The origin of integration in Virginia's public schools: a narrative history from 1951-1959

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The Origin of Integration in Virginia's Public Schools:
A Narrative History from 1951 to 1959

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A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of the University of Richmond
in Candidacy
for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
in
History

August, 1991
Richmond, Virginia

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I certify that I have read this thesis and find that, in scope and quality, it satisfies the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts/Science.

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Thesis for Masters degree  
University of Richmond  
1991  
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This thesis traces the origins of integration in Virginia’s public schools from a strike for equal facilities by black students in Prince Edward County in 1951 to Governor Almond’s capitulation of the resistance movement in 1959. The 1951 student strike became a law suit challenging the constitutionality of Virginia’s segregation laws. It was one of four cases heard collectively before the United States Supreme Court in 1954 as Brown v. Board of Education. Virginia resisted the Court’s decision until 1959.

The thesis relied upon newspaper accounts and personal interviews. It concluded that a fear of amalgamation of the races and a lack of support for education were principal causes for the resistance movement.
For Carolyn
and
for my poor students who taught me how to teach
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my gratitude to a few individuals and institutions who have been of particular assistance in preparing these pages: Dr. Barry Westin for directing the work herein and also for his patience and concern; my brother Butch for rescuing me from a note pad and pen with the gift of a computer; my wife Carolyn, who I can not thank enough for doing things I should have done so that I might have time to complete this, taking pictures, correcting my grammar, and listening without complaint; my friend Wayne Russell at the *Amelia Bulletin Monitor*, who made the pictures camera ready for the printer; the staff at the University of Richmond’s Boatwright Memorial Library, who have always managed to smile when asked for help; and Longwood College, whose library may be the only one in the world to have *The Farmville Herald* on microfilm.
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... a long habit of thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial appearance of being right, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defense of custom. But the tumult soon subsides. Time makes more converts than reason.

—Thomas Paine
INTRODUCTION

In 1954 the United States Supreme Court heard the school segregation case Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas. The unanimous decision, delivered by Chief Justice Earl Warren, overturned the Plessy v. Ferguson doctrine of "separate but equal." This one decision was to have a greater impact on Virginia’s public education than any event since Reconstruction.

To read Brown as a case concerned only with the racial integration of public schools is to read Brown too narrowly. True, the case did not consider issues of race beyond the field of education, but its impact reached further. The integration of public schools was a furthering of American democracy in much the same way as the nineteenth amendment had been in extending the vote to women. It provided an opportunity for greater participation in and benefit from American society.

A great deal has been made of Virginia’s resistance to integration. Virtually all of the Commonwealth’s policy makers have been assailed for the roles they played. The criticism was inescapable. The position they felt obliged to adopt was untenable and most of them knew it. How much time was necessary to implement the Brown decision? The question has been around as long as the decision has. The answer is unknowable. One suspects impatient integrationists and foot dragging segregationists have both overstated their cases. Ultimately, integration occurred when it could no longer be lawfully avoided.

The Brown decision brought an immediate response from the Old Dominion.
Outraged whites moved quickly to resist the court order. For five years, Virginia’s leaders exhausted every legal avenue of resistance available to them. In the end, it was Governor Lindsay Almond who had the lonely task of standing before a special session of the General Assembly asking it to end the state’s resistance.

The integrationists had won. Democracy had increased. The legal system had prevailed, and violence of any real significance had been avoided. The Almond administration had led the state through some of its most trying years, an accomplishment little appreciated by either side.

Earl Warren opened an era in 1954; Lindsay Almond closed that era in 1959. However, no era has ever existed in a vacuum. The Brown decision was only one of four concurrent cases. All of these cases had roots in the past and limbs which extended into the following decades. This is the story of one of those cases lumped under Brown, the one which originated in Prince Edward County, Virginia.

The struggle to integrate the state’s schools began in Virginia’s rural southside in 1951. Specifically, it began in Prince Edward County in the politically powerful Fourth Congressional District. This district, which possessed more blacks, more white segregationists, and more of the state’s legislators than any other, led the state in resistance to integration. While support for the resistance movement was found throughout the state, no area ever matched the Fourth District’s intense commitment to segregation.

Prince Edward County was the site of a student strike in 1951. Black high school students struck for facilities equal to those of white students, a simple demand, but the case was not to remain so simple. Lawyers for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) agreed to represent the striking students if the suit were modified to challenge the constitutionality of Virginia’s segregation laws. The students agreed.

Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward was entered in Richmond’s United States District Court in 1952. The county won; state law prevailed. It was, according to the court, the conduct of the county in failing to provide equal facilities and
not the law which needed to be corrected. The county could not have expected a more favorable ruling. Indeed, they were aware of their neglect and had begun efforts to correct the situation. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs persisted. The Prince Edward case would eventually be heard in the United States Supreme Court where it was combined with similar cases and became known collectively as Brown v. Board of Education. However, in 1952 Brown was two years and a little more than two-hundred miles away in Washington, D.C.
CHAPTER 1
A CHILD SHALL LEAD THEM

The trouble began at Farmville’s old R.R. Moton High School. On 23 April 1951, 450 black students walked out of their overcrowded brick school. Four days later, Prince Edward County’s bi-weekly newspaper, The Farmville Herald, registered the county’s shock.

In view of the era, a period when southern newspapers typically relegated news of its black citizens to a few column inches somewhere inside, often under a generic header of “Colored News,” a headline was in itself a bit of news. On 27 April 1951, The Farmville Herald ran news of the strike under a front page headline: “Moton Students Claims Unjustified Board Feels Now.”

If the Prince Edward County School Board had ever felt the Moton students’ claims were justified, it was impossible to tell. The story made no mention of any previous position. The students’ claims were easier to understand.

At the heart of the Moton students’ complaints was the lack of equality between black and white school facilities. No one claimed the facilities were equal. The naked eye refused such an argument. Three tar paper shacks sat at the back of R.R. Moton High School to cater to the overflow of students. The school for the white children needed no tar paper shacks.

With the student walkout four days old, The Farmville Herald told a stunned Southside community “the [school] board considers the action [strike] particularly unfortunate and ill directed now in view of the present negotiations for a site for the proposed new high school.”
That secret, the search for a new high school site, had been kept nearly as well as the Moton students’ intent to strike. It must have been an easy secret to keep. The Farmville Herald, the community’s only paper, habitually neglected to report the business of the school board. There is nothing to suggest the school board wanted its business reported. They were well aware the tar paper shacks could not be used indefinitely. They were equally aware any solution would require financing and white voters had given them little reason to think they were anxious to foot such a bill.

There is no reason to suspect the Moton students might have known the internal politics of the school board. The promise of a new facility had been made as early as 1947, when M. Boyd Jones, R.R. Moton’s Principal came to Farmville.

I was told by the Division Superintendent that he had available at that time $490,000 with which to renovate an old building they had there that they were going to use for the Negro high school. That fell through for one reason or another - I don’t know what happened.

One of Jones’ teachers had an idea what happened. According to Connie Rawlings, who taught Social Studies at the black high school, “the people paying the most taxes resented paying for blacks and poor whites.”

The Farmville Herald struggled to make sense of the strike news. A twenty member “strike” committee met with School Superintendent T. J. McIlwaine. The paper failed to identify them just as it failed to discover the strike leaders. The Superintendent suggested the strike “should be considered a breach of discipline which should be met by measures on the part of the Principal and faculty there.” On the editorial page, The Farmville Herald lent its support to Superintendent McIlwaine. It was, the paper assured readers, an “ill-advised tactic of immature youth and should be so considered.” If no one was available to blame, and apparently no names had availed themselves by deadline, something must be blamed, the magnitude of the story demanded it. The Farmville Herald blamed discipline, or as they saw it, the lack of it, “at home, church and school.” The emphasis fell on “school” by virtue of its position in the sentence. But lest one miss the hook, a broad net was cast blaming the entire “present system of education.”

The first of May marked the ninth day of the “ill advised tactic.” Without students, neither Superintendent McIlwaine’s principal nor his faculty could administer discipline.
Indeed the problem did appear to be discipline, though not in the way T.J. McIlwaine had imagined it. The students, by all appearances, were quite disciplined. Not a single student had abandoned the strike. This discipline, this highly organized action, was puzzling. It was difficult enough to imagine teenagers of any race leading a strike. These were the grandchildren of slaves, they were in some instances the children of the poor and ignorant. The Farmville Herald sought another answer.

There was much to be learned. However, the news, like the people, was segregated and consequently difficult to know. The teachers and principal of R.R. Moton maintained regular hours without their students. Doubtless they produced an amusing picture though little in the way of hard news. The better story, the paper reasoned, and also the more difficult story to obtain, was a stone’s throw from The Farmville Herald office, at the Beulah African Methodist Episcopal Church on the corner of South Main and Fourth Streets. The students, the paper reported, held a meeting there on Monday morning, the last day of April. Unfortunately for The Farmville Herald the meeting had been closed to the press.

In the absence of substantial news, The Farmville Herald developed a plausible theory on the editorial page. “The so called ‘student strike,’ the paper wrote, ‘appears to have an outside stimulus.’” Indeed the strike was sophisticated, its objective was clear, it was well organized, and the students were remarkably united. Surely an adult must have instigated the strike. What The Farmville Herald would not accept, however, the Richmond dailies had already suggested; the strike was to eliminate segregation. “We do not believe this has any foundation in fact.” On both counts, The Farmville Herald was mistaken.

Rows of Empty Seats

The “outside stimulus” The Farmville Herald sought to blame for the student strike did not exist. The NAACP did not suggest, initiate, sanction, or encourage the strike. Nor, for that matter, did a sanctimonious North. And both were often suspect.

