Political influences on the National Park Service: past and present

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Since the beginning of the Reagan Administration in 1981, there has been a dramatic change in policies affecting the national parks and the National Park Service. The Department of the Interior's goals combined with the economic strategies of this Administration have brought about new park policies that have departed sharply from those of the last two decades. This thesis is designed to distill some of the changes evidenced in park policy and the Park Service under the Reagan Administration.

Recent changes in park policy are analyzed by comparing them to past policies. Thus, there is a substantial review of the history of the Park Service and park policies for comparison. As it was found, the new park policies established during the Reagan Administration are often so untraditional, they stand in a class by themselves. They have been hailed by developers and scorned by preservationists in some cases, other cases find the reverse to be true. Regardless of the opinions of those interested in the parks, however, the consequences of these policies will last long after the end of this administration.
I certify that I have read this thesis and find that, in scope and quality, it satisfies the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Dr. John T. Whelan

Dr. Thomas R. Morris

Dr. Robert J. Morgan
POLITICAL INFLUENCES ON THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE:
PAST AND PRESENT

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For Joe, who understands what Yellowstone means to me.
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Author's Note

The impetus for writing a thesis on park management stemmed from a discussion with Yellowstone's veteran park winterkeeper, Steven Fuller. Talking in his cabin nearby the Grand Canyon of the Yellowstone over the Christmas holidays in 1987, he mentioned that the Park Service was negotiating with Yellowstone's concessionaire, T.W. Services, to open Canyon Village for winter use. For anyone familiar with Canyon Village in Yellowstone, this news would come as a surprise.

Canyon Village is currently located in the heart of Yellowstone's wild country, in what is considered to be prime grizzly bear habitat. Its site, at an elevation of 7748 feet, is annually acclaimed one of the coldest spots in the continental United States. Canyon Village's twenty-five year old lodging facilities typically garner more attention, however, ranking as some of the most rustic in the entire park system. In no way would the cabins or the lodge currently on site be able to comfortably shelter Yellowstone's wintertime visitors from its notoriously frigid sub-zero wintertime temperatures.

Yet, what was more puzzling to learn from the discussion with Steve Fuller, however, was the knowledge

1Michael Frome, "Park Tourism is Big Business", National Parks, November/December 1984, p.16.
that it was the Park Service that was the initiator of the proposal to open Canyon Village for winter use. As an agency whose primary purpose is "to conserve the scenery", their pursuit of wintertime concession operations at Canyon seemed illogical. Moreover, the 1916 National Park Service Organic Act specifically mandated that "national interest must dictate all decisions affecting public or private enterprise in the parks." Any "national interest" in initiating wintertime operations at Canyon Village, however, was not apparent.

As it stands, the beauty of the traditionally seasonal concession operation at Canyon allows people to come and enjoy the Canyon during the summer, but when the location closes in the fall, the flora and fauna have time to


4That "national interest is not apparent" is a personal judgement. I have searched for any proposal regarding Canyon Village wintertime operations and have found none. If there was any evidence of public interest, logically it would surface in the newspapers or, at least, in one of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition's quarterly reports. To date, however, I can find no reference to it.
All spectacular viewpoints from the canyon rim remain accessible to winter tourists without wintertime lodging facilities. T.W. Services currently provides daily transportation to the canyon in the winter, via snowcoaches and snowmobiles, for daytime visitation. Thus, the questions begged to be answered: What was motivating the Park Service to persuade T.W. Services to provide accommodations and food services at Canyon Village in the wintertime? Why was the Yellowstone Park Service choosing in this case to emphasize use over preservation? And more importantly, what was its significance, if any, in the broader framework of future park service policy trends? Any satisfactory answer to these questions, however, first requires an understanding of park management policies in the past.

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Introduction

For almost a century, federal activism in domestic affairs was considered to be an appropriate role of government and was widely encouraged. Any dispute over this philosophy was "largely confined to academics and political ideologues." Yet, within the last decade, this idea has been challenged on a national scale. Movements to promote change have emerged from many political, economic, and social arenas. Yet, none have been so powerful as those within the Reagan Administration.

The Reagan Administration's philosophy with regard to domestic affairs has been one of less government intervention, with more private operation. To implement this program of domestic reform, the Reagan Administration sought Cabinet secretaries who would be willing to act as agents "for the president's policy preferences." In doing so, "President Reagan has made perhaps the most determined


effort of any recent president to bend the permanent
government to his will."4

There are many examples of agencies who have undergone
extensive change during the Reagan Administration as a
result of his political appointees work. Five cited in an
article by Lawrence E. Lynn include: the Employment and
Training Administration (ETA) of the Department of Labor:
the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture (FSDA);
the Mine Health and Safety Administration (MHSA) of the
Department of Labor; the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC); and the National Highway Traffic and Safety
Administration of the Department of Transportation. As he
notes, these five agencies and their administrative
appointees had three primary things in common. The first
was that each agency head "appeared to reflect Reagan's
philosophy and intentions in making appointments to
subcabinet positions."5 Secondly, they promoted "Reagan's
conservative ideology...dutifully executed administration
policies concerning budget and staff reductions,
and...formulated specific goals consistent with Reagan's
general policies."6 Lastly, each agency head was noted for

5Ibid., p.344.
6Ibid.
promoting "definite ideas about changing the agency beyond merely carrying out Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and White House directives."7

Using Lynn's criteria to distinguish other Reagan appointee's playing similar roles, one cannot help to note as well the work of the Secretaries of the Interior James Watt and Donald Hodel. It is my tenet in this thesis that their work too serves as an excellent case study of the changes promoted by Reagan appointees. They too altered agency infrastructure and policies to mirror those coming from the White House. Yet, in doing so they were also experimenting with some of the nation's most precious commodities: our national parks.

There are hundreds of national parks in the United States and all have different policy needs. The National Park Service (NPS) administers a variety of entities from battlefields to historic homes to great primitive areas such as Yosemite. Thus, there is a need to set limitations on the types of parks to be studied. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus primarily on policy changes as they have effected the larger primitive parks, known to many as the "crowned jewels." These original national parks, including Yosemite, Yellowstone, Glacier, Zion, 

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7Ibid.
Bryce, and the Grand Canyon, are the most vulnerable as they cannot be replaced. Their land forms and scenic vistas are unique as is their ecological makeup. Many endangered flora and fauna are protected on these lands where they have been unable to survive elsewhere.

In this thesis, it is my intent to explore in depth the history of our national parks and the Park Service to elucidate the significance of the policies Watt and Hodel were able to implement affecting them. Did they truly set in place radical new polices for the Park Service and the parks, or were these policy changes taking place gradually over time? I am also interested in how the Park Service has changed as a result. Are they truly administering the national parks as charged by Congress and the President to do under Public Law 65-235? Or are park policies today being imposed upon NPS administrators by forces outside of government or within the federal system?

Constitutionally, the President and Congress have the right to make laws and execute them. To aid them in executing laws affecting the national parks, they established the National Park Service in 1916 with the mandate that they should "provide for the enjoyment...by the public" of parklands in such a manner so as to "conserve the scenery...for the enjoyment of future
generations." In doing so, Congress and the President created a third party, NPS, through which presidential and congressional policies must be carried out.

While bureaucracies do not have any constitutional authority and are thus technically subordinate to Congress and the President, historically they have gained a great deal of power in their own right. This power is partially derived from their "expertise". As less than one percent of Congress and the White House staff have degrees in science and land management, historically these bodies have deferred to the scientific expertise NPS officials offer when making park policy. This reliance on bureaucratic experts has frustrated the White House and Congress at times, but has more often than not been adhered to.

The Reagan Administration, however, chose not to adhere to bureaucratic experts' decisions on park policy that interfered with their agenda. Instead, the Administration relied on political appointees and the


powers granted to the President under the Constitution. This thesis does not intend to debate whether his policy-making strategies were legal or illegal. It is assumed that they were Constitutional. Rather, the questions this thesis beg to answer are how did the Reagan Administration view NPS experts, how did this Administration choose to use its expert information, and how did this Administration's agenda fit in with those previously established for the national parks?

In order to find the answers to these questions, it is necessary to do a historical review of the parks and the National Park Service in order to delineate the public policies affecting them. This will help to determine whether the Reagan Administration's goals for the parks and the National Park Service were actually unprecedented. The environment and forces acting on the parks are also very important so I will explore the parks from the perspectives of Congress, the public, the scientific community, and the business community over time as well.

Chapter I will be a broad overview of the beginnings of the national park idea and the national parks. This chapter will help to establish the context in which the parks were established and it will help us to understand American's early perspectives of the parks and the subsequent polices set for them.
The second chapter will focus on the beginnings of the National Park Service. With the establishment of a federal agency whose mission it was to preserve the parks, the national park idea was further refined as were the management plans for them. Also to be discussed are outside "lobbying power influences." These various lobbying power influences have also had a significant role in writing Park Service policy and they have not hesitated at times "to criticize the National Park Service when they deemed it necessary." This chapter will focus on park policies through 1950.

The third chapter will concentrate on park policy as it is shaped by NPS, Congress, and the environmental movement of the 1960's. All three forces acted to reassess the national park idea and subsequent management plans for the "crowned jewels." Also to be discussed will be the directives emanating from the Department of the Interior and the White House. These forces will also be evaluated as shapers of park policy.

The fourth chapter will delineate the events and


12Ibid.

forces shaping park policy just prior to the Reagan Administration. The record of the Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations will serve as a basis with which to compare the Reagan Administration's role in shaping park policy.

Finally, the fifth chapter will analyze the Reagan Administration's influence on the national parks and the National Park Service. The role that Interior Secretaries James Watt and Donald Hodel will be of prime importance as political appointees of the President. The National Park Service role in park policy making in comparison to the Administration's, Congresses', and outside forces' powers will be analyzed as well. A conclusion will follow this chapter wrapping up the changes that have taken place over time and comparing them to changes that took place specifically within the Reagan Administration. This will help to determine whether the Reagan Administration truly did play a revolutionary role in reforming park policy and the bureaucracy in charge of administering them. If this was accomplished, this case study will also help to determine how the Administration reshaped "both public policy and the modis operandi of the federal
bureaucracy."14 And this case study will determine if the National Park Service, the primary agency responsible for managing the "crowned jewels", and the parks themselves were affected in result.

Chapter I

On March 1, 1872, Congress established Yellowstone National Park. It was the very first park of its kind not only in the United States, but in the world. The Act establishing this park mandated that the land would be "reserved and withdrawn from settlement, occupancy, or sale."¹ It mandated that regulations "provide for the preservation, from injury or spoilation, of any timber, mineral deposits, natural curiosities, or wonders".² Lastly, the act moved to "provide against the wanton destruction of the fish or game."³ It was an unprecedented piece of legislation passed by Congress with regard to land use. For the first time, Congress declared that land did not simply exist for one generation's use and profit. Rather, Yellowstone had aesthetic value so great that it was to be reserved not only for those living, but also for future generations to enjoy.

