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Elizabethan foreign policy : 1567-1585

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ELIZABETHAN FOREIGN POLICY: 1567-1585


BY

JO ANNE REYNOLDS

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND
IN CANDIDACY
FOR THE DEGREE OF
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APPROVAL SHEET

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "John A. Kelly", is written over a horizontal line. The signature is written in dark ink and extends to the right of the line.

(Thesis Advisor)

(Department Chairman)

(Member of Examining Board)

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IN

DEDICATION

TO

MR. CHARLES N. REYNOLDS, JR.
MR. AND MRS. LANNIE W. CROPPER

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PREFACE

The topic of this paper, "Elizabethan Foreign Policy: 1567-1585", evolved from an attempt to analyze Anglo-Spanish relations during the same period. The interrelatedness of the religious and political problems among the major powers of the period led this author frequently into considerations outside the original sphere of interest. While the topic was expanded in scope, it should be noted that the paper attempts to deal only with the more significant factors affecting English foreign policy and does not pretend to illuminate the complex and changing national situations elsewhere. Specific external events are introduced only when they directly affect Elizabethan foreign policy considerations.

One precaution must be noted in conjunction with the dates. Throughout the paper, old style calendar dates have been converted to conform with the new style calendar. (This affected only those dates between March 25th, and January 1st which were increased one year by the conversion.) Also, it should be noted that the old English spelling and punctuation was retained in certain quotations for flavor.

A sincere expression of thanks is due to Dr. John R. Rilling whose brilliant lectures stimulated interest in this period, and whose criticism and advice proved invaluable. The aid of the librarians of the Virginia Historical Society in securing primary source materials, and of Miss Mary C. Clark in proof-reading the final draft is greatly appreciated.

Gratitude is also extended to the Richmond City Public Schools for granting me the study furlough which allowed me to perform this research. Finally, to my parents, Mr. and Mrs. Lannie W. Cropper, for affording me with the opportunity to pursue my education, and to my husband, Charles N. Reynolds, for his aid and encouragement, I am deeply grateful.

CHAPTER I: DECISION MAKING

Elizabethan foreign policy has been characterized as shifting with the winds. Indeed, it has been stated that Elizabeth had no policy. Actually what appears to have been vacillating indecision might more accurately be described as deliberate flexibility.¹ In tracing the course of Elizabethan foreign policy from 1567 to 1585, a period marked by continuing crisis and overt hostilities among the foremost European powers, the astuteness of the Queen in not adhering to the rigid policies advocated by certain of her counsellors becomes apparent. In making decisions in those turbulent days, the Queen was guided not by preformulated policy directives, but by sagacity. She analyzed every situation carefully, studying the alternatives and weighing the proposals of her various counsellors before attempting to make a decision.

Under the framework of Tudor government, the responsibility for making decisions in the realm of foreign affairs ultimately rested with the sovereign, who was aided by the Privy Council. Elizabeth determined to accept this responsibility and from the beginning of her reign displayed both great interest and aptitude not just in the important considerations of formulating particular policies, but also in the everyday details of State, such as the going over of incoming and outgoing correspondence which might have been handled completely by her secretaries.² Her Renaissance

education in linguistics proved to be highly advantageous as she sought to converse directly with many of the foreign ambassadors in Latin, French, and Italian since English was not at that time considered a language of diplomacy.³

The fact that Elizabeth was the unmarried Queen of a realm whose fate affected the destiny of all of Europe removed her choice of a husband from the purely personal sphere and made it an important consideration of State. This, pressed to advantage, served to involve her inextricably in foreign affairs. Clearly, courtship became her trump card in the precarious game of European diplomacy.⁴

The role of the Privy Council in foreign policy was advisory. It derived its authority from the monarch. The great bulk of its work was in the handling of the details of administration, as the Register of the Privy Council reveals.⁵ Only in extreme crises when the question of war or peace was to be decided did Elizabeth consult with the Council as a body.⁶ She preferred to give audience to her counsellors individually, on the principle of "Divide and rule".⁷ Since there was seldom any unanimity of opinion within the group, she could depend upon hearing several points of view, and then selecting the one which best suited her own purposes. High questions of policy were often debated by inner circles of advisors who sought to influence the Queen during informal audiences at court functions.⁸

From the ranks of this inner circle of advisors steps the most influential, able, and devoted of Elizabeth's counsellors, Sir William Cecil, her principal Secretary for fourteen years. Perhaps

his success may be explained in terms of his demonstrated administrative ability. "His capacity for work, his care for detail, his grasp of difficulties, amounted to genius; and if ever there was a perfect minister, it was he."⁹ This diligence in administrative details is evident in his very precise, and thorough memoranda and minutes which have been preserved.¹⁰

The relationship that evolved between Cecil and the Queen may be defined as a partnership; however, he always remained the devoted servant and she the mistress. Although always eager to advise her, he never attempted to dominate her, and even he could never really predict her actions. As she became increasingly aware of his many talents, she relied on his "wide knowledge and worldly wisdom" to temper "her feminine impulses," and "her versatility forced him to cast off the shackles of precedent."¹¹ Together they forged their own policy, unhampered by established procedures, relying sometimes on orthodoxy, frequently on flirtations, considering sometimes religious factors and at other times weighing secular considerations more heavily, and always allowing themselves to be guided by the exigencies of the situation. During his tenure as secretary, it would be impossible to conclude whether she did more to influence him or he to influence her.¹²

Contemporaries of William Cecil support this point of view regarding his eminence. Indeed, it is truly amazing that he was so highly regarded by so many rival camps. Fenelon, the French Ambassador, and De Spes, the Spanish Ambassador, both agreed that he was the dominant figure in the Council. De Spes commented in

1569: "The Queen's own opinion is of little importance and that of the Earl of Leicester still less, so that Cecil unrestrainedly and arrogantly governs all."¹³ A similar opinion was reflected by De Guaras, serving the Duke of Alva in an unofficial capacity in January of 1572, when he remarked: "It is Burghley who rules the whole of the Country",¹⁴ and again on October 12th when he reported: "The best Counsellor of all of them is Lord Burghley as he follows the will and bent of the Queen, and he is supreme in the country and in the Queen's estimation."¹⁵ Mendoza who was in the service of Spain in 1581, regarded Cecil as the most important of all the counsellors also, while the French Ambassador at that time, Mauvissière, paid him an even greater compliment in declaring that he was "most exempt from all passions save for the service and honor of his Mistress." Strangely enough, both men felt that he was their best friend at Court.¹⁶ Even Cecil's foremost rival, Leicester, resentfully admitted to his influence when he told Fenelon that Cecil was more the king than Elizabeth the queen.¹⁷

Even after Cecil was elevated to the peerage on February 25, 1571, as Baron Burghley, he reluctantly held on to his position as first secretary for another year.¹⁸ He was to attain additional powers in accepting the position of Lord Treasurer, however, as he directed and managed all royal revenues and expenditures and exercised control over Crown lands. He was also to have extensive appointive power in this department.¹⁹ It is important to note that even after relinquishing the title of Principal Secretary, Burghley

still managed to direct the affairs of State. His successor, Sir Thomas Smith, certainly did not displace him as is obvious by his comments to Burghley on October 15, 1572: "I well preceive her Highness is disposed to sign nothing except your Lordship be here.... Your hasty going hence hath made as appeareth, all things here turn backwards. I have somewhat ado to get to the Queen and more to get anything signed... I perceive, until that your Lordship come again, will be no good done."²⁰ The change of office served to relieve Burghley of the crushing load of administrative details, but in no way lessened his role of advising the Queen. Elizabeth became increasingly dependent on him for advice and would rarely take action before consulting him. He had become a unique figure in the Court, and his position and influence, secure without rival.²¹

Perhaps the genius in Burghley's statesmanship and the reasons for his unrivaled influence can best be seen if one examines his memoranda.²² He often stated several courses of action and presented the pros and cons of each in detail, even if he favored one over the other. He won the Queen's confidence as being a "dispassionate judge" and found that he could achieve more by not directly opposing the royal position. Appropriately, Burghley has been called the "master of the art of the possible" and his actions often represented a compromise between his own desired course of actions and that which the Queen favored.²³ Finally, perhaps the most notable factor in his success with the Queen was his disposition to subordinate all other matters including his religious goals to the national interest.

There were other members of the "inner circle" of the Privy Council who at times were to compete with Cecil for the Queen's favor and of these it was Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, who afforded him the greatest concern. Even after the tragic death of Dudley's wife, Amy Robsart, in which public opinion probably falsely implicated him and forced Elizabeth to abandon hope of marriage to the one man that she was known to have loved, he continued to occupy a place of high favor in the heart of the Queen.²⁴ Just as Burghley had been instrumental in preventing this marriage, so he attempted to lessen Leicester's influence on the Queen later. It was the case of Cecil, the patriotic statesman, calling on Elizabeth to fulfill her responsibilities as opposed to Leicester, the self-aspiring courtier, appealing to Elizabeth the woman.²⁵ This personal contest was to fragment the Privy Council with Leicester and Arundel challenging Cecil and Bacon in the earlier years.²⁶ Later the lines were to become identified with the religious question, all of Elizabeth's counsellors being anti-Catholic after Arundel's death in 1580, with the exception of Sir James Croft. There was however, among the Protestants a strong left-wing Puritan group. Although Leicester took the leadership of this radical group consisting of Bedford, Knollys and Walsingham, it is suspected that he was motivated mainly by personal rather than religious considerations. After Bacon's death, only Sussex and Hatton continued to give their support to Cecil's program.²⁷ In addition to the religious strife within the ranks of the Protestants, there was also factional discontent with the old Northern nobility, predominantly Catholic, resenting the influence of the "new men".

They allied themselves with Leicester in his unsuccessful attempt to oust Cecil, and did not stop until they had involved themselves in the treasonous enterprise of attempting to overthrow the Cecilian regime. 28
It appears that these intrigues had the reverse effect from what had been intended, as it has been pointed out that Cecil's influence with the Queen following this was on the ascendancy.