Black students found much that provoked them. The difference between their inadequate little school, R.R. Moton at the intersection of Ely and South Main Street,
The Farmville Herald, the bi-weekly newspaper into whose lap fell the story of integration.
and the large single unit whites enjoyed uptown at Farmville High were glaring.\textsuperscript{22}

J. Samuel Williams was senior class president at R.R. Moton High School in 1951. Thirty nine years later he remembered,

Several of us were dissatisfied. The white school was one large single unit. Our athletic field had no lights, our school was over crowded. Three tar paper shacks were on the same lot as the school. They (the shacks) had pot belly stoves to keep warm. We had no gym or showers. We would play football in the mud, change our clothes and go home dirty to wash. We lacked a lot of basic things.\textsuperscript{23}

Indeed, they did lack a lot of basic things, but to suggest, as \textit{The Farmville Herald} was doing, that one of the basics they lacked was leadership, was absurd. M. Boyd Jones was a qualified and determined principal. He brought to Farmville an undergraduate degree from Hampton Institute and a Masters degree in Education from Cornell.\textsuperscript{24}

Students and faculty alike have described Jones as a "strong disciplinarian."\textsuperscript{25} Samuel Williams recalled Jones as a "very, very serious man," a man for whom "every moment counted and should count for something. When he came out of the office," Williams said, "people flew."\textsuperscript{26} A former teacher at Moton High, Connie Rawlings remembered Boyd Jones as a "terrific principal, one of the best." He was a "nice man," a "very positive man," and a "very professional man."\textsuperscript{27}

Jones was also a man frustrated by what the black community called the "white power structure," meaning the various branches of the county government, in this instance the school board. Jones and his close friends, Reverend L. Francis Griffin and County Agricultural Agent John Lancaster, worked closely with the black Parent Teacher Association to secure a firm commitment from the board for a new school. When the school board's appointed committee failed to show progress in locating a site for the black school, Griffin and Lancaster, on behalf of the PTA, found a suitable three-acre lot south of town. The land was available for $8,000. Six months later they were told the site had been approved - provided a price could be agreed upon.\textsuperscript{28}

A number of Moton's students watched the PTA's efforts to improve their school.\textsuperscript{29} The students, no doubt, shared their parents frustration. Frustration proved to be the first element in a chemistry lesson no one intended to teach. It was mixed with
The old R.R. Moton High School where Barbara Johns began a strike that ultimately led to the integration of Virginia’s public schools.

Farmville High, the large white facility envied by the striking students of R.R. Moton.
an impetus found in large quantities among Moton’s student leaders. Virginia’s public education system was about to be challenged as it had never been challenged before.

Five students, “‘special people,’” Connie Rawlings would later call them, met to discuss their dissatisfaction with Moton High. Samuel Williams, John Stokes, Carrie Stokes, Barbara Johns, and John Watson watched the progress of the PTA in securing better facilities for their school and made their own plans. They watched and planned in secret. They made placards and plotted their steps. They went undetected by their teachers and principal; a feat made possible, according to Samuel Williams, by “‘an almost inate ability among blacks since slave days.’” According to Williams, blacks have “‘always had their own vehicles of communication, an ability to talk in a circle of white people’” with “‘catch phrases’” and “‘not be detected.’” But these were not white people. It would be easy to keep secrets from whites in a segregated society. These were their people, their parents, their principal, their teachers; and somehow they kept the secret from them.

By the spring of 1951 a student strike for facilities equal to those of the white students at Farmville High was in the making. On the twenty-third of April it came to pass. Connie Rawlings remembered, “‘Boyd Jones received an anonymous phone call that someone was skipping school and about to leave on a Greyhound Bus from downtown. He left school to stop it. While Jones was gone, a note was passed to teachers calling for an assembly.’” The only thing unusual, the only clue Connie Rawlings had that something was about to happen, was the note. “‘Jones usually rang a bell for an assembly.’” This time there was no bell.

After the students had been seated, the curtain to the auditorium stage was drawn. The president of the student council John Stokes was at the lectern. The students announced their intent to strike and asked the teachers to leave the auditorium. Amazingly, they complied. Connie Rawlings left the auditorium with the rest of the teachers. “‘As we left the assembly, we saw the principal coming in from the bus station. The phone call was a hoax. We told him about the strike and told him we would go to classes if anyone wanted to be taught.’” Jones wanted the students to be taught. He rushed into the auditorium and frantically did his best to disuade the students from their strike. The students did want to be taught, but not that morning, not until they obtained a facility equal to Farmville High.
The student leaders worked into the afternoon. Barbara Johns and Carrie Stokes called on the minister of Farmville’s First Baptist Church, the Reverend L. Francis Griffin, for the names and addresses of the NAACP’s special counsel for the southeastern region of the United States. The names the children received were those of Oliver Hill, Spottswood Robinson, and Lester Banks, all of Richmond. According to Richard Kluger in his history of the Brown case, Simple Justice, the children appealed for help.

Gentlemen:
We hate to impose as we are doing, but under the circumstances that we are facing, we have to ask for your help.

Due to the fact that the facilities and building in the name of Robert R. Moton High School, are inadequate, we understand that help is available to us. This morning, April 23, 1951 the students refused to attend classes under the circumstances. You know that this is a very serious matter because we are out of school, there are seniors to be graduated and it can’t be done staying at home. Please we beg you to come down at the first of this week. If possible Wednesday, April 25 between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. We will provide a place for you to stay. We will go into detail when you arrive.

The letter was signed by Barbara Johns and Carrie Stokes.

Day turned to night and night became morning and teachers reported to their classrooms. They faced rows of empty seats. It was, according to Connie Rawlings, both “fascinating and amusing. Every time a bus went by we went to the windows to see if anyone was coming to school. We attended meetings all day. We made lesson plans months ahead. Poor Mr. Jones got no support from downtown.”

The children had found no more support downtown than had their unfortunate principal. They sought a meeting with school board chairman M.R. Large. The meeting was denied. They sought and received an audience with superintendent of schools, T.J. McIlwaine. The meeting solved nothing. Both the children and the superintendent left disgusted. However, support was coming. On the second day, parents, about twenty of them according to Boyd Jones, met secretly to help the students. For reasons of safety their identities have been kept secret to all but a select few of Prince Edwards’s black community. There was good reason for the secrecy. Francis Griffin’s support for the students was open and obvious from day
Monument to Rev. L. Francis Griffin, Sr. on the lawn of the old R.R. Moton High School.
one; as a result he suffered horribly. Griffin had a heart condition, no doubt aggravated by the strike and the slights of merchants and townspeople who refused his family the goods, services, and credit they were normally accorded. However, to Connie Rawlings and others who worshiped at his church, Griffin was "fearless." On the third day of the strike, busloads of students passed Moton High on their way to the First Baptist Church. How school buses became available to take students anywhere other than school has remained a mystery or more likely a well kept secret, one for which Boyd Jones would pay dearly. But on that day the buses rolled past Moton High. The students were enroute to see Spottswood Robinson and Oliver Hill. The lawyers discouraged the strike. The students were unmoved. They would not return to their classrooms until a new school had been built. Equal facilities did not interest Robinson and Hill; an end to segregation did. The students progress had again been halted. Nothing short of an attack on segregation would persuade the lawyers to perform. It was a steep price. The students went home to think it over. The fourth day of the strike ended at the high school with a meeting of parents and students, all totaled about a 1,000 people. Court dates prevented Robinson and Hill from attending, but the NAACP executive secretary for Virginia, Lester Banks, was there and held sway over the crowd. By the time Banks had finished speaking, there was little resistance to the desegregation plan. On 5 May a mass meeting was held at the First Baptist Church to ratify the plan to desegregate. The lawyers were empowered by consensus. The Farmville Herald covered the mass meeting. At last a student leader was about get her name in the paper. Barbara Johns pointed out the inadequacies of her school for the local press - no gym, no cafeteria, temperatures both very hot then very cold in the temporary rooms, only four water fountains for 450 students, and two of those fountains did not work. By acknowledging the role of Barbara Johns in the student walk out, was the paper backing off their "outside stimulus" theory? Hardly. For natives there was a message between the lines, a subtle argument for The Farmville Herald's theory.

Barbara Johns' uncle, Vernon Johns, was well known in the county. He had succeeded Francis Griffin's father as minister at the First Baptist Church, which had the largest black congregation in the county. Vernon Johns had been born in 1892.
Rev. Griffin's First Baptist Church of Farmville was the locus of many strategy sessions for the striking students and their parents.
in the Dalton Heights area of Prince Edward County. He was educated at Virginia Union University in Richmond, Virginia, Oberlin College in Ohio, and Virginia Theological Seminary in Lynchburg, Virginia.\textsuperscript{54} "He was a complex and baffling man."\textsuperscript{55} "He preached against the insane hatred between the races,"\textsuperscript{56} read Latin and Greek, and sold vegetables in the basement of the church.\textsuperscript{57} His sermon "Transfigured Moments" made him in 1926 the first black to be published in Best Sermons.\textsuperscript{58}

It was popular in some circles to think Reverend Johns had somehow taken part in Prince Edward's disturbance. Surely his sixteen year old niece's role pointed to his involvement.\textsuperscript{59} After all, how much could the children have done without the help of adults? Then there was Reverend Griffin who called himself a life long "disciple" of Vernon Johns.\textsuperscript{60} Was this not evidence enough of Johns' involvement? The theory was plausible, but it was wrong. It gave too much credit to Vernon Johns. He had a tremendous influence on his family, but Barbara Johns could by all accounts think for herself, she was simply "cut" as Samuel Williams recalled "from the same cloth" as her uncle.\textsuperscript{61}

On the same night that Barbara Johns addressed the press, the firm of Hill, Martin, and Robinson agreed to petition the Prince Edward County School Board to end segregation in their public schools. They did so on behalf of thirty-three children and their parents. The strike had come to an end.\textsuperscript{62} The drama was over. A long tedious trek had begun.

Barbara Johns would not make the trek. She was whisked away for her protection. She moved to Montgomery, Alabama with her Uncle Vernon and his family. There she watched her uncle pioneer the Civil Rights Movement as he pastored the Dexter Avenue Church and paved the way for a younger man named Martin Luther King, Jr.\textsuperscript{63} But that was another matter. There were children in Prince Edward who could not leave.
CHAPTER II

THE POSTION WE HAVE ALWAYS TAKEN

On the eighth of May, The Farmville Herald noted in an editorial that if the students of Moton High had been "in charge of the 'strike' situation," they "no longer" were. The NAACP had "assumed control." This the paper found disturbing for it meant a simple local effort to obtain a new school had grown into a movement to end racial segregation in Virginia.  

The NAACP, however, was not challenging segregation per se, their focus was much more narrow. It had to be. In 1951 the only racial segregation the Virginia constitution addressed was in education. Certainly segregation existed in other areas; it existed in everything from restaurant service and rest rooms to marriage. But those forts of racial segregation could wait. The Commonwealth was girding itself for an assault on her constitution.  

The firm of Hill, Robinson, and Martin began with a petition to the Prince Edward County School Board. The petition asked the board not to enforce section 140 of the constitution and its statutory counterpart, the former directing that "White and colored children shall not be taught in the same school." This the Richmond firm insisted discriminated against black students.  

Following the school board's May meeting, the petition was turned over to the Prince Edward County Attorney, Frank Watkins. The letter which accompanied the petition said unless the board replied within five days both counsel and petitioners would assume the petition was denied. The NAACP had the school board in a dif-
difficult position. In order to comply with the wishes of the petitioners, it would be necessary for the board to violate state law. The petition deadline was ignored.\textsuperscript{10}

On the 25th of May, the \textit{The Farmville Herald} printed a reply from school board chairman M.R. Large to Spottswood Robinson III.