By 1890, the western frontier was conquered. Since then, Yellowstone and the national park idea have become


²Ibid.

³Ibid.
increasingly more important in the American mind. From our
cement palaces, Americans needed to know there were still
areas in the United States were "natural forces still
predominate(d), where bison graze(d) freely and grizzly
bears roam(ed) unrestricted."4 For many, Yellowstone and
other national parks became this symbol of wildness. They
were links to America's past in our continuing history.

With this in mind, as we look back to the actions and
policies leading to the reservation of wildlands, it is easy
for us to romanticize the past. In our modern understanding
of the environment and ecology, we naturally look to our
American forefathers as having had incredible foresight to
realize the future need for such areas. In a time of
abundant wilderness, they "conserved" land. Yet, at the
time Congress established Yellowstone National Park, ecology
or environmental management was not even a part of our
vocabulary.

While Congress moved to hold these original national
parklands in perpetuity, it was primarily done to ensure the
public would always have access to them for their
"enjoyment". There was no consensus among these gentlemen
as to how these wildlands should be used or managed in order

4Wayne Owens, "Crying Wolf in Yellowstone", National
Parks, March/April 1988, p.16.
to retain their pristine character. Moreover, there were no wildlife biologists or range specialists to consult. For Congress in the late 1800’s, there was nothing to compare national parks to. Nothing like a national park had "ever been brought under administration before, not even for the great military princes."6

As Congress continued to set land aside as national parks through the turn of the century, it became apparent there would need to be a central agency administering these properties. On August 25, 1916, forty four years after the establishment of Yellowstone, the National Park Service (NPS) was created as the federal oversight agency for the parks. The establishing Act mandated that the Park Service "provide for the enjoyment... by the public" of parklands in such a manner so as to "conserve the scenery... for the enjoyment of future generations."7 In this statement of purpose was an "equivocal mission", one the Park Service has struggled with ever since.8

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6Ibid.
As there was never any consensus on how the Park Service should best manage the parks, or what state the parks should be in, early park directors looked to precedents set by the United States Army and others who had administered the park intermittently prior to 1916. To understand the early policies of the Park Service, one must first understand land management practices in the 1800's. Early American's attitudes and actions with regard to land use were to greatly influence early national park policies.

With firmly ingrained ideas toward land use that have been retained over a century, the public has been quick in modern history to criticize the Park Service should things appear amiss. While the early explorers and legislative leaders are remembered as the bearers of the national park "gift", the Park Service is often depicted as the spoilers of it. As the designated protectorate, they are automatically assumed to be at fault. But as a review of history will prove, there have always been extraordinary outside forces acting on the parks. I will argue they are found to be equally responsible for any preservation or deterioration of our parklands. As Wilbur R. Jacobs notes in his treatise "Revising History with Ecology":

The destruction of our natural environment is usually viewed as a great modern problem, the implication being that only in the twentieth century has the onslaught taken place. There is growing realization, however, that from the beginning of history we Americans have been both destructive
and wasteful... (of wildlands.)... It is actually the scale of the damage instead of its newness which forces us, though still reluctantly, to confront the problem today.9

It is hoped this thesis will shed some light on the history of American's attitudes toward parklands and how these lands have subsequently been affected by public policies. The problems and prospects our national parks face today are the direct result of over two hundred years of man's interventions, attitudes, and political actions.

The Beginnings of Land Management in Colonial America

Americans have looked to "nature as proof of national greatness" since the end of the American revolution.10 Realizing their new nation did not have the rich traditions of the British Empire, Americans had to seek out and extol upon other assets. The most obvious asset was the land. Reveling in the beauty of it, early American's "reassured themselves that they were destined for a grand and glorious future in their own right."11

Prior to the Civil War, however, there was little public concern to preserve or conservatively use land.


Rather the early to mid-1800's was marked as a time of territorial expansion. Americans "burned the forests... diverted rivers from their course or united them at their pleasure" to shorten the "distances which separated the North from the South and the East from the West." For those moving west, the Homestead and Desert Acts promised a share of public land to all those who could manage it. With the discovery of gold in Colorado, Wyoming, and California, there emerged a time of rapid economic growth. The push to the Oregon country by the Zionists, moreover, enhanced western migration. All of these factors added up to an expansionist land policy. A land policy that argued land was to be conquered, not preserved.

Alexis de Tocqueville noted this expansionist sentiment as he came across it in northern Michigan in 1831. Finding few in awe of wilderness, de Tocqueville decided that the American vision was "fixed upon... the march across these wilds, draining swamps, turning the course of rivers, peopling solitudes, and subduing nature." Yet, there were a few anomalies to this attitude of development, notedly,


George Catlin.

In 1827, Catlin emersed himself in painting Niagara Falls. Noting the commercialism already marring the view, he was later to propose setting aside a tract of this land as a "Nation's Park, containing man and beast in all the wildness and freshness of their natural beauty."14 Catlin's sentiments were echoed by another early nature advocate: Henry David Thoreau. As Thoreau stated, "Why should not we, who have renounced the King's authority have our national reserves... in which the bear and panther, and some of the hunter race, may still exist, and not be civilized off the face of the earth."15 Thoreau and Catlin's ideas regarding land management and the conservation of natural resources, however, were well ahead of their time.

The Reservation of Arkansas Hot Springs

In 1832, Congress authorized the governor of Arkansas to set aside the territory surrounding Arkansas' Hot Springs so that they might always be publicly used.16 While the Act set a precedent protecting geological features, the Hot


Springs were reserved for their medicinal value and to avoid a private monopoly rather than for aesthetic beauty. The Hot Springs Preservation Act "makes no mention of the preservation of natural curiosities in their original state, the protection of wildlife, (or) the public pleasuring ground feature." The Act, thus, was not thought to be in the same class as those later preserving national parks.

The two most frequented areas of scenic beauty in the United States in the 1830's that most resembled the later national parks were Niagara Falls in New York and Virginia's Natural Bridge. Thousands flocked to these places annually to witness their unique beauty, albeit, there were no laws formally protecting either of these geological wonders.18

Yosemite Park

After the Arkansas Reservation Act, it was not until June 30, 1864 that Congress again moved to reserve land for public use. Under the persuasion of Senator John Conness and American Steamship Transit Company owner Israel Raymond, the federal government set aside a portion of Yosemite Valley and Mariposa Redwood Tree Grove to be administered by the state of California.19 The state was to have control of

19Runte, National Parks: An American Experience, p.29.
the Yosemite valley on the condition that it was to be held for "public use, resort, and recreation... for all time."20

The Yosemite Park Act is often thought to be the precursor for later national park legislation. It embodied the first ideals of conservation and use for the benefit of the people. Yosemite Park also mirrored the later commonly understood criteria for national parks. Yosemite was set aside for its incredibly beautiful valleys in the Sierras. In fitting with the later national park criteria, the land reserved in Yosemite was "sublime" and "scenic" as based solely on "direct human appreciation."21 The designated boundary of Yosemite included only those scenic areas. Thus, American's early "biological ignorance or indifference" towards wilderness was depicted in this delineation process.22

Shortly after the establishment of Yosemite Park, John Muir arrived in the "range of light" and began writing a series of articles on nature as he knew it.23 While they

20Laws Relating to National Park Service, p.64.


rapidly became in vogue as were Thoreau's collection of essays and John Burrough's descriptions of flora and fauna, their popularity hinged on descriptions of unusual and incomprehensible forms in nature. In the early 1800's, the public was not drawn to nature by a mass concern for ecological awareness. Rather, Americans nationwide were intrigued by descriptions of monumental forms of nature as yet unknown to most on the East Coast.

The Establishment of Yellowstone National Park

Monumentalism was found in plentitude by the first exploration parties that discovered the Yellowstone region in 1870. While a trail of Indians, fur trappers, and prospectors preceded the exploration party led by Henry Washburn, Nathaniel Langford, and Gustaveous Doane, "it was not until 1870 that the region was closely examined and its wonders officially confirmed."24 The diaries of the Washburn, Langford and Doane team members show that all were continually amazed at Yellowstone's unique hot springs, geysers, waterfalls, and canyons.

During the nightly campfires of the expedition, proposals were made by some of the members that they should each buy quarter sections of Yellowstone, especially "those that would eventually become a source of great profit to the

owners".25 As history holds it, one member of this expedition, a Judge by the name of Cornelius Hedges, had another idea. Judge Hedges was so impressed by what he saw that he countered initial proposals and instead argued one night, "there ought to be no private ownership of the region... The whole of it ought to be set aside as a great national park."26 The suggestion was met by "an instantaneous and favorable response from all except one."27 By the time the expedition emerged from this wildness they were committed to the idea that this land should be kept free from development.

Nathanial Langford noted in his diary during the trip, "our purpose to create a park can only be accomplished by untiring work and concerted action in a warfare against the incredulity and unbelief of our national legislators."28 Yet, while the Washburn, Langford, and Doane expedition emerged very much determined to create a park, Alfred Runte argues in National Parks: An American Experience, that

25Nathanial Langford, as quoted by Harlean James, Romance of the National Parks, (New York: Macmillian Company, 1941) p.13.

26Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, p.41.


28Butcher, Exploring Our National Parks and Monuments, p.76.
preservation and protection of the wildness for nature's sake was not one of their goals. As he notes, "Nathaniel Langford's visions for Yellowstone Lake... might well have been inspired by Lake Como or the French Riviera. 'How can I sum up this wonderful attraction!' he exclaimed. It is dotted with islands of great beauty, as yet unvisited by man, but which at no remote period will be adorned with villas and the ornaments of civilized life.'"29

While Langford's intentions for Yellowstone may not be as pure as some historians would have us remember, following the end of the expedition, Langford immediately set out to publicize the region. Newspaper clips, lectures, and magazine articles all conveyed the message brought by this team that this was "probably the most remarkable region of natural attractions in the world", and "should be... set aside as a public National Park."30

In the fall of 1871, the United States Geological Survey traversed the Yellowstone plateau to map and explore the region. This scientific team, lead by Dr. Ferdinand Hayden included artist Thomas Moran and photographer, William Henry Jackson. With their help, Hayden's team was

29Runte, National Parks: An American Experience, p.43.

the first to extensively map and survey Yellowstone. Their resulting geologic records of this trip provided invaluable insight into the unique Yellowstone plateau in later Congressional hearings. However, it was to be Thomas Moran's paintings and Jackson's photographs of the scenery that would convince Congress of the uniqueness of the natural phenomena to be found there.

