnic and religious background of the people being incorporated into the new state. This action on the part of the western powers has resulted in considerable civil disorder because the new states incorporated include groups with histories of previous bitter rivalries and incompatable cultures. Moreover,

the western powers established political and economic systems in the

new states and in the existing states controlled by the colonial and

mandate powers which would be most beneficial to them rather than

the people of the state. The political system established was invariably

one of a small but elite ruling class which would cooperate with the

western power. The economic system was an exploiting capitalistic

system in which the western powers were able to extract raw materials

and import manufactured goods. This resulted in the economic under-

development of the third world state.

Iraq was created by Great Britain in 1920 under the mandate system.

The British incorporated the predominant Shiite Muslim Province of

Basra, the Sunni Muslim dominated Province of Baghdad, and the oil

rich Province of Mosul which included a large contingent of Sunni

Muslim Kurds. The Shiites and Sunnis have a long history of rivalry

and the Kurds a long history of demands for an independent Kurdish

state and refusal to give up their native Kurdish language and culture.

Great Britain installed a constitutional monarch system of government

with the Sunni Muslims and an imported Muslim King from Arabia in

control of the native government. Great Britain controlled the political

and economic system, established military bases and signed agreements

with Iraq which gave British companies exclusive rights to extract

Iraqi oil in Mosul.

Lebanon was created by France in 1919 under the mandate system.

The French joined Maronite Christian dominated Mt. Lebanon with the

Muslim cities of Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, Tripoli and the Biqa Valley.

Sunni Muslims occupied the cities and the Biqa Valley while the Shiites

and Druze occupied Southern Lebanon. The French established a political

system in which all government positions were to be held by the leaders

and elites of each religious group with the Maronite Christians holding

superior power over all groups. The Muslims did not want to be separated

from Greater Syria and initially refused to cooperate with the Maronite

Christian (pro-French) government. The capitalist economic system

was dominated by France and the Maronite Christians. The forceful

inclusion of the Muslim areas into a Maronite Christian dominated

country and the division of power on the basis of religion proved

to be disastrous.

Egypt came under the direct control of Great Britain in 1882

when they militarily intervened and restored the king to the throne

ostensibly to protect their investment in the Suez Canal. They controlled

the political and economic system of Egypt in the same manner as their

colonies and used force to require the King to appoint officials of

their choosing and to abide by their policies. The native government

was a monarch system upheld by a small and wealthy landowning group.

Britain controlled the economy in order to export Egyptian cotton

to British factories and import manufactured goods.

As the early history of Iraq and Lebanon indicates, the western

powers incorporated non-compatable people into a state causing polariza-

tion of the people along ethnic and religious group lines rather that

encouraging the people to unite as one people and form a cohesive

country. The polarization in Egypt was based on wealth as well as

pro and anti-British and Monarch sentiments. Egyptian nationalist

sentiments were growing during this period, particularly on the part

of the growing middle class, but it was subsequently minimized by

strong Pan-Arab sentiments during Nasser's reign.

The second characteristic identified by Clapham as helping

to explain political instability in third world states is the hierarchial

distribution of power in government. The power of government is the

personal property of government leaders and officials who use their

positions for personal benefit and that of their support group. Subordinates

retain and maintain their government positions based on oaths of loyalty

or kinship ties.

The division of power in Iraq from 1920 to 1958 placed government

in the hands of the Sunni Muslim king and a ruling elite. Great Britain

had veto power over all decisions until 1932. The election system

allowed wealthy Sunni families, tribal sheiks and Shiite religious

leaders to control voting in their area and place their own hand picked

candidates in parliament. Since the king depended on the backing

of the ruling elite for retention of the throne, he did not interfere

with their political manipulations. Each political leader considered

his government position to be his own personal property and used it

for his own personal benefit. The Iraqi government lacked trained,

honest and dedicated persons who would operate the state in a manner

most beneficial to the country and the people. Corruption was rampant.

Since the overthrow of the monarch in 1958, the government of Iraq

has been in the hands of the Sunni Muslim dominated military autocracy.

Parliament has not been reinstated and all power belongs to the president,

the military occupied RCC and the Baath party over which the president
presides. The Shiites and Kurds are given very little voice in govern-
ment although since 1983, the Kurds have been allowed to run their
own local government as long as it is consistent with President Hussein's
policies.

