

1995

Eisenhower and liberation : the case study of Poland, 1953-1956

Mary Catherine Stagg

Follow this and additional works at: <http://scholarship.richmond.edu/masters-theses>

 Part of the [United States History Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Stagg, Mary Catherine, "Eisenhower and liberation : the case study of Poland, 1953-1956" (1995). *Master's Theses*. Paper 1045.

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

Eisenhower and Liberation: The Case Study of Poland,
1953-1956

Mary Catherine Stagg

Masters of Arts In History

University of Richmond

May 1995


Dr. John D. Treadway, Director

This thesis, based largely upon research conducted at the Eisenhower Library in Kansas, takes a new look at the official policy of "liberation." Focusing on NSC 174, this study contends that there was substance behind the campaign rhetoric of Eisenhower and Dulles. Poland was used as a case study because through an understanding of NSC 174, the Poznan riots of June 1956 can be interpreted in a new light. The uprising can now be viewed as successful as it disrupted the Soviet-satellite relationship, prevented the consolidation of Soviet power in Eastern Europe, and in some measure returned Poland to its people. Although Poland was not liberated by the revolt, it took its first step away from Moscow towards eventual liberation. Thus, the true measure of the success of Eisenhower's liberation needs to be examined against its guideline, NSC 174, and not against public perception.


I certify that I have read this thesis and find that, in scope and quality, it satisfies the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.



Dr. John D. Treadway, Thesis Advisor



Dr. Ernest C. Bolt, Jr.



Dr. John L. Gordon, Jr.

EISENHOWER AND LIBERATION:
THE CASE STUDY OF POLAND,
1953-1956

by

MARY CATHERINE STAGG

B.S., Georgetown University, 1989

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty

of the University of Richmond

in Candidacy

for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in

History

May 1995

Richmond, Virginia

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface	ii
Introduction.....	1
I. Liberation.....	11
II. A Strategy is Formed.....	38
III. The Next Two Years, 1954-1955.....	51
IV. 1956: The Litmus Test.....	77
Conclusion.....	107

PREFACE

Before I began this project, I knew very little about Eisenhower other than the old popular slogan, "We Like Ike." I had respected him for his achievements in World War II and naturally had concluded that he was an effective leader. On the other hand, I had also been aware that during his first term in office he had been heavily criticized for failing to do more for the peoples of Poland and Hungary when they revolted in 1956. In my research, I encountered both criticism and praise of Eisenhower and I would like to take time to review the trends in Eisenhower scholarship and define where I think my work fits.

Although Eisenhower was elected to his first and second terms by overwhelming majorities over Adlai Stevenson, he was not without his critics. In 1956, Hans J. Morgenthau, Richard Rovere and Norman A. Graebner attacked Eisenhower for his lack of leadership and indecisiveness while in office. As Morgenthau wrote: the President's approach to foreign policy and international problems was "informed by a philosophy of abstention, conciliation and pacifica-

tion...."¹ The list of Eisenhower detractors soon grew to include Marquis Childs, William V. Shannon, Emmet J. Hughes, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and H. W. Brands to name just a few. Childs argued in his book, Eisenhower: Captive Hero; A Critical Study of the General and the President, that Eisenhower was unprepared for his position as President, was simplistic in his thinking, and his administration was a failure.² Brands labeled Eisenhower as being "slow to realize the import of revolutionary changes confronting America and unable to control the bureaucracy that made policy in his name."³ The crux of this criticism centered on impressions of Eisenhower as failing to make decisions, allowing Dulles to determine American foreign policy single-handedly, and merely reacting to events rather than understanding their larger context. Few could argue the

¹Quoted in Gary W. Reichard, "Eisenhower as President: The Changing View," South Atlantic Quarterly 77 (Summer 1978): 267. This is an excellent summary of Eisenhower scholarship and contains a good bibliography. For works by these critics, see: Norman A. Graebner, The New Isolationism: A Study in Politics and Foreign Policy Since 1950 (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1956); Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Decline and Fall of American Foreign Policy," New Republic 135 (10 December 1956) and "What the President and Mr. Dulles Don't Know," New Republic 135 (17 December 1956); Richard Rovere, Affairs of State: The Eisenhower Years (New York, 1956).

²Anthony James Joes, "Eisenhower Revisionism: The Tide Comes In," Presidential Studies Quarterly 15 (Summer 1985): 562. Also, see the Reichard article for works by the additional authors mentioned above.

³H. W. Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," American Historical Review 94 (October 1989): 962-63.

point that the liberation of the captive peoples of Eastern Europe failed to occur in 1956 -- something Eisenhower and Dulles through their rhetoric had led the American people to believe was an aim of their foreign policy. But was Eisenhower really an indecisive, uninvolved, and ineffective President who preferred to sit back and let others do his work for him?

Eisenhower revisionists would argue no. As the President's papers in Kansas became available to historians, it soon became clear that his detractors really had little to stand on. Even Arthur Schlesinger had to admit that the Eisenhower papers altered the old picture of the president and wrote that Eisenhower had more energy, interest, cunning and command than many had earlier assumed.⁴ The revisionists, such as Murray Kempton, Garry Wills, Richard Rhodes, Fred I. Greenstein, Robert A. Devine, Stephen E. Ambrose, Robert Branyon, Vincent P. DeSantis, Blanche Weisen Cook, Barton Bernstein and Peter Lyon, went even further. They saw a "political genius" who had a "remarkable political instinct,"⁵ a man who ran his own administration, set its goals, did not let Dulles set the foreign policy, and who emphasized his role as commander-in-chief rather than that

⁴Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The Ike Age Revisited," Reviews in American History 11 (March 1983): 6.

⁵Reichard, "Eisenhower as President," South Atlantic Quarterly, 274, 275. Again, see his footnotes for revisionist articles.

of a partisan leader. Greenstein coined the phrase "hidden-hand" to define Eisenhower's low-profile leadership style and built on Kempton's statement that "It was the purpose of his existence never to be seen in what he did."⁶

Although low-profile, Eisenhower ran his own show and was at the center of events and decision-making. Steve Neal in his article, "Why We Were Right to Like Ike," credits Eisenhower with restoring confidence in the Presidency as an institution and says that finally historians know what the public knew all along: that he was neither passive nor detached.⁷ Wills went further and wrote that it was "no mere accident that he remained, year after year, the most respected man in America."⁸ As Eisenhower himself stated: "The United States never lost a soldier or a foot of ground in my administration. We kept the peace. People ask how it happened -- by God it didn't just happen. I'll tell you that."⁹ DeSantis summed up Eisenhower's achievements according to the revisionists: "His Presidency will always

⁶Ibid.

⁷Steve Neal, "Why We Were Right to Like Ike," American Heritage 37 (December 1985): 55.

⁸Quoted in Reichard, "Eisenhower as President," South Atlantic Quarterly, 274.

⁹Quoted in Stephen G. Rabe, "Eisenhower Revisionism: A Decade of Scholarship," Diplomatic History (Winter 1993): 100.

be associated with prosperity, abundance, and peace, no mean accomplishment for a military leader."¹⁰

As to my own observations after completing my research, I have to agree with the revisionists. In the material available at the Eisenhower Library, it is impossible to find anything but an intelligent, well-informed, and masterful Eisenhower firmly in control of his administration. He was the one making the decisions, and it is clear from the information there that Dulles knew it too. The question for me then was why such an intelligent man who truly sought peace, could get into so much trouble over the word "liberation." Clearly there was a gap between his rhetoric and the results, and this is what I address in my thesis. First, however, some foreign policy background.

In 1947, George Kennan, Director of the Department of State's Policy Planning Staff, wrote an anonymous article in Foreign Affairs entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." He used this article to express his thinking on the objectives of a country's foreign policy (to protect the security of the nation and to advance the welfare of the people) and noted that as "complete security or perfection of the international environment will never be achieved,"¹¹ equilibrium

¹⁰Vincent P. DeSantis, "Eisenhower Revisionism," Review of Politics 38 (April 1976): 207.

¹¹Quoted in: John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 28.

needed to be maintained in the world so that one country or group of countries will never dominate it. When the public learned that Kennan had written the article, it assumed that he was making some sort of an official policy pronouncement and gave it the name containment as this word appeared in the article. From this rather odd beginning came what resulted in the Truman administration's policy toward the Soviet Union, one of containing its threat.

John Foster Dulles, the foremost Republican spokesman on foreign policy and a consultant to the State Department, criticized containment. As early as December 1949, he wrote that the "eventual liberation" of countries under communist control ought to be "an essential and enduring part" of the foreign policy of the United States, but he advocated no specific action. He claimed that "there will develop pockets or centers of resistance" and "in light of what happens, further steps can be taken."¹² Additionally, by 1952, the bipartisanship of the early cold war period had dissolved and it was clear that foreign policy issues would be very important in the Presidential campaign. Dulles, possessing the skill of stating positions in attention-getting terms, proclaimed the positive policy of liberation to be the one to defeat the Democrat's negative containment.

¹²Quoted in: H. W. Brands, Cold Warriors; Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 9.

By May 1952, Dulles had outlined his plan for liberation in an article in Life magazine. He claimed that if this plan was followed, a peaceful separation of these countries from Moscow could be achieved and that gains could be made against communism in general. He then went on to write a sentence that deserves more attention than it has received: "The local Communist parties would lose much of their vigor and belligerence as the Soviet Communist party became ever more preoccupied with its own "home work" of coping with the growing restiveness of the captive peoples."¹³

This in a nutshell represents what I believe was actually the operating policy of Eisenhower's first administration. In this thesis I plan to show that although the term "liberation" was employed during the campaign, it was really used because Eisenhower found it to be a powerful word that brought him results. It was a call to action, appealed to people's morals, and it was just what Old Guard Republicans wanted to hear as it distanced them from the Democrats and Yalta. Additionally, it lured voters of Eastern European descent into the Republican camp and was a powerful psychological weapon against the Soviets. Although Eisenhower demanded that Dulles temper his calls for liberation with the word "peaceful" and make clear that the United States

¹³John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness," Life 32 (19 May 1952): 157.

refused to call for bloody revolts in these captive countries, liberation was a cry that dominated his campaign.

Once in office, one can clearly see that although liberation was hoped for, it was neither aggressively pursued nor achieved as actual policy. However, I argue that Eisenhower did more than return to Truman's containment -- something even the revisionists agree on. In the thesis that follows, I usually render the word "liberation" without benefit of quotation marks, as it is my contention that Dulles and Eisenhower *did* aspire to free the captive peoples of eastern Europe. This freedom was never viewed by the administration as a short-term goal, but it was hoped for. To my mind, "liberation" implies that it was mere rhetoric; I prefer to think the term had more substance behind it although it lacked immediacy.

The substance behind the rhetoric can be found in the fact that Eisenhower outlined steps to create tensions within the Soviet bloc in the hope of encouraging another Tito-like regime. He also planned to keep the Soviets so busy dealing with their internal problems that they would be unable to consolidate their power and use it in a more aggressive manner against the West.

This thesis finds precedent in Dulles' Life article in which he wrote that he wanted to keep the Soviets preoccupied with their own "home work" and if followed leads to the conclusion that in the case of Poland in 1956, Eisen-

hower and Dulles could claim victory. Gomulka at that time appeared to offer hope of a second regime along the Tito model and he had indeed kept the Soviets preoccupied. Poland is a good case study of libertation as it proved the success of a policy many believe did not exist. Zbigniew Brzezinski agreed with this conclusion in his work, The Soviet Bloc; Unity and Conflict. He wrote that the Polish revolt succeeded because

- (1) it was preceeded by a gradual and continual dissolution of Stalinism in Poland
- (2) the power was held by the Party which executed the change of power to Gomulka
- (3) as the power was given to Gomulka, the revolt was given a Polish nationalist self-assertion element
- (4) Gomulka proposed domestic reform without challenging areas of Soviet sensitivity (membership in the bloc and the rule of the Party)
- (5) the pattern of Polish events paralleled some of those in Yugoslavia in 1948, so the Soviets took the path of least resistance¹⁴

As Brzezinski further stated: the significance of Poland "...meant that the USSR was...moving toward a greater realization that its leadership in the camp required a more equitable adjustment between Soviet interests and those of other members."¹⁵ The conclusion would then be that diversity in the bloc would ultimately lead to disunity and a victory for the West.¹⁶

¹⁴Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc; Unity and Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 362-63.

¹⁵Ibid., 265.

¹⁶Ibid., 268.

As more information is declassified at the Eisenhower Library, I believe my thesis will be upheld. If the revisionists truly believe that Eisenhower was a "political genius," then how could he have failed so miserably with liberation? What they need to do is to take a closer look at liberation and see behind the term to the substance. Thus, although a gap appeared between the President's words and results, this gap is explained when his true aims are revealed (in NSC 174). As John Gaddis pointed out, Eisenhower could not publicize what he was doing; to do so would only destroy those opportunities he was seeking to exploit.¹⁷

¹⁷John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace; Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 175.

INTRODUCTION

As World War II was drawing to a close, the leaders of the "Grand Alliance" against Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin met at Yalta on 4 February 1945 to discuss postwar Europe.¹⁸ In particular, they sought solutions to the problem of what forms a defeated Germany and a liberated Poland would take, and they explored the possibility of creating an international organization to take the place of the ineffective League of Nations. A statement issued on 11

¹⁸For further information on Yalta, see Russell D. Buhite, Decisions at Yalta, An Appraisal of Summit Diplomacy (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1986); Diane Shaver Clemens, Yalta (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Richard F. Fenno, The Yalta Conference (Boston: Heath, 1955); Jan Karski, The Great Powers and Poland 1919-1945, from Versailles to Yalta (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1985); John L. Snell, The Meaning of Yalta; Big Three Diplomacy and the New Balance of Power (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956); Edward Reilly Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians; The Yalta Conference (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1949); Cyrus Leo Sulzberger, Such a Peace: The Roots and Ashes of Yalta (New York: Continuum, 1982); Athan G. Theoharis, The Yalta Myths: An Issue in United States Politics, 1945-1955 (Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 1970).

February outlined the decision of these three men to occupy Germany when the war was over, to hold free elections in Poland, and to meet at San Francisco to create the future United Nations. Although no such agreement was made at Yalta, it had been attributed by cold war politicians and historians as being the place where the world was divided into two increasingly antagonistic camps, the Western one and the Soviet one.¹⁹

The root of this accusation lies with the decisions made concerning Poland. At Yalta, the "Big Three" promised that Poland would regain its independence and that free elections were to be held there with democratic and anti-Nazi parties. The problem with these promises was that the wording was vague and open to interpretation. Unfortunately, the Yalta Conference provided no firm safeguards to ensure that "independent" and "free" were defined in western terms. As a result, the Soviet Union, whose army was already present in Poland, had its own concept of what constituted an independent country and free elections. The Soviet Union used Yalta's vague wording to its advantage, defining "democratic" and "anti-Nazi" parties as those which cooperated with the communists; thus, the elections on 19 January 1947 were controlled by the Soviets and a Soviet

¹⁹See, inter alia, Snell, The Meaning of Yalta; Big Three Diplomacy and the New Balance of Power; Sulzberger, Such a Peace: The Roots and Ashes of Yalta.

puppet government was installed in Poland, enslaving millions of people in a communist system.²⁰

Poland and squabbles over occupied Germany increased the tensions between East and West. The United States slowly began to view the Soviets as being expansionist especially as Western concern about the civil war in Greece grew. Great Britain had maintained a military presence in

²⁰For further reading on Polish history: Mary Craig, Lech Walesa and His Poland (New York: Continuum, 1987); Norman Davies, God's Playground, a History of Poland (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Norman Davies, Heart of Europe: a Short History of Poland (New York: Clarendon Press, 1984); M.K. Dziewanowski, Poland in the Twentieth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity (New York: Scribner's, 1984); Oskar Halecki, A History of Poland (New York: Roy Publishers, 1956); Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, Pilsudski: A Life for Poland introduction by Zbigniew Brzezinski (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1982); Jakub Karpinski, Countdown, the Polish Upheavals of 1956, 1968, 1971, 1976, 1980, translated by Olga Amsterdamska and Gene M. Moore (New York: Karz-Cohl, 1982); R.F. Leslie, Reform and Insurrection in Russian Poland, 1856-1865 (Newport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1969); Flora Lewis, A Case History of Hope: the Story of Poland's Peaceful Revolutions (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1958); Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland; Pattern of Soviet Aggression (New York: Whittlesey House, 1948); William Richard Morfill, Poland (New York: GP Putnam's Sons, 1893); W.F. Reddaway, et al, eds., The Cambridge History of Poland (New York: Octagon Books, 1971); Richard Felix Staar, Poland 1944-1962: The Sovietization of a Captive People (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1962); Konrad Syrop, Poland: Between the Hammer and the Anvil (London: Hale, 1968); Konrad Syrop, Spring in October: The Story of the Polish Revolution, 1956 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976); A.E. Tennant, Studies in Polish Life and History (London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1924); Piort S. Wandycz, The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795-1918 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974); Richard M. Watt, Bitter Glory: Poland and its Fate 1918 to 1939 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982); Adam Zamoyski, The Polish Way: A Thousand Year History of the Poles and their Culture (New York: Franklin Watts, 1988).

Greece and was helping it to fight communist rebels who threatened the local government, but when Great Britain announced in late 1946 its intent to leave Greece, the United States became concerned not only about Greece, but also about Turkey as well. If Greece fell to the communists, Turkey would be surrounded by non-democratic countries.

This concern led President Harry S. Truman to initiate the Truman Doctrine on 12 March 1947. This policy, aimed first and foremost at Greece and Turkey, offered American aid to any free nation resisting communist propaganda or sabotage. It was the first instance of postwar international resistance to communist aggression. Besides Greece and Turkey, the Truman administration was concerned about the post-war economic recovery of Europe. Advocating a policy of collective defense Truman proposed the Marshall Plan, which became effective April 1948 when the United States offered massive aid to 17 European countries. Besides helping these countries to recover, he also hoped to bring them into the Western orbit. The Marshall Plan was a four-year program in which \$13.3 billion was given to Europe. With the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the world cemented into two camps and the American policy of containment took effect.²¹

²¹See preface for more on containment. Also, Robert J. Donovan has written two volumes on the Truman Years: Conflict and Crisis, The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1945-

Containment was a policy designed to keep communists from expanding their influence in the world. An important year in East-West relations, 1949, found the West threatened by a strengthening Eastern sphere. The Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb on 29 August, and in China a communist government came to power on 1 October. In Korea, the United States and the Soviet Union could not agree on what type of provisional government should be set up, so Truman refused to withdraw American troops. He felt it better to have a Western presence in the country than to leave it open to a probable communist takeover. With the increased militarization and tension in Korea, war eventually broke out in June 1950. As the conflict dragged on, growing discontent with the Korean War and with the Democratic administration's policy of containment, which appeared to achieve little while costing much, helped Dwight David Eisenhower, already a popular war hero and advocate of a policy of liberation to win the presidential election in 1952.²²

President Eisenhower was in office during an important

1948 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1977); Tumultuous Years, The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1949-1953 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1982).

