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Serbo-American relations, 1903-1913

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
Serbo-American Relations, 1903-1913

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Master of Arts in History
University of Richmond
May 1997
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Abstract

Of the available studies concerning pre-World War I Serbia, few have shown more than a passing interest in that country's relations with the United States. Indeed, no books have appeared on the subject, while only four articles examine Serbo-American affairs during the kingdom's most dynamic decade, from 1903 to 1913. Though each is in some way valuable, these works fail to give an adequate account of the relations existing between Serbia and the United States. Therefore the following chapters explore Serbo-American affairs from the death of King Alexander I Obrenović in June 1903, to the conclusion of the Second Balkan War (1913). Relying primarily upon American diplomatic dispatches, as well as upon Serbian commercial data, this thesis concludes that contact between the two countries was small (owing largely to America's traditional non-involvement in European affairs), yet grew in significance towards the end of the ten-year period.


I certify that I have read this thesis and find that, in scope and quality, it satisfies the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History.



Dr. John D. Treadway, Thesis Advisor



Dr. Martin Ryle



Dr. Ernest C. Bolt, Jr.

*Serbo-American Relations,
1903-1913*

by

JASON C. VUIC
B.A., Wake Forest University, 1994

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of the University of Richmond
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for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in
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I. Introduction

Of the available studies concerning pre-World War I Serbia, few have shown more than a passing interest in that country's relations with the United States. Indeed, no books have appeared on the subject, while only four articles examine Serbo-American affairs during the kingdom's most dynamic decade, that being from 1903 to 1913.¹ They include: Wayne S. Vucinich, "American-Serbian Relations in 1903-1904," Danica Milić, "Privredne veze SAD i Srbije do prvog svetskog rata," Bogdan Popović, "Majski prevrat i SAD," and Dragan Živojinović, "Jugoslovenske zemlje u politici Sjedinjenih Američkih Država do 1918. godine."² Though each is in some way valuable, these works fail to give an adequate account of the relations existing between Serbia and the United States. Both Vucinich and Popović concentrate on the Belgrade coup of 1903, while Milić utilizes economic

¹A fifth scholar has written an overview of Serbo-American relations, though, inexplicably, he fails to include the years 1903-13. See Ranko Petković, *Jedan vek odnosa Jugoslavije i SAD* (Beograd: Vojnoizdavački i Novinski Centar, 1992).

²The above works are as follows: Wayne S. Vucinich, "American-Serbian Relations in 1903-1904," *Slavia* 15 (August 1940): 3-9; Danica Milić, "Privredne veze SAD i Srbije do prvog svetskog rata," *Istorijski Časopis* 28 (1981): 129-35; Bogdan Popović, "Majski prevrat i SAD," *Jugoslovenska revija za Međunarodno pravo* VIII (1961): 80-98; Dragan Živojinović, "Jugoslovenske zemlje u politici Sjedinjenih Američki Država do 1918. godine," *Zbornik Matice Srpske* 29 (1984): 49-68.

records to paint a rather incomplete picture of America's early interest in Serbia. Only Živojinović treats the subject accordingly, but even then in a too general, somewhat dismissive manner. In short, there exists a small yet important gap in Balkan historiography. Therefore the following chapters will explore Serbo-American relations from the death of King Alexander I Obrenović in 1903, to the conclusion of the Second Balkan War. The work as a whole, however, does not represent a quantitative and/or structural analysis of America's pre-war Balkan diplomacy. It is, rather, a chronological account of a short, though influential period of Serbian history, one seen through the unique perspective of American diplomatic observers.

To be sure, Serbian sources form an important part of this narrative, but the diplomatic dispatches of various American functionaries are prominent for two reasons. First, they reveal the common, day-to-day conduct of Serbo-American relations, including consular affairs, inter-state commerce, and diplomatic dialogue. Second (and perhaps more importantly), they provide an impartial and altogether uncommon view of the most important events occurring in Serbia prior to World War I. Of particular interest are the dispatches of Minister John B. Jackson (1903-04), as well as the wartime (1912-13) accounts of Belgrade Consul Maddin Summers.

Inasmuch as this work is devoted to a brief ten-year period, Serbia and the United States were in contact as early as 1867.³ Formal diplomatic intercourse, however, did not take place until late 1881, when American and Serbian representatives negotiated two separate agreements, one a treaty of commerce, the other a consular convention.⁴ The following year, both the American Senate and the Serbian skupština consented to ratification, and on 14 July 1882, the agreements were signed by President Chester A. Arthur. The exchange of ratification took place just four months later, on 15 November 1882.

The first American representative to present his credentials in Belgrade was Eugene Schuyler, a New York native who also was accredited to the courts of

³At this time *de facto* relations were established through the American consul at Bucharest, Louis Czapkay. In Czapkay's absence, a Serbian representative named Kosta Magazinović was asked to oversee American interests. See Bogdan Popović, "Pokušaj uspostavljanja američko-srpskih odnosa 1867," *Prilozi za književnost, jezik, istoriju, i folklor* 28 (1962): 49-57. See also Milan Bulajić, "Upostavljanje diplomatskih odnosa između Knjaževine Srbije i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država 1881," *Zbornik istorijskog muzeja Srbije* 19 (1982): 147-187.

⁴For the text of America's commercial and consular treaties with Serbia, see Department of State, "Treaty of Commerce Between the United States of America and Serbia," and "Convention between the United States of America and His Highness the Prince of Serbia, Defining the Rights, Immunities and Privileges of Consular Officers," *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949*, ed. Charles I. Bevans, vol. 12 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), 1227-1237. On the Senate ratification, see U.S. Congress, Senate, *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States of America*, vol. 23 (New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), 476-77. The commercial treaty of 1881 was retained by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Greece and Romania.⁵ As minister resident and consul-general, Schuyler took an active interest in Serbian affairs. From 1882 to 1884, he promoted Serbo-American commerce, and during that time enlisted the support of an American entrepreneur named Edward M. Grant. Despite their disagreements, both Grant and Schuyler enhanced America's commercial links with Serbia. In 1884 for instance, American exports to Serbia were worth over 2.3 million dinars, the highest level reached throughout the kingdom's forty year existence. After the death of Grant (as well as with the reappointment of Schuyler), trade between the two countries assumed an irregular, somewhat neglected status.

The United States, it appears, was simply more interested in other areas of the globe. Central and South America, China and the Pacific region, all were new and promising grounds for expansion.⁶ Therefore by 1890 the United States had become an active participant in world affairs, yet it continued to view Europe as

⁵Schuyler presented his credentials on 10 November 1882. See Department of State, *Principal Officers of the Department of State and United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1990* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 164-66. With regards to Schuyler and the advent of Serbo-American relations, see Milan Bulajić, 147-187, and Dragan Živojinović, "Uspostavljanje diplomatskih i trgovinskih odnosa između SAD i Srbije 1878-1881," *Zbornik za Istoriju* 25 (1982): 31-50; Idem, *Pregled*, no. 216 (1982): 2-13.

⁶Concerning America's foreign interests prior to World War I, see Walter LaFeber, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, vol. 2, *The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993) and Lawrence E. Gelfand ed., *Essays on the History of American Foreign Relations* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1972).

both decadent and dangerous, "with its balance of power, its rivalries,...[and] its constant threats of war."⁷ Serbia, by association, was no different, positioned as it was between the great eastern empires of Russia and Austria-Hungary. In addition, Serbia was relatively remote, and its commercial prospects had yet to be explored, let alone exploited. Few Americans travelled there, and even fewer wished to accept a diplomatic post in Belgrade.

Between 1882 and 1903, no fewer than ten men were named the American chiefs-of-mission, though not one chose to reside in Serbia on a regular basis.⁸ Both economic and political affairs thus were handled by lower officials, most often consuls or vice-consuls general, many of whom were not even American citizens.⁹ Until 1903, only a few chiefs-of-mission showed more than a passing interest in Serbia, John B. Jackson among them.

⁷Quoted in Foster Rhea Dulles, *The Imperial Years* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1956), 310. See also Julius W. Pratt, *A History of United States Foreign Policy*, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.), 201-75.

⁸Department of State, *Principal Officers of the Department of State and United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1990*, 164-66. See also John D. Treadway, "Serbian-American Relations: the First Quarter Century," Paper presented at the Serbian Academy of Sciences, Belgrade, 25 March 1992, and Elmer Plischke, *United States Diplomats and Their Missions: A Profile of American Diplomatic Emissaries since 1778* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975).

⁹As to the duties of consular officials, see Charles Stuart Kennedy, *The American Consul: A History of the United States Consular Service, 1776-1914* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990). See also Henry E. Maddox, *The Twilight of Amateur Diplomacy* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989).

Appointed late in 1902, Jackson was an experienced foreign officer, who came to the Balkans after a similar assignment in Berlin.¹⁰ As envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the courts of Greece, Romania, and Serbia, Jackson was in a unique yet useful position when confronted with the peninsula's myriad entanglements. He could leave Serbia, tour neighboring kingdoms, and conduct other business in the region without disrupting diplomatic ties. This was especially helpful in moments of crisis, such as in June 1903, when a palace revolution resulted in the death of King Alexander I Obrenović. The event marked a watershed in the history of modern Serbia, as Obrenović, somewhat Austrian in his leanings, was succeeded by Peter I Karadjordjević, a strict constitutionalist and supporter of Tsarist Russia. Over the next decade Serbia would realign itself, undoing a string of unpopular moves that had been initiated by its former monarch. According to one historian, in the years prior to 1903, Obrenović:

carried out four state coups, abrogated three constitutions, and named and dismissed twelve cabinets as he gyrated between personal despotism and semi-constitutional rule.... In foreign affairs

¹⁰A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Jackson entered the Foreign Service in December 1890. He spent the greater part of his career in the Balkans, subsequently serving as E.E. and M.P. to Montenegro and Bulgaria. In 1906, Jackson represented the United States at the Olympic games in Athens; in 1912 he was a special representative to the coming of age ceremony of Crown Prince Boris of Bulgaria.

Alexander zigzagged between Russia and Austria-Hungary until neither power believed nor supported him. Alexander concluded that he could do precisely as he wished without heeding objections or opposition.¹¹

In July 1900, the young king announced his intention to marry Draga Mašin, a widow ten years his senior. Those closest to him objected, citing the need of a foreign princess, or at least someone of less questionable repute. Interior Minister Djordje Genčić begged Alexander to reconsider, arguing "Sire, you cannot marry her. She has been everyone's mistress, including mine."¹² Undaunted, Alexander soon fell under the control of Draga, a beguiling, unscrupulous woman. Unable to prevent the marriage, the king's cabinet resigned amidst widespread indignation. Even Alexander's father, the ex-King Milan I Obrenović, expressed regret, believing his son was "pushing Serbia into an abyss."¹³

¹¹David MacKenzie, "A Military Coup Which Succeeded: Serbia May 29, 1903," *Serbian Studies* 6 (Fall 1991): 55.

¹²*Ibid.*, 56.

¹³Quoted in Wayne S. Vucinich, *Serbia Between East and West: the Events of 1903-1908* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954), 9. Milan had renounced his throne in 1889 for the sum of two million dinars.

Eventually the marriage spawned a plot by the officers' corps to assassinate the couple, whom many viewed as an embarrassment to the Serbian nation. Blind with love, Alexander

endeavored to transform Draga into a state cult. Regiments, schools, and villages were named after her. Her brothers and sisters were continually at the court and took part in formal audiences and receptions. The queen's birthday, September 11, was designated a state holiday.¹⁴

To make matters worse, Draga thrice feigned pregnancy in order to solidify her position as queen. When at last examined by foreign obstetricians, it was revealed the queen was not pregnant, and, as many feared, sterile. The public was outraged, and as a result, disaffection grew.¹⁵

By late 1901, the planned conspiracy had come to involve over 120 civilian and military officials. On two separate occasions they planned to remove the pair, though for various reasons, their efforts had come to naught. When in 1903 it was rumored that Draga's brother was to be named heir to the Serbian throne, a plan

¹⁴Ibid., 12.

¹⁵One of Jackson's predecessors, Charles S. Francis, stated in 1901 that "the present situation...in Servia is most serious and that the people, especially the commercial interests, regard with grave apprehension the future of the country." Despatches of the United States Ministers to Serbia, 5 July 1900 - 31 July 1903, National Archives, Microcopy No. T-630.

took shape.¹⁶ Led by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević-Apis, some twenty-eight army officers stormed the palace in the early morning hours of 11 June. After a frantic search they succeeded in killing both the king and queen, as well as a number of prominent figures. A provisional government quickly formed, and by 15 June, Serbia possessed a new king, Peter I Karadjordjević.

¹⁶Besides that of MacKenzie and Vucinich, a number of works in English examine the coup of 1903. See Chedomile Mijatovich, *The Royal Tragedy: Being the Story of the Assassination of King Alexander and Queen Draga of Serbia* (London: 1906), and Herbert Vivian, "A 'Glorious Revolution' in Serbia," *Fortnightly Review* 79 (1 July 1903): 67-75.

II. From Coup to Coronation, 1903-1904

As for the United States, the coup of 11 June caught Minister Jackson completely unprepared. His first dispatch, sent nearly two days after the affair, came to the State Department via the American embassy in Vienna. The reason for this was that the regicides occurred when Jackson was between posts, travelling aboard a Greek steamer to Trieste. Instead of proceeding directly to Belgrade, Jackson stopped at the Austrian capital to wire Washington of his plans. "Unless otherwise instructed," he wrote, "I shall go to Belgrade Monday and enter into relations with the de facto Servian Government.... Please send new credentials if [the] mission is to be continued."¹ On 15 June he arrived in Serbia, the same day on which Peter was elected king by the Serbian skupština.