Sir Francis Walsingham has been mentioned in conjunction with the radical Puritan faction in the Privy Council, but his role in directing English foreign policy merits further consideration. The first evidence that is available concerning his entry into the realm of foreign affairs is a letter which he wrote on the request of Sir Nicholas Throgmorton to Cecil regarding accommodations for a Mr. Robert Stewart who was to solicit aid for the Huguenots from the Queen 29
At that time he was employed by William Cecil to perform secret service work. 30 That Walsingham performed his tasks in France well is indicated by the fact that the Queen called on him to play a vital role in investigating the Norfolk plot and on October 7, 1569, he was informed of the Queen's wishes that he retain Ridolfi at his house for further examination. 31 His next important assignment was to consist of aiding the Huguenots in securing favorable terms from the French monarch, Charles IX, in 1570. By the time that he was actually commissioned to go, however, the Treaty of St. Germain had been signed, and his mission appeared to have been only for the purpose of offering congratulations. In reality, he was given the more important task of feeling out the attitude of the French King towards Elizabeth and in regard to the Scottish question. 32

Extremely important to Walsingham were the years from 1570 to 1573, the period of his embassy to France. It was during this stay that he defined his attitudes on the important questions of policy which were to remain for the most part unchanged.³³ Although he definitely did not wish to assume the position of Ambassador to France, the Queen felt that she needed a highly reliable man for the very tedious negotiations which were anticipated, and Walsingham was to display the ability which justified such confidence in him.³⁵ During this embassy, he played a key role in advancing the Anjou marriage negotiations,³⁶ initiating discussion with Anjou regarding the possibility of English financial support for his campaign in the Low Countries,³⁷ in promoting marriage negotiations in regard to Alençon,³⁸ in concluding the Treaty of Blois,³⁹ and in bringing about reconciliation between England and France following the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day.⁴⁰ The convictions which Walsingham had cultivated from his experiences colored his future advice to the Queen against Spain and Mary Stuart, and in favor of aiding the revolting Dutchmen and Protestants elsewhere.⁴¹

That Walsingham's performance of duties in France had been pleasing to Elizabeth is evidenced by the fact that on December 21, 1573, he was appointed as Joint Principal Secretary.⁴² His advancement as a public servant had been phenomenal and it was certainly recognized by the foreign courts that he was one of the principal persons in influencing governmental policy.⁴³ De Guaras, in a letter dated November of 1574, revealed his conviction that

Walsingham was Spain's chief opponent: "This Walsingham is of all heretics the worst. He was Ambassador in France, and as he is in authority here and is the right hand of Orange, and evil may be expected from him and his friends in Council."⁴⁴ This prediction by De Guaras proves to have been somewhat justified for throughout the first four years of his office, his religious bent led him to use his influence to promote the cause of the Dutch rebels and French Huguenots. His statement of priorities which follows lends credence to this point of view: "Above all things, I wish God's glory and next her Majesty's safety". Elizabeth was aware of these sentiments which were to increasingly bring him into disfavor with her. She charged him justifiably with being more concerned with promoting Protestantism than the interest of the realm. Actually, he felt that the two causes were synonymous.⁴⁵ Perhaps this religious bent in conjunction with one other characteristic, his outspoken bluntness and impetuosity, were the two main factors which prevented him from approaching Burghley's eminence in the high council of the court, and in the eyes of the Queen.⁴⁶

CHAPTER II: STATE OF AFFAIRS (1567-1573)

Having discussed the influential persons in the decision-making process, attention might now be directed to the general state of affairs in 1567. Relations with Scotland at this time had been determined to a great extent by what had happened at Kirk O'Field on February 9th, 1567, when Darnley had been mysteriously murdered.⁴⁷ Elizabeth, in seeking evidence to clear Mary Stuart of this crime, found that the facts mustered in the subsequent investigations tended to support public opinion in incriminating both the Earl of Bothwell and Mary.⁴⁸ The Scottish nobility was enraged by what followed for not only did Mary refuse to see that Bothwell was prosecuted properly, but she allowed him to enhance his position at court to such an extent that the "very fabric of Protestant Scotland" was threatened. Murray fled to England, and Lennox, the appointed plaintiff for the farcical trial which was to take place in Edinburgh, never appeared, and thus Bothwell was declared "not guilty" in the "absence of an accuser."⁴⁹ The indiscreet Queen of Scots brought further shame on her country when under the pretence of abduction and rape, she married her sordid lover on May 15, 1567.⁵⁰ Mary had pushed the Scottish nobility too far, and on June 15th, her forces were defeated at Carberry Hill and she was taken prisoner, and forced to abdicate in favor of her son James VI, who at this time was but a year old.⁵¹ Control of Scotland then rested in the hands

of the Protestant nobility led by Murray who became regent. The events to this point had actively worked to the advantage of Elizabeth. Her rival had been both discredited and dethroned and the new government of Scotland would necessarily, because of its religious leanings, look to England for an alliance. Furthermore, the young James would be reared in Protestantism and thus would be a much more favorable candidate for the succession than his Catholic mother had been, and because of his age it would lessen the chance of a plot against Elizabeth to hasten his succession.⁵²

It is therefore strange that Elizabeth at this point decided to abandon the advice of her ministers by intervening in Mary's behalf to the extent that she threatened Murray with armed intervention unless he released Mary and restored her to at least nominal sovereignty. Cecil and Throckmorton were able to dissuade her from the use of force, however, but she steadily refused to recognize the sovereignty of James or the regency of Murray. Upon Mary's escape and futile bid to reclaim the throne on May 13, 1568, Elizabeth was faced with a serious problem when the fugitive Queen of Scots fled across the border into England. There were only two alternatives open to Elizabeth since she realized that she could not give this "Catholic pretender to her own throne" freedom to join forces with the restless Northern nobility. She had either to proclaim Mary's guilt which would justify her taking her into restraint or she could restrict Mary's activity while attempting to negotiate a compromise with the Regency which would nominally restore Mary while leaving the real authority with the

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established Protestant government. The latter was the course which she chose to pursue when she called for each side to send their commissioners to York. The case which Murray and the Scots produced against Mary was so convincing that it precluded any hopes that Elizabeth might have had for restoring Mary.⁵⁴ Yet rather than declare openly against Mary, Elizabeth declined a verdict. The result was that there was a shadow of doubt cast over the question of Mary's guilt in the minds of those who had not seen the "Casket Letters", and this served to keep alive the Marian faction in Scotland, to give the discontented English Catholic element a rallying point, and to invite Spanish and French⁵⁵ intervention on her behalf.

Anglo-French relations in 1567 were generally amiable, especially since according to the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis which had been signed on April 2, 1559, it was now time for France to restore Calais to England or to forfeit 50,000 crowns.⁵⁶ Cecil wrote to Norris in France to inform him of the coming of Sir Thomas Smith and Sir William Winter to press the negotiations.⁵⁷ Upon their arrival they went through the ritual in presenting their case to Charles IX, but his refusal to consider the question on the grounds that the English had invalidated the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis by their occupation of Le Havre was certainly expected.⁵⁸

Earlier, in 1562, Elizabeth had miscalculated the strength of a divided France and had suffered the disaster which lost her Calais by her invasion of Le Havre. Actually, at that time Catherine de Medici was the real ruler in France as she determined the course of action that her young son Charles IX would follow upon his succession to the throne in 1560. Her power was greatly undermined,

however, as she found herself in the midst of three rival factions, the Guises, Montmorenci, and the Bourbons. This internal strife strengthened the appeal which Condé made to Elizabeth on behalf of the Huguenots. Once having involved herself in their support, she was badly betrayed as Condé made an agreement with Catherine de Medici whereby the Huguenots united with the Catholics to expel the English in return for a grant of religious toleration. This was a lesson which Elizabeth was not easily to forget. Although she never completely deserted the Huguenots in the many wars that followed, she abandoned the idea of open intervention in favor of secret loans of money and supplies when she was so inclined. It also had the effect of convincing Catherine that these internal dissensions served to invite foreign intervention, and she was thus prepared to make concessions at home in the name of toleration, and of cultivating an understanding with Elizabeth, even if it meant abandoning Mary Stuart.⁵⁹

No such trend toward reconciliation is discernible in Anglo-Spanish relations, but rather the course of events seemed to reveal that friction was increasing. Elizabeth had feared the possibility of joint action on the part of the two Catholic monarchs in promoting Mary's claim upon her return to Scotland. She was overly suspicious of Philip's intentions, and she misjudged the situation in thinking it possible that France and Spain could overcome their differences on behalf of Mary Stuart, and certainly neither was prepared to intervene unilaterally. Hence Mary's secret appeal for aid in 1565 met with little success. All that

she secured from Philip was a promise to lend money secretly through the Pope, and then only upon receiving Mary's promise not to lay claim to Elizabeth's throne during her lifetime. Later, however, he modified his position and actively encouraged the designing Mary Stuart in her plots against Elizabeth thus justifying Elizabeth's appraisal of him and his intention regarding his desire to see the Catholic Queen of Scots upon the English throne.⁶⁰

Among the many factors tending to increase the tension between England and Spain was the increasing competition that England was offering Spain in regard to control of the seas. England was beginning to recognize the possible advantages to be afforded by a strong navy, not only for defense, but for offense as well. Because of England's location, it was in a position to threaten two of Spain's main lines of communication. From 1567 on, it was essential that Spain maintain a direct route to the Netherlands, for it was there that the bulk of its army was engaged. This depended on free access through the Channel, as did the Spanish supply route to the Baltic which was vitally important for the procurement of the mast and cordage with which to equip her armadas, and also of corn with which to feed them. Equally important, but perhaps not quite so vulnerable was the "silver route" across the Atlantic. This was the stimulus that was to transform "English seapower from a coast defence force ancillary to the army into an independent long range weapon..."⁶¹

That Spain was aware of the challenge afforded by the English to its position of supremacy in the New World is apparent in its attempt to break the lucrative "Triangular Trade" established by

John Hawkins. To break the monotony associated with these legitimate trading expeditions, he resorted to piracy which proved so detrimental to the Spanish silver supply that Philip repeatedly complained to Elizabeth. This appeal was without avail however, as the Queen not only lent her approval to his adventures but purchased shares in his second expedition and provided him with the "Jesus", a large royal ship of 700 tons. Elizabeth's confidence in his success was well founded as she and the other shareholders were rewarded with sixty percent profit.⁶² Provoked by such actions, Philip II was moved to protect his silver fleet, by the putting together of an escort known as the Indian Guard.⁶³

In addition to the pirateering, Spain was concerned over England's southward and westward exploration enterprises. These actually involved only a small number of men and their significance has often been exaggerated, however, they did prove to be points of contention which served to increase the tensions between the two monarchs.⁶⁴ Probably more important but less well known than the publicized western voyages were the voyages to Morocco and Guinea which had begun under Northumberland but which were continued under Elizabeth. The Queen persistently ignored Philip's protests that they had been awarded to Portugal, and countered with the reply that she would recognize sovereignty only in those areas of effective occupation.⁶⁵

One particular incident did kindle the hostilities of Elizabeth, who was already infuriated by the Spanish reprisals for English privateering and piracy on the high seas. This occurred in San

Juan de Ulla, Mexico, on September 16th, 1568, when Hawkins stopped there for repairs with two of the Queen's warships, the "Jesus", and the "Minion", and four additional vessels.⁶⁶ On the following morning, a Spanish squadron consisting of thirteen heavily armed galleons and frigates, and under the command of Alvarez de Bacan who had been dispatched for the purpose of thwarting Hawkins' goal, approached the harbor. Hawkins, realizing the adverse odds, occupied the island and secured the mouth of the harbor. Excluding a Spanish Admiral from a Spanish port was indeed drastic action in a time of peace, but the circumstances were desperate. Before allowing the squadron to enter, a formal treaty was signed recognizing the right of the English fleet to remain, and to retain possession of the island until repairs were completed. The agreement was kept until noon of September 20th, when the Spaniards attacked the unprepared, disadvantaged, English fleet.⁶⁷ The "Jesus", three of the smaller ships, many men, and a considerable portion of the cargo were lost. Hawkins escaped with his life as did Drake "who was afterwards to exact from the Spaniards with compound interest a full retribution for all his sufferings". Perhaps the Queen's anger at this unprovoked breach of faith was increased still further due to the fact that as a shareholder in the adventure, she suffered personal financial loss.⁶⁸

Still another factor made Elizabeth less prone to bend under Philip's threats of retaliation. This was the increasing economic independence of the English merchants. Cardinal Granvelle, Chief

Minister to Margaret of Parma, Governess of the Netherlands, convinced that the English merchants were at the root of the heretical Protestant outbursts in such cities as Bruges, decided to place an embargo on English cloth. He felt that this would surely bring Elizabeth into submission and restore England to Catholicism once the merchants felt the crippling effect of the loss of their main market. Elizabeth retaliated by excluding imports from the Netherlands and by preventing exports except in English bogs. Granvelle took reciprocal action, but only to his own disadvantage, as the growing opposition in the Netherlands forced his recall. Trade was reopened, but negotiations continued into 1567, and the significance of the encounter was that it re-emphasized the political danger of relying on one country, especially if that one country was the Netherlands which at this time was teetering on the brink of anarchy.⁶⁹