²²John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 2d ed. (New York: Praeger, 1962), 103; Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy 1938-1970 (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971), 218.

time period in terms of East-West relations. Events ranging from Stalin's death in 1953 to the Polish riot of 1956 in Poznan offered chances for a reduction in world tensions and for a possible decrease in Soviet power in the Eastern European countries. Eisenhower ran for the presidency in 1952 with such aims on his platform, and he espoused the cause of "liberation" for the Soviet satellites. Some critics believe that Eisenhower failed in his plans for liberation,²³ but this work aims to show through the examination of National Security Council papers that "liberation" was more a cry used to gain public support for Eisenhower's policies vis-a-vis the communist world, rather than the immediate goal. Eisenhower wanted these satellite countries and their people to assert their own national customs, traditions, and identities, and by these means to maximize Soviet difficulties by resisting domination. If the Soviet Union could not consolidate its power in this area, it could not then use this power against the West. During the Presidential campaign, John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's advisor and future Secretary of State, argued that liberation was designed to take advantage of

situations in various parts of the world which afford those of dynamic purpose the opportunity peacefully to set up strains and stresses within the Soviet-dominated world which will preoccupy the rulers with home

²³See preface for more details.

problems and gradually disintegrate and shrink their control....²⁴

Early in 1953 Eisenhower began working on "creating problems" for the Soviets, and the first months of his presidency were busy. He formed the Committee on International Information Activities to study the United States' use of propaganda in presenting itself and its policies to the world, and he tried to persuade Congress to pass a resolution on captive peoples. Two events in 1953, however, caught the administration off guard and with no idea of how to respond: one was the death of Stalin in March 1953, the other the pro-democratic riots in East Germany three months later. Eisenhower, surprised to find the United States had no contingency plans for such events, directed the National Security Council to formulate guidelines concerning American policy toward the Soviet Union and its puppet politicians. The results were NSC 158 and NSC 174, outlines that would guide American foreign policy for the next three years.

NSC 158, created as an immediate response to Stalin's death and to the riots in East Germany on 29 June 1953, was merely an interim plan on how to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities; it focused on psychological, and not diplomatic, objectives. NSC 174, formulated on 11 December 1953, was the most important policy statement made during Eisenhower's

²⁴Quoted in "Containment and Liberation," The Commonweal, 6 February 1953, 442.

first administration and was the key to interpreting the success or failure of the president's policies through the end of 1956. In it liberation was determined to be a long-term goal; the short-term goal was to create disequilibrium in the Soviet sphere. Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, and other similar organizations carried out humanitarian aid programs and propaganda campaigns, as they could be effective means of increasing satellite national sentiments and thus problems for the Soviet Union.²⁵

Official relations between the Polish and American governments were formally correct at best and frequently full of mutual recriminations. Diplomatic negotiations produced little or no results, so propaganda became the most effective method of promoting resistance to Soviet domination. Unfortunately, with propaganda a policy's effectiveness is impossible to measure concretely. Not until the Poznan riot on 28 June 1956 did the United States know for sure that its efforts had been at least in part successful. The riots proved to the world that the Poles hated the presence of the Soviets in their country and that, given an opportunity, they would not accept without question all directives handed down from Moscow.

²⁵Robert T. Holt and Robert van de Velde, Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); U.S. Policy Toward Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe, 11 December 1953, Box 8, NSC Series, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

The difficulties in Poznan began when the workers protested their economic conditions and poor standard of living; the trouble arose when the protest turned to anti-communist, anti-Russian, and pro-freedom slogans and turned to violence. The riots could be interpreted as a failure of American liberation policy as Poland remained a communist country. This conclusion is incorrect. By the aims of NSC 174, the riot was a success. It demonstrated the desire of the Poles to be free from Soviet control. Propaganda efforts by the United States had kept hope alive and resistance firm. The riots in Poland forced a change from a Polish regime dominated by Moscow to a more "liberal" government run by communist Poles who thought that Polish national interests should play a role in determining Polish governmental policy.²⁶

Although still a Soviet "satellite," Poland had taken the first steps to loosen the grip of the Kremlin. This liberalization and resistance to sovietization proved a partial victory for Eisenhower's policy toward Eastern Europe and not its failure. There now existed some disequilibrium in the Soviet sphere and the Soviets were further from, and not closer to, consolidating their power. The Poles now had a government that could address national issues and characteristics. The Poles took a stand against

²⁶See chapter four. Also see Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, 262-63.

sovietization and Eisenhower's policy of liberation made a step forward and away from the old policy of containment.

I. LIBERATION

During the 1952 presidential campaign, Adlai E. Stevenson ran as a reluctant Democratic candidate against Dwight D. Eisenhower. Stevenson aspired to a second term as governor of Illinois but was coerced into running for the presidency as there were few other candidates willing to stand against the popular war hero. Stevenson was known for his oratory, but he ran into difficulty as he found himself continually defending the unpopular policies of fellow Democrat Truman. The Democrats claimed to have worked for peace and to have ended the tragic era of isolationism of the Republicans prior to World War II, but the Democratic administration was the one that involved the United States in Korea.

Eisenhower, a favorite of liberal and moderate Republicans, was chosen to run over the conservative and isolationist Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio. Eisenhower possessed a wider appeal within his own party and he criticized Roosevelt and Truman for their "usurpation of

executive power."²⁷ Eisenhower wanted to increase Congress' activities and to put an end to the costly and unpopular Korean War. The Republicans also possessed a powerful weapon during the election: the flamboyant, then junior senator from Wisconsin, Joseph McCarthy. McCarthy, unleashed against the Democrats and their past years in power, tried to link Stevenson with Moscow. Campaigning in his home state, McCarthy stated: "If somebody would only smuggle me aboard the Democratic campaign special with a baseball bat in hand, I'd teach patriotism to little Ad-
lie."²⁸ McCarthy added spice to the campaign trail and appealed to people's frustration with the complexity of the Cold War, but the Republicans won based upon Eisenhower and his own personal appeal and policies.

During the 1952 presidential campaign, Eisenhower called on the expertise of John Foster Dulles²⁹ and the two espoused the policy of liberation of the East European satellite countries and exploited the public's frustration with the Democratic Party's policy of containment. Eisenhower and Dulles claimed that Presidents Roosevelt and

²⁷Quoted in Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. 2, The Presidency (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 56.

²⁸Quoted in Fred J. Cook, The Nightmare Decade, The Life and Times of Senator Joe McCarthy (New York: Random House, 1971), 6.

²⁹Dulles was the foremost Republican spokesman on foreign policy, a consultant to the State Department, a one-time UN delegate, and a participant of many international conferences.

Truman had sold out Eastern Europe by tracing victory in World War II for a new enemy and new oppressors in the form of the Soviet Union. The Republican Party saw containment as a policy failure, regarding it as a negative policy that aimed at preserving the status quo; in their view, containment surrendered the initiative to the enemy, was costly, could possibly bankrupt the country, and merely reacted to counter Communist danger wherever and whenever the communists chose to attack.³⁰ Additionally, containment, aiming to halt the spread of communism, did little for the peoples of Eastern Europe already under Soviet domination.

During the campaign, Dulles called containment "negative, futile, and immoral," and noted that the aim of foreign policy was not to coexist indefinitely with the Communist menace, but to eliminate it. In his view, this could be accomplished with a "psychological and political offensive."³¹ What the Republican platform offered was a new and positive policy:

We maintain that man was not born to be ruled, but that he consented to be governed;...It will be made clear, on the highest authority of the President and the Congress, that United States policy, as one of its peaceful purposes, looks happily forward to the genuine independence

³⁰Spanier, American Foreign Policy, 104. This viewpoint can also be seen in the Republican Party Platform of 1952 in: Donald Bruce Johnson, ed., National Party Platforms, vol. 1, 1941-1956, 2d ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978), 497.

³¹Spanier, American Foreign Policy, 104.

of those captive peoples....We shall again make liberty into a beacon light of hope that will penetrate the dark places.³²

Dulles felt that according to this plan, American foreign policy would be based on spiritual values such as those expressed by Abraham Lincoln, who, on his way to be inaugurated in Washington, D.C., said of the Declaration of Independence, "To me this declaration means liberty, not alone to the people of this country, but hope for the world, for all future time."³³ Ideas would become weapons and the United States would be the hope of all peoples and the despair of all aggressors.³⁴ United States policy would stand for a righteous cause. As Dulles later stated in 1965:

Our foreign policy can't divorce itself from our belief that each individual has his origin and destiny in God and enjoys a spiritual nature and personal dignity. We must therefore oppose those who treat the individual as an animated bit of matter to promote the domination of the world by atheistic rulers.

Moral principles are, or should be, applicable to governments as well as to individuals. Violation of these principles inevitably brings suffering and loss. Men and nations both must try to follow a righteous course.³⁵

³²Johnson, National Party Platforms, 496-99.

³³Quoted in: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., The Dynamics of World Power; A Documentary History of United States Foreign Policy, 1945-73, vol. 2, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (New York: Chelsea House, 1973), 466.

³⁴Spanier, American Foreign Policy, 104.

³⁵Andrew H. Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy (Princeton, NJ: D. van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1965), 102.

One of Eisenhower's campaign speeches broadcast over Radio Free Europe to the Iron Curtain countries in October 1952 illustrates the party platform:

I am grateful for the opportunity Radio Free Europe gives me today to address a message to the millions of friendly people now held captive under the dictatorship of Moscow. I have more to say to you than a mere personal greeting and expression of my understanding for your hardships of the present.

I am speaking to you as an individual American citizen. However, I believe I am qualified to tell you something of what is in the hearts and minds of the overwhelming majority of Americans. For in recent weeks it has been my privilege to travel tens of thousands of kilometers in my country, talking to people in every walk of life and of every economic condition. I have found them disagreeing with one another on many important questions that affect our own political life at home. This is an old and honored American political custom. But there is one matter of national policy on which I find them almost unanimously agreed. That is that Americans want to live truly in peace with the world. But they believe that true peace is not a possibility so long as other peoples who have been accustomed to their own freedom are deprived of it. The peace we now have is not enough. We in the new world will never feel entirely secure in our homes until security had been restored to you in yours. That is why Americans, although they differ on other subjects, join willingly in giving their support to the peaceful strengthening of the growing alliance among free nations of the West.

May the time come when the words memorized by all young Americans--"with liberty and justice for all"--will be true of all peoples throughout the world who wish to rule themselves. God Bless You.³⁶

This is one of many examples of Eisenhower's messages of hope to captive peoples. In addition to the positive and

³⁶Statement Broadcast Over Radio Free Europe to Iron Curtain Countries, 3 October 1952, Box 2, Stephen Benedict, Collection of Materials re: General Eisenhower's 1952 Campaign Speeches.

moral policy of liberation, the Republicans, during the campaign, also proposed massive retaliation and mutual security. These were more dynamic policies than containment, and focused on *action* as opposed to *reaction*. The idea behind liberation and massive retaliation was to keep the threat of the Soviet Union at bay, while the West would be strengthened into a united bloc through the policies of mutual security. The American people's dissatisfaction with the past policies, coupled with these promises of action, served to elect Eisenhower, an already popular man who had proven himself in Europe in the past and who offered hope for a new and better future.³⁷

Once in office, Eisenhower and Dulles, the new Secretary of State, began to explore all possible avenues for turning campaign rhetoric into reality. Testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the topic of "Communism, Containment and Global Strategy," Dulles once again denounced containment as an unsound policy and stated that it was bound to fail because a defensive policy never won against an aggressive policy. In his view, liberation was an aggressive policy and the hope of liberation was to be kept alive without provoking a general war: "It must be and can be a peaceful process, but those who do not believe that results can be accomplished by moral pressures, by the weight of propaganda, just do not know

³⁷Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, 218.

what they are talking about."³⁸

In his Inaugural Address, Eisenhower announced his first proposal for action on the liberation issue. He declared that America would "never acquiesce in the enslavement of any people in order to purchase fancied gain for ourselves." He asked Congress to join him in "an appropriate resolution making clear that this Government recognizes no kind of commitment contained in secret understandings of the past with foreign governments which permit this kind of slavery."³⁹ The futility of appeasement was apparent and never again would the United States trade honor for security.⁴⁰ These transparent references to Yalta again accused the Democrats of allowing the peoples of Eastern Europe to be enslaved by the Soviet Union.

The new President's proposal for a resolution on captive peoples received a positive response from Congress, so much so that by the end of January, five resolutions had been introduced on this topic. On 26 January 1953, in keeping with his campaign promise of more vigorous psychological warfare, Eisenhower created the President's

³⁸Quoted in Schlesinger, Dynamics of World Power, 465.

³⁹United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Inaugural Address (Washington, D.C.: GPO 1953), 167.

⁴⁰"Proclaiming Our Faith Anew: Inaugural Address of President Dwight D. Eisenhower," The Department of State Bulletin, 2 February 1953, 167; see also Janet Podell and Steven Anzovin, eds., Speeches of the American Presidents (New York: H.W. Wilson Co., 1988), 565.

Committee on International Information Activities. William H. Jackson, one-time Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, headed the committee that was instructed to "survey and evaluate the government's information and related policies and activities with particular interest to international relations and national security" and to present its report by 30 June 1953.⁴¹ Eisenhower stressed the group's importance to his strategy by stating to the press that a "unified and dynamic effort in this field is essential to the security of the United States and of other peoples in the community of free nations."⁴²

The United States government was not the only organization involved in psychological warfare for the liberation of the East European satellites. The National Committee for a Free Europe, created on 2 June 1949 by private individuals, aimed to conduct a propaganda campaign against the communist-dominated satellites and do things an official government agency could not do. It attempted to support exiles from these countries by finding jobs for them, aiding them in publishing their articles and distributing them to their homelands, analyzed and indexed new Soviet laws, provided Congress with information on developments in the

⁴¹"International Information Activities Committee Appointed," The Department of State Bulletin, 9 February 1953, 217.

⁴²"President's Plan," New York Times, 27 January 1953, 14.

Soviet orbit, sponsored lecture tours, and created study centers. This committee, however, became famous for creating Radio Free Europe which first broadcast 4 July 1950.⁴³

Seeking to preserve "the Western democratic tradition in Eastern Europe," Radio Free Europe promoted "counterrevolution through seduction--the prospect of American material culture, fashion, commodities--and through fear--the prospect of an enslaving, death-dealing communism."⁴⁴ It was a genuinely patriotic "home service" radio for satellite peoples with the political goal of contributing to their peaceful liberation.⁴⁵ Radio Free Europe, ostensibly created to provide jobs for exiles, was actually created to perform tasks that an official government agency could not. Radio Free Europe's radio broadcasts could conduct a propaganda campaign against six communist-dominated satellite countries in central and eastern Europe and the United States government could not be held officially responsible for the contents of the broadcasts. The Central Intelligence Agency, not unaware of the advantages Radio Free

⁴³ Robert T. Holt, Radio Free Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958); James L. Tyson, United States International Broadcasting and National Security (New York: Ramapo Press, 1983); Sig Mickelson, America's Other Voice, The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (New York: Praeger, 1983).

⁴⁴Blanche Weisen Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1981), 128-29.

⁴⁵Holt, Strategic Psychological Operations, 206.

Europe provided the United States in its propaganda warfare against the Soviet Union, secretly channelled funds to the "private" station through State Department guidance.⁴⁶ The President's newly formed Committee on International Information Activities would address such issues as coordinating the efforts of the official government radio station, Voice of America, with those of the private Radio Free Europe. Now that the West had the ability to pierce the Iron Curtain, at least with radio signals, it was looking for ways to turn harassment of regimes and morale boosting into actual liberation.

On 2 February 1953, during his first State of the Union Address, Eisenhower recalled that with victory in 1945 Americans had anticipated a world of peace and cooperation; instead, there now existed a world of turmoil:

From this costly experience we have learned one clear lesson. We have learned that the free world cannot indefinitely remain in a posture of paralyzed tension. To do so leaves forever to the aggressor the choice of time and place and means to cause greatest hurt to us at least cost to himself....This administration has, therefore, begun the definition of a new positive foreign policy.⁴⁷

For Eisenhower this foreign policy had to be clear, consistent, and confident, global, envision all peaceful

⁴⁶To read more on Radio Free Europe, refer to footnote 40 as well as Holt, Strategic Psychological Operations.

⁴⁷Quoted in: Fred L. Israel, ed., The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents; 1790-1966, vol. 3, with an introduction by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (New York: Chelsea House, 1967), 3012-13.

methods and devices, foster the advent of practical unity in Europe, recognize the importance of world trade, and stress mutual security as one country could not defend the liberty of all nations. The hope of freedom depended on American strength, heart and wisdom, strength in arms, and spiritual resources.⁴⁸ Eisenhower's address signalled the official beginning of the new administration's psychological offensive against the Kremlin and its allies. The United States would now take the initiative in the Cold War, a role reversal from the Truman years. Eisenhower appeared to be fulfilling his promise of action and his administration was gaining momentum and it was only the beginning of February.

Encouraged, Eisenhower continued with his plans. The resolution he proposed in his inaugural speech gained a more concrete form in February and became known as the Declaration on Captive Peoples.⁴⁹ The United States declared that it would never agree to the enslavement of others for gain. The declaration recalled past international agreements (Yalta), pointed out the Soviet leaders' violation of them (no free elections in Poland), and noted that the United States had never agreed to such violations or results. The United States expected the Soviets to live up to the

⁴⁸Ibid., 3025.

⁴⁹Eisenhower sent a letter and his proposed draft of the resolution to Vice-President Richard M. Nixon and Speaker of the House Joseph W. Martin, Jr., on 20 February 1953.

agreements and to keep the peace. The text of the draft resolution Eisenhower sent to the House read as follows:

WHEREAS, During World War II, representatives of the United States, during the course of secret conferences, entered into various international agreements or understandings concerning other peoples; and

WHEREAS, The leaders of the Soviet Communist Party, who now control Russia, have, in violation of the clear intent of these agreements or understandings, subjected the peoples concerned, including whole nations, to the domination of a totalitarian imperialism; and

WHEREAS, Such forcible absorption of free peoples into an aggressive despotism increases the threat against the security of all remaining free peoples; and

WHEREAS, The people of the United States, true to their traditional heritage of freedom, are never acquiescent in such enslavement of any peoples; and

WHEREAS, It is appropriate that the Congress join with the President in giving expression to the desires and hopes of the people of the United States: Therefore be it

RESOLVED, that the Senate and House concurring, JOIN with the President in declaring that the United States rejects any interpretation or applications of any international agreements or understandings, made during the course of World War II, which have been perverted to bring about the subjugation of free peoples, and further

JOIN in proclaiming the hope that the peoples who have been subjected to the captivity of Soviet despotism shall again enjoy the right of self-determination within a framework which will sustain the peace; that they shall again have the right to choose the form of government under which they will live, and that sovereign rights of self-government shall be restored to them all in accordance with the pledge of the Atlantic Charter.⁵⁰

Dulles felt strongly about this resolution, claiming that it had two purposes: to "register dramatically" the breaches by the Soviet Union of wartime agreements; and to "register equally dramatically the desire and hope of the American people that the captive peoples shall be

⁵⁰"Liberation of Captive Peoples," The Department of State Bulletin, 2 March 1953, 353-54.

liberated."⁵¹ On 26 February he told the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs that:

The captive peoples are oppressed by a great fear that at some future time the United States may agree to a partition of the world whereby we would accept and support Soviet dictatorship of alien peoples in the hope of gaining greater security for ourselves.⁵²

With these statements Dulles condemned the policy of the past, containment, and offered the hope of liberation. He continued: "We do not accept or tolerate captivity as an irrevocable fact which can be finalized by force or by the lapse of time."⁵³ Eisenhower and Dulles were careful, however, not to repudiate Yalta as this would jeopardize America's rights in Vienna and Berlin.

For the anti-communist Poles, the resolution on captive peoples had a profound effect; it was a promise of liberation and provided a measure of hope for the future. They had not been deserted by the West as they had feared. Charles Douglas Jackson, a member of William Jackson's Committee on International Information Activities and a special assistant to the President, received a note from Radio Free Europe to the effect that the number of letters the station received from Poland had increased dramatically

⁵¹Bennett Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation, East-Central Europe in United States Diplomacy and Politics Since 1941 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 123.

⁵²United States Senate, Executive Sessions of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 26 February 1953, 169.