The division of power in Lebanon from 1920 until the present
has been based on religious affiliation. Until the civil war began
in 1975, the government was a coalition of all religious groups but
the Maronite Christians maintained virtual dictatorial powers because
they controlled the office of the presidency. This resulted in the
appointment to and control of all high government offices by Maronite
Christians. France had veto power over native government affairs
until the beginning of World War II. The historical data concerning
Lebanon very clearly reveals how each government official, whether
Maronite Christian, Sunni Muslim, etc., used his office to benefit
himself and his electoral district which was usually his own religious
group. This religious based political system deeply entrenched the
already existing intense Christian-Muslim rivalry and rivalry among
the Muslim groups for political and economic control of the country.
Today, each of the seventeen warring factions in Lebanon controls
the political and economic activity within the area they militarily
occupy.

The division of political power in Egypt from 1882 to 1952 was
shared by Great Britain, the Monarch, and the small but wealthy land-
owning group. The military coup in 1952 ended the monarchy and the
power of the landowning ruling elite. Nasser and the military officers
of the RCC assumed all government power at that time. Nasser and

Sadat were part of and had the backing of the military as does the current president, Mubarak. All government positions since 1952 have been distributed on the basis of personal loyalty to the president and kinship ties. Widespread corruption existed in the Nasser and Sadat regimes and to a lesser extent in Mubarak's regime.

The division of political power in Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt does correspond to the definition and explanation given by Clapham and helped to create political instability.

The third characteristic associated with political instability in third world states according to Clapham is the question of the legitimacy of the state government. Clapham states third world state governments have not established governmental systems capable of selecting and sustaining political leaders. Constitutions have not survived because the division of power was not based on the consent of the people but on the desires of the elite, thus they lack legitimacy.

Iraq's government during the British mandate period was officially labeled constitutional monarchy and was modeled on the British system. However, the king retained dictatorial powers since he could dissolve parliament, commanded the military, and appointed all officials. The constitutional monarch system was retained after Great Britain granted independence to Iraq in 1932 but the balance of power shifted. A wealthy Sunni and tribal sheikh landowning class had developed after 1900 in Iraq and occupied government positions. With the removal of the British mandatory government, the King needed the backing of and had to share power with the wealthy landowners and the army.

Since the 1958 revolution, all power of government has been in the
hands of the military autocracy and the Baath party. Changes in government
leadership have been the result of military coups except in 1979,
when Vice President Hussein was promoted to the presidency by the
RCC and Baath party. At no time during the history of Iraq has government
been based on the consent of the people. The 1970 Iraqi constitution
has not been implemented and government continues to be a military
autocracy.

The Lebanese government lacks legitimacy because it was established
by the Christian majority, of which the Maronite Christians were the
largest groups, without consultation with or imput from the Muslim
communities. The constitution of 1926 has not been revised to show
the changing composition of the Lebanese state. According to scholars
on the Middle East, by 1950 the Muslims had a majority status. The
manipulation of the election system by the Maronite Christians prevented
the government from being by the consent of the people. The Lebanese
government has no power.

The government of Egypt also lacks legitimacy. The king of Egypt
shared power of government with Great Britain from 1882 to 1952.
An appointed parliament held only advisory powers. Politics in Egypt
from 1952 until 1981 was a military dictatorship and a one party system
with a hand picked parliament to rubber stamp presidential policies.
It is still a military autocracy. Several political parties currently
exist but they have no voice in government due to election manipulation
by President Mubarak. The distribution of government power is not
based on consent of the people.

The fourth characteristic of Third World States identified by
Clapham is the government's absence of a broad power base. In most

third world states, extreme competition occurs between political parties,

if allowed, or different factions within society for control of state

power. Rulers in third world states establish coalitions, destroy

their rivals,and manipulate oppositions groups in order to retain

power.

The history of Iraq shows the monarch government which existed

until 1958 based its power on a very small but rich landowning group

and after 1930, the army. After 1958, the government's base of power

has been limited to the army and the Baath party whose active and

influential members include about 20,000 of the countries' eleven

million people.

The power base of the government of Lebanon from 1920 until 1975

was the Maronite Christians who until the 1950's were the largest

single group in Lebanon and part of the slight Christian majority.

Today the official government is powerless and power in Lebanon is

shared by the warring factions within the country.