Jackson found Belgrade to be the most ambivalent of places, where the murders had failed to elicit even the smallest expressions of "either horror or regret."² He therefore felt that in Serbia there was "no such thing as public

¹Jackson to John Hay (Secretary of State), Vienna, 13 June 1903, T-630.

²Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 20 June 1903, T-630.

opinion, and to the masses the personality of the King, the nature of the Constitution, or the fact whether or not there is a constitution at all," was a matter of "absolutely no importance."³ Though he spoke at length concerning the supposed apathy of the people, Jackson did not, however, offer a detailed account of the coup. He wrote that Belgrade was full of special correspondents, and that the story most likely had been reported in the American press.

Indeed, several American newspapers devoted space to events of 11 June. Of these, the *Pittsburgh Gazette* and the *Chicago Record-Herald* were the most attentive, as each city possessed a rather large Serbian population. The *Gazette* claimed thunderously that the murders could "change the map of Europe," while in a similar manner the *Record-Herald* insisted they were among the most "notable assassinations in history."⁴ Both publications expected a civil war, but like the *Washington Post*, their editorials hoped the coup would not inspire "acts of [foreign] intervention."⁵ Few newspapers discussed the future of Serbo-American relations, though the *New York Times* proffered its own advice as to what path the

³Ibid.

⁴*Pittsburgh Gazette*, 12 June 1903; *Chicago Record-Herald*, 12 June 1903.

⁵*Washington Post*, 14 June 1903. Two days earlier, the *Post* reported that "the Servians seem to be as proficient in rioting at home as they are in this country."

State Department should follow. If Peter chose to "scandalize mankind by rewarding the murderers," it stated that Jackson (as a three-way representative) should not break off relations, but "simply refrain from going there."⁶ The *Sun* of New York cautioned President Theodore Roosevelt that "in the present instance it would be the height of irony and in the poorest taste...to telegraph the new King," especially since Peter had "attained the throne through an act of blood."⁷ Echoing *The Sun*, the *Boston Daily Globe* believed "it would not be proper to extend congratulations to the new king," but that "since the United States and Servia have never sustained close diplomatic relations" Roosevelt's position was "less embarrassing than it otherwise would be."⁸

The *Chicago Chronicle* insisted that though horrible indeed, the events in Serbia "would not have any important effect on the interests of the United States."⁹ In like manner, The *Cleveland Plain Dealer* sardonically remarked that it doesn't

⁶*New York Times*, 16 June 1903.

⁷The *Sun* (New York), 12 June 1903.

⁸*Boston Daily Globe*, 12 June 1903. The *Globe* stated on 13 June that the fate of Draga "should be a sad warning for American heiresses who aspire to get too near the throne. The bluest royal blood will brook no rivalry with the common herd, and the common people do not trust their own origin."

⁹*Chicago Chronicle*, 12 June 1903.

seem to matter whether the ruling dynasty was "[one] *vitch* or 'tother."¹⁰ The *Philadelphia Inquirer* went a step further, maintaining that "the time has gone when the civilized world would be aroused even by minor disturbances in that section [of the world]."¹¹

It appeared, however, that the *Inquirer* was far too presumptive, especially when the Great Powers were reacting with genuine, unabraded disgust. Their indignation only intensified when Peter forbade any arrests or condemnations, an understandable gesture considering that many of the conspirators held influential positions within his government. Nevertheless, Jackson and the rest of the Belgrade diplomatic corps continued to hope that "foreign comment...[would] ultimately be of some affect," and let it be known that they expected the dismissal of those involved.¹² On 19 June, Jackson wrote:

Everything goes to show that the conspiracy was most carefully planned and admirably carried out in all its details. The provisional government assembled with suspicious promptness, and the various proclamations are of such a character as to lead one to believe that it had been prepared in advance.... Those

¹⁰*Cleveland Plain Dealer*, 15 June 1903.

¹¹*Philadelphia Inquirer*, 12 June 1903.

¹²Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 19 June 1903, T-630. The Belgrade diplomatic corps consisted of representatives from the following nations: the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Romania, Greece, Turkey, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Bulgaria.

directly concerned with the attack...are not at all ashamed, and officers implicated in it act as guides through the palace and give explanations with more or less evident pride.¹³

The new monarch spoke of the conspirators in "complimentary terms," and according to Jackson, both the National Assembly and the Metropolitan of Belgrade "either directly or indirectly expressed approval" with their work.¹⁴ The conspirators also enjoyed a large measure of public sympathy, and were "extolled by the army and the people as liberators of the country."¹⁵

Nonetheless, Jackson understood that the Belgrade coup posed an enormous threat to the regime it had brought to power. Indeed, most of the diplomatic corps believed Peter to be a mere figurehead, devoid of authority, and wholly under the influence of the conspirators in question. Serbia's new foreign minister, Ljubomir Kaljević, confided in Jackson that it "made little difference whether the new

¹³Ibid. The provisional government consisted of ten members, four of which actively participated in the murder of Alexander. They included: Jovan Avakumović (prime minister), General Jovan Atanacković (minister of war), Djordje Genčić (minister of the finance), and Colonel Aleksa Mašin (minister of public works).

¹⁴Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 18 June 1903, T-630.

¹⁵Quoted in David MacKenzie, *Apis: the Congenial Conspirator* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1989), 51.

king...[was] a man of great capabilities or not," though he himself was a old Karadjordjević supporter.¹⁶

On 19 June, Jackson informed Secretary of State John Hay that Russia was the first country to enter into relations with the Royal Government, though its minister, Nicholas Charykov, was urging the punishment of the conspirators. According to Charykov, Serbia was an independent nation, and to him, the conspiratorial question was solely of domestic concern. In the interest of "peace in the Balkans," he stated that "nothing should be done to weaken the authority of the new king."¹⁷ Russia, however, supported Peter for a far less benevolent reason. The new monarch was a known Slavophile and proponent of Serb expansionism. It was quite possible that he would sever Serbia's unusually close ties with Austria-Hungary, first initiated during the reign of Alexander's father, King Milan Obrenović. Jackson informed Hay on 21 June:

The general impression seems to be that Russia has gained a considerable advantage over Austria by her prompt recognition of King Peter...[Austria has] been more interested in maintaining good relations with the sovereign [Alexander I Obrenović], while Russia has paid more attention to the Servian people. The sons of the new King are being educated in Russia, and his sympathies are supposed

¹⁶Jackson to Hay, Athens, 29 June 1903, T-630.

¹⁷Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 21 June 1903, T-630.

to be more with that country than they are with Serbia's more immediate neighbor.¹⁸

Russia and Austria were, in fact, the only countries to be informed officially of Peter's accession, leaving other diplomats unprepared for his 25 June arrival.

Without personal letters of introduction (in Jackson's case, between Roosevelt and Peter,) protocol demanded that foreign envoys neither meet with nor recognize the new king.

Jackson's position therefore was somewhat anomalous, and on 20 June he wrote that most of the other gentlemen "all had letters to the late King, and we should all need letters for his successor."¹⁹ Secretary of State Hay responded promptly, instructing Jackson to remain relatively aloof, and to observe the actions of the other consuls. "If the diplomatic body [is] unanimous you may act with them," wrote Hay, "otherwise do not be in haste to enter into official relations. In view of the recent horrible crimes it might be as well for you to remain for a while

¹⁸Ibid. For a general overview of Russian policies toward Serbia, see Barbara Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Also of interest is Charykov's own work, *Glimpses of High Politics: Through War and Peace, 1855-1929* (New York: Macmillan, 1931).

¹⁹Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 20 June 1903, T-630. According to one scholar, Peter's regime appeared not to understand the accepted protocol, and in particular the need for formal letters of accession. See Bogdan Popović, "Majski prevrat i SAD," 93.

at one of your other posts."²⁰ To ascertain what he called "a uniform course of action," Jackson met with the representatives of some twelve countries the next morning.²¹

At the Turkish legation the emissaries agreed to show proper respect to the new king, though none wished simply to ignore the regicides. Most would have been ready, however, "to recognize the new King if he had notified their sovereigns, instead of doing so only in the case of the Czar and the Emperor Franz Joseph."²²

Jackson himself believed that Russia was following the proper course, and if America had possessed any real interest in Serbia, he would have followed Charykov's example. Both Russia and Austria, he stated, "abhor the murder of King Alexander no less than does the rest of the civilized world, but nothing they can do will bring him back to life, and there would appear to be nothing which could be gained through failing to treat his successor with the customary respect."²³

To this he added:

²⁰Hay to Jackson, Washington, D.C., 20 June 1903, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State- the Balkan States, 1801-1906, National Archives, Microcopy No. M-77.

²¹Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 21 June 1903, T-630.

²²Ibid.

²³Jackson to Hay, Athens, 29 June 1903, T-630.

King Peter was chosen in a constitutional manner, and so far as the Servian people can be said to have a will, it is the will of the people that he should reign over them. As an American republican, it seems to me proper that he should be recognized promptly.²⁴

Nevertheless, Jackson refused to act without diplomatic credentials, the lack of which forced him to leave Belgrade on 23 June. Accompanied by the Turkish minister, he departed on an evening train for Athens.²⁵

America's immediate interests in Serbia, such as they were, thus fell under the supervision of acting vice-consul Christian Vögeli, a Swiss citizen and representative of the New York Life Insurance Company. In the past Vögeli had rendered much service to the Legation, but in Jackson's estimation, he frequently expressed a bias "too great...[for] political matters."²⁶ His wife was a Serbian, and together they openly sympathized with Peter. To Jackson's chagrin, Vögeli draped his office with bunting and other decorations in honor of the new king, though at the entrance an American shield hung prominently.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵For a brief survey of Jackson's activities in Athens, see Demetrios E. Peppas, "Relations Between the United States and Greece, 1878-1908," *Balkan Studies* 9 (1968): 354-358.

²⁶Jackson to Hay, Athens, 29 June 1903, T-630.

At the time, only one American was living in Serbia, Samuel Weiss, a Hungarian immigrant employed by Vögeli. Besides insurance, both Weiss and Vögeli concerned themselves with exports to the United States. According to Jackson they "averaged about six envoices a year, but there were practically no imports, such American articles as find their way into the country being brought from Austria."²⁷

Table 1
Serbian Trade with the United States,
1903-1904

<i>Year</i>	(in dinars)					
	<i>kg.</i>	<i>Exports value</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>kg.</i>	<i>Imports value</i>	<i>%</i>
1903	----	----	----	948,559	766,458	1.32
1904	70	1,000	----	863,111	745,274	1.22

Source: *Statistika spoljašnje trgovine Kr. Srbije. 1903-1904.*

Nevertheless, the Serb Ministry of Finance did keep a sufficient record of goods imported from the United States. Though nearly all passed through Austrian middlemen, in the decade prior to 1904, imports from the United States were a respectable 9,303,758 kg. According to the Serbian Ministry of Finance, their value came to just over 11.5 million dinars. To be sure, 1903 imports had

²⁷Ibid.

dropped to their lowest level in fifteen years (948,559 kg), but Serbia still managed to purchase some 530,000 kg of coffee, 308,000 kg of cooking and mineral oils, and 17,000 kg of machinery, all of which came from stateside producers.

Conversely, Serbian exports to the United States were almost non-existent, the lack of a coastline, and inadequate transport treaties contributing to a low sea-faring trade. What Serbia could export (mostly dried fruits and other agricultural products), was sent to Germany, Britain, and Austria-Hungary, the latter claiming over 80 percent of its trade in 1903-04.

To Jackson, the dearth of American commerce could be attributed to what he considered half-hearted diplomacy. The absence of permanent ministers in each of the Balkan capitals frequently resulted in missed opportunities, especially in Romania, where oil and grain exports were among Europe's largest.²⁸ Jackson believed that under the circumstances it was impossible "to satisfy himself or any

²⁸On Jackson's attempts to improve American commerce with Romania see I. Stanciu, "Considérations sur l' evolution des rapports commerciaux entre la Roumanie et les Etats-Unis d' Amérique jusqu' en 1914," *Revue Roumaine d' Histoire* 11 (1972): 622-625. For comparative studies of Romanian commerce see John R. Lampe and Marvin R. Jackson, *Balkan Economic History, 1550-1950* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982) and Ivan T. Berand and György Ránki, *Economic Development in East-Central Europe in the 19th & 20th Centuries* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

one else, or to do much of anything towards advancing American commercial interests."²⁹

Jackson was not the only representative, however, to criticize American practices. By 1903, Serbia's prune export was the largest in the world, exceeding that of the United States by almost 13,000 tons.³⁰ Some twenty years earlier, vice-consul Edward M. Grant had talked of "securing arrangements which [would] throw the entire prune trade of Serbia into American hands," but to do so he needed the "cooperation [of] the right kind of a House in the United States."³¹ Such cooperation was not forthcoming, nor was an increase in America's minuscule consular budget. In fact, both Grant and his successor Vögeli were "honorary" vice-consuls, a term applied to unpaid functionaries.

Fortunately for Vögeli, his ultimate livelihood did not depend upon Serbian exports to the United States. He performed admirably as an agent of New York

²⁹Jackson to Hay, Athens, 29 June 1903, T-630.