⁵³Ibid., 168.

over the past few months: 21 letters were received in November 1952; 18 in December 1952; 29 in January 1953; and 72 in February 1953⁵⁴. Radio Free Europe attributed the increase to the fact that Eisenhower had been elected President, that liberation was official United States policy, and that Radio Free Europe had been broadcasting all developments in Washington to the Polish people.

On 5 March 1953, news of the death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin reached Washington. The question was: how should the United States respond? Just the day before the National Security Council had discussed Stalin's illness, with C. D. Jackson saying that this presented the first big propaganda opportunity the United States had had in a long time. The President's response to this illness was very important psychologically and his reaction was to be more a psychological move than a diplomatic one.⁵⁵

Jackson was shocked to find that "no Agency of this Government had in its files anything resembling a plan, or even a sense-making guidance" on how to react to Stalin's illness or death.⁵⁶ Eisenhower was similarly appalled at the lack of a plan and proclaimed in a cabinet meeting on 8

⁵⁴Radio Free Europe to Jackson, 12 March 1953, Box 5, Jackson Records.

⁵⁵135th Meeting of the NSC, 4 March 1953, Box 4, NSC Series, Ann Whitman File.

⁵⁶Jackson memo, 4 March 1953, Box 29, Administration Series, Ann Whitman File.

March: "We have no plan. We are not even sure what difference this makes."⁵⁷ A Newsweek article on 16 March summed up the situation correctly: "The men in the White House were just as bewildered as the man on the street. They did not know how the death of Joseph Stalin would affect the future of the world."⁵⁸ Radio Free Europe, on the other hand, ran a carefully planned program. Indeed, Radio Free Europe scooped all of the satellite countries' stations with the first broadcast of the news. It operated under the following presumptions: Stalin's death created a period of maximum tension in the satellite countries, so the station must take caution not to provoke premature and futile demonstrations of resistance; it showed no sympathy for Stalin but was not resorting to petty denunciations of him; and it attempted to sow doubt and confusion among satellite communists by emphasizing speculation on who would take over the government and what internal struggles might occur.⁵⁹ All the while Radio Free Europe would assure the people that liberation would come.

C. D. Jackson remarked that, "In the case of Radio Free Europe, because of their greater flexibility and freedom

⁵⁷Quoted in: Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 106.

⁵⁸"Cold War, Ike, and Malenkov: 'Watch and Wait' Is the Key," Newsweek, 16 March 1953, 34.

⁵⁹Stalin's Death and Reactions and Results of the President's Speech, 30 March 1953, Box 892, Official File.

from official taboos, I was able to suggest a nasty idea or two."⁶⁰ One such idea might have resulted in RFE's broadcast of a report entitled "Poles Overcome by Stalin's Death," purportedly provided by a factory worker in Swidnica, Poland:

A liquor prohibition was enforced by the authorities here on the third day after the announcement of Stalin's illness, at the time when the illness was becoming critical. In the majority of places you could only get weak beer and only if you looked as if you really needed it. But most people had something stored away for such an occasion, and I, for one, thought it fitting and respectful to drink to the health of the Great Thinker and wish him long life and recovery. But it was too late and our fervent toasts were of no avail, so instead we solemnized his all-too-early call to Valhalla. It was done with great decorum, as benefits such an occasion, at least among our people. Unfortunately there were many Poles whose grief was so great that they lost consciousness.⁶¹

Dulles conveyed the United States government's "official condolences" on 6 March 1953, but the White House and State Department were otherwise quiet. The Resolution on Captive Peoples was put aside at this time as no one wanted to antagonize the Soviets. Watchfulness was the policy for the moment, while a struggle for power ensued in the Soviet Union. Georgi M. Malenkov, the new prime

⁶⁰Jackson memo, 4 March 1953, Box 29, Administration Series, Ann Whitman File.

⁶¹"Poles Overcome By Stalin's Death," News From Behind the Iron Curtain, May 1953, 49. Additionally, the American Embassy in Warsaw noted that upon Stalin's death: "At no time did any Embassy officer see any visible sign of personal sorrow...." United States Department of State, "Quarterly Report of Poland's Foreign and Domestic Developments," Confidential United States State Department Central Files, Poland, 1950-1954, 10 April 1953.

minister, appeared to be leading the race to succeed Stalin, but Nikita Khrushchev was advancing as well as he became the Party's new senior secretary. C. D. Jackson concluded that the Soviet government appeared unified for the moment due to the initial shock of Stalin's death, so the President was to wait and make a major speech when an appropriate opportunity arose. Until then, the United States would stress world peace and hope that when the new Soviet leader appeared, he would respond to this hope for peace. The United States expected no change in the Soviet's economic and military power or in its tight control over the satellite countries.⁶² The Soviets would likely continue their hostility toward the West as they would fear the West's consolidation and a possible move against the bloc in this period of uncertainty.⁶³

Meanwhile, Eisenhower set up task forces to study and make recommendations concerning three alternative strategies under the heading of Project Solarium: containment (continuation of the Truman years); global deterrence

⁶²Proof of the continuing Soviet domination of Poland can be seen in a speech given by Bierut on 28 March 1953. In it, he devoted over 50 paragraphs to the adulation and deification of Stalin. The text appears in Confidential US Files, Poland, 1950-1954, 21 April 1953.

⁶³Probable Consequences of the Death of Stalin and the Elevation of Malenkov to Leadership in the USSR, 10 March 1953, Box 1, Jackson Records. Also see the report of the same name and date in CIA Research Reports, The Soviet Union 1946-1976 (Frederick, Md: University Publications of America, 1982).

(increase American commitments and meet communist transgressions with severe punishment); and liberation.⁶⁴ When Eisenhower's task forces reported to him, liberation was chosen as the most desirable policy, to be achieved through political, psychological, economic, and even paramilitary warfare designed to penetrate the communist empire, "roll it back," and liberate the captive peoples.⁶⁵ It is no surprise Eisenhower chose this strategy as it was consistent with what his administration had already been attempting in its first days in power.

Despite the lack of any overt policy changes or actions on the part of the Soviet Union or of the United States, the propaganda war continued unabated. Voice of America broadcast the American view that, "whatever the impact of Stalin's death upon the Soviet ruling class and upon the Russian people, one thing is historically certain--the totalitarian system which is Stalin's legacy one day will fall from its own internal weakness."⁶⁶ In the United

⁶⁴For more on Project Solarium, see: Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability," American Historical Review, 963-89; David B. Capitanich, The Eisenhower Presidency and American Foreign Policy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), 41; Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History (Summer 1990): 319-42; James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, United States Foreign Policy and World Order, 2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1981), 176.

⁶⁵Nathan, United States Foreign Policy and World Order, 176.

⁶⁶"Voice Forecasts Battle for Power," New York Times, 7 March 1953, 3.

Nations, American Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., made a statement that it was obvious since the UN's founding that it alone cannot create peace as long as a major power leans the other way. Malenkov eventually responded by issuing a surprising statement that any and all "troublesome and unsolved questions may be resolved by peaceful negotiations."⁶⁷

This pronouncement created a stir and the United States responded that it was interested in Malenkov's words, but that words needed to be backed up with deeds such as resolving the deadlock in the UN over a world disarmament plan. The Soviets rejected the American proposal as artificial. As such unfruitful talk continued, the United States experienced a Soviet diplomatic attack through its Polish satellite. On 5 March, a Pole had flown a MiG-5 to Denmark, requesting asylum in that country. The Polish government demanded the return of both the pilot and the airplane and charged that United States authorities were organizing espionage, subversion, and sabotage within Poland's borders, calling these activities America's "Volcano Plan." According to this alleged plan, targets in Poland were to be chosen for bombing by American Air Force planes at some future date. A second confrontation occurred when the Polish Embassy in Washington, D.C. began

⁶⁷Harrison E. Salisbury, "Malenkov Offers To Settle Tensions by Peaceful Means," New York Times, 16 March 1953, 1.

distributing a booklet entitled "Documents on the Hostile Policy of the United States Government Towards People's Poland." The Department of State requested that its distribution be stopped.⁶⁸

Such problems with Poland, Malenkov's peaceful words, the Soviet propaganda attack on the United States, and an article appearing in Pravda 18 March discussing "capitalist encirclement," caused the National Security Council to conclude at its meeting on 26 March that: "...[the] pattern of Soviet psychological tactics since Stalin's death appears to be aimed at using the 'new look' of Malenkov's succession to advance with greater impact the traditional aims of Stalinism."⁶⁹ In other words, the NSC believed Soviet actions would continue to attempt to subvert the West while Malenkov publicly voiced words of peace and of problem-solving. Malenkov, in the American view, was seeking a propaganda victory in the Cold War.

On 16 April 1953, Eisenhower addressed the duality of Soviet words and actions in a speech he made concerning the

⁶⁸"Poland Renews Anti-U.S. Charge," New York Times, 18 March 1953, 4; "Poland Renews Anti-U.S. Charge," New York Times, 22 March 1953, 34; "Pole Flies to Denmark in First Intact Russian MiG-5 to Reach West," New York Times, 6 March 1953, 1,3; "Polish Embassy Asked to Cease Distributing Anti-U.S. Book," Department of State Bulletin, 20 April 1953, 578; "U.S. Scores Poles' Book," New York Times, 31 March 1953, 19.

⁶⁹Psychological Planning Board--Stalin's Death--Soviet Lures and Pressures Since, 26 March 1956, Box 1, Jackson Records.

post-Stalin world. This speech was his "Chance For Peace" speech. It began:

In this spring of 1953 the free world weighs one question above all others: the chance for a just peace for all peoples....The way chosen by the United States was plainly marked by a few clear precepts, which govern its conduct in world affairs:

- (1) No people on earth can be held, as a people, to be an enemy, for all humanity shares the common hunger for peace and fellowship and justice.
- (2) No nation's security and well-being can be achieved by isolation
- (3) Any nation's right to a form of government and an economic system of its own choosing is inalienable.
- (4) Any nation's attempt to dictate to other nations their form of government is indefensible."
- (5) Lasting peace cannot be based on an arms race but in just relations and honest understanding.

The Soviet government held a vastly different vision of the future. Security was not found in mutual trust and aid, but in force.

There remained, however, one thing essentially unchanged and unaffected by Soviet conduct: the readiness of the free nations to welcome sincerely any genuine evidence of peaceful purpose enabling all peoples again to resume their common quest of just peace...We welcome every honest act of peace....We care nothing for mere rhetoric.... I know of nothing I can add to make plainer the sincere purpose of the United States...What is the Soviet Union ready to do? Whatever the answer be, let it be plainly spoken....Is prepared to allow other nations, including those of Eastern Europe, the free choice of their own forms of government?⁷⁰

The speech, eliciting no official reply from the Soviet Union, received an unofficial response to the American challenge in Pravda:

Facts show that only by a stubborn struggle for their rights did the peoples of Eastern Europe come to the

⁷⁰Quoted in: Janet Podell and Steven Anzovin, eds., Speeches of the American Presidents (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1988), 569-72.

present popular-democratic form of government....It would be strange to expect the Soviet Union to interfere in favor of installing the reactionary regimes overthrown by these peoples.⁷¹

With this one article, Pravda reduced Eisenhower's offer to work with the Soviet Union for a just peace in Europe to the level of mere propaganda as the offer was rejected by the Soviet Union. As expectations for a dialogue fell, international affairs between these two countries returned to business as usual.

As no resolution of the problems existing between the United States and the Soviet Union appeared forthcoming, America looked to its allies and to possible psychological or propaganda victories it could gain, such as exploiting the results of the United States Escapee Program (created 21 March 1952 within the State Department by President Truman and continued under Eisenhower). This program was designed to meet the needs of escapees from communist countries, such as providing toiletries upon their arrival in the West, determining their abilities and providing vocational and language training as needed, and resettling them. In March 1953 alone, 58,000 refugees arrived in West Berlin. Due to these large numbers, the National Security Council decided to exploit the escapees for psychological value and from then on, United States policy encouraged the defection of all Soviet nationals and of "key" personnel from the

⁷¹Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation, 127.

satellite countries. Phase "A" of this policy provided for the reception, care and resettlement of the people. Phase "B" concerned the subsequent "use" of the escapees, such as the exploitation of the facts of their escape by Radio Free Europe and by other similar organizations. On 22 April 1953, Eisenhower asked Congress to pass legislation allowing 120,000 immigrants a year for the next two years into the United States. This calculated move was designed to demonstrate that America was willing to look after people the Soviet system could not or would not support. The Escapee Program reflected negatively on the Soviets and on the puppet satellite regimes, while aiding such Western allies as the Netherlands, France, and Great Britain who had been struggling with the flood of refugees to their countries. Moreover, the refugees provided the United States with considerable intelligence about activities behind the Iron Curtain.⁷²

In another move, Dulles and Joseph Flack, the American ambassador to Poland, discussed on 4 May a plan to offer food to one or more satellites through the International Red Cross or some similar agency. This proposal held potential

⁷²For more on the Escapee Program, see Frank L. Querbach, "The Refugee Relief Act of 1953," The Department of State Bulletin, 24 August 1953, 231-35; "President's Proposal for Admission of European Migrants," The Department of State Bulletin, 15 June 1953, 857-59; Psychological Value of Escapees from the Soviet Orbit, 30 March 1953, Box 1, Jackson Records; United States Escapee Program, 21 March 1952, Robert K. Gray Records.

propaganda value whether accepted by the satellite regimes or not. Dulles requested Flack's view on the issue and wanted to know if any food shortages existed in Poland. Flack responded that a few shortages of some items existed, but that there was no threat to the health of the population. As to the offer of food, Flack felt that the Polish government would "violently reject [the] offer"⁷³ which implied it was unable to support its people. The regime would use the offer for its own propagandistic purposes, e.g., accuse the United States of dumping low-grade commodities on the countries of Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, a press release by Dulles on 3 May, the 162nd anniversary of the first Polish Constitution,⁷⁴ noted that that document had been written "during another period of great national trial [when] the people of Poland proclaimed with a voice that no tyranny has ever been able to silence-- their will to be free."⁷⁵

Although the Poles remained quiet on this anniversary, a month later the Czechs and East Germans made considerable

⁷³"Ambassador in Poland (Flack) to the Department of State," Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 8, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean (Washington, DC: GPO, 1988), 58.

⁷⁴The Polish Constitution, signed 3 May 1791, was the second democratic constitution after that of the United States. Unfortunately, the 1791 constitution was short-lived, as Poland was soon partitioned and did not regain its independence again until after World War I.

⁷⁵Charles E. Egan, "American Leaders Hail Spirit of Poles," New York Times, 3 May 1953, 1.

noise. On 1 June, workers at the Skoda factory in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, rioted, seizing city hall and attacking symbols of communist authority. The riot, quickly suppressed, received little attention in America because it was so short-lived and localized. The East German riots, on the other hand, proved a test for Eisenhower's liberation policy.

East Germans had been experiencing economic difficulties, such as labor shortages, longer working hours for lower wages, and general communist inefficiency, which had led to food shortages in the country. On 16 June, two weeks after the Pilsen uprising, East German workers marched to the House of Ministries carrying a sign stating, "We demand a reduction in the norms."⁷⁶ By the time the workers reached the ministries building, a crowd consisting of other workers, students, and non-workers had already gathered calling for secret ballots and the resignation of the Communist government. The demonstration, originally about economic grievances, quickly became one for reform, democracy, and freedom. The following day the police and the Soviet army arrived as the revolt became more violent and the people more vocal in their anti-communist, anti-Soviet demands. By nightfall, however, all was quiet and martial law had been instituted. The communists remained

⁷⁶Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation, 131.

firmly in control and the West feared that the local population would probably suffer from reprisals.⁷⁷

The immediate American response was silence; as with the death of Stalin, no contingency plan existed for such an event. At the 150th meeting of the NSC on 18 June, the members noted that Molotov's "soft" policies were affecting the satellites, as witnessed by the Czech and East German riots. The NSC believed that for the first time the slaves of the Soviet Union felt "they could do something" and they showed the world that they were willing to die for freedom. The meeting concluded with a consensus that if the Soviets had to rely on their own troops to put the riot down--as the local troops were not trustworthy--then this was a sign of promise. Beyond this analysis, they proffered no plan at the meeting. Indeed, it was not until a week later that some guidelines were formed. The NSC decided to recommend passive resistance to the people of East Germany and Eastern Europe in order to avoid bloodshed and that the United States should continue the use of the rioting East Germans' slogan of free elections.⁷⁸

⁷⁷For more information on the East German riots: Arnulf Baring, The Uprising in East Germany: June 17, 1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972); Martin McCauley, The German Democratic Republic Since 1945 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983); Jonathan Steele, Inside East Germany, The State That Came In From the Cold (New York: Urizen Books, 1977).

⁷⁸150th Meeting of the NSC, 18 June 1953, Box 4, NSC Series, Ann Whitman File; U.S. Policies and Actions to Exploit the Unrest in the Satellite States, 25 June 1953,

The failure of the United States to liberate East Germany or even to act in such a way as to gain them more freedom was perceived by liberation critics as the failure of the policy of liberation.⁷⁹ The positive policy of action that the American people had counted on when Eisenhower took office was unveiled as a policy of mere rhetoric. It appeared that the old policy of containment was still in place. Neither the East Germans, nor the Poles, nor any other satellite peoples would be free. The great hope for the future was dashed by America's inability to act in East Germany. So it appeared to many in the world, but was this really the end of efforts to replace containment with a policy of liberation? No one in the administration believed so.

Box 4, NSC Series, Ann Whitman File.

⁷⁹For more on critics of liberation, see preface. See also Charles C. Alexander, Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era 1953-1961 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975). On page 64, he writes: "Yet as Kennan commented, from the outset Dulles 'knew very well that whatever he might say publically, he was going to have to pursue in reality... pretty much the policy [of containment] toward the Soviet Union with which my name had often been connected.'" Reichard quoted Ambrose: "'Eisenhower and Dulles continued the policy of containment' and 'avoided any embarrassment over their lack of action through their rhetoric.'" Reichard, South Atlantic Quarterly, 278.

II. A STRATEGY IS FORMED

On 29 June 1953, in the immediate wake of the East German riots, the Jackson Committee presented its report on international information activities to Eisenhower, concluding that there appeared no evidence of any basic change in the perceived Soviet objective of world domination. Although the Jackson Committee felt the key to Soviet strength lay in its tightly organized political system and impressive political warfare capabilities, the weaknesses of the Soviet system were the attitudes of the Soviet and satellite peoples towards their rulers. Finally, the report concluded that political warfare should be used as an instrument of national policy for applying pressure to Eastern Europe by offering hope, preventing sovietization, and providing objective and reliable news to these countries.

The committee further noted that the primary purpose of an information program was to persuade foreign nationals that it was in their best interest to take actions consistent with the national objectives of the United

States. It also advised that greater effort be used to enlist private American organizations to advance American objectives and the United States aim to improve international cooperation on propaganda in international organizations and with allied governments. Radio programs such as those produced by Voice of America and Radio Free Europe were to continue; the number of exchanges of persons should increase; publications, films, information centers and especially inexpensive books needed to be made more widely available as well.⁸⁰

Robert L. Johnson, chief administrator of the International Information and Educational Exchange Program, summed up the Jackson Committee's conclusions:

"The...purposes of the information program should be to submit evidence to the peoples of other nations that their own aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace are supported and advanced by the objectives and policies of the United States."⁸¹ To accomplish this, the committee recommended the establishment of the Operations Coordination Board within the NSC to coordinate NSC policies among all bureaus and agencies to ensure that they carried out the plans correctly, and the establishment of the United States

⁸⁰Jackson Committee Report, 29 June 1953, Box 4, NSC Series, Ann Whitman File.