The power base in Egypt from 1882 until 1952 was a small but

wealthy landowning class. The 1952 revolution destroyed that power

base and shifted power to the military. Nasser initially had the

backing of the masses because he had rid the country of a corrupt

king and a hated British colonial power. He manipulated public opinion

through the use of mass rallies with supporters bused in to participate.

When Nasser resorted to brutal and repressive measure to control dissention,

his popularity declined among the people and the military. Sadat

and Mubarak have also based the power of their government on the military.

Sadat removed the Nasserites from the military and government positions and replaced them with his own people. He also manipulated the religious fundamentalists against the Nasserites which eventually led to his assassination. Mubarak appears to be trying to steer a middle course between Nasser and Sadat's policies, but has placed his own people in key positions. Since all persons in high government positions retain and maintain their positions on the basis of loyalty to the ruler, the power base of the government is basically the government officials and the bureaucracy.

The fifth characteristic identified by Clapham is the lack of a shared sense of nationalism among the people because each group has retained its ethnic, religiou or other values as primary. The political system in third world states is one in which the ruler and government officials consider their government position to be personal property and their power base is kinship ties or oaths of loyalty. This system prevents the development of a sense of common values, formation of a national self identity, and the development of a shared value system between the government and the people.

The ruler of Iraq was not an Iraqi and did not attempt to unite the people. With British military backing, he built a power base for his government among the wealthy Sunni Muslim and tribal leaders, many of whom were also Sunni Muslims. He excluded the Shiites, Kurds, and common people from power. This prevented the development of a sense of one people and the development of a national identity. Tribal, ethnic and religious membership remained the primary value of the bulk of the people. The military coup in 1958 simply shifted the power base of the government to the Sunni dominated military.

The current president, Hussein, also uses military and police power
to force the people to conform to government policy. The Baath party,
which is the only political party, is pan-Arab in sentiment and stresses
the Arab heritage of the State and Arab socialism instead of Iraqi
nationalism. Consequently, the masses have retained the ethnic, religious,
tribal and village loyalties as their primary value system.

The value system in the Lebanese state has always been based
on religious affiliation. The Maronite Christian dominated government
imposed by the French and the distribution of government power on
the basis of religion firmly entrenched those values. Lebanese na-
tionalism was intially present among the Maronite Christians who saw
Lebanon as their national homeland. After World War II, Maronite
Christian domination, the quest for power by various religious groups,
and foreign intervention caused all religious groups except the Druze
to become fragmented. Today the Muslims are divided not only into
Shiites and Sunnis but into factions within each group. Some Muslims
are pro-Syrian and Baathist in their ideology; some are pro-Iranian
and desire a theocratic state; and some desire to develop independently
within the Lebanese state. The Maronite Christians are also divided.
Some are pro-Israeli and desire a close alignment with the west while
others advocate alignment with Syria and other Arab states. The Druze
appear to want an independent Lebanese State with each group (Druze,
Sunni, etc.) retaining their own identity.

The value system in Egypt has undergone changes as leadership
has changed. Egyptian nationalism was growing among the middle class
before the British intervention in 1882. Nationalism continued to

grow during the monarch period but the people were not united except

that they were all anti-British and anti-monarch. The people were

divided into fundamentalists who wanted a theocratic state, young

Egyptians who wanted a fascist type state, Arab nationalists who wanted

to become part of the total Arab world and others who wanted to develop

a free and independent Egypt. After the 1952 revolution, Nasser advocated

and allowed only Pan-Arabism. All other groups were ruthlessly suppressed.

Sadat removed and suppressed the Nasserites who were pan-Arab. He

stressed the Muslim and Egyptian heritage of the country. Mubarak

is trying to perform a balancing act between the policies of Nasser

and Sadat and has allowed a multi-party political system to develop.

However, his own party retains dominant power. The Egyptian people

appear to be proud of their heritage but do not share common values

and goals with the government leadership and bureacracy. The primary

value and goal of the government leadership is retention of power

rather than the development of Egypt in a manner most beneficial to

the people and the country. As a result, Egypt today is a hodge podge

of ideologies. The country is like a volcano ready to erupt.