The Railroad Influence in the Creation of Yellowstone

By 1871, it had dawned on the Northern Pacific Railroad that a Yellowstone park could potentially be a boon to rail use. Its remoteness meant the Northern Pacific would hold practically a monopoly on tourist transportation to the area. On October 27, Dr. Hayden received a letter from a Northern Pacific Railroad employee, A.B. Nettleton, who pleaded: "Let Congress pass a bill reserving the Great Geyser Basin as a public park forever--just as it has removed that far inferior wonder the Yosemite Valley and big trees."31 The letter was written on the stationary of "Jay Cooke and Co., Bankers, Financial Agents, Northern Pacific Railroad Company."32

The Northern Pacific Railroad moved to sponsor Nathaniel


32Ibid.
Langford travels on the lecture circuit in 1871, selling the national park idea to the American public. Langford extolled upon the magnificent scenery in his public speeches which "appealed to a tenacious American desire to measure up to European civilization."33 Yet, he also yielded to more puritan Americans by noting Yellowstone's uselessness to agriculture, mining or manufacturing purposes. The "remoteness" of Yellowstone "also assured, by in large, that (it) had little economic value."34

Langford met with Montana Territorial Representative William Claggett in the winter of 1871-72, who with the help of Dr. Hayden, drew up a bill to set aside the Yellowstone region. Representative Claggett first introduced this legislation to the House on December 18, 1871. Senator Pomeroy introduced it in the Senate.

As the bill was heard in the Senate Committee on Public Lands, Pomeroy also emphasized the unsuitable Yellowstone environment. As he noted, "there are no arable lands, no agricultural lands there. It is the highest elevation from which our springs descend, and as it cannot interfere with any settlement for legitimate agricultural purposes, it was

33Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.9.
34Ibid.
thought it ought to be set aside."35 Dr. Hayden assured the Senators that the land was totally worthless. Expedition team leader Gustaveous Doane took the stance on the stand that while it was worthless land, it did have great scientific value. As he stated, "in the branches of geology, mineralogy, botany, zoology, and ornithology, it is probably the greatest laboratory that nature furnishes on the surface of the globe."36

While, it is thought that the Northern Pacific "greased the wheel" a little for legislative approval, the Yellowstone Park bill was approved by the Senate on January 30, 1872.37 Yet, a number of Montanans remained unconvinced this was a positive step for Yellowstone. As the editor of the Helena Daily Herald noted, "without a doubt the Northern Pacific Railroad will have a branch track penetrating this Plutonian region, and few seasons will pass before excursion trains will daily be sweeping into this great park thousands of the curios from all parts of the world."38 Anyone

35Haines, Yellowstone National Park: Its Exploration and Establishment, p.117.


desiring to see it in a more pristine state, he advised, should come immediately.

Others regarded the project with little favor because they were concerned that Congress would not "open roads or hostelries" in Yellowstone, leaving it inaccessible to the great mass of travelers."39 As a petition appearing in the Rocky Mountain Weekly Gazette stated, "we are opposed to any scheme which will have a tendency to remand (Yellowstone) into perpetual solitude by shutting out private enterprise."40 Thus, were recorded some of the first public arguments regarding preservation in tandem with use.

On February 27, the national park legislation passed in the House 115-65 and on March 1, 1872 it was signed into law by President Grant. The act itself was billed as being inherently democratic. By setting aside a tract of land for the benefit and enjoyment of all, it ensured that Yellowstone's wonders would not be controlled by a wealthy few. As Senator Trumbull assured, with a national park no one could "plant himself right along the path that leads to these wonders and charge every man that passes along... a


fee of one to five dollars."41 In the eyes of the majority of Congressional officials, however, the land was set aside with the understanding that it was inherently "worthless" and that it would require no Congressional appropriations to be maintained.42

Americans understanding of the national park concept as it was conceived in the Yellowstone Act was broad and varied. Yet, the loosely written act could be interpreted to provide something for everyone. Some looked to Yellowstone as a "valuable resort for a certain class of invalids".43 Others hoped its conservation clause would pave the way for the "rescue" of the Niagara "from its present degrading surroundings" in a similar manner.44 It emerged rather to suit a "happy convergence of many disparate interests."45

In Mountains Without Handrails, Joseph Sax argues, that "the modern desire to view "the first national park" as the

42Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.9.
45Joseph Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.11.
product of (an early) public ecological conscience has little history to support it.46 Certainly this is the case with Yellowstone and a number of the other early parklands to follow. When the boundaries of Yellowstone National Park were carved out by Hayden and Langford, no thought was given as to the boundaries of its ecosystem. Rather, "the enormous size of the Yellowstone reservation... (was) largely to avoid missing any wonders not yet discovered which might exist in the same general area."47 Yellowstone was undoubtedly set aside strictly for its unique thermal features. Interest in them being more indicative of America's "fascination with monumentalism" rather than any concern for biology.48

Yellowstone National Park was created in a time in our nation's history when the West had yet to be fully explored. Montana, Wyoming, and Idaho, the three territories that Yellowstone's boundaries were carved out of, were not even admitted to the union. Indian wars were still being fought in this region. The idea that the park was set aside at that time strictly as a wilderness preserve, thus, is inconceivable.

46Ibid., p.7.


48Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.7.
Park Management

In the early years, the only access to Yellowstone was by stage via roads running from Montana's southern border into the park. The first few handfuls of tourists in Yellowstone in its formative years, thus, were Montana residents. The primary reason they came to Yellowstone was the hot mineral baths. Bathhouses, offering cleansing thermal waters and medicinal cures were provided in abundance by early concessionaires. Locals, such as James McCarthy and Uncle Jim Yancy, also provided accommodations for these visitors as approved by the Secretary of the Interior.49

Nathaniel Langford was appointed to be the park's first superintendent shortly after Yellowstone was set aside in 1872. But, because Congress had been promised they would spend "not one cent for scenery", they never appropriated a salary for him.50 Moreover, Langford had no legal authority to make and enforce laws to protect the park. These limitations were eventually to force him to return home to Minnesota. Records show Langford was only in the park twice during his five year stint as Superintendent.

The absentee landlord management policy found in

Yellowstone during its formative years offered a whole new set of problems for the park. Squatters "moved in and vandals and poachers preyed on its natural wealth."51 The few adventurous tourists who came into the park were often seen with "shovel and axe, chopping and hacking and prying up great pieces of the most ornamental work they could find."52 Yet, no one seemed to care. Complacency among Congressmen and others was a result of the predominant understanding that held land could not be permanently disfigured. This was especially true in an area as vast as Yellowstone Park.

Langford was relieved of his superintendent duties in April, 1877 and replaced by Philetus W. Norris. Norris was provided with a salary and annual appropriations "to protect, preserve, and improve the Park".53 While he had no more authority than Langford to enforce law within the park, at least with the allotment of funding he was able to approve construction of buildings and hire a "gamekeeper" to prevent poaching of the animals. Norris was thought to have been a great asset to Yellowstone as Superintendent, yet, he made one unfortunate mistake. As he choose to name hundreds

51Clary, The Place Where Hell Bubbled Up, p.33.
52Ibid.
53Ibid., p.36.
of thermal features, roadways, and mountains after himself and his family, a few prominent Montanans became concerned he was taking over Yellowstone and used their clout to convince Congress to remove him in February 1882.

With the removal of Superintendent Norris, Yellowstone witnessed a series of weak Superintendents during the mid 1880's. As none of these superintendents had the gumption to stand up and fight for the park, it left the land extremely vulnerable to spoilation. Especially as during this same time, the park was experiencing its first real boon in tourism. With the completion of the Northern Pacific Rail line into Gardiner, Montana, over five hundred visitors were arriving annually by rail. The railroads offered packaged tours so that travelers could see many of the park's primary attractions as part of their ticket package. The railroads also helped to set up stage coach companies and subsidized the construction of lodging facilities inside the park to improve guests stay.\textsuperscript{54} Yet, as their money came from tourists, neither the railway lines or the concessionaires assumed the role of protectorates of the environment. Guests came first.\textsuperscript{55} It was thought the beauty of Yellowstone would exist in perpetuity.

\textsuperscript{54}Zawslowsky, \textit{The Black Calvary of Commerce}, p.29.

\textsuperscript{55}Clary, \textit{The Place Where Hell Bubbled Up}, p.51.
While the park's interior was threatened by unregulated visitor use during the 1880's, forces in Washington seemed determined to legally revise the national park idea to its detriment as well. Northern Pacific railroad owners were continually exerting their influence in Congress to run a line through the northern section of the park. The legislative sponsor noted he could not fathom "the sentiment which favors the retention of a few buffalos to the development of mining interests." 56 While mining had been prohibited in the initial legislation protecting Yellowstone, it was hoped this clause would be reversed. In the meantime, the railroad's "right of way" bill was tooted as a means of bring the park to the people, yet, it was also seen as a measure "inspired by corporate greed and natural selfishness." 57 On December 14, 1886, this measure was defeated in the House 107-65. Allin argues in The Politics of Wilderness Preservation that this preservation success was primarily brought about because "the slaughter of buffalo had been on such a magnificent scale that it must... have been recognized as a conservation crisis before the exhaustibility of most other resources was apparent." 58


57 Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, p.32.

To combat apparent management problems, Congress moved to make some changes in the park's administration. Beginning in 1883, the civil superintendents were allowed to remain and each was to hire ten assistants. However, the duties of protecting the park and developing roadways were reassigned to the Army. While they still had no formal authority to enforce law within the park, the Secretary of the Interior at least could request the use of troops from the Secretary of War.

The Army's role in Yellowstone was to "prevent trespassing or intruders from entering the park for the purpose of destroying the game or objects of curiosity."59 When Congress failed to appropriate any money for the park in 1885, the Secretary of the Interior appealed to the War Secretary for troops to take over park administration in its entirety. While the Secretary of the Interior remained the Chief Park protectorate, the Army would regulate and enforce laws in the parks. The commander of troops was eventually to become "the acting superintendent".60 In this fashion, the Army was to administer Yellowstone between 1886 and 1916 before the Park Service was established.

59"An Act making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1884", as cited in Laws Relating to the National Park Service, p.27.

60Cameron, The National Park Service, p.34.
The Army in Yellowstone

On August 17, 1886, Captain Moses Harris lead fifty men in to the park to begin their duties as park managers. One of their first tasks was to put out forest fires which had been burning for the "greater portion" of the summer season. They also moved to oversee concession operations and create the first visible system of law and order. The Army curtailed the cutting of live trees, enforced the ban on hunting or trapping of the wildlife, and stopped trespassing and squatting. It was to be "enjoined upon all soldiers to be vigilant and attentive in the enforcement of the foregoing regulations... They were not "to hesitate to make arrests when necessary", although they had little recourse for action once they did.

In the eyes of the early concessionaires and tourists, the army officers were seen as being kind, courteous, and an overall asset to the park. They rapidly moved to fill informal duties as that of trail crew and tour guide as well as being general law enforcement officers. Yet, the Army neither had any sense of ecology or wildlife conservation. In fitting with Americas nineteenth century attitude that


wildness was unlimited, they proceeded to kill animals in the park thought to be a detriment to the tourists. It was primarily the mountain lion, cougar, bison, and wolf that were thought to be "bad" animals in the park and the Army attempted to kill them all.