⁸¹U.S. International Information Administration, 29 July 1953, Box 13, Administration Series, Ann Whitman File.

Information Agency to coordinate American propoganda abroad with United States policies and objectives.

The East German revolt demonstrated to Eisenhower that concrete policies and strategies to achieve liberation were virtually nonexistent. Consequently, the National Security Council finally cobbled together an interim plan on 29 June entitled "United States Objectives and Actions to Exploit the Unrest in the Satellite States." NSC 158 called for the United States government to pursue certain psychological objectives:

- (1) To nourish resistance to communist aggression throughout satellite Europe, short of mass rebellion in areas under Soviet military control, and without compromising its spontaneous nature.
- (2) To undermine satellite puppet authority.
- (3) To exploit satellite unrest as demonstrable proof that the Soviet empire is beginning to crumble.
- (4) To convince the free world, particularly Western Europe, that love of liberty and hatred of alien oppression are stronger behind the Iron Curtain than it has been dared to believe and that resistance to totalitarianism is less hopeless than has been imagined.

The objectives aimed to undermine the authority of the satellite governments through the implementation of a dual phase plan. The first phase required under sixty days to initiate:

- (1) Reemphasize United States support for German unity based on free elections followed by a peace treaty
- (2) Implement Volunteer Freedom Corps completing discussions as soon as possible with Allied governments
- (3) Consider bringing Soviet repression of the East German revolt before the UN

The second, or long-term, phase needed more lengthy preparation:

(1) Consider United States advocacy of

- Free elections in the satellites and association with the West European community, with emphasis on economic cooperation and rehabilitation, and
- Subsequent withdrawal of all foreign troops from Germany, Austria, and the satellites

(2) Cultural appeals to Soviet intellectuals

(3) Consider the inclusion of Soviet nationals in Phase II of the Volunteer Freedom Corps project ⁸²

NSC 158, roughly an outline of a strategy to guide the administration in the formulation of later plans, suggested psychological warfare, rhetoric, humanitarian aid, and covert operations be used to combat Soviet power and to hopefully bring a measure of freedom to the satellites. Although plans would change and develop over the next three years, the means to achieve their ends would remain the same as those suggested in NSC 158--largely propaganda.

Concerning the short-term recommendations of NSC 158, the "Resolution on the Situation in Germany" passed by Congress on 2 July fulfilled the first suggestion. The second proposal aimed to incorporate escapees from the Iron Curtain countries into the United States military; however, there were too many details to work out for the VFC to be realized. As to the last and similarly unsuccessful proposal, Eisenhower thought it unwise to condemn the Soviets in the UN for their actions in East Germany. Such a

⁸²United States Objectives and Actions to Exploit the Unrest in the Satellite States, 29 June 1953, Box 1, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

charge would turn the UN into a mere forum for propaganda, and he did not want to open the United States up for later reprisals by the Soviet Union in the General Assembly. The long-term actions were never accomplished.

NSC 158 was not a plan for liberation or for a rollback of Soviet power. It was an outline of steps the administration could take to weaken the prestige of the Soviet empire without jeopardizing the outbreak of war. As yet, no liberation plan existed, but it was clear the tools of such a plan would be psychological warfare, rhetoric, humanitarian aid, and covert operations. Eisenhower and Dulles drew certain conclusions about Eastern Europe:

- (1) There is exploitation of the working class by the East German government that professes to protect it
- (2) Soviet satellite regimes do not have real popular support
- (3) The satellite governments are Soviet puppets
- (4) Puppet regimes can be challenged by a population
- (5) The riots were ostensibly against the harsh conditions, but they were really for freedom and against Soviet domination

Therefore, United States objectives should be:

- (1) Show people in satellite countries through facts, reports and interpretations that are credible and convincing that Soviet power was not impregnable and that East German resistance was a success
- (2) Strengthen the confidence in the potential of their own strength and increase their spirit of resistance
- (3) Make Soviet control of satellite people as difficult as possible without risking bloodshed and risking our reliable reputation
- (4) Reflect United States opposition to their enslavement and United States determination that liberty be restored to these people

- (5) Maintain level of resistance calculated to exploit any opportunities that appear⁸³

After the riots in East Germany, Radio Free Europe and the Eisenhower administration appeared more determined in their propaganda efforts than before. An example of a broadcast to Poland by Radio Free Europe ran along the lines of describing the qualities of the type of man that the totalitarian regime was trying to produce. That man did not want freedom, was a tool of the state, a robot without any human feelings, and was essentially a dehumanized individual. Taught to hate, he hated the enemy and struggled against this enemy to unmask and destroy him. Unfortunately, Soviet morality had its own concept of virtue and crime, crime being associated with the struggle for freedom or faith in God. Fortunately, the West was mobilizing its positive strength to build a lasting peace on the principle of independence of all nations; therefore, when one thinks of liberation, think in terms of when and not if.⁸⁴

In a White House press release on 7 August, Eisenhower hailed the signing of the Refugee Relief Act that would allow 214,000 immigrants into the United States, 186,000 of whom would be escapees from communist countries. Eisenhower felt that the passage of this act demonstrated America's

⁸³"Unrest in Satellite Countries," FRUS, vol. 2, National Security Affairs, 1728-29.

⁸⁴"This is Radio Free Europe," News From Behind the Iron Curtain, June 1953, 41.

concern for homeless, persecuted, and less fortunate individuals in other lands and was in dramatic contrast to what was occurring in Eastern Europe.⁸⁵ The defection of Dr. Marek Stanislaw Korowicz, first alternate member of the Polish delegation to the UN, provided another propaganda victory for the West. Korowicz announced that 95 percent of the Poles were opposed to their communist leaders and that people felt Soviet power in their country could be "disrupted from within." Saying that it was important to get the true news into Poland and commending Radio Free Europe, he later broadcast to Poland over that station words that the United States used for propaganda purposes.⁸⁶

In October the United States tried a different tactic, the use of humanitarian efforts to try to ease some of the tension between the two governments. Dulles notified Ambassador Flack that the United States proposed a Christmas season gift package operation in Poland in which CARE would mail packages containing food to Polish recipients designated by their friends and family in the United States. Despite expectations to the contrary, the Polish government approved this operation and packages were distributed at

⁸⁵"Refugee Relief Act Signed," Department of State Bulletin, 17 August 1953, 1-2.

⁸⁶John C. Devlin, "New Polish Alternate at UN Asks Asylum Here," New York Times, 19 September 1953, 1.

Christmas. The United States had succeeded in gaining contact with the Polish people.⁸⁷

However, this one bright spot was not indicative of the general relations between the two countries. The American propaganda campaign made the Polish regime uncomfortable, which in turn led to a governmental crackdown on the Polish church. It was estimated that upwards of 95 percent of the population supported the Catholic church in Poland either due to their own beliefs or in an effort to oppose the regime as it was the only truly nationalist and non-communist organization in the country.⁸⁸ The state struck against this enemy on 25 September and arrested Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, the Polish Primate and a true leader of the Polish nation. The Eisenhower administration used this

⁸⁷The American Embassy in Vienna sent its opinion of the Polish people's response to the packages to the Department of State: "They have a fantastic belief that the USA can never be vanquished...The packages sent by them to Europe have done a magnificent job of propaganda for the US." Confidential US Files, Poland, 1950-1954, 19 October 1953, 5.

⁸⁸For more on the Catholic Church in Poland and Cardinal Wyszynski, see: "Arrest of Cardinal Wyszynski," Department of State Bulletin 19 October 1953, 528-29; "Quarterly Report of Poland's Principal Foreign and Domestic Developments, July-September 1953," Confidential United States State Department Central Files. Poland (Frederick, Md: University Publications of America, n.d.); Bogdan Szajdowski, Next to God-Poland: Politics and Religion in Contemporary Poland (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983); Stefan Wyszynski, A Freedom Within: The Prison Notes of Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, trans. by Barbara Krzywicki-Herbert and Walter J. Ziemba (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983); Norbert A. Zmijewski, The Catholic-Marxist Ideological Dialogue in Poland, 1945-1980 (Brookfield, Vt: Dartmouth, 1991).

unjust arrest for propaganda against the communists as it demonstrated their penchant for force and disrespect for human rights.

Tensions mounted again between the two governments when, in December, the public learned that Lt. Colonel Jozef Swiatlo of the Polish political police, and Deputy Chief of Department 10 (where all the compromising information on others was kept) of the Ministry of Public Security had sought asylum in the West. No details were released but the West was already questioning Swiatlo on the situation in Poland. Relations appeared destined not to improve.

Fortunately, by the end of the year the United States finally had an official policy towards the satellite regimes. NSC 174, established 11 December 1953, was a statement on "United States Policy Toward Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe" and was the first plan to outline concrete steps that could be taken to bring the long-term goal of liberation closer; thus, an issue that the world thought dead was alive to the Eisenhower administration. NSC 174 noted the following:

- (1) The Soviets controlled and exploited the satellites despite problems
- (2) Barriers to consolidation of the Soviet Union were:

-The anti-communist attitude of the great majority of the population in each satellite. This anti-communism is intensified particularly by loss of personal freedom and a reduced standard of living, as well as by outraged religious and national feelings, but its undiminished survival over the long run is jeopardized by communist control over

every aspect of the lives of the people, particularly the young.

-The continued refusal of the West to accept the permanence of the imposed satellite regimes as compatible with the freedom and self-determination of nations;

- (3) Underground groups were scattered
- (4) A Tito-like regime was not expected to appear in other satellites even though Tito showed proof that there was an alternative to the Kremlin
- (5) The detachment of any major European satellite from the Soviet bloc does not now appear feasible except by Soviet acquiescence or by war⁸⁹

The NSC 174 policy conclusion was that the policy sought resistance to domination over the satellites⁹⁰ and elimination of that influence.

Accordingly, feasible political, economic, propaganda and covert measures are required to create and exploit troublesome problems for the Soviet Union, complicate control in the satellites and retard the growth of the military and economic potential of the Soviet bloc. Decisions on such measures to impose pressures on the Soviet bloc should take into account the desirability of creating conditions which will induce the Soviet leadership to be more receptive to acceptable negotiated settlements. Accordingly, this policy should be carried out by flexible courses of action in the light of current estimates of the Soviet Government's reactions and of the situation in the satellite states concerned, after calculation of the advantages and disadvantages to the general position of the United States in relation to the Soviet Union and to the free world.

NSC 174 objectives were:

Long-range: The eventual fulfillment of the rights of the peoples in the Soviet satellites to enjoy governments of their own choosing, free of Soviet domination

⁸⁹U.S. Policy Toward Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe, 11 December 1953, Box 8, NSC Series, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

⁹⁰author's emphasis.

and participating as peaceful members in the free world community.

Current: To disrupt the Soviet-satellite relationship, minimize satellite contributions to Soviet power, and deter aggressive world policies on the part of the Soviet Union by diverting Soviet attention and energies to problems and difficulties within the Soviet bloc.

Courses of action therefore included: continued negotiations with the Soviet Union and involvement in the UN and NATO; increasing resistance and hope in the satellites without inciting them to premature revolt or commitments on American action to bring liberation; promoting passive resistance; promoting nationalist, religious, cultural, and social sentiments; aiding defectors and refugee organizations; increasing unity in the West; continued diplomatic missions to the Eastern European countries; promoting anti-communist elements and disaffection in the armed services; stimulating conflict within the bloc and between it and the Soviet Union; and continued advocacy of the right of peoples to choose their own government.⁹¹

In sum, the United States could take direct action for liberation--but that would lead to a global war; accept the fact of Soviet control--an unacceptable option; or call for the eventual elimination of Soviet power, but not give a time period for this decline. The administration chose the third choice by following the courses of action mentioned above. The methods to be used included diplomacy,

⁹¹U.S. Policy Towards Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe, 11 December 1953, Box 8, NSC Series, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

propaganda, economic policy and covert operations to maintain the morale of anti-Soviet elements, sow confusion, discredit the authority of the regimes, disrupt relations with the Soviet Union, and generally to maximize Soviet difficulties.

As these were all flexible and adaptable courses of action, NSC 174 remained a valid policy despite the world situation at any given time. The importance of this plan was that it recognized liberation as a long-term goal and proved that it had not been abandoned after the East German riots as many had assumed. NSC 174 showed the administration's aim was to slow down and/or prevent the sovietization process in the satellite countries. If the peoples could not be sovietized, the communists were prevented from consolidating their power and thus from using this added strength to act against the West. This also meant that the satellite peoples were ensuring their future liberation by resisting their absorption into the Soviet Union. As Dulles had stated on 27 January 1953: "The Russian Communists, as I've pointed out, have swallowed a great many people to date, approximately 800 million, but you know there is such a thing as indigestion."⁹² What could not be absorbed would eventually have to be rejected.

⁹²Quoted in: "A Survey of Foreign Policy Problems, Address by Secretary Dulles," The Department of State Bulletin, 9 February 1953, 215.

Eisenhower, although elected because of his popularity and on the hope of liberation, never held it as a short-term goal. Since he wanted to avoid a war with the Soviets, he had to rely on liberation through peaceful means, something only possible in the long-term. What Eisenhower needs to be recognized as accomplishing was not a return to containment but the creation of NSC 174. This call to action established the policy of resisting Soviet domination of the satellites and maximizing its difficulties in the eastern bloc. He pointed the United States towards liberation and outlined the increments by which this goal could be achieved. Only by looking at NSC 174 is it clear what the Eisenhower administration hoped to attain. As was mentioned in the preface, for Eisenhower to take advantage of opportunities, he had to keep these opportunities secret, thus the rhetorical smoke-screen.

III. THE NEXT TWO YEARS, 1954-1955

To achieve the disruption in Soviet-satellite relations envisioned by the NSC, Eisenhower needed to be sure that he had the support of other countries as well. On 7 January 1954, he stated: "American freedom is interlocked with the freedom of other peoples."⁹³ However, he particularly worried that the countries of Western Europe might be seduced by the Soviet's "new look" strategy, a policy in which the Soviets appeared to desire peace, better relations with the West, and a cessation of past tensions. Eisenhower and Dulles felt this "look" was merely a change of tactics rather than a change of objectives on the part of the Soviet Union.

C. D. Jackson in particular was not fooled by the new Soviet tactic. In a letter to the president on 24 February he related what this "new look" really meant after meeting with Soviet representatives in Berlin.

During the social gatherings, whether in the Soviet Embassy or when we were hosts, the Soviet mood was one of great personal friendliness, sometimes verging on an

⁹³Israel, State of the Union Messages, 3027.

almost pathetic eagerness to be liked personally even though professionally the gap between us was as great as ever.⁹⁴

The Polish Government-in-Exile in London⁹⁵ was not fooled either and made the following evaluation and suggestions through its representative, Mr. Adam Ciolkosz, Foreign Secretary, Polish Political Council in London, to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. He stated that the communist regime in Poland was weak and confused now that Stalin was dead, whereas before, the regime had always received specific orders from Moscow; now the orders were either vague or non-existent. For example, the 2nd Congress of the Polish Communist Party had been due to meet, but as no orders had arrived from Moscow instructing it to meet, the Congress was postponed.⁹⁶

Ciolkosz proclaimed Radio Free Europe to be extremely effective and remarked that President Eisenhower had made a great impression on Poland and on all the countries behind the Iron Curtain as for the first time someone in a

⁹⁴Post-Berlin Thoughts on the Current Soviet Psyche, 24 February 1954, Box 41, Jackson Papers.

⁹⁵The Polish Government-in-Exile was one of three groups of Polish exiles, divided by differences. It proposed to offer an alternative to the communist government in People's Poland, but was not recognized by the United States or by most other governments.

⁹⁶United States House, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Polish Government-in-Exile in London: Views on German Rearmament and Communist Control of Eastern Europe, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 589.

responsible position mentioned the liberation of Eastern European countries as a condition of stable peace in Europe and cooperation among nations based on confidence. The Polish people, however, were not happy that the issue of German reunification seemed to be in the foreground of American-Soviet relations. As the American and Soviet plans on German reunification were irreconcilable, the division of Europe would be maintained. What Ciolkosz and his organization recommended as a way to liberate Poland was for America to propose a unified but disarmed Germany to the Soviets. He reasoned that if the Soviets could have a disarmed Germany, they would withdraw from Eastern Europe as that would be preferable to staying in countries where they were unwelcome. In addition, all of Eastern Europe would welcome a unified and disarmed Germany because these countries still feared the possibility of another German invasion; thus, with one proposal, all the world would be behind the United States. Congress, however, ignored his testimony.⁹⁷

The administration was further frustrated in its desire for better relations with Poland when the Polish Consulates in New York, Chicago, and Detroit began circulating communist propaganda. The Department of State responded by closing the consulates, contending that they "serve no useful purpose in the conduct of relations between the

⁹⁷Ibid.

United States and Poland at the present time."⁹⁸ Poland called this a "highly unfriendly step" and retaliated by asking the United States to close its consulate in Gdansk.⁹⁹

These closures merely added fuel to the ongoing propaganda war. Radio Free Europe, utilizing the guidelines created by NSC 174, provided a way for the government to demonstrate its continued commitment to Polish freedom. RFE tried to convince the satellite people to use their own strength and ingenuity to hack at the Iron Curtain from the inside, especially as they were strong now at a time when their rulers were confused and disorganized. It also directed a campaign against the police and the army in the hopes of undermining their loyalty to the communist leaders. The broadcasts also attempted to sow doubt among the communist officials by reminding them that any chances of living to a ripe old age were not great as most of them would either be disgraced, purged, imprisoned, or shot. The youths in the satellite countries were targeted as well and told to learn as much as they could about arms and soldiering because one day these skills would be needed.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸"Poles' Consulates Ordered to Close," New York Times, 26 February 1954, 1. Also in "Closing of Polish Consulates General," Department of State Bulletin 8 March 1954, 352. For the American Embassy's evaluation of the situation, see: "Quarterly Report of Poland's Principal Foreign and Domestic Developments," Confidential US Files, Poland, 1950-1954, 9 April 1954.

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Holt, Strategic Psychological Operations, 210-11.

Dulles wrote Henry Ford on 25 March: "I say with confidence that Radio Free Europe is today one of the most effective means available to the Western World in combating Communist aggression....,"¹⁰¹ meaning that by hindering sovietization of the satellites, the consolidation of Soviet power would not occur and such power could not then be used against the free world.

On the 163rd anniversary of the Polish Constitution of 1791, the United States hailed the document as an example of the Poles' tradition of freedom, and on 7 May the President wrote a letter to General Wladyslaw Anders of the Polish Armed Forces-in-Exile on the commemoration of the Battle of Monte Cassino. Eisenhower wrote that Monte Cassino was representative of the heroism and sacrifices of the Polish soldiers in the past war against the forces of totalitarianism in Europe. The battle would stand as a symbol of the Polish nation's inextinguishable love of freedom. The Polish people today again were faced with foreign oppression and were meeting it with the same qualities of heroism. America was convinced their courage and faith in freedom were not in vain.¹⁰²

On 15 July the first progress report on NSC 174 noted that in executing the policy the following actions had been

¹⁰¹Dulles to Henry Ford, 25 March 1954, Box 7, Chronological Series, Dulles Papers.