³⁰Michael Palairat, "Merchant Enterprise and the Development of the Plum-Based Trades in Serbia, 1847-1911," *Economic History Review* 30 (November 1977): 583. From 1903-1907, Serbia exported some 35,400 tons per annum; the United States, 22,400 tons. Prior to 1900, Serbia also experienced two short lived export booms, first for silk in the 1860's, then for wine in the 1880's. Again see Michael Palairat, "Serbia's Role on International Markets for Silk and Wine, 1860-1890," *Acta historico-oeconomica Iugoslaviae* IV (1977): 161-86.

³¹Grant to John Davis (Assistant Secretary of State), Belgrade, 12 September 1884, Despatches from the United States Consuls in Belgrade, 1883-1906, National Archives, Microcopy No. T-513.

Life, and in 1903 could claim over 1,100 Serbian clients, a number which would increase substantially in the coming decade.³² The company's success was due in large part to a lack of domestic providers, and for many years it would rank second or third among a host of European firms. All told, New York Life handled over 20 percent of Serbia's life insurance policies from 1903 to 1904.³³

On 8 July, Jackson informed Hay that most European sovereigns had been notified of Peter's succession, and that a number of ministers subsequently had returned to Belgrade. "All this goes to show," wrote Jackson, that "etiquette has as much to do as morality, with the action of the diplomatic corps in absenting itself from the reception of King Peter."³⁴ Jackson's dispatch prompted Second Assistant Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee to write, "If etiquette settles it, why should we not have a notification from Peter? Perhaps it will enable us to decide this knotty point."³⁵ In a note to Secretary Hay, Adee stated:

³²Danica Milić, "Domaći i strani kapital u osiguranju (Srbija do 1914)," *Istorija XX veka* XII (1972): 13-30. The New York Life Insurance Company established a Belgrade office in 1887.

³³Ibid. A rather humorous editorial appeared in the 15 June edition of the *Chicago Record-Herald*, stating: "After all, there is one advantage in being King of Servia. He isn't likely to be bothered much by insurance solicitors!"

³⁴Jackson to Hay, Athens, 8 July 1903, T-630.

³⁵Adee to Francis B. Loomis (Assistant Secretary of State), Washington, D.C., 23 July 1903, T-630.

There can be only two valid grounds for the non-recognition of King Peter. 1st, a conviction that he was accessory before the fact to the murder of the late King. 2nd, an opinion that the virtual reward of the murderers and their participation in the new govt. is immoral. I hardly know what right we have to sit in judgement on either of these charges.³⁶

Hay wrote in response, "I think your view of the situation is immensely correct- but Peter is a little slow- we can afford to wait."³⁷

On 18 July, Assistant Secretary Francis B. Loomis wired Jackson (who was now residing in Bucharest) that it was best not to travel to Belgrade at that time, and that before doing so he first should ascertain discreetly if Peter had sent a letter notifying the President of his accession. If this was not the case, wrote Loomis, Jackson was to be careful "not to invite such an action."³⁸ As of 23 July, Jackson had gathered no such information, and stated that he was unable to do so without officially consulting Peter's government. He ultimately felt that Vögeli was so "entirely Servian in his sympathies" that he was of no use, and that the Russian

³⁶Adee to Hay, Washington, D.C., 13 July 1903, T-630.

³⁷Hay to Adee, Washington, D.C., not dated, T-630.

³⁸Loomis to Jackson, Washington, D.C., 18 July 1903, M-77. Loomis appears to have been following the opinion of the State Department as a whole. In fall 1903, Hay met informally with Mabel Grujić, a West Virginia native and wife of Serb diplomat Slavko Grujić. Though she sought information as to why the United States had not recognized Peter, Hay would only tell her that he "needed to take American public opinion into account." It is therefore obvious that Hay did not wish to be the one to re-initiate relations. See Bogdan Popović, "Majski prevrat i SAD," 93.

minister Charykov, to whom he might write in ordinary circumstances, was "liable to communicate with the Servian authorities."³⁹

While in Romania, Jackson and his family were entertained by King Carol I, who tended to speak with feeling about the recent events in Serbia. According to Jackson, the monarch had just signed new credentials for his minister at Belgrade, though felt it necessary to resign from his post as honorary colonel of a Serbian regiment. Carol did not, however, "feel at liberty to postpone longer the renewal of diplomatic relations," especially when Serbia imported close to a million dinars worth of Romanian goods the preceding year.⁴⁰

In early August, Jackson received a confidential letter from the Dutch minister to Serbia (who likewise was accredited to Romania), informing him that Peter had sent telegrams to all the European heads of state. "Either due to forgetfulness or economy, no [such] telegram was sent to the President.... [The

³⁹Jackson to Hay, Sinaia, 23 July 1903, T-630. Though Jackson was critical of Vögeli, one of his successors would call the vice-consul "well qualified for the post he occupies," and state that "the Consulate is a credit to him and to America." Moore to Department of State, Belgrade, 22 August 1905, T-513.

⁴⁰Jackson to Hay, 31 July 1903, Despatches from the United States Ministers to Romania, 1880-1906, National Archives, Microcopy No. T-727. Jackson is credited with having normalized relations between Washington and Bucharest, problems of which arose due to Romania's treatment of its Jewish population. See Dumitru Vitcu and Gabriel Bădărău, "Political Implications of the Romanian Emigration to America up to 1918," *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire* 31 (1992): 266-267. For an interesting piece on 19th century U.S.-Romanian diplomacy, see G.M. Razi, "Early American-Romanian Relations," *East European Quarterly* XXI (March 1987): 35-65.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs] thought of doing it the next day, then hesitated,...then decided merely to send an autograph letter."⁴¹ As this letter was in the course of preparation, Jackson asked that he be accredited as soon as it was received.

Besides, wrote Jackson "it is not our practice to notify foreign governments of a change in our President.... [Therefore] I do not think we should be too diffcile" with regards to King Peter.⁴² In addition, he felt that the new monarch was acting in such a way as to increase his popularity, and had shown little intention of mixing in party politics.

Indeed, the reign of Peter would come to represent the culmination of Serbia's struggle for parliamentary government.⁴³ Unlike his predecessors, Peter was a strict constitutionalist, who held a deep respect for the basic principles of democracy. He not only swore to uphold the new constitution, but also pledged "to devote himself to the establishment of justice and freedom in Serbia, to the

⁴¹Jackson to Hay, Sinaia, 6 August 1903, T-630. Jackson specifically asked that this particular correspondence not be included in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³On Peter and the rise of parliamentary government, see Alex N. Dragnich, "King Peter I: Culmination of Serbia's Struggle for Parliamentary Government," *East European Quarterly* 4 (June 1970): 170-78; Idem, *The Development of Parliamentary Government in Serbia*, (Boulder: East European Quarterly, 1978), 95-106.

improvement of the economy, and to the modernization of the army."⁴⁴ Of prime importance, however, was his belief that political leadership was to be in the hands of those who enjoyed a majority in the parliament.

One of the first acts of the provisional government was to reinstall the skupština elected in August 1901. In characteristic fashion, the Radical Party had dominated the elections, winning 84 out of 130 seats.⁴⁵ Its return to power virtually guaranteed the selection of Peter, whose own sentiments resembled those of Nikola Pašić, Lazar Paču, and other Radical leaders. The party itself enjoyed overwhelming support, a fact alluded to by Jackson on 24 August.

The election of a new Skupština takes place on September 8/21, and it is expected that a Radical majority will be returned. This will lead to further changes in the government, and if King Peter is able to affect these changes in a peaceful, constitutional manner, it is to be hoped that comparative tranquility—for a time at least—may be the result.⁴⁶

⁴⁴Michael Boro Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, vol. 2 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 537.

⁴⁵The most successful of Serbian parties, the Radicals were successful at mobilizing the Serbian peasantry behind such liberal notions as limited government, rule by law, and civil rights. See Gale Stokes, *Legitimacy through Liberalism: Vladimir Jovanović and the Transformation of Serbian Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975). See also Traian Stoianovich, "The Pattern of Serbian Intellectual Evolution, 1830-1880," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 1 (March 1959): 242-272.

⁴⁶Jackson to Hay, Sinaia, 24 August 1903, T-630. Jackson made no distinction as to the old Radicals and Independent Radicals, the primary parties of the pre-election campaign.

By late August, Jackson was certain that Peter was "winning the good opinion of the people in his Capitol" and that he appeared "to have made a good impression... elsewhere in the country."⁴⁷ Foreign relations were also on the upswing, demonstrated by the large number of representatives who had reestablished contact with Belgrade. As matters stood, all the ministers formerly accredited to Serbia (excluding the British, the Dutch, and the American) had presented their credentials to Peter.

Though the United States also refused to accredit its minister, both Britain and the Netherlands took much firmer positions regarding the conspiratorial question. As referred to previously, the Dutch minister relocated to Bucharest, while the mission of the British envoy, Sir George Bonham, was suspended entirely. Charykov earlier told Jackson that as England was not directly interested in the Balkans it could "act on purely moral grounds."⁴⁸ This was indeed the case, but on 31 August, Jackson wrongly reported that Bonham would be re-accredited after the elections, and that the Dutch minister would receive his credentials before

⁴⁷Jackson to Hay, Sinaia, 13 August 1903, T-630.

⁴⁸Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 21 June 1903, T-630.

long.⁴⁹ Whereas the United States based its reasoning on accepted protocol, neither Britain nor the Netherlands was willing to expose its representative to what the Foreign Office called "the necessity of having to shake hands with and to sit beside a regicide."⁵⁰

Although Jackson did not insist upon such measures, he did show his displeasure with a Serbian government largely "in the power of those responsible for...the night of June 10th/11th."⁵¹ He speculated as to who indeed held power, and on 13 September, wrote:

Generally the King appears to be trying to do his best in every way, but it is an open question as to whether he is acting in a manner to please those who actually rule.... One should not be surprised or astonished at any news which may come from Serbia, or at anything which may happen in that country.⁵²

Indeed, Jackson sent his dispatch in the wake of a botched counterconspiracy, the trial of which did not conclude until 26 September. It appears that a number of

⁴⁹The issue as to whether or not Britain would re-accredit its envoy was of prime importance to Serbia, and rumors apparently circulated quite freely. For what is probably the most thorough study of Anglo-Serbian relations after 1903 see Ljiljana Aleksić-Pejković, *Odnosi Srbije sa Francuskom i Engleskom, 1903-1914* (Belgrade: Istorijski Institut, 1965). See also Zara S. Steiner, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914* (Cambridge: University Press, 1969).

⁵⁰Quoted in Frances A. Radovich, "The British Court and Relations with Serbia," *East European Quarterly* 4 (Winter 1980): 463.

⁵¹Jackson to Hay, Sinaia, 24 August 1903, T-630.

⁵²Jackson to Hay, Sinaia, 13 September 1903, T-630.

officers from the Niš garrison disapproved of the conspirators, who with the dynastic change moved to fill all of the better civil and military positions. Led by Captain Milan Novaković, some twenty officers united under the slogan *Mundire dole, oni ili mi!* ("Remove uniforms, they or we!"), protesting the conspirators' corrupt, praetorian influence.⁵³

Novaković and his fellow officers insisted upon a peaceful, judicial intervention, frequently charging that the conspirators had violated their sworn military oaths. They also stated that their movement was in no way directed at the Karadjordjevići, leading many to believe that Peter himself was interested in removing the regicides from his court.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, wrote Jackson, "it has been officially announced that as a constitutional sovereign, the King is bound to respect the amnesty granted to the original conspirators by the Skupshtina."⁵⁵ In the end, both Novaković and his counterconspiracy were arrested, and mild prison terms given to those involved.

⁵³See Wayne S. Vucinich, *Serbia Between East and West: the Events of 1903-1908*, 70-74.

⁵⁴It is interesting to note, however, that the counterconspiracy originated in Niš, where the Obrenović dynasty enjoyed a considerable degree of support. Jackson earlier stated that in this city, "one or two regiments took the oath of new allegiance [to Peter] with some hesitation." Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 19 June 1903, T-630.

⁵⁵Jackson to Hay, Sinaia, 26 September 1903, T-630.

Though Peter refused to condemn the conspirators, they in fact were kept out of a cabinet formed after the elections of 21 September. Vögeli informed Jackson that Serbia's new government, a split coalition of Radicals and Independent Radicals, had prepared all letters announcing the accession of King Peter, "but none [have been] sent away yet, and no decision has been taken if they [will] send these letters through Diplomatic Agents, by post or if they...[will be sent through] special Envoyes."⁵⁶ As Jackson was to leave for Athens in late November, he requested that the State Department forward his credentials by telegraph, with as little delay as possible." On 24 October, Adee instructed his staff that since "Peter's notification may reach us soon," it was probably time to "get the thing in shape, credential letter, etc. so that we can telegraph Mr. Jackson as he requests."⁵⁷ Less than a month later, Jackson reported that a letter to President Theodore Roosevelt had been sent to the Serbian minister at Berlin, and from there it shortly would be transferred to Washington, D.C.

By 28 November, Adee was in possession of Peter's announcement, and a formal reply from the President came on 11 December. Adee informed

⁵⁶Jackson to Hay, Sinaia, 8 October 1903, T-630. The Independent Radicals formed in 1901, believing the old Radical Party opportunistic and given to quick compromise.

⁵⁷Adee to Smith, Washington, D.C., 24 October 1903, T-630.

Jackson that the time for the presentation of these letters was up to him, but that he should plan his visit to Belgrade "so that it may not be claimed to possess any significance as a condonement by this government of the acts which so shocked the sense of all civilized peoples."⁵⁸

Adee's concern was in fact that of the entire diplomatic corps, which continued to insist that the conspirators be punished. In order to pressure the king, both the Austrian and Russian ministers agreed to a "diplomatic strike," whereby they would avoid any and all court functions. Other ministers followed suit, and by January most had taken leave of Belgrade. They did not, however, break off relations and according to Jackson their boycott was more social than political.