We construe the requests and demand of the petition prepared and submitted by you to be that the school board of Prince Edward County, Virginia, adopt and pursue a policy in violation of section 140 of the Constitution of Virginia.\textsuperscript{11}

The school board had no intention of following such a policy.

The NAACP made its next move. Spottswood Robinson filed an action in Richmond's United States District Court to prohibit the enforcement of the Virginia statute which provided for separate schools for blacks and whites.\textsuperscript{12} It was time for the school board to seek a defense. They hired one of Virginia's largest and most prestigious firms, Hunton, Williams, Anderson, Gay and Moore.\textsuperscript{13}

As the school board prepared for court, a similar case was being tried in the United States District Court of Charleston, South Carolina. Harry Briggs, Jr. and others sued Chairman R. W. Elliott and others of the Board of Trustees of School District Number 22 of Clarendon County for injunctive relief from segregation.\textsuperscript{14} The case held great interest for a number of Virginia lawyers and legislators. Briggs v. Elliott, as the South Carolina case was called, was similar to the case pending in Virginia. The outcome of the trial might well forecast the decision in Virginia.\textsuperscript{15}

In the South Carolina case, it was argued the plaintiffs, that is the black school children of Clarendon County, were entitled to integrated schools, as their segregated schools were not equal to those of the whites. Further, it was argued the constitution and statutes of South Carolina requiring segregation of races in public schools violated the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.\textsuperscript{16} \textit{The Farmville Herald} took an interest in the South Carolina case. It was, they reported, similar to the Prince Edward case and would come to trial on the 28th of May.\textsuperscript{17}

On the 23rd of June the United States District Court in Charleston entered its decree. It found the provisions of the South Carolina constitution and its statutory counterparts not in violation of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. The laws, the court reasoned, were not in conflict with the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, but the defendants, that is the school district, had violated the plain-
tiffs' 14th Amendment rights when they failed to provide facilities and opportunities equal to those of the white students. In other words the 14th Amendment did not entitle the plaintiffs to integrated schools per se, but it did entitle them to equal facilities. 18

Three days later The Farmville Herald recorded the decision from South Carolina. A federal court had backed segregation in public schools. The same article noted the NAACP planned to appeal the case to the United States Supreme Court. 19 A battle had been won; a war remained to be fought. But for the moment at least, the South Carolina case could be taken as a pleasant prophecy for the Prince Edward County School Board. The county had every reason to expect state law to be upheld.

Virginia's Governor John Battle and Attorney General J. Lindsay Almond viewed the South Carolina case as a confirmation of Virginia law. 20 "I am highly gratified" the Governor was reported as saying, "with the decision which confirms the position we have always taken." 21 But Almond sounded a note of caution lest some of The Farmville Herald's readers failed to grasp the full decision. "'If the provisions of Virginia law on mixed schools are to be sustained, equality of facilities,' he warned, 'must be established.' " 22

The Times-Dispatch carried very much the same story of the South Carolina case with the same remarks from Battle and Almond as The Farmville Herald had carried. The Richmond paper made no comment beyond the front page story. This absence of editorial comment may be worthy of note when contrasted with the black owned Norfolk Journal and Guide. The Journal and Guide went quite literally to great length, two-full page columns, to denounce the decision of the South Carolina court. The Norfolk paper called the decision "'amazing and disheartening.' " It's editors called the ruling a "'repudiation of United States claims to democracy'" and took the opportunity to "'abhor all discrimination.' " 23

Briggs v. Elliott was, of course, a setback for Hill, Robinson, and Martin. It must have been discouraging. Still, the NAACP intended to proceed with their case against the Prince Edward County School Board. 24 If board members had hoped to have this burden removed from them, they had hoped for too much.

While the NAACP lawyers sought "'eminent educators, anthropologists, psychologists and psychiatrists' " 25 as expert witnesses, the school board went about
its business. As a part of their business in July, the board fired Boyd Jones as principal of R.R. Moton High School. Petitions to have Jones reinstated were drawn up. Jones, the petitioners insisted, had in no way instigated the student strike. The board however was unmoved. Jones would not be reinstated.

Chairman M.R. Large insisted the board’s action was not a reprisal for the strike. Petitioners, of course, did not believe the chairman, and it mattered little what the board intended. Jones had been fired and the board’s action was perceived as a reprisal. Jones thought it was. Years later he would comment that he had been fired because he had become “too dangerous.” That is, he had in the minds of many, either instigated the trouble or failed to make sufficient effort to stop it. Whatever the reason, Jones, like Barbara Johns before him, moved to Montgomery, Alabama. However, his career was far from over. He taught at Alabama State College and later received a PhD from Cornell. But his role in Farmville was finished. His students struggled on without him.

On the 8th of August the state entered the fray; the Attorney General’s office filed an intervention suit with the court. The suit marked the first time the Commonwealth had intervened on behalf of a county. Clearly, whatever the outcome, the Prince Edward case would have implications for all of Virginia’s counties, and the state was taking no chances.

In the South Carolina case, the defendants had relied heavily on legal precedent and did little to counter the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses. The precedents had been clear and sufficient for the defendants to prevail. The lawyers of Hunton, Williams, Anderson, Gay and Moore had noted all of this, as had the Attorney General’s office. But to rely solely on legal precedent was to take chances the state did not wish to take. Instead, they intended to create issues of fact and law.

The state’s constitution might well stand up to attack, but Prince Edward had no chance of prevailing under the separate-but-equal doctrine. Being so advised by the Attorney General, the Governor approved a $600,000 loan for the construction of a new school for the blacks. In April the students of Moton High had struck for equal facilities; four months later a dream was on the verge of becoming a reality, and yet the struggle was far from over.

First on the list of 117 students whose parents sued on their behalf was a four-
The new R.R. Moton High School, renamed Prince Edward County High, after integration.
teen year old girl named Dorothy E. Davis. Consequently, the case heard before the three man court on 25 February 1952, was titled Davis et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, Va., et al. Except for the expert witnesses, which the defense countered with equally eminent authorities, Davis v. School Board was not a great deal different from Briggs v. Elliott. The issues were the same. The plaintiffs asked the court to strike down a law which required black and white children to be educated in separate facilities; failing that, they asked to have the inequalities between the schools corrected.

The decision of the United States District Court in Richmond was not surprising. State law was upheld and as funds and land had been obtained and plans completed, an injunction to correct the inequality between the schools was thought unnecessary. The NAACP had suffered yet another defeat.

A Nick and Tuck Campaign

Nineteen fifty-three was not a terribly exciting year in Prince Edward County. Certainly it did not compare to the two previous years. There were no students striking as there had been in 1951, and since the trial of Davis v. County School Board in 1952, the issue of public school integration appeared to be at an end. The school board went quietly about the business of building a new school for blacks, and black and white students attended classes as usual.

Colgate Darden, former Governor of Virginia, and at the time of the trial, President of the University of Virginia, had regarded the doctrine of separate-but-equal as a matter settled by law when he appeared as an expert witness in the Davis case. Darden’s opinion appears to have been typical of most Virginians. The courts had done nothing to change his or anyone’s mind. Neither Thomas B. Stanley nor Theodore R. Dalton made an issue of segregation in their bid for Governor that year, and for good or ill, Stanley and Dalton provided a good deal of what little there was to get excited about.

Since the time of Reconstruction, Democrats had occupied the Governor’s Mansion in Richmond. Thomas Stanley was the Democratic candidate in 1953. Given the history of gubernatorial races to that time and given the strength of United States Senator Harry Byrd Sr.’s Democratic party organization and what usually amounted
to token opposition from the Republicans, most political pundits thought Stanley a likely winner. They were nearly wrong. Dalton offered more than token opposition from the long-suffering Republicans of Virginia. He had all the attributes of a good campaigner. Moreover, Democratic candidate, Thomas Stanley did not.

Mills E. Godwin Jr., then a state senator from Suffolk, campaigned for Stanley’s election. Godwin remembered Stanley as a poor speaker. He was inadequate on his feet before groups, but a grand campaigner so far as meeting people and shaking hands, slapping them on the back, having a nice word with them. He was a politician in the sense that one-on-one, I haven’t seen many that were better than he was. Nobody could dislike Tom Stanley as an individual.

However not many people got to know Tom Stanley as an individual, certainly not enough to elect him governor. His inadequacy before groups and, as former Fourth District Representative Watkins M. Abbitt, Sr. recalled, a reluctance to answer questions from the press, became a concern for the Byrd organization.

Momentum seemed to be with the Dalton campaign. Lindsay Almond, who was seeking re-election as the state’s attorney general, privately predicted Dalton’s election. Almond shared his concerned with Byrd. However, Byrd was a United States Senator and this was a state wide election. As a United States Senator Byrd felt it wise to remain publicly aloof from a state wide election. Byrd kept silent. It looked as though Dalton would become Virginia’s first Republican governor since Reconstruction.

It might have happened if Dalton had not endorsed a bond issue for roads. A bond issue would mean going into debt. For Harry Byrd, a pay-as-you-go fiscal policy was sacrosant. A $100 million bond issue could not be allowed to go unchallenged. Byrd campaigned for Stanley, and though it was by a narrow margin, Stanley won. Former Governor Albertis S. Harrison remembered the final days of that campaign in an interview during the summer of 1990.

Byrd had to get in there with both feet to get him elected. Byrd was seldom active in campaigns. He let it be known who he was supporting. He would do what he could but so far as going all over the state, he didn’t do any of that. But it was very seldom that he had to get in there with both feet. It was when Dalton came out for the bond issue that he came into the campaign real-
ly strong. It was nick and tuck, we could have lost it. I know that about six or seven of us went down there [Richmond] and tried to work with the campaign for the last three weeks. I stayed in Richmond at Stanley's headquarters. It was Wat Abbitt, little Harry Byrd and I. We tried to get him elected but it won't [sic] easy . . . when Dalton came out for the bond issue thing, he dropped a bonanza in his [Stanley's] lap. That's the sort of thing, if you are in politics, you just wish would happen to you.45

Much has been made of the closeness of the race. Possibly too much has been made of it. The Byrd organization was far from losing its place in Virginia politics. It did not depend upon a single race or office. The era of the multi-media blitz had not arrived. Huge coffers from political action committees had yet to enter Virginia politics. If the organization came to feel, as some writers have suggested, it needed a boost, it would be difficult to imagine why. Had Dalton won, there was little he could have accomplished without the blessing of the Byrd organization. The organization had the leadership of the General Assembly. It had wide influence throughout Virginia and a broad base of power.

