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THE ROOT MISSION

BY

WILLIAM R. CONGER

A THESIS
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Chronology of the Root Mission

(March - November, 1917)

The dates given are according to the Western (Gregorian) calendar. The Western calendar was 13 days ahead of the Russian (Julian) calendar that was in effect in Russia until February 1, 1918. The Western calendar is used throughout the text.

March 8  Mass demonstrations in Petrograd.

March 10  General strike, demonstrations, and bloodshed in the capital.

March 11  Tsar dissolves the Duma.

The Temporary Committee of the Duma is formed.

March 13  Tsarist government is overthrown in Petrograd. The Temporary Committee assumes control of bureaucratic functions. Petrograd Soviet of Workers Deputies is formed.

March 14  President Wilson received Ambassador Francis' telegram reporting a successful Russian revolution.

March 15  Tsar Nicholas II abdicates.

Milyukov and the Soviet agree on terms for ruling Russia.

March 16  Inauguration of the Provisional Government.
March 22  Ambassador Francis recognizes the Provisional Government on behalf of the United States.

March 27  Petrograd Soviet issues a call for peace without annexations or indemnities.

April 2  President Wilson delivers his war message to Congress.

April 6  America declares war on Germany.

April 9  Oscar Straus suggests an American Commission to Russia.

April 10  Colonel House suggests a commission.

April 11  Lansing received Ambassador Francis' telegram warning that Russian Army is "precarious" and some groups are urging peace. Lansing conveys this to the President and urges a commission. Wilson agrees.

April 12  The President and Lansing exchange ideas as to the personnel of such a commission.

April 16  Lenin arrives in Petrograd.

April 24  Elihu Root accepts the position of Special Ambassador to Russia.

April 26  Root discusses the Mission with Wilson.

April 27  Senator Robert LaFollette (R-Wisc.) attacks the selection of Root and accuses Root of attempting to hinder the cause of Russian political refugees.
May 1  Professor Milyukov's war aims note is published.

May 2  Morris Hilquitt attacks the selection of Ambassador Root.

May 3  Alexander Petrunkevitch suggests that Root is a poor choice to head the commission. Violent anti-Milyukov demonstrations in Petrograd.

May 4  Samuel Untemeyer criticizes the selection of Root. Petrograd demonstrations continue.

May 13 Alexander Guchkov resigns as Minister of War and Navy.


May 18 First Coalition government formed in Russia. Kerensky becomes Minister of War. Six socialists obtain ministerial posts. Prince Lvov continues as Premier.

May 20 Root Mission sails from Seattle.

June 3  The American Mission disembarks at Vladivostok.

June 11-12 Root Mission discusses a propaganda campaign.

June 13 Root Mission arrives in Petrograd.
June 16  The American Mission is formally presented to the Provisional Government. First all-Russian Soviet convenes in Petrograd.

June 18  Ambassador Root cables Lansing to suggest a major publicity campaign.

June 21-24  Majority of Root Mission visits Moscow.

June 22  Bolsheviks call off their planned anti-government demonstration.

June 26  Lincoln Steffens tells Wilson that he should clarify Allied war aims and suggests public abrogation of Allied secret treaties. The President declines.

June 27  Root and General Scott visit Russian Army Headquarters.

    William Phillips replies to Root's cable of June 18: The administration is considering the idea of a publicity campaign.

July 1  The Russian offensive in Galicia begins.

    Bolsheviks win a decisive moral victory in mass parades in Petrograd.

July 2  Root sends his second cable urging a publicity campaign.

July 5-7  Petrograd Conference of Allied Ambassadors.

July 7  Frank Polk cables Root that the publicity campaign is still under consideration.
July 10  Root cables Lansing that the Mission has completed its work.

July 12  Root Mission leaves Petrograd.

July 16-17 Violent anti-government demonstrations in Petrograd.

July 18 Provisional Government orders arrest of Bolshevik leaders.


August 4  Root Mission arrives in Seattle.

August 6  Kerensky forms second coalition.

August 8  Root Mission arrives in Washington and confers with Wilson and Lansing.

August 21 The President receives the Report of the Root Mission.

August 25-28 Moscow State Conference. General strike in Moscow. The President's vague message is read to the State Conference.

August 30 Root, Dr. Mott, and Cyrus McCormick make final attempt to persuade the President to begin a publicity campaign on Russia.

September 9-12 Kornilov insurrection.

October 7 Kerensky forms Third Coalition.

October 27 President sends Edgar Sisson to Russia with instructions to begin a publicity campaign.
November 6-7  Provisional Government is overthrown.
November 8  Soviet Inauguration.
November 25  Edgar Sisson arrives in Petrograd.
INTRODUCTION
I. Introduction

The final decision to enter World War I was made by President Wilson in late March, 1917, within two weeks of the March Revolution in Russia. With the entry of the United States into the world war the Russian war effort became a subject of great importance to the administration. Several sources close to the President advised him to send an American commission to Russia in order to keep that nation in the war and as a show of American sympathy. Wilson officially agreed to send a special mission on April 12, 1917.

Neither the President nor most of his advisors knew or cared much about Russia prior to the spring of 1917. Those few who did have a knowledge of that country failed to achieve a satisfactory understanding of the revolution prior to the selection of the Root Mission. This failure to understand substantially contributed to errors in the selection of the personnel of the commission. Although the President was actively involved, secretary of State Robert Lansing appears to have carried primary responsibility in the selection process. Choosing the right person to head the commission was a difficult decision that quickly narrowed to former Secretary of State Elihu Root, former President Theodore Roosevelt, and former Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan. President Wilson
chose Root because he disliked or feared Roosevelt. Why Secretary Bryan wasn't chosen is unknown. Both Roosevelt and Bryan would have been superior choices because of their comparatively liberal records and charismatic styles. Difficult decisions also had to be made regarding who would be sent to represent American labor and American socialism and whether or not to send a Jewish representative. The choices of Root, Socialist Charles Edward Russell, and labor leader James Duncan were not well received in some quarters. Anti-war and pro-German forces attacked their credibility, usually unfairly, both in America and in Russia. The resulting damage may have ruined any chance of success that the Mission may have had prior to its departure from America.

Although most members of the Root Mission were at worst harmless, the critical choices of Root, Russell, and perhaps Duncan were poor, even fatal, one. This was not due to any real failing on their part, but because of their inherent political vulnerability. After their arrival in Petrograd, the American emissaries met constantly with numerous members of the Provisional Government, the old Tsarist government, and various other Russians, Americans and
Allied representatives. The Mission was hampered by President Wilson's excessive concern with war aims and peace terms which prevented it from addressing both of these crucial issues. Thus restrained, the members concentrated on information gathering and encouraging the Russians to fight. Several members had exciting adventures and at least three had profound short-term impacts. Only two members of the Mission visited the Soviet, which had become the visible center of power in Russia. This was most probably for obvious reasons of diplomacy. It is doubtful that either American had a profound impact on the Soviet.

Despite their lack of Russian background the Mission's members had, by the time of their departure, a surprisingly comprehensive if somewhat narrow understanding of the Russian situation. They concluded very early that a massive publicity campaign was desperately needed, but the administration ignored their requests for money and other necessities to begin it. In spite of the frustrations thus engendered the American emissaries returned in an openly optimistic frame of mind. This positive outlook probably reflected the assumption that the predicted Bolshevik revolt would be crushed and that this occurrence would bring an end to internal divisions in Russia. Further,
an optimistic appraisal of the situation would have a positive effect on the American war effort. After they returned to America, most members of the Mission demonstrated a serious concern for Russia's fate. However, at an immediate audience with the President the emissaries' plans for a major propaganda campaign in Russia were not even mentioned by President Wilson. Several members continued in their attempts to see the President or otherwise to influence Russia and America. During the fall of 1917 a modified form of the proposed publicity campaign was finally begun. It was too little and too late.

It is impossible to determine whether America could have influenced the course of events in the Russia of 1917. If she could have and failed, the blame, barring as yet undiscovered information, must lie with Woodrow Wilson.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this study is to examine the Root Mission to Russia from its conception to its final report and to evaluate the effectiveness of each member individually as well as that of the Mission as a whole. Further, major actions and responses of the Wilson Administration and other American officials have been considered where these
actions have a direct bearing on the effectiveness of the Root Mission. This study also provides a narrative account of the constructive work of the commission and attempts to highlight those experiences which might well have had a significant impact on the Mission's understanding of the Russian situation. It is not the purpose of this study to provide a definitive account of all aspects of the Root Mission, its members, or the Wilson Administration's relations with Russia during this period. Nevertheless, this work does examine the majority of available sources relating to the Root Mission, its members, and the administration during this period of American History.

The scope of this paper is limited to the presentation of the actions, experiences, and viewpoints of the mission and its individual members both as to the Russian situation and to the actions of the administration. Naturally much of the correspondence between the President, Secretary of State Lansing, and other important Americans has been included.

It is not within the scope of this paper to provide a definitive study of internal administration and State Department communications or to examine, in depth, the Russian reactions to the Root Mission or its members. All primary Russian sources contained
herein were those that were translated for Root Mission personnel and can be found in American sources. Most secondary Russian sources on this period have little bearing on the Mission but often provide interesting background information. Several important subtopics require further study that is beyond the scope of this paper. These include internal State Department communications, Russian newspaper reaction to the Root Mission, and the activities of Charles R. Crane. Neither the primary nor secondary sources used in this study document or strongly suggest any other conclusion than the one I have reached. It is important to note, however, that the motivation behind the inaction of Wilson, Lansing, and other important American officials on the issue of a major propaganda campaign remains in doubt and to my knowledge undocumentable.

Sources

The primary sources used in developing this study include the papers of Woodrow Wilson, Robert Lansing, Elihu Root, Charles Edward Russel, and General Hugh L. Scott, all of which are housed in the Library of Congress. With some important exceptions, I have used only those parts of the papers cited above that bear directly on the Root
Mission: March through August, 1917. The most useful among these include *The Report of the Root Mission* and *The Log of the Root Mission*, both included in the papers of Elihu Root at the Library of Congress, and several separate reports by General Scott (in the Russell Papers), Admiral Glennon (Root Papers), and Dr. John R. Mott (Root Papers). In addition, State Department records, housed in the National Archives under the title, "World War I and its Termination, 1914-1929" were used extensively. This source contains many of the documents that have not been published in the extremely valuable series, *The United States Department of State: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. Of this latter series, *The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920*, and *1918: Russia*, particularly Volume I contain much of the official correspondence between administration officials and American diplomats abroad that bears directly on this period. Nevertheless, there are many important communications that can only be found in the National Archives. In addition *The New York Times* has been used extensively throughout.

Existing primary sources that were not consulted include: Dr. Arthur Link's major work on the Wilson papers; the papers of David R. Francis, the American
Ambassador to Russia during this period, located at the University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri; the papers of Colonel Edward M. House at Yale University; the papers of Colonel William V. Judson at the Newberry Library in Chicago; the papers of Samuel N. Harper at the University of Chicago; and papers of Charles R. Crane which are divided between the Institute of Current World Affairs in Hanover, New Hampshire and Columbia University in New York. I know of no other existing papers relating directly to the Root Mission, its members, or those closely connected with it.

Dr. Link's work on the Wilson Papers, has not, as of December, 1979, been carried up to the period of the Mission. Judging from his written accounts, his communications with his superiors, and comments made about him by George Kennan, Jr. and Lincoln Steffens, the papers of David R. Francis would probably contain only insignificant insights on the Root Mission. The papers of Colonel House may contain some useful information that cannot be found in Charles Seymour's The Intimate Papers of Colonel House and other primary and secondary sources. Colonel Judson's activities were largely centered around those of General Scott and thus usually outside the activities of the main body of the Root
Mission. Nevertheless, they may be important sources on this topic and are certainly important from August, 1917 until Judson was recalled from Russia. Samuel R. Harper's memoirs were published posthumously and were used herein. The Crane papers at Columbia University may be examined only with permission of his closest living relative which I was unable to get at the time of this writing. Although most of these papers are not crucial, the absence of those of Crane, Harper, and possibly Judson prevent this from being a definitive study.

Memoir accounts by those who were with the Mission, include two books by Charles Edward Russell, *Bare Hand and Stone Walls* which covers most of his life and contains a chapter on his activities in Russia and *Unchained Russia* which gives his views on why the Allies failed to understand the situation and thus "save" Russia. The latter is excellent. Colonel T. Bentley Mott's *Twenty Years as a Military Attaché* is a useful account that supports Root's viewpoint of the Mission. James Duncan recorded his experiences in a pamphlet entitled "Labor Presents Russian Revolution," which appears to have been a copy of the speech he delivered to the American Federation of Labor's convention in Buffalo in 1917.
The author found it useful but short of enlightening.

Memoir accounts by American of official status during the period include Secretary of State Robert Lansing's *War Memoirs* which touches on the Root Mission, David R. Francis' two books, *Russia from the American Embassy*, a rambling account of limited value, and *Russia Observed*, demonstrates that Francis did eventually gain a better understanding of what had occurred. Samuel N. Harpers memoirs, entitled *The Russia I Believe In*, *The Memoirs of Samuel N. Harper, 1902-1941*, were useful for background information and include his appraisal of the Root Mission, Francis, and the Russian situation.

A most valuable memoir account is by one of the Russian guides, Dmitri Fedotoff-White, and is entitled *Survival Through War and Revolution in Russia*. Taken in part from the author's diary, this work gives an excellent and thorough account of Admiral Glennon's activities. Fedotoff-White also offers characterizations of the Root Mission's members which add some insight, admittedly opinionated and one-sided, into their characters, habits, and appearances. The diary of American Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, and his book, *The Wilson Era*, offer background on
decision making at the cabinet level during this era and describe the March 23 meeting that discussed the Root Mission. Alexander Kerensky, who led the Provisional Government after May 15, 1917 wrote numerous books giving insight into his viewpoint and a minimum of information on the Root Mission. His major book covering this era is The Catastrophe: Kerensky's Own Story of the Russian Revolution. Influential industrialist Charles R. Flint's Memories of an Active Life gives support to Root's viewpoint that the American Mission was a "grandstand play" perhaps designed to discredit Root. Famous "muckraker" Lincoln Steffen's Autobiography sheds some light on Charles Crane. George Creel's How We Advertised America and Rebel at Large: Recollections of Fifty Crowded Years discuss American war propaganda but give little on the Root Mission. Arthur Bullard, who was eventually given charge of American propaganda in Russia, barely touches on the Root Mission in The Russian Pendulum: Autocracy - Democracy - Bolshevism. Samuel Gompers Seventy Years of Life and Labor reveals his viewpoints on various topics including Russia and the revolutions. Morris Hillquit's highly opinionated Loose Leaves from a Busy Life mentions Root, Russell and others.
My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories, a two volume work by Sir George Buchannan, British Ambassador at the time fails to touch on the American Mission but gives interesting background on the numerous personalities of the era. American Ambassador to Sweden Ira Morris offers some insights on American policy towards Russia in From and American Legation.

Secondary sources on particular individuals who were members of the Root Mission include Philip C. Jessup's excellent biography, Elihu Root, Albert Parry's brief but useful account of Charles R. Crane's life in the Russian Review, Basil Mathews biography of Dr. Mott, entitled John R. Mott: World Citizen, and Justin Kaplan's Lincoln Steffen's: A Biography.

There are as yet no secondary sources dealing with the Root Mission either exclusively or in detail. George F. Kennan, Jr.'s Russia Leaves the War was very useful on the period and gives background information on several members of the Root Mission. The most useful general sources of the period included William Henry Chamberlain's The Russian Revolution, 1917 - 1921, Marcel Lievman's The Russian Revolution, Robert D. Warth's The Allies and the Russian
Revolution and William Appleman Williams' American-Russian Relations, 1781 - 1941. Max M. Laserson's The American Impact on Russia: Diplomatic and Ideological, 1784 - 1917 contained background information and a critical view of the President's choices. Christopher Lasch's American Liberals and The Russian Revolution was also insightful and somewhat critical.

The most useful views of Woodrow Wilson's political background and general approach to Foreign Policy were Harley Notter's The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, Arthur S. Link's Wilson the Diplomatist and N. Gordon Levin's Woodrow Wilson and World Politics.
CHAPTER ONE

THE TWO GOVERNMENTS OF RUSSIA
On March 15, 1917, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia relinquished his throne, ending three hundred years of Romanov rule. Nicholas was a victim of several factors, most importantly his own naivety and ineptitude and the Russian governmental system. He headed an autocracy which had proven itself to be incapable of handling the social and political problems of a society that had begun to move into the modern, industrial world after 1880. When World War I broke out, Russia's bureaucratic inefficiency and industrial backwardness were no match for Kaiser Wilhelm's highly organized war machine. As the war progressed, the government found itself faced with food shortages that it could not rectify and mounting internal dissention. In addition, the Tsarina, her advisor--the infamous Gregory Rasputin, and a group of high court officials were widely rumored to hold pro-German sympathies. The combination of high court rumors, military defeats, and internal chaos caused one important member of the Russian legislature to question, in December, 1916, whether Russia's defeats were the result of "stupidity or treason." ¹

Despite these rumblings from below, most Russians, from Monarchists to Bolsheviks, were surprised by the Revolution of March, 1917. The revolt that was
to topple the Romanov dynasty had begun as a bread riot on March 9. By the early morning hours of March 13, these riots had grown into a full scale revolt that forced the Czar to abdicate on March 15.²

Following a brief attempt to preserve the monarchy, first under the Tsar's son, Alexei, then under the Czar's brother, Grand Duke Michael, power in Russia fell to two groups: The Temporary Committee of the Duma and the Petrograd Soviet. The Temporary Committee of the Duma had been created on March 11, 1917, after the Tsar, buoyed by an exaggerated report of that day's successful suppression of demonstrating crowds, dismissed the Duma.³ After technically accepting the Tsar's ukase the members of the major non-Rightest Duma parties formed a Temporary Executive Committee with monarchist Duma President Michael Rodzianko as its leader. The avowed purpose of the Temporary Committee was to preserve order in the capital, but many of its members also retained the hope of preserving the Monarch in some form. In fact the rapid pace of events caused some members of the Committee to argue that they should take power before the more radical elements seized it.⁴ Eventually this viewpoint won out and on March 16 the Temporary Committee created, from among its members, the Provision Government of Russia.
Politically the Provisional Government cannot be said to have reflected the Russia of 1917. Although it represented the major moderate parties in proportion to their representation in the old Duma, that body had been elected in 1912 under an electoral system deliberately designed to favor conservative parties. As a result the large and powerful socialist parties had only one representative: the charismatic Labor Duma deputy, Alexander Kerensky. Along with Kerensky, the new Government consisted of seven Cadets (Constitution Democrats) and five Octobrists (Conservative Nationalists), giving it a political stance that would have been moderately liberal before the Revolution but was now decidedly conservative, particularly on issues relating to the war and economics. 5

The principal figure in the new government was Dr. Paul N. Milyukov, a classical Liberal whose model government was the British Parliament. Historian William H. Chamberlain describes Milyukov, who was the leader of the Cadet Party, as shrewd but somewhat academic. 6 Titular leadership of the Provisional Government rested in the hands of the public-spirited but colorless President of the Union of Zemstvos and Municipalities, Prince George E. Lvov. Other ministers worthy of note were Finance Minister Michael I.
Tereschenko, a wealthy, young sugar manufacturer from the Ukraine and War Minister Alexander I. Guchkov, a well-to-do Moscow merchant and leader of the Octobrist party.  

Counterpoised against the Provisional Government was the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies. This body traced its origins to the Revolution of 1905 and was initially a somewhat accidental group composed of socialist Duma representatives, radical lawyers, and journalists. The Soviet met for the first time since 1905 on March 16 in a room of the Tauride Palace. Originally known as the Soviet of Workers Deputies, it was expanded to include representatives of the large number of soldiers who had gathered in the room. During March and April of 1917 the predominance of power in the Soviet was held by the Menshevik wing of the Social Democratic Party and the largely agrarian Social Revolutionary Party. The Bolshevik wing of the Social Democratic Party remained in eclipse until the return of Lenin in April. But even after Lenin's return the more moderate parties remained in control until mid-September.  

On March 14 Dr. Milyukov reached an agreement with the Soviet on a general program for ruling Russia. By the terms of this agreement the Provisional
Government was to act as caretaker until a Constituent Assembly could be elected. Agreement was also reached on the establishment of various democratic institutions and such measures as a general amnesty, the right to organize and to strike, and freedoms of speech and press. 9

It was on the critical issues of continuing the war, the type of peace that would follow, and Socialist desires for redistribution of land that the bourgeois Milyukov and the leaders of the Soviet were unable to agree. These critical issues were to continue to be the cause of sporadic internal unrest throughout the Provisional Government's existence. In addition to creating problems for the government, the failure to adequately resolve these questions served both as weapons in the hands of the Bolsheviks and thus ultimately political difficulties for the moderate socialist parties which did not attempt to force a final resolution of the land question. 10

The Petrograd Soviet, initially owning the allegiance of the majority of soldiers and workers in the capital, might well have resolved both issues and taken power for itself in March. That it did not was due primarily to the philosophy of its majority, which felt that the Revolution was bourgeois
in character and that Russia must first go through a period of capitalist rule and development before socialist theories could be applied. This philosophy was so pervasive among the majority of Soviet members that even the ideas of sharing power with the government or allowing individual members of the Soviet to participate in the government were initially voted down by that body's Executive Committee. But despite the Soviet's decision not to participate in the Provisional Government it was able to exercise considerable de facto veto power due to its extensive following.

The resulting dual system of government presented a confusing picture to most Russians and to their Allies. Realistically, the ability of any group to exercise power depended upon support of the leaderless soldiers in general and those of the Petrograd garrison in particular. The soldiers, having largely rejected their officers but having no leadership structure of their own, were clearly unprepared to take power. Nevertheless, their identification with and support of the Soviet put the Provisional Government in a precarious position whenever it disagreed with the former body.

In the United States President Woodrow Wilson had officially learned of the March Revolution on
on March 14 when the American Ambassador in Petrograd, David R. Francis, had cabled Secretary of State Robert Lansing. Francis reported that he had been unable to send a telegram since March 11 and that the "Revolutionists have absolute control in Petrograd and are (making) strenuous efforts to preserve order, which successful except in rare instances."14

Like most other Americans, Wilson's background on Russia and her affairs must be presumed to have been extremely limited. There is no evidence that he had studied the affairs of that nation at any time. The vast majority of the President's background and experience inclined towards domestic rather than foreign affairs. In the latter he assumed that the primary goal of American diplomacy was to translate American ideals into action in the world. He idealistically desired a peaceful world but felt this would only occur when "democracy" triumphed everywhere.15 Professor Arthur Link summed up the President's problems with foreign policy:

Time and again Wilson used the same methods and almost always with the same results: the formation of faulty policy through sheer ignorance, men working at cross purposes, confusion in the State Department and in the embassies and legations, and the like.16
It is little wonder that Wilson told a friend shortly before assuming office in 1913 that it "would be the irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs." Nevertheless, Wilson, by 1917, did have experience in foreign affairs: what he lacked was knowledge of Russia. Unfortunately his Secretary of State knew little more about Russia than did the President.