None of them wanted to come into personal contact with the regicides, certain of whom still form a part of the household of King Peter. In this household there have been several changes lately, but there are even yet several adjutants and other members of it who took an active part in the 'removal' of King Alexander....⁵⁹

Peter himself was forced to cancel a New Year's reception; the absence of foreign secretaries and other attachés was apparently too great an embarrassment. Instead, a centennial celebration for the Karadjordjević dynasty was held in Topola, the

⁵⁸Adee to Jackson, Washington, D.C., 15 December 1903, M-77.

⁵⁹Jackson to Hay, Athens, 24 January 1903, T-630. For a review of the diplomatic strike, see David MacKenzie, "The May Conspiracy and the European Powers: the Diplomatic Boycott Against Serbia, 1903-1906," *South East European Monitor II* (1995): 3-19.

home of Peter's famed grandfather, Karadjordje (Black George) Petrović, who had led a Christian uprising against the Turks in 1804.⁶⁰ As Peter was unwilling to dismiss the conspirators, court functions therefore were limited to those of local, as well as patriotic concern.

Serbia's opposition press also was urging "the necessity of ceding to the opinion of Europe," deemed unanimous when the whole of the diplomatic corps declined invitations to a court ball in February.⁶¹ Prior to the event, Jackson stated that there were "constant rumors of friction in governmental circles, and another ministerial or worse catastrophe...[was] thought possible at any time."⁶² This was indeed true, as the Grujić cabinet soon resigned due to inter-party bickering and the "diplomatic strike" referred to above.

Peter at first turned to Stojan Protić, a Radical and former minister of the interior, in hopes of forming a new cabinet. But when Protić refused, Peter had no other option but to reinvest Grujić with the responsibility.⁶³ The ministerial crisis

⁶⁰See Michael Boro Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, vol. 1, 27-82.

⁶¹Quoted in Wayne S. Vucinich, *Serbia Between East and West: the Events of 1903-1908*, 85.

⁶²Jackson to Hay, Athens, 24 January 1904, T-630.

⁶³According to Vögeli, Peter's policy of "not interfering in political matters, and in making ministers responsible for their actions [has made] the position of minister...more difficult, and fewer men are willing to accept office....Under King Alexander the ministry was merely a

lasted more than a week, though the end result was a cabinet of noted personalities, including Nikola Pašić (foreign minister), Lazar Paču (finance), Ljubomir Davidović (education), and Radomir Putnik (war).

Although Grujić's cabinet was again free of conspirators, the diplomatic corps continued to press Peter for their wholesale removal from court. After more than a month's hesitation, Peter finally conceded, issuing a royal decree in which the officers who had been given posts by the provisional government were now appointed to various regiments and their places filled by those who were not implicated in the conspiracy. Some in fact were promoted, but at last "the chief objection of the Powers against renewing diplomatic relations with Serbia has been removed."⁶⁴

Credentials in hand, Jackson was now able present himself to Peter, though the State Department insisted that he use "cautious discretion."⁶⁵ On 6 May 1904, he returned to Belgrade, and after meeting briefly with Foreign Minister Pašić, submitted a written request for an audience with Peter. Eager to renew relations,

tool in the King's hands and its members were not obliged to think or act for themselves but merely to obey orders." Jackson to Hay, Athens, 15 February, 1904, T-630.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Hay to Jackson, Washington, D.C., 18 February 1904, M-77.

the Serbian Foreign Office acted with considerable haste. "Within twenty four hours my calls were returned," wrote Jackson, "and on the afternoon of May 7th I received a communication in which it was stated that King Peter would receive me on Monday, the 9th."⁶⁶

Jackson learned at or around this time that the new Russian minister, Konstantin Gubastov, had been received with more ceremony than had heretofore been customary. In order that "no false impression be created," Jackson let the Serbian foreign office know that he expected his own reception to be "in accordance with the new precedent."⁶⁷ This was a somewhat laughable demand, considering that the United States showed a paltry concern for Serbia, as well as for its political and economic well-being.

Nevertheless, on 9 May Jackson was met at his hotel by Peter's court marshal, and taken to the palace in a carriage complete with outriders and a cavalry escort. Once inside the courtyard, Jackson was attended to by over a dozen adjutants and other court officials, while a military band incongruously played "Hail Columbia." Soldiers lined the palace stairs, and after a presentation of arms, Jackson was ushered into an audience with Peter. Upon the presentation of

⁶⁶Jackson to Hay, Athens, 14 May, 1904, T-630.

⁶⁷Ibid.

credentials, Jackson assured the king of the "best wishes of the President and of the American Government for the prosperity of Serbia...."⁶⁸ Peter responded in kind, stating that he was deeply touched, and that he would "neglect nothing which may realize and facilitate a closer rapprochement between our two countries."⁶⁹

After the exchange of statements, wrote Jackson, the conversation was of an informal character, and refreshments were served according to Serbian national custom. He again met with Pašić, then sat briefly with Peter, the crown prince, and other members of the royal family.⁷⁰ At length the king took leave, and Jackson returned to his hotel in the same manner in which he had come. Relations thus restored, he collected his belongings, then departed for Greece that evening.

Through the summer of 1904, Jackson tended to other Greek and Romanian matters, but returned to Belgrade in September for Peter's coronation. As instructed by Secretary of State Hay, he proceeded in the company of Charles Wilson, a legation secretary who at times functioned as his chargé d'affaires. They arrived to find the city filled with visitors, and brightly illuminated in honor of the

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰As Peter was a widower, the royal family included two sons and a daughter, namely George, Alexander, and Jelena.

new king's coronation. The ceremony itself lasted over two and half hours, and though "an unusual proceeding in the present age," wrote Jackson, it effectively excited Belgrade's "oriental surroundings."⁷¹ The next evening a dinner was given for all chiefs-of-mission, followed by a theatrical production, a military review, a court ball, horse races, and a mock battle. Jackson spoke briefly with Peter, offering his congratulations to a man whose "satisfaction and contentment were obvious."⁷²

⁷¹Jackson to Hay, Sofia, 26 September, 1904, T-630.

⁷²Ibid.

III. Pig Wars, Fakes, and Physicists, 1905-1911

Following Peter's coronation, Jackson informed Hay that unless something unusual occurred, he would not return to Serbia until spring. He stated that he had been given ample opportunity to speak with Peter, and that now, with the onset of winter, it would be best for him to retire to Athens. It was a logical move, considering that Jackson was aware of "an impending ministerial crisis," one which threatened to disrupt the government for an indefinite period of time.¹

The crisis to which he was referring concerned the second Grujić cabinet, a loose conglomeration of old and Independent Radicals who no longer could work in unison. Their constant bickering had led Jackson to believe that Peter was much "too constitutional," and in need of infinitely firmer policies.² It appears that the Independent Radicals, tired of what they regarded as Radical opportunism, were decidedly against inter-cabinet cooperation. The situation came to a head in December 1904, when Grujić lost even the support of his own party, the majority

¹Jackson to Hay, Sinaia, 3 October 1904, T-630.

²Jackson to Hay, Sofia, 26 September, T-630.

of which favored a more powerful figure at the helm. A subsequent re-shuffling lead to an all-Radical cabinet under the premiership of Pašić, who also retained his portfolio as foreign minister. For the first time since his accession, wrote Jackson, "King Peter has a homogeneous cabinet, and it is hoped that the result will be advantageous as far as domestic matters are concerned."³ The opposite was in fact true, and by May 1905, Pašić himself would resign. Nevertheless, he was able to sway Peter towards a Serbo-Bulgarian rapprochement, the result of which was the famed Austro-Serbian "Pig War" of 1906-11.

Heretofore Serbia had been dependent upon Austria-Hungary for a great majority of its commerce. Lacking sufficient outlets, it had gravitated toward Vienna, in Jackson's estimation, "more or less from a sense of necessity."⁴ Now that Pašić and other Serb Slavophiles were in power, they openly endeavored "to bring this state of affairs to an end."⁵ By spring 1904, Serbia had entered into two separate treaties with Bulgaria, one of which laid the foundations for an eventual customs union. Jackson was highly skeptical, however, believing that "the

³Jackson to Hay, Athens, December 17 1904, T-630.

⁴Jackson to Hay, Athens, 20 April 1905, T-630.

⁵Ibid. On the advent of a customs treaty see Andrew Rossos, "Serbian-Bulgarian Relations, 1903-1914," *Canadian Slavic Papers* 23 (December 1981): 394-408.

practical Bulgarians" were willing to aid Serbia only as long as it was to "their own economical and political advantage."⁶ He also opined that if Serbia:

breaks with Austria-Hungary she is bound to become dependent upon Bulgaria (and indirectly upon Germany)... Under the circumstances Bulgaria has nothing to lose and everything to gain from a commercial understanding with Serbia, while that country can at best change one form of economic dependence for another.⁷

Whatever the case, Serbia held firm in its belief that economic emancipation could be achieved through Bulgaria. Twice in 1904 Peter met with the Bulgarian Prince Ferdinand, and in the summer of 1905, a Serbo-Bulgarian customs agreement was reached. It would take effect in March 1906, though Serbian officials asked that it be kept secret until the conclusion of their own talks with Vienna.

Meanwhile, the American State Department informed Jackson that it intended to create a second Balkan mission, thereby re-assigning him as envoy to the courts of Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro. The ministerships of Serbia and Romania would continue to be under one legate, a presidential appointee by the name of John W. Riddle. As Riddle was not scheduled to arrive in Belgrade until the spring of 1906, it was suggested that Thomas Ewing Moore, Riddle's *chargé d'*

⁶Jackson to Hay, Athens, 20 April 1905, T-630.

⁷*Ibid.* Serbia signed a commercial treaty with Germany on 28 November 1904. See Horst M. Lorscheider, "The Commercial Treaty between Germany and Serbia," *Central European History* 9 (June 1976): 129-145.

affaires *ad interim*, be introduced personally to Peter. Afterwards Jackson was to present his own letter of recall, and to take leave of Belgrade entirely.

On 12 July, both Moore and Jackson attended a reception in honor of the king's birthday, a hearty affair in which Peter offered the new minister his "sincere expressions of good-will."⁸ Moore then met with the diplomatic corps, and at length was introduced to Serbia's new foreign minister, Jovan Žujović.⁹ There was of course no mention of Serbo-Bulgarian affairs, though for some time, stated Jackson, it was obvious that the two countries had formed an "anti-Austrian combination."¹⁰

The following afternoon Jackson arranged for an official audience with Peter, who subsequently thanked him for "making closer the relations between the United States and Servia."¹¹ The king then spoke with great interest regarding America's Serb communities, and questioned Jackson as to the publication of Serbo-American newspapers, such as San Francisco's *Nezavisnost* (Independence),

⁸Moore to Secretary of State, Sinaia, 25 July 1905, T-630.

⁹Two days earlier, Žujović had forwarded a letter expressing his government's regret at the death of Secretary of State John Hay, whom he called a "citoyen très distingué et homme d'Etat eminent." Jackson to Secretary of State, Belgrade, 10 July 1905, T-630.

¹⁰Jackson to Hay, Athens, 20 April 1905, T-630.

¹¹Jackson to Secretary of State, Belgrade, 13 July 1905, T-630.

New York's *Srpski Rodoljub* (Serbian Patriot), and Chicago's *Ujedinjeno Srpstvo* (Serbian Union), three prominent publications of 1905.¹² When Jackson at last departed he was given an autographed photo of Peter, ostensibly to commemorate his brief, yet eventful stay.

Moore himself remained in Belgrade for another ten days, witnessing the general elections of 23 July. He recorded that over 1,000 candidates were vying for only 160 seats; all told they comprised seven voter lists drawn from nine different parties. To Moore, such a system of was curious indeed. He wrote:

Inasmuch as a good proportion of the Servian peasant-population is illiterate, it is necessary to adopt a means of enabling the electors...to recognize the difference in the lists. They may only vote for one party, that is to say choose one of the lists, and their votes go to all named on the list selected.... Each party has its own ballot box and they are distinguished by being of different colours. At Belgrade, for instance, there were seven boxes, placed sided by side, having all the colors of the rainbow.¹³

The final returns gave the Independent Radicals a one-vote majority, and control of the ruling skupština. Unsurprisingly, the margin proved to be too narrow to establish any real degree of cabinet stability. For the next eight months, the

¹²For an extensive list of Serbo-American newspapers, see Adam S. Eterovich, *A Guide and Bibliography to Research on Yugoslavs in the United States and Canada* (Palo Alto: Ragusan Press, 1978), 47-54. See also Robert P. Gakovich and Milan M. Radovich, *Serbs in the United States and Canada: A Comprehensive Bibliography* (St. Paul: University of Minnesota Immigration History Research Center, 1992), 133-157.

¹³Moore to Secretary of State, Sinaia, 31 July 1905, T-630.

Independents struggled with Serbia's myriad crises, the greatest of which was the country's souring relations with Austria-Hungary.

Late in 1905 Austrian authorities discovered that Serbia and Bulgaria were planning to create their own customs union, one which would give Belgrade additional transport and shipping privileges. Enraged, Vienna subsequently broke off negotiations and by January 1906, it had closed its borders to Serbian commerce.¹⁴ The effect was immediate, and altogether severe. Between 1905 and 1906, Serbian exports to Austria declined by over 34.6 million dinars, and imports by another 11 million. In like manner, trade with the United States declined precipitously, and in 1906 the Serbian Ministry of Finance recorded an utter absence of American imports. A plausible explanation appears to be that Austrian intermediaries could no longer afford to transport American goods, especially when Serbia began to impose higher tariff rates on the Dual Monarchy.