The final characteristic identified by Clapham is the manner

in which the economic resources of third world states are manipulated

by the ruling elites in order to stay in power. All economic planning

is done from the standpoint of political gain and the state becomes

the broker between domestic and external interests. Usually the economy

is based on the extraction of commodies for trade on the world market,

non development of domestic industries and the importation of manu-

factured goods. This results in the underdevelopment of the state

and in most instances requires the borrowing of huge amounts of money

from international organizations in order to finance domestic consumption

and government spending.

The Iraqi economy was controlled by the ruling landowning elite (about 2% of the population owned two thirds of the land) and the monarch until 1952. Great Britain had monopoly control of the Iraqi Oil industry. After 1958, the military and Baath party nationalized industry, Iraqi oil, and the vast majority of land. Private land ownership is strictly limited. The government plans and manages all production and distribution of goods in order to finance its regime.

The Lebanese economy was controlled by the Maronite Christians with some ownership and control by the urban Sunni Muslims (5 to 1 ratio). Since the Maronite Christians controlled the office of the presidency from the time the country was created, they were able to retain control of the economy. During the 1950's and 1960's, the Lebanese economy prospered but became dependent upon tourism, exportation of goods, banking, and light industry. The civil war which erupted in 1975 destroyed the economy along with the political structure. Today each warring faction controls economic and political activities within the area it militarily controls.

The Egyptian economy was manipulated by Great Britain, the monarch and the wealthy landowners until 1952. The economy was primarily based on exportation of raw materials until the mid 1930's when it shifted to the importation of raw materials for industrial production. As in Iraq, 90% of the people in Egypt were landless and were virtually tied to the land. After the military coup, Nasser nationalized industry and land and all economic planning and management was in the hands

of the government (Arab Socialism). Sadat opened the system to allow private ownership and foreign investment in Egyptian industry and Mubarak has maintained the system, but economic planning and management is still in the hands of the government.

Basically, the results of the developments in Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt are identical to the six characteristics identified by Clapham as being responsible for political instability in third world states. The control of the government by an elite group in Iraq and Egypt, while under the monarch system and after independence, and the control of the government of Lebanon by the Maronite Christians as well as the division of power on the basis of religion, has prevented the unification of the people.

The people of Iraq do not share a common identity with the ruling government because it has made no effort to develop a national Iraqi identity. The ruling government espouses Arab nationalism. The failure of the government to incorporate the people into the political system has allowed them to retain their ethnic, village, religious or tribal group membership as their primary value system. Therefore, neither the common people nor the government leadership has developed state nationalism. Political unstability in Iraq has been the result of ethnic, religious, or tribal unrest as well as power struggles among members of the ruling military and Baath party. If the government leadership would encourage Iraqi nationalism and incorporate the people into the government, state nationalism and political stability would gradually develop.

The political system of Lebanon is completely fragmented. The people of Lebanon have always given their primary loyalty to their religiou group. Additional fragmentation is based not only on religion but differing ideologies within the religious groups. The lack of unification of the people and failure to develop a common identity and state nationalism has resulted in chaos in Lebanon.

The people of Egypt are divided into a hodge podge of nationalistic sentiments. The emphasis on Arab nationalism by Nasser from 1952 until 1970 had a very detrimental effect upon national unity. Nasser's initial popularity with the masses would have allowed him to unite the people with the government had he attempted to do so. Opposition to Nasser grew in the 1960's in the form of Marxism, Egyptian nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism. Sadat unleashed the groups suppressed by Nasser while suppressing the Arab nationalist Nasserites. Mubarak recognizes all groups except the fundamentalist, but manipulates the electoral process to retain dictatorial powers. The denial of a share of power in government to important political groups has resulted in almost daily unrest. The fuse to the powder keg appears to be very short. Since the people are politically fragmented, they do not share a common identity with the government. The people and the government do not share common goals and values and have not developed state nationalism.

The historical data presented does prove that state nationalism did not develop in Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt because of the six character-istics identified by Clapham as being responsible for political instability in third world state, which includes Middle Eastern States.

FOOTNOTES

[1]
Samuel P. Huntington, <u>Political Order In Changing Societies</u> (New Haven, 1968), pp. 1-2.

[2]
Howard J. Wiarda, "Toward a Nonethnocentric Theory of Development: Alternative Conceptions from the Third World," <u>New Directions In Comparative Politics</u>, ed. Howard J. Wiarda (Boulder, Colorado, 1985).

Huntington, pp. 1-92.