Secretary of State Robert Lansing had followed his father into the practice of law and had first turned towards diplomacy in the 1890's when he married the daughter of President Cleveland's Secretary of State, John Foster. Thereafter, Lansing served as an American representative in numerous international arbitrations until 1916 when he became counsellor of the State Department. When William Jennings Bryan resigned in 1915, Lansing was chosen as his successor. Like Wilson's, Lansing's background reveals no particular knowledge of or interest in Russia. Despite this fact he was to exert considerable influence on the makeup of the American commission and on Wilson's view of the American and Russian roles in World War I. On March 20 Robert Lansing had put forward the idea that the Russian Revolution was important to the Allied cause because it had "removed the one objection to affirming that the European War was a war between
Democracy and Absolutism." Lansing felt that such an approach would "put a new spirit in the Allies" and might strengthen both the Russian democracy and the democratic element in Germany. 19 Although he did not accept this view initially, by April 2, in his War Message to Congress, Wilson made several references to Russia, describing her as "always in fact democratic at heart" and having "added to our hope for the future peace of the world" by throwing off the "terrible" autocracy which ruled her. Wilson referred to Russia as "a fit partner for a league of honour." 20 With the United States now fully committed to the War, Russia's new democratic government and its ability to continue became matters of great concern to the administration. Lacking adequate knowledge, the President relied on various sources but turned principally to a set of trusted advisors. This small group consisted, on this issue, of Lansing, Colonel Edward M. House, Charles R. Crane, and Professor Samuel N. Harper. 21

Colonel House had long been one of the President's key advisors and trouble shooters. Like Lansing he had no extensive personal knowledge of Russia, but he did have numerous sources of information, mostly British and French, who at least as early as January 1916, had become concerned about Russia's ability to
continue the War. Although House's influence on Russian affairs appears to have been limited after the first stages of American relations with the Provisional Government, he did influence America's early responses to the new government in Russia.22

Charles Crane was the son of a wealthy Chicago industrialist who had amassed a great fortune in the plumbing business. Originally a Republican, the younger Crane had become active in the Progressive Party. In 1912 he had decided to support Wilson over Roosevelt and had been active in financing Wilson's campaign. Crane's long-standing romantic interest in Russia resulted from his extensive travel there and his many contacts among Russia's upper and middle classes. Crane was primarily interested in Russian art and religious affairs, but Wilson seemed to have placed great and perhaps undue reliance on Crane's view of the Russian political situation.23

Samuel Northrup Harper first became interested in Russia when his father, William Rainey Harper, then President of the University of Chicago, had joined Charles Crane on one of his many visits to that country. Harper had converted his early interest in Russia into a career, becoming Professor of Russian Language and Institutions at the University of Chicago with his chair being financed by Crane. Harper, who
had visited Russia many times, had attended four sessions of the Duma and had witnessed the Bloody Sunday massacre of 1905. He had gone to Russia twice during the war, once in 1915 as advisor to Ambassador Francis and again in 1916 on his own. Harper's contacts in Russia, unlike Crane's, were primarily among bourgeois circles, although he had also made limited contacts with some socialist groups.

Upon learning of the Russian Revolution on March 14 Lansing asked his aide Richard T. Crane, who was Charles Crane's son, to contact Professor Harper in order to obtain "some knowledge of the participants in the revolution and the purpose sought by it." Harper's analysis of the situation was both simplistic and to a large extent inaccurate being based on very little knowledge of what had actually occurred. Harper informed the State Department that the March Revolution was political rather than social in nature. The revolution had not been directed against the dynasty but was a revolt against attempts by the Czar's government to "disrupt public organizations" such as the Prince Lvov's Zemstvo Union, the War Industries Committees, and the peasant cooperative societies. Further it was clear to Harper that the Duma had the support of these public organizations and the Army. Based on this belief he concluded that the leader of
the Provisional Government would "be able to hold the confidence of (the) country and army" and accomplish its aim, namely a "more effective prosecution of war and war till victory." This view completely ignored the fact that the leaderless soldiers and workers of Petrograd, who had brought about the March Revolution, were certainly not motivated by a desire to win the war.

Charles Crane's initial analysis of the state of affairs in Russia was remarkably similar and Wilson appears to have accepted the Crane-Harper view that the Provisional Government had "the confidence of the Russian people" and that the "liberal-nationalists" who, from Harper's viewpoint, appeared to be in control were enthusiastic supporters of democracy based on the Western model.

The initial reaction of the American public was also one of enthusiasm and optimism. Particularly indicative of this trend were the mass meetings held in New York under the sponsorship of such groups as the American Society of Friends of Russian Freedom, the American Commission of the All-Russian Zemsky Union, and the American Committee for the Encouragement of Democratic Government in Russia.

The enthusiasm of the administration and important sections of American society was initially confirmed
by America's diplomats in Russia. America's Ambassador to Russia at this time was David R. Francis. Francis was not well suited for the task he was to face. He had initially been sent to Petrograd in March of 1916 to negotiate a new trade treaty with Russia. A former Mayor of St. Louis, Governor of Missouri, and member of President Cleveland's cabinet; Francis was undoubtedly selected to negotiate the new treaty because of his loyalty to the Democratic Party and his background as a grain merchant and banker. As a diplomat, however, he was a poor choice. He neither had familiarity with Russia nor spoke the language. His midwestern manners soon made him a virtual outcast at the court of the Tsars. Even one of his admirers described him as "a very blunt, outspoken American, who believed in speaking his mind regardless of the rules of diplomacy." 

In spite of his personal drawbacks, Francis' prestige and influence as the representative of the world's foremost democracy soared with the coming of the March Revolution. On March 18 he cabled Lansing asking that he be allowed to be the first Ambassador to extend recognition to the new government, which "will have a stupendous moral effect especially if given first." Lansing replied in the affirmative
on March 20, in spite of Colonel House's attempts to have the United States await recognition by Britain and France. On March 22, 1917, at 4:30 pm, Francis formally recognized the Provisional Government on behalf of the United States at a meeting of the Council of Ministers.

Outside of Francis, the Wilson Administration's major sources of information were the American consuls at Petrograd and Moscow; North Winship and Madden Summers. The contrast between their reports and those of Francis is striking. Francis reports were often overly optimistic and almost always lacking in depth. While the Ambassador appears to have been well informed on the feelings and opinions of the Provisional Government he had very little knowledge or understanding of the Soviet and seems not to have even bothered to send an observer to that body. Winship and Summers on the other hand were well informed on the Russian situation and wrote excellent, lengthy reports. Unfortunately, Francis' short telegrams arrived in Washington one or two days after they were sent. The reports of Winship and Summers were sent by diplomatic pouch and took from one to two months to reach the State Department.

Francis' first reports had emphasized the virtually universal acceptance and tranquil aftermath of
the March Revolution. By March 23 he had, however, become concerned, warning Lansing that the "socialistic element composed of working men and soldiers holding continuous meetings in the Duma are advocating abolition of classes and the right of soldiers to disobey their officers. In spite of this situation, Francis was able to report that Petrograd remained tranquil and that the Provisional Government was growing stronger, although it was "compelled to handle socialistic element carefully and danger from that source is not entirely dissipated."

This potential threat from the Russian left did not dissipate; by April 11 Francis was warning that conditions in the Russian armed forces were "precarious", that certain groups were "urging peace", and that some of his sources of information feared that the "army will be influenced thereby." Lansing, undoubtedly already concerned about German pressure on the eastern front, passed the cable to the President, adding that he wished "we could do something to prevent the socialistic element in Russia from carrying out any plans which would destroy the efficiency of the Allied Powers."

The Secretary of State went on to suggest that the United States send a "commission of some sort" in order to accomplish this purpose. This marks the beginning of the official discussion between the
President and Secretary Lansing on this subject. More importantly Francis' cable and Lansing's response document the Administration's awareness of the possible threat to the continuation of the war effort that was posed by the Russian socialists.
CHAPTER TWO

A CONSERVATIVE MISSION
It was on the basis of Ambassador Francis telegrams and several other concerned sources that the idea for an American mission to Russia was first conceived. In his response to Lansing's memo of April 11, Wilson stated that the "suggestion of a commission to Russia has come to me from a number of quarters, and I am inclined to think that it would be a good plan to send one, and send it practically at once." When and by whom the idea of sending a commission to aid the Provisional Government first came is not certain. It is certain, however, that the idea did not originate with Wilson, and it appears to have come from several sources over a period of about a week.

The earliest documentable mention of sending some type of American commission to Russia appears to have occurred on April 7 when the New York Times mentioned that a group of unidentified Americans "having large interests in Russia" sent a report to London which recommended an American commission of "national character" to help in providing for financial assistance and various other supplies that the new government in Russia might require. Further, such a commission "would do much to cement the stability of the institutions which have resulted from the revolution."
On April 9, Oscar Straus, the former chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, presented such a plan to Andrew D. White. White, a former American Ambassador to Russia, apparently conveyed Straus' ideas to Robert Lansing and Colonel House. Straus discussed the matter with his close friend George Kennan who reports that both Lansing and House liked Straus' idea, provided the Provisional Government was amenable.³

On April 10 Colonel House cabled Wilson from New York that "some distinguished Frenchmen asked me today to suggest to you the sending of an American Commission to Russia."⁴

Charles R. Flint, a merchant, shipper, financier, and adventurer, who frequently corresponded with the President, wrote Wilson in April urging that a commission, "thoroughly representative of all elements in American life", be sent to Russia to express the "congratulations and sympathy of the American people and "to ascertain the most effective means by which the two countries could cooperate in the prosecution of the War."⁵

Whether Wilson received similar suggestions in other personal communications is not revealed by the sources available. It does appear that those who were offering advice to the President were concerned
about both the possibility that Russia would be unable to continue the war and their own economic interests. With America now having joined the conflict, Russia's ability to pin down a sizeable portion of the eastern armies of the central powers became of paramount importance to Colonel House and his French acquaintances. The latter went so far as to propose that American aid for the Provisional Government be preconditioned on a continuation of the war. Russia must "be told authoritatively that if they are to have the good will and financial support of this country, they must compose their internal differences and not make a separate peace at this time."  

Undoubtedly the purposes that were to be fulfilled by sending a mission to Russia were clear in the minds of Wilson's advisors. However, it is critical to any analysis of the success or failure of the Root Mission that Wilson's own concept of the purpose of the mission and his instructions to its members be known. If the President shared the view of his advisors that the purpose of the Mission was to keep Russia in the War then his selection of personnel, his final instructions to them, and their performance must be judged on that basis. If the President had other purposes in mind then these questions should be approached accordingly.
Unfortunately the President's public and private statements on this subject consist of rather innocuous generalities. On May 17 the United States conveyed its official statement of purpose to the Provisional Government. The American Mission was being sent to convey "the friendship and good will" of the United States, to express the "confident hope" of America that the new democracy of Russia "will join with the free people of America in resisting with firmness and fortitude the ambitious designs of the German Government", and to find "the most efficient means of cooperating with the Russian Government in the prosecution of the war." Thus it is clear that the Administration wanted to keep Russia in the war and that this goal was at least one of the objects of the Mission.

The President, in the invitations extended to the American envoys, asked them to show Russia "our interest and sympathy at this critical juncture in Russian affairs and to associate ourselves in counsel and in all friendly service with the present Government of Russia." Additional statements reflect a similar view of the Mission's purpose and for perhaps understandable reasons Wilson seems to have avoided any public reference to the war-oriented objective of the Mission.
In the absence of any record of the actual instructions that were given verbally to the members of the Mission, the clearest statement of the aims of the Root Mission was, due to its confidential nature and sources involved, a cable from a member of the Root Mission, Basil Miles, to Moscow Consul Madden Summers. This cable was sent on June 18, 1917, with the purpose of informing Summers of the Mission's arrival in Moscow and its aims while in Russia. Miles stated that:

This is a war mission, whose purpose is concerned exclusively with what the United States can do to help Russia prosecute the war immediately to a successful conclusion.

The mission, if practicable (sic) is anxious to impress on the public mind the firm and vigorous support offered by the United States to free Russia. 11

The speeches and actions of the Mission's members while in Russia reflect this view. 12

On April 14 Lansing, at the instructions of Wilson, cabled Ambassador Francis asking him to "Discreetly ascertain from Milyukov" whether it would be acceptable for the United States to send a commission of "distinguished Americans to consult with the Russian Government as to the best means of cooperation and to convey a message of good will from the United States." 13 On April 19 Francis responded that such a mission was acceptable. He suggested that it "should
be very discreet and give attention first and mainly to successful prosecution of the war, exercising care in giving expression to views concerning internal affairs." 14

The process of selecting personnel for the Mission was nevertheless begun even before the Provisional Government had approved the idea. The President wrote Lansing on April 12 with his initial list of persons to serve on the commission, following the suggestions Colonel House made to him on April 10: "a prominent Jew (Oscar Straus), a businessman (Willard Straight), a labor leader (Samuel Gompers), and an educator (Benjamin Ide Wheeler)." To these he added Charles R. Crane and Samuel Harper. 15

Lansing, whose suggestions eventually represented a majority of the commission, discarded most of the Wilson-House suggestions in responding to the President later in the day. Retaining Gompers and Crane, Lansing found that Wheeler and Straight were unsuitable, that Oscar Straus might overplay "the Jew element" if Gompers were also chosen and that Harper, according to "several different sources is not as popular as I had supposed in Russia," and should not be sent. Lansing went on to propose Doctor John R. Mott, "a businessman like Cyrus McCormick or Harold (Howard) Elliott; a financier like Bertrand (Samuel
of these all except Howard Elliot made the trip to Russia.

Although the President relied to a large extent on Lansing to initiate the individual selections, he did have a clear idea of the type of men he wanted. To Wilson the "important, perhaps the all-important thing is the personnel. Men of large view, tested discretion, and a sympathetic appreciation of just what it is they have been sent over for are the sort we need;" further, "...they should look the part."

In addition Wilson clearly wanted a bipartisan mission: "...they must not all be Democrats - need not any of them be Democrats, - but should all be genuinely enthusiastic for the success of the Russian revolution." Crane, Dr. Mott, Bertron, and McCormick appear to have fit this description; in Wilson's view their inclusion in the Mission appears to have been setted from April 19 onwards.

It is obvious from the type of men chosen that one of the major functions of the first tier of commissioners was to represent various American interests, e.g., labor, finance, business, religion. These men were given the title Envoy Extraordinary and were largely selected for their knowledge and standing in their fields of endeavor. They were expected to be able to confer on these broad topics with their
Russian counterparts. Only Crane and to a lesser degree Dr. Mott and Cyrus McCormick had prior interests in Russia. It was undoubtedly a major purpose of the second tier of the commission to provide the knowledge that their superiors often lacked.

Dr. John R. Mott was an American leader of the Y.M.C.A. Although he was a Methodist, he became fascinated by the Russian Orthodox Church. He was active in attempting to bridge the gaps between all Christian churches but had taken a particular interest in the Russian Church, perhaps because of its geographic isolation from the majority of Christian groups. Dr. George M. Day, Fraternal Secretary of the Y.M.C.A., described Mott's attitude as "extremely agile ... in hurdling the barriers of denominationalism, creed, color, race! To him the words of our Lord, 'that they all may be one', were sacred, prophetic, vital!" Dr. Mott had made contacts with the leaders of the Russian Church and had visited Russia in 1909. He was a natural and appropriate choice to join the American Mission.19

There is little information available on Samuel Reading Bertron. Born in Mississippi, Bertron had graduated from Yale and thereafter founded the banking firm of Bertron and Storrs in New York. Although it does not appear that he had any connection with or
knowledge of Russia, he did have some prior diplomatic experience having been an American representative to the Turkish-Italian peace negotiations of 1912. I have found no written record of his business or political dealings or of his activities while a member of the Root Mission.  

Cyrus R. McCormick was the son of the famous inventor of the reaper and head of the International Harvester Company, which had relatively extensive business interests in Russia and was part of the massive holdings of J. P. Morgan and Company. McCormick had frequently corresponded with the President on subjects relating to Russia during the spring of 1917.

While the choices of Crane, Dr. Mott, Bertron, and McCormick were handled with dispatch the remaining selections required greater consideration. Choosing the right man to lead the American Mission appears to have caused much discussion and involved the entire cabinet. This was, of course, a critical choice, most probably because diplomatic missions often take on the character of their titular head, especially in the minds of the press and general public of both their own nation and the nation to which they are sent.

The field of candidates being considered for the leadership position was narrow. The President had
initially wanted to send a member of his cabinet, and Colonel House thought Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo would be the best choice. Secretary of Interior Frank K. Lane was also mentioned. Wilson decided, however, that members of his cabinet could not be spared from the more pressing problem of war preparation. It was thus decided to look outside the administration for a man to head the commission. The President and his cabinet appear to have considered only three possibilities: Wilson's own former Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan; former President Theodore Roosevelt, and former Secretary of State Elihu Root.

William Jennings Bryan had long been a pacifist and was a vigorous opponent of American entry into World War I. He had, in fact, resigned as Wilson's Secretary of State when the President insisted on a firm note to Germany which Bryan believed might close the last door to negotiations. Nevertheless, with America's entry in the conflict, Byran had offered his services and declared that the "discussion has ended," the entire country must now "stand undivided behind the President." The proof of his sincerity can be seen in the fact that he was to spend much of the war supporting bond drives and giving patriotic speeches to new recruits. Bryan also had some
previous connections with Russia, having visited that country in 1902. If Secretary of the Navy Josephus P. Daniels' account is correct, Bryan had once predicted that Russia would be the "first country in Europe to become a Republic." There is no documentary evidence that President Wilson had any reason not to select his former Secretary of State. Bryan's resignation had apparently been of a cordial nature and both men appear to have been saddened by the occasion.

William Jennings Bryan would have been a good, even excellent, choice to head the American commission precisely because he had been such an adamant and vociferous pacifist prior to April, 1917. Further, his liberal-populist viewpoint and gift for fiery oratory may well have appealed to many Russian socialists and possibly some of those who opposed the war. Of the three candidates for the position he was the least vulnerable to socialist criticism.

Former President Roosevelt was another potentially good, perhaps excellent, choice. Although Roosevelt did not have an extensive knowledge of Russia, he had been the mediator of the Treaty of Portsmouth ending the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. This must have given him some standing in that country which, when added to the fact that he was a former American President, makes it highly likely that he
would have been recognized in Russia as a name, a personality, and perhaps a friend. The choice of Roosevelt seems a good one because the former President's fairly progressive views and record were widely known and difficult to tamper with. While not quantifiable, Roosevelt also possessed a certain charisma that could well have made him extremely popular with the Russian people and an inspirational war advocate. He had a domestic following similar in size to Bryan's and there appears to have been some popular support for the idea of sending him to Russia.  

Further, Roosevelt appears to have been the only one to have actually expressed an interest in the appointment. John Hays Hammond, an American mining engineer and associate of President Taft, stated in his autobiography that several of the former president's friends had asked him to intercede in Roosevelt's behalf. Hammond approached Colonel House, who liked the suggestion of sending the flamboyant Republican to Russia. Wilson, however, did not. He dismissed the idea with the remark that "I could not in any circumstances consider the suggestion of sending Mr. Roosevelt anywhere to represent the administration." Thus President Wilson's longstanding distaste for Roosevelt prevented the latter's selection.
Senator Elihu Root's background made him an obvious choice from the standpoint of enlisting Republican support for the Administration's war program; a policy that Colonel House had strongly urged the President to follow. 32

Born in Clinton, New York, in 1845, Root had begun his law career by starting his own firm in New York City, where he soon became a leading corporate lawyer. During the last two decades of the nineteenth century he had become interested in politics and had associated himself with the reform element of the Republican Party of New York. He subsequently became a close friend of Theodore Roosevelt. In 1899 President William McKinley, looking for a man with legal skills to administer the territories recently acquired in the Spanish-American War, appointed Root to the post of Secretary of War. In this position Root successfully dealt with the Philippine insurrection in 1900 and effected a major reorganization of the War Department. With the death of John M. Hay in 1905 Roosevelt appointed Root Secretary of State. Between 1905 and his resignation from that office in 1909 Root brought about significant improvement in American relations with both Latin America and Japan, concluded the lengthy North Atlantic fisheries dispute, and negotiated numerous arbitration
treaties with Europe. In 1912 he received the Nobel Peace Prize for his handling of American possessions as Secretary of War and his successes as Secretary of State. Upon his resignation from the State Department in 1909 Root won a seat in the United States Senate from his native New York. He remained in the Senate until 1915, where he aligned with the Taft Republicans and became a leading and vociferous opponent of President Wilson. Root's opposition to Wilson was in fact so vociferous that the President had on one occasion described Root and Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge as men who would stoop to "twist the truth", had little conscience and used "insincere and contemptible methods of fighting." After America declared war on April 6 the suggestion came from various quarters that a war-time coalition cabinet be formed and that it include both Root and Roosevelt. It is doubtful that the President looked on this idea with any degree of enthusiasm. In any event it was Root who took the President off the hook by declaring on April 9 that the Republicans needed "no coalition Government to make us loyal. We will make a coalition ourselves with every Democrat in the country." It was Lansing who first mentioned Root for this position at a cabinet meeting in April. Secretary of the
Navy Josephus Daniels, who appears to have raised the only objection, wrote later that he considered Root deserving of the appointment in every way, but feared that the former Secretary of State would be perceived as "a little brother of the rich" and that the Russian refugees then living in America would be able to discredit Root in the eyes of Russian socialists. "Before Root arrives in Russia these reports, unjust to him, will close the ears of Russian revolutionists to his arguments and appeals. He will not have a chance to do the things he sincerely wishes to do." Daniels contends that he actually made this specific statement at the time and was not using the advantage of hindsight to criticize or apologize for Wilson's selection. If his memory was accurate, Daniels' reservations should have been heeded, for they demonstrated remarkable foresight.  

Daniels states that he went on to suggest that either former President Roosevelt or William Jennings Bryan be appointed to head the Mission. Both Lansing and McAdoo were unbending in their support of Root. The President, who had earlier expressed his determination not to let considerations of party enter into the debate, sided with Lansing and McAdoo. On April 19 the President wrote Lansing that if the Secretary found Root to be "a real friend of the Revolution"
during his conference with the Senator on that date, then Root should head the commission. Root apparently met Wilson's qualification, for on April 21 the New York Times reported that the former Senator "appeared tonight to be the probable selection, although several other men were under consideration." According to Lansing, Root accepted on April 24 at a dinner given by the Secretary of State for visiting British leader Arthur Balfour. Root called on the President on April 26 to accept the job formally and discuss the situation. The following day his appointment was publically announced by the State Department.

Numerous reasons have been suggested for the selection of Root to head the commission. Clearly the impetus came from Lansing. Josephus Daniels suggests that perhaps it was because Root had supported the appointment of Lansing as Counsellor to the State Department at a critical juncture. Certainly Lansing had cause to be grateful as he probably would not have become Secretary of State had he failed to obtain the Counsellor post. It is more probable however that Lansing, in addition to his own conservative inclinations and appreciation for Root's support, felt that the former Secretary of State was the best choice from the standpoint of diplomatic expertise.
Why Wilson was willing to support Lansing on this is of course the crucial question. Colonel T. Bently Mott, who accompanied Root on the Mission, suggests that Root was chosen in order to satisfy the cries for a proposed coalition cabinet. This seems unlikely, for the coalition issue had already been settled. It is clear, however, that Wilson was concerned with Republican support in the House of Representatives and in the country as a whole. This partisan concern must be considered a secondary factor in Root's selection.

Charles R. Flint, who visited Root just prior to the latter's departure suggests that Root was sent "for the purpose of weakening his political prestige." Although Root's participation in the Mission may have had this effect there is no evidence that Wilson had intended such a result.

Wilson himself, in response to critics of the appointment, emphasized Root's experience, understanding of the fine art of diplomacy, and sympathy for the new Russian democracy. This latter consideration was of paramount importance to the President. It probably stemmed from the genuine sympathy which Wilson himself felt towards that nation. It also shows that Wilson was serious in his hopes that the Mission would at least be helpful to the new Russian Government.
Another requirement that the President emphasized was that the members of the Mission "must look the part." This requirement appears to add credence to the theory that Wilson was at least secondarily concerned that the Mission give a prestigious appearance to both America and the Provisional Government, a purpose for which Root was well suited.

The selection of the man who was to lead the mission was made with dispatch, even haste. The elections of representatives of American socialism and American labor, and the decision not to send a Jewish representative were made with greater difficulty. Wilson and Lansing had clearly decided that a representative of labor should be included and had agreed on Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, on April 12. The suggestion had come originally from Colonel House in his cablegram of April 10, but he had changed his mind by April 20 after learning that Gompers was "persona non grata with the labor people" in Russia. Wilson had apparently already come to this conclusion by the nineteenth, feeling that "Gompers himself and the leaders immediately associated with him are known to be pronounced opponents of Socialism and would hardly be influential in the present ruling circles of labour at Petrograd." Wilson suggested someone named
"Lehman", but added that Lansing should consult with Gompers as to who would be a "real representative of American Labour"; not a socialist but yet someone who would not be regarded in Petrograd as "an active opponent of Socialism".

Gompers recommended James Duncan the first Vice President of the American Federation of Labor and sixty year old head of the Granite Cutters International. Born in Scotland, Duncan's primary accomplishment was his successful leadership of a campaign to bring the eight hour day to the granite cutting industry. Duncan had no formal diplomatic experience aside from participation in several international trade union conventions, and there is no evidence that he had any knowledge of Russia or the sentiments of her workers. He accepted an invitation to join the mission on May 7, stating that he was "in hearty accord" with the Mission's objectives. Duncan was not a good choice and the reason for his selection, in spite of Gomper's recommendation, is uncertain. The President may well have selected Duncan because he felt that sending a representative of the American Federation of Labor was a domestic political necessity. Nevertheless Wilson knew that Gompers and his "inner circle", which must have included Duncan, were not acceptable to many, if not most, Russian
socialists. The effect of this selection was to place all hope of establishing a rapport with the Soviets in the hands of an as yet unnamed American socialist.