With the onset of the "Pig War," Serbia realized that its economic survival rested on the procurement of alternative commercial outlets. To this end, Pašić's second government enlisted the support of Russia, France, Italy, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, the latter of which granted transit rights to Salonika and a

¹⁴The most authoritative study on the Austro-Serbian "Pig War" is by Dimitrije Djordjević, *Carinski rat Austro-ugarske i Srbije 1906-1911* (Belgrade, 1962).

loading zone in its harbor. Thus by 1907 Serbia was well on its way to economic recovery, demonstrated by an almost 20 percent increase in total commerce. Over the next five years, trade with the United States would rise associatively.

Table 2
Serbian Trade with the United States,
1905-1911

Year	(in dinars)					
	kg.	Exports value	%	kg.	Imports value	%
1905	----	----	----	942,207	1,298,877	2.03
1906	----	----	----	----	----	----
1907	779	2,600	----	299,434	186,011	0.26
1908	1,301,508	1,985,500	2.71	524,490	473,970	0.63
1909	2,081,305	3,005,090	3.23	931,637	869,960	1.18
1910	2,673,258	3,867,370	3.93	1,080,666	1,011,259	1.19
1911	2,544,007	3,609,310	3.08	1,729,389	2,135,672	1.85

Source: *Statistika spoljašnje trgovine Kr. Srbije. 1905-1911.*

Starting at a meager 186,000 dinars in 1907, the value of imports from the United States peaked at a sizable 2.1 million in 1911. Though they continued to represent a small portion of all Serbian imports, goods from America were consequently of greater value than those purchased from Romania, Bulgaria, or Greece. What is most surprising, however, is that during this period Serbia managed to increase its own exports to the United States. From 1908 to 1911, Serbian exports averaged over 3.1 million dinars per year, a number which

exceeded that of the previous twenty years combined. While coffee continued to be the most imported of American goods, Serbia exported large quantities of dried fruit and copper.¹⁵

The Austro-Serbian "Pig War" was of great interest to the American shipping industry. First, in 1905-06 the American Car Company explored the viability of constructing a train car factory at Niš.¹⁶ Then in 1907, the firm Balston Brown approached the Serbian government regarding the construction of railway lines, and in particular, of a much coveted route to the Adriatic. Like those of other nations, American businesses hoped to capitalize on a Danube-Adriatic railway, that would circumvent Austria, as well as its projected train line through Novi Pazar.¹⁷ Perhaps the most interesting of proposals came in 1909, when the American Engineering Company offered to construct a canal between the Danube and the Aegean Sea. As the canal was to traverse Turkish territory, Serbian

¹⁵For an excellent study of Serbian mines and foreign capital see Danica Milić, *Strani kapital u rudarstvu Srbije do 1918g* (Belgrade: Istorijski Institut, 1970).

¹⁶Concerning the American Car Company, Balston Brown, and the American Engineering Company, see Danica Milić, "Privredne veze SAD i Srbije do prvog svetskog rata," 131-132.

¹⁷For an excellent summary of the proposed Danube-Adriatic railway, see Wayne S. Vucinich, *Serbia Between East and West: the Events of 1903-1908*, 210-230. See also Arthur J. May, "Trans-Balkan Railway Schemes," *The Journal of Modern History* XXIV (December 1952): 352-367; Idem, "The Novi Bazar Railroad Project," *Journal of Modern History* X (December 1938): 496-527.

officials refused to entertain the proposal without an agreement with Constantinople.

In the end, none of the above plans was acted upon, though their very existence revealed that American firms were aware of what Moore called "a great new field, rich in trade possibilities."¹⁸ Nevertheless, without direct commercial links, Serbia and the other Danubian countries were relatively inaccessible to the United States, especially when business there could "only be availed of with caution and through trustworthy agents on the spot."¹⁹ Christian Vögeli was one such agent, and from 1905 to 1910, New York Life averaged almost 1600 insurance policies per year.²⁰ Needless to say, other American companies were less venturesome, neglecting "trade opportunities entirely in these countries of far Eastern Europe."²¹

On 23 April 1906, Minister Riddle at last arrived in Belgrade, assuming his post after similar work in Cairo. He met with Peter on 7 May, and after brief introductions the two men spoke casually regarding the recent San Francisco fire.

¹⁸Moore to Loomis, Sinaia, 22 August 1905, T-513

¹⁹Jackson to Hay, Athens, 14 January 1905, T-630.

²⁰Milić, "Domaći i strani kapital u osiguranju (Srbija do 1914)," 25.

²¹Moore to Loomis, Belgrade, 22 August 1905, T-513.

The king expressed deep regret, though at the same time he was confident that "American energy would soon efface all traces of material damage."²² He did not, however, touch upon any of the "unpalatable questions" affecting Serbian affairs.²³

The first such question regarded trade relations with Austria-Hungary. In early 1906, Serbia was feeling the baneful effects of an imposed economic embargo. Not satisfied with simple tariff concessions, Vienna insisted that Serbia agree to a series of irrelevant conditions, mostly regarding bank loans and proposed military contracts. Riddle at once stated that these conditions were "so onerous that no [Serbian] ministry could accept them and still stand."²⁴ Nevertheless, Austrian officials held firm, believing that if the skupština refused their proposals, the Serbs would soon "suffocate in their own swine fat."²⁵

The second and third questions were in themselves connected. First, Great Britain and the Netherlands still refused to re-accredit their envoys until all of the regicides had been removed. Since none of them were on duty at court, this meant

²²Riddle to Elihu Root (Secretary of State), Belgrade, 9 May 1906, T-630.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Quoted in Željko Šuster, "Serbia's Economic Relations with the West Before World War I," *Serbian Studies* 7 (Fall 1993): 37.

retiring those who had been reassigned (and even promoted) to posts outside of Belgrade. In order to do so, Peter would have to confront a conspiratorial faction that had come to exert an enormous amount of influence, at times affecting "military appointments, [the] procurement of military supplies and credits, and in general any basic issue before the government."²⁶

Indeed this was no small task, though Peter ultimately had the support of Nikola Pašić, who was once again head of a new cabinet. According to Riddle:

The prime minister is desirous of settling the question forthwith, as he expresses the opinion that his party would triumphantly carry the approaching elections if it could go before the country with the prestige of having solved this question, for even the peasants feel strongly on the subject and realize the stigma which is cast upon Serbia in the opinion of foreign nations.²⁷

Thus in collusion with Pašić, Peter decided to retire the remaining conspirators.²⁸

On 16 May 1906, Pašić informed Great Britain that the final six regicides (Popović, Mašin, Mišić, Lazarević, Kostić, and Atanacković) had been pensioned off and would not return to their positions. The Foreign Office responded

²⁶Vucinich, *Serbia Between East and West: the Events of 1903-1908*, 102.

²⁷Riddle to Root, Belgrade, 9 May 1906, T-630.

²⁸On Pašić's role in the dismissal of the remaining officers, see Alex N. Dragnich, *Serbia, Nikola Pašić, and Yugoslavia* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1974).

favorably, and on 11 June, exactly three years after the Belgrade coup, Anglo-Serbian relations were restored.²⁹ It was a major diplomatic breakthrough, though increased Serbian ties with Britain were anathema to Austrian interests.³⁰

By mid-1906, the great alliances of Europe had all but materialized; for this reason Germany and Austria feared British, French, Italian, and Russian influence over Belgrade. Led by a determined foreign minister, Count Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal, the Dual Monarchy therefore began to pursue a more active policy in the Balkans.³¹ The Austro-Serbian "Pig War" was the first step, followed by plans to construct a railroad connecting the Sanjak of Novi Pazar with Salonika. By doing so, Aehrenthal hoped to isolate the states of Serbia and Montenegro, thereby ending any greater-Serb or Yugo-slav aspirations.³² In fall 1908, Vienna made its most aggressive move to date. After brief negotiations with the Russian foreign

²⁹The Dutch minister, Baron de Welderren Rengers, at last would present his credentials on 19 November 1906.

³⁰Concerning Austria and Britain, see Alfred Francis Pribram, *Austria-Hungary and Great Britain, 1908-1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951).

³¹See Alfred Francis Pribram, *Austrian Foreign Policy, 1908-1918* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1923). See also F.R. Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo: the Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914* (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972).

³²As to this point, see John D. Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1983). See also Soloman Wank, "Aehrenthal and the Sanjak of Novibazar Railway Project: A Reappraisal," *Slavonic and East European Review* XLII (June 1964): 353-69.

minister Alexander Izvolsky, Aehrenthal announced the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina.³³

The ensuing crisis nearly brought Europe to war, though at length Serbia was forced to accept the Austrian acquisitions. Nevertheless, for Pašić and other Serb leaders the annexation of Bosnia was an unpardonable act that threatened the very existence of the Serb nation. For over five months they refused to recognize the annexation, claiming that: (1) it was illegal under the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, and that (2) if the Great Powers were willing to accept such a change, then Serbia should be entitled to some sort of territorial compensation, most likely the Sanjak of Novi Pazar.

In contrast, the United States accepted the annexation with great indifference, maintaining that as a non-participant (in both the Congress of Berlin and in Balkan affairs at large) it had little business expressing an overt, potentially complicated opinion. To this end the State Department instructed Riddle's replacement, a Delaware native by the name of Horace G. Knowles, that he should

³³Known as the famous "Buchlau Bargain," Izvolsky and Aehrenthal agreed that Austria could annex Bosnia-Hercegovina if the Turkish Straits were reopened to Russian warships. For a general overview see Barbara Jelavich, *The Habsburg Empire in European Affairs* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969), 152-153. Also of interest is Bernadotte Schmitt's *The Annexation of Bosnia, 1908-1909* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937; reprint, New York: Howard Fertig, 1970), 19-29 (page references to reprint edition); and John D. Treadway's *The Falcon and the Eagle: Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 1908-1914* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1983).

remain in Bucharest, thereby dispelling "any active [American] interest in the situation."³⁴ Nevertheless, Knowles followed the Serb reaction closely, reporting that the entire population was "thoroughly aroused," and insisting upon "an immediate war with Austria."³⁵ He ultimately felt, however, that the Serbians:

are as excitable as they are poor and helpless.... They will parade through the cities, make violent speeches and close the schools for a few days, but, they will not make war against Austria. Before this dispatch reaches you [Secretary of State Elihu Root], you will have heard, in all probability, the passing of the war cloud from over Servia.³⁶

Meanwhile, America's Serb communities were expressing a similar indignation. On 11 October 1908, the Committee of the Servians of New York petitioned President Theodore Roosevelt "to use the influence of his exalted position [so] that the rights of the people of Bosnia-Hercegovina are protected."³⁷ The Servian National Committee of San Francisco hoped that the United States, as the "exemplar of fair dealing and justice among nations of the earth," would

³⁴Root to Knowles, Washington, D.C., 7 October 1908, Numerical and Minor Files of the Department of State, 1906-1910, National Archives, Microcopy No. M-862. Riddle left Bucharest on 23 January 1907, and was replaced by Knowles, a former consul at Bordeaux, France, in July of that year.

³⁵Knowles to Root, Bucharest, 6 October 1908, M-862.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Committee of Servians of New York to Roosevelt, New York, 11 October 1908, M-862.

"intercede on behalf of Bosnia and Hercegovina...."³⁸ A meeting of Pennsylvania Serbs, all of whom had fled to America from "the tyranny of Austria," asked the President to "offer aid to their brethren...[in order] to free and unite all Serbs."³⁹

The White House also received petitions from Serbian groups outside the United States. Writing "in the name of friends in the Servian Parliament" two London based nationals (giving only the names Lazarovich and Hrebelianovich) informed Roosevelt that:

the sudden and arbitrary annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina has robbed the populations of those Servian lands of all hope of national development and liberty and is the first step towards the annihilation of the independent Kingdom of Servia. Our very existence as a people is in peril.⁴⁰

To this they added a brief appeal, imploring Roosevelt to aid a people "whose own watchword" was a familiar "give me liberty or give me death."⁴¹

An interesting note from the Committee of Servian Women (Belgrade) was sent to Edith Roosevelt, and then to First Lady-Elect Helen Taft. Written by Nadegeđa Petrović, it stated:

³⁸Servian National Committee to Roosevelt, San Francisco, 20 October 1908, M-862.

³⁹Pavlovitch to Roosevelt, Pittsburgh, 20 October 1908, M-862

⁴⁰Lazarovich and Hrebelianovich, London, 8 October 1908, M-862.

⁴¹Ibid.

We believe Madame, that you may be induced to interest the noble and liberal minded women of the United States of America on behalf of the said Committee of Servian Women, in order that they too may raise their voice in the cause of Justice and Liberty and save these two countries [Bosnia and Hercegovina] from slavery, which has been abolished in the United States of America more than half a century ago.⁴²

Though Roosevelt failed to answer the petition, Taft ultimately expressed sympathy with the Committee and their struggle for Bosnian independence. By doing so she incurred the wrath of the Austrian consul, who questioned President Roosevelt as to the matter on 28 December 1908. Claiming ignorance, he promised to correspond with the Tafts at the earliest possible moment. The following day he wrote to them, stating:

I know nothing of the incident, but I am glad to tell you what I think are undoubtedly the facts in the Balkans. No better bit of governmental work has been done in Europe than the work of the Austrians in governing Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is objected to by precisely the type of individual who objects to our having interfered in the Philippines, Santo Domingo, and Panama. I need hardly tell you that while Serbia has done better as an independent power than she did under Turkey, she has done hideously, nevertheless. The present King is the beneficiary of an assassination of the most atrocious kind, and the real authors of the assassination have never been punished. I hope and believe that the Southern Slavs will ultimately grow able to stand by themselves and do as well as the Bulgarians and Romanians have done; but at present independence or annexation to Serbia would work for Bosnia and Herzegovina very much as [William Jennings]

⁴²Petrović to Edith Roosevelt, Belgrade, 16 November 1908, M-862.