The Byrd organization generated its election power from the county court houses. This was particularly true in the rural southside. The farmer who came to town to tend his monthly business was often swayed by the the clerk, the treasurer, the sheriff and other insiders whose judgement he depended on. These people voted as a block. They elected each other and they elected Harry Byrd and those Byrd endorsed.46

Some of the organization's survivors have appeared slightly uncomfortable with the word "organization" as though it might suggest something a bit more structured than it actually was. Perhaps too, a rigid structure smacked of "machine," an inappropriate word for Byrd supporters as it suggests political wrong doing. "Machine" has brought to mind images of Chicago's Richard Daley and dead men voting. This was not the way of Harry Byrd. Byrd was tapped into the county governments. Generally speaking, he liked the people he found at the court house and they liked him. The organization was good politics. It won elections.47

The era supported Byrd politics almost as well as the organization did. It could hardly help but support the party in power, any party in power, particularly one with a crafty leader like Byrd. It was the day of literacy tests and poll taxes and, consequentially, low voter turnout. A large voter turnout was not the intention, an interested
voter was.  

It was thought a poll tax and a literacy test assured an interested voter with, as Albertis Harrison described it, "a modicum of intelligence." These things were thought desirable in a voter. Later they would come to be viewed as elitist symbols. The poll tax was $1.50, which was worth more then than now; yet the tax was not oppressive. A pint of Smirnoff Vodka could be bought for $2.05. A lady’s stockings sold for $1.00. The money was not the hard part. Voters had to pay their tax months in advance of the election. One had to be interested to be a voter or at the very least not forgetful.

The literacy test required less memory than the poll tax. Governor Harrison explained the test. "The test was a simple test. If you could write: 'My name is John Smith. I am twenty one years old. I have lived in Brunswick county for over a year and I would like to vote.' That was all you needed to do."

It was in this political environment that Thomas B. Stanley was elected governor. Stanley had scarcely more than taken the oath of office when the storm clouds of controversy surrounding segregation began to appear. The controversy was to make for a hectic term and much of the burden was to fall on Attorney General J. Lindsay Almond.

A Unanimous Decision

Despite the negligible attention the Prince Edward case received in 1953, the issue had not yet been resolved. The United States Supreme Court had agreed in 1952 to hear the NAACP’s appeal. Four cases all involving issues of school desegregation were combined. These cases came from the states of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. Collectively, they came to be known as Brown v. Board of Education.

The Court began hearing arguments in December of 1952. Both sides were ably represented. The pro-segregationists were led by John W. Davis, a graduate of the law school at Washington and Lee University in Lexington, Virginia, a one-time Democratic nominee for President (he had been defeated by Calvin Coolidge in 1924) and a Wall Street lawyer. The anti-segregationists were led by Thurgood Marshall, a graduate of Howard University law school and a veteran of Supreme Court bat-
ties. Marshall had a hand in seventeen Supreme Court cases; fifteen of those cases found him on the winning side.\textsuperscript{55}

No decision was reached in December. Questions were arranged for reargument and the case was held over for the next term.\textsuperscript{56} The suspense, stress, and strain was to increase for the participants of Brown. Chief Justice Vinson died on 8 September 1953.\textsuperscript{57}

Dwight Eisenhower had become president in 1953. It was his task to appoint Vinson’s successor. Meanwhile, Brown was on hold. There was, of course much speculation by Court and White House watchers. Eisenhower found his choice in California governor Earl Warren. Warren had but a matter of days to settle his business before leaving for Washington. Warren readied himself like a good soldier. On 5 October 1953 he was on the bench for the start of the new session.\textsuperscript{58}

On 7 December the Court returned to Brown. Oral argument concluded two days later. Still no decision was forthcoming.\textsuperscript{59} Earl Warren, who had been serving as interim Chief Justice, was confirmed in March of 1954 while the nation waited for the ruling,\textsuperscript{60} but the ruling was still two months away.

The Court handed down its decision on 17 May 1954. Residents of Prince Edward County read about the decision the following day in The Farmville Herald. It was a lengthy headline that greeted readers: "Unanimous Decision United States Supreme Court Outlaws School Segregation." The Court had ruled that segregation prevented equal education.\textsuperscript{61}

Shock silenced Virginia’s elected leaders. In like manner, Farmville’s public school officials kept quiet also. It made little difference. The Farmville Herald hardly needed the comments of community officials to develop the story. On page one The Farmville Herald ran five paragraphs on the decision. According to the paper the Brown decision would affect nine million white children in seventeen southern and southwestern states and the District of Columbia.\textsuperscript{62} It was a segregationist’s nightmare. The Farmville Herald fell into step with state and local leaders; no comment was found on the editorial page.

Connie Rawlings remembered hearing about the Brown decision while on a school picnic. "I heard it on the radio. It was like the sky had fallen, when it came to race relations."\textsuperscript{63} Sammy Williams remembered the Brown decision more simply. "I thought we had won,"\textsuperscript{64} he said. Williams, of course, was expressing the naviete
of a teenager. He would have to have been a soothsayer to have imagined what
the coming years would bring.

By Friday, the 21st of May, The Farmville Herald and many state and local leaders
had regained their voice. The paper carried another long headline: "County Leader
Ask [sic] Fair, Calm Approach To Problems Created By Supreme Court School De-
cision."65 A "fair calm approach" would appear to have been out of the question.
This was obvious even in the headline, which referred to the problems "created
by the decision," not the opportunities. The paper had passed judgement on the
Court. The solemn division between front and editorial pages had been violated in
a single headline; but then in southside little precedent existed for fairness between
the races.

The county leader referred to in the headline was School Superintendent T.J. McIl-
waine. The Court had rendered a decision laden with moral pronouncements, but
there were no instructions on how to reach the Court's ideal. The superintendent
and his school board waited for instructions from the Virginia Department of Educa-
tion and they in turn waited on the Court. Without instructions to the contrary, Prince
Edward determined to continue with segregation as usual. Continue they did. The
school board was in no hurry for changes, and so for want of directions from the
Court no changes were expected for the coming year.

In the same issue, Edward A. Carter, Prince Edward County's Chairman of the
Board of Supervisors, suggested a commission be formed to study the problems
arising from the Brown decision. Governor Stanley had anticipated such a sugges-
tion. A commission to study desegregation was expected by early summer.66 It would be called the Gray Commission.
CHAPTER III

NULLIFICATION NONSENSE

The Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education buffeted Virginia’s newly elected governor. Like an unwilling rider, Tom Stanley found himself upon an animal he could not control and could not abandon. The Brown decision dominated Stanley’s four years as governor.

Stanley’s initial response to the Court’s decision was calm. The Governor planned to appoint a commission to study the problems the Court’s decision might create and recommend a course of action. Leaders of both races were to be invited to share their views.\(^1\) It was, according to Mills Godwin, “a very moderate and acceptable statement.”\(^2\) Nothing was expected to change immediately. By the end of May the State Board of Education was advising Virginia’s city and county school boards to continue segregation for the coming school year.\(^3\)

However, moderation and a plodding pace were not acceptable to southsiders, who wished not to be moved at all. The Byrd organization owed a debt to southside. The rural sparsely populated area had long provided the Organization with wins. Most recently, Tom Stanley had benefited from the southside vote.\(^4\) As if that were not enough to entitle these people to the Governor’s ear or at least a bit of his attention, they were in a unique position of influence. The Fourth and Fifth Congressional Districts, which composed Virginia’s Southside, lay sprawled just south Richmond. The Fourth District was home to more Assemblymen than any other district and it, like the Third, was convenient for the delegate or senator who wished to drop in
on the Governor or spend some extra time in Richmond. As a practical matter, the southside was represented out of proportion to its population. It also included the largest percentage of blacks in the state.

In Farmville staunch segregationists began to act. Newspaper publisher J. Barrye Wall, Sr. and dry cleaner Robert Crawford sought to create a "white NAACP." This organization would come to be called The Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties. In an organizational meeting of the Defenders, State Senator Charles Moses, Representative Watkins Abbitt Sr., and J. Barrye Wall Sr. were chosen as a nominating committee to select a president for the organization. Their choice was Robert Crawford.

Bob Crawford was a man with strong convictions. He was a supporter of Senator Harry Byrd, a zealous American Legionnaire and a strong Presbyterian. Crawford's politics were decidedly conservative. Senator Joseph McCarthy's charges of communist infiltration of the federal government appeared real to Crawford. Indeed, for Bob Crawford the strife between the races was easily imagined as part of a communist plot.

The Defenders exemplified the thinking of white Southsiders. The original officers of The Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties were all from Southside. The organization's first thirteen chapters were all located in Southside. So well were the Defenders attuned to the thinking of Southside's white population, that in a span of two years, the group grew to sixty chapters and 12,000 members.

To think of these Defenders, these segregationists, as somehow painted by the same brush as Ku Klux Klansmen would be a grave error. The Defenders would not tolerate so much as the waving of a Confederate flag at their meetings for fear they might be associated with the Klan or other organizations of that ilk. The Defenders were jealous of their reputation; the taint of violence or civil misconduct they were certain would ruin them. "If this community," Crawford said of Farmville in a 1955 New Republic interview, "should suffer just one incident of Klanism, our white case is lost. No matter who starts it, the whites will be blamed. We must not have it."

Ugly incidents did occur, and there is no particular reason to think whites were blameless, even though the Defenders did not condone violence. Reverend Francis Griffin when interviewed by Bob Smith, author of They Closed Their Schools,
Virginia’s Congressional Districts are seen here as they existed from 1951–1959. Note the advantage of the disproportionate size and strategic location of the Fourth.
remembered the anonymous notes and phone calls. "It would be . . . How would you like to attend a neck tie party and you be the honored guest? Some whites would ride by and call out nasty things. Once someone called me up and said if I went by the Confederate monument on High Street I would be killed." \(^{15}\)

There were other incidents. There was a homemade bomb that sputtered and died on Griffin's doorstep. There was an unsuccessful attempt to start a fire outside the minister's brick home and a more successful attempt across the street, which prompts one to think the latter might have been a case of mistaken identity. \(^{16}\) There was even a cross set afire at the Moton High School, as though the Klan might have paid the area a visit. All of these incidents either Reverend Griffin or the Farmville police attributed to children or incompetents, not the Defenders. \(^{17}\)

Insults are generally resented regardless of who sends them. While it is difficult to imagine that blacks saw a great deal of difference between overt acts of racism and the more subtle behavior of the Defenders, many whites were quick to point out differences. Albertis Harrison made the distinction clear in a 1990 interview.