The idea of sending a second representative from the American Socialist or labor camps was probably conceived on April 19 when Joseph Choate, an American diplomat and lawyer, saw Lansing and mentioned that knowledgeable friends of his in New York "thought that two representatives of labor should be sent" to Russia, "one from each class." Lansing passed the idea along to Wilson, saying that he presumed Choate's advisors to have meant that representatives of both socialist and non-socialist labor circles should be sent to Russia. The President agreed and the difficult search for an American socialist who would be acceptable to Russian socialists and who had views on the war that were acceptable to the administration began.

The choice was a difficult one because the Socialist Party of America was, in 1917, dominated by such pro-German and anti-war socialists as former Wisconsin Congressman Victor Berger and Morris Hillquit. For some unknown reason, perhaps naivete, Berger was actually asked to join the mission but declined. When Hillquit's name was mentioned,
Wisconsin Senator Paul O. Hustings recommended that Wilson publicly deny that such "rabid pro-Germans" were even being considered.58

The field was quickly narrowed to those Socialists who had declared their willingness to support the war effort. The names most often mentioned were William English Walling, Arthur Bullard, A. M. Simons, John Spargo, George Kennan and Charles Edward Russell.

Walling was the nephew of Grover Cleveland's Vice Presidential candidate in 1880. He spoke fluent Russian, was a contributing editor of numerous popular magazines, and a founder of the NAACP. Walling was perhaps the best choice for the position and quickly became the Administration's first choice after being suggested to Root by Charles R. Flint.59

After daily meetings with the Secretary of Labor, Walling declined State Department Counselor Frank Polk's invitation to join the American commission; despite his willingness to serve he feared that the anti-war socialists would attempt to discredit him.60 Walling went on to suggest Simons, Spargo, or Russell, in that order. Simons, the non-Jewish head of the Milwaukee Branch of the Wisconsin Defense League, declined.61 John Spargo apparently was passed over, and attention now turned to Charles E. Russell.
Russell had been a reporter and writer with several major American newspapers and was the author of twelve books and numerous articles of an anti-capitalist, anti-corruption bent. In 1908 he had become active in the Socialist Party and was their candidate for Governor of New York in that year and again in 1912. In March of 1917 he had joined several other prominent American socialists in writing an article for The New Republic in support of the war. In addition Russell had written Wilson that he was convinced that the United States should intervene in the war in an attempt to rid the world of German autocracy and militarism permanently.

Despite this letter to the President the choice of Russell came from Lansing, who wrote the President on May 3 that he had read W. E. Walling's The Socialists and the War and found the views of Charles Russell contained therein to have been "more in accord with what I conceive to be the best suited to influence Russian Socialists." Russell was invited soon thereafter. Like Duncan he had neither diplomatic expertise nor familiarity with Russia and was apparently selected largely on the basis of his views on the war. Since the Russian Socialists were unlikely to pay much attention to an American trade union representative the selection of an American
socialist who could both support the war and relate well to the Russian socialists was again critical. Although it was difficult to find such a representative, either Arthur Bullard or George Kennan might have been better choices.

Bullard's background in Russian affairs was extensive. He knew many members of the Russian socialist parties and had been active during the Revolution of 1905. In addition he met the necessary criteria of supporting the war and being an active socialist although he was not a member of the socialist party of America. Bullard had been recommended by Simons on May 4 when the latter declined to join the mission, but the President did not pursue Simon's suggestion at that time. Bullard was again recommended to the President by George Creel on May 14. Creel, newly appointed head of the Committee on Public Information, had met with the President in early May to discuss this very topic but had overlooked Bullard on that occasion. On May 14, after Russell had already been invited, Creel wrote Wilson about Bullard. Wilson thought that the suggestion was "a splendid one" and said that he had just sent Lansing a note to that effect. Lansing, either resenting the influence of Creel or finding Bullard too liberal, blocked his appointment on the grounds
that Stanley Washburn, a *London Times* correspondent, had already been selected for the position in question. 67

George Kennan would have been another excellent choice to represent the American socialist viewpoint to the Russian people. Kennan was a noted author, lecturer, and world traveller and had spent many years in Russia in various pursuits. There Kennan had become well versed in Russian affairs and his expose of Tsarist practices in the Siberian prison system made him popular in Russian socialist circles. 68

On May 3 Senator Root wrote Lansing supporting Kennan's inclusion in the trip to Russia in some capacity. 69

Why Kennan wasn't invited is unknown, although he may have been ill at the time. 70 In any event neither Bullard nor Kennan became members of the Root Mission, and Russell, totally unknown in Russia, became America's best hope of reaching the Russian masses.

The question of whether to send a Jew as a member of the commission became both a difficult and embarrassing issue. It was Colonel House who had originally suggested that a prominent Jew be included. 71 Lansing, while not opposing the inclusion of a Jewish representative, had not wanted to send more than one, and he preferred Gompers. 72 When Gompers declined Wilson decided to send Eugene Meyer of New York.
Meyer was a Wall Street banker and close friend of Justice Louis D. Brandeis. He had no diplomatic experience and no apparent connection with Russia; his selection was probably due entirely to his friendship with Brandeis. Meyer accepted the invitation and began preparations for the trip. On April 30 Lansing, following a conversation with Stanley Washburn, told the President that it would be a "great mistake" to send any Jews to Russia because "there was never a more intense bitterness and hostility to the race than at present." Washburn apparently felt that this was due to the Provisional Government's "endeavoring to impress the idea of liberalism in the treatment of the Jews." Furthermore, the presence of a Jew on the commission would arouse "popular suspicion" as to the purpose of the Mission and thereby threaten its effectiveness. 73 Ambassador Francis telegraphed a similar opinion. 74

The issue may have been decided on May 2 when Colonel House added fuel to the fire by warning Wilson that the commission already contained too many capitalists and that there was strong opposition to Meyer who was seen by some as a "reactionary stockbroker of doubtful reputation" and whose only qualification was his friendship with Brandeis. 75 With such strenuous opposition coming from both
Russia and America, the administration was forced to withdraw the Meyer invitation. On the negative side Lansing warned that it would be difficult to explain this in America and it would require "very careful handling." On May 3 Meyer, accompanied by Brandeis, visited Lansing and declared his willingness to withdraw upon learning of the administration's position.

The fact that Meyer had been asked to withdraw from the Root Mission did not make news in the United States until late May, when Judge Aaron Levy of New York, who had met with Wilson on several occasions, published a story in the New York Hebrew-language daily, The Warheit. He recounted the incident and claimed that Meyer had been dropped because the Provisional Government "objected to having a Jew on" the Commission. The President, who had been trying to keep the matter out of the press both for its possible negative effect on the Provisional Government and for obvious domestic political reasons, was "shocked" and "amazed" that his confidence had been violated. A series of cables between Levy, the President's secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, and Wilson followed. Levy protested his innocence and contended that the rival Jewish paper, The Day, had intentionally misinterpreted him in its telegram to Tumulty.
The Meyer and Levy incidents did not become American political issues and were hardly reported, but President Wilson remained convinced that his confidence had been violated. The Warheit's article may well have adversely influenced American Jewish opinion of the Provisional Government.

Although the labor and Jewish questions were perhaps the most difficult, the remaining selections were not easily made. On May 7 the acting chairman of the American Red Cross wrote Wilson suggesting that a member of that institution should be included in the Mission as it would "enhance our reputation and show you care." Assistant Secretary of State William Phillips inquired as to what Root thought of the idea. For some reason the former Senator responded that he was "absolutely and unalterably opposed" to this. Wilson sided with Root, perhaps out of deference to the Special Ambassador, and the matter was dropped. There is no evidence to explain Root's vehemence on the subject.

Aside from the Red Cross, numerous other institutions and individuals applied for positions. Wilson, Lansing, Root, and other influential government officials were bombarded with requests to accompany the Mission. In addition various Commission members, particularly Cyrus McCormick, had their own
ideas of who ought to be included and numerous newspapers asked to attach correspondents. 84

By mid-May the Root Mission was complete. In addition to Root, Crane, McCormick, John R. Mott, Bertron, Duncan and Russell, the other senior members of the Mission were General Hugh Scott and Rear Admiral James Glennon. The inclusion of military representatives was suggested by Treasury Secretary McAdoo. 85

General Hugh L. Scott had made his reputation fighting Indians in the American West and as Governor of the savage Moro tribes of the Philippines. He had just retired his position as Chief of Staff of the Army and the Root Mission appointment was probably intended as his "last hurrah." In addition the appointment of the retiring Army Chief of Staff was undoubtedly considered prestigious from a diplomatic point of view. 86

Rear Admiral James F. Glennon was the selection of Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels. 87 The Admiral, who was younger and of lower rank than General Scott, was selected with an eye towards avoiding potential conflicts between two officers of equal rank. 88 At the time of his appointment Glennon was the Commandant of the Washington Navy Yard and Superintendent of its Naval Gun Factory; he was one of the Navy's foremost ordinance experts. His war
experience had included action at Newchwang, Santiago, Havana, and in the Philippines. Both Scott and Glennon were rather gruff, old-school types, who undoubtedly knew both their specialties and how to lead men.

The middle level members of the Root Mission had much more experience in and knowledge of Russia. Rather than representing various groupings of American society, these men were undoubtedly selected with an eye towards providing insights and information about that country which most of their superiors lacked. First among these was the Military Attache of the Root Mission, Colonel William V. Judson. Judson was knowledgeable in Russian affairs, having been the U. S. Army's observer in Russia during the Russo-Japanese War. He was a graduate of West Point, had earned an M. A. from Harvard, and had served the Army in various capacities relating to harbor engineering. George Frost Kennan describes Judson as "a man of utmost integrity of character" and credits him with much insight. Judson's appointment to the Root Mission was the recommendation of Postmaster General Omar Burlison.

Colonel T. Bentley Mott also had West Point and career military backgrounds. Mott had been to Russia in 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War but had only
limited experience in or knowledge of that country. Born in Leesburg, Virginia, he had spent the majority of his life in the Army serving in various capacities as an attache and observer. In 1903 he had assisted then Secretary of State Root during the Alaska Boundary negotiations. He had become a close friend of Root's at that time and passed up an opportunity to join General Pershing's staff in order to go to Russia at Root's personal request.91

Major Stanley Washburn, who had spent the previous three years in Russia as a war correspondent, was made Secretary to the Mission. Lansing was very desirous that Washburn have this position and although the Major was ill at the time, he was persuaded to join the American party. Little has been written about Washburn. He was, however, one of the few members of the Mission who had an extensive Russian background and appears to have been both useful and influential.92

Mr. Basil Miles became Secretary of the Mission on May 9. Miles also had Russian experience having been Secretary to American Ambassador George Meyer in St. Petersburg from 1905 through 1907. During 1916 and early 1917 Miles had been a special minister of the United States in charge of overseeing Russian treatment of German and Austrian prisoners of war.93
Mr. Eugene Prince was named as a civilian aide and interpreter. Prince, who had been born and educated in Russia, provided both a knowledge of the language and the country. He was the Russian representative of the Willys-Overland Company and owed his American citizenship to an act of Congress. Prince would join the mission in Vladivostok.  

Probably the most difficult task, according to Colonel Mott, was that of organizing the clerical staff. Numerous Congressional clerks, often with the backing of their employers, attempted to find a place with the Commission. Two were selected: James F. O'Rourke, Secretary to Senator Pomerane, and Jay Keegan, Secretary to Representative Baker. James F. McKenny, a State Department clerk, was made Chief Clerk and Disbursing Officer, and Duane E. Washburn, another clerk with a State Department background, served as a secretary. The remainder of the staff included McCormick's private secretary, Clyde S. Stilwell, General Scott's orderly, Seargent Paul Z. Randolph, a clerk with the Carnegie Peace Foundation, George D. Gregory and George E. Long, who had been to Russia three times, as messenger.  

The overall make-up of the Root Mission was decidedly conservative, particularly considering that it was being sent to a country in which extremely idealistic socialists wielded much influence.
Root, Bertron and McCormick were all clearly connected with capitalism. Even the more liberal members were relatively conservative by Russian standards. The progressive Crane was also a capitalist by birth, Russell was one of the more conservative socialists available, and Duncan's practical trade-unionism was totally out of place in revolutionary Russia. The documentary evidence available shows that the Root Mission was primarily the creation of Secretary of State Robert Lansing. Why Lansing maneuvered for such conservative personnel cannot be fully understood. Certainly his basic conservatism must be taken into account. Lansing's ignorance of the fundamental philosophies and relative strengths of Russian social and political groups must again be considered a factor. The Secretary of State may have simply picked people that he liked personally without a critical examination of the situation.

Why Wilson took a back seat to Lansing in the selection of the Mission's personnel is an even more interesting question, to which there appears to be no clear-cut answer. There is no apparent reason for the President to have assumed that Lansing had a superior understanding of Russia. It is possible, however, that Wilson had delegated this responsibility to his Secretary of State with the understanding that
the "experts" in this area, including Crane and Harper, and undoubtedly others, were to be consulted. In any event the Root Mission's final make-up was one that might well have been excellent for a mission coming to the United States. As a mission being sent to revolutionary Russia it was too conservative as a whole and, more importantly, its "liberal" members were exceedingly vulnerable to attack. Clearly neither the President nor his advisors gave adequate consideration to the possible socialist reaction. It was, however, the reaction of the Russian refugees then living in America that may well have done most to destroy the Mission's credibility.
CHAPTER THREE

A TREASONABLE CONSPIRACY
The announcement of the appointments of the various members of the Root Mission was generally well received in America. The New York Times of April 26, 1917, described the upcoming Root Mission as "one of the most important diplomatic missions which the United States has ever undertaken in foreign lands," and praised the appointment of Ambassador Root as "like putting the best diplomatic brains which this country can provide against the machinations of German diplomacy."\(^1\)

Although the majority of American press opinion seems to have been favorable to the Mission and to the appointment of Root, there was opposition. It came from three broad groups -- those who were genuinely concerned that Root and perhaps other members of the Mission would not be well received, those who were not politically disposed to like Root, and those who were trying to prevent the Mission's success.

Alexander Petrunkevitch, Yale economics professor and son of the first floor leader of the Russian Duma, was the premier public spokesman of the first group. Petrunkevitch first brought up the issue at the Economics Club in New York where he cautioned that the members of the Root Mission will "be met there (in Russia) with distrust" because the New York socialist press opposed the Administration's choices.
and would not hesitate to cable their condemnation of Root Mission personnel. Petrunkevitch went on to contend that the members of the Commission should be chosen with an eye towards accommodating the Social Democrats and Social Revolutionaries, whom Petrunkevitch considered to be, "now in power." The Yale professor further stated that he had attempted to convey his view to President Wilson but implied that the latter had been too busy with other problems. Petrunkevitch's speech is important because Senator Root, who declined to comment for some reason, read the reports of it, and President Wilson must have been aware of it. Despite this warning, Wilson refused to reconsider, most probably because it would have been a public political embarrassment.

Samuel Untemeyer, a prominent Jewish intellectual who appears to have been genuinely concerned for the ultimate success of the Mission, criticized Root's appointment on the grounds that he was "incredibly narrow and provincial in his conception of the Jew." Rabbi Stephen S. Wise of New York wrote the President on April 24 that he felt that Root should not be chosen, for he "represented those very influences and powers from which the Russian people have at last been liberated." The views of Untemeyer and Wise were undoubtedly motivated in part by the domestic
political concerns of the American Jewish community. It is not at all clear that Root's attitude toward the Jews, whatever it may have been, had any significant impact upon his reception in Russia. 6

While some of the criticism that was leveled at Root came from those who were either genuinely concerned with the Mission's success or merely offended by Root's appointment, the majority of the attacks on the former Secretary of State came from sources bent on discrediting Root and the Mission altogether. Abraham Shiplacoff, a socialist member of the New York Assembly, went so far as to present a resolution asking the President to reconsider the appointment. Root was very popular in New York, even amongst Democrats, and Shiplacoff's resolution was quickly "hooted down" by his fellows and a motion was "unroariously carried" to the effect that no mention of it be made in the journal. 7

Representative Meyer London (D-New York) made the critical observation that the Russian socialists would look on the appointment of Root "as a calamity." 8 This attack may well have been strictly political in nature; it was not well received. London was eventually forced to publicly deny that he was leading a movement to discredit the commission. 9

Morris Hillquit, one of the most important leaders of the majority, anti-war faction of the Socialist
Party of America, was very critical of Root's appointment and warned that "There is no doubt . . . that by the time Mr. Root reaches Petrograd the people of Russia will be informed of his record as a conservative." When asked if he had conveyed this message to Russia, Hillquit replied "Not yet," but "I repeat they will know all about Mr. Root. I can assure you of that." A reporter mentioned that Hillquit's veiled threats might, if carried out, constitute a violation of a law against discrediting government representatives during time of war. The socialist leader contended that the Root Mission was not a war mission only a friendly "visit." 10

Hillquit's threats began a series of attacks on Root and other members of the Commission by the anti-war, often pro-German, socialists. Various socialist-oriented newspapers including Victor Berger's Milwaukee Leader, the New Yorker Volksreitung, a German Social Democratic paper, the radical socialist New York Call and the Russian Social Democratic paper, Novy Mir, attacked Root for his conservatism and his alleged mistreatment of two Russian refugees; Christian Rudewitz and Janoff Pouren. The Volksreitung went so far as to call Root the "fiercest enemy of comrades Rudewitz and Pouren." 11

The charges concerning Pouren and Rudewitz were baseless and in fact the direct opposite of the truth.
Both men had fled Russia under fear of imprisonment. Under intense pressure from the Tsarist regime the United States government had ordered them, through the court system, returned to Russia. Root, then Secretary of State, had intervened in their behalf and ordered the cases reopened. Extradition orders were denied in both cases.\textsuperscript{12} Despite these facts the socialist papers must have had some effect, for some of the thousands of refugees who were returning to Russia from America undoubtedly believed them. Although it is impossible to document, it is certainly probable that some pro-German and anti-war socialists sent letters and copies of their newspapers to Russia hoping to discredit Root.\textsuperscript{13}

Somewhat surprisingly, one of the major allies of these socialist papers was Progressive Republican Senator Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin. La Follette, while perhaps a socialist at heart and certainly extremely anti-war in oratory, was presumably not pro-German in sentiment. Nevertheless, it was La Follette who gave greatest credence to the notion that Root had attempted to deny political asylum to Pouren and Rudewitz. La Follette made these charges on the Senate floor on April 27, 1917.\textsuperscript{14} Whether he had gotten his "facts" from the pro-German socialists or vice-versa is unknown but his mention of Root's
treatment of Russian refugees occurred prior to those of the socialist papers. More importantly LaFollette's position made the charge more convincing to those Russians and Americans who wished to believe them.  

As titular head of the American Mission, Ambassador Root was likely to receive some criticism. He was not alone; James Duncan and Charles Edward Russell were also targets. The most damaging of these attacks occurred in Russia, where Maxim Gorky's *The New Life* expressed "astonishment" at the choices of Duncan and Russell and claimed that neither was an official representative of either American labor or socialism. Obviously James Duncan was as true a representative of American labor as could have been sent and Samuel Gompers wasted no time in cabling Petrograd to that effect. Russell had no defense. On May 15 the National Executive Committee of the Socialist Party of America, easily dominated by pro-Germans, issued a statement asking Russell to decline his appointment, denied that Russell truly represented American socialism, and expelled their one-time candidate for Governor of New York.  

While Wilson, Root, Duncan, and Russell offered no public defense, the Administration's friends did counter-attack through W. E. Walling and Samuel Gompers. Walling attacked the Hillquitt group on May third, when
he accused them of a pro-German attitude and of aiding the enemy. Remarkably, Walling suggested that there should be no socialist representative whatsoever, while at the same time he stressed the need to conciliate the Soviet. In another statement issued the same date, Walling and J. G. Phelps Stokes, another important socialist in the Walling-Russell camp, recommended another of their group, James W. Gerard, as a popular choice to represent American socialism. The reason behind these contradictory statements is unknown. On May 5 Gompers, at the request of Senator Root, cabled the Petrograd Soviet that the "Kaiser's agents in New York as well as in Russia" were carrying on "a campaign of misrepresentation and villification" against the Root Mission and were not to be believed.

On Monday, May 7, the Department of Justice revoked the passport of Boris Reinstein, "a prominent member of the Socialist Labor faction in New York", stating that it was feared that Reinstein intended to go to Russia to agitate against Root and the American Mission. Reinstein was closely connected with the anti-war faction of Berger and Hillquit; whether he had intended the actions he was accused of is unknown.

On May 20 the New York Times struck what was apparently the final blow in the battle between the
administration, its allies, and the anti-war and pro-German socialists. In an editorial of that date, entitled *A Treasonable Conspiracy*, the *Times* stated that Gompers ought not to be forced to fight "single handed" against the "organized and treasonable effort now being made to undermine the American Commission to Russia." The *Times* defended Root, Russell, "a socialist who puts America first", and Duncan and accused their opponents of giving "aid and comfort to the enemy."²³ It will in all probability never be known whether this veiled threat would have been carried out, but its effect was to silence the Root Mission's critics.

Despite the effect of the *Times* editorial it is possible, even probable, that the damage to Root, Russell, and possibly Duncan had already been done. The choices were questionable in the first place and their vulnerability should have been anticipated. It should be said in the defense of the Wilson Administration that it was faced with a difficult dilemma. The administration could not send pacifists or majority faction socialists like Berger and Hillquit to convince Russia to remain in the war. On the other hand, men like Root, Duncan and Russell were easily discredited in Russian eyes. The administration's best course would perhaps have been to send men like Bryan,
Roosevelt, Kennan, and Bullard, who both favored the prosecution of the war and were more likely to be highly esteemed in Russia. The selection of a socialist was certainly a major problem, and on the surface it would be difficult to quarrel with the Party's candidate for Governor of New York as a proper representative of American socialism. Unfortunately, among the activist ranks of American socialism, identification with ethnic background outweighed both their loyalty to the country that had taken them in and the neutralist and anti-autocratic tenets of their political philosophy.

Despite domestic opposition, whether well intended or not, it is highly questionable whether the initial ignorance and overly optimistic outlook of the Root Mission's members could have been overcome. The necessarily pro-war position of the American representatives could never have been well received in some important circles in Russia. Even Bryan, Roosevelt, Bullard, and Kennan would have been forced to take this pro-war position. Whether they would have been more convincing is open to question. They would, however, have presented greater problems for Russia's anti-war factions.

Despite this domestic opposition the final composition of the Root Mission was set by early May,
although Root's initially positive outlook on the expedition had changed. First, his cordial relations with Wilson and Lansing were interrupted by the announcement that a second American mission was being sent to Russia. This was the Commission of Railway experts, headed by the famous American engineer, John F. Stevens, and being sent to assist Russia with her severe transportation problems. The idea of sending railway experts to Russia had originated prior to the March Revolution. After the Revolution the two missions were at first to be merged but the administration decided to separate them. Root was opposed to separate missions and cabled Lansing that it was "plain that we can't have three bodies dealing with the Russian Government at the same time -- the regular Embassy, the President's Mission and the R. R. Commission." Root suggested that the Railway experts be included in his own Mission. Lansing forwarded Root's views to the President who considered the problem to be one of misunderstanding. Wilson's view was that the two commissions should be separated because of their functional difference. Basically the Root Mission was to gather information, while the Railroad Commission was to examine the transportation crisis on a first hand basis and aid the Russians directly and specifically. The division
was a natural one and the President expected Root to understand the reasons for it once he had been able to consult with Bertron, with whom Wilson had discussed the matter.  

Although Ambassador Root had perhaps over-reacted to the appointment of a separate Railroad Commission, he also began to have serious doubts about the real purpose of the mission; perhaps with good reason.  