Bryan's theory of immediate independence would work for the Philippines.⁴³

It is ironic that the person to whom the Serbs so earnestly appealed was a firm believer in Austrian administration. In addition, Roosevelt thought that Serbia was the worst governed of all the Balkan states (excluding Turkey), and in 1911 wrote that "it must be pretty awful to be connected with the Serbian royal family!"⁴⁴ Such opinions aside, neither Roosevelt nor the United States government wished to get involved in a dispute so removed from American interests. Nevertheless, a few American newspapers suggested that he take a more prominent role in the crisis, possibly through an international conference like the one held at Algeciras some five years earlier. Best summarized by the *Indianapolis Star*, these editorials felt that it was a great chance for Roosevelt "to make a hit by restoring peace in the Balkans."⁴⁵ But for the most part, American papers tended to

⁴³Roosevelt to William Howard Taft, Washington, D.C., 29 December 1908. *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, ed. Elting E. Morison, vol. 6, *The Big Stick, 1907-1909* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), 1447. On Roosevelt and Bulgaria, see "Theodore Roosevelt and the Bulgarians," *Bulgarian Review* 5 (December 1965): 72-73. See also Marin Pundeff, "Stefan Panaretov and Bulgarian-American Relations," *Bulgarian Historical Review* 17 (1989): 26.

⁴⁴Roosevelt to George Trevelyn, Oyster Bay, 1 October 1911. *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, ed. Elting E. Morison, vol. 7, *The Days of Armageddon, 1909-1914* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 363. Roosevelt also described Prince Alexander as a "dreadful creature," though he only had met him on one occasion.

⁴⁵*Indianapolis Star*, 7 October 1908.

echo the *Washington Post*, which held that as "a friend of all nations concerned," the United States would not allow itself to be "drawn into their quarrels."⁴⁶

Eventually, Knowles departed Bucharest on 4 February 1909, some two months before the crisis had passed.⁴⁷ Therefore the United States was without an envoy to Serbia, at a time, wrote one official, when Europe was undergoing "kaleidoscopic changes."⁴⁸ By the beginning of March war appeared so imminent that the American chargé d' affaires in Bucharest inquired as to whether the State Department needed a temporary representative in Belgrade, ostensibly to give "an inside historical account of what may transpire there."⁴⁹

⁴⁶*Washington Post*, 6 October 1908. This appeared to be the prudent position to take, especially when even the tiny Serb state of Montenegro was looking for American support. In May 1909 and again in 1911, King Nikola I unbelievably offered a strip of Adriatic coastline to the United States so that it could construct and maintain its own European naval base. See Richard D. Challener, "Montenegro and the United States: A Balkan Fantasy," *Journal of Central European Affairs* XVII (October 1957): 236-42. See also Dragan Živojinović, "Ustanak Malisora 1911. godine i američka pomoć Crnoj Gori," *Istorijski Zapisi* XX (1967): 323-38.

⁴⁷Knowles received a subsequent recommission to Nicaragua.

⁴⁸Charles Francis to Philander C. Knox (Secretary of State), Vienna, 20 March 1909, M-862.

⁴⁹Norman Hutchinson to Secretary of State, Bucharest, 1 March 1909, M-862. Around this time the State Department received another inquiry, this one from Silver, Burdett, and Company, a well known textbook publisher. The company was desirous of information pertaining to the new boundaries of Austria-Hungary, and wanting to know in particular if Bosnia-Hercegovina was now "an acquired territory" of the Habsburg Empire. Silver, Burdett, and Company to Secretary of State, New York, 12 May 1909, M-862.

The State Department ignored his suggestion, while the next two appointees, Huntington Wilson and Spencer F. Eddy, failed even to make the journey to Belgrade. Both men were given the title envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, though for whatever reason they failed to accept their missions.⁵⁰ On 25 September 1909, John R. Carter received the appointment, finally presenting his credentials over seven months later, in May 1910. For the next year Carter served as E.E. and M.P. to the courts of Romania, Serbia, and Bulgaria, and in turn witnessed two of the most bizarre episodes in the course of Serbo-American relations.⁵¹

The first occurred in the spring of 1910, when Serbia's envoy to Paris, Milenko Vesnić, issued a sharp denial that Crown Prince Alexander and his brother George were seeking wealthy American brides. Though the story first appeared in a 1908 edition of the *New York Times*, it soon was picked up and reprinted in newspapers throughout the country. It held that a Russian general named "Tcherf Spiridonovitch" was acting as a matrimonial agent, and that he

⁵⁰Wilson ultimately declined the appointment; Eddy served at Bucharest but never went to Belgrade. See Department of State, *Principal Officers of the Department of State and United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1990*, 164-66.

⁵¹The Bulgarian mission, formerly filled by a "diplomatic agent," was elevated to full envoyship in June 1910 and added to the exiting Serb/Romanian post. A graduate of Harvard Law School, Carter came to Belgrade after serving as an embassy secretary in London.

diligently was searching for interested American families. When Vesnić caught wind of the reports, he immediately dismissed them as false. "Should either of the future princes at any future time go to America," he stated, "it will be only to visit the country and study institutions which are especially interesting in Serbia, the most democratic kingdom in old Europe."⁵²

The second event occurred some six months later, when a man by the name of Stefan Dusanovitch filed a complaint with the State Department, demanding that a New York justice of the peace make "a complete and immediate apology" for serving him with an official court summons.⁵³ Styling himself the "Prince of Rashka," Dusanovitch believed that he possessed a kind of diplomatic immunity under which he was exempt from legal proceedings. The Department's Diplomatic Bureau initially had no idea who Dusanovitch was. Someone suggested that he had ties to the ruling house of Petrović-Njegoš in Montenegro, but when this proved false, the letter was passed on to Second Assistant Alvey A. Adee.

Adee at once recognized Dusanovitch as that "lunatic" who had earlier approached the Department with claims to the Serbian throne. Amazing as it may

⁵²*New York Times*, 28 March 1910.

⁵³de LaPoer Brownsman to Knox, East Hampton, N.Y., 23 October 1910, Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of Serbia and to Political Relations Between the United States and Serbia, 1910-29, National Archives, Microcopy No. M-357.

seem, Dusanovitch was only one of numerous pretenders seeking recognition through the American government. In June 1903, the *New York Times* reported that a Brooklyn wine merchant named Louis B. Cociancich had papers proving he was king.⁵⁴ Though nothing came of it, another would-be monarch emerged in 1905 from of all places, County Line, Iowa. His name was Theodore M. Streu, and after corresponding directly with the Belgrade consulate, insisted that Secretary of State Root take "such further action [in naming him king] as may be considered expedient."⁵⁵

Of course nothing came of these proposals, though Dusanovitch, Cociancich, and Streu elicited stern recriminations from America's Serb community. In November 1912, two of its leaders, Paul H. Pavlovitch and Milan Yeftich, issued a statement condemning them as "fakers" who were "shamelessly abusing the name of the Serbian people."⁵⁶ They went on to state that due to some basic historical facts, "no honest man would to-day even think of calling himself a

⁵⁴*The New York Times*, 13 June 1903.

⁵⁵Moore to Bacon (Assistant Secretary of State), Bucharest, 9 December 1905, T-513.

⁵⁶*The New York Times*, 26 November 1912. At the time, Pavlovitch was the secretary of the Serb Federation Sloga, and Yeftich was the editor of *The Servian Daily*.

Servian noble."⁵⁷ Nevertheless, Dusanovitch remained quite vocal in his claims, and even went so far as to enlist a "Comptroller of the Household" named G. W. de LaPoer Browsman.

It was Browsman who in 1911 asked that "His Imperial Highness" be appointed as a volunteer aid to Major General W. H. Carter of Fort Sam Houston, Texas. According to Browsman, Dusanovitch was "most anxious to see active service with the troops of the United States," and hoped that the Department would answer his request "with propriety."⁵⁸ After a few more isolated (and ultimately unanswered) letters, both Dusanovitch and Browsman faded into obscurity.

Just over a month later, a more famous person would enter the realm of Serbo-American relations, this time with the proper recognition of the United States government. His name was Michael Idvorsky Pupin, an eminent physicist and inventor, and in May 1911 Peter appointed him as Consul-General to both the United States and Canada.⁵⁹ Apart from Nikola Tesla, Pupin was the most celebrated of Serbian-Americans, having immigrated from the Banat region of

⁵⁷*Ibid.* They obviously were referring to the Turkish conquests of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries which had decimated Serbia's native nobility.

⁵⁸de LaPoer Browsman to Knox, Amagansett, N.Y., 11 March 1911, M-357.

⁵⁹On the advent of Serbo-Canadian relations, see Nicholas Pašić, "Diplomatic Relations Between Canada and Serbia," *Serbian Studies* 4(Spring 1987): 77-86.

Vojvodina in 1874. His scientific work dealt primarily with electromechanics, and as a professor at Columbia University, Pupin held the patents to over thirty inventions.⁶⁰ As an author, speaker, and philanthropist, Pupin was a conscious proponent of Americanization, and by the mid 1920s his autobiography, *From Immigrant to Inventor*, was a popular text in American high schools.⁶¹

Nevertheless, Pupin maintained close ties with America's Serb communities, and after 1908, became one of its most prominent members.⁶² Before then he was politically inactive, though with the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, he helped to found an American protest organization called the Srpski Narodni Centralni Odbor (Serbian National Central Committee).

Expecting a war with Austria, Pupin's committee raised large sums of money for the Red Cross organizations of both Serbia and Montenegro. Though the crisis passed, Pupin remained a prominent fixture in the political life of

⁶⁰Pupin began teaching mathematical physics at Columbia University in 1890. For an authoritative study of Pupin's work, see Slavko Boksan, *Mihailo Pupin i njegovo delo* (Novi Sad: Matica srpska, 1951).

⁶¹In fact, Pupin's work *From Immigrant to Inventor* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923), won a Pulitzer Prize in 1924. For a related article see Vladislav Tomović, "M.I. Pupin—A Pulitzer Prize Winner—in the Eyes of American Readers," *Serbian Studies* 2 (Spring/Fall 1983): 69-78.

⁶²For an excellent review of Pupin's involvement in America's Serb communities see Michael Boro Petrovich, "Pupin in Serbian-American Life before the First World War," *Serbian Studies* 4 (Fall/Spring 1986/1987): 5-27.

Serbian-Americans, and in 1911 received word that he had been named Serbia's Consul-General in New York. The post itself was honorary, and although Pupin was given no salary, supplies, or budget, he opened an office with his own funds that year.⁶³ The end result was entirely beneficial for Serbia. With the outbreak of the Balkan Wars in 1912, Pupin became a vociferous supporter of the Serbian cause. For the next two years he would perform various functions for the Serbian government, including the issuance of passports to immigrants who had come to America from Macedonia, Kosovo, and other regions liberated from Turkey. During World War I he was particularly active, funding Red Cross detachments, giving speeches, and organizing volunteers for transport to Europe.

⁶³See Božidar Purić. *Biografija Bože Rankovića: Doprinos istoriji srpskog iseljeničtva u Severnoj Americi* (Munich: Iskra, 1963): 68.

IV. The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913

The year 1912 was of pivotal interest to the Balkan states, and for Serbia it signified its final liberation from the Ottoman Empire. Though an independent kingdom since 1878, Serbia had long coveted the Turkish territories surrounding Ohrid and Skopje, collectively known as "Old Serbia." It was here that the powerful Nemanjić dynasty had established a medieval empire, and to a majority of Serbians, this area was unquestionably *Serbia irredenta*.¹ Expansion southward was given further impetus with the 1908 annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. If Serbia was unable to secure land from Austria-Hungary, it assuredly could snatch a province or two from the moribund Ottoman Empire. To achieve this end, Belgrade officials entered into a series of separate agreements with Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Greece, the aim being to partition the European holdings of Turkey. Ironically enough, this "Balkan League" of 1912 was borne of an idea

¹In the years prior to 1912, those territories claimed by Serbia were being depleted of their Serbian populations, many of whom fled to America to escape the political unrest and lawlessness of European Turkey. See Jovan Pejin, "Iseljavanje iz Kosovskog vilajeta i drugih krajeva pod Turcima u SAD 1906-1907. godine." *Istorijski Glasnik* 1-2 (1985): 49-54. Another work of interest regarding the United States and Turkish Macedonia is by Hristo Andonov-Polyanski, *The Attitude of the U.S.A. Towards Macedonia* (Skopje: Macedonian Review Editions, 1983). See also Christ Anastasoff, "The Illenden Insurrection of 1903 and Contemporary American Reaction," *Balkania* 2 (October 1968): 18-21.

defensive in nature. Supported by Tsarist Russia, the League originally formed with the goal of keeping an aggressive Austria in check.² It soon became clear, however, that the Balkan states could not be controlled by their sponsor, and in the fall of 1912, each government was making final preparations for war.