During this crisis the Merchant Adventurers had attempted to expand their field of trade to include Germany with Emden as the center of exchange. This proved somewhat abortive and with Granvelle's removal, trade shifted back to Antwerp. The supremacy of this great commercial center was not to withstand the political crisis, and in fact was already on the decline. In 1566, this same company, the Merchant Adventurers had succeeded in making Hamburg "a principal gateway for German and Baltic trade." This had a double significance as it not only allowed England to break its dependent status in regard to Antwerp, but to further break the already deteriorating Hanse monopoly.⁷⁰

It was also in regard to the Netherlands that Philip was to make the political blunder that precipitated the "diplomatic revolution" which drove England to seek an alliance with France and tempted both countries to overt action against Spain. The dramatic effects of the Spanish monarch's decision to wreak vengeance on the Netherlanders, to stamp out all traces of heresy, and to ruthlessly impose his absolute authority at the expense of the privileged nobility, were not yet revealed when on August 22, 1567, the Duke of Alva, Philip's notorious agent rode into Brussels, accompanied by a Spanish army of some 10,000 infantry.⁷¹

The specific events which afforded Philip with an excuse to intervene might be connected with the formation of the Compromise, or League of Nobility in 1565. Its sole purpose was to enlist support to pressure the government under Margaret of Parma, who was directly responsible to Philip for all decisions, to relax or repeal the despised Edicts, opposed by both Protestants and Catholics.⁷² A procession of four hundred of these nobles, representative of all the realm, took place on April 1566, for the purpose of presenting the Governess a petition requesting such action. She received them honorably and invited them into her chamber where she informed them of her decision which in essence would temporarily suspend the Edict, until a decision from her superior, Philip II, could be rendered.⁷³

The group that made the greatest gains during this period of relaxation was the Calvinist, probably due to the zeal of their

leaders and their genius for organization. Their arduous nature led them to resent the restrictions still placed on them, " and the holding of meetings outside churches did not give sufficient vent to their long-suppressed feelings. They longed for action, and in the breaking of images, they found it."⁷⁴ Once this movement to destroy the most treasured religious objects was begun at Fopringhe on August 14th, it swept the country in frenzied waves, spreading to Oudenard on the 18th, Antwerp on the 20th, and on the 22nd, to both Ghent and Amsterdam, then on to Leyden, Delft, Utrecht, Friesland, and Groningen. Thus the Governness, seeing that some official action was needed to stop the anarchy, consented to an "Accord" which simply stated that preaching would be permitted on condition that the people put down their arms and refrain from interfering with the old religion. Also, the dissolution of the Compromise was written into the agreement. Margaret, upon regaining her composure, began to take action to weaken the Accord and met with little opposition except from the ranks of the Calvinists who hoped to make Antwerp the strategic as well as spiritual center of their movement. Orange, the stadholder of the province, refused to identify himself with this radical movement, contrary to the tide of national public opinion.

By preventing their armies under the leadership of Tholouse from entering the city, he forced them to remain at Oosterweel, in the open countryside, where the Government's forces massacred the lot. Wisely, most of those who had associated themselves

with the Compromise fled the country, including Orange, not in fear of Margaret, but to escape the reprisals from the Army that the Duke of Alva was known to be gathering.⁷⁵

Subsequently, the Brussels government not only succeeded in restoring the old order, but for the first time regained the loyalty of the bulk of the population. This was due to the reaction against the Calvinists' excesses and the fact that the majority of the intractable elements had emigrated. Such was the state of affairs when Philip actually dispatched Alva, thus making his excuse seem less valid and "hard for nervous neighbors to believe that Philip was sending Alva with so large a whip merely to flog so dead a horse."⁷⁶ Elizabeth's alarm was not surprising then, as an army which was eventually to swell to over 50,000 was based just across the Narrow Seas from Dover, approximately one hundred miles from London. Some feared that having performed its task in the Netherlands, it would be positioned strategically to turn on England.⁷⁷

As the "Iron Duke" conducted his reign of terror through the so-called Blood Council with "calculated deliberation" and "systematic persistence", William of Orange appeared to be the only leader capable of saving the country, and then only with external aid. He directed his appeal to Europe, not in the name of Protestantism, for he never conceived of his campaign in terms of overthrowing Catholicism, but rather in terms of a united Netherlands offering freedom to both Catholic and Protestant.⁷⁸ Regardless of the terms in which the appeal was

shrouded, Elizabeth had no intention of involving herself at this point. She hoped that France, who obviously was equally alarmed at the Duke's army only eighty miles from Paris, would take some action. This possibility was removed as the Huguenots, suspecting that the army massing on the border to shadow Alba might be directed against them, hastened to combat it, thus precipitating the Second French Religious War in September of 1567.⁷⁹

While avoiding overt action against Spain, Elizabeth's outrage manifested itself in other signs of growing hostility toward Philip. One of these which served to quicken Philip's anger was her renewed support of Hawkins, even after she and Cecil assured De Silva that he would not trade in the prohibited places.⁸⁰ Still another incident served to push the two sovereigns into opposite camps. The principal offender was Philip. Elizabeth first became aware of the trouble brewing when her Ambassador to Spain, Dr. John Man, wrote that he had been denied the privilege of private religious ceremony and was forced to attend Mass. Elizabeth protested and reminded Philip of the ambassadorial privileges that she granted his representatives in England. When the Spanish account of what really happened was revealed by De Silva, it appeared that Man really had abused his privilege in denouncing the Pope publicly at a dinner party as a "canting little monk". Elizabeth was persuaded to recall him upon receiving confirmation of this story, but was later to be outraged to discover that Philip had already expelled him. Cecil denounced Philip's actions as "a great piece of disrespect and insult towards the Queen", and as

"a pretext for war".⁸⁰

Coinciding with Elizabeth's recall of Man was Philip's recall of De Silva. This too served to further increase the growing distrust and suspicion between the two countries. Whereas Elizabeth had considered De Silva the only Spanish Ambassador sincerely desirous of an Anglo-Spanish alliance, she recognized his replacement De Spes as a "disciple of the sword" and did not hesitate to make her hostility toward him known. This was clearly the end of any pretended Anglo-Spanish amenities.⁸¹

The first overt anti-Spanish action was a bold move on the part of Elizabeth to increase her financial resources. The opportunity presented itself when four small Spanish ships took refuge from the weather and French pirates in the harbor of Plymouth. Upon discovering that they contained a considerable loan in the amount of £85,000 from the Genoese bankers and were destined for Alva, Elizabeth sought and received permission from the Genoese creditors to borrow this money herself. This no doubt put Alva in a precarious position as he badly needed the money to make payments already in arrears to his anxious troops.⁸² De Spes informed Alva of the underhanded deal, and suggested wholesale reprisals including the seizure of all English cargoes and vessels in the Netherlands, in addition to imposing an embargo on all English trade. Elizabeth learned of the seizures on January 3rd, and retaliated with comparable measures four days later.⁸³

Alva's confiscation of the English ships was an unwise move, as it justified Elizabeth's seizure of the Genoese loan. It placed

her technically in the right, and for the first time allowed her to avow openly her intention of keeping the money. Also, the Spanish and Flemish property in England proved considerably more valuable than that which the Duke had obtained.⁸⁴

Within the Privy Council, as within the realm, there was much dissension regarding the Queen's actions relating to the seizures and there was considerable disagreement regarding the proper course of action. In a so-called "Short Memorial of the State of the Realm", Cecil prescribed clearly what he considered to be the direction that the Government should take: first, the establishment of a Protestant League consisting of Denmark, Sweden, and Protestant Princes of Germany in addition to England, for the purpose of defense to resist the Catholic coalition; secondly, the giving of aid to the Protestant rebels of France and the Low Countries.⁸⁵

The Spanish ambassador De Spes succeeded in capitalizing on this domestic division by encouraging the northern English Catholic nobility in a plot to free Mary Stuart, marry her to the Duke of Norfolk, and with the aid of Spanish forces supplied by the Duke of Alva, place her on the throne of England. Those who were involved in the plot to a varying degree included the Marquis of Winchester, the Duke of Norfolk, the Earls of Arundel, Northumberland, Pembroke, Westmoreland, and Leonard Dacre. From the very beginning, the plan proved abortive, as Elizabeth, having learned of the intended marriage scheme, arrested Norfolk, Arundel,

Lumley, and Pembroke in conjunction with it.⁸⁶

Having taken Norfolk into custody, Cecil felt that the internal crisis would pass. The Queen's anxiety had not subsided, however, and upon hearing of an "intended stir of the people of the North", from the Earl of Sussex, President of the Council of the North, Elizabeth became alarmed and ordered him to command the Earls of Northumberland and Westmoreland to present themselves at the court.⁸⁷

Both Cecil and Sussex were convinced that this action was a bit rash and that it might indeed precipitate a rebellion. Thus Sussex sought to temper the harshness of the royal command by calling the Earls to himself to assuage their fears. That they did not respond to his call alarmed him: he dispatched the royal order to them, and on November 13th, he proclaimed them and their confederates to be rebels. On the same day, he wrote to the Queen, expressing still his doubt that the Earls would take aggressive action, but promising that if they pursued such a course, he would be ready to give up his life on behalf of the Queen.⁸⁸ Elizabeth at this point, feeling that their intentions were certainly belligerent, on November 20th, sent out "Minutes, to certain Lords appointed Lieutenants in certain Shires", commissioning them to prepare to suppress the rebellion.⁸⁹ She followed this preliminary notice up with instructions to the Earl of Shrewsbury on November 26th, detailing the number of men that each shire was to have at a particular place at a specific time, and

appointing other shires to have ready a certain number of men to serve upon an hour's warning.⁹⁰ Sussex's report of the forces which he had been able to enlist had convinced the Government that local levies could not handle the rising in the North, and thus Lord Hunsdon had been sent with a roving Commission to aid Sussex, while an army from Linconshire was organized under Clinton, and another from Warwickshire under Warwick. Sir Ralph Sadler was also sent to render assistance to Sussex who was given command of the forces in Berwick.⁹¹ Elizabeth, anticipating no small struggle, was determined to break the rebellion early so as not to allow the Earls time to solicit additional support, especially from foreign quarters. This is precisely what occurred and on the 11th, Sussex took the offensive, but there was little fighting as the rebel's resistance melted away. On the 21st of the same month, it was reported that the two Earls had fled across the Border. The revolt was over in December save one last flickering, fanned by Leonard Dacre in February of 1570. Lord Hunsdon easily smothered this feeble effort and Dacre fled to Scotland to join the two Earls and the few supporters that they had managed to carry with them into hiding.⁹² Pope Pius V issued his belated bull five days after this last encounter, five months too late to benefit the rebellion.⁹³

The bloody reprisals that followed testify to Cecil's relentless determination to search out and punish those who

took part in the uprising. He had carried with him for ten years the fear of the Northern Catholics, and "he seized this opportunity to bring them to their knees, by torture and terror".⁹⁴

Punishment was ruthlessly meted out to the rank and file who were hanged by the hundreds, and martial law was imposed.