A few days prior to Root's departure he was visited by William English Walling, Melville Stone, head of the Associated Press, and Charles R. Flint, the wealthy and highly influential financier. Flint recorded the meeting. Root remarked that he was "going to Russia in the same spirit that my (Flint's) son is enlisting in the Army" but Flint felt that Root was "fearful that the commission ... was not likely to be properly supported." There is no other evidence that Root actually said this and Flint's recollections were published after the fact in 1923. Nevertheless, Root had obviously been concerned when he asked Flint and Walling to go to Washington and persuade Gompers to cable the Petrograd Soviet in support of the Root Mission. In his memoirs Flint suggested that Root was sent to Russia "for the purpose of weakening his political prestige."
The best evidence against this view is Wilson's statements to Lansing as to the caliber and personnel he desired for the Commission made on April 12, 1917. Further Root, at age 72 and having retired from the Senate, was no longer a direct political threat to Wilson. Although Root was still a very influential man and it is certainly possible that, while never stated, the political objectives of the President and his Secretary of State were either assumed or conveyed orally, Flint's conclusions are highly improbable.

Whatever the case may have been, Ambassador Root appears to have been concerned both with the support the Mission was to get from the Wilson Administration and the reaction of the Russian socialists. If Flint's report of his conversation with Root is accurate it may show that Root was at least suspicious of the optimistic reports on Russia's internal situation that he had been getting from some quarters and suspected that the Soviet was a body of potentially significant political clout and worthy of some observation. Certainly we know that Root had read the report of Petrunkevitch's speech and we can probably assume that he read the various reports relating to the activities and statements of the Soviet carried in the New York Times during April and May of 1917.
Further, Root had received cables from, among others, Melville Stone (on May 15) to the effect that the Russian socialists did not look on him favorably. Stone had gotten this view from Charles H. Boynton, an associate of Eugene Meyer and member of the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, who had gone to Russia on March 19 to promote Russian-American trade. The Ambassador received a similar report from Count Leo Tolstoi, who had earlier backed Roosevelt, and who now predicted some trouble for Root in Russia.

It would be surprising if the attacks on Root in the press and the warnings from Boynton and Tolstoi didn't raise some serious doubts in the former Senator's mind. Still, when he wrote his wife that he was not looking forward to the trip and that he was going to be "awfully bored" in Petrograd, he made no mention of the anti-war socialists' attacks or his questions about the behavior of the President. In addition to his doubts about what awaited him, he was probably not in the best of health as he had just recovered from "a severe attack of the grippe." The Ambassador had come to look on the Mission as a tedious duty. He ordered a large package of novels and two cases of Scotch.
The Root Mission left Pennsylvania station in Washington at 6:15 pm on May 15 in two pullman cars belonging to the Pennsylvania Railroad. On the sixteenth the Commission stopped near Chicago to allow Professor Harper to board. Harper was to brief the Root Mission on the political situation in Russia. After changing trains in Chicago the party proceeded to St. Paul and Seattle. It was during this uneventful trip of three days that Harper briefed the Mission on his appraisal of the Russian situation. Whether his views had changed significantly from the ones he had originally cabled to the State Department is unknown but highly probable. On May 18 Root cabled Lansing asking that Charles Crane, who had now been in Russia for several weeks, cable his impressions to Vladivastok for the Mission's inspection. The remainder of the trip was spent being entertained by General Scott who recounted his adventures among the Indians.

On May 20 the Root party arrived in Seattle and were met by Captain Hinds of the USS Buffalo; a reconverted destroyer which was to take them to Russia. Cyrus McCormick, who had been on the West Coast for personal reasons, joined the Mission that afternoon after which they departed. The first few days were cold and unpleasant and several members of the Mission
fell victim to seasickness of which General Scott's was the most serious case. From May 25 to the 30th the Buffalo was engulfed in a dense fog with visibility limited to a few hundred yards. The passengers occupied themselves with "deck golf, an invention of Dr. Mott, Colonel Mott's sand-filled football, and movies. On May 30 the Buffalo entered the Sea of Okhotsk where the first bird alighted. As the dense fog cleared on the thirty-first the Buffalo was forced to change course when it hit an iceberg. Damage was minimal. As the Buffalo entered the Sea of Japan on June 1 the envoys began preparation for their mission. Senator Root addressed the group on the purpose of the Mission and warned against talking too freely "as Russia was full of German sympathizers and spies". Dr. Holton Curl instructed the party on the proper diet. 42

On June 3 the Root Mission arrived in Vladivostok one day early and thirteen days after leaving Seattle. They were met by Lt. Commander Griida of the Russian flotilla, the American Consul at Vladivostock, John K. Caldwell, and several others. Major Stanley Washburn and interpreter Eugene Prince also joined the Mission here.

What the members of the Root Mission expected to see upon their arrival at Vladivostok is unknown.
Since the Root Mission was initially conceived, several major events had occurred in Russia and in Russian-American relations. First, from late March through April and May thousands of political refugees had returned to their native land from several western countries, including the United States. The internal atmosphere in Russia was one in which all those who had opposed the Tsarist regime were viewed as heroes. No matter who these individuals were or how radical their views, they were welcomed home with open arms. Further, the Provisional Government paid for their return in many cases. Many of these refugees were politically radical in view and most were undoubtedly opposed to the war. They had come home to change their country, not to die in its army. Among their number were included powerful Bolshevik leaders Lenin, Trotsky, Borodin, Shatov, and Kollontai, and the anarchist, Prince Peter Kropotkin. The Provisional Government, still favoring a continuation of the war to a successful conclusion, became concerned as anti-war ranks were swelled. There was little the government could do because the moderate socialists in the Soviet took the view that socialists of any view were their "comrades" and could not be criticized openly. One result of the influx of radicals was to shift the Russian political
spectrum to the left, both within the Soviet and throughout the country.

On May 1, 1917, Foreign Minister Milyukov had announced in an internal memo that Russia would observe the secret treaties that the Tsar had made with the Allies in 1915. The treaties obligated Russia not to accept a separate peace and promised important territorial gains. The crucial aspect of the secret treaties, as far as Russia was concerned, was that in the event of victory, she would acquire both Constantinople and control of the Dardanelles, principal goals of Russian foreign policies for centuries. The Soviet, while not necessarily against a continuation of the war, was diametrically opposed to territorial aggrandizement. Most of its members applied the principle of "peace without annexation, without indemnities, and on the basis of self-determination for all people." When Milyukov's note was published, despite the Foreign Minister's attempt to keep it secret, the conflicting principles of the Foreign Minister and large numbers of socialists resulted in an open confrontation with both sides staging demonstrations over the secret treaties.

The socialists won out and forced the resignations of Guchkov on May 14 and Milyukov on May 15.
The resulting shakeup brought five moderate socialists into the cabinet, marking the acceptance of the socialists' enormous influence in Russia. The new coalition government did not, however, shift its policy decisions radically to the left. The change was most obvious in semantics; speeches and publications were now worded in a manner that was acceptable to the Soviet. Alexander Kerensky became Minister of War and was now the key figure in the government. He was a Trudovic, a small non-Marxist faction that usually aligned with the moderate Social Revolutionaries, and obviously not ready to put many of the major tenets of socialism into practice in the Russia of 1917. He was the bridge between the government and the Soviet of which he was still a member. The other key figure in the government was Michael I. Tereschenko who became Minister of Foreign Affairs and can be seen as the leader of the bourgeois half of the government.

Both Kerensky and Tereschenko had decided to continue the war as long as possible. The acquisition of Constantinople and the Dardanelles had become a political anathema which could not be discussed openly. The socialist view of no annexations and no indemnities became the government's public stance. If there were to be no annexations and no indemnities, the war was now one wholly of defense unless occupied
"Russian" land in Poland were considered. Thus, depending on Russia's desire to retain these landholdings, further war could come to an end unless Germany attacked or Russia could be persuaded to aid her western allies. It was now up to the Root Mission to assist the Provisional Government in convincing as large a percentage of Russian society as possible that it was in their interest to continue the war. It is doubtful that the Mission's members realized the extent of opposition to their cause.

Whatever the Root Mission expected when they disembarked at Vladivostok they were quickly enlightened and perhaps rudely awakened by the local political scene. Upon disembarking they were met by Mr. N. P. Matveev, the President of the local Executive Committee. Mr. Matveev inquired as to the Americans' purpose. Root responded that the Mission had come "to convey to the Russian democracy the good will of America, her sister democracy; to seek to establish closer cooperation and friendship between the two nations, and to assist her in every way possible."

In addition to Matveev the Root party was also met by some soldiers and workmen and a representative of the City of Vladivostok. It was soon learned that neither the city nor the garrison were under the
control of the Provisional Government but rather
directed by various committees elected from among
their rank and file. Further a group of radical
socialist refugees who had returned from America
only a few days ahead of the Buffalo had attempted
to arouse the local garrison and civilians against
the Mission. The attempt to turn back the Root
Mission was defeated in the Vladivostok Soviet.
Despite the radicals defeat, the Root Mission was
hurried on board a train after spending only a half
hour in Vladivostok. This situation must have had
a profound impact on the Americans as they set out
for their trip across Siberia to European Russia.
It should have been useful to the American mission's
understanding of the Russian situation that its first
real contact with Russia revealed a city not under
the control of its national government but in the
hands of several local committees. In addition, the
Root party became aware that there was definite oppo-
sition to their mission. It is also important to note
that the vote of the Vladivostok Soviet was the mis-
sion's first evidence that at least some parts of the
new Russian democracy were not opposed to the
Americans, but might take a "wait and see" attitude.
Nevertheless, if Charles Edward Russell's account is
accurate, the Bolsheviks had already decided to oppose
the American Mission. Russell reported that the party hired a train to follow the Root Mission to Petrograd and denounce the American at every station at which they stopped.⁵²
CHAPTER FOUR

DEMOCRACY MEETS DEMOCRACY

WITH A VENGENCE
The ten day trip to Petrograd was largely uneventful. It included several informative meetings with military officials and numerous momentary stops where the Mission was met by cheering crowds. These were probably taken too seriously.

On June 4 the Root Mission stopped at Harbin in Manchuria where it joined the American Railroad Commission. The American ministers were also met by General Horvat, governor of the Chinese Eastern Railroad and General Potapov, later a member of the Russian Mission to the United States. Potapov claimed to have been Russia's first revolutionary general and stated that he had great influence with the Soviet. Root saw Potapov as "a glaring example" of the unfortunate tendency of everyone in Russia to consult "his own wishes in obeying any instructions coming from what would be considered higher authority."

The American party left Harbin later in the day after meeting with a deputation from the Chinese Foreign Minister. ¹

Now riding in the Tsar's Imperial train, which included the dining car in which the Tsar had signed his abdication, the American Mission reached Irkutsk on June 5.² Sometime during the fifth Root sent his first telegram back to Washington. It read: "Indicative situation critical but not without
grounds for hope." Whether this impression had come as much from the generals as from impressions of the situation in Vladivostok is unknown.

The next few days produced events of a more positive nature. Several train loads of women, children, and soldiers passed shouting "Hurrah, Americanski!," and cheering crowds met the Root party at several Siberian towns where Root made short speeches.

On June 7 the Mission conferred at Irkutsk with Mr. S. Saltykov who was the Chief Commissioner of the Siberian Provinces. Saltykov stated that he felt the Provisional Government would have a very hard time governing while the war continued and Russia was experiencing economic and political troubles. Ambassador Root's somewhat insensitive reply was that "a country's strength comes from hard times." Envoys Russell and Duncan probably made a better impression in Irkutsk, receiving loud and repeated applause from a large crowd of soldiers and workers to whom they spoke.

The Root party got another glimpse of the "new" Russia on June 8 when they passed a train decorated with "a number of red placards bearing various devices with regard to democracy and freedom." On June 9 the Mission was loudly cheered at Novo
Nikolaievsky by a large crowd and again at Kanishlov on the following day. There Root, Scott, and Russell spoke and all received ovations, particularly Russell when he removed a small red ribbon from his coat and held it aloft. Despite their enthusiastic reception the Russian masses of 1917 must have been a rugged lot; and in one of the small towns on their way across Russia, Root turned to Colonel Mott and observed: "Tibby, I am a firm believer in democracy, but I do not like filth."

The remainder of the trip was uneventful and the American Mission arrived in Petrograd on June 13. The cross-country train trip to Petrograd demonstrated that the Provisional Government had failed to fill the void caused by the fall of the old tsarist bureaucracy. This had left Russia in a state of "extraordinary decentralization" with both military and civilian affairs being conducted by "tens of thousands" of separate committees "having no established relations with each other and practically acknowledging little or no right of control on the part of the Petrograd government." Although the Provisional Government had been recognized it had yet to exert control over the numerous Soviets and other committees that had sprung up throughout the country.
Root's appraisal was, however, that revolutionary Russia was in an "extraordinary condition" of "good order."  

Russia's relative stability was perhaps the most outstanding aspect of the interlude between the fall of the Tsar and the Bolshevik revolution. With the exception of desertions from the army, the great mass of the population had been going about their business as usual. This situation is noted in a number of primary and secondary sources and appears to have existed, with a few relatively minor exceptions, until mid-July. Nevertheless The Mission's arrival in Petrograd must have left the members wondering if the Provisional Government had any kind of organizational ability whatsoever. Dmitri Fedotoff-White, a young Russian Naval officer who had been assigned to the Root Mission as a guide and interpreter, described the scene of the Mission's arrival. There was no band present. It had probably refused to be bothered. The honor guard was "untidy" and in khaki uniforms "blended perfectly with the dirty yellow walls of the station" and thus went totally unnoticed by the American visitors.  

The reception presented a striking contrast. The Americans, who wore formal attire, were greeted by Prime Minister Lvov, Foreign Minister Tereschenko,
Finance Minister Shingarev and Communications Minister Nekrassoff, all of whom wore simple business suits. Prince Lvov was the worst offender, wearing "a badly cut sack suit." Perhaps what was most noticeable was "the intense earnestness visible on every face. The members of the Russian Cabinet had a drawn, worn, tired look, as of men overworked, weighted with a tremendous responsibility, and suffering from its strain." It was "democracy greeting democracy with a vengeance."¹³

Ambassador Francis was characteristically enthusiastic and undoubtedly delighted to see his fellow countrymen.¹⁴ Francis introduced the American Mission as representing "every phase of political belief" in the United States and went on to state that there were "no classes in America." This latter remark brought out "a few furtive grins among the solemn faces of the audience."¹⁵

Ambassador Root followed Francis with a speech of his own. It was one that would be typical of the approach of the American Mission. Root first congratulated the Russians on their achievement of democracy and then went on to encourage them to continue the war.¹⁶ As Root's speech came to an end socialist Minister A. V. Peshekhonov asked Fedotoff-White to "please tell these Americans that we are tired of this war. Explain to them that we are weary
of the long and bloody struggle." Although White declined to translate the message and the Americans were unaware of what had been said, it was symptomatic of the basic conflict of interests involved. 17 The Americans wanted an active eastern front to keep the pressure on Germany. The Russians were tired of war with good reason, and if they took the socialist view that there were to be no annexations or indemnities there was nothing to fight for; they would fight only if the Germans attacked. The Germans had undoubtedly decided that they could not reasonably spare the troops to attempt a major attack on Russia, nor did their strategy require it. They would not attack. Nonetheless the American mission had to try for there was, of course, no guarantee that the Germans could be beaten with or without Russia.

Dmitri Fedotoff-White described this perception of the Americans' attitude:

"On the whole the attitude of some of the members of the Mission was not unlike that of a lot of missionaries descending . . . in the beginning of the nineteenth century upon a tribe of benighted savages on some Pacific island to bring to them the blessings of the white man's civilization and deriving a great deal of satisfaction from the flattering notion that the Lord had made them from other clay than the poor heathens they were about to proselytise. 18

Fedotoff-White felt that the majority of the Root
Mission looked upon the Russians as "a lot of likeable but unreliable and sometimes very naughty children." On the other occasions Fedotoff-White cited a "senior attache" who lectured him on the prevalence of syphilis and the lack of "moral restraint" among the villagers and the general attitude among the Mission members that "All senior officer were either grafters, incompetents or libertines, interested only in making love to ballerinas."¹⁹

There was, undoubtedly, some general truth in these views despite their offensiveness to Fedotoff-White and any other Russians who might have discerned them. That Russia was not ready for democracy of the Western type should have been obvious. After centuries of Tsarist tyranny the largely illiterate population lacked many qualities, such as education and democratic experience, that are often considered necessary for Western democratic government. However, there good behavior in the absence of either police or unified leadership was undeniable.²⁰

On Thursday, June 14, 1917, the Americans met with the foreign and domestic press and visited Foreign Minister Tereschenko whom Root described as "tall and impressive," highly intelligent and imaginative.²¹ Afterwards the military members of the
American mission called on War Minister Alexander Kerensky. The Americans were surprised to find the Russian War Minister wearing "very rough khaki colored cloths" with his arm in a sling from shaking hands with the troops. Root and General Scott visited the British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, in the late afternoon.  

The following day saw the Root Mission again receive the press in the morning. Root lunched with Francis, Prince Lvov, and Tereschenko. In the evening the entire Mission was formally presented to the Provisional Government. Root and Tereschenko gave major addresses. Ambassador Root's speech stressed that "one fearful danger threatens the liberty" of both Russia and America — the German military autocracy. The American democracy, although not directly threatened, was preparing to fight for both nations' freedom. The obvious implication was that America had joined the conflict to put an end to autocracy and war and that she had no other self-interested motives.  

Tereschenko replied on behalf of the Provisional Government emphasizing the unity of purpose of newly democratic Russia and the United States; both as fellow democracies and partners in a war against autocracy. Treschenko went on to attack German militarism
and "imperialistic schemes." The Russian Minister was very careful not to offend the Soviet. Ambassador Root had either perceived the situation or had been informed of it by the government and had made a careful reference to American support of the "right of self-determination of all nations." Copies of both speeches were sent to the President through Lansing.

On June 17th, a New York Times reporter who was covering the Mission would report that it was "in this direction of thrashing out the question of the aims of the war that the chief province of the Mission will lie." This was not to be the case. Wilson appears to have already been preoccupied with the peace that would follow the "war to end all wars." As soon as he received a copy of Root's speech the President instructed Lansing to wire Petrograd in order to caution the members of the commission against speaking about "the terms of peace or of settlement which will be insisted on by the United States. The President is himself reserving all such utterances until very different circumstances arise, and hopes that you will pursue the same policy."

Whether or not Wilson was overreacting, the effect of his action was to tie the hand of the Commission on this crucial issue. The question of war
aims was probably the paramount issue of the intellectuals of the Soviet and it had been this issue that had forced the resignations of Milyukov and Guchkov. The Soviet and the majority of the Russian population would not accept a war of conquest or indemnity. The inability of the members of the Root Mission to speak to this crucial issue played into the hands of those who desired to discredit the motives of the Allied governments. The most ironic aspect of this situation was that President Wilson's policy at Versailles on these issues was similar to that of the Russian Soviet. It was unfortunate that the President's failure to adequately articulate American war aims before June undermined the credibility of the Root Mission and therefore of America. It was not that the President was unaware of the position of the Soviet, the fact that Tereschenko and Kerensky desperately desired to appease that body on these issues, nor that Root had taken the position that Tereschenko and Kerensky undoubtedly hoped he would take. There is no evidence that Root had discussed his speech with members of the Provisional Government.

The President's extreme caution on the issue of war aims may be attributable to his desires to avoid speaking for or offending Britain, France and the
In addition he may not have been able to perceive the disastrous effect his actions would have on Root Mission and American credibility. It is highly doubtful whether Wilson had, at this point, and understanding of the true nature of the Russian situation. He therefore gravely underestimated the potential importance of the Root Mission. More importantly, the President may have failed to understand the importance of Russia in his over-all concept of world-wide democracy. Unfortunately a continuation of the war and the triumph of Russian liberal - nationalistic democracy appear to have been mutually exclusive.

After the formalities of the first two days the Ambassadors spent the next six days meeting with and gathering information from Tereschenko, former War Minister Guchkov, British Labour Party minister, Arthur Henderson, and numerous other Russians, Allies, and members of the American business community in Petrograd.

In order to cover the various areas of Russian society the Mission's members split up with each one working on his own specialized areas in the hope of producing an overview in the report. This approach allowed the American Mission to cover a much broader spectrum of Russian society, investigating the
financial, military, labor, religious and political affairs of Russia in much greater depth than would have been otherwise possible. Although this system proved to be somewhat disorganized, due more perhaps to time limitations than anything else, its principal fault can perhaps be found in its failure to expose most members of the Mission to the Russian masses and their power center, the Soviet. Only Charles Russell and James Duncan would visit that body.

While this lack of exposure to these crucial areas may have colored the final report and overall impressions of the members of the American Mission, that job was really one to be undertaken by those administration and State Department officials who were more familiar with the intricacies of the Russian scene and were stationed in Russia on a full-time basis.

Ambassador Root spent his initial period in Petrograd meeting with partisans of the old government, the new government, Russian and American businessmen and journalists.31 It soon became obvious to Root and others of the party that the situation in Petrograd was discouraging. This view was contained in Root's first Petrograd report to Lansing which was very pessimistic:

"Conditions here critical, general St.
Petersburg opinion very pessimistic; industrial and financial conditions bad; Provisional Government seems secure; no visible agitation against it at present. Government very confident of pulling the country through."
The "fundamental" problem according to Root's view was that the soldiers had "interpreted new freedom as meaning that every man could do as he pleased" and "refused spoken orders from anyone. Accordingly authority of officers has been repudiated and military discipline has practically failed." Root laid the blame for this situation on "a tremendous German propaganda" and the "extreme socialists who are for peace at any price and very active."

Although some elements did favor a continuation of the war effort, Root concluded accurately that the decision rested with the soldiers and "we have got to get at them in some way." 32

Whether Root correctly interpreted the optimism of the Provisional Government is open to question. Dmitri Fedotoff-White felt that the more realistic members did not think Russia could continue. 33 Kerensky and Tereschenko did however, and they were working very hard to rally the country behind them. 34

To support their efforts Root proposed to Washington a massive publicity campaign costing "at least $5,000,000" and featuring newspapers, pamphlets, posters, public speakers, and motion pictures. In addition, he advocated the establishment of Y.M.C.A. stations along the Russian front and went on to ask for an immediate funding of $100,000 to begin the campaign. 35 Root was not alone in his view; surpris-
ingly the majority of the Root Mission had already made up their minds about what should be done to aid Russia. The Mission's consensus would appear to have been that if the Russians were unwilling to continue the war the Americans could not invest extensively in Russia. Russell had advanced this position as early as May 31 while still on board the Buffalo. 36

The specific idea of an all-out propaganda campaign was conceived as early as June 11 when Stanley Washburn brought up the idea, arguing that it was a very close decision whether the Russians would continue the war. On June 12, while still on board the train to Petrograd, the Mission held a general conference on the subject at Russell's urging. Washburn introduced his plan to begin the effort immediately and in conjunction with the British. There was general agreement on this and Washburn and Russell began work on it at once. 37 Thus Root's plan had been some time in the making before he cabled his ideas to Lansing. Obviously, the Ambassador believed the situation to be critical and expected a prompt response that was not forthcoming.

In the interim Root continued his numerous meetings and speeches. Root's speeches presented the basic theme of the official American viewpoint: the United States was pleased with the Russian Revolution,
at least as it was understood in America, and intended to help the new Russian democracy. Germany was the enemy of democracy and of the essential interests of both America and Russia. Ambassador Root and the other members of the Commission made clear with varying degrees of subtlety that American aid to Russia was essentially predicated on Russia's continuation of the war.38

While Root concentrated on the upper echelons of the Provisional Government and other Allied representatives, Samuel R. Bertron and Cyrus McCormick were given the job of acquiring an understanding of Russia's financial problems and needs. Neither man appears to have left any detailed record of his activities or impressions outside of the official reports of the Mission.39

The financial needs of the new government were massive. On May 16 the United States had established a $100 million credit at 3% interest per year. Upon receiving the credit the Russians immediately ordered 500 locomotives and 10,000 freight cars which they desperately needed. The first American credit was due to mature on June 30, 1917 but would be funded by a larger credit on that date.40 It was the task of McCormick and Bertron to determine further Russian needs.
In pursuit of their mission the two American businessmen met with Finance Minister A. I. Shingarev on numerous occasions, Acting Minister of Commerce and Industry Stepanov, Frank Corse of the New York Life Insurance Company, and Professor Emory, the Russian representative of the Guaranty Trust Co. Out of these meetings McCormick and Berton came up with what they called a "comprehensive statement" of Russia's financial needs. 41

McCormick made no public addresses and, except for the meetings required to get a view of Russian economic needs, he was, according to Dmitri Fedotoff-White, concerned only with "looking after the interests of his harvesters." That Fedotoff-White was unimpressed by the harvester heir is an understatement: he found McCormick rude and bad mannered: "a cunning old merchant." 42

Berton was more active than McCormick. Although he made no public addresses, the New York banker participated in the negotiations of transportation problems and was active in organizing the propaganda campaign. He appears to have been or become a confidant of Root on this trip. Berton left little record of his impressions of the mission. He was obviously in favor of the propaganda campaign and concurred with the Root Mission's final report. 43
Dmitri Fedotoff-White could remember very little about Bertron except that he was "obsessed" with informing the Russians about America's part in the war. Samuel R. Bertron was certainly the most obscure member of the mission although he may have actually done more real work behind the scenes than several of the other members.