The people felt strongly in Virginia. These were not rednecks. These were some of the finest people we have in Virginia. The Supreme Court had said segregation of schools was legal over a period of decades. All of a sudden in 1954, they said it's not. Now there were constitutional scholars that said this isn't right. They said in effect, maybe the Supreme Court will change its opinion. Maybe there is some way this thing can be mediated. The people who felt that way about it were not just scum by any means. Take Collins Denny in Richmond, Denny was an exceptionally able constitutional lawyer. You had Billy Old over there who was a Judge of the Circuit Court in Chesterfield County. In Amelia County Valentine Southall was one. Barrye Wall in Farmville. You can name them throughout the state. \(^{18}\)

In the Prince Edward chapter of the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, the officers and directors were credible men who managed the community's affairs and business. They counted among their number tobacco manufacturer J.W. Dunnington, Farmville Mayor W.C. Fitzpatrick, Dr. S.C. Patterson, J.G. Bruce of the Board of Supervisors, former School Board Chairman Maurice Large, and publisher Barrye Wall. \(^{19}\) These men and others like them gave resistance to the Brown decision an air of respectability. They also represented a significant number of votes
Confederate monument on High Street dedicated to the Defenders of State Sovereignty.
for state elected officials.

Governor Stanley did not long maintain his moderate position. Not that the governor feared a re-election campaign; Virginia governors are not permitted to succeed themselves. The pressure came from the Byrd organization whose leaders agreed with Southside thinking. In the wake of such pressure, Stanley changed his position. Conservative political winds were blowing through Richmond and ambitious men knew it.

State Senator Garland Gray was an ambitious man who hoped some day to be Governor. He was also one of the most influential segregationists south of the James River. Gray favored a commission composed of state legislators to serve as the Governor's Commission on Public Education. Such a composition would have an obvious advantage in getting its recommendations through the General Assembly. Governor Stanley found the idea attractive. Gray was appointed chairman of a thirty-two man commission. All of the appointees were from the General Assembly. It should be noted, the General Assembly had no black members.

Was the black community being ignored? In a rather small way Governor Stanley had kept his promise to the black community. He consulted black leaders. Shortly after the Court overturned Plessy v. Ferguson, the Governor invited such black leaders as NAACP lawyer Oliver W. Hill and Norfolk's Journal and Guide publisher P.B. Young to meet with him. If this, was the Governor's idea of seeking input from the black community, it was something less than blacks might have hoped for. He asked these leaders to ignore the recent Brown decision and continue to accept segregation. It was a silly suggestion with predictable results. The gentlemen refused. The Commission on Public Education began its work without the services of the black community.

The Commission on Public Education came to be known as the Gray Commission for its Chairman Garland Gray. Senator Gray was well thought of among Virginia's elected officers. Mills Godwin, who was a member of the Commission and in 1954 a State Senator, remembered Gray as "a man of intelligence" and the "highest integrity." Further, Gray was a wealthy man who had "worked hundreds of black people in business." Of course, having worked black people and having worked with black people were hardly the same things, but in the absence of black representation, it would have to do.
Would the Gray Commission have been better received if it had included blacks? The answer, of course, can not be known for certain. However, it probably would not have met with any more success than it actually did. For it came to be critized by all sides save that one true Virginia minority, the moderates.

Oliver Hill has pointed to a number of things that may have kept integration from progressing smoothly. "In the first place, no one wanted to admit that segregation was wrong. Of course, the majority of white people believed in segregation. The one thing that terrorized them was to be called 'nigger lover.'" Add to those fears, as Hill suggested, the fear of intermarriage, at that time still illegal in Virginia, and one finds a people virtually without recourse except to resist.

Without benefit of either educators or black leaders, the legislators took it upon themselves to find a solution to the greatest crisis to ever face Virginia's public schools. It was a lot to take on. The hysteria was only beginning.

On 1 June 1954 the The Farmville Herald quoted Virginia's Superintendent of Public Education, Dowell J. Howard.

In the view of the opinion of the Attorney General on this day (May 28) received, to which we adhere, the board proclaims the following policy: 'The local boards of education are hereby ad­vised to proceed as at present and for school session 1954-55 to operate the public schools of this state on the same basis as they are now being operated as heretofore obtained.'

Clearly nothing was going to change rapidly.

If anyone had thought a reprieve for an academic year might encourage southside whites into accepting the inevitable, he thought wrong. Two days after announcing the Attorney General's advice to local school boards, The Farmville Herald ran the following front page headline: "'Supervisors Back Segregated Schools Here With Refusal To Appropriate Operating Funds For 55-56.'" It was change rather than the speed of change that concerned white southsiders.

Lest someone misunderstand their feelings, by 20 July 1954 the Prince Edward County Board of Supervisors had put the Court and the state on notice. A resolution opposing integration appeared on the front page of The Farmville Herald. The resolu­tion declared the Board of Supervisors to be "'unalterably opposed to the operation of non-segregated public schools.'" They believed it would be "'not only imprac-
ticable, but that it will be impossible to operate a non-segregated school system in the Commonwealth of Virginia."

The Board went further. It announced its intention "to use its power, authority and efforts to insure a continuation of a segregated school system" in the state.

The justices, however, do not appear to have been subscribers to The Farmville Herald, or particularly worried that Virginia or one of its small counties might secede from the union. The Court continued about its business, nonplussed by the opposition of the little county. On 28 September 1954 The Farmville Herald readers followed the latest development in their case. The Court had set How and When Arguments on school integration for 6 December 1954. The Court required the attorneys involved in the Brown case, including Prince Edward County School Board lawyers, to return to discuss whether decrees should require immediate admission of black children to the schools nearest their homes, or whether there should be a gradual adjustment.

There were other questions to discuss. Even if the Court agreed with Virginia’s position that integration needed to be gradual, there remained the questions of how gradual and by what method. Might the Court appoint someone to study and recommend methods? It was a possibility. It was just as possible the lower courts would find themselves in the unenviable position of handling the detailed arrangements of integration. However, there was no question of the Supreme Court overturning its recent decision. That was not a question in consideration. Unfortunately, that was something not everyone understood.

Albertis Harrison was on the executive committee of the Gray Commission. He saw the confusion many people, including Senator Harry Byrd, were having with the Court decision.

You had thousands of people who said all you have to do is not do it [integrate]. The Supreme Court was wrong and they will change their minds. Well those of us who were attorneys, we knew throughout the whole thing, there was very little chance that an appellate court [would overturn its decision]. I know because I’ve been on one for fifteen years. When we hand down a decision we don’t change it next week or next month or the next year. Senator Byrd was not a lawyer. His background was not legal. Therefore he didn’t see the thing through the same eyes that I did and that ultimately Lindsay did. He [Byrd] had an idea that
if you resisted strong enough and a southern manifesto and Congress came in and everybody in the House said we ain’t going to do this, then the decision might be changed or modified. . . . He [Byrd] felt the decision was morally wrong after the races had been separated all those years.  

While the Attorney General and others prepared to argue for gradual integration, the Gray Commission, in the words of its chairman, continued to develop “a plan . . . whereby the views of the public . . . may be obtained.”  

It was doubtful though that the commission would be able to develop a plan in time to help Attorney General Almond with his arguments. About all the commission could do in such a short time was exist as an example of good faith on the part of Virginia to right her wrongs. There was nothing Governor Stanley could do but wait. Nevertheless, pressure to stop integration continued from the southside. In addition to the resolutions received from Prince Edward County, the Governor received resolutions opposing integration from the boards of supervisors of Buckingham, Powhatan, and Amelia counties.  

The Governor did suggest public hearings of the Commission be held around the state. The chairman agreed. A hearing date was set for 15 November 1954 to address the question of “What course should Virginia take in light of the Supreme Court decision?” The hearing was advertised “primarily for spokesmen of local governing bodies, members of the General assembly and leaders of recognized organizations of both races.” Speakers came in droves. In all there were 143 requests to speak. It was easy to imagine a large crowd would follow. Consequently, the Commission moved the hearing, originally scheduled for the Capitol, to the Richmond Mosque, a large downtown auditorium.  

There was little chance the hearing would accomplish much. The Commission, it has been noted, was not representative of all Virginia’s people. As though more controversy was needed to help things along, the Commission’s chairman, Garland Gray, managed to inflame many on both sides of the integration issue just days before the hearing. At a Defender rally in Prince George County, he called the Brown decision “political and monstrous.” He went further by adding he . . . did not intend to have his grandchildren go to school with Negroes . . . when I was appointed Chairman of the Governor’s Commission on segregation, I told that group that I would act impartially and hear everything anybody wanted to say . . . But I also
said I have my own personal convictions . . . which I do not intend to sacrifice on the altar of political expediency.\(^{41}\)

Just how, the Chairman intended to perform his duties impartially was not explained.

A large crowd came to Richmond for the hearing. Albertis Harrison remembered that day.

We had a lot of pressure on us, Lindsay had it on him. We had 5,000 people come to the capital. We had this organization, Defenders of State Sovereignty. When you had to deal with that crowd, you had a problem on your hands.\(^{42}\)

Certainly it was not the right atmosphere for a disinterested hearing.

On 24 November 1954 the Gray Commission met in closed session. Upon adjourning they announced, "the matter of holding further public hearings was discussed at great length; no further public hearings are to be recommended."\(^{43}\) The Gray Commission may have discussed the advantages and disadvantages of holding further public hearings at some length. The Times-Dispatch however managed to avoid editorial comment altogether.

The Gray Commission issued its first preliminary report two months after the first hearing. On 15 January 1955, the Commission concluded that the "overwhelming majority" of Virginians opposed integrated schools. They also concluded that forced integration would destroy public schools in many parts of the state. Given those conclusions, the Commission thought it wise to explore lawful means of resisting integration. They rejected the idea of holding more public hearings as in their words, it would result in "cumulative testimony."\(^ {44}\)

The conclusions of the Gray Commission were not as well received across the state as they were in Southside Virginia. the Roanoke Times, easily the largest publication in western Virginia, criticized the commission for its secrecy and failure to call more public hearings. "$'Doesn't the Commission trust the people?'" the paper asked.\(^ {45}\) From the other side of the state, the Norfolk-Virginian Pilot, accused the Gray Commission of taking a negative position on integration without sufficient research to warrant such conclusions.\(^ {46}\) The NAACP, of course, blasted the Gray Commission. They accused the Commission of speaking only for whites. The "overwhelming majority" of blacks, they said, favored integration.\(^ {47}\)

The Court handed down its Brown II decision on 31 May 1955. The cases were to be remanded to United States District Courts with instructions to develop local
integration plans "with all deliberate speed." The business of assessing and solving the various problems of the schools were to be left to the schools. The courts, naturally, would determine whether the action of the school authorities constituted good faith in implementing integration. The courts in question were to be the ones in which the cases originated.

Many in southside were disappointed with the ruling. Still, the state had done well. Integration would not occur overnight. The very same United States District Courts that had upheld the doctrine of "separate but equal" were to have jurisdiction over the progress of integration. "Good faith" might well be accomplished with little effort, while little was actually accomplished. The words "good" and "faith" were after all vague, and they became no clearer when combined. What would southsiders have? If they were white, they would have segregation. These people were hoping for a miracle; they of course were disappointed.