There were delays in cases of the influential extending only until procedures regarding the confiscation of their estates were completed.⁹⁵

As the Border Lords and Scots refused to cooperate with Elizabeth in suppressing the rebels, raids were conducted by troops selected from Southern England. The Queen felt the necessity of bringing in special forces because she feared that the Border troops would be overly lenient for fear of future retaliation. They were certainly well chosen for their job, as destruction wreaked from Kelso to Dumfries testified. All stone houses were blown up, and much of the land was razed by fire.⁹⁶

It should be noted that this rebellion was not raised entirely for the sake of religion as ostensibly pretended. The rebel leaders no doubt desired to cloak their personal ambitions with the Crusader's cross which they wore on their breast, but the real target was the entire Tudor pattern of government with its centralizing policies and its new administrators who had replaced the old. Among the rank and file, religion probably served as a motivating factor, but the primary force was no doubt their traditional loyalty to the old ruling families of the North. Sussex's proclamation of November 25th,

attacks the sham and hypocrisy in no uncertain terms:

They pretended, for conscience sake to seek to reform religion, where indeed it was manifestly known many of them never had care of conscience, or even respected any religion, but continued in dissolute life, until at this present they were driven to pretend a popish behavior, to put some false colour upon their manifest treason. 97

The rebellion in the North, so feared and for a time so threatening, was begun without adequate preparation, and conducted so poorly that its inglorious termination might logically have been predicted. For the tragic results of this fiasco, much of the blame must be placed on De Spes, for encouraging the rebellion with his unfounded promises of Spanish assistance. Yet English Catholics were not to learn easily that Philip's aid was not easily given, or given at all without ample indications to assure him of reaping the harvest of success and guarantee him of avoiding the penalties of failure. 98

Northumberland's confession, when finally exacted, revealed that the conspiracy had not been hatched until after Norfolk's imprisonment, that they were hoping to prompt a general uprising of all English Catholics by releasing Mary Stuart, 99 and most important, that they were relying on foreign assistance. 100

This last factor was of extreme importance for it was this revelation along with the revival of the Marian faction in Scotland upon Murray's assassination on January 22, that caused Elizabeth to veer on a much more determined course of action in the year 1570. This new toughening line toward Spain was revealed as Elizabeth made the following demands of Philip

through Cobham: that a special envoy be sent to treat with the seizures, and that the English rebels and refugees be expelled from Spain. Elizabeth was aware of the increasing pressure on Alva following the Genoese loan seizures and the privateering successes in the Channel, especially since the expenses incurred in the Morisco Revolt, the Lepanto Campaign, along with the Counter-seizures by the English, prevented Philip from relieving his financial burden. She thus felt that she was in a position to force a favorable settlement, or would make no settlement at all.¹⁰²

While assuming such an arrogant position in regard to Spain, Elizabeth recognized the merit of strengthening her alliance with France. It was for this purpose that she dispatched Walsingham^{am} to France. The successes of his embassy have previously been enumerated. The prime object of his first year in this post was to strengthen the Anglo-French relationship by promoting the Anjou marriage. Catherine de Médici, although eager to come to terms with Elizabeth doubted her sincerity in these marriage negotiations, and thus hesitated to take the initiative in proposing such a match. Thus in the beginning it was the English rather than the French crown that promoted the Anjou marriage project, based on the consideration that such negotiations might prove to be a handy diplomatic expedient.¹⁰³ The official marriage proposal was not made to Elizabeth until April 14th, when Cavalcanti brought to England the "Eight Articles of Demand of marriage with Henry Duke of Anjou".¹⁰⁴ Most of the Privy Counsellors, including Burghley and Laceyster lent their

support to the proposal, but there was much discussion throughout the country at large that a French husband might be equally as objectionable as Mary Tudor's Spanish Philip.

This difference of opinion is illustrated by a document entitled "A Discourse of the Queenes mariage with the Duke of Anjoye, drawn oute by the Lorde Keeper." Sir Nicholas Bacon, the occupant of that office, elaborated on three personal reasons and four reasons of State why "it is necessarye for here to mary withoute longer delay of tyme." He included a discussion of the "discommodities", but these were not nearly so great. Sir Walter Mildmay, an opponent of the marriage, rejected the Lord Keeper's conclusion and on the document itself revealed his disapproval by his marginal notes and his concluding note which states: "To the matter of Religion, which is the greatest thing, he hath said nothing, and to the rest the aunsweres are not so weightie as the objections if they be well considered."¹⁰⁵ Talk of this permanent Anglo-French alliance was enough to convince many of the English Catholics that Spain might now be ready to render assistance in their behalf.¹⁰⁶

Such was the atmosphere that prompted the formation of another Catholic plot, this time by a Florentine banker resident in London by the name of Ridolfi. The key information which led to the unravelling of this sinister conspiracy was produced when Charles Bailey, a Scottish agent of the Bishop of Ross, having been put to the rack, admitted knowledge to a proposed plot.

inviting aid from the King of Spain, the Duke of Alva, and the Pope.¹⁰⁷ Further questioning implicated the Bishop of Ross who admitted to having received letters regarding Mary's role in the plans. Interrogation of Higford and Barker, two of Norfolk's secretaries, led to the discovery of the key to the cipher which enabled Burghley to transcribe a letter written by Mary to Ross which sealed the fate of Norfolk. In his own testimony, Norfolk, having been already compromised, gave evidence against Hugh Owen, Arundel's servant, and Sir Henry Percy.¹⁰⁸ The most damning evidence was obtained from the Bishop of Ross, whose fear for his own life, led him to reveal to a committee of the Privy Council all the details, spelling out the roles of the Queen of Scots, the Spanish ambassador, Norfolk, Owen, Stanley, and Percy.¹⁰⁹

The revelations of the Ridolfi plot quite certainly accentuated the Spanish danger and tended to increase Elizabeth's concern about Philip's possible interference elsewhere. Particularly alarming was the invitation extended by the Irish to Philip to be their sovereign. The circumstances which prompted this action occurred during the administration of Sir Henry Sidney as Lord Deputy of Ireland. Sidney was confronted with a situation in which strong Irish Chieftans rebelled against England's attempts to consolidate its control, particularly in the Northern Ulster area where the chieftan O'Neil exerted great influence.¹¹⁰ When an English expedition of Sir Peter Carew, Sir Richard Grenville, and Sir Humphrey Gilbert tried to revive old claims in Munster and Connought, the result was a period of three years from 1569

to 1571 of monotonous slaughter and bloodshed. These conditions prompted the Irish to seek Spanish assistance. Although Philip was abstaining from open interference on the hope of warding off English involvement in the Low Countries, an English traitor by the name of Stukeley, in the service of Spain, caused Elizabeth considerable alarm as he attempted to muster up an army of invasion.¹¹¹

The resulting tension in Anglo-Spanish relations prompted Elizabeth to expedite the negotiations for the French alliance. The marriage negotiations that had begun in 1571, had stalled mainly on the question of religious allowances. Gradually, Leicester began to push the religious issue to undermine the negotiations and to convince Walsingham that the match might be harmful to the Protestant cause.¹¹² The Queen held on to her stubborn position regarding the religious concession for some time, thus giving Catherine cause to doubt her intentions once again, and thus contributing also to a growing negative attitude on the part of the French, toward the marriage.¹¹³ Actually, Anjou, having come further under the influence of the Guises, probably would have rejected the match even if Elizabeth had conceded on the point of discussion.¹¹⁴ At this stage, both Walsingham and Leicester began to hope in terms of an Anglo-French League without the marriage. Burghley staunchly insisted that the marriage was an indispensable preliminary to secure the alliance.¹¹⁵

It was for the purpose of reviving the marriage negotiations,

and, if that failed, of formulating a defensive alliance that Sir Thomas Smith was dispatched to join Walsingham and Killigrew in December of 1572. He soon discovered, to Burghley's consternation, that there was little hope of reviving the Anjou match, but that Catherine was willing to offer the Duke of Alençon as a substitute.¹¹⁶

Although Burghley favored the match, Elizabeth emphasized the problem of religion coupled this time with the problem of age.¹¹⁷

In addition to these major considerations, it seems that Elizabeth was also disturbed by the report which she received from Walsingham making mention of his pock-marks.¹¹⁸ Thus realizing that the prospects for reaching an accord on the new marriage proposal were slight, the English diplomats concentrated their efforts on negotiating a favorable treaty of alliance.

In November 1571, Walsingham wrote to Burghley that the time was especially favorable for concluding a French alliance since Charles IX, although ostensibly joyous over Don John's victory over the Turks at Lepanto, was inwardly disturbed by the increase in Philip's reputation, and therefore more amiable to the English.¹¹⁹ Their success depended on the resolution of two main problems, the question of Mary Stuart and Scotland, and the religious question. On both of these issues, England succeeded in getting a compromise which favored their position. Although Elizabeth had insisted upon having a religious clause, aimed at Spain, written into the treaty, it was agreed to accept a letter from the French king in lieu of a definite statement written into the treaty itself.

Regarding the first issue, England agreed to a joint Anglo-French commission empowered to reconcile the warring factions in Scotland upon the French recognition of James as the de facto King. Absolutely no mention of Mary Stuart was made in the treaty according to the English wishes.¹²⁰ The final draft of the treaty was signed by Walsingham and De Foix at Blois on April 19, 1572.¹²¹ The merit of this "defensive league" was not really in the positive military commitment which either one was obligated to afford the other in case of attack, for this was indeed meager, but rather in the promise not to aid the unstated enemy, which was clearly Spain.¹²²

Concurrent with the negotiations for this treaty, talks were held with Coligny for the purpose of formulating an alliance of France, England, and the German Protestants to aid Orange's brother, Louis of Nassau, who was planning a large summer offensive in 1572. The plan called for the partition of the Netherlands, with France receiving Flanders and Artois, England receiving Holland and Zeeland, and the rest under William going to the Empire. Realizing the danger presented by the possibility of French control of Flanders, which would give France control of the entire coastline east and west of the Straits of Dover, Burghley was quick to reject such a proposal. England found French domination of the Netherlands an even more frightening prospect than Spanish control.¹²³

While rejecting positive aid in the form of an alliance as described above, Elizabeth in what was at the time considered a

pro-Spanish move, provided Orange with the opportunity to control much of Holland, Zeeland, and the important waterways to Antwerp. The event which precipitated this revolt in Holland and Zeeland was Elizabeth's expulsion of La Marck and Brederode and the lesser privateers under their command on March 1, 1572.¹²⁴ The Narrow Seas had become infested by pirates and privateers, some calling themselves captains in the service of Orange, some from France, joined also by some Englishmen. From their headquarters, in the southern English ports, they swept the Channel, plundering all nation's ships, but releasing their hostilities particularly on the Spanish whose crews they threw into the sea.¹²⁵ Following their expulsion, they combed the coasts for several weeks before occupying the Brill, a small town which commanded entry into the Rhine. Second in command under La Marck was Van Treslong who suggested that they hold it for Orange. Following its capture, Flushing actually invited the Beggars into its midst, Enkhuizen broke into rebellion, and using these as bases, La Marck's crew succeeded in bringing most of the towns of Holland and Zeeland into Orange's camp. As Alva was forced to remove still more of his troops south to combat the forces being mounted by Louis of Nassau, much of the country north of the Rivers fell into the hands of the rebels.¹²⁶

The prime English consideration at this point was that of preventing French intervention in the struggle. Once Alva had succeeded in breaking the southern offensive at Mons, he turned north and began his campaign to regain most of the territory

taken by the Beggars. Only Holland and Zeeland continued to offer any noteworthy resistance. In a key document attributed to Burghley, entitled a "Memorial for Matters of Flanders", he set forth the ambivalent role that England was to assume in its dealings with the Netherlands:

If the Duke of Alva seemed able to hold his own against France, England should 'let both sides alone for a time.' If not, and if 'the French proceed to seek to possess the maritime coasts and frontiers' then Alva should be informed secretly of the Queen's Majesty's disposition to assist the King his master by all honourable means she might in the defense of his inheritance, so as it may appear to her that he will discharge his subjects of their intolerable oppression, restore them to him, deliver them from the fear of the Inquisition, and continue with her Majesty the ancient league for amity and traffic in as ample sort as any others, Dukes of Burgundy heretofore have done. ¹²⁷

This statement reveals Elizabeth's exact sentiment regarding the desired outcome of the struggle. This official position was not unchallenged however, as it became increasingly clear that Leicester and Walsingham subordinated national to religious considerations, and continued to advocate armed intervention on behalf of the rebels. ¹²⁸ The doctrine was first applied by Sir Humphrey Gilbert who in June 1572, directed a band of English volunteers according to his secret instructions to drive the French out of Flushing, and counter their influence in Zeeland. ¹²⁹

An internal crisis in France plunged that country into a series of religious wars that rendered it inoperative in the Netherlands' struggle and temporarily relieved England of this worry. The event which initiated this civil strife was the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day which occurred on August 24,

1572. It was largely due to the connivance of Catherine de Medici who, after failing in an attempt to assassinate Coligny, succeeded in convincing her gullible son Charles IX that the Huguenots were plotting to overthrow him and stamp out Catholicism. By consenting to the execution of the major Huguenot leaders, who happened to be in Paris for the celebration of the marriage between the Bourbon candidate, Henry of Navarre and the King's sister, Margaret, Charles IX precipitated a nation-wide massacre of Protestants.¹³⁰

News of the brutal massacre shocked England into a state of frenzy. The Queen sent an ambassador north to inform the Scottish nobility, measures were taken to tighten the security on Mary Stuart, the musters were called out, and the fleet was put in a state of readiness. When the French Ambassador was finally given audience with the Queen, he found the Court dressed in black for mourning.¹³¹ Elizabeth heard the official story but doubted its veracity. Walsingham confirmed her doubts as "he advised Elizabeth strongly not to be deceived by their 'fair speaking' but to regard them as enemies."¹³² He advised her also that he desired to be recalled as his life was threatened by the ultra-Catholics with the Guise family back in power. Upon broaching this matter to Charles IX, he was urged to stay, with the King insisting that such a break in diplomatic relations would be construed unfavorably, and possibly as a declaration of war.¹³² It appeared that this single baleful day had completely changed the political complexion.

The English looked upon the French as monsters of falsity; their recently concluded treaty now seemed but a fraud, and the marriage negotiations a lie. Momentarily, England stood alone against a united and intolerant Catholicism.¹³⁴ Actually neither side at

this time was in a position to break their alliance, and Charles assured Elizabeth that he would restore the Edicts of Toleration, and do what he could to punish the perpetrators of the murders.¹³⁵

Catherine set to work immediately to revive the negotiations for the marriage, even suggesting that she accompany Alençon to England.¹³⁶

Elizabeth stalled on this account, but at least gave evidence that she would give further consideration to the question of the marriage.

Relations with France from this point on were certainly to remain strained, but Elizabeth, with Burghley's backing, was determined to preserve the patched alliance itself.¹³⁷

CHAPTER III: YEARS OF CALM (1573-1580)

For better than a decade following the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day, Elizabeth's reign was blessed with the luxury of relative peace, characterized by the absence of major foreign conflict, and freedom from domestic rebellion. The first five of those particular years, from 1573 to 1578, brought a calmness and security yet unknown in Elizabethan England.¹³⁸ This spirit of tranquility did not prevail in the Privy Council, however, as Walsingham who became Joint Principal Secretary with Smith in December of 1573, vigorously agitated, with Leicester's support for active intervention on behalf of the Protestant cause. Walsingham's accurate evaluation that the quietness of England "proceeded from her neighbors' unquietness" caused him to feel that the state of peace would be shortlived. He forecast that the transient distractions of her enemies would disappear, "and the two great monarchies of Europe' would turn 'not only to disquiet but also to displace Her Majesty.'"¹³⁹ Events which occasionally served to alarm the Queen caused some variations in the overall policy so that "its movements look as erratic as those of a sailing boat in light and variable airs, constantly trimming its sails to catch each puff of shifting breeze even while aiming always at the same mark." The main objectives were two in number, first to keep the French out of the Netherlands and Scotland, and to restore to the Netherlands the semi-independent

position and the liberties which they had enjoyed under Charles V.¹⁴⁰

The change of monarchs in France in May of 1574, with the death of Charles IX and the accession of Henry III raised some doubt regarding Anglo-French relations in that Anjou was a staunch Catholic. Yet with his own country torn by civil strife, he was in no position to risk alienating Elizabeth, and on February 20, 1575, he eagerly renewed the Treaty of Blois which again became effective on April 6th, with the Queen's ratification.¹⁴¹ The following year, the Queen's warning against Alençon's proposed Netherlands' venture, along with a renewal of the internal conflict, served to retard any such activity until July of 1578.

On the question of seizures and counter-seizures with Spain that resulted from the 1568 seizure of the Genoese loan, it appears that the Spanish merchants had suffered heavy losses. In addition, they had sustained heavy losses due to piracy and the loss of English trade which had been diverted to Emden and Hamburg.¹⁴² Burghley responded favorably to Alva and together in 1573, they concluded an agreement on the following points: that trade would be restored between England and Spain and the Low Countries, that privateering and piracy in the Channel would be suppressed, and that English rebels would be expelled from the Low Countries, and the Dutch rebels from England. This limited agreement in 1573, provided for the renewal of trade. All of these points were not given formal recognition until August of 1574, and final claims were also recognized at that time in what became known as the Convention of Bristol.¹⁴⁴ Animosities between the two

countries had been still further reduced in November 1573, when Philip replaced the despised Alva with his much less hated successor, Don Louis de Requesens.¹⁴⁵

In pursuing the ultimate terms of peace which she desired for the Netherlands, Elizabeth chose a pacific course as she offered her services to mediate between Spain and the Netherlands. At this juncture, it was William, rather than Philip who held out, preventing a settlement. He proved contrary, not only in insisting that religious liberty be added to the ancient liberties, but in blocking the Scheldte and thus preventing England from reopening trade with Antwerp. The Privy Council Register reveals that positive steps were taken to retaliate against William's policies. Laws were passed preventing Englishmen from joining in with the Beggars,¹⁴⁶ a Dutch squadron was seized at Torbay,¹⁴⁷ an embargo was placed on Dutch shipping,¹⁴⁸ trading vessels were stopped in the Channel and their crews distributed over the Cinque Ports,¹⁴⁹ and the Lord Mayor of London was directed to seize Dutch merchants who traded there.¹⁵⁰ There were counter reprisals in the Low Countries, and Sir William Winter, Robert Seale, and William Davidson were sent to seek rapprochement on these matters.¹⁵¹ The Dutch proved to be so thick in the Channel that single merchant ships awaited convoy in the Thames, fearful to venture out alone. The Admiralty ordered that additional security be provided for those ships transporting contraband between Spain and England.¹⁵² Finally, realizing the mutual damage involved,

Elizabeth and William came to terms,¹⁵³ the impressed Dutchmen and ships were released, and Elizabeth once again permitted the sale of arms to Holland on a somewhat limited scale.¹⁵⁴

The unfortunate death of Requesens in March of 1576, left the Spanish army leaderless.¹⁵⁵ Their pay twenty-two months in arrears, they mutinied and began pillaging the country, wreaking violence in their path. On November 4th and 5th, they sacked the important city of Antwerp, causing the Merchant Adventurers there heavy losses. Because of their unbridled violence, and the military anarchy that they fostered, these troops were given the name "Spanish Fury".¹⁵⁶ Their mutiny meant the practical collapse of Spanish authority over the Netherlands, and freed Holland in actuality, although it was to be another seventy years before Spain recognized its independence.¹⁵⁷ The mutineers retained a form of organization under an "electo", and determined to purge the country of heretics and undertook even their massacres under the guise of piety.¹⁵⁸ With the central government unable to restore order, the States began levying troops to oppose the murderous bands, and the States of Brabant addressed a summons to the other provinces excepting Holland and Zeeland to send representatives to the States General. Only Flanders and Hainaut responded, but together these three selected Aserschot as their Chief. The Council of State, under De Roda challenged this opposition movement. The States General, meeting illegally looked to Orange for support and incorporated in their program the conclusion

of peace with Holland and Zeeland. This body had taken the first step on the road to rebellion against Philip, and this revolution of 1576, was motivated by the people themselves.¹⁵⁹ The conclusion of the Pacification of Ghent with the States was an indication that Orange and his rebels had won an astounding victory.

This was the state of affairs when Don John, Requesens' replacement, finally arrived in 1577. The States General had succeeded in soliciting great support and the nobility was determined to hold on to their rightful demands upon the agent of absolutism. Realizing the weakness of his situation, he capitulated and by signing the Eternal or Perpetual Edict in February, ordered the Spanish troops out of the country.¹⁶⁰ This Edict appeared to symbolize the epitome of Elizabeth's success, in that the Netherlands had been temporarily reunited, with their ancient liberties, and recognizing the Spanish king as their sovereign. There was one flaw, however, and this was in the Edict's failure to settle the religious question, thus alienating the Hollanders and Zeelanders.¹⁶¹

As the conflict in the Netherland was renewed, Elizabeth concluded that the religious issue was the dominant cause. She was thus determined to remain aloof in terms of a military commitment. Alençon was to cause her considerable anxiety, however, as the French, now free from the grips of civil conflict, were threatening to assume a more positive role. The States General had secured the Austrian Archduke Mathias as Don John's replacement

and Philip had returned the Spanish army under the very able Alexander Farness, the Prince of Parma.¹⁶² He proceeded to display his talent on January 31, 1578, at Gembloux where he badly defeated the army of the States General.¹⁶³ Again Elizabeth attempted mediation, sending Walsingham and Lord Cobham to attempt to secure an agreement between Don John and the States. The failure of this embassy to the Low Countries in the summer of 1578, left her with but two choices, offering English assistance, or backing Anjou's enterprises.¹⁶⁴

Her instinctive desire to avoid overt action proved so strong that it prompted her to revive the marriage negotiations with Alençon. For the next four years, Elizabeth utilized the Alençon courtship most effectively. There existed a mutual need: Elizabeth needed a knight to fight her battle in the Low Countries; and Alençon badly needed financial backing.¹⁶⁵ During the extended courtship, two psychological factors were no doubt to play an incalculable role, the first being Leicester's marriage to Lettice Knollys, and the second being the Queen's age, forty-five in September of 1578.¹⁶⁶ To expedite matters, Alençon sent a court favorite Jean de Simier in January with power to conduct negotiations and to conclude the marriage.¹⁶⁷

The Queen invited discussion from her Privy Counsellors on the proposed marriage. An interesting document bearing on the subject is a copy of a letter which the Earl of Sussex had written to the Queen in August of 1578. The fact that

the copy is in Sir Walter Mildmay's handwriting might be explained by the fact that he took great interest in the marriage question, and engaged in the discussions with Backerville and Simier. In this presentation, he enumerates both the "commodityes which he saith will follow" and the "discommodityes that are objected". It is difficult to conclude which he felt were the weightier.¹⁶⁸ Mildmay also endorsed another key document which records the deliberations of a commission of privy counsellors who were considering the question. According to the document, Burghley, Sussex, Leicester, Hunsdon, Hatton, Walsingham, and Wilson were included. The discussion is divided into three main categories: "Perilles growing by the mariage, the commodityes growing by the mariage, and perriles insuing by leaving this Alliance." The arguments are decidedly weighted against the proposed union.¹⁶⁹