It is important to note that the United States Army officers in Yellowstone were not hard headed utilitarians. Rather, they ordered the slaughter of animals and allowed logging in the park as they truly believed Yellowstone to be an unlimited wilderness. There was no conceivable way man could destroy wilderness because there was just too much of it. Moreover, the puritan ethic held fast even in the late nineteenth century that "generally held altruism and aestheticism in disdain." The Army acted on this philosophy. While it might contradict modern philosophies of conservation or preservation of natural resources, it can be argued nevertheless, in the late 1800's, military management "saved the National park idea".

The Establishment of Other Early National Parks

As the United States Army moved to improve Yellowstone and the park ideal in eyes of the public and Congressional officials, it paved the way for the establishment of other

63 Hampton, How the United States Calvary Saved Our National Parks, p.4.

64 Ibid., p.5.
national parks. By 1890, Yosemite's status was changed from that of a state park to a national park and the land was reverted to federal ownership. In the same year, Sequoia and General Grant (now known as Kings Canyon) national parks were established.65 In 1899, Mt. Ranier national park was created. Most of these new parks were established as a result of "local action led by a few concerned individuals to prevent despoiling."66 New parks were not thought of as being part of a system of national parks. Their protective legislation was basically worded in the same manner as was Yellowstone's and all fell under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior. Albeit, all parks were independently administered. Until the creation of the National Park Service in 1916, the history of the national parks was "a history of individual parks rather than group development."67

The Conservation Era

While the national park idea was gaining increasing acceptance among Americans by 1890, there was evidence as well that they were reassessing their attitude toward land


use. As more and more people were able to travel to Yosemite and Yellowstone by rail, they became aware of the beauty of the country. At the same time many at home were becoming aware of waste and mismanagement of land within their own townships. The striking blow came with the 1890 census as it "sounded America's earliest environmental warning, announcing for the first time in history the country no longer had a frontier."68 As the frontier had long symbolized "abundance and prosperity", the public responded with an unprecedented concern for natural resources.69 Environmental awareness groups, such as the Sierra Club and the Appalachian Mountain Club took root and prospered. Support for the environment also came from the business community, garden clubs, and scientists.

With a growing concern for the environment came a growing acceptance in America of national parks, especially among the middle class. The idea of public park ownership "fit into a homogeneous, universal notion of the public good; all Americans, regardless of class and region would become the beneficiaries of its bounty."70 As the rail and tent camps, such as Wylie Way, made parks accessible to the

70Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, p.14.
middle class, visitation soared. In Yellowstone visitation increased from 5,438 in 1895 to 9,579 in 1899.\textsuperscript{71} As John Muir noted in 1898:

Thousands of nerve-shaken, overcivilized people are beginning to find out that going to the mountains is going home; that wildness is a necessity; and that mountain parks and reservations are useful not only as fountains of timber and irrigating rivers, but as fountains of life.\textsuperscript{72}

To Americans' in the late 1800's, parks were for people.

Two important pieces of legislation were enacted by Congress in the 1890's that were to have a great impact on parklands. The first, known as the "Lacey Act", gave the Secretary of Interior and those under him the legal authority to enforce laws in Yellowstone. Under this act, the Park was mandated to be part of the United States judicial district of Wyoming. Regulations set by the Secretary of the Interior would be punishable by law and the laws of the state of Wyoming would be applicable otherwise.\textsuperscript{73}

In addition, the "Lacey Act" declared that "hunting,... killing, wounding, or capturing at any time of any bird or wild animal, except dangerous animals, when it

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Henry Finck, "Yellowstone Park as a Summer Resort", The Nation, September, 1900, p.248.
\item Hampton, How the United States Calvary Saved Our National Parks, p.125.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
is necessary to prevent them from destroying human life or inflicting injury", would be prohibited. This passage was extraordinarily important as it provided unprecedented protection for wildlife. It was thus recognized that wildlife in the parks had value as did unique thermal features, rock formations or mountains. Wildlife would no longer exist simply to feed the guests. Yet, the Act also made allowances for fishing, leaving the Secretary of Interior to set concrete stipulations. Fishing was much too popular a sport to eliminate.

The second piece of legislation that was to have a tremendous influence on the parks was a provision designating forest reserves, later known as national forests. The provision itself was actually attached to a much larger Sundry Civil bill so it was never subject to debate. However, this inconsequential rider provided the President with the unprecedented authority to set aside large sections of public lands to be protected for their timber. Almost immediately, President Harrison established the Shoshone Forest Reserve, setting aside 1.25

74An Act to Protect the birds and animals in Yellowstone National Park, and to punish said crimes in said park, and for other purposes as cited in Laws Relating to the National Park Service, p.30.

75Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, p.34.

76Ibid.
million acres buttressing Yellowstone Park.77

In 1897, Congress also moved to provide for "the management" of these forest reserves so that the timber would not be destroyed.78 Subsequently, the Forest Service was created and Gifford Pinchot became the first Chief of the Division of Forestry. Pinchot was a great advocate of land use and national forests were quick to be labeled "lands of many uses".79 Yet, use of forestland would become an issue of concern for national park advocates as forests were primarily located next to parklands. As national forests provided a vital buffer zone between parklands and developed areas, they would later become of vital importance to park managers.

The Conservation Movement Continued 1900-1910

The two greatest lobbyists for the conservation movement by the early 1900's were thought to be President Theodore Roosevelt and Chief of Forestry Gifford Pinchot. While they worked diligently to promote the idea of land conservation by pushing Congress to set aside more and more federal lands, there was no consensus how these lands should be managed or what "conservation" meant. Many people,

77Ibid.
79Motto of the United States Forest Service.
especially Westerners were still "apt to dismiss conservation as an artificial concept tinged with Eastern romantic and humanitarian notions."80 They labeled Conservationists as "nature lovers or socialist planners."81 Yet, to those in tune with the environmental awareness movement for the most part, the notion of conservation had less radical overtones. "Conservation", was merely the notion that natural resources should be used more wisely.

Between the years 1900-1910, the conservation movement along with the influence of President Roosevelt assured the addition of parklands. Six national parks were created during this period in time: Crater Lake in Oregon, Wind Cave in South Dakota, Sully's Hill in South Dakota, Platt in Oklahoma, Mesa Verde in Colorado, and Glacier in Montana.82 All establishing acts for the parks were similar to that of Yellowstone's.

During this same time period, Congress also passed an Act for the preservation of American Antiquities in 1906. This Act gave the President the unprecedented authority to


81Ekirch, Man and Nature in America, p.82.

82Foresta, America's National Parks and their Keepers, p.12.
set aside lands as national monuments which he deemed to have "historic or prehistoric interest." Beginning with Devil's Tower in Wyoming and the Petrified Forest in Arizona, President Roosevelt was quick to set aside sixteen other national monuments during his administration. Management of these areas was split with the Department of Agriculture, administering the national monument status battle fields; while the Departments of War and Interior shared responsibilities for the monuments of natural significance. Yet, problems with this divided management policy were many. As it was noted, "under existing conditions two departments were charged with jurisdiction over national monuments, and three may be. Responsibility is divided. There can be no uniformity on administration unless there is uniformity in letting the monuments alone." 

Between 1900-10, this same haphazard federal land management style was prevalent throughout the parklands as well. All parks continued to be managed independently. While some of the parks were graced with the presence of the

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83 James, Romance of the National Parks, p.68.
84 Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, p.72.
Army and the Corp of Engineers, others were managed by the Secretary of the Interior with the help of forestry officials. Problems with the forestry professionals in the parks, however, was to come to a head within the first decade. Goals for the parklands differed between the Forest Service under Pinochet and the Interior department in tandem with other conservationists, such as John Muir and his Sierra Club. For Muir and others, reserved parklands were to be sanctuaries of nature, entirely left in their natural state as a contrast to the state of society. To Pinochet, the goal of conservation was "development."86

In 1908, President Roosevelt called a Conservation Conference of Governors to discuss the conservation of reserved lands and ways they could be better managed. While this conference was led by Pinochet, the most influential speaker appeared to be Dr. Horace McFarland, President of the American Civic Association. In contrast to Pinochet's utilitarian philosophy toward park management, McFarland pushed instead for better park protection. As he noted,

the national parks, all too few in number... ought to be held absolutely inviolate by Congress... The scenic value of (land)... should be jealously guarded as a distinctly important national resource, and not as a mere incidental increment.87

86Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, p.14.

87James, Romance of the National Parks, p.69.
Arguing for the creation of a national bureau, he stated,

Nowhere in Washington can an inquirer find an office of the national parks, or a desk devoted solely to their management. By passing around through three departments, and consulting clerks who have taken on the extra work of doing what they can for the nation's playgrounds, it is possible to come at little information.88

After the conference, Dr. McFarland began to campaign in earnest for the establishment of a single agency to manage the national parks. He found support for his idea from those in the Sierra Club who in 1910 "took up the cause... and appointed a special promotion committee to advance the idea."89 By 1911, with their help, it was clear he had won the support of a great number of public interest groups.

By 1912, national park conferences were being organized by these public interest groups to discuss how parks should be managed. Also for the first time in 1911 and 1912, the national park superintendents and officers from the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and War convened in Yellowstone and Yosemite respectively to discuss park management. It was the Superintendents' goal to bring about improvements that would lead to greater park control by the Department of the Interior.90

88Ibid., p.72.

89Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, p.17.

On February 12, 1812, President Taft sent a request to Congress asking them to create a Bureau of National Parks. Such a bureau for parks was "essential", he stated, as "everyone recognizes the obligations of the Government to preserve them for the edification and recreation of the people." 91 While legislation was introduced in 1812, nothing ever became of it in the Sixty-second Congress.

In 1913, however, the dream of a single agency administering the parks began to hold more promise. For one, a new Secretary of the Interior came on board, Franklin K. Lane, who was eager to establish a National Park Service to be placed under the authority of the Department of the Interior. Yet, legislation for the National Park Service, even with the support of Secretary Lane, did not win the support of the Sixty-third Congress. 92

The Hetch-Hetchy Controversy

While Congress did not see fit to create a National Park Service in 1913 they did move, however, on December 19, 1913 to allow "the City of San Francisco the right to use certain lands in the Yosemite Park, specifically the Hetch Hetchy Valley, for the construction of a reservoir to supply the city with water and to generate electric power." 93 It

91James, Romance of the National Parks, p.73.
92James, Romance of the National Parks, p.75.
93Cameron, The National Park Service, p.10.
was an "exceptional case" and even considered to be a radical act in its own time as it provided for unprecedented industrial use of parkland.\textsuperscript{94} Albeit, the damming of the Hetch Hetchy valley had a long history, even longer than the history of Yosemite National Park.

Citizens of San Francisco had considered damming Hetch Hetchy Valley since 1882, however, they had never before been able to simultaneously gain local, state, and federal permission. Once Yosemite had become a national park in 1899, the Valley legally was restricted from such development, but that did not stop developers from moving to fight. Developers since the turn of the century had sought to elect a mayor in San Francisco with the same utilitarian philosophy and attitude toward Hetch Hetchy. In 1907, they found one in Mayor James Garfield, a good friend of Gifford Pinochet. Garfield pushed the Hetch Hetchy dam proposal to approval in San Francisco and then took it to Congress.