[3]
Andre Gunder Frank, <u>Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America</u> (New York, 1969), pp. 3-120.

[4]
Christopher Clapham, <u>Third World Politics, an Introduction</u> (Madison, 1985), pp. 12-111.

[5]
Clapham, pp. 12-37.

[6]
Clapham, pp. 39-60.

[7]
Clapham, pp. 61-88.

[8]
Clapham, pp. 90-111.

[9]
Richard F. Nyrop, ed., <u>Iraq, A Country Study</u> (Washington, D.C., 1979), pp. 20-21.

David E. Long and John A. Hearty, "Republic of Iraq" <u>The Government and Politics of the Middle East</u> and North Africa, ed. David E. Long and Bernard Reich (Boulder, Colorado, 1980), pp. 107-110.

[10]Don Peretz, <u>The Middle East Today</u> (New York, 1978) p. 403.

[11]
Yosef Gotlieb, "Secretarianism and the Iraqi State," <u>Religion and Politics in the Middle East</u>, ed. Michael Curtis (Boulder, Colo), pp. 153-160.

Peretz, pp. 401-403.

Edith and E.F. Penrose, <u>Iraq: International Relations and National Development</u> (Boulder, Colo., 1978), pp. 41-55.

[12]Gotlieb, pp. 153-160.

Peretz, pp. 405-420.

Penrose, pp. 41-55, 82-95.

[13]Peretz, p. 409.

[14]Penrose, pp. 202-215.

15
Nyrop, pp. 50-62.

Penrose, pp. 274-288.

16
Penrose, pp. 333-350, 360-376.

Nyrop, pp. 185-187.

17
Claudia Wright, "Religion and Strategy in the Iran-Iraq War,"
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 4, (October, 1985), pp. 841-842.

18
Penrose, pp. 205-215.

19
Penrose, pp. 82-95.

20
Penrose, pp. 353-376.

21
Nyrop, pp. 184-187.

Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, A Study in Iraqi Politics, Washington,
D.C., 1978), pp. 31-48.

22
Penrose, pp. 112-134.

23
Penrose, pp. 81-110.

Peretz, pp. 398-411.

24
Penrose, pp. 112-134.

25
Penrose, pp. 353-376.

26
Frederick W. Axelgard, "Iraq and the War With Iran," Current
History, February, 1987, pp. 57-60, 82.

27
Penrose, pp. 41-74.

28
Nyrop, pp. 4-5.

29
Penrose, pp. 81-83.

30
Penrose, pp. 81-86.

31
Penrose, pp. 199-237, 353-376.

32
Nader Entessar, "The Kurds in Post-Revolutionary Iran and Iraq,"
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4 (October, 1984), pp. 911-913.

33
Entessar, pp. 914-922.

34
Peretz, pp. 398-401.

35
Penrose, pp. 56-74.

36
   Penrose, pp. 137-160.

37
   Penrose, pp. 381-416.

38
   Penrose, pp. 452-488.

39
   Nyrop, pp. 2-8.

40
   Entessar, pp. 911-922.

41 Axelgard, p. 82.

42 M. Graerne Bannerman, "Republic of Lebanon," The Government
and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, eds. David E. Long
and Bernard Reich (Boulder, Colo., 1980) pp. 207-212.

43 Peretz, pp. 339-340.

44 Ibid.

45 Peretz, p. 341.

46 Peretz, pp. 342-346.

47 Edward E. Azar and Robert F. Haddad, "Lebanon: An Anomalous Conflict",
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 4, (October, 1986), pp. 1344-1348.

48 Wadi D. Haddad, Lebanon, The Politics of Revolving Doors (New
York), pp. 22-26.

   Peretz, pp. 349-350.

49 Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon (Cambridge),
pp. 38-47.

   Peretz, pp. 351 - 355.

50
   Augustus Richard Norton, "Estrangement and Fragmentation in Lebanon,
Current History, February, 1986, p. 58.

51
   Itamar Rabinovich, "Syria and Lebanon", Current History, February,
1987, pp. 61-64.

52
   Kamil S. Salibi, "The Lebanese Identity", Religion and Politics
in the Middle East, ed. Michael Curtis (Boulder, Colorado), pp. 217-225.

   Khalidi, pp. 33-38.