Burghley's extensive notes on the committee meetings held on October 2, 1579, for the purpose of discussing the proposal and on October 6, 1579, for discussing the specific treaty are most valuable in revealing the feeling of the individual counsellors. Lord Burghley, who was evidently presiding, set forth the following "Order how to proceed to the Discussion of the Questions moved concerning the Queenes Mariage with Monsieur d'Anjoy": To consider first the danger to the Queen and Government if she doesn't marry; to consider how to remove the danger without marriage; to consider

the danger or harm if she does marry; to consider what profits or benefits are to be derived if she does marry; and to compare the above. ¹⁷⁰ He detailed each of the following members' point of view, revealing that Mildmay, Sadler, Mr. Vice Chamberlajn, and Sir Henry Sidney opposed the marriage, whereas only Mr. Secretary Wilson, and Lord Hunsdon gave their approval. ¹⁷¹ The following conclusion which Burghley presented to the Queen is typical of his restraint:

If hir Majesty wold here of the Perrills by mariadg wit then Remedyes, and also of the Perrills by mariadg with ther Remedyes, her Majesty might thereof by her Wisdom, with the assistance of God's Spirit, make election of the on or the other; and than every good Counsellor would surpress ther several Opinions, being contrary, and follow and by all ther Powers and Wills maynteane hir Majesty's Election. ¹⁷²

The emotional involvement displayed in this courtship distinguished it from the others. It can probably be best explained in terms of the two psychological factors previously mentioned. Elizabeth displayed her sensitivity on the subject by relieving John Stubbs of his right hand for his well publicized diatribe entitled "The Discovery of a Gaping Gulf whereunto England is like to be swallowed by another French Marriage if the Lord forbid not the bands by letting her Majesty see the sin and punishment thereof." Stubbs, writing with bluntness, addressed himself to the public ear, expressing his opinions that the Queen was too old and the Duke, rotten with debauchery—"the old serpent himself in the form of a man come a second time to seduce the English Eve and to

ruin the English Paradise."¹⁷³ Sir Philip Sidney's sentiments, expressed in a letter to the Queen, were more in accordance with the main objections being raised throughout most of the country, namely opposing the proposed bridegroom on grounds of his nationality and his religion.¹⁷⁴ Elizabeth, although disturbed by the unfavorable public utterances, nevertheless, appointed a committee of the Council to arrange the terms of the marriage with Simier. On October 24th, the negotiations were completed, and he returned to France. There was a proposal however, which stipulated that the treaty was inoperative for two months during which time Elizabeth hoped to obtain her subject's approval.¹⁷⁵

The months following Simier's departure saw a loss of enthusiasm on Elizabeth's part. By January of 1580, Burghley¹⁷⁶ concluded that the Queen had again decided against the marriage. In the spring of 1580, yet another civil conflict enveloped France, this time arising out of court intrigues and involving Henry of Navarre and his brother the Prince of Conde'. In "La Guerre des Amoureux", as the struggle was called, Navarre established his military reputation at the siege of Cahors, and Conde' fled to Germany and later to England. These Civil Wars in France had again served as a deterrent to the marriage negotiations, thus allowing Elizabeth to keep up the "ticklish game of keeping her French suitor 'in correspondence'".¹⁷⁷ There was much agitation in the Privy Council at this point as the situation in the Low Countries had prompted Orange

and the States to offer Alençon sovereignty in return for French support. This offer was confirmed in the Treaty of Plessis le Tours, a copy of which Alençon sent to Elizabeth who openly expressed no disapproval. It appears that her main concern was again Spain, with the possibility of the Guises returning to power in France and uniting with Philip against her. French involvement in the Netherlands was preferred to this possibility, especially if she could once again direct the actions of Alençon by rejuvenating the marriage discussions. ¹⁷⁸

Upon the King's announcement that he once again intended to send commissioners to England, Elizabeth insisted that they be of the highest rank, probably hoping that such a show would serve to convince Spain of the strength of the Anglo-French alliance. Such was provided as the French retinue included the Prince Dauphin, the Secretary of State, Lansac and Fenelon to actually conduct negotiations, and at least 500 lesser gentlemen. Preparations had been made to equal the splendor of the occasion as a special banquet hall costing over £1744 had been constructed, and they were elaborately dined at Cecil House in Covent Garden and sumptuously entertained by bear-baiting on May Day and by the "Triumph" which was staged in the tilt-yard at Whitehall. Once again the commissioners succeeded in formulating a treaty but again there was a loophole, as the treaty contained a clause which stated that its application depended on a definite arrangement between the Queen and the Duke to marry. ¹⁷⁹

Alençon arrived in England in October of 1581, where he was to remain through December, either for the purpose of marrying the Queen, or if that failed to secure financial backing from her. As the months wore on, Elizabeth had a definite inclination to get rid of him, even if it cost her money. Finally she induced him to leave with a grant of £10,000 and a promise of £50,000 to be paid later. She publicly feigned sadness at his departure but it is reported by the ladies of her chamber that she danced for joy.¹⁸⁰ The courtship had certainly served its purpose by giving Elizabeth another seven years to bolster her home defenses.¹⁸¹

During the years of peace, Elizabeth had done much to enhance England's defensive capacity. General musters were held frequently,¹⁸² and the Lord Lieutenants, who were given the responsibility of training the local bands, were given the duty of seeing that a certain number of men in each county were to be instructed in the exercise of firearms.¹⁸³ Equally important to the home defenses, was the development of related home industries. There was an organized search for natural resources such as saltpetre, and the manufacture of gunpowder, and munitions was greatly encouraged. The increase in copper and calmine mining allowed the production of bronze cannon at home.¹⁸⁴

To further economic independence, additional trading companies were chartered. The Eastland Company, incorporated in 1579, established its headquarters in Elbing, Poland, and did

much to enhance the Baltic and eastward trade. The Moscow Company which had been organized in the 1550's, began in the 1570's to expand into the Mediterranean and Levant. In 1581, the Turkey Company was incorporated, and the Venice Company received its charter in 1583.

The most significant reforms in the realm of defense were those which transformed the English navy from a coastal defense force to an "ocean-going fighting navy". These were engineered by Hawkins who enjoyed Burghley's backing. From 1578 to 1587, the number of fighting ships increased only by three, from twenty-two to twenty-five. But the older ships were rebuilt and there was a significant change in their design. They became longer and narrower in proportion to their length, the towering forecastles were removed, and the tonnage was reduced, thus making them faster, easier to handle, and more seaworthy. They were manned with guns enabling them to sink ships at longer range, and their fighting power was thus greatly enhanced.

¹⁸⁶ In addition to these improvements made on the fighting ships, eighteen ocean-going pinnacles were added to the navy, and the reconstitution of the coastal beacons was completed.

¹⁸⁷ The expensive task of improving the Great Yarmouth Harbor was undertaken, ¹⁸⁸ and the strengthening of the defenses of the Thames was begun. ¹⁸⁹

Furthermore, Hawkins succeeded in eliminating corruption and inefficiency and thus was able to reduce expenditures on the fleet to £6,000 yearly as compared to £10,000 yearly in Henry VIII's reign. He also

raised the wages of the Queen's seamen from six shillings to ten shillings per month.¹⁹⁰ That these various reforms proved most effective was revealed by the significant naval victory over the "Invincible Armada" in 1588.

CHAPTER IV: TOWARDS WAR (1580-1585)

It had indeed been fortunate that England had enjoyed the benefits of peace and had utilized the opportunity to strengthen itself internally. For a series of "catastrophic changes, touched off by a series of princely deaths" indicated that England was soon on the road to war. The first of these, the death of the young King Sebastian of Portugal, occurred in August of 1578, at Alcazar. He was succeeded by his great-uncle, Cardinal Henry, who lasted only until January 31, 1580. It was upon his death that there ensued a conflict in which Philip II of Spain and Don Antonio, illegitimate nephew of the deceased Cardinal, were the main contestants. 191

Elizabeth was not alone in realizing the increased danger that might be afforded her upon Philip's accession to the Portugese throne. Catherine was also drawn to Elizabeth by the realization of this mutual threat. Philip determined that the best strategy to prevent their interference would be to encourage other problems to occupy their attention. Thus he proposed through Mendoza some possible joint Franco-Spanish scheme on Mary Stuart's behalf. 192 The situation in Scotland changed dramatically in the course of the year 1579, however, due to the intrigues of Esmé Stuart, Seigneur D'Aubingy, the young cousin of James who represented the Guise faction.

D'Aubigny, soon created Earl of Lennox, rose rapidly and within the year, due to the hesitation of Elizabeth to support Morton with force, had succeeded in overthrowing and imprisoning the regent.¹⁹³ This transformation presented quite a threat to England and the Queen's anxiety is reflected in the Privy Council's Register. Lord Huntingdon, president of the Northern Council, was ordered to confer with the English border wardens to secure uniformity of action along the border,¹⁹⁴ a supply of military stores was sent to him,¹⁹⁵ Lord Hunsdon, upon returning to his post at Berwick was dispatched a sum of £5,000,¹⁹⁶ and 2,000 infantry and 500 cavalry were dispatched to the border.¹⁹⁷ There were complaints returned that additional supplies were needed at Newcastle,¹⁹⁸ and that of the horses sent to the border, only thirty were serviceable.¹⁹⁹ Even Philip began to fear the Guisian influence and so his ambassador Mendoza attempted to warn Elizabeth of the French scheme in Scotland.²⁰⁰

Another Spanish scheme intended to divert Elizabeth from interfering with his Portuguese aspirations met with disaster. Philip had somehow been considering lending his support to James Fitzmaurice, and the Pope's Nuncio in their plans to land a combination Spanish and Italian expedition in Ireland. Philip rejected the role of open intervention but consented to aid the Pope in defraying the expenses of the expedition of 8,000 men, launched from a Spanish fort under a Papal flag. The purpose of the expedition was to aid Desmonds in holding

the Catholic West against the English. Entries in the register of the Privy Council reveal the great alarm that this news aroused.²⁰¹ Captain Thornton was dispatched in the "Handmaid", the only man-of-war available, to defend the coast.²⁰² Upon receiving news of Fitzmaurice's landing at Smerwick, Dingle Bay, the Privy Council ordered the following emergency measures taken: a service of posts from London to Hilbre was organized;²⁰³ the Mayor of Bristol was given instructions to send gunpowder and lead to Waterford;²⁰⁴ stores of provisions were collected at Bristol;²⁰⁵ the Western levies were called to duty;²⁰⁶ Sir John Ferralt was summoned to command a squadron;²⁰⁷ an embargo was enforced on shipping at Clester and Liverpool to provide transportation for the levies;²⁰⁸ French pirates were commissioned to act as pilots along the Irish coast;²⁰⁹ Wales was ordered to supply 1,000 men;²¹⁰ and the Irish Lord Treasurer, Henry Wallop, was extended £10,000 credit.²¹¹ The actual invasion proved to be a fiasco with almost all of the invaders being killed at Smerwick in November of 1580.²¹² The Council sent letters to Sir William Burke and Lord Kildare of the Burkes, thanking them for their part in the death of Fitzmaurice.²¹³