The Gray Commission went back to work. In a matter of days it made two brief recommendations. On 9 June 1955 the commission recommended the State Board of Education continue segregation for the school year 1955-56. There was, according to the Commission, too little time to work out a feasible plan of integration. Further, there was no need for the Governor to call a special session of the legislature.

The long awaited report of the Gray Commission came in November 1955. There were twelve legislative recommendations in the report. At the heart of the report were two recommendations. Basically, the policy was that white children were not to attend integrated schools against the wishes of their parents. This was to be accomplished in two ways, a local option pupil assignment plan and a private school tuition grant proposal. In the interest of white southsiders, schools could be closed to avoid integration. Of course, all Virginia’s whites were not from the "black belt." In the mountains and valleys of western Virginia, the black population was comparatively small. Integration of a small black population might be accomplished with little trauma and much economic benefit. Maintaining a "separate-but-equal" school for a small population had been expensive. Under this plan, a community was permitted to integrate. Parents who objected to integrated schools could secure grants to send their children to private schools.

The Gray Commission had taken what they must have imagined to be a noble
path. They had driven the middle of the road. It was a dangerous place to be. Traffic, they would soon discover, came from both directions.

The options were misunderstood. Mills Godwin remembered integrationists were alarmed by the thought of the legislature closing the schools. "Talk of [segregationists] shutting down all the schools came from the integrationists." It was one of the most forceful thrusts Godwin could imagine the integrationists using against resisters. "Nobody that I ever knew in the General Assembly thought we ought to close all the schools to prevent integration." 53

Albertis Harrison remembered another reason for opposition to the Gray plan. "Oh no, the Gray Commission means you’ll have some integration. Some integration is like being a little bit pregnant. That was their favorite expression, ‘you can’t be a little bit pregnant.’" 54

Oliver Hill never thought the local option feature of the Gray plan was the right idea. Hill’s problem with the Gray plan was entirely different from those who equated token integration with being "a little bit pregnant" though. During the summer of 1990 Hill was asked if adoption of the Gray plan might have been "a step in the right direction?" "No," he replied, "because what community was going to opt for desegregated schools?" 55

The answer, though undoubtedly it had slipped Hill’s mind, was Arlington County. The northern Virginia county, certain the Gray local option feature would be passed in the 1956 Regular Session of the General Assembly, announced the approval of Virginia’s first local integration plan. 56 The Gray plan, however, never passed legislative muster. Perhaps local option was a reasonable starting place. No one will ever know.

Albertis Harrison felt, "If we could have gone forward with the Gray Commission, if it had been accepted in good faith by everybody, that would have solved the problem a little bit quicker." 57 There never was much chance, however, that everyone would accept the plan as a good faith effort. Virginia’s attitudes were nearly as diverse as her accents.

On the same day the Supreme Court handed down its second Brown decision, 31 May 1955, angry white citizens in Prince Edward County asked their Board of Supervisors not to approve the school budget. The board agreed to comply with the wishes of these citizens. The deleterious effects of integration were apparently
considered so bad as to outweigh the benefits of public education.\textsuperscript{58}

It should be noted that however deleterious the effects of integration were expected to be, Virginians had never placed a great deal of value on public education. Education, certainly beyond the rudiments necessary to function in one’s society, was something for the privileged. Linwood Holton has insisted this has been the case since colonial times. "They [Virginians] never did believe in education. There were several efforts [to promote education] beginning with Thomas Jefferson but they were rejected."\textsuperscript{59} William Link has taken a much closer look at Virginia’s education in his book, \textit{A Hard Country and a Lonely Place}. Link found rural Virginians often resented public education. Common Schools were generally opposed in the Antebellum South for it was thought even a "rudimentary education" was of no use to a "plain farmer" or "mechanic." Education was, to a large extent, still considered a private matter in the twentieth century. For whites and blacks, school attendance fluctuated with the seasons and the need for labor.\textsuperscript{60} Education was of secondary importance.

On 1 August 1955, a pamphlet was published by William W. Old, a Chesterfield county lawyer. The pamphlet created a sensation in 1955 among southsiders who hoped for a loophole through which to escape integration. The popular pamphlet was reprinted in 1959 accompanied by essays to update the reader as to the plight of segregation. It was an interesting pamphlet for it at once raised the segregationist argument from the level of simple unadorned racism to a question of states’ rights. It reflected southside’s cavalier attitude toward education. It raised hopes without warrant. It inflamed unnecessarily. And it plunged the state into a posture of unparalleled silliness.

The pamphlet resurrected a concept called interposition. The idea was originally brought to life by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison to avoid the effects of the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798. Old, using the same concept as Jefferson and Madison, raised the hopes of white Virginians that the state might somehow interpose its sovereignty and prevent integration. Public education was, after all, a matter the Constitution left for the state governments.

Some significant changes, however, had occurred in the country since Jefferson and Madison penned the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, and Old, for all his scholarship failed to note them. The Court in the eighteenth century was hardly the
power it had become by the twentieth century. The question as to which was more powerful, had been settled in 1865. Since that time, the Fourteenth Amendment, with its equal protection clause, had been added to the Constitution.

Today Judge Old's little pamphlet might best be viewed as a reflection of white southside's thinking during the mid-twentieth century. His opening statement is perfectly in line with the angry citizens who demanded their school boards close schools rather than integrate. "'The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on the issue of segregation in the schools has precipitated an issue which far transcends the immediate problem of the operation of the public schools, terrible though that problem may be.'"61 His position became even clearer on the following page. "'I would much prefer to see the destruction of the public school system than to see the races integrated in the schools.'"62

James Jackson "Jack" Kilpatrick, the talented and persuasive editor of the Richmond News Leader, was infatuated with the theory of interposition. Old's pamphlet was a rich source of material for editorials. Kilpatrick did not miss his opportunity. He ran a series of editorials from November of 1955 until February of the following year.63

Virginius Dabney, Kilpatrick's Pulitzer prize winning counterpart at the Richmond Times Dispatch, quoted Kilpatrick years later in his history Virginia: The New Dominion "'I never did understand interposition to mean effective nullification.'" It hardly mattered how the editor understood it. The legislature was near hysteria with what Delegate Robert Whitehead called "'nullification nonsense.'"64

If it can fairly be said that Kilpatrick sowed the seed of "'nullification nonsense,'" it must in all fairness be remembered that the climate had to be right for the seed to grow. The climate was decidedly right for hysteria.

Amelia and Powhatan, counties just east of Prince Edward, set financing for their schools on a monthly basis. This would allow them to cut off funding in the event integration was forced upon them.65 Prince Edward County, whose majority was no more interested in operating an integrated school than her neighbors, lost two principals, one of which publicly admitted his leaving was due to the uncertainty of school funding.66

In retrospect, there was little reason to think Kilpatrick's editorials would raise the level of debate among southsiders. Perhaps Kilpatrick was reaching for the sublime
editorial. At his best, Kilpatrick was an engaging debater and a capable writer. He might have reached the heights of lofty argument had he not embraced interposition. It was a popular if impractical idea, as former Fourth District Representative Watkins Abbitt, Sr. recalled in 1989. "'You couldn’t have it [interposition] or you wouldn’t have a federal government. It was a nice idea, gave them something to talk about.'"67

The legislators certainly talked about interposition. A Resolution of Interposition was brought before the General Assembly. It passed the Senate thirty-six to two and the House of Delegates eighty-eight to five.68 Shortly after the resolution passed, Attorney General J. Lindsay Almond ruled it was not a legislative enactment and therefore did not have the force and effect of law. It, therefore, was not a legal defense.69 The resolution did little except to fan the flames of defiance.

More to the point of avoiding integration was the Gray Commission's recommendation to amend the state's compulsory-attendance law. The idea was so simple as to be eloquent. Without a compulsory-attendance law, students could not be made to go to school. If a child could not be made to go to school, a child could not be made to attend integrated schools. Most parents, however, wanted some type of education for their children. The Gray Commission was not proposing white students withdraw from school in mass. As Mills Godwin said, "'We realized we had to educate all the children. We might have to change some of the ways we were going to do it.'"70

The question was how could a child be educated without attending an integrated school? One answer was obvious. Children could attend private schools. Just as obviously, all parents could not afford to have their children attend private schools. Something would have to be done if resisters were to be shielded from charges of elitism by moderate whites.

Section 141 of the Virginia Constitution dealt with public education. It made no allowance for underwriting private schools or giving students tuition grants to attend them. Such allowances could be made if a limited constitutional convention were held. The requisite work was done. The convention was set for 9 January 1956 so the state constitution could be amended.71

Senator Byrd read a copy of the Gray Plan while on an overseas Congressional trip. The Senator, an ardent segregationist, was not satisfied with what he read.
When he returned things started to change.\textsuperscript{72}

Former Governor, Colgate Darden recalled a conversation he had with Senator Byrd over dinner at the Army-Navy Club in Washington, shortly after the Senator’s return. The conversation hinted of things to come. “Nobody ever need plan to run for public office in Virginia that’s not on the segregated side of this issue,” Byrd told Darden.\textsuperscript{73} “Harry,” Darden replied, “that’s academic as far as I’m concerned because I’m never going to run for public office anyway.”\textsuperscript{74}

Soon after the Senator’s return, E. Blackburn “Blackie” Moore, Speaker of the House of Delegates and an intimate of Harry Byrd, introduced a resolution in the House. The Moore Resolution suggested no preparations be made for the 1956-57 school year. At about the same time the Moore Resolution was introduced, Senator Byrd declared “massive resistance is the best course for us to take.”\textsuperscript{75}

Just exactly how much influence Senator Byrd had in creating resistance for integration can not be measured. Men who were in a position to view and feel the Senator’s influence up close disagree on its scope and force. Oliver Hill, typical of those who had to contend with Byrd’s influence, has attributed an awesome amount of power to the Senator. “He was the patron saint of Virginia, if he had said lets work this thing out, let’s do something, it would have happened.”\textsuperscript{76} Future Governor A. Linwood Holton was Republican Party Chairman for Roanoke at the time of Byrd’s “massive resistance” statement. Holton concurred with Hill. “There is no question about that,” he said. “Byrd’s name was magic. If he had made any kind of reasonable statement this thing could have taken place without a ripple.”\textsuperscript{77}

Colgate Darden and Albertis Harrison saw Byrd’s influence in a different light. They disagree with those who have suggested Virginia might have avoided “massive resistance” had Byrd wished to lead the state in a different direction. As to Byrd’s position, “I don’t think it would have made any difference at all,” Harrison has said. “Some of these people in Virginia were just opposed to integration. They would have repudiated him.”\textsuperscript{78} As Colgate Darden saw it, Byrd did not have the strength to “…execute the change. I think he reflected a rising tide of resentment in the state and without.”\textsuperscript{79}

Questions may remain about the exact measure of Byrd’s strength. However, there is no question that he was politically strong. There is no question that he reflected the sentiment of the white Southside voter. Nor is there any question that Byrd op-
posed the local option feature of the Gray Plan.