¹⁰²United States Presidents. Public Papers, 1954, 482.

taken: the United States had continued its opposition to Soviet domination of the satellites; a one-megawatt transmitter had been put up in Germany in order to increase broadcasts to the Iron Curtain; NATO had conferred on ways to coordinate propaganda broadcasts to the Soviet Union and satellites; the Escapee Program was expanded; West Berlin had become a showcase for the goods and policies of the West; messages and statements on occasions of national days in the East European countries were issued; and the Voice of America was keeping up its broadcast hours.¹⁰³

In evaluating NSC 174, the report said: "Thus, while the policy objectives of NSC 174 remain valid as long-term goals, the ability of the United States to take direct action towards achieving those objectives is limited."¹⁰⁴ The problem was that the United States wanted a rollback of Soviet power without risking war, the avoidance of which was another major American policy. This report shows that liberation was alive as a long-term policy¹⁰⁵ and that the United States would never risk war for the satellites; however, it did not keep the United States from acting under the authority of NSC 174, to deter the sovietization of these peoples--a short-term objective. The report stated

¹⁰³Progress Report on NSC 174-Actions in Execution of Policy, 15 July 1954, Box 8, NSC Series, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵Refer to page 51 for long-term objectives.

that all recommended actions were being carried out and provided a new list of actions to be carried out by December 1954. This list stated specific actions the United States could do to decrease Soviet prestige in the eyes of the world and of the satellite peoples. For example, the United States was to press for the return of American citizens in Soviet jails, distribute films on the techniques of communist takeover and control, place a spotlight on the policies and problems of agriculture in the Soviet Union and the satellite countries, continue publication of Problems of Communism, issue statements on national holidays, display United States military strength whenever appropriate, see if it would be possible to develop cultural and technical exchanges, and continue advocacy of the right of peoples to their own independent governments.¹⁰⁶

In keeping with the spirit of NSC 174, the Kapus family, Hungarian nationals and the first to receive visas under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, met with the President. As Dorothy D. Houghton, from the Office of Assistant Director for Refugees, Migration and Voluntary

¹⁰⁶List of Agreed Courses of Action for Period 7/1/54 - 12/31/54 to Implement NSC 174, 25 August 1954, Box 67, OCB Central File Series, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. In September 1954, the Assembly of Captive European Nations was created. Following the spirit of NSC 174, it was an organization that became important for the Poles in exile as they organized to provide Washington with information about the situation in the Soviet bloc, stress the illegitimacy of the communist regimes, call for free elections under guidance of the UN, and warn against certain Soviet overtures to the West.

Assistance wrote to James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary at the White House,

The dramatic circumstances of the Kapus escape from Hungary one year ago, the personal tragedy suffered by Mrs. Kapus (she lost her foot when she stepped on a mine) in crossing the border into Austria, and the fact that they are the first escapees to enter the United States under the Refugee Relief Act makes the case particularly valuable from the point of view of exploiting behind the Iron Curtain the escapee program and as provided for by appropriate National Security Council directives.¹⁰⁷

Another story exploited on both sides of the Iron Curtain was that of Jozef Swiatlo, who had defected to the West in December 1953, and was just beginning to tell his story over Radio Free Europe a year later. Radio Free Europe devoted over 150 programs to his tales of the many evils done by the Polish Communist party, the state, and by the Government. Poland, he said, was run exclusively by Moscow, especially through its ambassador to Poland, and Boleslaw Beirut, the leader of Poland, was a mere puppet who lived grandly while the workers were robbed of basic human rights while many even starved. He then detailed the activities of the Bezpieka, or the secret police. He told how they rigged elections, rewrote and reorganized history, imprisoned and murdered many Poles, and were essentially the spearhead of Soviet aggression in Poland.

Swiatlo's story was so widely publicized and detailed so many horrors that the Polish Government eventually

¹⁰⁷Houghton Memo to Hagerty, 2 August 1954, Box 578, Official Files, Office of the Staff Secretary.

dissolved their Ministry of Security. Radio Free Europe, pronouncing victory, claimed the closure occurred as a direct result of their heavy attack on the police-state aspect of communism. RFE felt that this event, as no other, demonstrated that propaganda could bring direct results in the war against the sovietization of a subject people. The Polish Communists did dissolve the Ministry, but the real reason was that the ruling elite had discovered the threat the secret police posed not just to the populace, but to them as well. It was an act committed out of self-preservation rather than of embarrassment over propaganda. Interestingly, the ruling elite had to learn about the Ministry of Security's threat to them through RFE.¹⁰⁸

The new year brought new, more aggressive thinking into the Eisenhower administration. The Operations Coordinating Board, the small group within the NSC, produced a report on 5 January 1955 entitled, "Analysis of the Situation with Respect to Possible Detachment of A Major European Soviet Satellite." The OCB, assessing the possibility of detaching

¹⁰⁸For more information on RFE and the Swiatlo story, see Marcin Krol, "Listening Through the Jamming," American Scholar 61, no. 3 (1992): 431-35; Konrad Syrop, Spring in October; The Story of the Polish Revolution, 1956, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1957), 21-24; "The Swiatlo Story," News From Behind The Iron Curtain, March 1955, 3-36; Foreign Service Despatch from Vienna to the Department of State, February 18, 1955 and the Quarterly Report of Poland's Principal Foreign and Domestic Developments October-December 1954 in Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Poland 1955-1959 (Scholarly Resources, Inc., n.d.).

a satellite from the bloc by implementing NSC 174, realized this was an unlikely proposition as the United States did not want to risk war, but it examined the situation anyway. Internal action by a country was seen as the most possible means of detaching a satellite, whereas external action was ruled out as it was sure to lead to war. Covert operations supporting resistance were deemed risky as well as they would have to be on such a large scale and spread over so many years that the Soviets would probably deem it the equivalent of open hostilities. The only other method of satellite detachment would be if the United States was victorious in a war against the Soviet Union; thus, the chances of the United States achieving detachment were limited as the Soviet Union held the trump card of actual possession of the countries, and detachment due to internal forces required a strong local leader and Eastern Europe peoples held most of their leaders in contempt.

By the end of the month, the NSC had turned the OCB study into NSC 5505/1: "Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities." Using its guidelines, the United States increased pressures on the governments within the satellites. The policy aimed to discredit communist regimes and to again, hinder the Soviet Union in its effort to consolidate its power in the area, and to somewhat empower the satellite peoples. NSC 5501/1 stated that one method to achieve this goal was to increase both popular and

bureaucratic pressures on the governments, thus causing them to spend more of their time on internal problems; in turn, this would increase tensions, divisions and infighting among the regimes. In order to accomplish this, propaganda was used to illustrate the following: the problems that existed with police states; low standards of living; opposition to collectivization; cultural and intellectual regimentation; interference with religion; dissatisfaction of the minorities; nationality problems; ideological weakness of the system and the government structure of the Soviet Union.

Radio Free Europe, simultaneously making similar observations, found three forces working for the liberation of the satellites: external forces, such as the unity and strength of the West to resist the Soviet Union; orbital forces, such as the strain between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; and internal forces that were resisting a communist takeover. RFE still held to its principle of discouraging bloodshed by trying to maintain and enhance nonviolent resistance to the Soviets. The station's operating principles were to present the objective truth, to be a "home service" radio--providing news and entertainment that Radio Warsaw would provide if it were free--to remain autonomous, and to be a "tactical" operation by being fresh and timely and by frequently beating the communist radio stations to the news. Through these operating principles

the NSC hoped to use Radio Free Europe to put NSC 5501/1 into action.¹⁰⁹

This occurred immediately. NSC 5501/1, created 31 January, led to the launching of "Operation Spotlight" on 12 February.¹¹⁰ Balloons dropping a million copies of Swiatlo's book on Poland, provided the Poles with documentary evidence of the government's perfidy. The purpose of Operation Spotlight was to weaken the communist apparatus of control and to better enable the Polish people to defend themselves against this structure in the future and to remind the Poles of the West's interest in them. As Eisenhower stated on 8 February, the United States and Radio Free Europe were out to win the battle for men's minds. Only as long as the peoples behind the Iron Curtain knew the outside world had not forgotten them, only that long would they remain as potential deterrents to Soviet aggression.¹¹¹

The success of Operation Spotlight was immediately apparent due to the Soviet and Polish governments' strong denunciation of it. Radio Free Europe defended itself and the balloon operation by pointing out that abnormal actions

¹⁰⁹Holt, Radio Free Europe, 20-27.

¹¹⁰For more on Operation Spotlight: "Operation Spotlight," News From Behind the Iron Curtain, March 1955, 37; "Polish Reactions to Radio Free Europe's Swiatlo Pamphlet and 'Operation Spotlight' Campaign," Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Poland, 1955-1959 15 July 1955. Twenty three reports are included in this despatch.

¹¹¹United States Presidents. Public Papers, 1955, 251.

had to be taken as the communists themselves had created abnormal conditions when they had subjugated the countries and denied them access to information. In every free state, people had unlimited access to information, such as in London where Izvestia and Pravda could be purchased.¹¹² Radio Free Europe and NSC 5501/1 were more than willing to fill the information gap of the satellite peoples.

Meanwhile, the administration drew up plans in the event of an uprising in Eastern Europe. Eisenhower, convinced that the Soviets would prevent the success of any uprising, determined that the United States would do the same and no more as it had done during the East German riots in June 1953. America would not:

- (1) precipitate hostilities (by providing arms or logistical support)
- (2) alienate its allies
- (3) cause uprisings and consequent annihilation of the people on the basis of exhortations or promises which the United States was not able to support¹¹³

The United States had made it clear that it would cause as many difficulties for the satellite regimes as it could and try to weaken their power, but America would not risk war or its allies for Eastern Europe. The fine line between the

¹¹²"Radio Free Europe Speaks," News From Behind the Iron Curtain, March 1955, 38.

¹¹³"Analysis of Action to be Taken in the Event of an East European Uprising," FRUS, vol. 25, Eastern Europe (Washington, DC: GPO, 1990), 10-11. This also reflected Eisenhower's personal view, as he wrote in his diary on 22 January 1952: "The purpose of America is to defend a way of life rather than merely to defend property, territory, homes, or lives." Immerman, Diplomatic History, 328.

public and vocal policy of liberation and the actual policy of resisting sovietization was now apparent.

Although unlikely to achieve concrete results, Eisenhower remained open to negotiating with the Soviets. This desire prompted his statement to the press in March, "I have said time and again, there is no place on this earth to which I would not travel, there is no chore I would not undertake, if I had the faintest hope that, by so doing, I would promote the general cause of world peace."¹¹⁴ This sentence left the next move to the Soviets. The Soviet Union had been trying to promote its international image of peace, so Eisenhower challenged the Soviet leaders to act on their words. Eisenhower sought a deed on their behalf to signal a willingness to solve the problems between them.

As the Soviets remained quiet, the United States resumed action on NSC 5501/1 in order to exploit communist vulnerabilities and achieve objectives set out in NSC 174. On 22 April, the New York Times reported that the State Department had prodded the Soviets to disclose the fate of sixteen leaders of the Polish underground who had been arrested after World War II. It stated that "so far at the United States Government is aware" four men have not returned to Poland. This note also not so subtly reminded

¹¹⁴Quoted in Graebner, The New Isolationism, 214.

Europe that even though the Soviets were trying to make friends there, they have never been generous or humane.¹¹⁵

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, trying to show that it did have "friends," signed the Warsaw Pact on 14 May 1955.¹¹⁶ The pact, a direct response to West Germany joining NATO, provided for cooperation and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republics of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic. The pact was to be a "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance" in accordance with the UN charter. The members would strive for the universal reduction of arms and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction. A joint command was established and if one of the members were attacked, the other members would come to its aid.

The Warsaw Pact did little more than put into polite words the reality of the Soviet Union's domination of the area. What was both surprising and welcome to the West was the Soviet Union's signing of the Austrian Treaty on 15 May. The Soviets had never signed a peace treaty with Austria ending World War II as this allowed them to maintain some

¹¹⁵"United States Seeks Word of Jailed Poles," New York Times, 22 April 1955, 5.

¹¹⁶For further reading on the Warsaw Pact: N. Edwina Moreton, East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance: The Politics of Detente (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978); Robin Alison Remington, The Warsaw Pact; Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971).

troops in that country.¹¹⁷ The treaty, calling for a neutral Austria and for a withdrawal of all troops from within her borders, was a major step for the Soviet Union; the United States interpreted it as concrete proof of the Soviet Union's willingness to do more than talk about peace. This single act, performed more than two months after Eisenhower's challenge, paved the way for a four power conference held in Geneva in July. The Soviet Union had wanted a summit meeting and it now had it; the United States had wanted deeds and not words and it had that. Each side was looking forward to the conference, albeit with a cautious eye.

Publicly hailing the conference, Eisenhower felt that the world was making a steady, if slow, march towards real, secure, permanent peace. He stated the world was nearer to the ideals that had been fought for in World War II, but in private, he was cautious. Dulles was even more skeptical. Worried that the Soviet Union wanted the Geneva Conference for propoganda and prestige reasons and not for real problem-solving reasons, he believed that the offers of meetings should be turned down unless there was some probability of success. Dulles absolutely did not want

¹¹⁷The Russians stalled the completion of a treaty with Austria because they wanted to keep troops there. With troops in Austria, they had an excuse to keep soldiers in Hungary and Romania as well. In order to gain its independence, Austria agreed to be a neutral nation and a treaty was finally signed.

Geneva to become a spectacle and promote false euphoria. He knew that the difficulties of the world could not be solved in one meeting and he worried that the public might not realize this. As the conference neared, the tone out of Washington became more careful. Eisenhower and Dulles began to stress that the meeting would not settle matters of importance, but "would be concerned with finding approaches' by which progress toward a resolution of difficult problems might be made."¹¹⁸

The United States goals at Geneva were:

- (1) progress towards the unification of Germany without neutralizing or demilitarizing Germany or subtracting it from NATO
- (2) "european security" in terms of decreasing the numbers and control of forces in the Soviet area without consolidating the Soviet grip in Eastern Europe
- (3) the leveling and control of armaments (which will build-in United States superiority)
- (4) increased independence and growth of self-determination on the part of the satellites
- (5) an end to Soviet support of International Communism as a hostile, revolutionary body
- (6) the opportunity to reach people of the Soviet bloc with knowledge and ideas
- (7) (marginal) the Soviet participation in the "Atoms for Peace" plan¹¹⁹

In estimating the prospect of the United States achieving its goals, it was found that the first two goals were linked and should be remitted to the Foreign Minister's meeting

¹¹⁸A.J. Goodpaster Memorandum of Meeting with the President, 22 July 1955, Box 1, International Meeting Series, Office of the Staff Secretary.

¹¹⁹U.S. Goals at Geneva, 11 July 1955, Box 1, International Meeting Series, Office of the Staff Secretary; Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation, 158.

that would occur later in the fall. There might be some progress on the third and sixth goals and progress on the fifth might be made privately. On the fourth goal, relating to self-determination for the satellites, it was acknowledged that it would be difficult to have any formal undertaking of the issue from the Soviets as they will refuse to have it as a proper topic for discussion.

Some Soviet aims were assumed to be:

- (1) the appearance that the West has conceded to the Soviet rulers a moral and social equality which will help them maintain their rule in the satellites by disheartening resistance
- (2) relaxation of military activities by the West, such as NATO activities and the issue of German rearmament
- (3) nuclear disarmament without extensive safeguards¹²⁰

With this in mind, a psychological strategy was drawn up for the Geneva Conference in which the United States was to capture the political and psychological imagination of the world. Assuming that the Soviets would use the conference in order to gain a psychological advantage rather than to conduct serious diplomatic negotiation, the proposals introduced at Geneva were to be more important than the actual results of the conference. The best way for the United States to show the Soviet Union's insincerity, while demonstrating the true desire of the United States for peace and for the welfare of others, was by introducing the satellite issue that the Soviet Union was known not to want

¹²⁰Soviet Goals at Geneva 11 July 1955, Box 1, International Meeting Series, Office of the Staff Secretary.

to discuss. The United States would thereby strengthen its moral and ethical position by calling for a plebiscite in the satellite countries.

This issue could be tied to European security as the Soviet Union was very interested in that topic. It had been proposed that at the opening of the conference, the President mention the Soviet Union's illegal control over the satellites and state that this was a major factor contributing to American distrust of the Soviets. The United States could also ask the UN to submit recommendations regarding the holding of plebiscites, but if a more direct attack was needed, a mention would be made that the end of the war agreements calling for free elections should be honored.¹²¹

Eisenhower did just that in his opening speech at Geneva on 18 July:

[The American people] feel strongly that certain peoples of Eastern Europe...have not yet been given the benefit of this pledge [of self-determination] of our United Nations wartime declaration, reinforced by other wartime agreements.

Premier Bulganin responded:

It is common knowledge that the regime of people's democracies has been established in those countries by the people themselves of their own free will. Besides, nobody has authorized us to consider the state of affairs in these countries. Thus, there are no grounds for discussing this question at our Conference.¹²²

¹²¹Ibid.

¹²²Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation, 159.

Needless to say, no resolution on the satellites was reached at Geneva. The greatest idea to come out of the meeting was the so-called "Spirit of Geneva." World tensions decreased as both sides agreed that neither would start a forced change of the status quo. What was important was the use of the word "forced." Force, or overt aggression, would not be employed as a method for change, but the struggle continued and propaganda remained as important as ever. The United States, stressing its aim of liberation through Radio Free Europe in order that the East European countries not feel abandoned by the West, reasoned that if the Soviet Union accepted the status quo, then there was no need for them to hold onto the satellites for security reasons. It appeared that the Soviets worried less about the United States' use of force than its use of propaganda to turn the peoples of Eastern Europe against the Soviet Union. While American military strength could be combatted with Soviet nuclear weapons, the war for men's minds was the harder one to win.

Upon returning to Washington, Eisenhower and Dulles expressed caution. Eisenhower stated that there was "evidence of a new friendliness in the world," but that time alone would tell what was achieved at Geneva.¹²³ He referred to the follow-up meeting in October when the

¹²³Quoted in: "President Says Time Will Tell What Geneva Achieved," New York Times, 25 July 1955, 1.

foreign ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France were to meet to try to work out the details of problems confronting the relationship between these countries. The United States, holding no illusions about the Soviet leaders or their system and still desiring the freedom of the satellites, continued to hope for peace and that the "Geneva spirit" would produce it. Until the meeting in October was over, however, the Soviet Union was still a threat.

The OCB, still busy looking for ways to combat the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe, produced another list of guidelines on 21 September. Regardless of the Geneva spirit, no changes appeared within the satellite countries and progress towards liberation remained slow and intermittent. The new list included approaches to be supported: exploit any communist process that claimed adherence to democratic procedures; stress the West's interest in the welfare of Eastern Europe; the United States should continue to write notes to the East European governments on national holidays; stress freedom of religion, as well as the fact that satellite troops were merely to become cannon fodder in a war, etc. The list was little different from that first proposed by NSC 174, but these actions remained effective. As to Poland specifically, the United States encouraged religious freedom and maintenance of national traditions. Additionally, a

shift occurred, a moving away from a blanket attack on all communists in the country as it was concluded that many in the government were Polish nationalists who were actually trying to aid their own country and not Moscow. These people were to be encouraged in their efforts.

The spirit of Geneva waned by the end of October as the foreign minister's meeting accomplished little and the Soviets withdrew to their former posture of antagonism toward the West.¹²⁴ The success and publicity of the West's escapee and refugee programs had become a thorn in the side of the communist regimes as these programs mocked the government's claims of superiority to the West. The Kremlin thus decided to make these escapees and refugees the target of their own propaganda through a "redefection" campaign.¹²⁵ Accordingly, Polish embassies in the West increased the numbers of films and publications that they showed, sponsored lectures, circulated letters from relatives at

¹²⁴The Poles had worried the West would be "taken in" by the Soviets, but were relieved when at the foreign minister's meeting the West showed that they saw the unchanging nature of the Soviet's long-range aims. For a full post-Geneva analysis of the Poles' feelings on Geneva, as viewed by the American Embassy, see: Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Poland, 1955-1959, 19 January 1956.