Charles R. Crane was another member of the Root Mission whose activities in Russia remain partially obscured. Crane was born on August 7, 1858, in Chicago. His father, Richard Teller Crane, had been unencumbered by formal schooling and he decided that his son Charles should not be allowed to go beyond the eighth grade. Charles worked for the Crane Company for many years, but eventually sold his interest in it to his brother Richard after the death of their father. This transaction left Charles Crane with $12 million with which to travel and influence world politics.

Crane had long been interested in Russia, China, and the Middle Eastern countries. Originally a Republican of progressive leanings, he was made American Minister to China in 1909, undoubtedly as a reward for his efforts in Republican financing. Crane promptly attacked the Sino-Japanese treaty of that year and President Taft was forced to recall
him at the insistence of Secretary of State Philander C. Knox. 46

Charles Crane's interests in Russia centered around the Russian Orthodox Church, Russian art and architecture, and the Russian aristocracy, with whom he had many contacts. Mrs. Madden Summers, wife of the American Consil at Moscow described his knowledge of Russia as "superficial". Charles Crane's knowledge and personality were indeed unusual. He had the charm of an aristocrat and "was gifted with an extraordinary sensitivity to men and what they stood for." 47 Although his personal interests and emphasis were mainly cultural, Crane seemed to have often gravitated to politics. He travelled extensively and was often rumored to have been financing political factions including Sun Yat-sen, an Albanian uprising, and Syrian and Lebanese revolts against French colonialism. 48 At one time he attempted to buy out the entirety of Saudi Arabian oil interests. 49

Crane's activities while in Russia in 1917 remain somewhat of a mystery. On his previous trips to Russia he had cultivated a close friendship with Professor Milyukov. 50 In the absence of further evidence, he should be seen as a supporter, if only in spirit, of Milyukov's Cadet Party.
Crane sailed for Russia soon after the March Revolution. On March 27 he boarded the Norwegian Christianiaford, accompanied by famous muckraker Lincoln Steffens. This was the same vessel on which Trotsky attempted to sail, but he was forced to disembark at Halifax, Nova Scotia. Crane arrived in Russia, via the Baltic, in later April and in time to witness the downfall of his good friend Milyukov. This activities during May are obscure, but there is some evidence that, through the efforts of Steffens, he visited the Petrograd Soviet. Crane, who apparently went to Russia as Wilson's observer, was not appointed to the Root Mission until after his arrival there.

With the arrival of the Root Mission later in May, Crane joined Dr. John R. Mott on his trip to Moscow and accompanied the YMCA Leader on most of his activities. Little mention of him is made in the log of the Mission. Crane's initial impression of the Russian situation is contained in a telegram sent to his son Richard, Lansing's secretary, on May 14, 1917. Crane instructed his son to tell Dr. Mott that the Orthodox Church "had no part in Revolution which is entirely socialistic and material in aims. However, Revolution now going on in Church . . ." Those Bishops who had been elevated or
held power under the influence of Rasputin were on the way out and the new hierarchy "will probably be socialistic certainly democratic and free and Bishops will have to come down to people for support and inspiration. Much spiritual agitation and apocalypse widely studied."\textsuperscript{55}

Crane left little further evidence of his thoughts on the Revolution during this early period. Dmitre Fedotoff-White in the last entry that is purported to have been taken directly from his diary described Crane as "very absent-minded . . . " always immersed in thought and dreams." White went on to note that despite this, "he seems to be the only member of the Mission who had a more or less clear idea of what it is all about.\textsuperscript{56}

By mid-June Crane had obviously become concerned at the course the revolution was taking. In fact he was so concerned that he asked Lincoln Steffens to return to Washington to carry a message to Wilson. Crane said that he, Francis, and Kerensky had cabled Wilson "in vain; they could not make the President understand that public opinion reigned in Russia and that the new government had no power to do what the allies wished."\textsuperscript{57} Steffens agreed to go, whereupon he met twice with Kerensky. During these meetings, Kerensky stated his view that the Russian people
would not fight unless the secret treaties, which were widely believed to exist, were repudiated.

Public opinion in Russia might be directed, Kerensky thought, but not by him. The President might steer it back to the war -- he and the allies, if Wilson could manage the allies. Nobody but President Wilson can answer that German charge and destroy that belief in the simple minds of the Russian peasants.58

On June 26 Steffens, armed with letters from Crane and Francis, met with the President. "I delivered my message to a silent, thoughtful man." Wilson "knew nothing about the secret treaties. But the way he said it and what he meant was clearly understandable to me... He knew of those secret treaties, not as an ally, not officially as a party... but only as I and the public knew of their existence." Wilson went on to say that if the United States had been a party to their making he could request the public abrogation which Kerensky needed so badly. Wilson was not in that position and didn't feel he could do what Kerensky wanted: "No, that is hard. That I cannot very well do."59 Thus ended the attempts of Kerensky, Crane, and to a lesser extent, Francis, to persuade Wilson to take the lead on war aims and give the Russian people a cause to fight for. Wilson's inaction here is another possible miscalculation in America's relations with Russia during the revolutionary period. Of all the members
of the Root Mission, Charles Crane seems to have had the most influence on Wilson's policy decisions regarding Russia. The failure of Crane's personal agent to persuade the President to take action must be seen as the de facto conclusion of the issue. If Steffen's account is accurate, this was obviously a question of priorities in the mind of the President. Wilson decided that he would rather not risk disagreements with his allies than take this step towards uniting the Russian people behind Kerensky.

In fact the President appears to have seen the texts of some of the secret treaties and at least to have discussed them with Arthur Balfour during April, 1917. It was most probably on the basis of this knowledge that the President wrote House on July 21:

England and France have not the same views with regard to peace that we have by any means. When the war is over we can force them to our way of thinking, because by that time they will among other things be financially in our hands; but we cannot force them now, and any attempt to speak for them... would bring on disagreements.

This statement serves to explain Wilson's muzzling of the Root Mission, his reticence on war aims, and his negative response to Steffens. Nonetheless, these were serious mistakes. Wilson, Lansing, Francis and others all knew that the Russian Army was in
rearming and releasing of the Bolsheviks and their leaders. When Charles Crane arrived in Sweden in late September he told an American report that the Russians "are losing the proper sense of their position in the scheme of worldly affairs." Further, "extensive and laborious repairs are necessary." It would become a test of strength between the Bolsheviks and the workers with their "ignorance of economics" and the "more conservative peasant farmers."
CHAPTER FIVE

THE GREAT ORATORS
While the main body of the Root Mission remained largely in Petrograd, various members of the Mission travelled extensively. Dr. John R. Mott and Charles R. Crane, who had the best contacts in Russia of the major members of the Mission, journeyed to Moscow. General Scott travelled to the front and Roumania. Admiral Glennon toured both the Baltic and Black Sea fleets. Mott, Scott, and Glennon had perhaps the most interesting experiences of all the Mission's members and perhaps the greatest short-term influence on Russia.

Dr. John R. Mott saw his purpose in Russia as that of "cultivating" what he considered the heart of Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church. Dr. Mott's first contact with that church had occurred in 1897 in Tokyo when he had met with Russian Orthodox Archbishop Nicolai of Japan. In 1909, as a leader of the YMCA and member of the World Student Christian Federation, Dr. Mott participated in the worldwide student evangelistic meetings which were held in Russia. Later, he learned that the Holy Synod had passed a resolution that he was not to be permitted to visit Russia for religious purposes again. The cause for this attitude is unknown but is probably a sign that the Tsarist dominated Church was apprehensive about any movements that were not its
own.\textsuperscript{2} Undeterred, Dr. Mott held the meetings of the W.S.C.F. in Constantinople in 1911 so that some of the Orthodox leaders that he had met in 1909 could attend and some did.\textsuperscript{3}

Once in Russia, John R. Mott concentrated on observing the new democracy and attempting to persuade the Russian Orthodox Church to take a leading role in Russian political affairs and to support the Russian war effort.\textsuperscript{4} Through his contacts with Charles Crane, Mott knew that although the Church had taken no part in the March Revolution, it was undergoing an internal upheaval. The major outward result of this was the ouster of Bishops who had been appointed by Rasputin. Crane had felt that in the new Orthodox Church the Bishops would have "to come down to (the) people for support and inspiration." Further there was much "spiritual agitation and the apocalypse (was) widely studied."\textsuperscript{5}

After spending the first few days in Petrograd, Dr. Mott and Crane set out for Moscow where they witnessed the first National Sobor (convention) of the Russian Orthodox Church in nearly 250 years. On June 19 Mott addressed this body. He stressed the importance of the Orthodox Church taking a role in political affairs. He contended that the Church had held the Russian nation together in the past and
that it was the Church that must assert itself now if Russia were to be saved from internal disintegration. Nevertheless Dr. Mott placed great emphasis on the continuation of the war: "We are deeply grateful because of what you are proposing and planning to do to continue this struggle to a successful conclusion." Mott went on to encourage the Russians with an account of American war preparations and its commitment to the cause of the democracies. He received loud applause. While in Moscow, Mott had eight lengthy interviews with Prince Vladimir Lvov, the High Procurator of the Orthodox Church. Lvov, who was technically a member of the Provisional Government and well informed on Russian political events, discussed the problems facing both the Church and the Russian nation.

After these meetings Mott and Crane returned to Petrograd where they attended the meetings of the Holy Governing Synod of the Orthodox Church. Dr. Mott was able to participate in the deliberations of the council of that body which was the process of revising the constitution of the Church. Mott also participated in the deliberations of the Commission on the Revision of the Curriculum of the Ecclesiastical Academies and Seminaries. Dr. Mott spent much of the balance of his time in Russia holding private
interviews with various religious leaders and visiting seminaries and monasteries. He did not confine himself to the Russian Orthodox Church. He visited with all the major Protestant leaders except those of the Lutherans, three of the most influential Jewish leaders, and Bishop Ciplack the leader of the Polish Roman Catholics. One of the meetings that Dr. Mott enjoyed the most, according to his biographer, was that with the leading Bishops of the Old Believers, the twelve million member sect that included among their number about half of the Cossacks. This group had been persecuted for centuries due to their adherence to an earlier brand of Christianity. On June 27 Dr. Mott, James Duncan, and Samuel Harper visited the Cossack Congress in Petrograd. This group was significant both because of their fierce independence and their military abilities. Although he came uninvited, Dr. Mott was able to talk to numerous delegates and address the conference. Mott's address struck the usual theme, emphasizing the American interest in the continuation of the war. According to his report Dr. Mott received an "enormous ovation" and the Cossacks passed a resolution supporting an immediate offensive against Germany in order to "consolidate the conquests of the revolution."
Mott also began the organization of YMCA sponsored camps in the major garrison cities of Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev, and Jassy in Roumania. He believed that the idleness of the Russian Army was a major factor in its declining discipline and morale. Working in connection with Mr. Archibald Harte, the YMCA's chief representative in Russia, Dr. Mott began organizing and instructing those American Prison Camp secretaries who had not already become active in this area. After his return to America Dr. Mott would continue to work on the YMCA angle until the Bolshevik revolution in October.

Charles R. Crane described Dr. Mott's selection as "amply justified" and characterized the Christian leader's efforts as "the really great and inspiring and permanent achievement of the Commission." Crane felt that Mott's addresses to the Orthodox Church in Moscow and that to the Old Believers had a profound impact. Although Dr. Mott was very active while in Russia and his speeches were undoubtedly effective, particularly the one he made to the Cossacks, Charles Crane's estimate of the YMCA leader's effect was an understandable exaggeration. Dr. Mott's stated goal of persuading the Orthodox Church to take a more active role in Russian politics went unfulfilled. Although there is little doubt
he had a strong impact on the Orthodox, the Old Believers, and the Cossacks, only the latter group was probably in a position to have a profound impact on Russian events. The Orthodox Church did not have a strong tradition of activism in Russian politics, had little influence over the minds of the proletariat, and had been closely tied to the Tsarist Monarchy in the minds of many Russians. Thus Mott's speeches and YMCA activities, despite some positive impact, appear too little in quantity and too late to be effective.\(^{14}\) Part of the reason for this was that the time limitation placed upon him was severe, and it was hardly Mott's fault that the areas of Russian society where he had the greatest influence were not the areas that would have a major impact on the course of Russian history at that time. His lasting impact must be seen as confined to the hearts and minds of individuals.\(^{15}\)

Dr. Mott returned to America sharing the view of the majority of the Root Mission that Russia could be kept in the war with the aid of American money, propaganda, and the YMCA camps. He was perhaps brought to this view by his interviews with Procurator Lvov and the very positive responses that his pro-war speeches received.\(^{16}\)
The condition of the Russian military forces was, of course, of crucial interest to the Root Mission and any reasonable understanding of the Russian situation. General Scott and Admiral James F. Glennon were given the assignments of inspecting this aspect of Russian affairs. General Hugh L. Scott is described by Dmitri Fedotoff-White as a "clever diplomat" who was well versed in the psychology of the American Indians. The general was certainly the most outspoken member of the mission. No sooner had he come into contact with his counterparts in the Provisional Government than he may have ruffled a few feathers. After an initial round of interviews, visits to Peterhof, and inspections of various military installations, Scott met with Assistant Minister of War, General Manikovsky. Manikovsky made it known that Russia needed large sums of money to purchase war materials. He assessed the military situation as both a problem of morale among the lower echelons of the Army and a critical transportation problem due primarily to insufficient rolling stock, poor management, and the low morale of the railroad workers. The Russian General asked Scott if he would telegram Russia's needs to President Wilson. General Scott who had sat silently throughout Manikovsky's presentation
wasted no time in delivering his interpretation of the American position in the most blunt terms. Scott stated that if he sent such a telegram the President would inquire when the Russians would make an advance on the western front. "What would I answer?" asked the American General. Manikovsky, now grasping fully the Americans' terms for economic and military assistance, promised an advance in the near future. General Scott replied that he would telegram the President in the near future. 18

Having been told of Russia's basic needs Scott set out for Russian military headquarters (Stafka) at Mogilev on June 27. He was accompanied by Ambassador Root, Dr. Mott, Colonels Judson and Mott, and Lieutenant Michie. The American contingent was entertained by General Brusilov who held a reception and dinner in their honor and spent several hours discussing the military situation. Brusilov then outlined his plans for the Russian advance which was to begin in four days. Scott did not record his impressions of Brusilov or the proposed advance, but by the time the American general left Russia the advance, although, initially successful, had begun to collapse and the telegram Scott had promised was never sent. 19
Perhaps the most interesting part of General Scott's mission did not occur in Russia but in Roumania. The Roumanians formed an important link on the eastern front. Unfortunately they had become bottled up around Jassy and had lost two thirds of their pre-war territory. Nevertheless they possessed fifteen divisions, ten of which were considered to be in very good fighting condition. Perhaps more importantly the spirit of these units had a positive effect on the Russian soldiers around them. 20

Scott set out for Roumania the day after meeting with Brusilof, accompanied by Judson, Colonel Mott, Michie, and Major Parker, a military observer connected with the American legation in Roumania. When it arrived in Jassy, the Scott party met with Roumanian Prime Minister Ion Bratinau, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Army Chief of Staff, and American Consul William Andrews. 21

The American party attended a lunch with King Ferdinand I and his Queen after which General Scott suffered an embarrassing moment. When he found himself alone with the King, as protocol dictated, neither he nor the Roumanian monarch could think of a "single word to say to the other". After several moments of silence the King turned and went to the
Queen's side. Colonel Mott came to the General's aid. Undoubtedly embarrassed by this incident, General Scott redeemed himself nicely soon thereafter when he was given an opportunity to speak to the assembled members of the cabinet, the royal family, and various members of the parliament. The aging general had perhaps his finest hour giving a rousing speech in which he declared that America had mobilized eleven million men, twenty thousand aeroplanes, and voted billions of dollars for war. All of this was a rather large exaggeration and Scott knew it. The Roumanians responded with cheering and thunderous applause. The Prime Minister declared it to have been a tremendous success and Consul Andrews agreed that "no other speech of official visitors had the value for them (the Roumanians) which the speech of General Scott carried." In a cable to Washington, however, Andrews noted that Scott's speech had had the unfortunate side effect "of giving the Roumanians the idea that the United States would give them everything they are asking for" and warned that the United States might be embarrassed by this in the near future. At very least the Scott visit to Roumania had boosted morale at a critical time; and the General seems to have had, according to
Colonel Mott, every intention of carrying out his promises to the Roumanians. By the time he returned to America, however, he had forgotten exactly what these promises were.\textsuperscript{24}

General Scott's view of the Russian government, gathered from meetings with Kerensky, Manikovsky, and others both before and after his trip to Roumania, was less positive. In Scott's eyes "radicalism pervaded the whole government to a dangerous degree," and on one occasion he went so far as to advise Kerensky to "execute about one hundred of these German agitators like \ldots Lenin and Trotsky, or at least deport them.\textsuperscript{25}

Unlike most of his compatriots, Scott was able to perceive that "all" of Russia was tired of the war. Whether the majority desired peace at any price was a question as yet unanswered in his mind. Further he was unsure whether the Provisional Government had the capacity to restore order and continue the war. But the General also recognized that Russia's presence in the war would be of immense value. In his report Scott expressed his fears that if Russia withdrew it would be "hard to predict how long it will take to win" and it was "possible that Germany can't be conquered" at all.\textsuperscript{26}

General Scott concluded that it would be worth the cost of substantial American war loans to keep
Russia "even passively in the war until next spring" and hope that she could launch an attack during the following summer. Scott went on to recommend that the United States take over Vladivostok as an American base for purposes of supplying Russia as it was in "total confusion." Scott's analysis seems to have been as close to approximating a reasonable American approach to the situation as anyone's. From a military viewpoint America could aid Russia primarily with her transportation problems. The confusion of this system not only made it difficult to supply the Army but also endangered the supply of food and other necessities. This could give rise to internal disorder. Further, as an assistant to Kerensky had pointed out, any advance was likely to exaggerate the supply problem. In his official report Scott advocated a loan of $300 million for Roumania. The American General concluded that Roumania's fate was inexorably tied to that of Russia and thus it was important to keep the ten strong Roumanian divisions in the field because of their positive influence on nearby Russian divisions.

Admiral James F. Glennon had perhaps the most exciting adventures and the most significant short-term impact on Russia of any of the American Envoys. After spending several days in Petrograd, Glennon,
accompanied by Dr. Holton Curl, Lieutenant Alva Bernhard, Captain Newton McCully, on-going American Naval Attache at Petrograd, Commander Walter S. Crosley, his replacement, and Dmitri Fedotoff-White set out to visit the Black Sea Fleet.  

Before the Glennon party reached the Black Sea they were given their first taste of Russia's internal dissension. The party was stopped at one of the larger stations to the south of Moscow to purchase tonic water when a burly soldier rushed their car yelling "throw the damn bourgeois out!" As the attacker leapt into the car, Fedotoff-White, somewhat to his surprise, struck the intruder in the face and sent him flying. Luckily for all concerned the crowd of troops on hand. This first taste of revolutionary Russia was soon followed by another. Within several miles of Sebastopol the Americans heard rumors of a revolt in the Black Sea Fleet. Unlike their Baltic counterparts, the southern fleet had been stable since the beginning of the revolution. Fedotoff-White was obviously shocked and saddened to find that "the last citadel of order and discipline in the Russian Navy was in the hands of the Bolsheviks."  

When they arrived in Sebastopol, the Naval party found that the fleet's commander, Admiral Kolchak,
later to become a leader of the White Russian forces, had been deposed but was free and unharmed. The fleet seems to have been under the loose control of various Soviets and other ad hoc groups, some undoubtedly Bolshevik in sentiment and heavily influenced by "outside agitators" from the Baltic Fleet. In an atmosphere of "profound distruct" the local Executive of Soldiers, Sailors and Working Men had voted not to support the Provisional Government. Incredibly, Admiral Glennon was able to restore order in the Fleet. Glennon first met with the executive of the Soviet and was so well received that he was invited to address the entire soviet of 1,200 members later in the day. Like General Scott, Glennon seems to have known what to say and when. His speech began with praise for Admiral Kolchak and emphasized the discipline, self-restraint, and military record of the American Navy. When he had finished the Soviet was persuaded to restore the arms and authority of the officers and arrest some of the worst agitators. The Soviet's executive committee reversed their earlier vote and backed the Provisional Government by a vote of sixty to three. Although he was unable to prevent Kolchak's recall to Petrograd, the American Admiral's performance was not only heroic and inspiring: it was incredible. It is surprising
that he undertook to reverse the positions of the Soviet and even more so that he met with such success.

The incident demonstrated how truly malleable many Russians were at this time. There was on one hand strong and genuine fear of the officer class. This had certainly been agitated by the prevalent view that Russia's defeats were the result of a pro-German conspiracy within the Tsar's government. On the other hand while there were undoubtedly quite a few incidents of officers mistreating their men, there were also unquestionably many well-intentioned officers who posed no threat to the soldiers and sailors. It was in any event an atmosphere of great distrust. Certainly Glennon must have come away from the incident feeling that Russian extremists could be persuaded to moderate their views if they could be exposed to viewpoints similar to his own. After their successes with the Black Sea Fleet, Glennon and his party travelled to the northern ports of Archangel, Roggekuel, Reval, and Helsingfors. They were accompanied part of the way by Admiral Kolchak with whom Glennon discussed the Russian Naval situation. The Baltic Fleet had already established its reputation for radicalism and violence in March when it revolted and attempted
to set up government by soviets. Dmitri Fedotoff-White's former commander, Admiral Nepenin, had been murdered in the process. There had been several other major incidents since then, and it is safe to say that the Baltic Fleet as well as various local workers soviets were constantly on the verge of going over to the Bolshevik cause and declaring themselves independent of the Provisional Government. After their experiences with the Black Sea Fleet the Glennon party must have entered the Baltic area with some trepidation.\textsuperscript{36}

Glennon's party first visited the port of Archangel where they were able to view the long lines of ammunition trains that were waiting to move southward. They also learned that conditions in the fleet were bad, but there was no immediate danger of revolt. Moving on to Roggekuel on the Gulf of Riga the Americans were able to sail on a small destroyer whose crew proved to be both well-trained and enthusiastic. Returning to shore the Glennon party got its first taste of the war when they were interrupted by a German air raid. Glennon "enjoyed himself hugely" giving various orders and leading his little band to cover.\textsuperscript{37} At Zerel the party got another positive view of the Baltic situation as enthusiastic sailors tossed Glennon in the
air as per the local custom. The Admiral apparently enjoyed this event after a few nervous moments.38

After an exciting thirty knot sail on the modern destroyer Samson Glennon arrived in Helsingfors in time to witness a revolt by several battleships. As Admiral Derderevskii's yacht attempted to set sail for Reval the battleships, under radical command, attempted to block the yacht. Luckily for Verder­evskii several submarines that remained loyal to the Admiral interposed themselves and the ships withdrew.39

After this incident Admiral Glennon and Fedotoff-White became involved in another incident which demonstrates some of the problems that the Provi­sional Government faced. After hearing of the brutal slaying of Admiral Nepenin, Glennon thoughtlessly remarked that it "had served him right" as the Russian Admiral "had no business to give up without a fight." Dmitri Fedotoff-White left the American Admiral's presence in a rage and only Commander Crosley's intervention persuaded him to return. After Glennon had made an apology Fedotoff-White explained that the officers were virtually powerless as the govern­ment "didn't dare investigate or punish the murderers" and had little real power to back them up because of the strength of the Soviet. Whether Glennon accepted
this view is unknown but at least he was exposed to it.