In Congressional hearings over Hetch Hetchy valley, Forestry Chief Pinochet set the tone as he stated, "the fundamental principle of the whole conservation policy is that of use, to take every part of the land and its resources and put it to that use in which it will best serve

\textsuperscript{94}Sax, \textit{Mountains Without Handrails}, p.9.
the most people." Pinochet promised any assistance necessary to see it to completion. The dam was entirely in fitting with his "conservationist" or utilitarian philosophy regarding land use. In opposition, John Muir appealed to Congress in arguing: "Dam Hatch Hetchy? As well dam for water-tanks the people's cathedrals and churches, for no holier temple has ever been consecrated by the heart of man." 

In the end, the utilitarians lobbying in Congress clearly won any debate on Hetch Hetchy, mostly owing to circumstance and the understanding of "conservation" at the time. Looking ahead to the future, many Congressmen were convinced San Francisco's potential domestic water supply was at stake. Even as people revered their parklands, their "spiritual attachment to untrammed nature" was not as great as their "commitment to economic progress." None of the eleven California Congressional officials opposed the damming of the Hetch Hetchy valley. As the chairman of the House Public Lands Committee noted;

When it comes to weighing the highest conservation, on the one hand, of water for domestic use against the


97 Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.10.
preservation of a rocky, scraggly canyon, allowing 200,000 gallons of water daily to run idly to the sea, doing no one any good, there is nothing that will appeal to a thoughtful brain of a commonsense, practical man.98

Thus, the Act was passed and the dam was built, albeit, almost immediately, some came to regret it.

The Establishment of a National Park Service

While the approval of the Hetch Hetchy dam was lauded by many, it was also equally devastating to others, especially to those "conservationist", or "preservationist" Sierra Clubers who had actively fought the dam proposal for fifteen years.99 The damming of the Hetch Hetchy valley was to be an irrevocable loss of scenic beauty in the Sierra highlands. As John Muir was to write, "some sort of compensation must surely come out of this dark damn-dam-damnation."100

Initially, the dam act was to jolt public awareness that parklands were not being held in perpetuity as their establishing acts would suggest. More importantly, however, the damming of the Hetch Hetchy valley renewed with vigor a national fight to establish a National Park Service. In the damming of the Hatch Hetchy, some influential parties were

98Everhart, The National Park Service, p.16.
99Ibid., p.16.
100Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, p.47.
finally convinced of the need for an administrative agency for the parks.

While the Secretary of the Interior Lane had initially supported the Yosemite park dam, in 1914, he was to admit that it was a mistake. It is believed "he was committed to the cession of the Hetch Hetchy valley... as a reward to California for giving its vote to Wilson."101 Determined to make amends, Lane renewed his efforts to gain a separate bureau for the parks.

In December of 1914, Lane appointed a new Assistant Secretary, Stephen Tyng Mather, whose sole job initially was to garner support for the establishment of a national park service.102 Mather devoted the entire year of 1915 to selling influential railroad owners, writers, lawyers and Congressman on the idea of a National Park Service. He sponsored and personally financed numerous first class excursions through the parks for these gentleman. As it was noted, Mather's "enthusiasm, public spirit, and generosity"... (gave him) "friends in every direction, and especially in Congress. The stage was set for action and

results."

State of the Parks -- 1915

In 1915, 334,799 visitors were reported to have entered the fourteen existing national parks. The Army had done a good job of providing law enforcement and interpretive services over the years, yet, troops in the parks were expensive to maintain. In 1915, it was estimated that military management in Yellowstone alone cost the government $194,193.49. Costs of establishing and maintaining a civilian force it was figured would cost half as much. President Wilson was concerned, moreover, there were not enough men in the Army even during a time of peace to divided some among the parks.

As the primary managers in the parks for the past thirty years, the Army had done a commendable job overseeing concessions, building roads and bridges, while dealing with the continuing problems of illegal poaching and hunting. Yet, even with their hard work, the parks still lacked many necessary facilities and access routes to accommodate the increasing numbers of visitors. While the use of

103Horace Albright as cited in James, Romance of the National Parks, p.77.


105Hampton, How the United Stated Calvary Saved Our National Parks, p.178.
automobiles was first sanctioned in many park areas in 1915, many of the initial stage coach roads simply could not accommodate them.

Another monumental problem to be reckoned with in the parks in 1915 was the existence of private lands within many national park boundaries. With the exception of Yellowstone and Arkansas Hot Springs, many plots of land within park areas had been developed prior to their reservation. There were no Congressional appropriations to secure these plots, thus, leaving private land owners free to do as they wished with their property.106

The Creation of the National Park Service

In the spring of 1916, Congressman William Kent, "a man with good credentials among both wise-use conservatives and preservationists", introduced a bill establishing a National Park Service, as did congressman John Raker.107 Senator Reese introduced similar legislation in the Senate. With the Hatch Hetchy Act controversy still shadowing Congress, it was time to move forward. The House bills were first addressed in hearings of the Committee on Public Lands in April and it quickly became clear to those present that the


Kent proposal carried the momentum.

In hearings, the financial rewards to be reaped from the park lands were the prime selling point for the establishment of a Park Service. As Agricultural Secretary Fisher opened the hearing on the Park Service bill before the House Public Lands Committee, he stated, "we should try to make our people spend their money in this country instead of abroad, and certainly as far as spending it abroad for the scenic effect."108 Mather took the stand at the hearings as the representative for the Department of the Interior and also gave his support for the Kent bill. As he stated, "our national parks are practically lying fallow, and only await proper development to bring them into their own."109 In addition, Dr. McFarland also testified as a contributor to the Kent bill. As he noted, parks were practical. Parks enabled men to be challenged in a different manner than work. Parks would promote "service and efficiency... (rather than) pleasure and ornamentation."110

The most important passage from the Kent legislation, as McFarland noted, was taken from an earlier writing of

109Ibid., p.103.
110Ibid., p.101.
Frederick Olmsted, Jr. It stated:

The fundamental object of these aforesaid parks, monuments, and reservations is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historical objects therein and to provide for the enjoyment of said scenery and objects by the public in a manner and by any means that will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.111

This initially noncontroversial statement was to become the statement of purpose for the National Park Service (NPS).

Support for the NPS bill could be found in the Departments of the Interior, and Agriculture, numerous environmental organizations, the American Civic Association, and railroad owners.112 It seemed this broadly written piece of legislation offered something for everyone. The avowed "preservationists" organizations supported the Park Service act as it promised to conserve the scenery. The utilitarian railroad owners supported it in their thinking that a Park Service would ensure scenic areas were be maintained for their rail tours. Another factor of consideration: war. The United States would almost certainly become involved in World War I. It was considered by many to be only a matter of time before the troops in the parks would have to be removed.

The Kent bill establishing the National Park Service

111James, Romance of the National Parks, p.76.

(NPS) was passed by Congress on August 25, 1916 and signed into law by President Wilson. Overnight, the National Park Service became the ninth bureau in the Department of the Interior and the overseer of 14 national parks and 22 national monuments encompassing over six million acres.\(^{113}\)

To manage these properties, NPS was to hire a Secretary, an assistant director, a chief clerk, a draftsman and any other employees the Secretary of the Interior deemed necessary.\(^{114}\) The Secretary of the Interior also was granted the final authority to "make and publish such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary... for the use and management of the parks".\(^{115}\)

In Congress, the only firm understanding as to how parks should be managed could be summed up in one word: profitably.\(^{116}\) There was no consensus exactly how these parks and monuments should be managed with respect to flora and fauna. No Congressional official was an expert on land

\(^{113}\)At this time NPS only assumed responsibility for the national monuments already under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior.


\(^{116}\)Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.11.
management. Moreover, land management, especially relating to parklands, was not a high priority. Secretary Lane had their trust and they were satisfied to leave those details to him. There was also widespread confidence that NPS was in good hands under the directorship of Stephen Mather.

For conservationists, the establishment of NPS cemented the legitimacy of the parks and provided for a centralized decision-making agency. Prior to this act, any park superintendent's efforts to correlate "methods of management was impossible... (Moreover,)... the supervisory officers in Washington could only give the parks incidental attention."117 For railroad owners, it was hoped with NPS help, parks could be made more profitable. The environmental groups, on the other hand, finally had a promise from the federal government that the scenery would be protected or "conserved." As they were soon to be reminded, however, the term "conservation" meant many things to many people.

Chapter II

While the National Park Service Act was approved on August 25, 1916, Congress failed to appropriate funds towards its establishment until April, 17, 1917. At that time, Stephen Mather was named Director of the Park Service. Horace M. Albright became Assistant Director. Together, these two men almost singlehandedly determined the direction of the Park Service for the next two critical decades. They saw NPS through a "time of rapid growth and development" despite World War I and the Great Depression. Yet, even as they moved to bring tourists to the parks and enlarge the park system, they established a policy of prudent development as known in their time and set a precedent for all to follow.

The Mather Years 1917-28

In 1917, Mather and Albright had a formidable task ahead of them with regard to problems within the parks and the park system. Within the original parks, there was no "integrated planning in the construction of new buildings, camps, villages, entrance roads, and trails." While cars

1Report of the Director of the Park Service to the Secretary of the Interior, 1917, p.1.
3Albright, The Birth of the National Park Service, p.104.
had recently been permitted in the parks, few park roads were able to accommodate them. This left the Park Service faced with inadequate facilities, irate tourists, and automobile clubs who were quick to protest the inaccessibility of many areas.

Mather and Albright also were faced with the growing problem of private land ownership within the park boundaries. Among these private land owners, there seemed to be a pervasive general disregard for park management and lack of understanding of conservation. In 1917, there were simply no funds available to begin to buy these individual tracts of land.

The greatest problem appeared to be the lack of any semblance of a park system. Each park was operating independently, often swaying to local political interests or concessionaires pressures. Prior to 1917, there were no formal rules for park management, only an establishing act and a string of mandates issued by various Army Corps and other groups. While the Army had set about to establish some form of park management, policies ranged widely between the parks, often to the detriment of the wildlands and wildlife.

The 1918 Policy Directive

To combat these problems, the first task Mather and Albright undertook was to build an effective organization
and establish a set of bylaws for the parks. In 1918 Secretary Lane formally issued a policy directive to Mather which addressed twenty three specific references as to how parks should be managed. This letter, "commonly believed to have been written by Mather himself, was a concise expression of Mather's management philosophy."4 (See Appendix A) It alone probably best denotes park management policies as realized during the first two decades.

This policy directive was not a Magna Carta for park management that argued parks should be managed solely by preservationist or utilitarian principles. Rather, Mather argued that park lands were to be used for recreation, and thus, should be protected against any commercial or "industrial use."5 Mather argued for development in parks where warranted for the enjoyment and recreation of visitors. He encouraged the development of concessions. He encouraged the use of the automobile in the parks. He encouraged park personnel to take an active role in the management of wildlife and range. Yet, at the same time, he created a set of bylaws to ensure the parks would remain in their natural state.

4Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, p.27.

The First Decade

With his stated mission for the parks, Mather next set out to make parks more accessible to everyone, especially automobile owners. To accomplish this, Mather and Albright revived their promotional campaign for the parks in earnest throughout the first decade. This "ambitious publication campaign included articles strategically placed in mass circulation magazines like National Geographic" as well as professional journals.6 It also included articles targeted at automobile owners to encourage their use.7 This campaign was designed not only to provide information, enhance public interest, and subsequently increase visitation, but it was also to link the new NPS with the national parks. Their efforts in all arenas quickly paid off. As public awareness of park lands and support for the parks and NPS increased, so did the legitimacy of NPS and congressional response to park projects.

Within a period of ten years, park visitation increased five hundred percent from 335,000 to 2.3 million.8 This growth is largely attributed to Mather's promotional

6Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, p.25.
campaigns and introduction of the affordable automobile. The rise in tourists encouraged a sharp increase in appropriations for park roads and the addition of seven new parks during this time: Mt. McKinley (1917), Grand Canyon (1919), Arcadia (1919), Zion (1919), Great Smoky Mountains (1926), Shenandoah (1926), and Mammoth Cave (1926). Funds to establish the latter three parks were raised almost entirely through matching grants aided by private contributions.

Management of Concessionaires

To better accommodate the increasing numbers of guests, Mather moved to drastically reorganize concession operations in the first decade. Appalled at "both the wasted space and duplication of services" evidenced in many parks, Mather subsequently decided that any business competition in parks was unhealthy.9 He opted instead for "regulated monopolies" that could provide everything visitors needed.10 Under the Organic Act, Mather was permitted to "enter into contracts with responsible persons of firms for up to thirty years, without having to advertise or accept competitive bids for projects."11 Mather monitored these

9Dyan Zaslowsky, "Black Cavalry of Commerce", p.28.
10Ibid., p.28.
11Ibid.
"under strict Government supervision and rate control."12

Mather and Albright also replaced the Army personnel in
the parks with park rangers. Rangers took on the
responsibilities of law enforcement in the parks but were
also there to provide nature talks and other interpretation
activities. In addition to permanent rangers, university
professors were invited to give lecture series in the parks.
When Albright took over as the Superintendent of Yellowstone
in 1919, he began to recruit "ninety day wonders", better
known as college students, to put in new trails,
campgrounds, and provide nature education programs.13

As with any concessionaire or NPS project, Mather and
Albright were cautious to look at the ramifications of
their projects and Congressional proposals. Distinctions
were constantly being made as the park system grew in size
and stature as to what was appropriate in the parks and what
was not. For example, in Yellowstone, swimming pools and
bear dumps were endorsed where as dam proposals were fought.
In the Grand Canyon, mule rides along the rims were
permitted while cable cars were not.14 In Yosemite, the

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13Albright, The Birth of the National Park Service, p.142.

14Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, p.23.
"fire fall" over Yosemite falls was approved initially and later banned. Mather and Albright considered themselves to be conservative in their planning for the parks. As Mather noted

I am firmly against over-development of the parks by too many roads, and only those needed to facilitate easy access to the most scenic sections will be constructed. Large areas will be retained in their original wilderness condition, accessible only by trails for horseback riding and hiking. In several instances we have been urged to construct roads through sections of the park that are the ranges of wild animals. In refusing to consider these projects favorably, the Service is complying with the expressed will of Congress to conserve the wildlife of the parks.

Once Mather's policy directive was implemented in the parks, it won the support of a great many influential persons. The wealthy Americans, who made up the majority of visitors to the national parks, "leaned toward minimal development and preservation-oriented management." They were pleased that the Park Service was taking "an active role as promoter of tourism, road building, and hotel development without losing support of its preservationist constituency." Also pleased were prominent


16Stephen Mather, "What I am Trying to Do with the National Parks", World's Work, May, 1924, p.41.

17Forresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, p.29.

18Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.10.
preservationists such as John Muir. Muir recognized that support for the parks was critical, even if it meant they must "compromise their ideal of complete preservation... Surely, they reasoned, the public's recreation could never harm the parks the way dams could."19

Management Decisions Made in the National Interest

In the early years, Mather and Albright faced the classic public policy problem of justifying the work of the new bureaucracy and its importance to America to ensure continued funding. For this, they needed a strong "favorable image, to convince the public what the agency does is in keeping with the highest of popular values."20

Their desire to keep a strong favorable image often lead them to management practices that were less than scientifically sound. With regard to wildlife management, for example, Mather and Albright were inclined to feed elk rather than see them starve through the winter.21 They had no understanding, as did most persons of their time, of the natural ecological food chain. Mather and Albright also continued the practice, initiated by the Army, of killing

19Zaslowsky, "Black Cavalry of Commerce", p.29.
20Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, p.25.
"mountain lions, wolves, and other killers" in the parks. NPS was always "looking to their extinction" as they were thought to be "bad" animals. Furthermore, Mather and Albright introduced non-native fish into parks' river and streams in the hopes that they could create prime fishing grounds. In many of the larger parks, there were even fish hatcheries set up to aid in this goal.

Early land management practices were another area in the early years where a favorable public image dictated policy. Throughout the Mather and Albright years all forest fires were suppressed. Forest fires were "the greatest menace... and guarded against by strict supervision (and) constant patrolling." Forests were also cleared of any dead trees where funds permitted as they were thought to mar the view. And in many parks, cattle grazing was permitted. Yet, these were management practices acted in innocence rather than a renouncement of management by science. As the Report of the Delegate of the American Society of Zoologists to the National conference on Parks was to add,

NPS is "without constructive plans of management... which will insure them against destruction from over use as recreation parks. Such plans of management must be based on


23Cameron, The National Park Service, p.53.

24Ibid., p.52.
knowledge of plant and animal ecology which they do not possess."25

Yet, Mather and Albright, like many connected with the parks at the time, had little concept of any contradiction between preservation and use. With a minuscule amount of tourists enjoying the parks even at their peak in the 1920-30's (in comparison to the numbers today) they could detect no noticeable impact of tourists on natural areas. So accordingly, they widely encouraged tourism and conservative development. As Congress had earlier promised "not one cent for scenery", it was extremely important that Mather and Albright prove that national parks were profitable enterprises.

Park Issues Mather and Albright Failed to Address

There were also several park issues Mather and Albright failed to address in their tenure altogether. Professional papers relating to park management during this time were quick to criticize NPS for failing to set any criteria as to what constituted a national park. Most parks at the time were established as a result of local or political interest in an area. Outside of suggesting that they should be unique in their policy directive, there was no directive to

"safeguard national park standards." Some critics argued there should be no additions to the national park system which did not contain extraordinary features equal to that of Yellowstone or Yosemite. Other critics, concerned with preserving land for the sake of science as well as recreation, argued for the establishment of parks just to retain tracts in their natural state.

There was also the question of boundary lines for the national parks. While Mather recognized that many of the early park lines were "arbitrarily set", it was difficult to convince Congress and the local residents they should be changed. Even when they were changed they were usually restructured to include "natural topographic features such as rivers and mountain ranges." No thought was given as to what area the natural ecosystem encompassed or to migration habits. Primarily, because parks in the early years were not run on scientific principles, but rather on Mather's business principles.

A third concern relating to NPS was that of the ever


increasing numbers of automobiles in the parks. While the automobile age had "promoted popular support for the parks", negative environmental and recreational aspects associated with thousands of cars in the parks was just being realized.29 The National Parks Association (NPA), a private organization supporting national parks, was one of the first to make note of this in 1923. They feared "that what it saw as the true worth of the national parks--their value as places for communion with nature... would be diminished by the flood of auto campers."30

Mather and Albright learned early, however, that you cannot please everyone all of the time. While Mather and Albright moved to make parks more appealing to the public as a whole, from the beginning NPS was forced to encounter those who disapproved of the park concept in its entirety. With each area that was transferred into a national park, there were Congressional battles. The Forest Service viewed them as a threat every time a section of their land was transferred to NPS.31 Mining interests and developing interests were alarmed at each addition to the Park System.

29Everhart, _The National Park Service_, p.23.
30Foresta, _America's National Parks and Their Keepers_, p.29.
31Albright, _The Birth of the National Park Service_, p.88.
Mather moved to try to convince the public that parks were advantageous for all. To minimize interagency conflict, he assured the Forest Service that the Park Service's mission in land management was entirely different from their utilitarian perspective. As forests often buttressed parks he argued, many "national parks play an important part in protecting the watersheds of streams important for economic use." To soothe those who lived on the edge of parks and saw them as a threat to development, he shared his vision of parks as business opportunities. As he argued, it was in everybody's interest to promote the parks. More support for the parks meant more opportunities for those living on their boundary and more federal support to further the protection of important tracts of land.

Analysis of the Mather Years

Mather and Albright's successes in the first two decades are attributed to a great many things. For one, Mather unselfishly devoted himself entirely to the parks. He donated money to see through the completion of projects such as Tioga Road. He also acted as a philanthropist, encouraging others to give generously. Whenever possible both Mather and Albright heightened public awareness of the parks through lectures and tours. They succeeded primarily

because of their own ingenuity and their desire to make the national park concept a reality for many generations to come.

Mather succeeded also, however, as he had the great fortune of having a close relationship with the President, Congress, and the Secretaries of the Interior during his term. Mather "was a Bull Moose Republican" in a "Wilson Democratic administration", but he rarely met with any "political interference in getting his job done." He was to come to know a great many of the Congressmen personally and felt at home in requesting Congressional appropriations. Secretary Lane was instrumental in justifying to Congress and the people the need for the Park Service in its early years. Yet, Lane interfered little with park management operations. This NPS independence is reinforced by all historical accounts of the early years of the park service. In them, there are few references to Lane or the Department of the Interior at all.

33Albright, The Birth of the National Park Service, p.18.

34There are only two conflicts between Lane and Mather that are cited by historians. The first is Secretary Lane's approval of the Hetch Hetchy Dam in 1913. The second is the Fall River-Bechler dam proposal for Yellowstone National Park. Introduced in the Senate by Senator Frank Nugget in 1919, Lane insisted that the Park Service respond favorably to it over the objections of Mather and Albright. Cameron, The National Park Service, p.20.
Following Lane there was a quick succession of Secretaries under President Harding between 1919-1921. The new Secretary, Albert Fall, avoided disturbing the work of "the Park Service in any way."35 Hubert Work replaced Fall in March of 1923 as the Secretary of the Interior.36 Mather noted in 1924 that Work had "taken a deep personal interest in the parks and forcibly defined his policy toward them as one of complete protection from commercial exploitation."37

At the same time, Mather and Albright benefitted as the nation enjoyed a period of great economic prosperity. While this economic prosperity meant an increasing demand for natural resources, it also made it easier for Mather to secure large private donations for park projects. During his tenure, Mather secured private land donations to extend Sequoia National Park, Yosemite, and many others. Even when

35With Fall as well there was one issue that historians recount Fall and Mather disagreeing upon. It was relating to Secretary Fall's proposal for an all year round national park in New Mexico to be used for both recreation and commercial uses. Adamant that the land site was not national park material, he avoided acting on it. Fall took it to Congress himself in January 1923, where it failed. Albright, The Birth of the Park Service, p.126.