¹²⁵For more on the Soviet redefection campaign: "Emigre Go Home," News from Behind the Iron Curtain, October 1955, 3-13. Also see numerous foreign service despatches dated 14, 30 June, 20, 27 July, 3 October, 10 November, 6 December 6 1955, 16 January, 10 February 1956 in Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Poland, 1955-1959.

home, and placed agents among the youth to describe the wonders of their true homeland. The embassies also used propaganda to try to split the exile leaders from the ordinary refugees. The campaign was actually somewhat effective as some refugees did return home either out of sentiment or because of the problems they encountered in the West that they did not know how to handle. These people were then put on Radio Warsaw in an effort to destroy the allure of the free world.

The United States Information Agency, created 1 August 1953 out of the recommendations of the Jackson Committee report, was busy trying to counter Soviet redefection efforts. The goal of USIA's program was to encourage defection through the use of film, press, radio, news on escapees and interviews with resettled refugees. The agency explained the problems and accomplishments of the West in dealing with the refugees, reemphasized Western interest in the escapees, and challenged the Soviet Union to prove that Iron Curtain conditions had improved. The American counterattack prompted a visit by Romuald Spasowski, Polish Ambassador to the United States, to Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State. In discussing Polish repatriation, Spasowski stated that "Poles belong to Poland" and requested that American immigration officials suggest to Poles that they return "home." Murphy summarily refused, noting that the American position held that people should be

allowed to live where they wish. Spasowski replied that he had hoped for a more "positive attitude" on the part of the American authorities.¹²⁶

Dulles reacted to this campaign in a speech to the Illinois Manufacturers Association in Chicago, announcing a new phase of the struggle against international communism. He called the postwar decade a phase of violence and the threat of violence now appeared to be in "eclipse;" however, Vladimir Illych Lenin and Stalin had both emphasized the need for tactical "zigzag." The communists, according to Dulles, were merely changing their tactics, not their purpose.¹²⁷

Apparent evidence of this dualism in Soviet tactics existed in the treaty signing with Austria and additionally, in another State Department press release dated 23 December 1955. It mentioned Eisenhower's statement at Geneva on 22 July,

To help achieve the goal of peace based on justice and right and mutual understanding, there are certain concrete steps that could be taken:

- (1) to lower the barriers which now impede the interchange of information and ideas between peoples....¹²⁸

¹²⁶"Secretary of State for Political Action," FRUS, vol. 25, Eastern Europe, 96.

¹²⁷Peter V. Curl, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations 1955 (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), 12-13.

¹²⁸"Revival of Russian-Language Magazine 'Amerika,'" The Department of State Bulletin, 2 January 1956, 18.

and explained that a note had been sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union requesting action on this statement. The United States proposed the publication of an illustrated cultural and nonpolitical monthly magazine in the Russian language, *Amerika*, that would be devoted to the objective presentation of various aspects of American life and would be a concrete step toward a fuller interchange of information and ideas. Surprisingly, the Soviets zigged and accepted the proposal without requiring a preview of the magazine.

Thus, this chapter has shown that while the Eisenhower administration maintained liberation as a long-term goal as referred to by the President as late as the Geneva Conference, policy became focused on short-term actions. Eisenhower and Dulles wanted to know what could be done now, both to achieve liberation in the future and to frustrate the Soviet Union in the present. NSC 158 stated that psychological objectives were the best method of achieving both, and NSC 174 and 5501/1 provided the means of achieving these objectives. A few of the many examples include the efforts of Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, American participation in and exploitation of refugee and escapee programs, the United States' commitment to reawakening satellite peoples' national traditions and to their eventual liberation, and the United States' continued efforts to increase tensions within the bloc and between it and the

Soviet Union. The coming year, 1956, would let the United States know to what extent its short-term goal of maximizing the Soviet Union's difficulties and preventing the sovietization of captive peoples had succeeded.

IV. 1956: THE LITMUS TEST

President Eisenhower, continuing with efforts to keep alive the hope of liberation, sent a Christmas message over Radio Free Europe to the peoples of Eastern Europe stating:

During the Christmas season, I want you to know that the American people recognize the trials under which you are suffering; join you in your concern for the restoration of individual freedoms and political liberty; and share your faith that right in the end will prevail to bring you once again among the free nations of the world.¹²⁹

This short broadcast produced unexpected results. An angered, Khrushchev sent a note to the United States denouncing the message as "in no way accord[ing] with the spirit of Geneva,"¹³⁰ but Eisenhower rejected Khrushchev's note because it had been made clear to the Soviets at Geneva that the United States still hoped to achieve liberty for the oppressed peoples of Europe.¹³¹

¹²⁹Quoted in: "United States Position of Liberation of Captive Peoples," The Department of State Bulletin, 16 January 1956, 84.

¹³⁰Ibid.

¹³¹Refers to Eisenhower's opening speech at Geneva, see page 75.

On 5 January 1956 the President emphasized the United States' continued aim of liberation in his State of the Union Message: "The peaceful liberation of the captive peoples has been, is, and, until success is achieved, will continue to be a major goal of United States foreign policy."¹³² "Our world policy and our actions are dedicated to the achievement of peace for all nations." In July 1955 the heads of governments had held out the promise for a decrease in bitterness, but the failure of the Foreign Minister's meeting in October showed that the "Soviet leaders are not yet willing to create the indispensable conditions for a secure and lasting peace." The Soviet policy, according to Eisenhower, was zigzagging as it had shifted from an open reliance on military force to a policy of "division, enticement, and duplicity."¹³³ He concluded that this zigzag was the result of Soviet objectives being thwarted by the free world rather than the successes of their objectives being met; thus, the United States would continue its efforts to frustrate Soviet aims.

In speaking to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the next day, Dulles mentioned the satellites and told the committee that strong forces were building within them for change and that he and Eisenhower wanted the satellite countries' governments to respond to the national will of

¹³²Graebner, New Isolationism, 236.

¹³³Israel, State of the Union Messages, 3054.

the people and to provide some independence for their countries as Tito had done.¹³⁴ Radio Free Europe's balloons sent into Eastern Europe carrying anti-communist propaganda were seen as one effective means of bringing about that change in Eastern Europe.

Another reason for furthering such actions was the continuance of the communist redefection campaign. If the West ended its propaganda campaign while the communists continued theirs, it might appear as if the West had abandoned the satellites. The Eisenhower administration concluded that the best policy was to give the Soviet Union just what it did not want.

On 25 February, Khrushchev shocked the world when, in a secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, he condemned Stalin and the methods of terror he used against his own people. With one speech, Khrushchev brought a new ray of hope to the world of more open relations between East and West and of a thaw within the societies and cultures of the satellites. The United States government welcomed this speech, but it still remained cautious. Unsure that this was not another example of the Soviets' zigzag policy, the United States would study the Soviet Union's actions for signs of change, while it continued with its own agenda.

¹³⁴United States Senate, Executive Sessions of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 84th cong., 2d sess., 6 January 1956, 5.

Accordingly, a new progress report on NSC 174 presented on 29 February, covering the time period from 1 May 1954 to 29 February 1956, listed some of the actions taken as a result of NSC 174's earlier guidelines. The report noted that the information programs were continuing as planned, that the recommendation to offer agricultural goods to the satellites had been acted upon in the case of the Danube flood. The exploitation of any internal conflicts within ruling groups and the assurance of American interest in the area's future and freedom were furthered at every opportunity, and continued attempts were made for an increase in cultural contacts. No evidence of progress towards the long range objective of liberation was found during this period; nevertheless this fact did not change the validity of the policy.¹³⁵ In sum, the long-term goal of liberation seemed as far off as before, but actions could and should still be taken to bring it nearer as there was now a hint that there would be some easing of Soviet pressures on the satellites.

In discussing this report on 22 March, the NSC noted the difficulty the OCB had encountered in devising effective courses of action and that as far as concrete gains went, the United States had achieved little. Dulles replied that the hope of liberation was not gone as the Soviet Union had

¹³⁵Progress Report, 29 February 1956, Box 8, NSC Series, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

not advanced in any area in the world, and Eisenhower maintained that the United States must not be any less aggressive in pursuing the objectives just because it had not achieved the progress it would like to see. Feelings of hope and the spirit of resistance to the Soviets were hard to quantify, but it did not mean that they did not exist or could not be worked with. The NSC and the OCB were to continue the work and hope that the Soviets would encounter increased troubles with the satellites.¹³⁶

At the same time, the Donovan Emergency Commission of the International Rescue Committee to Investigate Communist Redefection Campaigns presented its report. Completing a list of recommendations to counter the Soviet campaign to entice escapees to return to the Soviet Union and to other East European countries, the group recommended that the United States should:

- (1) arouse the free world against the Communist redefection campaign and to the need for more effective counteraction
- (2) expand cooperation with other nations on behalf of refugees from communism, coordinate programs and share equally the burdens of their care
- (3) first priority should be to speeding the processing of refugee cases and to simplifying the process
- (4) a program is needed to strengthen the morale among refugees and to provide follow-up counseling for them for one year after resettlement

¹³⁶280th Meeting of the NSC, 22 March 1956, Box 7, NSC Series, Ann Whitman File.

(5) special measures need to be taken for the care of the old, ill and incapacitated¹³⁷

These suggestions advanced the short-term aims of NSC 174 as Dulles and Eisenhower wanted. Another program to promote these aims was the dissemination of western books abroad, through which the United States hoped to increase affinity for America and counter Soviet propaganda. An example included technical knowledge being made available through the USIA's 160 libraries abroad in order to aid economic development.¹³⁸

Another progress report, appearing on 18 April, indicated that the administration's propaganda efforts were producing the desired results. Concerning the American policy on Soviet and satellite defectors, this report mentioned the Soviet redefection effort, compared it to United States information programs and concluded that the American programs toward escapees and defectors continued to contribute to the achievement of United States objectives.¹³⁹

¹³⁷Donovan Emergency Commission of the International Rescue Committee to Investigate Communist Redefection Campaigns, 20 March 1956, Box 63, Subject Series, Confidential File.

¹³⁸Dan Lacy, "The Role of American Books Abroad," Foreign Affairs, April 1956, 414.

¹³⁹U.S. Policy on Soviet and Satellite Defectors, 18 April 1956, Box 1, NSC Series, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Also, as a point of interest, to date there were 1,700,000 escapees and refugees from Communism.

Beginning in March and continuing through May, mixed signals came out of Poland. A 12 May New York Times article related the Polish leaders' attacks on American policy toward Poland. These leaders felt deep resentment at the attempts of the United States to weaken Poland's relationship with the Soviet Union. "If you would accept this and act on it relations between Poland and the United States would improve enormously," stated Joseph Winniewicz, Deputy Foreign Minister. Another Polish official remarked, "We do not expect Americans to praise us or to say beautiful things about us, but we do expect normal politeness and decency."¹⁴⁰

Meanwhile, through other channels, the United States was receiving a different picture of the situation within Poland. Cominform¹⁴¹ was dissolved on 17 April and the Soviet Union improved relations with Tito by recognizing different roads to socialism,¹⁴² thus giving the Polish

¹⁴⁰Sydney Gruson, "Poles Resent Prodding by United States on Warsaw's Ties to Moscow," New York Times, 12 May 1956, 3.

¹⁴¹Cominform, short for Communist Information Bureau, was established in 1947 to spread communist propaganda. The Warsaw Pact, an outgrowth of Cominform, made this organization superfluous and it was dissolved 17 April 1956.

¹⁴²There had existed a Tito-Stalin split as Tito had refused to follow Moscow's orders on how to govern Yugoslavia. Khrushchev went to Belgrade to try to improve relations between the two countries by recognizing different roads to socialism. For more on Tito and his battles with Moscow, see Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York:

people hope for their own road to socialism. Although no Polish policy independent of Moscow had yet emerged, there appeared to be less outright injustice against the people. For instance, in recognition of severe economic hardships, the regime dropped the Five Year Plan and tried to compensate by making promises; however, "the chances for an immediate improvement in the standard of living are dismal."¹⁴³

On 26 May, a letter arrived at Radio Free Europe from a Polish listener describing the situation in his country:

All of us Poles greet your brave President Eisenhower as the leader of Europe. The whole of Poland also sends you, Mr. President, sincere greetings and honest thoughts from behind the Iron Curtain. We Poles place our only hope in you, the only father of the nation, and we look forward all the time to the removal of the Iron Curtain. Only one thing pleases us, that you have armed superiority and hydrogen bombs, for this is the only thing Khrushchev and his henchmen are afraid of, despite the fact that the Iron Curtain makes much noise and spreads hostile propaganda that it wants peace. Why does it arm? There is no day without tanks, artillery and ammunition being transported against West Germany. It is being armed to the teeth. All factories are being transformed into one great war arsenal. Slanderous propaganda is being spread abroad about reductions in military manpower but this had been going on for two years and no soldiers have gone home. People are being deported to Siberian mines or thrown into prison. Millions of people work for nothing, men and women are shot and hanged, children taken to orphanages, kolkhozes established by force. Thus work proceeds according to the soviet model. Patrols rove in villages and

Arno Press, 1972); Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks: His Self-Portrait and Struggle with Stalin (London: Reader's Union, 1954); Slobodan M. Draskovich, Tito, Moscow's Trojan Horse (Chicago: H. Regency Co., 1957).

¹⁴³"Ferment and the Polish Economy," News From Behind the Iron Curtain, April 1956, 10.

settlements and the UB listens in to private conversations to see whom it can arrest. Led by the present police...(illegible)...the NKVD.

Well then, dear countrymen, broadcast more programs in Polish, at the end of each program or news bulletin have the times of the next bulletin. When you broadcast your news bulletin in Polish, speak close to the microphone. Jamming is of no avail and we can hear a clear voice well in our receivers in Poland. Well now, while you talk into the microphone, you should lengthen or shorten the wavelength. The Iron Curtain will fail with its jamming for while listening we can always shift the knob a millimeter this way or that and we hear a clear voice. As for the enemy, he tunes to the wavelength at the beginning, sets his machine going and makes his awful racket without realizing that the broadcast wavelength has been shortened or lengthened by one millimeter.

Countrymen, criticize as much as you can for this has a negative effect on the Iron Curtain. Countrymen, send us arms, ammunition, radio transmitters by balloon so that we might establish contact with you and remain in constant contact. In this way we shall be able to tell you about everything that happens in Poland. This is what we need most against our enemy the Iron Curtain. Countrymen, if the Iron Curtain lets this letter through and you receive it, acknowledge it by radio on June 17th or June 24th, 1956, at 22:00 hours Polish time. We shall exclusively await an answer from you on those days. If we get an answer, you shall receive a large number of letters with all kinds of information at this or another of your addresses.

We Polish Poles greet our relatives abroad and wish that we many meet as soon as possible and prosper together. We wish for freedom and a truly free Poland, not the kind we have today where a pack of cigarettes costs 3 zloty while the worker can only earn 10 zloty a day. Shoes cost 670 zloty and the worker must labor a whole month and can only manage to earn 600 zloty. And what is one to live on for a whole month? A suit of clothes costs 1,500 zloty for which a worker must labor two and a half months. And what is he to live on and support his family on in the meantime? If he wants to do that the can't buy anything. Everyone is thus forced to carry a pistol, steal, assault, rob banks and so on since it isn't worth while to work under this communist system.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁴Letter to Radio Free Europe, 17 July 1956, Box. 44, Jackson Papers.

The author of this letter thus confirmed Eisenhower's assessment of the situation in Eastern Europe. The hope for liberation was not dead in the satellite countries, and American propaganda efforts had helped in preventing sovietization.¹⁴⁵

The new American Ambassador in Poland, Joseph E. Jacobs, sent a note on 29 May to the Department of State giving his views on the liberalization trend or "thaw" in Poland. Observing that things were more optimistically treated in the West than was warranted, he stated that there was no evidence of a change in Soviet policy and that any zigzag was due merely to expediency in addressing issues in Poland. As to the Poles' own road to socialism, their divergence from the Soviet Union represented the Polish regime's attempts to deal with the unique issues in Poland (e.g., the Catholic Church), that traditional Communist Party methods failed to address.¹⁴⁶ The Soviet army was

¹⁴⁵Also interesting is a joke popular at the time in Poland: A Polish Party member explaining to another Party member why he had the portraits of Khrushchev, Stalin, the Holy Father, and Eisenhower on the wall of his room..."I say my prayers before each of them beginning this way: To Khrushchev I say 'Our Father' to Stalin "who art in heaven' to the Holy Father 'hallowed be thy name' and to Eisenhower 'thy kingdom come.'" Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Poland, 1955-1959, 27 March 1956.

¹⁴⁶In an earlier telegram, the American Embassy in Warsaw had written: "Polish regime leaders have followed Soviet lead in laying down line that criticism cult individuals does not (repeat not) mean freedom to criticize basic party policy." Telegram from Warsaw to the Department of State, Records of the Department of State Relating to the

still in Poland and the "old Communist stooges of the Soviet Union [were still] in control.... Embassy believes 'changes' well under control."¹⁴⁷

On the other hand, in a news conference on 27 June, Dulles stated that international communism was in a state of perplexity and at internal odds because certain basic truths have caught up with it:

- (1) it has difficulty being an effective instrument of the cold war without the iron discipline and brutal terrorism used by Stalin
- (2) such rule will not be indefinitely tolerated by those subjects unless it produces a succession of victories¹⁴⁸

As there had been no recent victories, Dulles reasoned that it was safe to assume that satellite people's toleration of such rule was low.

In Poland toleration was very low and the 10 June issue of Po Prostu carried three articles on economic problems in Poland: one about "the problem which does not exist" or high unemployment; another on the problems with machinery and inefficiency in Lodz, a cotton center; the last about "the price of the plan" or the poor conditions in factories due to bad and overcentralized planning. If these articles could make the Polish press, then they were only a pale

Internal Affairs of Poland, 1955-1959, 8 May 1956.

¹⁴⁷US Embassy Despatch to the Department of State, 29 May 1956, FRUS, vol. 25, Eastern Europe, 173-74.

¹⁴⁸Peter V. Curl, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1956 (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), 205.

reflection of the attitude of the population as the communists would never reveal the true extent of their failures.¹⁴⁹

For the workers at locomotive factory, Works in the Name of Stalin at Poznan, or ZIPSO, production norms had continually increased over the past few years while average wages had declined three to five percent since 1954.¹⁵⁰ Earnings had decreased due to excessive tax deductions, the workers claiming that the regime had illegally deducted eleven million zlotys from their overtime pay. The employees wanted the money repaid. In addition, section W of ZIPSO received bad supplies that made it impossible to fulfill production norms, resulting in a wage cut. Meeting on 23 June to discuss the problem, the workers agreed to send a delegation of thirty men to Warsaw to seek relief from their difficult situation. The delegation left on Monday, 25 June, for the headquarters of the Metal Worker's Union and Ministry of Machine Industry.

When the delegates had not returned by Wednesday, 27 June, rumors began circulating in Poznan that the delegation had been arrested and consequently the workers decided to

¹⁴⁹Konrad Syrop, Spring in October; The Story of the Polish Revolution, 1956 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1957), 46-48.

¹⁵⁰Ibid., 48.

act on their own.¹⁵¹ On the morning of 28 June, carrying posters demanding bread, lower prices and higher wages, the frustrated workers marched two miles into the town center. Other people joined them in their march and by 10 AM a large crowd had gathered in front of the Town Hall. People initially sang religious hymns and patriotic songs in protest to the government, but the tone soon became more political and revolutionary. Anti-communist and anti-Soviet slogans appeared and there were cries of: "Down with the Russians," "We want Freedom," "Down with false Communism," and "Down with the Soviet Occupation."