Thus both General Scott and Admiral Glennon had relatively broad overall views of the Russian military situation. Although Scott could perhaps have seen more of the Russian army, it is doubtful that the Provisional Government would have wished to show him their worst divisions. Scott was well apprised of the military situation in general and Glennon's experiences were exceptional. Both men's conclusions seem realistic under the circumstances. Although General Scott seems to have evidenced greater doubt that Russia could launch a strong war effort, his advocacy of aid to Russian transportation seems to have been the most realistic American policy available. Both men seem to have come off somewhat gruff but had profound, if temporary, positive effects -- Scott in Roumania and Glennon at Sebastopol. Dr. Mott's effect appears to have been similar. The efforts of these three men should not be discounted due to the limitations placed upon them particularly by time and their areas of expertise. It is highly questionable whether these men could have had any strong influence on the Soviet had they been given the opportunity, although they might have had more insight into the
situation facing the Russian people and their allies had they been able to visit that body.
In retrospect the most important subsection of the Root Mission was that of James Duncan and Charles Edward Russell. Given the political situation, the discrediting of Root, and political and diplomatic realities which precluded the special Ambassador from making an appearance before the Soviet, America's best chances to reach that body now rested on Duncan and Russell. Only they among Root Mission personnel had the potential to establish a working relationship with the Soviet and adequately present the American viewpoint.

James Duncan's style and socio-political background may have excluded him from the start. He received mixed reviews from those present. Dmitri Fedotoff-White's characterization was caustic in the extreme. White described Duncan as "stupid," "vulgar," and "practically devoid of manners." Further, White reports that some members of the American Commission "openly" ignored him. In contrast, T. Bentley Mott described James Duncan as "an absolute joy" who was both very amusing and at age seventy-two still full of energy. Duncan's manners were not of crucial importance to the success of his mission, and may in fact have been an asset in some circles. However, the union leader's naive approach to the Russian situation was unlikely to influence
the intellectual and idealistic theoreticians who led the all-Russian and Petrograd Soviets -- whether Marxist or not. Duncan's emphasis was primarily pragmatic and too closely tied to the American experience to move or inspire the members of those bodies. It is possible that Duncan could have succeeded had he used a more inspiring approach.

Duncan apparently enjoyed his train ride from Vladivostok to Petrograd where he was able to make several speeches and numerous observations. Included among the letters was one in which he described the Manchurians as "more indolent than the Mongolians," which he may have attributed to his basic premise that "where returns or wages for labor performed are meagre, ambition to earn is not keenly in evidence." Perhaps the high point of the overland ride for Duncan was his cribbage victory over Judson. Duncan revealed his attitude on this occasion when he described his success as a victory of the "industrialists over the military."³

Duncan spent most of his time in Petrograd meeting with the Minister of Labor, Matthew I, Skobelev and touring the factory districts in the Petrograd area. He quickly realized the danger that the attitude of the workers posed to the war effort. Duncan's classic example of this problem was the actions of
the munitions workers who charged their employers for two hour discussions of politics.\textsuperscript{5} He hoped to improve Russian business-labor relations by introducing the Russian workers to the collective bargaining approach of the American Federation of Labor. He conveyed this idea principally through his talks with Skobelev and his speech to the All-Russian Soviet. He also advocated a shift system that would increase Russian labor's output and a quick settlement to labor problems in mining and munitions. In addition to these efforts Duncan met on several occasions with British Labor Party member, Arthur Henderson. During these meetings the two labor leaders discussed the war effort, the Stockholm Conference, and labor problems in general.\textsuperscript{6}

Duncan's visit to the All-Russian Soviet in late June influenced his whole perception of the Russian situation. While he watched, the Soviet voted on a motion to deport a certain Robert Grimm who was allegedly a German spy. The Provisional Government had already decided to deport Grimm, and the Soviet's vote thus constituted a vote of confidence. This vote was overwhelmingly in support of the government, 640 to 148. Duncan concluded that the Provisional Government enjoyed substantial support within the Soviet. The comfortable margin that the government
received "practically governed the session thereafter when important divisions affecting the status of the Government were taken up." Duncan was undoubtedly naive in assuming that a single vote adequately demonstrated the Soviet's support of the Provisional Government. He does not appear to have suspected that the Soviet had become the real power center in Russia.

On June 29, 1917 the leader of the Granite Cutter's Association was given an opportunity to reach the heart of revolutionary Russia. He did not. In his usual mundane fashion he described American labor practices, encouraged support for the "war to end all wars", and advocated a law prohibiting child labor. At one point Duncan argued that although soldiers couldn't fight in shifts, the workers could work in shifts to support their comrades. This approach was a good one and quite naturally brought applause from the soldiers' delegates who saw "the pith of the argument." The American labor leader did not elaborate on how the workers' delegates received the idea. In any event Duncan concluded that his address had been "well received" and that Soviet Chairman Tscheidze had made an "able reply."  

On July 27 Duncan attended the All-Russian Congress of Cossacks with Dr. Mott. The Cossacks constituted a relatively conservative force in Russian
politics. Nevertheless they had generally supported the March Revolution. By early July they were growing increasingly hostile to Bolshevik propaganda and had become a major bulwark for the Provisional Government. The Congress offered Duncan a more receptive audience than the Soviet had been, but he apparently failed to influence them in a major way and instead concentrated on his major theme of increasing work in the factories. The Cossacks were, of course, largely nomadic and had little interest in factory work.9

During late June and early July Duncan visited various other organizations, particularly the Petrograd Soviet, and made further visits to the workers who were responsible for the output of war material. From his report it appears that the American labor leader spent most of his time passing out American propaganda and giving speeches in which he advocated increased work in the factories, support for the war, adoption of the practices of American labor unions, and adoption of union labels.10 In his last major address, to the All-Russian Trade Union in Petrograd on July 5, Duncan once again struck these same tired notes, expounding American methods of union organization and settling "trade contentions."11 There is no record of how Duncan was received but this may well have been the proper audience for his ideas. In
general, however, his pragmatic approach to the advancement of "working men", which could have been highly useful in other times, was not well suited to a revolutionary era. Perhaps typical of the situation was the attitude of R. J. Ischudetzki; a labor leader who had arranged for Duncan's visits to the various war-related industries in and around Petrograd. Ischudetzki's position on the war was that he wished to end it "promptly and successfully so that there might be opportunity to depose and dethrone capitalism."12

It is doubtful that James Duncan made any lasting impression on either the Russian workers or their representatives. He seems to have been satisfied that one of his principle goals of increasing the output of Russian workers through an adoption of the shift system eventually gained Labor Minister Skobelev's support. Duncan reports that he was later informed that "the agitation along this line was satisfactory to the workers, providing suitable compensation was assured them." Duncan concluded that the Mission's visit had been a timely one; the Russian situation had on the whole been greatly improved and "excellent general results" were in evidence.13

It is easy to view Duncan as having been blind
to the meaning of the events that passed before his eyes. Obviously his advocacy of the adoption of child labor laws and the use of union labels seems preposterous in light of the questions of life and death that were facing his audience. The disturbing fact is that there must have been some reason for Duncan to take such an optimistic view of the situation in his official report. Certainly the vote in the All-Russian Soviet that sustained the Provisional Government was important, as were perhaps the others to which Duncan alludes.

It is unlikely that his positive conclusions were based upon some unrevealed facts. He may simply have suppressed his real fears both in the official reports and his public statements. Most likely, he failed entirely to understand what he was observing. There can, however, be little doubt that Duncan did not have the personality, prestige, or perspective to significantly influence those Russians with whom he came in contact. 14

Charles Edward Russell was potentially the most important member of the Root Mission. As an avowed socialist, rather than a trade unionist, Russell had a more concrete philosophical link with the Soviet's leaders. Although it is claimed that he had not read all of Karl Marx's Das Kapital he had at least read
some of it. More important perhaps were his intellectual facilities, which undoubtedly outshone Duncan's and his reputation as a "muckraker" and socialist candidate for Governor of New York. Counter-balancing these aspects of his background was his expulsion from the pro-German Socialist Party of America, the negative comments of Maxim Gorky's *The New Life*, and an article published in *Prahyda* by Trotsky which contended that Russell was a "secret member" of J. P. Morgan and Company. Most probably realizing that Russell did indeed have a chance of communicating successfully with both the Russian Social Revolutionaries and Social Democrats, anti-war forces concentrated their efforts in discrediting him. That they and some genuinely unconvinced Russians were successful in casting Russell in a bad light is highly probable. Whether Russell could or should have been able to overcome this sabotage is worthy of examination. In making this examination it is perhaps crucial to recognize that few Russians had knowledge of Russell personally. Reports of his expulsion from the American Socialist Party, recounted in Gorky's paper and perhaps others, must have some him significant, perhaps irreparable, damage in the absence of common knowledge of his genuine humanitarianism. This is another example of the harmful effects of both
general Russian ignorance and the absence of an effective outlet for the American viewpoint.

Dmitri Fedotoff-White's impression of Charles Edward Russell was somewhat critical. He found Russell a man of set and "rather moderate views" who considered himself a socialist theoretician. Further, Russell kept the company of "several long-haired individuals" who "led him by the nose" and "filled his head with all kinds of nonsense." One is left with the impression of a somewhat superficial socialist who was easily swayed. The identity of the "long-haired individuals" is unknown.

Unlike most of his compatriots Charles Russell seems to have avoided many of the early ceremonies and to have begun the work of organizing the publicity campaign. He worked on this with the aid of Stanley Washburn from June 13 until June 18. On the latter date Russell and Duncan again appealed to the other members of the Mission to begin a propaganda campaign of massive proportions. Russell characterized the feeling of the Root party as one of "great depression" on this day. At this point he asked to be relieved of his publicity work; apparently feeling that it was too insignificant under the circumstances.

During the remainder of his stay in Russia, Russell spent the majority of his time meeting with
the leaders of the Soviet and the editors of various radical newspapers. On June 19 he met with the three most influential non-Bolshevik socialists; Labor Minister Skoboleff, the President of the Soviet, Irakly G. Tseretelli and Social Revolutionary leader, Victor Chernov. Although Russell made no specific report of this meeting it seems likely that he was able to get a reasonably good view of the majority socialist viewpoints. When the main body of the Root Mission went to Moscow, Russell remained in Petrograd to talk with Soviet leaders. By June 22 he cabled the State Department saying that his work could not be completed in the time allotted and asked for permission to extend his stay.\footnote{20}

While he was awaiting a reply from the State Department, Charles Russell was given an opportunity to address the All-Russian Soviet.\footnote{21} Clearly aware of the criticism that had been leveled at him, he began his speech y demonstrating his socialist credentials:

"I hold in one hand the red card of the Socialist party of the United States and in the other the card of the printers' trade union, ...of which I am a member. I came therefore from the plain people of America, from the workers, the radicals, the American revolution, the champions of democracy."

After praising the Russian revolution, the effects of
which he described as "if in the darkest night a new planet had suddenly arisen greater than the sun.", the American socialist went on to describe America's peaceloving nature. Like most other speeches delivered by members of the Root Mission, Russell's soon turned to his main issue: "Today the American radicals, workers, and democrats have united ferevently to support and uphold this dreadful thing they had always abhorred." The war was one to save democracy, without which "there can never come socialism, never come peace, never come the emancipation of man." Further "... we can never right the ancient wrongs of labor, never gain for the producer the just fruits of his toil, never free men's hearts and lives from the frightful blight and cold horrors of the competitive system" without democracy. This was perhaps the best speech made by any member of the Root Mission. Russell clearly understood his audience as well as any American can have been expected to. He picked the best and only angle that he could have wisely used to bring the members of the Soviet to the American viewpoint.

It is clear that Charles Edward Russell understood the intricacies of the Russian situation in much greater depth than the other members of the Root Mission. In a series of articles published in various
popula American magazines soon after his return to
the United States, and eventually summarized in his
book, *Unchained Russia*. Russell concluded that the
decision of whether to continue the war lay with "the
toilers." It was the Soviet, not the Provisional
Government, that controlled Russia's fate. Further
a whole new attitude now prevailed in the land. Russell
criticized the "general failure of the Western
mind to grasp the sacredness of the Revolution." The
"Allies never grasped the primary fact of the
situation . . ." that it was the voice of the
proletariat and the proletariat alone that was
heeded." "But so strong are the fixed habits of
men's minds that Russia must be like the government of
other countries." It was clear to Russell that the
Allies had thought that the Russian Revolution aimed
only for political democracy, "But the Russian
Revolutionists had shot far beyond political democracy;
they aimed at industrial democracy no less."

What Russell feared was that the Russian worker
would never realize Germany's antipathy to democracy
in either the political or industrial sense. This
fear was based on both the Allies' general misunder-
standing of the nature of the revolution and the
presence of numerous "German" agents who "swarmed"
around the All-Russian Soviet, encouraging its leaders
to think that that body was the "new light of the world" while trying, with some success, to convince the Russians that the United States was the enemy of the Revolution. Russell was galled by the fact that the Germans had "overwhelmed the Allies on a field never wisely nor efficiently contested." Further, the American press was having the effect of aiding the Germans in their goals by its sarcastic articles about the Bolsheviks and other "ignorant" Russians, even if these stories were amusing to American audiences. For Charles Russell "there was very little fun in standing on the Field of Mars and hearing . . . " those articles . . . read to a crowd of idignant Russians." Charles Russell's view of this unfortunate situation was shared by Samuel Harper. As early as late April of 1917: Professor Harper had begun a campaign to have "all references to Russian weakness and ineffectiveness excluded from the press." Despite some success, however, the short-sighted American attacks were apparently still being read at the Soviet in July. 

Virtually alone and probably largely discredited, Charles Russell must have felt immense frustration. On June 30, Lansing wired Ambassador Francis to notify him that Russell could extend his stay in Russia. The American socialist never received this telegram.
Ambassador Francis, perhaps unaware of Russell's request, wired the Secretary of State at once asking for clarification. Later in the day Francis sent another cable noting that Russell was "in through touch with" the Soviet and was "maintaining that they have the power." Francis reported that this belief had led Russell to talk about the Provisional Government "disrespectfully and openly, consequently, if he remains in any capacity he might make trouble." Francis concluded that Russell had decided that his request was not to be answered and had therefore decided to return with Root. Thus the matter ended with Francis withholding the cable, although Polk wired Francis on July 7, ordering Russell's return.

After failing in his attempt to remain in Russia, Charles Russell joined his fellow ambassadors on the return trip. It was clear in his mind that two things must be done in order to save the Russian situation for the Allies. One was that a massive propaganda campaign must be launched by the United States and the other was that it must be impressed on American newspaper editors that articles critical of the Soviet and the Russians in general were having a disastrous impact on the Russian view of America. Russell would take up this two-fold mission upon his return.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE CAREFUL ATTENTION

OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT
While Dr. Mott, Scott, and Glennon were traveling and Russell and Duncan were trying to gain influence with the Soviet, Ambassador Root and the other members of the Mission were attending conferences, dinners, and entertaining or being entertained by various Russians and Allies and Americans in Petrograd. Ambassador Root remained in Petrograd throughout except for a short trip to Moscow which, while it may or may not have enlightened the mission members, does provide some interesting insights into the Russian mind of 1917.

On June 21, Ambassador Root and the main body of the mission, including Bertron, McCormick, Duncan, General Scott, T. Bentley Mott, Colonel Judson, and various aids left Petrograd for Moscow by train. Prior to their departure Basil Miles had wired American Counsel Madden Summers that the mission, while in Moscow, wanted no banquets or entertainment that would be "inconsistent with the present condition of short food supply." Miles requested that Summers find opportunities for "arousing some enthusiasm." On June 22 the American were officially welcomed by the Moscow Duma. After speeches by Mayor Astrov and several leaders of Russian and American commercial organizations, Root spoke. Again he emphasized that the Americans had come to aid Russia and that Germany was their common foe.
Although Root is reported to have received loud applause the response of several Moscovites who were present is significant. Were the Americans really going to aid Russia in her time of need? N. M. Kishkin, Commissare of Moscow, voiced this question when he stated that he had "always considered that the Americans . . . were realists . . . we are sure that at the present time the Mission has come with a real offer for which we are deeply thankful." The leader of the Moscow Soviet, Tretiakov, pointed out that many Russian "classes had not expected help from America in the war" and emphasized that because of this it was imperative that Russia derive a real benefit from the arrival of the Americans.

After the meeting Root spoke with reporters. Contrary to his actual beliefs he emphasized that he was not in the least bit alarmed by the Russian situation and that he expected the war to end by 1918. The reporter seemed more interested that the American soldiers followed orders out of a sense of duty in absence of an "elective principle."

That night the Root party slept on their train which was withdrawn from Moscow to Chimky, several miles away, undoubtedly for safety reasons. Throughout the rest of their stay in Moscow the Root party attended meetings and Root spoke to numerous groups. Most of
these events were of minor significance except for Root's meeting with the High Procurator of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, Vladimir Lvov. This meeting is of great significance not only because it is one of the few that was well reported, but because Ambassador Root appears to have given substantial weight to Lvov's observations on the Russian political situation. Further, Lvov's views were probably similar to those held by leading members of the government and many moderate socialists. They are also important because they are the only views of a Russian high official that can be documented in an American source.

The meeting was held at the National Hotel. Ambassador Root began the conversation by inquiring as to what Lvov thought of the proposed Constituent Assembly. Lvov replied that he disagreed with the government's timing; for he felt that the Assembly should not be elected prior to the end of the war. Lvov believed that a constituent assembly could be safely convened only after peace was achieved and Russia's "vital forces," i.e., the pro-law and order moderate majority of the socialist parties, had time to come into play. Further, Lvov feared that if an assembly was elected prior to an end of the fighting it would exhibit "dangerously maximalistic tendencies." Lvov went on to appraise the
current situation. He said an evergrowing gap between the Maximalists (Bolsheviks) and the moderate majority of socialists (the Social Revolutionaires and most Mensheviks) existed and that if a "clear break" occurred between the Bolsheviks and the Provisional Government he felt that the moderate Socialists would support the government.

At this point in the conversation Root expressed his fear that the Bolsheviks, waving the "black flag" of a separate peace would revolt and gain control of the country. Lvov cited the large pro-government vote in the Petrograd Soviet of March 14 (on a radical motion to arrest the Provisional Government) and contended that the new coalition cabinet had the situation in hand. Nevertheless, Lvov stated that he expected that the Bolsheviks could revolt at any time and probably in the very near future. Lvov felt that the moderates would win out, although much bloodshed was likely. The moderate socialists understood that now was not the time for many of the major socialistic innovations or an abandonment of the private property system. Root voiced the primary American concern of whether the army would be able to advance in the near future. Lvov replied that this was impossible until the Bolsheviks were defeated and their propaganda silenced. 

7
Much of Lvov's analysis seems correct. Although the March 14 vote was somewhat outdated it is clear that the majority of Russian socialists were not prepared to go forward with Bolshevik proposals.\(^8\) That Lvov knew or believed that the Bolsheviks would revolt in the near future is significant. Root accepted this view and it appears that the Provisional Government expected it.\(^9\) The political situation in Russia had in fact changed radically since the Root Mission had arrived. The majority of the Murshevik and Social Revolutionary parties were, by late May or early June, committed to the Provisional Government. In mid-June the Bolsheviks had won a decisive moral victory in a contest of banners among the workers of Petrograd. This had caused much concern in moderate and conservative circles and the Root Mission must have been aware of it to some degree.\(^10\) Judging from several of Ambassador Root's subsequent observations, he appears to have accepted Lvov's viewpoint that the Bolsheviks would be unable to gain control of the country at that time.

On June 24 the Root Part, now including Crane and Dr. Mott, returned to Petrograd, arriving the next day. From here Root and General Scott went to Russian general staff headquarters (Stafka) at Mogilev to meet with General Brusiloff. After Brusilou
apprised them of the military situation, Scott left for the front and Roumania while Root returned to Petrograd. After their visits to Moscow and Stafka the main body of the Root Mission resumed schedules similar to those they had had prior to their departure. On June 28 the Mission held a general conference to discuss what was learned at Stafka. On Sunday, July 1, Root joined Tereschenko at his dacha in Finland. The majority of the Mission's members attended special services at the Kazan Cathedral held in memory of those who had died in the March Revolution.

Ambassador Root returned on Monday and again took up the propaganda campaign. Since his original cable of June 17, (see supra, p. 82-3.), the Mission had received only a brief cable from Washington stating that the proposal and short-term funding were being given "careful consideration." Obviously concerned, Root, with the aid of McCormick and Bertron had put up $30,000 of their own money to begin the campaign. This initial expense included the publishing and mass distribution of two of President Wilson's speeches and one of Ambassador Root's and was carried out through the British and French. Now, two weeks after his original cable on the issue, Root again cabled Lansing: "I beg you to realize that Germany is now attacking Russia by propaganda and is spending
millions, at least a million dollars monthly, to capture the minds of the Russian people." He stressed the urgent need for "active and immediate counter-attacks by the same weapons" and noted the Mission's $30,000 expenditure. Charles Russell reported that Root himself had often been the victim of such propaganda, not necessarily German, and was "violently" attacked at the Field of Mars where the All-Russian Soviet met. Russell stated that he feared for the Ambassador's life.

Later in the day news of the successful advance of General Brusilov was received from the front. It inspired several popular demonstrations and the Soviet passed a strong "pro-war, civic duty" resolution supported by all but a "very few Maximalists and internationalists." This was, however, also the day when the All-Russian Soviet sponsored massive demonstrations in Petrograd. Confident of a victory the moderate majority of the Soviet had supported the idea which was originally a Bolshevik plan. In what turned out to be a contest of banners, the Bolsheviks won an astounding moral victory. There is no clear-cut evidence that the Root Mission was aware of this occurrence or its implications on July 1. It may, however, serve to explain the urgency of Ambassador Root's cable to Washington.
From July 5 through the seventh Root was occupied with the Conference of Allied Ambassadors thenk taking place in Petrograd. This Conference met at the British Embassy and was chaired by Arthur Henderson. Its purpose was to determine how best to aid Russia. The conference report, adopted July 7, suggested that Russia needed 2,000 locomotives and 40,000 railway cars, of which the United States could send about half. The report also advised adoption of the shift system, expansion of repair shops, and creation of price commissions and arbitration boards. It offered American skilled labor, and instructed the Russians to "avoid reckless driving." In addition a Joint Allied Committee would be set up on a semi-permanent basis in Petrograd for the purpose of aiding Russia.  

After the Allied Ambassador's Conference Root addressed a group of wounded soldiers on July 8 and learned from Tereschenko that the Provisional Government would be unable to meet the military payrolls due on July 15. This impending crisis could have had disastrous consequences, fanning the dissention of the Army and Navy into armed opposition to the Government. Root immediately telegraphed Lansing to request $75,000,000 in credits. This request was granted without delay, but no mention was made of the
$100,000 grant for propaganda. 21

By this time the Mission was ready to implement its propaganda plans. Charles Smith of the Associated Press had arrived from Peking to conduct the campaign. 22 Although the plan was under consideration in Washington, approval was not forthcoming. 23 On July 7 Root had received Washington's reply to his second request for money to begin a publicity campaign. The Mission was informed that the President approved of the campaign "in principle" and would authorize the $30,000 expense already incurred. The question of further outlay was "receiving the careful attention of the Department." 24 The American envoys became discouraged. T. Bentley Mott later stated that the "request for an allotment with which to begin operations was so modest" that the envoys had no idea "that it would be refused." Actually, as Colonel Mott pointed out, the request was not refused, it was simply ignored. 25 A disgusted Root ordered Mott to make arrangements for the Mission's return. He told Mott: "I want you to get this expedition started back as quickly as possible. We receive no replies to our telegrams and our staying here under such conditions is useless. Perhaps by going to Washington in person we can get some action." 26

As the Root Mission prepared to depart, the
persistent rumors of a major Bolshevik uprising continued. 27 Charles Russell reported that at one point it was suggested that the Root Mission withdraw to Helsingfors, as it was rumored that the Bolsheviks planned to attack the Winter Palace and "wipe out" the Americans. 28 Nevertheless the American ambassadors seem to have accepted the assurances of Procurator Lvov, Kerensky, and others, that the revolt would be successfully suppressed and the leaders of the Bolsheviks imprisoned. 29 Root cabled his appraisal of the situation to Lansing on July 10:

We feel that we have contributed materially to strengthening the Provisional Government and improving morale of people and army. The situation is certainly much more hopeful and stable than it was when we arrived. 30

Root's analysis of the work of the Mission was not only wishful but largely inaccurate. There can be little doubt that the speeches of several members of the Root Mission had been temporarily useful to the Provisional Government. It is improbable that any of these speeches had a lasting impact. The Mission had clearly, but understandably, failed to influence the great mass of the Russian people. This could only have been done through a large scale publicity apparatus.