Though Serbia had become increasingly belligerent towards Turkey, this had not always been the case. Prime Minister Milovan Milovanović was for a number of years an ardent Russophile, and until his death in July 1912, Serbia followed the St. Petersburg line. In doing so, he promoted defensive treaties such as the one formed between Belgrade and Sofia in March 1912, which pledged each to take joint action against any nation that tried to "annex, occupy, or even temporarily...invade" any Balkan province under Turkish rule.³ Obviously directed at Austria-Hungary, the treaty also called for Russian arbitration in the settlement of future territorial disputes.

To be sure, Serbia and Bulgaria held lengthy discussions concerning the future of Turkish Macedonia. Both countries wished to annex all or part of this

²On Russia and the Balkan League see Edward C. Thaden, *Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912* (College Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965). See also Andrew Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 8-69, and P.E. Mosely. "Russian Policy in 1911-1912," *Journal of Modern History* XII (March 1940): 69-86.

³Quoted in Petrovich, vol. II, 595. For a brief study of Milovanović's career, see Dimitrije Djordjević, *Milovan Milovanović* (Beograd: Prosveta, 1962).

territory, and by mid 1912, they seemed willing to wage war for it. Although Serbia appeared slightly more aggressive with the death of Milovanović, the American envoy, John B. Jackson, did not think that the new cabinet would "initiate any [sort of] adventurous policy."⁴ Nonetheless, by 15 September the United States consul to Belgrade, Maddin Summers, reported that "war was being clamored for on every side," and that the Serbian government had issued a prohibition on the export of wheat, corn, and other foodstuffs deemed necessary should conflict arise.⁵ Two weeks later Peter declared a moratorium on all private contracts, just one, stated Jackson, of the "extraordinary appropriations" passed to cover the cost of mobilization and war.⁶

Such measures notwithstanding, the Serbs failed to engage Turkey until 17 October, nearly ten days after their allies, the Montenegrins. Within a short period of time, however, the Serbian army had crossed the border into Macedonia, and on

⁴Jackson to Secretary of State, Bucharest, 3 July 1912, M-357. Jackson was reappointed as E.E. and M.P. to the courts of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania on 12 August 1911.

⁵Summers to Secretary of State, Belgrade, 15 September 1912, M-357. Summers was appointed as Consul-General to Serbia in 1911, though a majority of his career was spent in Brazil, Bolivia, and other South American countries.

⁶Jackson to Secretary of State, Bucharest, 10 October 1912, M-357.

24 October it scored a decisive victory at Kumanovo.⁷ By now war had opened on three fronts, and the outnumbered Turks were retiring quickly from Europe. Casualties were great on all sides, and by the end of the month, reported Summers, Belgrade was in "great need of medical and pecuniary assistance."⁸ In mid-November he reported that the number of wounded in Serbia was approaching 16,000, and that the city's schools, universities, and other buildings were acting as make-shift hospitals.

In addition, Red Cross representatives were arriving from countries throughout Europe, and soon they established base camps in cities such as Belgrade and Niš. Russian and German volunteers were especially prominent, though Summers believed that "no little surprise and regret is felt here" at America's failure to help.⁹ He also thought that

⁷On Serbia's entrance into the First Balkan War, see Ivan S. Pavlović, *Početak rata sa Turcima 1912* (Beograd: 1941). Though there are few works in English, two studies appear to be useful. See Ernst C. Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938) and Béla K. Király and Dimitrije Djordjević eds., *East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars* (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1987).

⁸Summers to Secretary of State, Belgrade, 28 October 1912, M-357.

⁹Ibid. Though the United States was slow to send humanitarian aid, it did order two warships, the *U.S.S. Tennessee* and the *U.S.S. Montana* to Smyrna and Beirut respectively. Their mission was to protect American interests in the Mediterranean. See Harry N. Howard, "The United States and the Problem of the Turkish Straits: The Foundation of American Policy (1830-1914)," *Balkan Studies* 3 (1962): 26-27.

if only from a purely commercial standpoint, we should respond at once to the suffering.... In recent years a flourishing commerce has grown up with the United States, and this has brought the people here into a closer contact and appreciation of the American people.... Anything which we might be able to do [therefore] would be deeply appreciated...¹⁰

Indeed, one of the cities for which the Balkan allies were fighting, Salonika, was a major outlet for goods to and from the United States. In 1912 alone, Serbian

Table 3
Serbian Trade with the United States,
1912-1913

Year	(in dinars)					
	kg.	Exports value	%	kg.	Imports value	%
1912	2,736,000	3,921,600	4.65	911,321	1,283,072	1.20
1913*	----	----	----	----	----	----

Notes: (*) Statistics for 1913 were incomplete due to the Second Balkan War.

Source: *Statistika spoljašnje trgovine Kr. Srbije*. 1912.

exports to America were worth nearly four million dinars, though imports from the United States suffered considerably from Serbia's wartime expenses. Nevertheless, the war itself peaked the interest of American manufacturers, and on three separate occasions Summers reported that bids were being submitted for both equipment and supplies.

¹⁰Ibid.

According to Jackson, however, the entire effort to equip and mobilize the Serbian army had left it ill-prepared, and "without sufficient time to fit up hospitals and to make other sanitary preparations."¹¹ The American Red Cross eventually responded, authorizing Summers to make a one thousand dollar contribution to Prime Minister Pašić, who subsequently conveyed "his expressions of greatest gratitude."¹²

By mid-December, the American Red Cross had sent upwards of ten thousand dollars to Serbia, just one of five belligerents to which funds were given. Summers believed that the money would be better spent if it went directly to the families of those at war, particularly when the country was "depleted of men."¹³ He also stated that

practically one tenth of the whole population responded to the call, and were put either into the field or on guard duty.... If the same percentage responded to a similar call in the United States, we would be confronted with the task of officering, arming, and supplying almost 10,000,000 men. The same applies to the other Balkan States, and we can also imagine the temporary misery that would result to the homes of ten million men in a bloody fight for their country.¹⁴

¹¹Jackson to Secretary of State, Bucharest, 5 November 1912, M-357.

¹²Pašić to Summers, Belgrade, 9 November 1912, M-357.

¹³Maddin Summers, Report on Hospital Work in Belgrade, 11 December 1912, M-357.

¹⁴Ibid.

Despite repeated requests on the part of Summers, George W. Davis, the chairman of the American Red Cross, refused to accept the proposal. In his opinion, the organization's charter, namely the 1864 Treaty of Geneva, took cognizance only "of the sick and wounded of armies in time of war."¹⁵ Therefore the American Red Cross would not contribute money unless Summers assured him that it would go directly to the Serbian government. It was then up to Pašić and the Serbian Red Cross to apply aid where "it would seem...the most expedient."¹⁶

Over the next few weeks, Summers would experience even more problems with the American Red Cross. For some time Davis refused to recognize or provide for a group of American post-graduate surgeons who had come to Serbia from Berlin.¹⁷ These men were skilled volunteers, and desirous of new and sanitary equipment, they unsuccessfully appealed to Davis. The reason given was that as an "invariable rule" the American Red Cross did not extend recognition to surgeons who "were not specifically retained or employed" by the organization

¹⁵George W. Davis, Washington, D.C., 16 December 1912, M-357. As to the Red Cross charter, see American National Red Cross, *History of the Red Cross: the Treaty of Geneva, and its Adoption by the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1883).

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷The four surgeons included: H.A. Rosenkranz (University of Chicago), Edgar L. Gilcreest (Johns Hopkins University), Theodore H. Wenning (Johns Hopkins University), William V. Boyle (Indiana School of Medicine, Indianapolis). An American bacteriologist named Benjamin Jablons (Cornell Medical College) also was present.

itself.¹⁸ To Summers, the Red Cross was making a terrible mistake, and he saw no reason why these men should not be afforded the necessary aid. Besides, Serbia was in dire need of surgeons, and it had been difficult enough to recruit and station the four he did have. Three other volunteers had left in less than a week, due mostly to what Summers called a "lack of grit."¹⁹

The need for medical assistance became all the more urgent with the failure of a winter armistice on 23 January 1913. Prior to that time, the Ottomans had agreed to relinquish all of their territory west of Enez (Enos) and Midye (Midia), virtually the whole of European Turkey. Negotiations ended, however, when a Young Turk revolt overthrew the Turkish government, and by February 1913, war had resumed on all fronts. According to Summers, the problem was not only that there were more wounded, but that a majority of Red Cross units had gone home when the armistice was declared. Therefore the four American surgeons were more valuable than ever, and as a consequence, each was given command of his own field hospital. But, wrote Summers, they lacked "uniforms, operating clothes,

¹⁸Summers to Secretary of State, Belgrade, 15 April 1913, M-357.

¹⁹Summers to Secretary of State, Belgrade, 12 April 1913, M-357. According to Summers, the three who left lacked a "willingness to undergo, as others have done, some inconvenience to relieve human suffering." Contrary to his opinion, it appears that the surgeons were afraid that they would be infected with cholera.

some instruments, bed linen, oil clothes, a change of linen for the wounded, interpreters, nurses, and in short, almost everything that a well organized unit should have...."²⁰

At length Davis recognized the group, though he did so only two days before the conclusion of a second armistice. Final peace negotiations opened on 20 May, and ten days later the war officially ended with the Treaty of London. The victors soon began to squabble over the division of Macedonia; the Serbs, Bulgars, and Greeks each claiming territory the others wished to possess. Before the Russians could mediate a peaceful settlement, the Bulgarian general staff decided that it would be better to strengthen its position through war. On 29 June, the Bulgarians attacked both the Serbian and Greek lines, thus initiating a second Balkan conflict.²¹

In short, the war was a disaster for Bulgaria. Already outnumbered by the Serbs and Greeks, within ten days Bulgaria had to face the additional armies of Montenegro, Romania, and Turkey. Nevertheless, its battles for Macedonia were among the bloodiest of both wars, and for a brief time the Bulgars were in

²⁰Ibid.

²¹On the advent of the Second Balkan War, see Savo Skoko, *Drugi Balkanski rat 1913. godine* (Beograd: Vojnoistorijski Institut, 1968). As to Austria's role in the conflict, see Margareta Faissler, "Austria-Hungary and the Disruption of the Balkan League," *Slavic and East European Review* XIX (1939): 141-157.

occupation of Serb territory. On 8 July, Summers reported that the Bulgarians had taken the Serbian town of Knjaževac, in the process committing a number of "cruelties" towards the Serbian wounded.²² "Some of the men had their ears cut off," wrote Summers, "some were burned alive, and the flesh [was] cut from others."²³ In contrast, the consul recorded that the Bulgarian prisoners were "well treated by the Servians," and that the king himself visited those who were imprisoned in Belgrade.²⁴

Summers's report was quite similar to that of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, an organization which sponsored a fact-finding mission to the Balkans in mid-1913. Included in this mission was an American named Samuel T. Dutton, a renowned professor of education at Columbia University.²⁵ According to

²²Summers to Secretary of State, Belgrade, 15 July 1913, M-357.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Summers to Secretary of State, Belgrade, 8 July 1913, M-357.

²⁵In addition to Dutton, the mission included three noted personalities, the most prominent being Pavel Miliukov, who would later become an important member of Russia's Provisional Government. The other two men were M. Justin Godart, a French lawyer and politician; and Henry N. Brailsford, a British author and journalist. It is interesting to note that the Serbian government refused to recognize or aid the mission due to Miliukov's anti-Serb opinions.

one of Dutton's sources, the Bulgarian attack on Knjaževac was "not a case of mere pillage...[it was] something worse; something stupefying."²⁶

In its final report the mission detailed instances of the "really savage and barbarous side of the second war," complete with mutilations, disembowelings, and beheadings.²⁷ Perhaps the most striking example concerned a Serbian soldier who was captured, then "put on a spit and grilled."²⁸ This is not to say that the report was entirely favorable to the Serbs. In fact, Consul Pupin felt that it was the result of "an Austrian intrigue," and that accounts damaging to the Serbs were intended to "blacken the Servian name throughout the civilized world."²⁹

Whatever the case, the report did state that Serbia experienced far more casualties in its war with Bulgaria than it had in the preceding war with Turkey. Indeed, Summers could attest to the enormous influx of sick and wounded soldiers, a great many of whom were dying for lack of attention. The situation appeared so bleak that Summers began to organize teams of Serbian-Americans to assist the

²⁶Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *The Other Balkan Wars: 1914 Carnegie Endowment Report of the International Commission into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*, with a Forward by George F. Kennan (Washington, D.C.: Jarboe Printing Co., Inc., 1993), 137.

²⁷Ibid, 142.

²⁸Ibid, 142.

²⁹*New York Times*, 29 June 1914.

doctors already present in Belgrade. He also contacted the *New York Herald of Paris* in hopes that the newspaper would call for the support of doctors throughout Europe.

The appeal caught the attention of Lafayette Young, a former U. S. senator from Iowa who was vacationing in Karlsbad.³⁰ A well-known philanthropist, Young informed Summers that he was coming to Belgrade, and that he wanted to help in any way possible. Upon his arrival, both Summers and Young travelled to the front-line hospitals at Niš. There they recorded that operations were performed without anesthetics, though in nearby rooms the wounded were "calmly and stoically awaiting their turn."³¹ They met briefly with each of the surgeons, and after distributing supplies, cigarettes, and other equipment, they boarded a return train to Belgrade. "As we passed through the country," wrote Summers, "everywhere suffering and distress [could be seen]. Only about half the land is cultivated, and even the corn fields are full of weeds.... The outside world, I am afraid, will have to render assistance this fall."³²

³⁰The editor of the *Des Moines Capital*, Young was for many years prominent in Iowa politics.

³¹Summers to Secretary of State, Belgrade, 24 July 1913, M-357.