Becoming increasingly inflamed, the crowd grew violent, rushing the jail and freeing the prisoners. While some destroyed the radio station that was responsible for jamming western broadcasts, others gathered arms and chaos ruled the streets. When the crowd attacked the Security Police building at 11 AM, the first shot was fired. The Polish Militia arrived soon afterward but did not fire at the crowd, some soldiers joining the crowd in its protest. By evening, however, the army arrived to quell the riot and by Friday morning, 29 June, the riot was over. In all it had claimed 54 lives and wounded over 200.

Both the government and the Polish people clearly understood that the demonstrators had not intended for a

¹⁵¹The rumors were false. The delegation had been held up in Warsaw by bureaucrats and were returning to Poznan by train.

riot to occur. They had only wanted their grievances heard, but the riot also showed the government that the economic situation was so serious that the workers were now very bitter and ready to fight for better conditions, and the regime now had proof that the population was against its rule. The Polish government sent the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Jozef Cyrankiewicz, to Poznan for damage control. Arriving on 29 June, he spoke to the people saying that every Pole and the entire society condemned the riot brought about by provocateurs. He acknowledged the workers grievances and promised that they would be addressed, "We are talking among ourselves frankly...", he began, but hostile agents wanting to hamper the progress of the process of democratization had taken advantage of the workers' grievances to stage a revolt and to make Poland look bad. He thundered: "anyone who lifts his hand against the people's authority shall have that hand cut off!"¹⁵² Cyrankiewicz and the communist paper, Trybuna Ludu condemned provocateurs and accused foreign agents at length.¹⁵³

¹⁵²Paul E. Zinner, ed., National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe; A Collection of Documents on Events in Poland and Hungary February-November 1956 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), 136. Also, US Embassy in Warsaw telegram to the Secretary of State 30 June 1956, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Poland, 1955-1959.

¹⁵³For more on the Poznan riot, see Antoni Czubinski, Poznan Czerwiec 1956-1981 (Poznan: Drajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1981); Lucja Ludaszewicz, Dramat nadziei poznanski czerwiec 1956 (Poznan: Wielkopolska Inicjatywa Wydawnicza, 1983); Jaroslawa Maciejewskiego and Zofii

The United States was similarly surprised by the riots. Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, telephoned his brother, John Foster Dulles, on 28 June informing him of the riot in Poznan. Said John Foster Dulles: "when they begin to crack...they can crack fast. We have to keep the pressure on."¹⁵⁴ Twenty-nine June was a busy day for the administration. Secretary of State Dulles held a staff meeting that addressed the problem of exploiting the unrest in the satellites brought to light by the Poznan riots. The United States was to be "on the offensive." Actions proposed at the meeting included the preparation of guidelines for USIA to exploit the riots, and the intent that USIA would publicize Soviet foreign aid programs and claims seeking to make the Soviet Union acknowledge or deny their validity--especially as no aid had been given to the Poznan area to ease the plight of the

Trojanowicz, Poznanski czerwiec 1956 (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Poznanskie, 1990); Edward Jan Nalepa, Pacyfikacja abuntovanego miasta: Wojsko Polskie w czerwcu 1956r. w Poznaniu w swietle dokumentow wojskowych (Warszawa: Wydawnicza Bellona, 1992); Jan Nowak, Polska droga ku wolnosci 1952-1973 (London: Gryf Publications, 1974); Jan Nowak, Polska z oddali: wspomnienia (Krakow: Znak, 1992); Poznan 1956-Grudzien 1970 (Paris: instytut Literacki, 1971); Marek Tarniewski, Porcja wolnosci (Warszawa: Wydawnicza G. O. Solidarni, 1989); Zofia Trojanowicz, Poznanski czerwiec 1956 (Gdynia: np, 1981); Edmund Tuliszka, O wypakdach poznanskiego czerwca 1956r. (Poznan: Buuro Prasowe MKZ Wielkopolska, 1981); also see Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Poland, 1955-1959 in this period for American analysis of the situation.

¹⁵⁴Allen Dulles Call to Dulles, 28 June 1956, Box 5, Telephone Call Series, Dulles Papers.

workers there. Later in the day, Dulles and Allen Dulles discussed the possibility of making an offer of foodstuffs to the Polish Government as the rioters seemed to need bread. Dulles then phoned the Red Cross to see if they would be in a position to offer the proposed foodstuffs.¹⁵⁵ As its plan, drawn up after the East German riots in the case of a similar situation arising, called for, the United States officially remained quiet and made an offer of foodstuffs on 30 June through the International Red Cross.

By 2 July, the American embassy in Poland sent a composite picture of the situation in Poland to the State Department.¹⁵⁶ It told of the hardships of the Poznan workers and how with wages cut they were unable to support themselves. The workers had asked for the government to address their problems, but the bureaucracy had either done nothing about the situation or had been too slow in acting. The embassy related that the demonstration was to have been peaceful, but that it became a mob due to the large number of people massed in the square, the authorities shooting over the crowd's heads, the emotional effect of singing the national anthem, the alleged killing of children during the firing of the warning shots, and the feeling of power the

¹⁵⁵Dulles call to Mr. Smith, 29 June 1956, Box 5, Telephone Call Series, Dulles Papers.

¹⁵⁶US Embassy in Warsaw Telegram to the Secretary of State, 2 July 1956, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Poland, 1955-1959.

crowd experienced as it was their first large popular demonstration in Poland since the war. The embassy believed no food shortages existed in Poland, but that the bread slogans were merely a symbol for the rioters' inability to procure necessities.

By 3 July the OCB and NSC had plans on how to deal with the riots. The OCB wanted the United States' offer of food to be given a lot of publicity as the riots were based on the dissatisfaction of the workers with the communist regime. As labor was the cause of the revolts, international labor could be involved, free elections under UN guidance in Poland and other satellite countries would be encouraged, and the United States would keep the propaganda offensive against the Soviet Union's efforts to pin the riot on the United States. The NSC policy number 5608, "United States Policy Towards the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe," remains largely classified, so any basic changes in strategy are unknown; however, it can be seen that an effort was made to maintain NSC 174 by trying to undermine Soviet prestige in the world and by trying to increase tensions between Poland and the Soviet Union. NSC 5608 also showed the increased importance of nationalism as reflected in the riot.

The United States officially refrained from commenting on the riot, but it felt itself to be on a propaganda offensive. The riot demonstrated the success of the

administration's efforts over the past three years to increase resistance to sovietization and its efforts were shown to have been effective through the anti-communist, anti-Russian slogans used by the rioters. Another issue to be exploited was the fact that it was the workers, whom the communists claimed to protect, who revolted against the regime. The government was going to use every governmental, private, and international organization it could in order to further reduce the Soviet Union's prestige and influence.

As to the use of international organizations, the United States had already made the food offer through the International Red Cross, but the Polish Red Cross refused the offer as food was not needed. The United States decided to let the offer remain open. Ambassador Lodge was interested in using the UN as a forum for discussing the riot or even as a means of using direct action in Poland, such as creating a Peace Observation Commission to go to that country. Dulles was hesitant on the idea of a Peace Commission but he encouraged Lodge to mention the interference of the Soviet Union in Poland, the economic failures of the Soviet satellite system, and the violation of trade union rights in an upcoming UN meeting on "Survey of the World Economic Situation, Including the Question of Full Employment and the Expansion of World Trade."¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁷Lodge to Dulles, 11 July 1956 and 16 July 1956, Box 2, General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, Dulles Papers; see also: State Department telegram to Murphy, 6

In an OCB meeting on 18 June, members discussed American action with regard to the Poznan riot, noting that USIA was collecting and using eyewitness accounts of the uprising. On 14 July the riot had been discussed at a NATO meeting, and Ambassador Lodge had mentioned the riot in a speech he gave at the UN. On 20 July Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, President of the International Peasant Union and Chairman of the Polish National Democratic Committee and the Polish Peasant Party, suggested that the Polish regime would follow a more moderate program if it felt the world was watching it; therefore, he recommended keeping pressure and attention on the situation there.

Radio Free Europe concluded from the riot that 1) the Poznan demonstrators had been prepared to fight the communists, and 2) that the local armies were not all that reliable, as many soldiers had aided the rioters. Yet the station felt its responsibility was to avoid encouraging more bloody sacrifices. One of its first messages after it received news of the Poznan riot was the following:

We understand and appreciate the motivations which have driven the workers of Poznan to desperate measures. However, riots and revolts are not likely to improve matters in Poland, for police may be given an opportunity for reprisals which may make things worse. No government which bases itself exclusively upon the tanks and bayonets of armed forces, will endure. But the

Polish people must husband their strength and hold on for the time of freedom.¹⁵⁸

RFE, continuing to report the news as it occurred, addressed the Polish worker's problems and their government on the spot about the people it imprisoned as a result of the riot. As the workers had demonstrated for legitimate demands, RFE wanted to protect them against retaliation by the Polish government and called for open trials to be held. It also helped to keep the listeners from feeling abandoned by the West, an important factor as further propaganda efforts would fail if the Polish people felt isolated.¹⁵⁹ Between 29 June and 3 July, Radio Free Europe devoted ninety-four hours of programming to the Poznan riot and provided information to the people when they could not trust their own stations. The station continued to move towards its goal of preventing the integration of the Iron Curtain countries into the Soviet empire by preventing sovietization of the people, and felt as the United States Government did, that it was witnessing success in its endeavors.

Meanwhile in Poland, the regime, admitting that the workers grievances were justified, attempted to make some amends by returning 1,200,000 zlotys of the 11 million it owed. Julian Tokarski, Minister of the Auto and Tractor Industry, was ousted as he had been the man responsible for

¹⁵⁸Radio Free Europe and the Poznan Demonstrations, 6 July 1956, Box 44, Jackson Papers.

¹⁵⁹OCB Meeting, FRUS, vol. 25, Eastern Europe, 222.

negotiations with the ZIPSO workers and he had not done his job. Tokarski had been told the workers would march if their grievances were not met, but he had not taken the warning seriously. The harsh rhetoric that the regime had used against the West immediately after the riot began to die down and by 28 July, one month after the riot, a change in tone occurred. Instead of attacking Dulles and the State Department for the propaganda campaign they were conducting, the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party stated that the riot had set the task for the Party of evaluating the sources and causes lying at its foundation. The PUWP planned to liquidate excessive centralization of planning and management, to raise the standard of living, to improve the supplies of materials, and to streamline their management.¹⁶⁰ The regime took a new posture and it appeared that Mikolajczyk's suggestion to keep the pressure on Poland was actually bringing about more moderate policies.

Proof was the trials of the people imprisoned due to the riot. On 26 September, Eisenhower, concerned about these people as he feared reprisals, stated that he hoped for fair and open trials with a legal counsel to defend the prisoners and that they would be able to speak freely without fear of retribution. He challenged the Polish regime to show that it had abandoned Stalinist methods.

¹⁶⁰Zinner, National Communism, 147.

Whatever the outcome of the trials, Eisenhower concluded, it was clear there would be no solution to the Polish situation until the people were given the opportunity to elect their own government, no matter what type of system that was.¹⁶¹ With an emphasis placed on fairness, the trials opened on 27 September. The sentences meted out to those convicted in the first round were relatively mild; before long the trials were postponed and the accused permitted to return home.

The other surprising event that demonstrated the liberalizing trend in Poland was not only the restoration of Wladyslaw Gomulka as a member of the Party on 4 August, but his ascent to the position of First Secretary by 15 October.¹⁶² The choice of Gomulka demonstrated that liberalization was genuinely occurring in Poland and that separate roads to socialism might actually be possible for a satellite country other than Yugoslavia. The example Tito set for the Poles cannot be underestimated, as he represented the possibility that other countries might resume control of their own affairs while sharing common doctrinal assumptions with Moscow. The Poles hoped to succeed, as Tito had, by convincing the Soviets that planned

¹⁶¹"United States Views on Polish Trials," The Department of State Bulletin, 8 October 1956, 552.

¹⁶²Although a confirmed communist, he had been ousted from the Party as he had opposed Stalin's control of Polish affairs. For more on Gomulka: Nicholas William Bethell, Gomulka: His Poland and His Communism (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1972).

concessions only served to increase support for socialism and improve Polish-Soviet relations.¹⁶³

The Polish Politburo knew it needed a policy popular with the masses that took into account national characteristics, but that would not at the same time provoke Soviet intervention. Gomulka was a communist, but he was also relatively popular and a Polish nationalist and the shift in the government raised urgent questions in Poland and in Moscow. In Poland, words were racing ahead of deeds as promises were made to the people of the availability of more consumer goods and passports to travel abroad. The problem was how the regime could meet these promises while the Soviet Union kept its army in Poland.

In Moscow, the riot, Gomulka's rise to power, and the subsequent promises were raising too many undesired questions that had to be answered. On 19 October Khrushchev arrived in Warsaw in a bad mood and said to the Polish leaders:

We have shed our blood to liberate this country, and now you want to hand it over to the Americans, but in this you will not succeed, this will not happen!¹⁶⁴

¹⁶³For more on the Yugoslav influence on the Poznan revolt, see Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc; Unity and Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). Brzezinski argues that de-Stalinization resulted in a rise in Polish nationalism, and that in the wake of Khrushchev's overtures to Tito, including the Soviet leader's 1955 visit to Belgrade, Poles wanted to be permitted to mark out and travel their own road to socialism as well.

¹⁶⁴Syrop, Spring in October, 94.

The United States government remained silent during these tense three days of Khrushchev's visit. Dulles said the contribution of the United States to the Poles was not "one of actual intervening and meddling, because that kind of thing...often is counter-productive." Rather, the United States' task was to "keep alive the concept of freedom" through the traditional theme of "conduct and example."¹⁶⁵ Eisenhower, agreeing with Dulles' statement of the American plan, said the hearts of the American people went out to the people of Poland in their struggle to win freedom from Soviet domination. The United States, he continued, took freedom for granted, but these people knew how important it was and through the recent unrest, "they at least may have the opportunity to live under Governments of their own choosing."¹⁶⁶

To some extent this became true. There would be no free elections in Poland, but the Soviet Union did allow Gomulka, a man chosen without prior Soviet approval, to stay in office. Gomulka was permitted to remain because he continued to maintain his faith in the communist system and he had the support of the people due to his liberalizing and nationalistic sentiments. In this position, he hoped to steer Poland to increased independence from the Soviets

¹⁶⁵Michael A. Gubin, John Foster Dulles, A Statesman and His Times (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 178.

¹⁶⁶"President Backs Poles' Struggle," New York Times, 21 October 1956, 1.

without jeopardizing their alliance with the Soviet Union, and to continue this process towards increased democratization.

The United States welcomed the news of the changes that Gomulka hoped to make as they mirrored American objectives of increased independence for Poland and of decreasing the power and prestige of the Soviet Union. On 23 October, the Department of State planning staff came up with a list of actions the United States should take to aid the process of Gomulka's rise to power. The United States was to make quietly known to the Polish regime Washington's willingness to furnish economic assistance (the United States did not insist on a break with Moscow); employ a policy of restraint--America approved of increased independence but did not expect to gain from it by increasing its own position there; and ready an appeal to the UN in case of Soviet intervention.¹⁶⁷ The administration felt particularly strong about the second proposal and attributed to this posture the Soviet Union's willingness to accept Gomulka as the United States was not ready to jump into Poland.

USIA, following a policy similar to that of Radio Free Europe's of not inciting further revolts, avoided any:

- (1) direct ID of United States policy with the present resurgence of Polish nationalism

¹⁶⁷Department of State Policy Planning Staff, FRUS, vol. 25, Eastern Europe, 259-60.

- (2) statement Poles might resent as outside interference
- (3) reference to recent events as the breaking up of the Soviet bloc
- (4) speculation that Poland represents the future doom of communism¹⁶⁸

There were no further revolts in Poland; however, influenced by Yugoslavia and Poland, Hungary sought its own road to socialism. Unlike the situation in Poland, the Hungarian outburst in Budapest, beginning 23 October 1956, was revolutionary in character and aimed for more than a mere nationalist communist government. It sought international neutrality and a withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact agreement. Unable to tolerate such an attack on their Great Power status, the Soviets invaded Hungary on 4 November, forcefully put down the revolution, and regained control over the country. The extreme violence in Hungary caused the American administration to stand firm on its decision to remain as quiet and proceed as cautiously during the events in Hungary as it had during the past riots in Berlin and Poznan.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸Ibid., 271.

¹⁶⁹For more on Hungary and the Polish-Hungarian connection, see: Ambrose, Eisenhower, 354; Noel Barber, Seven Days of Freedom: The Hungarian Uprising 1956 (London: MacMillan, 1973); Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller, Hungary 1956 revisited: The Message of a Revolution A Quarter Century After (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1983); Andor Heller, No More Comrades (Chicago: H. Regency, 1957); Melvin J. Laskey, ed., The Hungarian Revolution; A White Book. The Story of the October Uprising as Recorded in Documents, Dispatches, Eye-Witness Accounts and World-Wide Reactions (New York: Praeger, 1957); Richard Lettis and William E. Morris, The Hungarian Revolt, October 23-November 4 (New York: Scribner, 1961); William Lomax, Hungary 1956 (New

By 31 October the NSC had a plan to deal with the restless satellite countries. NSC 5616, an "Interim United States Policy on Developments in Poland and Hungary," addressed the importance of encouraging "national" communist governments. Gomulka was representative of this type of government, embodying the nationalistic, anti-Russian sentiment of the people with the realities of the presence of the Soviet troops. Courses of action included:

- (1) United States willingness to discuss problems affecting United States-Polish relations
- (2) increased economic relations, and encouraging the Poles to put their energies into satisfying consumer demands and peaceful trade
- (3) encourage the government to fulfill commitments of reform made to the public
- (4) increased economic, scientific, and cultural contacts¹⁷⁰

Eisenhower spoke before the nation the same day about the recent developments in Eastern Europe and, following NSC 5616 guidelines, he encouraged "national" communist governments: "A few days ago, the people of Poland with their proud and deathless devotion to freedom moved to

York: St. Martin's Press, 1976); Tibor Meray, 13 Days that Shook the World trans. by Howard L. Katzander, (New York: Praeger, 1959); Miklos Molnar, Budapest 1956: A History of the Hungarian Revolution trans. by Jennetta Ford, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1971); David Pryce-Jones, The Hungarian Revolution (New York: Horizon Press, 1970); Janos Radvanyi, Hungary and the Superpowers; The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1972); Paul E. Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).

¹⁷⁰Interim U.S. Policy on Developments in Poland and Hungary, 19 November 1956, Box 19, NSC Series, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

secure a peaceful transition to a new government. And this government, it seems, will strive genuinely to serve the Polish people." The Soviets issued a statement yesterday¹⁷¹ and appear willing to revise their policies to meet the demand for greater national independence and personal freedom. If the Soviets act on this statement of intent, it will be the greatest stride forward toward justice, trust and understanding among nations. In conclusion, Eisenhower reaffirmed that the United States had no ulterior motive with regard to Poland, but merely wanted it to be able to choose its own form of government.¹⁷²

Dulles, speaking on 12 November before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated: "It had been the bases of United States policy that the Soviet satellites should be liberated, not by the force of foreign arms, but by the relentless pressure of the demand of men to be free." By keeping alive their love of freedom and hope of liberation, Poland now had Gomulka's regime, "...[a] shift away from Soviet domination, and it has shown its ability to insist on

¹⁷¹The Soviet statement Eisenhower referred to was made over Moscow radio. It recalled that the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU condemned mistakes and violations and demanded that the Soviet Union apply Lenin's principles of equality of nations in its relations with other states. It said there were mistakes in the establishment of the new regime, "including some in relations between the socialist states-violations and mistakes which infringed the principles of equality in relation between socialist states.