37Mather, "What I am Trying to do with the National Parks", p.42.
Congress acted in 1919 to reject any "private funding of governmental programs," Mather was still able to carry on private promotional work through the establishment of the National Parks Association. With the support of Congress, he later was able to raise private funds to match government grants for the purchase of private lands within park boundaries as well.

Economic prosperity following the end of the first world war also allowed more Americans the luxury of leisure time. This boon gave Mather and Albright's promotional campaigns for the parks a boost as Americans could afford to travel. To add to this, there was the commencement of the automobile age. With the introduction of affordable automobiles, Americans were able to experience the parks in the numbers Mather never dreamed of. The popular new auto brought more tourists into national parks and eventually justified the need for a Park Service.

The Albright Years 1929-33

Mather suffered a severe stroke in November, 1928 and it rapidly became clear that he could no longer perform his duties as Director. He named Albright as his successor who was sworn in on January 12, 1929. Albright was well

38Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, p.66.
39Harlean, Romance of the National Parks, p.82.
prepared for the job. Having served three years as assistant
director and ten years as Superintendent of Yellowstone
National Park, he understood the Mather philosophy regarding
park management. As he recalled in his memoirs,

The years had prepared me as well as anyone for the
job. I knew personally about one hundred members of Congress
and was on a first-name basis with about one-third of
them.40

The Service Albright inherited was twice as large as
the one Mather had begun with in 1917. It was a well-
established organization incorporating "twenty-one national
parks and thirty-three national monuments, with 2.6 million
annual visitors, and a budget of $9 million.41 During his
tenure as Director, Albright concentrated his efforts on
buying up private plots of land within existing park
boundaries, expanding park boundaries, and bringing national
monuments and historical sites still under the jurisdiction
of the War Department over to the Park Service.

Aldo Leopold and the Age of Ecology

While park policies remained essentially the same
during the administration of Albright, as Mather had
established, nationwide there was the beginnings of an
understanding of ecology that would eventually move to have
a great impact on park management. While the term "ecology"

40Albright, _The Birth of the Park Service_, p.256.

41Everhart, _The National Park Service_, p.28.
had been around since 1866, it was later through a rapid succession of scientific breakthroughs that ecological studies found life existed through interaction with other life forms.42 Ecology came to be associated with the idea that all living things within an environment were interdependent. It gave man a whole new way of looking at nature.

Prior to the 1920-30's, man's "respect for nature had been more sentimental and spiritual than scientific."43 This perspective can easily be seen in the writing of Thoreau and Muir. Yet, with the help of early ecologists' such as Aldo Leopold, Bob Marshall, Victor E. Shelford, and G.A. Pearsons, the science of ecology became better understood. As it did, people began to listen to ecologists call for wilderness preserves. While ecologists initially looked to the Forest Service to establish these preserves, they recognized the closest thing to them existed already in the national parklands.

Conservation vs. Preservation

In line with the ecologists' findings, in 1933, V.E. Shelford authored a very important article in Science


43Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, p.194.
magazine in which he defined the difference between preservation and conservation with regard to the national parks. In many ways this was a radical idea in itself, but as he explained:

Many people conceive of the National Park Service as a conservation organization. To conserve, as the term is now most frequently used, means to preserve while in use and it often implies ultimate depletion. In actual practice the operations carried on in the name of conservation are not designed to preserve the natural order, not to establish and maintain a different order as regards kind and abundance of animals present. The difference between preservation and conservation is well illustrated in a recent publication by Wright, Dixon, and Thompson, who advocate the preservation of the birds and mammals in national parks. They point out the importance of dead timber to various birds and mammals, and the need of such timber for numerous invertebrates might well be added. Conservation as usually practiced removes dead and mature timber, while preservation lets nature take its course."44

V.E. Shelford thus linked the idea of preservation to natural regulation long before its time.

The Parks and the New Deal

While a new thinking on park management was taking hold in the scientific communities, in the business world, things were grim. The Stock Market crash and onset of the Great Depression in 1929 finally moved in to effect the parks by 1931. As it did, coping with the Depression became the Park Service's priority. NPS quickly found itself "an important place in New Deal efforts to cope with the wounded economy

and social consequences."

Albright resigned from the Park Service in 1933, and his assistant director, Arno B. Cammerer, became his successor. While it was expected Cammerer would operated the parks in the tradition of Mather and Albright, Cammerer instead saw the Park Service through the New Deal reforms initiated by President Roosevelt. It was a time, he believed, to concentrate on "the necessities of life... to build... a saner mode of living." No longer could the Park Service dictate policy in the political vacuum Mather had realized. Park Service autonomy was to some extent relinquished in an effort to work with other government agencies to the benefit of the people.

The Depression did not paint as a bleak a scenario for NPS and the parks, as it did for so many others. In June of 1933, President Roosevelt approved a Congressional resolution "consolidating all national parks, all national monuments, all national military parks, 11 national cemeteries, all national memorials, and the parks of the National Capital under National Park Service

45 Foresta, America's National Parks and Its Keepers, p.43.

administration."47 In 1933, President Roosevelt also "instituted a broad program of natural resource conservation implemented in part through the Civilian Conservation Corp (CCC)".48 President Roosevelt's close ties with the Secretary of the Interior Ickes made the Park Service the beneficiary of thousands of CCC workers.

Because of the depression, NPS had the advantage of being able to employ the best architects, biologists, archaeologists, and historians in the CCC program. The CCC set up camps in the parks and worked to build roads, roadside information stands, trails, NPS housing, and visitor facilities. Many of these projects had been planned by Mather and Albright, "but which had not been carried out for lack of money and manpower."49

Between 1933-40, the Park Service was the recipient of more than $220 million provided through a number of emergency relief programs.50 The majority of this money was directed toward CCC endeavors. CCC operated 650 camps and during the height of their program, employed 7,000 workers.

49 Foresta, America's National Parks and Its Keepers, p.44.
50 Everhart, The National Park Service, p.32.
in the national parks alone.

From a $50 million dollar grant extended by the Public Works Administration (PWA), the Park Service was able to acquire more land. This enabled a portion of the everglades in southern Florida to be designated a national park and the Grand Teton National Park was extended as well. National seashores were also approved for preservation and recreation purposes. The first to hold such status was Cape Hatteras.

A third source of funding for the Park Service came from the Emergency Relief Administration (ERA). They donated $28 million to be used for "recreation demonstration areas."51 These sites were undeveloped tracts of land outside cities that the Park Service developed for recreation purposes and eventually returned to the cities. While this project was not in line with those traditional associated with the park service, it brought the NPS to America's back door. In working on local community projects, NPS strengthened public recognition of their agency and the integrity of the NPS within many communities.

**NPS As Recreation Leaders**

In 1936, Congress passed the Parks, Parkway, and Recreation Act. The Act "clearly established the Park

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51Ibid., p.32.
Service as the preeminent federal recreation agency."52 In promoting recreation, the Act expanded their purpose. In providing technical assistance to other agencies, it was a boost to their status. The Act was also a sign of the times. In the 1930's, "recreation was a rapidly expanding federal activity."53

There were others, namely the National Parks Association and the Wilderness Society, who were very dismayed to see the Park Service labeled as a recreational agency. They considered the act to violate national park standards. National parks, in their eyes, were not recreational grounds, but great natural areas to be revered. To uphold that status, the National Parks Association recommended dividing up the national park system. On "one side would be 'national primeval parks'... on the other... the rest of the Park System and the other responsibilities the agency had acquired."54 While the motion was never seriously considered, it did address the conflict between preservation and recreational use. In questioning whether parks were places for recreational activities, the National

52Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, p.45.

53Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, p.46.

54Ibid., p.47.
Parks Association, the private foundation for NPS, argued affirmatively for preservation.

The Parks During World War II

Secretary Cammerer resigned his position in 1940 and was replaced by Newton B. Drury. Drury's appointment was of interest to many as he was the first chosen outside of the career ranks of the National Park Service. He had served as the head of California's "Save the Redwoods league for twenty years." Consequently, he did not view the parks so much from a business perspective as had Mather, Albright, and Cammerer. His guiding park management principle was "restraint." He was not so anxious to make the parks as accessible as possible and while this was a minor change in emphasis, nevertheless, it was a significant one.

Drury was almost immediately to realize his goal for the parks, but not as he had envisioned. Shortly after his appointment, "Pearl Harbor brought to a sudden end twenty-five years of almost unbroken growth for the Park Service. The men went off to war and the parks themselves virtually shut down. The total number of Park Service employees dropped to 2,000 in response.

Albeit, during the war the parks were not totally

55Everhart, The National Park Service, p.34.
56Ibid.
disregarded. As Congress looked for contributions to the war effort, they looked to the parks. In Olympic National Park, they found Sitka spruce, a perfect material for airplanes. In Yellowstone, they found an abundant supply of elk, a perfect food source for the men abroad.

While the elk meat proposal was just given lip service in Congress, the proposal to log Sitka spruce trees was taken seriously. In rebuttal, Director Drury argued before congressional committees that "critical necessity rather than convenience should be the governing reason for such sacrifice of an important part of our federal estate." "Critical necessity" became the theme of Interior Secretary Ickes as the whole Department took it upon themselves to investigate the matter and pose alternative resources. Fortunately for the parks, the War Department and Congress found alternative resources to replace those in the parks. But the case nevertheless set a precedent. In future years, the policy became that one would have to show "critical necessity" to be able to extract anything out of the parks.

The Park Service after 1945

Immediately following the end of the war, throngs of people came to the parks. The post war years were a time of

57Sax, *Mountains Without Handrails*, p.64.
recreation. Popular magazines equated the national parks to "Playgrounds for Everyone" and everyone wanted to know "How to see a National Park." Suddenly, in peace times, millions of "families in heavily laden sedans... courageously set out every summer to explore the wilds." By 1949, park visitation had topped thirty million as compared to twenty-one million in 1940.

While the public's interest in the parks was at an all time high in the ensuing decade, congressional funding for the parks remained at an all time low. The parks total budget had dropped from "$21 million in 1940 to $5 million during the war" and remained low thereafter. By 1949, the total operating budget was just $14 million.

Dwindling federal funds forced massive staff reductions during the war and it was soon evident that there would be no replacement of these services. By 1949, there were only 2,393 permanent employees to oversee 45 million acres of land as compared to 5,104 before the war.