Byrd never publicly spoke against local option. He simply never spoke of it. It was the lack of an endorsement that expressed his opinion. Byrd supporters were quick to pick up the Senator’s signal. Mills Godwin was one of those loyal supporters. “Let me say — Senator Byrd — I don’t ever remember him ever coming to Richmond talking to the legislators either individually or collectively about this matter [integration]. He said what he felt, and said it forthrightly. Of course all of us had ears and eyes and could see what sentiment was.”

The fear among massive resisters was that some communities would opt for local option. That fear was given credibility when the Arlington County School Board approved its plan to begin integration. Prominent men of moderate persuasion such as Colgate Darden and Dr. Dabney Lancaster, former State Superintendent of Public Instruction and president emeritus of Longwood College, lent their good names in support of the Gray Plan. It was their understanding that local option was to be an inseparable part of the plan. Such an understanding worked well for the organization as they campaigned for a constitutional convention.

The referendum passed by a large majority. Meanwhile, the Moore Resolution, which called for state schools to do nothing about the court order, had easily passed the House of Delegates before failing to get out of its Senate committee. With the defeat of the Moore Resolution and the passing of the referendum, the state was coming close to showing some compliance with the Court order. Segregationists would have to maneuver quickly to avoid token integration.

The Gray Plan without its local option feature was just another plan to avoid integration. Governor Stanley and Garland Gray, in the wake of Senator Byrd’s displeasure with the local option feature, had retreated from their support of the original plan. At their urging legislative surgery was about to be performed on the gray Plan. On 5 March 1956 forty delegates met in Richmond to carry out the mandate of the 9 January referendum by suggesting amendments to the state constitution. As expected, they voted unanimously to amend Section 141 of the Virginia Constitution. The amendment permitted tuition grants. However when, H.D. Dawburn of Waynesboro, offered a resolution to include the expected local option feature his effort died in Committee. The surgery was complete. Darden and Lancaster had been tricked.
Governor Stanley called a special session of the General Assembly for 27 August 1956. At that time, a package of thirteen bills that became known as the Stanley Plan were presented to the members of the legislature. In simplest terms it was a plan to cut state funds to any school which complied with a court order to integrate. A strong effort was made in both houses to oppose this fund withholding plan. Senator Byrd, however, favored the Stanley Plan and his influence, coupled with interposition hysteria from the voting public, put enough pressure on legislators to overcome opposition to the plan. In the House the Stanley Plan passed by a vote of fifty-nine to thirty-nine. In the Senate the vote was twenty-one to seventeen. The Stanley Plan had passed. The academic year of 1956-57 passed without integration, as did Governor Stanley’s term of office.
CHAPTER IV
WHITE HAIRER GENTLEMEN AND LOST CAUSES

Lindsay Almond hurried into the gubernatorial race of 1957. Almond was anxious to be governor. He had paid his dues to the Organization. He had served as judge of the Hustings Court in Roanoke. He had been elected to Congress in 1948 and was serving in that capacity when Virginia’s Attorney General, Harvey B. Apperson died. At the urging of the Byrd organization and the sacrifice of a one-third cut in pay, Almond filled the late Attorney General’s post. It was quite a sacrifice for a man who was not wealthy.

Still, Almond was not Senator Byrd’s candidate of choice for governor. The Senator would have preferred Garland Gray and Almond knew this. So without consulting Senator Byrd, Lindsay Almond announced his candidacy. The Attorney General had developed quite a following while in state office and both Byrd and Gray were aware of the strength Almond had gathered. There was nothing more to be done. Almond had the nomination and Byrd was content to smile on the party’s candidate.

In Farmville, Robert Crawford and the Defenders threatened to upset the race with an independent candidate if either the Democrats or Republicans failed to take a strong stand against integration. Lindsay Almond was a segregationist, but as Oliver Hill recalled from his days of practicing law before Judge Almond, “He wasn’t an ardent segregationist.” There were, however, a large number of votes to be gained from the right. T. Coleman Andrews had run as a states’ rights candidate in the 1956 presidential election and had polled more votes in Prince Edward County than
either Adali Stevenson or Dwight Eisenhower. Lindsay Almond was determined to have those votes and so became an ardent segregationist for right wing voters.

In 1957 Linwood Holton, Joe Parsons, Floyd Landruff, and a number of other young Republicans convinced Ted Dalton to make another run for the Governor’s Mansion. Republicans expected a big year. Dalton had done well in 1953. Perhaps he had done well enough to convince voters that Republicans could win in Virginia. Republicans expected Almond to be a stronger candidate than Stanley had been. However, they also expected Dalton to be stronger. ‘‘People realized,’’ Linwood Holton insisted in a 1991 interview, ‘‘with just a few switches a Republican could win.’’

There were reasons to think Democratic votes could be switched. According to Holton, ‘‘The Byrd organization would have preferred somebody else. They did not feel that Lindsay was ‘reliable’ so — that’s their word not mine — they were not enthusiastic about Lindsay Almond. If you can’t rely on Lindsay Almond,’’ the reasoning went, ‘‘then you might be better to have Ted Dalton than Lindsay Almond.’’ Further, Ted Dalton and Harry Byrd, Sr., while not political compatriots by any means, were friendly enough to hunt birds together. A Democrat could, therefore, conceivably vote for Dalton and not find himself much separated from his fellows. Republicans were hopeful 1957 would be their year to elect a governor.

Republican hopes faded quickly. In the fall of 1957 President Eisenhower sent troops to Little Rock, Arkansas to maintain order while those public schools were integrated. ‘‘It did indeed absolutely destroy any chance for a Republican to win in Virginia that year,’’ Holton recalled, ‘‘because people were so completely taken aback by the Federal government’s action in forcing integration in the public schools in such a visible — for that time — blatant way.’’

Dalton sought a middle ground, but the votes that had been in the middle were rapidly eroding. The votes were on the right and Almond grabbed them with campaign rhetoric that Linwood Holton found abhorrent. ‘‘I was sitting in the Jefferson School in Roanoke when Lindsay Almond made one of those speeches in which he made the famous statement, ‘I’d rather give my right arm than see one ‘‘negra’’ child in the white schools of Virginia.’ That’s almost identical language to what he used. It made me cringe.’’

In the end Dalton lost by more votes than he had in the previous campaign. An
event in Little Rock, Arkansas, a state most Virginians had never even visited, ruined Dalton's bid for governor. Ted Dalton had wanted very badly to be Virginia's first Republican governor. However, it was Linwood Holton who in 1969 would eventually gain that distinction.\textsuperscript{13}

Oliver Hill had once hoped to see Lindsay Almond elected governor. Of course, as Almond came to embrace the strong segregationist views of the Virginia right, Hill changed his mind. Certainly he could not vote for an avowed segregationist. Deprived of the vote he had once hoped to cast for an old acquaintance, Hill decided to have some fun. The reception which followed the Governor's Inaguration was open to the public. Hill and a friend decided to go. As the two blacks, the only blacks to attend the reception, made their way through the receiving line, so great was the surprise that the newly elected Attorney General, Albertis Harrison, introduced his wife to the NAACP lawyer as Mrs. Hill. It may well have been the last bit of mischievous humor either side enjoyed for several months.\textsuperscript{14}

As a result of the Brown decision and Virginia's resistance to it, the new Attorney General, Albertis Harrison, spent "more time in Federal Court than probably all the other attorney generals put together."\textsuperscript{15} Harrison had no idea that integration could forever be avoided. There were to his mind other reasons for going to court. "It was far better for me as a constitutional officer, a duly elected attorney general, to be in there fighting a losing cause than to have a bunch of rednecks marching up and down the street trying to keep the niggers out of the schools. Every time it came out in the newspapers that we were there [in the courts], it had a calming effect on the people."\textsuperscript{16}

By September of 1958, the Stanley School Closing Laws came into play. The Warren County Public Schools were ordered to integrate. As a result of the Court order, Governor Almond was obligated by Virginia law to close the schools. Almond was never a supporter of school closing laws, but he had no choice. The Warren County Schools were closed and removed from the Virginia public school system. In short order, the same situation occurred in Charlottesville with the same result. Lane High School and Venable Elementary were closed. Norfolk City Schools followed suit and forced nearly 10,000 students out of school.\textsuperscript{17} By the end of the month 12,700 Virginia children were no longer included in the public school system.\textsuperscript{18} Naturally enough, concerned parents continued to educate their children albeit under trying
conditions. A number of students were accommodated in makeshift schools while efforts were made to form private schools.\textsuperscript{19}

The reality of schools closing sent shock waves across Virginia. As Linwood Holton recalled, "Virginia was not going to put up with closing schools on a universal basis."\textsuperscript{20} The Roanoke Times, Norfolk's Virginian-Pilot, The Washington Post, and of course Norfolk's Journal and Guide had opposed the idea of massive resistance to the Court's order, but they were in the minority.\textsuperscript{21} Overwhelmingly, the Virginia press had been in favor of segregated schools, so long as they could be maintained legally.\textsuperscript{22} If Virginia's white press had feared that integration might erode the quality of the state's schools, school closings meant no education whatsoever. Legal maneuvers to avoid integration had been exhausted. School closings went too far. Something would have to be done to educate the children.

It was in the fall of 1958 amidst the school closings that the Richmond papers backed away from massive resistance. Publisher D. Tennant Bryan had favored massive resistance as had Vice-President and General Manager Alan S. Donahoe. Much to the relief of Times-Dispatch editor Virginius Dabney, Messrs. Bryan and Donahoe now concluded that massive resistance could not be upheld much longer. The Richmond papers had been friendly to Senator Byrd over the years and did not wish to surprise him. A courtesy call was made to Byrd's Berryville home to apprise the Senator of the papers' change in position. Making the trip were Tennant Bryan, Alan Donahoe, Jack Kilpatrick, columnist K.V. Hoffman of the Times-Dispatch and Virginius Dabney. The Senator was polite but unmoved.\textsuperscript{23}

In contrast to News Leader editor Jack Kilpatrick, Virginius Dabney had never supported the resistance movement. In deference to Bryan's wishes, the Times-Dispatch, under Virginius Dabney's editorship quietly acquiesced to massive resistance. The policy of massive resistance had always appeared "potentially disastrous" to Dabney. "The closing of schools seemed definitely counterproductive to me," Dabney recalled in his memoirs, "and, carried to its ultimate conclusion, appeared likely to turn Virginia into an educational slum."\textsuperscript{24}

Business leaders throughout the state became alarmed at the closing of the schools. Someone would have to persuade the Governor to change Virginia's course if the state was going to prosper. Linwood Holton recalled a meeting between some of Virginia's prominent business leaders and the Governor.
Harvey Wilkinson, a prominent banker, and Stuart Saunders of Norfolk and Western Railway, and a group of other business leaders of that caliber went to the governor and said ’Lindsay this has got to stop. We’re trying to develop the economy of Virginia and people are not going to bring investments to this state that involve people who won’t have a place to send children to public schools. It’s got to stop.’