That the Russian situation was "much more hope-
ful and stable" was clearly open to question. In fact the Provisional Government and their tenuous allies, the moderate majority faction of the Soviet, had recently suffered a defeat by the Bolsheviks in a contest for popular support in Petrograd. The Galicia offensive did appear successful on July 10 but the internal situation must be seen to have worsened since mid-June. In any realistic analysis the outcome of the expected Bolshevik uprising would be the determining factor. Since this had yet to occur Root's analysis must be considered as premature. 31

The Root Mission decided not to await the predicted uprising and boarded their train for Vladivostok later on the tenth. The return trip across Siberia was made by all the major original members of the Mission except Crane and Judson. Colonel Judson was appointed Military Attache in Petrograd where he remained until his recall in December, 1917. 32 Charles Crain remained in Russia until September.

The only major incident of the return trip occurred on July 11 when the American stopped at Viatka where they learned that a wooden bridge over which they must cross had been burned. The following day, while the Mission waited for the tracks to be switched to a new stone and steel bridge nearby, an
icehouse near their train was set on fire and flames spread to several freight cars. Both incidents were presumed to have been the work of the Bolsheviks. The train finally pulled out of Viatka on July 12 after a delay of thirty hours. The remainder of the journey to Vladivostok was peaceful. The train stopped on two occasions for the members to go swimming and Root made two speeches both of which were reportedly well received. On July 21 the Root Mission arrived in Vladivostok and embarked for America that afternoon at 2:41 p.m. Prior to his departure, Ambassador Root left the American Consul at Vladivostok, John K. Caldwell, a letter for Frank Billings of the arriving Red Cross Commission. This letter provides and excellent and more realistic statement of Root's conclusions about Russia. After pointing out that the of aid was predicated on whether Russia would be able to continue the war, Root added that:

We are satisfied that practically no one really connected with the government, either directly in the departments or indirectly in the majority of the council of the Workmen's and Soldier's Deputies, has any intention of making a separate peace.

Root believed the crucial question was whether the Provisional Government had the power to continue the war. The first "serious test" would come during the winter when the problem of having enough food,
both at the front and in the cities, would come to the fore. If this problem could not be met effectively, Root predicted "mob violence" and the overthrow of the Provisional Government. Root concluded that general problems with transportation and labor, especially the "great lack of discipline among the railroad employees", made improvement "very difficult". He advised Billings to take over the care of the refugees from occupied Russia and Poland so that the Provisional Government could concentrate on supplying the army. 34 This letter to Billings demonstrates that Root had a reasonable understanding of the Russian situation and that behind his public optimism lay serious doubts about the Provisional Government's ability to survive.

As the Root Mission left Russia in late July the predicted "Bolshevik" revolt took place. Like many of the events of the Russian revolutions of 1917, it was largely spontaneous and leaderless. The uprising was eventually turned into a victory for the moderates and conservatives. These forces would dominate until mid-September. 35 It is not known exactly when the Root Mission's members learned of the outcome which appeared to correspond to Procurator Lvov's predictions. In actual fact the "victory" of the non-Bolshevik elements was
turbulent and short-lived because the basic problems of land distribution and war aims remained unresolved. The Root Mission in all probability arrived in Washington believing that Lvov and those who supported his viewpoint were correct.\textsuperscript{36}

The return voyage was made in fourteen days. On July 26 the \textit{Buffalo} ran into a "brisk nor'wester" which caused the vessel to go through "certain complicated gyrations, which proved to be incompatible with the gastric safety of a number of the passengers."

Dr. Holten Curl lectured on his experience on the Russian front and Stanely Washburn spoke on "Russia's contribution to the cause of the Allies." The \textit{Buffalo} docked at Seattle on August 3.\textsuperscript{37}
CHAPTER EIGHT

INDECISION AT THE WHITE HOUSE
The Root Mission disembarked at Seattle on August 4 and, after a brief reception, Root, Russell, Duncan and General Scott spoke, generally emphasizing that democracy and the Provisional Government would survive in Russia. After a short stop in Chicago the envoys arrived in Washington on August 8 where they were met by State Department counselor Frank Polk and Samuel Gompers. At a Washington press conference Ambassador Root again emphasized Russia's strengths and the democratic traditions of many of the cities, towns and Zemstvo unions. Major Washburn admitted that the military situation was discouraging; the Russians having begun to fall back from General Brusilov's July offensive, but contended that the Russians would get stronger and the Germans weaker if the battle lines approached Petrograd and Moscow. General Scott was optimistic, noting that after an "orgy of liberty" the Russians were settling down. The Mission's members presented a united front of praise of Russia, optimism, and assurance that no separate peace could be made while the Provisional Government remained in power. Only Charles Edward Russell openly disagreed with his colleagues on any issues. Russell, while basically supporting the general outlook of the other members, contended that America should send troops to the Russian front and
continued to assert that the "workman's council" was the real government of Russia. The other members of the American Mission remained silent on the latter question but issued a general statement disagreeing with sending troops. The majority contended that transporting a small number of troops there would be of no moral or military account and when the Russians saw that American troops received higher pay and better rations the reverse might occur.

The question of whether or not to undertake a full scale propaganda campaign in Russia continued to be a source of conflict. Naturally the subject did not become a public issue but it was the major thrust of the Root Mission's suggested Russian strategy. Ambassador Root was, as demonstrated above, undoubtedly concerned. His sense of urgency is revealed by the fact that he cabled Lansing from Chicago on August 6 requesting an immediate meeting with the President which was granted. Colonel T. Bentley Mott described the meeting: "everybody was struck by the questions the President asked. He seemed very well informed . . ." on the Russian situation, "intelligent and charming." But he said not a word as to the Commission's plan or why he had never answered those telegrams." Mott does not record whether anyone asked the President about either topic,
but if his account is correct it seems unlikely that anyone did. That the Root Mission's foremost project was not even discussed seems incredible. Unfortunately there are no other in-depth reports of this meeting. It is possible that the members of the American Commission believed that they would soon have another opportunity to discuss the matter with the President at length. This was not to be the case.

After their meeting with the President the Root Mission had a "long conference" with Lansing followed by a more lengthy discussion between Root and the Secretary of State. Lansing recorded these meetings in memo. The Secretary of State noted that he was "astounded at their optimism" and stated that he felt that the Russian Revolution would follow the basic path of the French Revolution, i.e. moderation followed by terror culminating in a revolt against the terror and some type of military despotism. Lansing concluded that while there was still a chance that the Provisional Government and its allies would survive, the United States should "strengthen" Russia "morally and materially" but be prepared for her ultimate withdrawal from the war.

During their meeting of August 8, the President requested a full report be sent to him when ready. On August 21, Dr. Mott forwarded the report of the Root
Mission, a supplemental report including the proposed propaganda campaign, his own ideas on the uses of Y.M.C.A. stations in Russia, and several individual reports by members of the Commission.  

The main report covered various topics and provides a general summary of the conclusions of the Root Mission. The Report's chief contentions were that Russia's greatest problem was one of transportation; merchant ships were scarce and land transportation was "defective." The railroads in particular, were crippled by "defective organization" and by obsolete and worn-out rolling stock. The Report reiterated Root's note to Billings; the Provisional Government would not make a separate peace if it had "the power to continue the war." This power was predicated on popular support and the functioning of the "industrial system." The Government must also solve the problems of war weariness, increasing industrial inefficiency (which the Mission rated at one half of normal output), increased production costs, and the fact that many peasants were holding back their crops due to the decrease in the value of the ruble.  

The Root Mission's report was very clear in noting that the Petrograd Soviet had originally held "a greater power to exercise force" during the
first months after the March Revolution than did the Provisional Government. Upon the election of the All-Russian Soviet the relationship between the Soviet and the Government was more cooperative because the former was more conservative and responsible than its predecessor. The Report pointed out that the Provisional Government's policy of separating the "Maximalists" or "Bolsheviks" from the moderate majority was working and that the Provisional Government now had the power to enforce its decrees.

The Report concluded that substantial economic aid from the Allies would create "a strong probability of keeping Russia in the war." Without such aid there was "little prospect" of so doing. The benefits of such aid would be "enormous" even if they allowed Russia only to "maintain its defensive" and thereby force the Central powers "to maintain continuously a large force upon their eastern front." The report was signed by all but Charles R. Crane, who was still in Russia. 8

In its supplemental report the Root Mission's propaganda plan estimated that the Germans were spending three million dollars a month. The Mission suggested countering this with a total outlay of five and one half million dollars to establish a modern news service in Petrograd to provide information for
newspapers and periodicals, the publishing of pamphlets, a film service, special advertising through posters and the like, and to employ "hundreds" of speakers to tour the army and the country. The Y.M.C.A., through Dr. Mott, offered to establish camps and stations throughout Russia to provide recreation, reading rooms, lectures, movies, various courses, and "highgrade theatrical plays" to help improve the morale of the Russian Army. The individual reports were basically elaborations of the material covered in the main and supplemental reports. Root discussed the propaganda campaign, recommended journalist John F. Bass to head publicity in Russia, and described the Russians as "completely bewildered." 9

The reports, along with a memo from Dr. Mott about publicity were given to Lansing on August 21, but the President seems to have had them in his hands by the following day when he wrote Mott to thank him. Wilson's only comment on his intentions was a simple, unspecific, "I want and intend to help." 10

It was now ever two and half months since the idea of a publicity campaign had first been conceived, yet very little action had been taken. Outside of the publications of the speeches by Wilson and Root, paid for by the members of the Root Mission, only a promise to send one and a half million postcards,
bearing greetings from America to Russian soldiers, had been elicited from the Administration. 11

What occurred during the following period is unclear and difficult to document. On August 24 Colonel Mott called on the President immediately prior to the cabinet meeting of that day. Neither Mott nor Ray Stannard Baker's Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters give an account of what was said at this meeting. 12 Later in the day, presumably after the cabinet meeting, the President sent a telegram to The Russian National Council Assembly, also known as the Moscow State Conference, which was to begin meeting on August 25 in Moscow. 13 The message was typically ambiguous, expressing hope for "the triumph of ideals of democracy for self-government against all enemies within and without" and hoped the Assembly would give "material and moral assistance . . . to the Government of Russia in the promotion of the Common cause in which the two nations are unselfishly united. 14

On August 30, Root, accompanied by Dr. Mott and Cyrus McCormick, called on the President again to discuss their propaganda plans. Wilson's response was characteristic. He would give the plan "sympathetic consideration." 15
Whether or not a major propaganda campaign of the type suggested by the Root Mission would have kept Russia in the war and the Bolsheviks out of power can never be known. If such a campaign had been started when it was first conceived in June the results might well have been satisfactory. There is little doubt that the plan could have been started in late June or early July. The necessary personnel were available, including Russell, Washburn, Harper, and by July, Arthur Bullard in Moscow and Charles Smith in Petrograd. Russell, Washburn, and Bullard were already working on publicity. What they needed was money and effective outlets. Obviously, the plans for motion pictures and touring speakers required more time to prepare and the organizational abilities of an agency like Creel's Committee on Public Information. Nevertheless newspaper outlets existed and the Provisional Government must have had influence with many of them. Further, with the majorities of the Social Revolutionary and Menshevik parties now committed to the war, numerous possibilities must be seen to have existed. By late August, it was probably entirely too late to change Russian public opinion about the war and the Provisional Government, or to clarify America's position on war aims. Wilson apparently was temporizing, for he remained uncommitted to the Root Mission recommendations on November 10, 1917, three days after the Bolshevik revolution. Responding on that date
to a letter from Russell, again urging a full-scale propaganda effort, the President said that Russell's ideas ran "along the lines of my own thought," and that he would do his best; but "all sorts of work in Russia now is rendered extremely difficult because no one channel connects with any other, apparently." Wilson forwarded Russell's letter to Creel saying it was "a very important letter . . . very near the heart of the subject it is concerned with."17

The Mission recommendations had, in the interim, been sent to Creel who, according to his memoirs, supported plans by the Railroad Commission and the Red Cross but initially opposed the publicity idea as too expensive. Creel ultimately suggested that someone be sent to pursue the propaganda campaign "after study." On October 27, Edgar Sisson, Editor of Comopolitan and nor employed by the Committee on Public Information, sailed for Russia. He arrived on November 25, several weeks after the October Revolution. For a time he, assisted by Bullard, attempted to put forward the American viewpoint, but by then their efforts were of little value.18

During the remainder of August and throughout September, Root, Russell, and Duncan spoke of their experiences on numerous occasions. On August 16,
they spoke at the Union League Club in New York. Root continued to emphasize the strengths of Russia, citing "self-control equaled in few countries of the world" and an "extraordinary capacity for concerted action." On September 6 Root spoke at the convention of the American Bar Association at Saratoga, New York. He contended that while the Provisional Government had initially lacked control over the population and army it had eventually won over the "reasonable socialists" in the Soviet and with them the Petrograd garrison. In response to the public concern with the July uprising, and the march on Petrograd by General Kornilov, Root noted that these events had been explained to him prior to his departure. They were part of a plan to make Kerensky dictator of Russia. One can only imagine the effect in the Russian press of this surprising, even incredible, contention. There is certainly a possibility that it was true and could have been conveyed to Root by any number of people he had met with in Russia. The lack of political wisdom evidenced by its public mention is truly surprising, especially on the part of a man of Root's experience and general good judgement.
The major theme of Charles Edward Russell's post-mission speeches and some of Ambassador Root's was that of counter-attacking those prominent Americans who were still advocating peace. Principle among these was Senator LaFollette who had demanded that the Allies state their terms and introduced a resolution in the Senate asking for a peace conference. Russell began the counter-attack at the Union League Club reception of August 15, when he called LaFollette a: "disloyal American that disgraces the Congress of the United States", and a "traitor in disguise that has taken the oath of allegiance and goes to the Senate of the United States to do the dirty work of the Kaiser." Russell went on to note that LaFollette's words would be repeated on the Field of Mars and cause further weakening of Russian resolve. Senator Root joined in the attack, calling those who still backed peace after the decision for war had been made, "pro-German traitors" who "ought to be shot." Former President Roosevelt supported this view.21

In early September Riga began to fall to a German offensive. Russell spoke again in the sixth at the Convention of the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy in Minneapolis attacking LaFollette and his allies, particularly Senators Gronna and Stone,
and citing them as the real captors of Riga. Root continued the attacks on September 13 in Chicago mention no names but calling all arguments against the war, "enemy arguments." On September 15 Russell again attacked LaFollette, Gronna and Stone and demanded charges against them for "plain murder." It is clear from his book, *Russia Unchained*, that Russell truly believed that anti-war and pacifistic statements by prominent Americans would have a serious effect on Soviet opinion. It is not within the scope of this paper to calculate the effect of the words and actions of LaFollette, Gronna, Stone and others, nevertheless Charles Russell was one of a very few Americans who had been to the Soviet and seen the effect of similar statements and actions in the American press.

Internally, the Root Mission had been a model of unity. With some relatively minor exceptions the members worked together with "terrific spirit" and without quarrel. This internal harmony must be attributed to the influence of Elihu Root. From all accounts the members of the Root Mission thought highly of the performance of the former Secretary of State. Charles Russell believed that Root was in danger for his life during much of the trip; yet "he
bore himself throughout with a dignified and tranquil composure that moved us all to admiration." Further, "his personal kindness, unfailing wit, and genial acquiescence in whatsoever hardship or difficulty won all our hearts, however, we might differ from his views." Admiral Glennon is said to have told Josephus Daniels that he had "never heard more patriotic or wiser utterances in support of the true democratic spirit" than those of Root. James Duncan also praised the Mission's leader.

Despite this general harmony within the Root Mission, Root, and his friends, questioned the President's motives throughout the episode. According to his biographer, Phillip C. Jessup, Root felt that

"Wilson didn't want to accomplish anything. It was a grand-stand play. He wanted to show his sympathy for the Russian Revolution. When we delivered his message and made our speeches, he was satisfied; that's all he wanted."

Further Root suspected that Wilson hadn't even read the Ambassadors' dispatches regarding the publicity campaign. Nevertheless, Colonel Mott contended that he had never heard Root speak of Wilson in anything except "a spirit of entire objectivity." Given the President's unsupportive behavior and the absence of a documentable explanation for it, it is understandable that Root and his compatriots would think that their work had been futile and that the President had used them.
thus decided to await the return of the Root Mission. This would not, of course, answer the question of the half-hearted effort that was made but would explain its delay.
CONCLUSION
Whether the Root Mission can be expected to have had a significant impact on the Russia of 1917 is of course open to question. The fundamental problems which lay behind its inability to win over the Russian populace to a continuation of the war were massive. They included the basic ignorance of President Wilson and his closest advisors as to the power and influence of the Russian socialists; the failure of the President to make a clear, concise declaration of American war aims, which helped to undermine the Mission and America's credibility; and the practical inability of a small party of partially discredited Americans, having only tenuous administrative support, to overcome an apparently massive combination of German and Bolshevik propaganda.

President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing had an extremely limited knowledge of Russia. In addition most, if not all, of their advisors failed to realize the advances that had been made by the various socialist groups in that country. The blame for this failure must be placed in part on the inadequacy of the American intelligence gathering system in Russia and the poor communications system.

It was clearly a mistake for the President to have relied on the initial analysis of Charles Crane and Samuel Harper. It is obvious that neither
had, during March, April, and May, and adequate understanding of the defacto power enjoyed by the Petrograd Soviet and the workers, soldiers, and sailors of Russia. In light of the conservative make-up of the Provisional Government and the fact that neither man had been able to see the situation first hand, their lack of perception is understandable. The plain fact of the matter is that no one in the administration or among the Western Allies knew what was happening and mistakenly viewed the March Revolution as a triumph of liberal-nationalism.

It was this failure to recognize the influence of the socialists coupled with Lansing's basic conservatism, and the domestic political considerations of the administration that caused the selection of men, who despite their general good intentions and sympathy for Russia, were almost inevitably to be viewed with at best a suspicious eye by the Russian socialists. The choice of Root was clearly a mistake. Although the Bolshevik, German, and socialist attacks on his character were clearly unfair, the former Senator was obviously too closely tied to conservative Republican and eastern corporate interests to have been given a fair hearing in much of Russia. Despite this fact he demonstrated genuine sympathy for the country and performed admirably as head of the Mission. Unfortunately
he was, in a purely political sense, the wrong man for the job. Either Roosevelt or Bryan would have been superior and the failure of Wilson to choose Bryan remains a mystery. Many of the other members of the Mission appear to have reflected the domestic political concerns and to have been drawn from background that were too conservative to be influential with the defacto powers in Russia. It should, however, be noted that they were selected prior to the ouster of Milyukov and Guchkov and the resultant bourgeoisie-socialist coalition was established. Even when the necessity of influencing the Russian socialist groups began to be recognized, Wilson and his advisors failed to come up with Americans who could properly be expected to do so. James Duncan was clearly a domestic political choice whose membership in the American Federation of Labor automatically alienated significant numbers of Russian socialists. Charles Edward Russell might well have been an excellent choice had it not been for the attacks made upon him by the Socialist Party of America and certain Russian refugee groups. These groups and the Russian far lest appear to have succeeded on largely discrediting Russell even before his arrival in Petrograd.

The result of this unfortunate occurrence was that the American Mission had no representative whose
political image could be expected to significantly influence the Soviet. The Root Mission was thus most probably politically unacceptable to the Russian left from the outset. Despite this fact it was well received by the government and other more conservative circles and might still have been able to win over a majority of Russian popular opinion had it been able to express concurrence with the socialist viewpoint regarding war aims and eventual peace terms.

President Wilson had decided for political reasons, not to discuss these issues and, when he ordered the Root Mission to refrain from speaking to them entirely, the Americans' chances of winning over a majority of Russians must be seen to have declined significantly. That this policy continued despite the pleas of Kerensky, Charles Crane, and Ambassador Francis, which were delivered through Lincoln Steffens, is somewhat surprising. This is particularly because of the purported influence of Crane. It cannot be demonstrated that the British and French would not have gone along with public concessions to the Russian left, nor can it be demonstrated that a significant offensive by Wilson, the Mission, or both, on these important issues, would not have persuaded the Russian masses to continue their efforts. Once the decision not to speak to war aims and peace terms had been made the
Root Mission was relegated to using the carrot of massive economic assistance and "war for democracy" oratory to persuade the Russians to continue. Unfortunately these policies and statements had little tangible immediate value for the Russian people and the Mission and appear to have been ignored by the Russian left.

In addition it is important to note that the Root Mission was by itself too small and insignificant to have been expected to have reached the great mass of Russian people. Despite the fact that several members of the Mission, particularly Admiral Glennon and Dr. Mott were given significant opportunities to influence large numbers of Russians, these opportunities must be considered insignificant when compared to the opportunities open to the Bolsheviks, their allies, and German agents then at work in Russia. As Charles Russell stated, the western powers had been defeated on a field that was neither fully nor wisely contested. The best and perhaps only way to have done this was through a large scale educational campaign such as the Root Mission proposed. Had this been undertaken by the allies in conjunction with the Provisional Government in early June the outcome of the Russian Revolutions of 1917 might well have been different. It certainly cannot be said that the ultimate Bolshevik
victory seemed improbable. Nevertheless the threat was there, and the Root Mission, though fully aware of it, was obviously unable, on its own, to have significantly opposed such a threat without a large scale educational campaign and strong allied and administration backing. The plain fact of the matter was that the Russian people were tired of war and were understandably more interested in fundamental internal reforms.

The most unfortunate aspect of the Root Mission was that its members, particularly Root, Dr. Mott, and Admiral Glennon, performed well, knew what was needed, and yet were unable to do much about the problems that they saw. To the degree that America could have influenced Russia, the Root Mission's failure to do so must largely be seen as a lack of administration support. The Wilson Administration was clearly prepared to dole out large sums of money and war material to the Russians but was simply unworthy to commit itself to a massive effort to win the hearts and minds of the Russian people. As for the performance of the Mission as a whole it was cohesive.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter I


3. Chamberlain, 1:78; Liebman, p.p. 102-04. Tsar Nicholas was at Stafka (General Staff Headquarters at Mogilev) during this period. Apparently feeling confident of his position after the comparatively sparse crowds of March 11 had been disbursed with ease, Nicholas dismissed the Duma.


5. Chamberlain, 1:89.

6. Ibid., 1:86.

7. Ibid.

8. This was a decisive occurrence. The Soviet of 1905 had included only "workers" and their "representatives." Whether, in 1917, it was decided to include the soldiers due to their presence in large numbers at the Tauride Palace or the decision to include them was made for obvious political reasons, their inclusion in the Soviet was a tremendous boost to the power of that body. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 1:94.

11. Alexander Kerensky manager to persuade the Soviet to allow him to join the government and retained his membership in the Soviet until the Bolshevik Revolution in November. N. S. Chkheidze was offered the position as Minister of Labor in the Provisional Government but decided not to participate on the basis of that vote. Chamberlain, 1:89.

12. Ibid.


17. Ibid., p. 5.


22. Williams, p. 86, Note 146.


25. Ibid, p. 79.


33. House to Wilson, 12 March 1917, Wilson MSS, Box 198/91662.

34. Francis to Lansing, 22 March 1917, State Department Records, 861.00/294-296.

35. R. H. Bruce Lockhart, *British Agent*, (New York: Graden City, 1933), p. 279; Warth, p. 31; Lincoln Steffens, *Autobiography*, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1931), p. 764. Steffens and William Sheppard, a journalist who had accompanied him, told Francis that the Soviet held the real power but Francis said he couldn't observe it nor send someone to. The Ambassador told the reporters that they could cover it. He would be interested in what they could tell him about it. Francis was perfectly right in observing that he could not go. This would have been an insult to the government. Whether he should have sent someone is open to question. Certainly someone should have been there as an American observer, most probably a journalist in whom the administration had confidence.

36. *U.S.F.R., 1918: Russia*, passim. The unfortunate communications system does, however, serve as a possible explanation for the increasingly pessimistic view of Russian affairs that both Lansing and Wilson appear to have taken over the course of the summer of 1917.
37. Francis to Lansing, 18 March 1917, U.S.F.R., 1918: Russia, 1:5. See also Charles Crane to Richard Crane, 14 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Reel 383/5A/544, confirming Francis' observations on the tranquility of Petrograd. These reports undoubtedly contributed to the false optimism within the Wilson Administration.