¹⁷²"Developments in Eastern Europe and the Middle East," The Department of State Bulletin, 12 November 1956, 743-45.

greater control of internal affairs."¹⁷³ By 21 December, the United States considered Poland a "friendly nation" as it was no longer "dominated" or "controlled" by the Soviet Union. Talk of American economic aid progressed accordingly.

As the year drew to an end, Eisenhower was re-elected for a second term with a 3 million vote increase over his 1952 majority.¹⁷⁴ Once again he had run again against Adlai Stevenson of Illinois, who had called the Republican policy of liberation nothing but "bluster and bluff." Despite this charge, Eisenhower won due to his continuing popularity and to the fact that during times of crises, the American people tend to choose to stay with the present administration. Although the liberation of Eastern Europe had not been achieved, Poland had changed; a totalitarian regime had now been replaced by national communists. As Eisenhower said in a speech on 31 October:

A few days ago, the people of Poland--with their proud and deathless devotion to freedom--moved to secure a peaceful transition to a new government. And this government, it seems, will strive to serve the Polish people.¹⁷⁵

At the end of 1956, the United States remained cautious. A State Department national intelligence estimate

¹⁷³United States Senate, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 84th Cong., 2d sess., 12 November 1956, 608.

¹⁷⁴Johnson, National Party Platforms, 523.

¹⁷⁵Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of the American Presidents, 580.

concluded that the Soviet Union would continue its policy of shifting between repression and concession for the sake of expediency.¹⁷⁶ It was predicted that Moscow would again use repression as a means of control, but for the time being, at least, Poland had gained some breathing space.

¹⁷⁶"Probable Developments in Soviet-Satellite Relations," FRUS, vol. 25, Eastern Europe, 83.

CONCLUSION

Dwight Eisenhower won the 1952 presidential election in part because of his clarion call for a "rollback" of Soviet power in the countries of Eastern Europe. Critics subsequently argued that Eisenhower failed in his plans for a "rollback," or liberation, but an analysis of National Security Council papers shows liberation for what it was: a call used to gain public favor for his policies vis-a-vis the communist world, rather than the long-term goal. The years 1953 to 1956 provided many opportunities for a change in East-West relations, beginning with Stalin's death and the East German uprising in 1953, continuing with the Geneva Conference in July 1955, and ending with the Polish riot in Poznan in June 1956. The United States, initially surprised by the events of 1953, quickly formulated NSC 174, a plan concerning Eastern Europe that would guide official American policy for the next three years.

Introduced on 11 December 1953, NSC 174 recognized de facto Soviet control over the satellite countries, but observed that these same countries simultaneously prevented

the Moscow from consolidating its power in the region. NSC 174 aimed at encouraging resistance to Soviet domination in the short term and the elimination of Soviet influence in the long term. The United States did not want to risk a general war to achieve the ultimate goal of liberation, but the short-term aims of creating problems for the Soviets in their own backyard were easier to carry out. The administration concluded that the best means to effect change was by psychological warfare, and by 1956, propaganda and policy were so closely tied together that one could not readily be distinguished from the other.

The reason for focusing on psychological warfare versus conventional diplomatic activities was that this was how Eisenhower planned to attain his long-term aim of liberation. Relations with the Polish regime could at best be described as formally correct, but were usually tense and very difficult. The United States, learning from the East German riots in 1953 that diplomacy would not achieve liberation, enacted NSC 158, but this was merely a list of interim objectives and actions until a formal policy could be formed. That formal policy was outlined in NSC 174, which clearly stated that liberation was the *long-term* goal of the administration.

Humanitarian aid, the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and numerous other propaganda and informational organizations were some of the tools employed by the United

States in attempting to free Eastern Europe from the Soviet bear's formidable embrace. As there were no means by which the United States could measure the success of its policy in concrete terms, many critics initially concluded that Eisenhower's goal of liberation had met with only limited success, if not outright failure. The proof that his policies helped pave the way for the eventual liberation of the satellites came with the Polish riot in Poznan in June 1956.

For some the fact that the Polish uprising did not result in a democratic government or rid the country of Soviet influence pointed to the failure of liberation. I argue that this is an inaccurate view. As mentioned above, liberation was not NSC 174's, or President Eisenhower's immediate goal--regardless of what the public thought. American policy aimed at increasing difficulties for the communists and resisting sovietization. And the Polish riots demonstrated just how effective American government policy had been. They certainly offered undeniable proof of the depth of the people's hatred of communism and of the Soviet Union. They also showed that through resistance people might achieve some independence from Moscow--the right to travel their own road to socialism. The people of Poland were not yet free, but they had resisted the Russian bear and won a measure of autonomy. This was the first step on the road toward eventual liberation.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. PRIMARY SOURCES

UNPUBLISHED

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

- Benedict, Stephen: Papers, 1952.
 Dulles, John Foster: Papers, 1953-56.
 Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States (Ann Whitman File), 1953-56, 1960.
 Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President, White House Central Files, 1953-56.
 Gray, Robert K.: Records, 1952.
 Jackson, C.D.: Papers, 1953-56.
 United States President's Committee on International Information Activities: Records, 1950-53.
 White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1952-56.
 White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-56.
 White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records, 1953-56.
 White House Office, Staff Research Group, 1956.

PUBLISHED

United States Government Documents

American Foreign Policy 1950-55 Basic Documents. Vol. 1.
 Washington, D.C.: GPO. 1957.

CIA Research Reports, The Soviet Union, 1946-1976. Frederick, Md: University Publications of America, 1982.

Confidential United States State Department Central Files. Poland 1950-1954.

The Department of State Bulletin. 2 February 1953-26 November 1956. Washington, DC: GPO.

United States Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54. Vol. 2, National Security Affairs. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984.

_____. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54. Vol. 8, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1988.

_____. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-57. Vol. 25, Eastern Europe. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990.

_____. Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Poland, 1950-54. Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1986.

_____. Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Poland, 1955-59. Scholarly Resources, Inc., n.d.

United States House of Representatives. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs on United States Policy and the East-West Confrontation, 1951-1956. 83d Cong., 1st sess. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1980.

_____. Hearings Before the Select Committee on Communist Aggression to Investigate Communist Aggression Against Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, East Germany, Russian and non-Russian Nations of the Soviet Union. 83d Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1954.

United States Senate. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 83d Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 84th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1953, 1954, 1956.

_____. Hearings Before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on Voice of America. 83d Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, D.C.: GPO 1954.

_____. Senate Documents on Tensions within the Soviet Captive Countries: Poland. 83d Cong., 1st sess. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1953.

OTHER PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

Curl, Peter V., ed. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956. New York: Harper & Bros., 1956.

Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States from George Washington 1789 to George Bush 1989. Bicentennial ed. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1989.

Israel, Fred L., ed. The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents; 1790-1966. Vol. 3. With an introduction by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. New York: Chelsea House, 1967.

Johnson, David Bruce, ed. National Party Platforms. Vol. 1. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956, revised, 1978.

Podell, Janet and Steven Anzovin, eds. Speeches of the American Presidents. New York: H.W. Wilson Co., 1988.

Radio Free Europe. Radio Free Europe Background Reports, Country Series, Poland. Zug, Switzerland: Inter Documentation Co., 1983.

Schelsinger, Jr., Arthur M., ed. The Dynamics of World Power; A Documentary History of United States Foreign Policy, 1945-73. Vol. 2, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. New York: Chelsea House, 1973.

Zinner, Paul E., ed. National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe; A Collection of Documents on Events in Poland and Hungary February-November 1956. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956.

NEWSPAPERS

New York Times. 21 January 1953 - 29 December 1956.

Richmond Times-Dispatch. 21 January 1953 - 29 December 1956.

The Washington Post. 21 January 1953 - 29 December 1956.

II. SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS

- Alexander, Charles C. Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era, 1952-1961. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975.
- Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower. Vol.2, The President. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984.
- _____. Ike's Spies; Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1981.
- _____. Rise to Globalism; American Foreign Policy 1938-1970. Baltimore: Penguin, 1971.
- Berding, Andrew H. Dulles on Diplomacy. Princeton: D. van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1965.
- Brands, H. W., Jr. Cold Warriors; Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
- Branyan, Robert L. and Lawrence H. Larsen. The Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1961. New York: Random House, Inc., 1971.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. The Soviet Bloc; Unity and Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.
- Capitanchik, David B. The Eisenhower Presidency and American Foreign Policy. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969.
- Congressional Quarterly. Guide to United States Elections. 2d ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1985.
- Cook, Blanche Wiesen. The Declassified Eisenhower. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1981.
- Cook, Fred J. The Nightmare Decade, The Life and Times of Senator Joe McCarthy. New York: Random House, 1971.
- Divine, Robert A. Eisenhower and the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.
- Donovan, Robert J. Conflict and Crisis, The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1945-1948. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1977.

- . Tumultuous Years, The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1949-1953. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1982.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. Russia, The Soviet Union, and the United States. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1978.
- . Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
- . The Long Peace; Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Gubin, Michael A. John Foster Dulles, A Statesman and His Times. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.
- Graebner, Norman A. The New Isolationism, A Study in Politics and Foreign Policy Since 1950. New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1956.
- Holt, Robert T. Radio Free Europe. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958.
- Holt, Robert T. and Robert W. van de Velde. Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1960.
- Immerman, Richard H., ed. John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
- Kovrig, Bennett. The Myth of Liberation; East-Central Europe in United States Diplomacy and Politics Since 1941. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.
- Leslie, R. F., ed. The History of Poland Since 1863. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
- Lewis, Flora. A Case History of Hope: The Story of Poland's Peaceful Revolutions. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1958.
- Maciejewskiego, Jaroslawa and Zofii Trojanowiczowej. Poznan-ski Czerwiec 1956. Poznan: Wydawnictwo Poznanskie, 1990.
- Maisel, L. Sandy, ed. Political Parties and Elections in the United States, An Encyclopedia. Vol. 1, A-M. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1991.

- Marchio, James D. "Rhetoric and Reality: The Eisenhower Administration and Unrest in Eastern Europe, 1953-1959." Ph.D. diss., American University, 1990.
- Melanson, Ruchard A. and David Mayers. Reevaluating Eisenhower; American Foreign Policy in the 1950's. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987.
- Mickelson, Sig. America's Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. New York: Praeger, 1983.
- Nalepa, Edward John. Pacyfikacja zbuntowanego miasta; Wojsko Polskie w Czerwcu 1956r. w Poznaniu w swietle dokumentow wojskowych. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Bellona, 1992.
- Nathan, James A. and James K. Oliver. United States Foreign Policy and World Order. 2d ed. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1981.
- Neff, Donald. Warriors at Suez. New York: The Linden Press, 1981.
- Paterson, Thomas G. Meeting the Communist Threat Truman - Reagan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Poznan 1956-Grundzien 1970. Paryz: Instytut Literacki, 1971.
- Pusey, Merlo J. Eisenhower the President. New York: MacMillan, 1956.
- Sievers, Rodney M. The Last Puritan? Adlai Stevenson in American Politics. New York: Associated Faculty Press, Inc., 1983.
- Spanier, John W. American Foreign Policy Since World War II. 2d ed. New York: Praeger, 1962.
- Starr, Richard F. Poland, 1944-1962; The Sovietization of a Captive People. New Orleans: Louisiana State University Press, 1962.
- Syrop, Konrad. Spring in October; The Story of the Polish Revolution, 1956. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1957.
- Tyson, James L. United States International Broadcasting and National Security. New York: Romapo Press, 1983.
- Voice of America Programming Handbook. 3d ed. np, 1992.
- Wandycz, Piotr S. The United States and Poland. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.

ARTICLES

- Acheson, Dean. "Acheson Sees Ike's Foreign Policy as 'Bluff and Blunder.'" U.S. News & World Report, 5 October 1956, 88-91.
- "A New Look at the Soviet 'New Look.'" U.S. News & World Report, 21 January 1955, 54-60.
- "A One Year Record: A Balance Sheet of the Changes." Problems of Communism, March 1954, 1-23.
- "Big Four." Time, 1 August 1955, 16.
- Brands, H. W. "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State." American Historical Review, October 1989, 963-89.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew and William E. Griffith. "Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe." Foreign Affairs, July 1961, 642-54.
- Bromke, Adam. "Nationalism and Communism in Poland." Foreign Affairs, July 1962, 635-43.
- Brynes, Robert F. "East Europe in Crisis." Current History, February 1957, 71-76.
- Burk, Robert F. "Eisenhower Revisionism Revisited: Reflections on Eisenhower Scholarship." The Historian, February 1988, 196-209.
- Burnham, James. "Containment or Liberation? An Inquiry into the Aims of U.S. Foreign Policy." Day, 1953, 256ff.
- Carr, E.H. "Stalin." Soviet Studies, July 1953, 1-7.
- "Cold War, Ike, and Malenkov: 'Watch and Wait' Is The Key." Newsweek, 16 March 1953, 34-41.
- "Communism on the Defensive." Business Week, 7 July 1956, 27-28.
- "Containment and Liberation." The Commonweal, 6 February 1953, 442.
- "Crisis in East Europe." Business Week, 18 July 1953, 31-32.

- DeSantis, Vincent P. "Eisenhower Revisionism." Review of Politics, April 1976, 190-207.
- Dulles, John Foster. "A Policy of Boldness." Life, 19 May 1952, 146-59.
- "Eisenhower in Excelsis: The President's Prestige After Geneva." Round Table, September 1955, 363-38.
- Fish, M. Steven. "After Stalin's Death: The Anglo-American Debate Over a New Cold War." Diplomatic History, Fall 1986, 333-55.
- Gedye, G.E.R. "Crashing the Curtain." The Progressive, April 1953, 8-10.
- Gomulka, Wladyslaw. "The Policy of the Polish People's Republic." Foreign Affairs, April 1960, 402-18.
- Greenstein, Fred I. "Eisenhower As An Activist President: A Look at New Evidence." Political Science Quarterly, Winter 1979-1980, 575-99.
- Harriman, W. Averell. "After Stalin, What?" Newsweek, 16 March 1953, 28-31.
- Hass, Ludwik. "'Czarny Czwartek' Poznanski 1956r." Z Pola Walki, 31 no. 2 (1988): 166-75.
- "How Eisenhower Is Doing." U.S. News & World Report, 24 December 1954, 22-23.
- "Ike's First Year, Where United States Stands." U.S. News & World Report, 15 January 1954, 19-21.
- Immerman, Richard H. "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal." Diplomatic History, Summer 1990, 319-42.
- Joes, Anthony James. "Eisenhower Revisionism: The Tide Comes In." Presidential Studies Quarterly, Summer 1985, 561-71.
- Kersten, C.J. "The Liberation Policy and International Order," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, July 1953, 93-104.
- Korab, Alexander. "Poland: The Search for Independence." Problems of Communism, November/December 1956, 10-16.
- Kovacs, Imre. "Liberation for What?" International Peasant Union Monthly Bulletin, May 1954, 16-22.

Krol, Marcin. "Listening Through the Jamming." American Scholar, 61 no. 3 (1992): 431-35.

Lacy, Dan. "The Role of American Books Abroad." Foreign Affairs, April 1956, 405-17.

Lindley, Ernest K. "Eisenhower's Methods." Newsweek, 2 March 1953, 23.

_____. "The Effects of Stalin's Passing." Newsweek, 16 March 1953, 45.

Lowenthal, Richard. "Revolution Over Eastern Europe." Problems of Communism, November/December 1956, 4-9.

Malara, Jean. "Poland Since the Death of Stalin." Problems of Communism, March 1955, 12-19.

Matthews, George. "After Geneva." Marxist Quarterly, October 1955, 194-202.

"Minds in Revolt." Problems of Communism, May/June 1956, 24-41.

Neal, Steve. "Why We Were Right to Like Ike." American Heritage, December 1985, 49-64.

Nelson, Ann Kasten. "The 'Top of Policy Hill:' President Eisenhower and the National Security Council." Diplomatic History, Fall 1983, 307-326.

News From Behind the Iron Curtain, May 1953-April 1956.

Nowak, Jan. "Polityka Amerykanska Wobec Kraju i Emigracju w Latach Zimnej Wojny." Zeszyty Historyczna, n.s. 74 (1985): 40-57.

O'Konski, A.E. and others. "How Can We Help Satellite Nations to Attain Freedom?" Town Meeting, 3 November 1953, 146.

"Poland: Next to Explode?" U.S. News & World Report, 3 July 1953, 14-15.

"Polish 'Victory.'" Newsweek, 26 November 1956, 37-38.

"President Eisenhower Takes the Initiative." World Today, February 1954, 51-58.

"President Tells How to Win Friends and Defeat Communism." U.S. News & World Report, 1 June 1956, 94-98.

- Rabe, Stephen G. "Eisenhower Revisionism: A Decade of Scholarship." Diplomatic History, Winter 1993, 97-115.
- Reichard, Gary W. "Eisenhower as President: The Changing View." South Atlantic Quarterly, Summer 1978, 265-81.
- Ribuffo, Leo P. "Is Poland a Soviet Satellite? Gerald Ford, the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine, and the Election of 1976." Diplomatic History, Summer 1990, 385-403.
- Roberts, Henry L. "Crisis In The Soviet Empire." Foreign Affairs, January 1957, 191-93.
- Ryszke, Franciszk. "Poland in the System of Contemporary International Relations (1944-1979)." Review of the Polish Academy of Science, trans. by Halina Gusrka, 25 (1980): 37-49.
- Sarnoff, David. "New Look in the Cold War." Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 26 July 1956, 376ff.
- Seton-Watson, Hugh. "Eruption in East Europe: A Myth Destroyed and a Revolution Betrayed." Commentary, December 1956, 518-24.
- Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. "The Ike Age Revisited." Reviews in American History, March 1983, 1-11.
- Shannon, W.V. "Halfway with Eisenhower." The Progressive, August 1954, 7-9.
- "Six Days In Geneva." Time, 1 August 1955, 16.
- Solski, Waclaw. "Poland's Man on a Tightrope: Gomulka and Moscow." New Leader, 26 November 1956, 5-7.
- Stevens, Edmund. "Ike's Triumph at Geneva." New Leader, 1 August 1955, 3-4.
- Stone, W.T. "Russia's European Satellites." Editorial Research Reports, 4 November 1953, 769-86.
- _____. "Restive Satellites." Editorial Research Reports, 29 August 1956, 591-607.
- Strzetelski, Stanislaw. "The Background of the October Events in Poland." Polish Review, Autumn 1956, 68-79.
- Swianiewicz, Stanislaw. "Wspomnienia o Wiktorze Sukienickim." Zeszyty Historyczne. n.s. 66 (1983): 48-69.

- "The Armies Russia Fears." U.S. News & World Report, 24 July 1953, 22-23.
- "The Big Three: A Solid Front Faces Russia." Newsweek, 14 December 1953, 34-36.
- "The 'Big Two' at Geneva." U.S. News & World Report, 29 July 1955, 27-29.
- "The Captive Nations, 1956: A Comprehensive Report Prepared by the Assembly of Captive European Nations." New Leader, 9 April, 1956, section 2, s1-s15.
- "The Eisenhower Era." Newsweek, 23 January 1956, 25-33.
- "The Situation." The Commonweal, 28 August 1953, 504.
- "Trading Secrets, Ike's Dramatic Offer and How It Came About." Time, 1 August 1955, 17.
- Turner, A.C. "Strategic Criteria for a Policy of Liberation or of Containment." World Affairs Interpreter, January 1954, 429-39.
- Wiles, Peter. "Two Wandering Satellites: The Polish and Hungarian Experiences." Encounter, January 1957, 16-24.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Mary Catherine Stagg was born in Richmond, Virginia, in 1967. She attended Nijenrode, the Netherlands School of Business, and graduated from Georgetown University in 1989 with a B.S. in International Management and Marketing. She received her M.A. in History from the University of Richmond and is now living and working in Poznan, Poland.