Lord Desmond continued to lead the Geraldines in their rebellion against the English, and an army was raised for the purpose of suppressing it.²¹⁴ Lord Butler, Lord Sussex, Lord Leicester, Sir James Croft, and Dr. Wilson were members of the Committee formed to deal with the Irish.²¹⁵ Immediately, they dispatched Sir William Winters to take charge of the squadron

there.²¹⁶ It took considerable effort to bring order to the land as Lord Desmond and Saunders remained at large encouraging rebellion. Pelham and Ormonde were ravaging Munster in their attempt to subdue it, the Pale was in ferment, and the situation in Ulster remained unsettled.²¹⁷ Continuous fighting in the area between Kildare and William Carrickfergus on behalf of the English against the rebels, Tirlough and Lenough, brought famine to the area.²¹⁸ In June, Lord Grey de Welton became Lord Deputy but he did not arrive in Ireland until August.²¹⁹ Rebellions followed in the Pale in August.²²⁰ Two thousand reinforcements were sent to the area at the request of the new Lord Deputy,²²¹ but it was reported that many of these were inferior and unqualified recruits who deserted from the fleet before reaching Ireland.²²² A Genoese loan was secured for the purpose of supporting additional troops which were called up in March.²²³ The Irish rebellion for which Philip had been a catalyst had certainly served its purpose in diverting Elizabeth.²²⁴

Thus in 1581, when the Cortez recognized Philip's victory and bestowed upon him the crown of Portugal, no doubt that he felt he had achieved success. This greatly strengthened his position in that he acquired control of the Portuguese spice trade, and the Royal Navy from which he fashioned his Spanish Indian Guard, almost equalling the Royal fleet of Spain. It will be remembered that it was largely these circumstances which had caused Elizabeth to renew the Anjou courtship, and prompted him to come to England.²²⁵

The courtship probably served to irritate Philip, but he expressed even greater concern over the English actions regarding Don Antonio when he discovered that the "rebel pretender" to the Portuguese throne was being sheltered and even honored at court.²²⁶

Mendoza, continually harassed the Queen about her provocative and permissive attitude which allowed Don Antonio, with the aid of the London merchants, to put together a squadron of English ships with arms from the Tower to sail against his sovereign.²²⁷

The strain between the two countries increased still further when news of Drake's excessive depredations against the Spanish reached Mendoza. He attacked the Queen vehemently when he learned of her effusive reception of Drake.²²⁸

Mendoza's indignation was such that he became actively involved in promoting plots against the Queen through various agents who expressed a similar desire.²²⁹ One such plot materialized in 1583, and Philip was invited once again to consider the invasion of England. This invitation came in the form of a plot devised by the Guises and Mendoza who contemplated invading England via Scotland. Others involved included the Jesuits, Mary, and the Earls of Arundel and Northumberland. The plot was named after Francis Throckmorton, whose apprehension in November and subsequent confessions revealed that Philip in September had declined to support the Guise plan which had fallen through.²³⁰ Mendoza was thoroughly compromised by Throckmorton's confession, and his expulsion in January of 1584, a step approaching a formal declaration of war, marked the end of

any pretensions of amity. This clearly terminated the peaceful efforts.²³¹ There were those among Philip's advisors including Santa Cruz and Granvelle who in 1583, were advocating that he invade England immediately. He accepted Parma's advice, however, and determined to complete the conquest of the Netherlands, which would serve as his base of operations against England.²³²

The second event was the collapse of the United Netherlands in January of 1579, which had resulted in the formation of two rival unions. The Catholic Union of Arras, composed of the Walloon province of Artois and Hainaut, concluded peace with Spain five months later, thus leaving the Northern provinces, united in the Union of Utrecht, to continue their struggle against Spain alone.²³³ They also suffered the loss of additional strength when Parma succeeded in convincing Rennenberg, the Catholic stadholder of the North-east provinces to lend his forces to the royal cause.²³⁴ The most severe loss, however, occurred on July 10th,^{1584,} with the assassination of the Prince of Orange at Delft. The enemies of the revolt rejoiced for the revolt itself seemed to be "personified in the Prince, his ambition, its mainspring, his guidance indispensable", but in their belief that the revolt would collapse, they utterly miscalculated the situation.²³⁵

The third significant change occurred on May 31, 1584, in the death of Anjou. The Catholic League, under the Guise family, expressed its determination to prevent Henry IV of Navarre from assuming the French throne as it eagerly joined hands with Philip in the Treaty of Joinville. By this agreement, Philip

promised them 50,000 crowns monthly to crush the Huguenots and replace their King with his uncle, the Cardinal of Navarre.²³⁶

This relieved the anxiety regarding a possible Anglo-French coalition, that had for so long served to deter Philip from dealing with England.

Elizabeth was understandably alarmed upon hearing of the Treaty of Joinville, especially when Leicester and Walsingham interpreted it to suggest the possibility of Spanish control, not only of the Netherlands, but over France and all of Western Europe from Bms on the Elbe to Gibraltar. She thus committed herself, in the Treaty of Nonsuch, to a course of limited intervention in the Netherlands, rejecting Dutch sovereignty, but promising to send a force of 5,000 foot-soldiers and 1,000 horsemen to be led by an Englishman of the highest rank, namely Leicester. His departure in late 1585 finally brought the two antagonists face to face in the field.²³⁷ Philip's seizure of her cornships in May of 1585, provided her with a legitimate excuse for her own maritime activities, and Drake, who was commissioned with a strong squadron to release the ships and crews, was also given to understand that he was free to engage in any other piratical activity if the opportunity presented itself. Similar raiding maneuvers by Sir Walter Raleigh's brother along the Newfoundland banks, when considered with other warlike gestures, convinced Philip that he would now have to first deal with England before attempting the reduction of the Netherlands.²³⁸

It is ironic that Philip and Elizabeth, both with a strong aversion to war, found themselves in this position. Having witnessed the slow process, and the ultimate failure of diplomacy, the Spanish King, by the autumn of 1585 was drawn to the opinion that war was inevitable.²³⁹ Philip now had to face a popular sovereign and a nation which was imbued with a new sense of power, a realization of potential power, and a determination to decide its own fate without foreign intervention.²⁴⁰ Yet Elizabeth was aroused by the thought of Philip's vengeance. She had successfully defied Philip for years and had proved the master in the game of diplomacy. Her immunity had depended upon Philip's involvement in the Netherlands and his distrust of France. Neither was in a position to offer her substantial assistance now that Philip had determined to use direct force to subdue England once and for all. In January of 1586, the already impatient Santa Cruz was given the specific orders to make preparations for the execution of the "Enterprise of England" by the Armada.²⁴¹

Now, the new ideas of basing England's policy and defense on its insularity, reinforced by sea power were to be tested, and with only the nominal support of the Dutch rebels and the French Huguenots, Elizabeth had to face the challenge of Philip II, master of much of Europe. During the period from 1567 to 1585, the policies which Elizabeth and her major advisor, Burghley, instinctively pursued for the most part, proved sound. They had continually played upon the various rivalries and

jealousies of the Continental giants, taking advantage of the strains produced by the internal divisions in the case of the French Religious Wars, and in the Revolt of the Netherlands. They had turned religious dissensions to their own advantage not only in these two countries, but in Scotland, and thus succeeded in breaking the "Auld Alliance", and enticing the Scots into the English orbit.²⁴² Perhaps the foremost factor in the successful Elizabethan policy had been the Queen's determination to avoid involving England in serious foreign conflicts. This had secured for England a span of twelve peaceful years, unmarred by serious domestic or foreign struggles, during which time the nation had been able to strengthen itself economically, militarily, and politically, and thus prepare for the impending conflict. Elizabeth had proven herself a master in the outworn game of diplomacy. Philip was now to test her skill in the equally demanding game of war, and the fate of Europe hung in the balance.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ Conyers Read, Mr. Secretary Cecil and Queen Elizabeth (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), p. 187.
- ² R.B. Wernham, Before the Armada (London: Jonathan Cape, 1966), pp. 235-236.
- ³ J.E. Neale, Queen Elizabeth I (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1957), p. 68.
- ⁴ Wernham, p. 235.
- ⁵ John Roche Dasent (ed.), Acts of the Privy Council Vol. VII (Washington: Microcard Editions, Inc., 1963), p. ix.
- ⁶ Wernham, p. 238.
- ⁷ Neale, Queen Elizabeth I, p. 68.
- ⁸ Acts of the Privy Council, Vol. VI, x.
- ⁹ Neale, Queen Elizabeth I, p. 54.
- ¹⁰ Samuel Haynes (ed.), Burghley State Papers (London: William Bowyer, MDCCXL).
- ¹¹ Read, Cecil, p. 468.
- ¹² Ibid.
- ¹³ Conyers Read, Lord Burghley and Queen Elizabeth (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 20.
- ¹⁴ Martin Hume, Calendar of State Papers Spanish: Elizabeth 1568-1579 (London, Methuen Co., 1892), p. 383 and pp. 379-80.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., p. 422.
- ¹⁶ Read, Burghley, 257.
- ¹⁷ Ibid., p. 31.
- ¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 33-34.
- ¹⁹ Ibid., p. 83.
- ²⁰ Ibid., p. 102.
- ²¹ Ibid., p. 85.

- 22
Burghley State Papers.
- 23
Read, Burghley, p. 171.
- 24
Neale, Queen Elizabeth I, pp. 78-82.
- 25
Read, Burghley, p. 237.
- 26
Ibid., p. 20.
- 27
Ibid., p. 237.
- 28
Ibid., p. 13.
- 29
Robert Lemon, Esq. F.S.A. (ed.) Calendar of State Papers: Domestic Series 1547-1580 (London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, and Roberts, 1856), p. 314.
- 30
Conyers Read, Mr. Secretary Walsingham and the policy of Queen Elizabeth Vol. I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925), 56.
- 31
Calendar of State Papers: Domestic, LIX, No. 3.
- 32
Read, Walsingham, pp. 90-92.
- 33
Ibid., pp. 262-63.
- 34
Calendar of State Papers: Domestic, LXXIV, No. 12.
- 35
Read, Walsingham, p. 262.
- 36
A.G. Crosby, Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth 1569-1571 (London, Queen's Stationery Office, 1863), no. 1661.
- 37
Ibid., no. 1607.
- 38
Ibid., ccx, no. 1343.
- 39
A.J. Butler, Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth 1577-1583 (London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, and Roberts, 1863), no. 442.
- 40
Calendar of State Papers: Foreign, no. 549.
- 41
Read, Walsingham, p. 262.
- 42
Acts of the Privy Council, Vol. VIII, p. 169.
- 43
Read, Walsingham, pp. 287 and 372.

- 44 M.A.S. Hume, Calendar of State Papers Spanish: Elizabeth (London, 1892-1899), p. 404.
- 45 Read, Walsingham, p. 370.
- 46 Read, Burghley, p. 171.
- 47 Rawdon Brown and G. Cavendish Bentinck (eds.) Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts: Venetian 1558-1580 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1890), Vol. VII, 388. (The Venetian State Papers records the date as being February 11, 1567), and Wernham, p. 272.
- 48 Burghley State Papers, p. 454.
- 49 Read, Cecil, pp 376-378, and Venetian State Papers, p. 397.
- 50 Read, Cecil, pp. 377-378, and T. Cooper (ed.) Memoirs of the Life and Administration of William Cecil (London: T. Cooper Co., 1783), pp. 417-425.
- 51 Wernham, p. 273, and Venetian State Papers, 401.
- 52 Wernham, p. 273.
- 53 Ibid., 276, and Burghley State Papers, p. 764.
- 54 Burghley State Papers, pp. 480-488. (This included a copy of the so-called "Casket Letters" which were conclusive evidence of Mary's involvement in the plan to murder Darnley.) See also : Acts of the Privy Council, Vol. VII, p. xxx.
- 55 Wernham, p. 276.
- 56 Ibid., p. 245, and Calendar of State Papers Spanish, p. 625.
- 57 Calendar of State Papers: Venetian, p. 390, and Burghley State Papers, p. 763.
- 58 Calendar of State Papers: Venetian, p. 392, and Calendar of State Papers Foreign, p. 195.
- 59 Read, Walsingham, pp. 37-40, and Wernham, pp. 265-267.
- 60 Wernham, p. 271.
- 61 Ibid., p. 24.
- 62 Acts of the Privy Council, Vol. VII, xxx, and James Anthony Froude, English Seamen in The Sixteenth Century (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), pp. 44-54.