³²*Ibid.* Besides appealing to the Red Cross, the Serbian government also attempted to repopulate Macedonia with Serbs from the United States. See Milenko Karanovich, "Causes of Serbian Immigration to the United States," *Balkan Studies* 31 (1990): 156. It is unclear as to how

Neither Summers nor Jackson remained at his post long enough to oversee the procurement of such aid. The Second Balkan War ended on 10 August 1913, and within three months both men received new commissions for posts outside of Serbia. The country they left was destitute and penniless, though by the terms of the Treaty of Bucharest, it received the provinces of Vardar Macedonia, Kosovo, Metohija, and shared with Montenegro the Sanjak of Novi Pazaar. Its territory and population nearly doubled, and by June 1914, Serbia was able to put some 200,000 men in the field, backed by an equal number of reserves.³³ As a result of the two Balkan Wars, Serbia became a true military power, a fact which contributed greatly to the outbreak of World War I.

many returned, though it appears the Balkan Wars forced many more Serbs to immigrate to America. According to one author, a number of Serb veterans were among the striking miners caught in Colorado's famous "Ludlow Massacre" of early 1914. See George J. Prpic, *South Slavic Immigration in America* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1978).

³³Serbia increased its territory from an estimated 43,800 sq. km. to 87,300 sq. km., while its population rose from 2,912,000 to 4,444,000. See Petrovich, vol. II, 603.

V. Epilogue, 1914

In the wake of the Second Balkan War, Jackson's replacement was Charles J. Vopicka, a Czech immigrant and businessman from Chicago, Illinois. Although appointed as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary on 11 September 1913, Vopicka did not arrive in Belgrade until January of the following year. When the minister at last received an audience with Peter, he reported that there was "much joy among the Serbians, being Slavs, that the United States had selected a born Slav as her representative."¹ He found Peter "a man of very distinguished appearance," although "his health was poor and he was then quite seventy years old."² The king entertained Vopicka for more than an hour, and after parting gestures the minister left Belgrade for Sofia.

Vopicka remained in Bulgaria through the spring of 1914, though on one occasion he had reason to confer with Pašić. It seems he needed the prime

¹Charles J. Vopicka, *Secrets of the Balkans* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1921), 22.

²Ibid, 69. A year earlier Jackson made the same observation, stating that "His Majesty was suffering so badly from rheumatism that he was almost unable to walk." Jackson to Secretary of State, Bucharest, 1 April 1913, M-357.

minister's help in obtaining some confiscated American property, namely a case of Iver Johnson shotguns seized by Serbian customs at the outbreak of First Balkan War. The owner of the guns was an American citizen named Frederick Peters, owner of an import/export firm in Hamburg, Germany, who had sent the case directly to a buyer in Salonika.³ At length Vopicka secured its release, appealing directly to Pašić in late 1913.⁴

On 12 July 1914, Vopicka returned to Belgrade to attend festivities in honor of the king's birthday. Instead of mirth and revelry, he found the city subdued, its public buildings draped in ceremonial black. The cause of this was the death of Russia's chief representative to Belgrade, Nicholas Hartwig, an ardent supporter of Serbia and a close friend of its prime minister, Nikola Pašić. Though the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand had been murdered just two weeks earlier, Peter's Russophile court mourned only for Hartwig.⁵

³Peters to Secretary of State, Hamburg, 10 November 1913, M-357. Salonika was at that point controlled by the Ottoman Empire, but by the end of the war it was an acknowledged possession of Greece.

⁴Vopicka to Secretary of State, Sofia, 29 December 1913, M-357.

⁵The assassination of the archduke is ably discussed by Vladimir Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966). See also David MacKenzie, *Violent Solutions: Revolutions, Nationalism, and Secret Societies in Europe to 1918* (New York: University Press of America, 1996), 232-59.

According to Vopicka, the funeral was a grand affair, and though there were sworn depositions to the contrary, "ugly rumors were then afloat that Hartwig met death at the hands of the Austrian minister."⁶ Whatever the case, by July 1914 Austro-Serbian relations were utterly irredeemable. The murder of the archduke, believed to have been masterminded in Belgrade, elicited a stern ultimatum from Vienna. Among other things, Austria demanded that Serbia suppress all anti-Habsburg activity within its borders.⁷ It also insisted that Austrian officials take part in the investigation, a clear violation of Serbian sovereignty. Therefore on 25 July Belgrade agreed to virtually all of Vienna's terms, but openly rejected the presence of Austrian officials on Serbian soil.

To Vopicka this was of little importance. "It seems that Austria wanted war with Serbia," he wrote, and that regardless of Serbian reparations, the death of the archduke "was welcomed as a *casus belli*."⁸ Nonetheless, in a private meeting with Pašić, Vopicka advised the prime minister that he should avoid war at all costs,

⁶Charles J. Vopicka, *Secrets of the Balkans*, 28.

⁷For a general overview and translation of the ultimatum, see Sidney Bradshaw Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, 2d ed., (New York: Macmillan, 1939). See also L.C. F. Turner, *Origins of the First World War* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1970), Barbara Jelavich, *The Habsburg Empire in European Affairs, 1814-1918* and Alfred Francis Pibram, *Austrian Foreign Policy, 1908-1918*.

⁸Charles J. Vopicka, *Secrets of the Balkans*, 31.

especially when his country "was in no position to engage in fresh hostilities."⁹

Pašić's response, however vague, was that he would "do everything he *honorably* could to avoid war."¹⁰ This, however, did not mean an outright acceptance of the Austrian ultimatum. By 25 July 1914, Vopicka was in Bucharest, arriving aboard "the last steamer that left Belgrade before the World War began."¹¹

⁹Ibid., 30.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

VI. Conclusion

The outbreak of World War I, initiated by Austria in July 1914, brought a promising decade of Serbo-American relations to a close. In fact, Charles Vopicka was America's last official representative to Serbia, which in late 1918 became part of a triune kingdom encompassing both Croatia and Slovenia. From this point forward American representatives would be accredited to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, later known as Yugoslavia. As this country soon took on a unique, geo-political importance, its ties with the United States increased manyfold.

Thus Serbia's post-war relations with America stood in sharp contrast to those of 1903-13, when even President Theodore Roosevelt disparaged of contact with Belgrade. Whatever the case, at the beginning of this period Serbia had little time (or reason) to ponder the opinions of the United States. The country had just been rocked by a palace coup, and its new king, Peter I Karadjordjević, was in dire need of foreign recognition, particularly from those governments that were of more immediate importance to Serbia than was the United States. Therefore by August 1903, Peter had sent letters of introduction to each of the European heads of state,

though "either due to forgetfulness or economy," wrote the American minister John B. Jackson, "no [such] telegram was sent to the President...."¹²

One should not infer, however, that Serbia was disinterested in relations with the United States. On the contrary, Belgrade was acutely aware of America's expanding influence, especially in commerce, an area in which Serbia had long been dependent upon Austria-Hungary. If it indeed was to emancipate its own market, Serbia would have to increase its commercial links with countries outside of Central Europe, namely Russia, France, Great Britain, and if possible, the United States. To this end Belgrade concluded a number of commercial agreements, and in May 1904, Peter informed Jackson that he would "neglect nothing which may realize or facilitate a closer rapprochement between our two countries."¹³

Whether or not this "rapprochement" meant closer economic ties is open to debate, but what is certain is that by 1908, Serbian exports began to enter the American market en masse. That year the United States received over 1.3 million kg of Serbian fruit and copper. Though only 2.7 percent of Serbia's total export, the number would reach a high of 4.6 percent (2.7 million kg) in 1912. During this

¹²Jackson to Hay, Sinaia, 6 August 1903, T-630.

¹³Jackson to Hay, Athens, 14 May, 1904, T-630.

period there was also a marked increase in imports from the United States. Starting at just under 1 million kg in 1903, these imports peaked at 2.1 million kg in 1911. Though a majority were of a colonial nature (ie. petroleum, coffee, and tobacco), Serbia did manage to purchase a reasonable quantity of American machinery. Such striking growth, however, was not due to a greater stateside awareness of Serbia. It was, rather, the logical outcome of the Austro-Serbian tariff, or "Pig War" of 1906.

Instigated by Austria, the ill-fated "Pig War" was an attempt at pressuring the Serbs into economic and political servitude through the use of commercial sanctions. During its first full year the "Pig War" achieved the desired effect: Serbia's economy, heretofore dependent upon the Dual Monarchy for a majority of its trade, suffered a loss of over 40 million dinars. Within twelve months, however, the Serbs managed to acquire alternate commercial outlets, the most important being Turkish-held Salonika. Thus by 1907 Serbia was well on its way to economic recovery, demonstrated by an almost 20 percent increase in total commerce. Over the next five years, trade with the United States experienced a similar boom, lasting almost until the outbreak of the First Balkan War.

As for political affairs, beginning in 1906 there was a noticeable increase in diplomatic contact between Serbia and the United States. In June of that year the

State Department appointed, for the first time ever, a *resident* consul-general in Belgrade. It appears that the new post was created so that the United States could capitalize on the Austro-Serbian "Pig War" of 1906. The consul-general was expected, among other things, to alert American firms of new opportunities in the region. Therefore by 1907, at least three American companies were interested in Serbia, described optimistically as "a great new field, rich in trade possibilities."¹⁴ Prior to 1906, the State Department had used only vice consuls-general in Belgrade, though a majority of these men were from countries other than the United States. From 1903 to 1913, only two of the six men named to the post were American citizens. One such consul was of Swiss descent; another a Hungarian Jew who had immigrated to New York.

In addition to the Belgrade consulate, America maintained a representative of higher rank, a chief of mission known titularly as "envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary." These envoys were solely responsible for diplomatic contact between Serbia and the United States, often concluding treaties, appearing at royal functions, and exchanging notes between heads of state. In the decade preceding World War I, seven men were named to the post, a position requiring an appointment by the President himself.

¹⁴Moore to Loomis, Sinaia, 22 August 1905, T-513.

Apart from Serbia, the envoyship also included the courts of Greece and Romania. This left American ministers to the region in a unique position, especially in times of crisis, for they could leave their countries without a break in diplomatic ties. In 1903 for instance, Minister John B. Jackson left Belgrade in the wake of a palace coup. Other ministers would do so during the Bosnian annexation crisis of 1908-09, and during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. Besides personal safety, these men abstained from Belgrade for political reasons, often instructed to reside elsewhere so as to dispel any "active [American] interest in the situation[s]."¹⁵

So what then was America's stake in Serbia, and why did it insist upon relations with a country so devoid of economic and political influence? The answer seems to rest in America's new found position as a great power. Fresh from a war with Spain, in 1903 the United States was under the leadership of Theodore Roosevelt, an ardent, inimical nationalist who yearned for expansion. His push for new markets insured that American envoys could be found in such backwater places as Belgrade, Sofia, and Bucharest. Though some were aggressive entrepreneurs, trade between the two countries was small and remained so throughout the pre-war period. America's economic focus therefore was not on

¹⁵Root to Knowles, Washington, D.C., 7 October 1908, M-862.

Eastern Europe or the Balkans. On the contrary, American traders favored South and Central America, China, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific, all areas more profitable than Serbia. Political relations from 1903 to 1913 were even less pronounced, owing in great measure to America's traditional non-involvement in European affairs. Serbia was simply too remote, too controversial, and the center of an ongoing rivalry which soon led Europe to war.

Appendix A

U.S. Chiefs of Mission to Serbia, 1903-1913

name	res.	date apptd.	pres. of cred.	term. of mission
John B. Jackson	NJ	13 Oct. 1902	9 May 1904	13 July 1905
John W. Riddle	MN	8 March 1905	7 May 1906	23 Jan. 1907
Horace G. Knowles	DE	16 Jan. 1907	1 July 1907	4 Feb. 1909
Huntington Wilson	IL	17 Dec. 1908	-----	-----
Spencer F. Eddy	IL	11 Jan. 1909	-----	-----
John R. Carter	MD	25 Sept. 1909	3 May 1910	27 Oct. 1911
John B. Jackson	NJ	12 Aug. 1911	16 Jan. 1912	15 Oct. 1913
Charles J. Vopicka	IL	11 Sept. 1913	15 Dec. 1913	17 Dec. 1918

Source: Department of State. *Principal Officers of the Department of State and United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1990*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991, pp. 164-66.

Appendix B

U.S. Consuls-General to Belgrade, 1906-1913*

name	res.	date appt'd	term. of mission
Maxwell K. Moorhead	PA	22 June 1906	31 March 1908
Robert S.S. Bergh	ND	14 Dec 1908	29 Feb. 1912
Maddin Summers	TN	20 Dec. 1911	31 Dec. 1913
Lewis W. Haskell	SC	24 Nov. 1913	17 Sept. 1915

Notes: (*)The United States did not appoint a *resident* consul-general until mid-1906.

Source: List of U.S. Consular Officers, 1789-1939, National Archives, Microcopy No.T-587.

Appendix C

U.S. Vice Consuls-General to Belgrade, 1903-1913.

name	res.	date appt'd	term. of mission
Christian Vögeli	Serbia	10 March 1900	1 June 1908
Voislav Petrović	Serbia	1 April 1908	April 1909
Samuel Weiss	NY	16 July 1909	unknown
R. Novaković	Serbia	6 March 1911	unknown
Harry B. Richardson	PA	7 Feb. 1913	31 May 1913
E. Jevremović	Serbia	16 Sept. 1913	5 Feb. 1915

Source: List of U.S. Consular Officers, 1789-1939, National Archives, Microcopy No.T-587.

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