Almond had managed through legal maneuvers to stave off integration. However, his routes of escape were rapidly being cut off. Massive resistance could not be maintained forever. The courts were about to speak.

On 19 January 1959 in Harrison v. Day, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled against the school closings in a five to two vote. On the same day the United States District Court in Norfolk, having heard a suit brought by a group of white parents on behalf of their children, found the school closing laws challenged in James v. Almond to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The last routes of legal escape were closed.

It is ironic, if otherwise insignificant, that the courts overturned the ‘‘massive resistance’’ laws on the birthday of the state’s most revered Civil War hero, Robert E. Lee. It would seem Virginia had a fondness for white haired gentlemen and lost causes. There is no reason to think Almond hoped for a legal remedy; he was, by all accounts, a capable lawyer. But like the man who ran out of money before he ran out of checks, Almond had run out of law before he had run out of fight. For reasons that later escaped even the Governor, Almond fought on.

The following day, Almond delivered a radio address. The Governor lashed out at integrated schools describing them as places containing the ‘‘livid stench of sadism, sex, immorality, and juvenile pregnancy infesting . . . mixed schools.’’ In words reminiscent of John Paul Jones, the Governor vowed to fight on. Congratulations poured in. There were, however, no legal remedies left, and Almond would soon regret making what he came to call that ‘‘damn speech.’’

The Richmond papers, having veered from their previous support for massive resistance policies, politely refrained from making editorial comment on the Governor’s speech. Norfolk’s Journal and Guide, as might be expected, deplored the Governor’s speech. The Norfolk paper described Almond’s radio broadcast as a ‘‘fanatical
verbal attack’’ on the state and federal court systems and a ‘‘libel’’ against the ‘‘colored race.’’ District of Columbia School Superintendent Carl F. Hansen took exception to Governor Almond’s suggestion that immorality had increased in the Washington school system as a result of integration. Hansen called the Governor’s comments ‘‘unfounded in fact, with no justification and in poor taste.’’ 31

On 28 January 1959, before an emergency session of the General Assembly, the inevitable occurred; the Governor capitulated to integration. 32 Linwood Holton has said that ‘‘Lindsay Almond made the toughest decision that’s been made in the governor’s office in my time, and that was the decision to reverse his course. It took real courage to make that change. I admired him for doing it.’’ 33

Many who had been on Almond’s side did not feel the admiration Holton expressed. Indeed, Almond had been so staunch a resister, so defiant a speaker, and so swift to reverse himself, that many felt left ‘‘out in the cold.’’ 34

In fairness to Almond, it must be said that he tried to alert the organization as to what was about to happen. It was all to no avail ‘‘Byrd wouldn’t even take Almond’s telephone call. The Governor tried to call Byrd and tell him he was going to have to change. Byrd knew what the message would be and he didn’t want to hear it. He wouldn’t take the Governor’s telephone call,’’ Linwood Holton recalled. ‘‘I asked Governor Almond myself and he confirmed it.’’ 35 The result was a message many resisters, thirty-two years later, still expressed surprise and bitterness over. ‘‘He saved them from chaos,’’ Holton has insisted. ‘‘But they didn’t forgive him.’’ 36

On 2 February 1959, twenty-one black children entered white schools in Norfolk and Arlington. They were heavily protected by police, but in Virginia no obscenities were shouted nor threats made. This orderly process contrasted sharply with the violence which erupted in other states attempting to integrate. 37

There remained a need for legislation to replace that which had been overturned by the courts. Almond pushed a plan of token integration similar to the orginal Gray Plan. Indeed the plan called for ‘‘freedom of choice’’ or local option. In order to get this through the Senate, it was necessary to have the Senate resolve itself into a Committee of the Whole. This would allow the Senate to vote on the legislative package rather than risk the death of each bill in committee. Lieutenant Governor A.E.S. Stephens upheld the unusual motion, thus angering many resisters. Among those angered by the ruling were Senators Mills E. Godwin, Jr., Harry F. Byrd, Jr.,
and Garland Gray who ironically had chaired the committee which first recommended token integration by way of local option.\textsuperscript{38}

Almond’s legislation passed both houses albeit by narrow margins. The Senate vote could not have been more dramatic. Senator Stuart Carter of Fincastle, who was recovering from major surgery, was brought into the chamber on a stretcher to cast his vote for the Governor’s legislation. With Carter’s vote, Almond’s ‘‘freedom of choice’’ legislation passed the Senate by a single vote.\textsuperscript{39}

The era of massive resistance had come to an end. Barbara Johns, the Prince Edward County teenager who started the era of massive resistance in Virginia when she led her Moton High School classmates on a strike for equal facilities, was virtually unknown across the state. Lindsay Almond, who had become Governor of Virginia by riding the wave of massive resistance, found his political career at an end. The Byrd Organization was split into factions and was unable to adapt to a world that included media blitz campaigns and excluded poll taxes and literacy tests. In Prince Edward County, one of the four original defendants in the Brown case, the Supreme Court ordered the schools desegregated by September. Prince Edward’s board of supervisors responded to the Court’s order by following the wishes of its white majority. No appropriations were made for public education, consequently schools did not open in September. White children whose parents could afford it were accommodated by the private academies which quickly sprung up in southside Virginia. Black children remained without schools for four years.
Prince Edward Academy, the largest and best known of the private academies to develop in Southside Virginia as a result of massive resistance.
CONCLUSION

It has been suggested that massive resistance was a matter of simple racism carried to a logical extreme. Massive resistance was of course extreme, but there was nothing simple about it. In the first instance, racism, an undeniable element of the resistance movement, was and remains the outcome of numerous wounds and fears among southside Virginians. Racism has shown itself to have as many flavors and varieties as its peoples have accents and dialects. Racism may be part of a subtle snobbery select beyond skin color and limiting participation according to family names, income, professions, and education. It may seethe with overt hatred and spout insults. In southside Virginia racism has taken all of these shapes.

At the heart of resistance, racism was the fear of amalgamation. ""Mixed children in the school is the beginning of the end for both races. . ."" Bob Crawford once declared in an interview. ""It is inevitable that children who play together from the age of five will not stop at eighteen. There will be intermarriage."

Another legitimate concern was that Virginia's right, indeed that of all states, to oversee the education of her children had been usurped by the federal government. Constitutional scholars were quick to express such concerns. The orginal intent of the Fourteenth Amendment was roundly debated as was the legality of the amend­ment since it had been ratified while conquered states went without representation. The Brown decision exhumed the old confederate cause of state sovereignty versus the hated federal government. Anti-Washington politics has generally been well received by Virginia voters. In the 1950's it was particularly well received.

In addition to the states rights issue, Virginia had little commitment to education. This had been the case since colonial times. Thomas Jefferson made some efforts
to promote and reform education in Virginia, but these efforts were largely ignored. Education was for the most part considered an individual matter. Academies tended to the needs of those affluent and educated enough to desire it for their children. Among laboring whites, education was thought superflous, even a hinderance. Public education did not find its way to Virginia until the era of reconstruction. Then it was viewed askance by the fiercely libertarian nature of southsiders as interference from government grown too strong. Public education by the middle of the twentieth century was accepted but not prized. A white upper class with little interest in educating less fortunate whites showed even less interest in educating blacks. With the Brown decision, fears of public education as a socializing agent of a meddling government were raised anew. Given this background, anything short of resisting integration in public schools would have been truly miraculous.

Did massive resistance amount to anything more than a futile attempt to avoid integration? Perhaps it did. Segregationists have consistently credited the resistance movement with preparing Virginia for integration. They insist that massive resistance proved to Virginians that every step had been taken to escape integration and by stalling gave Virginians time to become reconciled to the idea of integration. Whether that time was actually needed or not one will never know. It is only in retrospect that segregationists have suggested their movement was intended to “buy time.” Certainly Virginia avoided the embarrassment of having court orders enforced by federal troops. Virginia was also spared the violence many states came to experience with integration. For resisters this has been their vindication. This line of reasoning is still open to question.

Repeatedly students of massive resistance have asked if the Gray plan should have been adopted. Had the Gray plan been adopted it probably would have moved integration along a quicker smoother road than it ultimately followed. Integrationists were impatient with the plan as it offered only token compliance with the court ruling they had sought for so long. Resisters thought any compliance was too much. Token compliance was, however, where Virginia began. The plan Lindsay Almond finally pushed through the General Assembly was quite similar to the Gray plan. It worked well enough as a starting place. There is no reason to think it would not have worked equally well when it was first proposed as the Gray plan.

One of the most unfortunate results of rejecting the Gray plan were the raised
hopes of escaping integration. Time spent hoping for the impossible can not be said to have helped Virginians prepare for integration. Harry Byrd, Sr. must accept a large degree of responsibility for this mistake. As the “patron saint” of Virginia, Byrd was in a position to offer the state and nation a measure of sorely needed leadership. Virginia did not need Harry Byrd to become an integrationist; indeed, it would have been unfair to expect Byrd or any politician to commit political suicide. However, it has never been too much to expect a United States Senator to support the Supreme Court of the United States as the final authority of her law abiding people.

In spite of Virginia’s peaceful record in ending segregation, there is good reason to believe that integration could have been effected more quickly and efficiently.
NOTES

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12. Ibid.


25. Reverend James Samuel Williams, interview.


30. Connie Rawlings, interview.
31. Reverend James Samuel Williams, interview.

32. Ibid.


34. Connie Rawlings, interview.

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41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Connie Rawlings, interview.

44. Richard Kluger, 595.


46. Connie Rawlings, interview.

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49. Richard Kluger, 601.

50. Ibid., 605.

51. Ibid., 604.

53. Richard Kluger, 575.


55. Connie Rawlings, interview.

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57. Connie Rawlings, interview.

58. Taylor Branch, 9-10.


60. Reverend James Samuel Williams, interview.

61. *Ibid*.


63. Taylor Branch, 606.
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11. Ibid., 25 May 1951, 1.

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30. The Farmville Herald, 10 August 1951, 1.

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60. Ibid., 875


62. Ibid.


66. Ibid.
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4. Virginius Dabney, 530.


6. Virginius Dabney, 530.


8. Bob Smith, 90.


10. *Ibid*.

11. Virginius Dabney, 531.


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