- 63
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- 64
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- 65
Wernham, p. 287.
- 66
Acts of the Privy Council, Vol. VII, xxx.
- 67
Froude, pp. 53-57.
- 68
Acts of the Privy Council, Vol. VII, xxx.
- 69
Wernham, p. 283. (It should be noted that P. Geyl, The Revolt of the Netherlands, 1555-1609 (London: Williams and Norgate Ltd., 1932), emphasizes the religious factor in explaining the recall of Parma.
- 70
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- 71
Ibid., pp. 290-91, and Geyl, pp. 99-100.
- 72
Geyl, p. 85.
- 73
Ibid., pp. 97-99.
- 74
Ibid., pp. 91-92.
- 75
Ibid., pp. 92-98.
- 76
Ibid., p. 99, and Wernham, p. 292.
- 77
Wernham, p. 292.
- 78
Geyl, pp. 104-105, and Acts of the Privy Council, VII, xxx.
- 79
Wernham, p. 294, and Martin Hume, Two Queens and Philip (New York: G. P. Putnam Sons, 1908), pp. 258-259.
- 80
Calendar of State Papers Spanish, p. 651, and Acts of the Privy Council, Vol. VII, xxx.
- 81
Venetian Calendar of State Papers, pp. 423-425, Fugger News Letters, p. 1, and Hume, pp. 259-261.
- 82
Read, Cecil, pp. 426-427, and Wernham, pp. 295-296, and Venetian State Papers, pp. 424-425.

83

Read, Cecil, pp. 432-433, and Wernham, pp. 296-297, and Fugger News Letters, pp. 3-4, and Venetian Calendar of State Papers, pp. 428-429.

84

Venetian Calendar of State Papers, pp. 430-431.

85

Burghley State Papers, p. 588.

86

Ibid., pp. 527-535, and pp. 573-575, and Hume, pp. 285-295.

87

Read, Cecil, p. 455, and Burghley State Papers, pp. 527-535, and 573-575.

88

Read, Cecil, pp. 456-457.

89

Burghley State Papers, p. 560.

90

Ibid., pp. 562-63.

91

Read, Cecil, p. 458.

92

Read, Cecil, pp. 461-62. (The size of the army as opposed to Elizabeth's usual thriftiness can only be interpreted to reveal Elizabeth's conviction that the Duke of Alva really would intervene on behalf of his Catholic friends.)

93

Ibid., pp. 448-49, and Venetian State Papers, p. 455.

94

Read, Cecil, p. 464.

95

Acts of the Privy Council, VII, xxxi.

96

Ibid., xxxii and Venetian State Papers, p. 456.

97

Read, Cecil, p. 465, and Fugger News Letters, p. 6.

98

Hume, p. 295.

99

Burghley State Papers, p. 768 (Anticipating the move to release Mary Stuart, Elizabeth ordered her removal from Tutbury to Coventry by Huntington.)

100

Read, Cecil, pp. 466-67, and Venetian State Papers, p. 439.

101

Burghley State Papers, p. 769.

102

Wernham, pp. 306-08.

103

Ibid., p. 310, Read, Walsingham, pp. 101-02, and Venetian State Papers, pp. 462-68.

104

Burghley State Papers, p. 771.

- 105
J.A. Payne Collier (ed.), The Egerton Papers (London: John Bowyer Nichols and Son, 1840), pp. 50-59.
- 106
Wernham, pp. 310-12.
- 107
Read, Burghley, pp. 38-39, and Burghley State Papers, II, pp. 93, 94, 105-05, and 116 contain Burghley's notes on the interrogations and the final confession.
- 108
Read, Burghley, pp. 41-42.
- 109
Ibid., p. 43, and Burghley State Papers, II, pp. 13-14, 20, 30, 41, 54, 58, 62, and 158.
- 110
Acts of the Privy Council, IX, x.
- 111
Ibid., xi.
- 112
Read, Burghley, pp. 41-42, and Acts of the Privy Council, IX, 43-51.
- 113
Venetian Calendar of State Papers, p. 471, and Read, Walsingham, pp. 132-33.
- 114
Read, Walsingham, p. 141, and Venetian Calendar of State Papers, pp. 479-483.
- 115
Read, Walsingham, p. 145, and Venetian Calendar of State Papers, p. 492.
- 116
Read, Walsingham, pp. 170 and 176, and Memoirs of Lord Burghley, pp. 549-553.
- 117
Burghley State Papers, p. 773.
- 118
Ibid., 774.
- 119
Memoirs of Lord Burghley, p. 573.
- 120
Read, Burghley, p. 71.
- 121
Burghley State Papers, p. 773.
- 122
Read, Walsingham, p. 190.
- 123
Wernham, p. 316.
- 124
Acts of the Privy Council, VIII, 67.
- 125
Ibid., pp. 27, 44, 45, 46, 49, 67, and 69.

126

Geyl, p. 116, and Fugger News Letters, pp. 4-5 gives the following account of how the "Beggars" received their name: "A group of nobles 'under the leadership of Louis, Count of Nassau, and Henry, Count of Braderode, presented a list of grievances to their regent, Margaret of Parma. As the Regent showed signs of alarm, one of her counsellors named Berlaymont exclaimed: 'What Madam, is your Highness afraid of these beggars (ces gueux)?' The name was adopted and the insignia of the Beggars or Malcontents became the wallet and bowl with the motto: 'Ficiele au Roi jusques a la besace.'"

127

Wernham, p. 320, and Read, Burghley, pp. 73-74.

128

Read, Burghley, p. 75.

129

Wernham, p. 321.

130

Ibid., pp. 322-23, and Burghley Memoirs, II, 606.

131

Read, Walsingham, p. 232, and Burghley Memoirs, II, 607.

132

Read, Walsingham, p. 237.

133

Ibid., p. 234.

134

Hume, p. 329.

135

Read, Walsingham, p. 241, and Burghley Memoirs, 607.

136

Read, Walsingham, p. 236.

137

Read, Burghley, p. 91.

138

Wernham, p. 324.

139

Ibid.

140

Ibid., p. 325.

141

Burghely State Papers, p. 776.

142

Acts of the Privy Council, VII, 41, 45, and 67.

143

Burghley State Papers, p. 773.

144

Wernham, pp. 327-28, Read, Burghley, p. 102, and Burghley State Papers.

145

Geyl, p. 136, and Hume, p. 341 points out that Elizabeth was forced to turn to Spain in 1575 as Orange in an effort to woo the French had promised his daughter in marriage to Alençon, who was to lead a French army to join Condé against Philip.

- 146
Acts of the Privy Council, IX, 15.
- 147
Ibid., p. 172.
- 148
Ibid., pp. 133, 191, 200, 251, 252.
- 149
Ibid., pp. 183, 191, 200.
- 150
Ibid., pp. 192-94.
- 151
Ibid., pp. 96, 102, 112, 130, 132, 44, 193.
- 152
Ibid., pp. 162, 184, 187, 189, 193.
- 153
Ibid., pp. 193-94.
- 154
Ibid., pp. 243-46.
- 155
Ibid., pp. 250-51, and 307.
- 156
Wernham, p. 329, and Acts of the Privy Council, IX, 316.
- 157
Gayl, pp. 142-43.
- 158
Ibid., p. 145.
- 160
Ibid., pp. 150-51, and Hume, p. 337.
- 161
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- 162
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- 163
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- 164
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- 165
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- 166
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- 167
Venetian Calendar of State Papers, p. 585.
- 168
Egerton Papers, pp. 74-78.
- 169
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- 170
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- 171
Ibid., pp. 332-35.
- 172
Ibid., 335-36.

- 173
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- 174
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- 175
Ibid., p. 221.
- 176
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- 177
Ibid., pp. 224-27.
- 178
Ibid., p. 229, and Fugger News Letters, p. 38.
- 179
Read, Burghley, pp. 258-61, and Fugger News Letters, p. 58.
- 180
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- 181
Wernham, p. 336.
- 182
Acts of the Privy Council, VIII, 272.
- 183
Ibid., IX, 5 and 23. (The "Statute of Artillery" also served to revive interest in archery, p. 386.)
- 184
Wernham, pp. 280-81.
- 185
Ibid., pp. 346-47. (These latter two were amalgamated in 1592 in the Levant Company.)
- 186
Ibid., p. 342.
- 187
Ibid., p. 343.
- 188
Acts of the Privy Council, VIII, 99 and 106.
- 189
Ibid., pp. 272, 274, 281-85, and 290.
- 190
Wernham, p. 343.
- 191
Ibid., p. 356.
- 192
Hume, p. 362.
- 193
Ibid., pp. 362-63.
- 194
Acts of the Privy Council, XII, vxiii.
- 195
Ibid., pp. 300, 313, and 315.
- 196
Ibid.
- 197
Ibid., p. 314.

- 198 Ibid., p. 318.
- 199 Ibid., p. 333.
- 200 Ibid., p. 339.
- 201 Ibid., p. 339.
- 202 Ibid., p. 364.
- 203 Ibid., and Acts of the Privy Council, XI, 90.
- 204 Acts of the Privy Council, XI, 120.
- 205 Ibid., p. 237.
- 206 Ibid., p. 209.
- 207 Ibid., p. 210.
- 208 Ibid., p. 219.
- 209 Ibid., p. 212.
- 210 Ibid., p. 223.
- 211 Ibid., p. 227.
- 212 Ibid., p. 220.
- 213 Ibid., p. 234.
- 214 Ibid., p. 364.
- 215 Acts of the Privy Council, XI, 257.
- 216 Ibid., pp. 264, 280-81.
- 217 Ibid., pp. 313, 385.
- 218 Ibid., pp. 375, 416, 419.
- 219 Ibid., XII, viii.
- 220 Ibid., pp. 35, and 39.
- 221 Ibid., pp. 75, and 181.
- 222 Ibid., p. 139, 218.
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- 225
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- 227
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- 228
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- 229
Hume, pp. 385-401.
- 230
Ibid., pp. 409-11, Wernham, p. 364, and Fugger News Letters, p. 81.
- 231
Hume, p. 414, and Acts of the Privy Council, XIV, 28.
- 232
Wernham, pp. 364-65.
- 233
Ibid., pp. 366-68, and Read, Burghley, p. 227.
- 234
Geyl, p. 176.
- 235
Ibid., pp. 192-93, and Acts of the Privy Council, XIV, vii.
- 236
Burghley State Papers, p. 405, and Hume, p. 422.
- 237
Hume, p. 427, Wernham, pp. 370-71, and Fugger News Letters, p. 77.
- 238
Wernham, pp. 371-72, and Hume, p. 429.
- 239
Hume, p. 431.
- 240
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- 241
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- 242
Ibid., p. 30.

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