53 Itamar Rabinovich, The War For Lebanon (New York), pp. 22-25.

54 Khalidi, pp. 33-38.

   Rabonovich, Current History, pp. 61-64.

55 Salibi, pp. 217-225.

56 Roger Owen, "The Lebanese Crisis: Fragmentation or Reconciliation?",
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4, (October, 1984), pp. 934-949.

57 Khalidi, p. 38

58 Khalidi, pp. 33-47.

59 Haddad, pp. 31-35.

60 John L. Esposito, "Islam in the Politics of the Middle East", Current History, February, 1986, pp. 54-57.

61 Norton, pp. 58-62, 88, 89.

62 Nora Boustany, "Palestinian Dissidents Win Beirut Camp Battle," The Washington Post, June 28, 1988, p. A9.

63 Norton, pp. 58-62, 88 and 89.

64 Rashid I. Khalidi, "Lebanon in the Context of Regional Politics: Palestinian and Syrian Involvement in the Lebanese Crisis", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3, July, 1985, pp. 495-514.

65 Marius Deeb, "Lebanon's Continuing Conflict", Current History January, 1985, p. 13.

66 Ibid., pp. ·13-15 and 34.

67 Norton, pp. 58-62, 88, 89.

68 Salibi, pp. 217-225.

69 John P. Entelis, "Ethnic Conflict and Reemergence of Radical Christian Nationalism in Lebanon", Religion and Politics in the Middle East, ed. Michael Curtis (Boulder, Colorado), pp. 234.

70 Salibi, pp. 217-225.

71 Entelis, pp. 227-241.

72 Esposito, pp. 54-57.

Norton, pp. 58-62, 88, 89.

Azar and Haddad, pp. 1344-1348.

73 Entelis, pp. 227-241.

74 Owens, pp. 924-938.

75 Bernard Reich, "Arab Republic of Egypt", The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, eds., David E. Long and Bernard Reich (Boulder, Colorado, 1980), pp. 309-311.

76 Peretz, pp. 192-197.

77 Derek Hopwood, Egypt, Politics, and Society (Boston, Massachusettes, 1985), pp. 1-40.

78 Ibid.

79 Peretz, pp. 216-228.

80
  Hopwood, pp. 84-104.

  81
  John Waterbury, <u>The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat</u> (Princeton, New Jersey, 1983), pp. 332-348 and 340-363.

  82
  Egypt's President - Blurry is Safer, <u>The Economist Newspaper</u>, October 3, 1987, pp. 44-45.

  Hamied Ansari, "Mubarak's Egypt", <u>Current History</u>, January, 1985, pp. 21-24, 40 and 41.

  83
  Peretz, pp. 216-228.

  Reich, pp. 309-317.

  84
  Hopwood, pp. 1-40 and 84-104.

  85
  Ibid. pp. 105-121.

  86
  Ansari, pp. 21-24, 40 and 41.

  <u>The Economist Newspaper</u>, pp. 41-45.

  87
  Hopwood, pp. 84-104 and 105-121.

  88
  Hamied Ansari, 'Egypt, Repression and Liveralization, <u>Current History</u>, February, 1987, pp. 77-80, 84.

  89
  <u>The Economist Newspaper</u>, pp. 41-45.

  90
  Hopwood, pp. 1-40.

  Hopwood, pp. 84-104.

  Peretz, pp. 192

  91
  Ansari, Mubarak's Egypt, pp. 21-24, 39-40.

  Ansari, Egypt, Repression and Liberalization, pp. 77-80, 84.

  Hopwood, pp. 105-121.

  92
  Ansari, Mubarak's Egypt, pp. 21-24, 39-40.

  93
  Robert Bianchi, Egypt: Drift at Home, Passivity Abroad, <u>Current History</u>, February, 1986, pp. 71-74, 82-83.

  94
  Hopwood, pp. 1-19.

  95
  Hopwood, pp. 132-135.

  Waterbury, pp. 207-231.

[96] Waterbury, pp. 424-434.

[97] Waterbury, pp. 24-29.

[98] Waterbury, pp. 228-248.

[99] The Economist Newspaper, pp. 44-45.

[100] Ansari, Mubarak's Egypt, pp. 21-24, 39-40.

[101] Waterbury, p. 247.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alnasrawi, Abbas. "Economic Consequences of the Iraq-Iran War", <u>Third World Quarterly</u>, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July, 1986), 869-886.