39. Ibid.

Chapter II

1. Wilson to Lansing, 12 April 1917, Lansing Papers 2:326. Lansing was adamant in his view that the Russian front should be kept open. In his cover letter transmitting Francis' telegram, Lansing stated that the socialist policy of no annexations or indemnities would, if adopted, "remove the chief incentive" for a Russian offensive. Further it "may cost this country millions of men if this movement for a separate peace cannot be checked."


4. House to Wilson, 10 April 1917, Wilson MSS, Box 87/92118. It is probable that House had yet to hear of Straus' suggestion.

5. Flint, p. 233. Flint does not give the date of letter.

6. Williams, passim and particularly page 86, Note 138. House stated that he feared Russia would either be "knocked or bargained" out of the war.

7. House to Wilson, 10 April 1917, Wilson MSS, Box 87/92118-9.


11. Miles to Summers, 18 June 1917, State Department Records 763.72/7487/0041-2.


15. Wilson to Lansing, 12 April 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/3800½; House to Wilson, 10 April 1917, Wilson MSS, Box, Box 87/92118-9. Oscar Straus, a former Secretary of Commerce and Labor, Edward N. Hurley, a former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, and Henry Morgenthau, a former American Ambassador to Turkey, were also mentioned as possible members of the American Commission. *The New York Times*, 25 April 1917, 8:2. Straus and Morgenthau were suggested by Colonel House, House to Wilson, undated, Wilson MSS, Box 87/92241.


18. Wilson to Lansing, 19 April 1917, *Lansing Papers*, p. 327. Wilson's letter listed these four plus Root, Eugene Meyer of New York, and John F. Stevens of New York. Meyer was originally invited to join the Mission but the invitation was later withdrawn. See, *infra*, pages 24-26 and Stevens was later named to head a separate Railroad Commission.


20. Suprisingly no further information on Samuel Reading Bertron is available in any of my sources.

21. Williams, p. 86.
22. House to Wilson, undated, Wilson MSS, Box 87/92241. House's cable was probably sent around April 11.


26. Ibid., p. 570.


30. Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root, 2 vols., (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1938), 2:336-358. A particularly amusing recommendation for Roosevelt was that of Mr. H. M. Robertson, President of the Alabama Home Building and Loan Association, who wrote the President that, "Next to the submarine nothing troubles us here in Alabama as much as the situation in Russia. And a thought comes to me with such force that I wish to express it to you. Who could deal with the multitude over there like the Honorable Theodore Roosevelt?" Further, in Russia, Roosevelt would be of "a thousand times more value to us than leading an Army in France. H. M. Robertson to Wilson, 8 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Reel 195/64B/42336.


32. House to Wilson, 10 April 1917, Box 87/92118-9.

33. Jessup, 1:


37. Ibid., 2:47. Daniels reported that Wilson responded with his theme that questions of party should not enter into the question. This was, of course, not what Daniels was concerned with.


43. Daniels, *Wilson Era*, 1:437


45. House to Wilson, 10 April 1917, Wilson MSS, Box 87/92118-9.


51. Ibid.

52. House to Wilson, 20 April 1917, Wilson MSS, Box 87/92466-7.
53. Wilson to Lansing, 19 April 1917, Lansing Papers, p. 327. This was probably Frederick William Lehman who would appear to have been Gompers first replacement. He had some political and financial connections with the Wilson Administration, had been born in Germany, and was very probably Jewish. Due to this latter factor he was probably "uninvited." Daniels mentions Lehman's inclusion in Wilson Era, 2:58.


55. James Duncan to Wilson, 7 May 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/4524½/0641.

56. House to Wilson, 20 April 1917, Wilson MSS, Box 87/92466-7.

57. Lansing to Wilson, 19 April 1917, Wilson MSS, Reel 383/5A/476. Lansing claimed that he did not understand what Choate's friends meant by this.

58. William Kent (U.S. Tariff Commissioner) to Wilson, 3 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Box 87/92729; Senator Paul O. Husting to Wilson, Wilson MSS, Box 87/92920-22, 9 May 1917.

59. Root to Lansing, 3 May 1917, State Department Records 763.72/4524½.

60. Lansing to Wilson, 7 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Reel 383/5A/534-6, including Polk's memo on 535-6; Walling to Wilson, 10 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Box 87/92954.

61. A. M. Simons to Senator Husting, 3 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Box 87/92923.

no rights that large ones were bound to respect, and a nation could opt for war instead of arbitration and "still suffer nothing in the estimation of mankind."


64. Lansing to Wilson, 3 May 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/4525.

65. A. M. Simons to Senator Husting, 4 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Box 87/92923.

66. Wilson to Creel, 14 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Reel 195/64B/42356; Creel to Wilson, 10 May 1917, Reel 195/64B/42399.

67. Kennan, 1:48. Kennan points out that Bullard did not care for the "limelight". It is thus open to question whether he would have accepted a position with the Root Mission. He did, however, accept the position of propaganda director in Petrograd. Washburn also appears to have been a good choice but need not have preempted Bullard.


69. Root to Lansing, 3 May 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/4524½.

70. Lansing to Wilson, 3 May 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/4524½.


73. Lansing to Wilson, 30 April 1917, Wilson MSS, Box 87/92680-1.

75. House to Wilson, 2 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Box 87/92728.

76. Lansing to Wilson, 3 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Box 87/92782.

77. Ibid.

78. Reuben Fink to Tumulty, 26 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Reel 195/64B/42367.

79. Tumulty to Wilson, 30 May 1917; Judge Aron Levy to Tumulty, 29 May 1917, both Wilson MSS, Reel 195/64B/42367.


81. Eliot Wadsworth to Wilson, 7 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Reel 195/64B/42331.

82. Samuel R. Bertron to William Phillips (Third Assistant Secretary of State), 8 May 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/5143/0004-5.

83. I have found nothing relating to the reason for Root's objection and do not feel qualified to speculate on it. Root had been a member of the International Relief Board of the Red Cross, Jessup, 2:314.

84. State Department Records, 763.72, passim.

85. McAdoo to Wilson, 17 April 1917, Wilson MSS, Box 87/92368.

86. Jessup, 2:38. General Scott did, however, accompany the American Army to France after the completion of the Root Mission.

87. Daniels to Wilson, 10 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Box 87/92368.

88. Ibid. Daniels told the President that Glennon had been picked because a senior Admiral could not be named "in view of the high rank of the army commissioner." This was not to demean Glennon in any way. Daniels held him in the highest admiration.
89. *Kennan*, 1:41.


92. Washburn had apparently been ill and for some week Mr. Willoughby Smith, who had been recommended by Ambassador Francis, appeared to have the position. An unknown Mr. Burr was also in contention for this position but he was charged with pro-German sympathies by the Provisional Government and appears to have been forced to leave Russia. I can find no references to this episode other than Lansing to Washburn, 12 May 1917 and 21 May 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/4617 and 4856h respectively and Francis to Lansing, 20 June 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/5452.

93. The best source of information on Basil Miles is George Kennan's *Russia Leaves the War*.

94. Lansing to Francis, 14 May 1917, 16 May 1917, and 22 May 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/4609, 4697, and 4792 respectively.


Chapter III


3. Ibid., 3 May 1917, 7:1,2,3.

4. Ibid., 4 May 1917, C7:3,4; Warth, p. 99.

5. Wise to Wilson, 24 April 1917, Wilson MSS, Box 87/192532-4.

6. In fact, though unfortunately, this might well have been an advantage if it was significant at all.


8. Lansing to Wilson, 28 April 1917, Wilson MSS, Reel 195/64B/42307.


10. Ibid., 2 May 1917, 9:4.


13. See The New York Times, 3 May 1917, 14:1 for an editorial attacking these papers and the threats of the disloyal socialists.

14. Ibid., 28 April 1917, 2:3.

15. I have found no record of a direct counter-attack by the Administration at this time.

16. The New York Times, 18 May 1917, 6:5, quoting the

17. Ibid., 19 May 1917, 3:4-6.

18. Ibid., 16 May 1917, 2:8.

19. Ibid., 4 May 1917, 7:3-4. Wallings charges, which appear in full form in the Boston Globe of May 3, were striking in nature. He noted that at one point Hillquit and Berger had been suggested as
possible members of the Root Mission. Walling responded to this idea by asking "Why not ask Bernstorff (the German Foreign Minister) to represent us?" A copy of this article can be found in State Department Records, 763.72/4524½.

22. Ibid., 10 May 1917, 8:4.
23. Ibid., 20 May 1917, II, 2:2
27. Lansing to Wilson, 7 May 1917, Lansing Papers, 2:329.
29. Root's biographer, Philip C. Jessup, suggests that Lansing's response regarding the Railroad Commission caused Root to suspect that Wilson didn't consider the Root Mission to be of much importance. Jessup, 2:359.
30. Flint, p. 234
31. Ibid.
35. Root to Lansing, 3 May 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/4524½/0097-8. Further, someone, probably Francis, cabled Washington to point out that some of the Russian refugees returning from America were planning to attack Root upon his arrival in Vladivostok and use Pouren and Rudewitz as their primary weapons. Root did not see this cable which didn't reach Washington until June 9. Unsigned cable to Lansing, Received 9 June 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/5239/0343.


37. Jessup, 2:360

38. Ibid.

39. The content of Harper's briefing is unknown. It probably consisted of his original interpretation modified by Francis' cables and various newspaper reports and was thus undoubtedly less optimistic than his view of March, 1917.

40. Root to Lansing, 18 May 1917; State Department Records, 763.72/4749.

41. The Long, Root MSS.

42. Ibid.


44. This phrase was that adopted by the Zimmerwald Conference of 1915. Which was a conference for European Internationalists opposed to the war. Austin Van Der Slice. International Labor, Diplomacy and Peace: 1914-1919. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1941.).

45. Liebman, p. 147.


48. The Provisional Government, despite its public concessions to the socialist viewpoint, was itself committed to an offensive, as was a majority of the Soviet if only to gain a stronger position with the allies after the war. *Ibid.*, 149-50.

49. The "Executive Committee" appears, from Duncan's account to have been a committee made up of various groups, including, but not confined to, the Vladivostok Soviet. James Duncan, "Labor Features: Russian Revolution 1917." *The Address of Convention at Buffalo, New York.* (Publisher unknown, 1917).

50. The Log, Root MSS.


Chapter IV

1. The Log, Root MSS.

2. It is probable that there were some objections to the fact that the American Mission was using the Tsar's train, although I have found no documentary evidence it. The Americans use of the train was, however, most probably unwise from a public relations standpoint.

3. Root to Lansing, 5 June 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/5234/0111.

4. The Log, Root MSS.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.


9. The Log of the Mission dates the American arrival as June 12; all other sources, including the Report of the Root Mission, date their arrival as June 13.


11. See particularly, Francis to Lansing, 18 March 1917, U.S.F.R., 1918: Russia., p. 5. The major incidents of violence had been confined to the March Revolution, the demonstrations against Milyukov and Guchkov and the July revolt of the Bolsheviks.

12. Dmitri Fedotoff-White, Survival Through War and Revolution in Russia, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1939), p. 138. Fedotoff-White characterizes all references prior to page 141 as having been taken directly from his diary. All material presented thereafter was written after the fact. Many of Fedotoff-White's characterizations of Root Mission members are extremely critical because, according to their author, he did not understand American behavior at the time. Many of these descriptions are
presented here in order to give some type of insight into people about whom little was written. They represent only White's opinion in 1917.

13. The Log, Root MSS.


15. Ibid.


17. Fedotoff-White, p. 144.

18. Ibid., p. 146.


20. Again, this fact appears to have had a profound and misleading impact on most American observers.

21. The Log, Root MSS.

22. Ibid. Ambassador Buchanan did not record this meeting in his memoirs.

23. Ibid.


26. Ibid.

27. The New York Times, 19 June 1917, 2:4. The reporter was not identified by the Times. Herbert Bailey was mentioned as being in Petrograd for the Times during this period. The President received a copy of this article on May 21. Tumulty to Wilson, 21 May 1917, Box 88/3/93271-9.


29. See infra, p. 92.
30. N. Gordon Levin's, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: American Responses to War and Revolution provides an excellent analysis of the almost blind optimism of President Wilson and some members of his administration, particularly Colonel House, in regards to Russia. Many months after the November Revolution, House was still convinced that the Bolsheviks were a temporary phenomenon and that the "liberal-nationalist" forces would regain power in Russia. Wilson appears to have shared this view.

31. The Log, Root MSS; Mott, p. 203.


33. Fedotoff-White, p. 144. This appraisal appears to have been exaggerated. Root, Dr. Mott, Russell, Duncan, and Bertron seem to have been very concerned but still optimistic. General Scott was pessimistic (see infra, p. 111). The views of McCormick, Crane, and Admiral Glennon are unknown at this point in time.


36. Charles Edward Russell MSS, The Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. (hereinafter Russell MSS). Russell made several notebooks or "diaries" of his activities while in Russia which may be found in Container #8. (Hereinafter, "Russian notebooks, Russell MSS").
37. The Log, Root MSS.


39. I have been unable to locate private papers of either Mr. McCormick or Mr. Bertron.

40. McAdoo to Wilson, 16 May 1917, McAdoo to Francis, 17 May 1917, both Wilson MSS, Box 88/93130-3.

41. The Report, Root MSS, Container #28. The appended report on Russia's financial needs was not reprinted in the U.S.F.R. series.

42. Fedotoff-White, p.p. 139-40.

43. The Report, Root MSS; *U.S.F.R., 1918: Russia*, 1:146. Bertron was one of the contributors to the $30,000 which the Root Mission used to begin their short-lived publicity campaign. The Log, Root MSS.

44. Fedotoff-White, p. 140.

45. The Long, Root MSS. The Log makes little mention of either Bertron or McCormick. It is nevertheless implied by this document that Bertron spent much of his time assisting Root and working on publicity matters.


47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., p. 21

49. Interview with Mr. Peter Martin, Director, Institute of Current World Affairs, Hanover, New Hampshire, November, 1979.

50. Parry, p. 28.

51. Senator LaFollette contended that he had sent Steffens to expose the Root Mission. Both Parry and Steffens contend that it was Crane who asked Steffens to go at a chance meeting shortly before Crane's departure. Lafollette's contention appeared in *The New York Times*, 21 April 1917, 1:4.


53. *The New York Times*, 21 April 1917, 2:1; Daniels, *Diary*, p. 57. At a cabinet meeting somewhat prior to the selection of Ambassador Root the President told cabinet members that Crane "knew well the leading spirits and said they were men of ability, and had the confidence of Russia." Taken in its context this statement implied that Wilson had tremendous confidence in Crane's knowledge of Russia and that he was one, if not the man upon whom the President relied for an understanding of that nation.

54. The Log, Root MSS.


56. Fedotoff-White, p. 140.

57. Steffens, *Autobiography*, p. 764. I have found no such cables from Crane, Francis, or Kerensky which make this specific point. There are to may knowledge no cable from Crane to Wilson or Lansing after May and understandably no cables from Kerensky at all.

58. Ibid., p. 765.

59. Ibid., p.p. 770-772. The letters from Crane and Francis are not included in the Woodrow Wilson MSS or in may knowledge any other source.

60. Daniels, *Diary*, p. 57


Note: the frame number in footnote number 63 is an approximation. All other information pertaining to this note is exact.
Chapter V


6. Mott Appendix, Root MSS, p. 3.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.


12. Ibid. According to Mathews the Y.M.C.A. had been highly successful in Britain and France working with both the regular armies and in prison camps. Mathews, p. 248.

13. Fisher, p. 158. I do not have a copy of this letter, nor know to whom it was sent. Fisher dates it as June 27, 1917.

14. It was very unfortunate that the Orthodox Church had apparently been closely connected, through his appointments of Bishops, with Rasputin. This undoubtedly tainted the Church and in all probability caused it to lose favor with the masses. Charles Crane to Richard Crance, 14 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Reel 383/5A/544.

15. This is another example of the inability of most members of the Root Mission to reach the masses, usually because they were not given the opportunity.

17. Fedotoff-White, p. 139.


19. Ibid.


21. Andrews to Lansing, 7 July 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/6109. Andrews was not informed of the impending arrival of the Scott party until the evening before its arrival. He was obviously taken by surprise by this visit and so noted in his cable.


27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., p. 2.

29. Ibid., p. 3.

30. The Log, Root MSS.


32. Ibid., p. 149.

33. Glennon Report, Russell MSS, Container #36; Fedotoff-White, p. 150.

34. Fedotoff-White, p. 154.

35. Liebman, p. 205.

37. Fedotoff-White, p. 158.
38. Ibid., p. 160.
40. Ibid., p. 164.
Chapter VI

1. Fedotoff-White, p. 139.


5. Ibid., p. 31.

6. The Stockhold Conference was an international meeting of socialists, predominantly of the anti-war factions, and generally considered a forum for the "internationalists". The majority of Allied governments, including the United States, opposed the Stockholm Conference fearing that it would hinder efforts to insure the defeat of Germany. See particularly Van Der Slie, passim.


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. James Duncan, a labor leader of some prominence appears to have been surprisingly naive both from the test of his message to the American Federation of Labor Convention of 1917 and form the texts of his Russian speeches. Did he really understand what he was observing or know anything about Marxism? Unfortunately, I have found nothing more on him.

15. Fedotoff-White, p. 139.

16. Russell, Bare Hands, p. 351. This reference is the only documentary evidence of this incident. Interestingly, Russell thought Trotsky was more likeable than Lenin. The American socialist
found the latter to be an "obstinate fanatic, bent upon making trouble." Trotsky was to Russell, "more likeable ... more human, wiser." (p. 351.) J. P. Morgan and Company had numerous holdings in Russia, including McCormick's International Harvester Company and Frank Corse's New York Life Insurance Company. There is no evidence that Russell had any connection with these companies or any other Morgan interests. In America he was known as an avowed enemy of many capitalist practices, if not the entire economic system. Nevertheless, his appearance in the same mission as McCormick, Root, Bertron, and probably Crane could easily be used to demonstrate Trotsky's contentions to the uniformed. American business interests in Russia had become extensive by 1917. This was particularly due to competition between the "House of Morgan" and the rival "partnership" of Jacob Schiff and Edward H. Harriman. For an account of these American interests and this rivalry see Williams, p.p. 23-85.

17. Fedotoff-White, p. 139.

18. Fedotoff-White does not reveal the indentity of Russell's companions and there is no other mention of the subject. I suspect that these "long-haired individuals" were some of the American journalists like Lincoln Steffens, William Shepperd, and Arno Dosch-Fleurot.

19. Russian notebooks, Russell MSS.

20. Lansing to Francis, 30 June 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/5634.

21. Robert Crozier Long, an American journalist stationed in Russia during this period, reported that Russell was "put off" several times in his attempts to speak to the Soviet. Long contends that it was only as a favor to several of the American journalists that Russell was allowed to speak at all. Russell makes no mention of this problem. Robert Crozier Long, Russian Revolution Aspects, (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1919).


25. Ibid., p. 19.
26. Ibid., p. 31.
27. Ibid., p.p. 21-30.
28. Ibid., p. 31.
29. Ibid., p. 40.
30. Ibid., p.p. 36-7.
31. Ibid., p. 38.
32. Ibid.
34. Francis to Lansing, 30 June 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/5634.
35. Ibid.
36. Polk to Francis, 7 July 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/5634.
37. Russell, Russia Unchained, p. 38.

Note: the frame number in footnotes #20, 34, and 36 are approximations. All other information pertaining to these notes is exact.
Chapter VII

1. Miles to Summers, 18 June 1917, "postscript," State Department Records, 763.72/74871/0043.

2. Root, America's Message.


4. *Izvestia Moscovskavo Soveta Rabotchich Deputatov*, 10 June 1917, translation, State Department Records, 763/6154/0276. Date is Russian (Gregorian calendar), American date (Julian calendar) is 23 June 1917.


6. The Log, Root MSS.

7. Ibid.


9. The Log, Root MSS. Procurator Lvov was a formal member of the Provisional Government.

10. The Log, Root MSS. Pauline Crosley, wife of American Walter S. Crosley, reported that soldiers were blocking many of the streets on this day and machine-gun fire could be heard in Petrograd. Mrs. Crosley believed that the Root Mission had had a restraining effect on the populace. This had begun to fade after July 1. That the Americans had such an effect is questionable. The situation in Petrograd did become more volatile around July 1 and continued to decline until the Bolshevik revolt in mid-July. Pauline Crosley, *Intimate Letters from Petrograd* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1920.), p.p. 73, 80, 113, 130-1.

11. The Log, Root MSS.

12. Ibid.


16. Russell, Bare Hands, p. 370.

17. The Log, Root MSS.

18. Surprisingly most Root Mission sources, including Mott, Russell notebooks, The Log, and the Report make little or no mention of this deceive Bolshevik success.


20. The Log, Root MSS.

21. Francis to Lansing, 8 July 1917, Lansing to Francis, 10 July 1917, U.S.F.R., Russia 1918, 3:11.

22. Lansing to Wilson, 25 June 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/5462/0492-4; Mott, p. 208.

23. Lansing to Wilson, 25 June 1917, State Department Records 763.72/5462/0492-4. Lansing suggested that Smith be hired for the job of "publicity man Petrograd" due to Washburn's "sickness." There are no other references to Washburn being ill and I have no response from the President. Obviously Lansing was considering the possibility. After a long wait in Petrograd, Smith simply returned to Peking when he failed to receive word from Washington.

24. Frank Polk to Bertron, Received 7 July 1917, U.S.F.R., Russia 1918, 1:129.

25. Mott, p. 208

26. Ibid.

27. Russell, Bare Hands, p. 358

28. Ibid., p. 360.

31. Of course Root's statement may well have been a mere formality and though the internal situation had worsened, due to the machinations of the Bolsheviks, this was hardly the fault of the Root Mission. It might well be seen as a problem that was aided and abetted by the failure of the Allies to state their war aims and peace terms which again played directly into the hands of the Bolsheviks. The muzzling of the Root Mission on these crucial issues again may well have caused many of the non-Bolshevik but anti-war Russians to view the Americans as simply friends of the Provisional Government and of American economic interests. While these facts were undoubtedly true of most, if not all, of the members of the Root Mission it is clear that several members, including Root, Russell, and Crane, knew that a clear delineation of the war aims of America and undoubtedly the other Allies was a practical necessity. See N. N. Sukhanov, *The Russian Revolution 1917: Eyewitness Account.* 2 Volumes. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962.) 2:424-482 for an excellent account of the June Days and his participation in them.


34. "To Billing," unsigned, 21 July 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/7487/0002-5. This note was found among documents conveyed to the Solicitor of the Department of State by a Thomas McKinnon on 20 September 1917.


36. It is highly probable that the Mission's members learned of the outcome of the uprising when they arrived in Seattle on August 3. It is indeed
possible that the Root Mission left Russia to avoid being caught up in the impending crisis. This might be inferred from Russell's statements, supra, Notes 27 and 28.

37. The Log, Root MSS.
Chapter VIII


4. Root to Lansing, 6 August 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/7553/0127.


8. *Ibid*.


10. Wilson to John R. Mott, 22 August 1917, Wilson MSS, Reel 151/43/301. Dr. Mott's memo was not included with this and I have been unable to find it elsewhere.

11. Frank Polk to Francis, 27 July 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/6193a/0419-20. Polk promised to send one million cards and more if necessary. Francis cabled a request for one and a half million which was presumably granted. Francis to Polk, 4 August 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/6193a/0425.

12. Baker, 7:233 only notes that Colonel Mott met with the President.

13. Baker, 7:233. Baker says that the President's message was received with "enthusiastic cheers." Obviously Colonel Mott's visit may have "inspired" the telegram.


18. Ibid., 354-6.; Kennan, 1:50-53, 258-60.


22. Ibid., 7 September 1917, 3:3.

23. Ibid., 15 September 1917, 1:1.

24. Ibid., 16 September 1917, I, 1:1.

25. See supra, p. 125.


27. Ibid., p. 192. Mott contends that the Missions' members turned to Root for "comfort and advice."

28. Russell, Bare Hands, p. 370.

29. Daniels, War Era, p. 60.


32. Ibid., p. 367-8; Mott p. 209; Warth, p. 106.

33. Mott, p. 192.

34. Creel, How We Advertised America, p. 352.

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