Ansari, Hamied. "Egypt: Repression and Liberalization", <u>Current History</u>, February, 1987, pp. 77-80, p. 84.

_____, "Mubarak's Egypt", <u>Current History</u>, January, 1985, pp. 21-24, pp. 39-40.

Azar, Edward E. and Robert F. Haddad. "Lebanon: An Anomalous Conflict", <u>Third World Quarterly</u>, Vol. 8, No. 4 (October, 1986), 1337-1350.

Azelgard, Frederick W. "Iraq and the War with Iran", <u>Current History</u>, February, 1987, pp. 57-60, p. 82.

Bianchi, Robert, "Egypt: Drift at Home, Passivity Abroad", <u>Current History</u>, February, 1986, pp. 71-74, p. 82-83.

Clapham, Christopher. <u>Third World Politics, An Introduction</u>. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.

Curtis, Michael, ed. <u>Religion and Politics in the Middle East</u>. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981.

Deeb, Marius. "Lebanon's Continuing Conflict", <u>Current History</u>, January, 1985, pp. 13-15, p. 34.

"Egypt's President - Blurry is safer", <u>The Economist Newspaper</u>, October 3, 1987, pp. 44-45.

Entasser, Nader. "The Kurds in Post-revolutionary Iran and Iraq", <u>Third World Quarterly</u>, Vol. 6, No. 4 (October, 1984), 911-933.

Esposito, John L. "Islam in the Politics of the Middle East", <u>Current History</u>, February, 1986, pp. 53-58.

Frank, Andre Gunder. <u>Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America</u>. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969.

Gordon, David C. <u>Lebanon, The Fragmented Nation</u>. London: The Hoover Institution Press, 1980.

Haddad, Wadi D. <u>Lebanon, The Politics of Revolving Doors</u>. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985.

Hopwood, Derek. <u>Egypt, Politics and Society</u>. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985.

Huntington, Samuel P. <u>Political Order in Changing Societies</u>. New
    Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Khassuri, Majid. <u>Socialist Iraq</u>. Washington, D.C.:   The Middle East
    Institute, 1978.

Khalidi, Rashif I. "Lebanon in the context of regional politics:
    Palestinian and Syrian involvement in the Lebanese crisis", <u>Third
    World Quarterly</u>, Vol. 7, No. 3 (July, 1985), 495-514.

Khalidi, Walid. <u>Conflict and Violence in Lebanon</u>. Cambridge,
    Massachusetts: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University,
    1979.

Long, David E. and Bernard Reich, eds. <u>The Government and Politics
    of the Middle East and North Africa</u>. Boulder, Colorado:
    Western Press, 1980.

Norton, Augustus Richard. "Estrangement and Fragmentation in Lebanon",
    <u>Current History</u>, February, 1986, pp. 58-62, p. 88-89.

Nyrop, Richard F. ed. <u>Iraq, A Country Study</u>. Washington, D.C.:
    U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979.

Owen, Roger. "The Lebanese Crisis: fragmentation or reconciliation",
    <u>Third World Quarterly</u>, Vol. 6, No. 4 (October, 1984), 934-949.

Penrose, Edith and E.F. <u>Iraq: International Relations and National
    Development</u>. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978.

Peretz, Don. <u>The Middle East Today</u>. New York: Holt, Rinehart and
    Winston, 1978.

Rabinovich, Itamar. "Syria and Lebanon", <u>Current History</u>, February,
    1987, pp. 61-64.

_____. <u>The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985</u>. Ithaca,
    New York: Cornell University Press, 1985.

<u>The Washington Post</u>, June 28, 1988, p. A9.

Waterbury, John. <u>The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat</u>. Princeton, New Jersey:
    Princeton University Press, 1983.

Wiarda, Howard J. <u>New Directions in Comparative Politics</u>. Boulder,
    Colorado: Westview Press, 1985.

Wright, Claudia. "Religion and Strategy in the Iraq-Iran War", <u>Third
    World Quarterly</u>, Vol. 7, No. 4 (October, 1985), 839-852.

Vita of Delores M. Moses

Education: B.A., Glassboro University, N.J., 1970, with major in
             secondary Social Science education.

Experience: 13 years teaching experience in New Jersey and Virginia.
             Subjects taught are government and history at the secondary
             level.

Personal: Married, one child.