As a result of inadequate funds, Director Drury reported, "rangers were cleaning the washrooms in the Petrified National Forest, and directing traffic in Muir

60 Everhart, The National Park Service, p.34.
61 Bernard DeVoto, "The Easy Chair", p.67.
Woods, while visitors roamed largely unguided and unrestrained."62 Vandalism reached an apex as so many treasure seekers and souvenir hunters were free to help themselves. Well traveled parks were littered with graffiti and trash while delicate sub alpine terrain and thermal features were destroyed. In 1950 damage to park facilities, trees, and monuments was estimated to be in the millions of dollars.63

As a result of the wear and tear on the physical structures realized from the hoards of visitors and neglect during the war, Director Drury was to report to the Secretary in 1949, the "backlog of needed physical improvements throughout the park system has pyramided to an estimated cost of... $496,000,000."64 For the 1949 fiscal year, the National Park Service received an appropriation of $7,440,000 for improvements. It barely made a dent and visitors were quick to complain. As Bernard Devoto wrote,

A woman in travel-stained denim is angry because Indian Creek campground is intolerably dusty... Another woman reports that the toilet at Inspiration Point Cliff has been clogged since early last evening... All but one of the


campgrounds looks like slums; in the observer's opinion, the reason why they look that way is that they are slums.65 Yet, even as it seemed prudent to improve park facilities, there were no subsequent increase in congressional funding. With the commencement of the Korean War in 1950, appropriations for the Park Service were again cut back. Albeit, visitors did not stop coming.

The visitor count rose from thirty million in 1949 to 48 million by 1954.66 Some conservative critics attributed this rise in popularity to a "phenomenal demand for outdoor recreation."67 Other preservationists argued that people sought "inspiration"... (and an)... "intimate experience... far from our highly urbanized and standardized civilization."68 Regardless, it was argued that they should pay more of the privilege of doing so. As it was noted, "if motor visitors to Yellowstone during 1954 had paid just $1.27 each toward what they received, instead of 75 cents, and those to Yosemite 95 instead of 62 cents, they would


67Everhart, The National Park Service, p.35.

68Richards, "The Great American Litterbug", p.204.
have paid the entire annual cost of the two parks."69 Yet, even then, this was not likely to occur. All park revenues were deposited in the federal Treasury.

Shortly thereafter, Bernard Devoto wrote a widely publicized article in Harper's Magazine suggesting that the government close all the parks. It was the only alternative, he stated, since neither Congress nor the people cared that our "priceless heritage" was "beginning to go to hell."70 Frank Tinker argued that all that was truly impressive in America should have remained relatively unknown. In that way, it would have only been sought out by those with a "sincere interest" in it.71

**Wildlife and Wildlands Management**

In addition to the problems realized by increasing numbers of visitors by the 1950's, there were also problems to be reckoned with in the areas of wildlife and wildlands management. There had been few changes made in either area since the days of Mather and Albright. And yet, Mather and Albright did not focus on the science of wildlife or wildlands management to begin with. They did their best to


71Tinker, "Vandalism--Nature's Number #1 Enemy", p.314.
set policies with the information they had available at the time. This left Drury and his followers to face the consequences related to unbalanced wildlife populations.

By 1950, it was very apparent that few parks were complete ecosystems. (i.e. all range lands and habitats where park animals roamed were protected) While Mather had stated in his 1918 policy directive that parks needed to incorporate only spectacular geographic features, it was a policy implemented without the benefit of later understandings of ecology. Science had since proved that animals were interdependent on one another. Yet, park boundaries were set. There was no money to enlarge them and many border properties had been commercially developed anyway.

In the parks, it was apparent that range reductions and human interferences had altered normal wildlife relationships. Albeit, in 1949, Director Drury described the NPS method of wildlife management as "nonmanagement". "In theory", he stated, "all forms of wildlife are... left to shift for themselves."72 It was apparent by the 1950's if the Park Service wanted to preserve the wildlife, new management policies would be necessary.

Fortunately for the Park Service, many of their lands

had been carved out of Forest Service holdings and remained surrounded by national forests. While the Forest Service took a more utilitarian approach to resource management and permitted seasonal hunting, wildlife was still better protected on their property than in developed areas. Yet, this was still not enough to ensure the survival of many species. Without a complete ecosystem, some animals were dying out while others were becoming overpopulated with the absence of any natural predators.

In Yellowstone, for example, moose and deer populations were decreasing as the elk were moving into their natural winter range to find food. Consequently the elk populations were multiplying at a terrific rate, especially as they had no natural predators. The Army and later the Park Service had successfully decimated the mountain lion and wolf populations by the 1920's in their belief that they were "bad" animals. While the Park Service had proposed to the Montana State Game Department that they increase their hunting permits for elk north of the park boundary, the Game department refused. Thus, Drury noted, the "Service itself will be forced to affect a drastic reduction... to save the remaining range and associated wildlife."74

73Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, p.23.

74Annual Report to the Secretary of the Interior from the Director of the Park Service, 1949, p.317.
Another problem to be reckoned with in regard to wildlife was the bear populations in the parks. Bears in Yellowstone, Glacier, Yosemite, Sequoia, and Great Smoky Mountains all came to associate humans with food as tourists "and their goodies... managed to turn... black bears into panhandlers." Consequently, beggar black bears were becoming a menace on the roadsides. The problem only acerbated itself as more and more visitors were coming into the parks.

With regard to wildland management, the greatest threat to park terrain after the war Drury considered to be forest fires. The policy with regard to forest fires was one of immediate suppression, yet inadequate staff and funds often kept park fires burning. A second ongoing threat to the wildlands was insect epidemics. Beginning in 1949, Congress had provided funding to chemically control such bugs as the pine bark beetle in Grand Teton National Park and the needle miner in Bryce Canyon National Park, but as the appropriations were so small, the park service was not able to control all infestations.

75 Ed. "Fifty Three Million On The Go", Newsweek, August 6, 1956, p.64.

76 It is likely that the limited funding in this case may have saved a great deal of the parks' wildlife. In their innocence, one of the more popular chemical sprays used was DDT. Annual Report of the Director of the National Park Service to the Secretary of the Interior, p.321.
Echo Park Controversy

In addition to all the problems facing the Park Service with regard to the interior of the parks, the power of the agency was put to the test several times during Drury's administration. The showdown, however, came in 1950 regarding a proposed dam project for Dinosaur National Monument near Echo Park, Colorado. It fell in line with a number of other dam proposals for parks and appeared to be the critical deciding factor. As it was noted in the initial department hearings, "let's open this to its ultimate and inevitable extent, and let's settle... once and for all time... whether we may have... wilderness areas... in the United States." 77

Drury had approved of a dam study in this area by the Bureau of Reclamation in the 1940's. While he may have considered the approval to be just a courtesy extended to the Bureau of Reclamation, over the years they garnered political support for the project. By 1950, they were ready to build. The Park Service, however, "had failed to keep its allies, the preservation groups, informed of the issue."78 They had no political momentum behind them to oppose the dam and when Secretary Chapman approved it, it

78Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, p.51.
seemed as if it would become a reality.

By 1951, all that NPS could hope for was that Congress would defeat the Echo Park dam. In Senate and House hearings, however, it was evident the project had a great deal of support. It came mainly from: "Congressman, governors, civic clubs, chambers of commerce, utility companies, water-users associations, the Bureau of Reclamation, and a tribe of Navaho Indians."79 Opposition came primarily from preservation organizations and educational groups. The Park Service as an agency under the Department of the Interior was in no position to directly oppose it. Thus, they were forced to rely on the support of interest groups and public appeal. Fortunately for them, this proved to be enough. After a long battle in Congress, the Echo Park dam legislation was defeated on April 1, 1956.80

Wilderness advocates hailed the defeat as a great victory. In the face of future dam proposals, they were encouraged that with the Echo Park decision, Congress had affirmed the value of undeveloped land. For the Park Service, though, there was little joy in the victory. Their

79Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, p.216.

power over the fate of parklands had been tested and it was clear they were not in control. Rather in this case, NPS was dangerously dependent on their allies. As Foresta explained in *America's National Parks and Their Keepers*,

An agency always pays a price for the support of its allies. The greater the relative strength of the allies, the greater the restrictions they will be able to impose on an agency and the greater will be the consideration of their interests in the formation of common goals.81

While the Park Service had previously enjoyed a great deal of autonomy in its decision-making processes regarding the parks, the Echo Park controversy signalled a weakening of this power. Yet, the Park Service's reliance on its allies was only beginning.

**A Changing of the Guard**

In the heat of the Echo Park controversy, Director Drury had resigned and Conrad L. Wirth was appointed the new Director after a short period of leadership by Arthur E. Damaray. Wirth, unlike Drury, was a career Park Service official with "practical knowledge of how things get done in Washington."82 And undeniably, there was plenty to be done. With the parks and the Park Service's integrity rapidly diminishing, he set about to change the system almost immediately.


82Everhart, *The National Park Service*, p.36.
Mission 66

To combat the problems facing the parks, in 1955 Director Wirth announced the beginning of "Mission 66,... a ten year rehabilitation and capital development program... to improve facilities, staffing, and resource preservation at all areas in time for the 50th anniversary of the Service."83 This program was designed to be conservation oriented. As Director Wirth noted, "to achieve specific protection goals within a park, the best control is properly planned and executed development."84 As Lou Garrison, Chairman of the Mission 66 Steering Committee concurred, "appropriate development of facilities such as roads or trails actually could be viewed as a conservation and protection measure, as it tended to channel and restrict use."85 With eighty million visitors projected to visit the parks in 1966, it was apparent some action in this direction needed to be taken.

It was calculated in 1955 that "Mission 66" would cost the federal government $800 million over the period of ten years.86 To garner support for the project and necessary

83Ibid., p.42.


86Everhart, The National Park Service, p.36.
funding, Wirth looked to the American Automobile Association (AAA) and environmental groups for help. While AAA sponsored the kick-off activities in Washington for the program, the "surge of publicity calling attention to the dilemma of the national parks", was also a boon to the cause.87

In a meeting between President Eisenhower and Wirth in 1956, the President pledged full support for Mission 66. With that advantage, a bill was submitted with some funds in it for every Congressman with a park in his district. Not surprisingly, "Congress bought Mission 66 completely and gave it a warm reception at budget-hearing time.88 Eventually, Congress would wind up contributing more that $1 billion for this one NPS program.

Conclusion

At the close of the 1950's, NPS found itself facing a myriad of problems throughout the national park system. Yet, it was hoped that as a result of Mission 66 some of the tension on the park's facilities would be relieved. It was also hoped that satisfactory completion of Mission 66 would help NPS to regain integrity, agency independence that was lost as a result of the war, and more federal funding.

87Wirth, "Mission 66", p.17.
The Park Service had become well established by the 1950's, however. It was clear people loved their parks and with the increase in vacation time, people were getting out and enjoying them more. Mather, Albright, and their predecessors had done their job well. In the process of building up public support, they had also built up a powerful political constituency, including key congressional officials and environmental organizations. While the costs of a powerful political constituency was realized in the Echo Park Controversy, the alliance nevertheless proved to be beneficial to the ecological integrity of the parks. NPS came to recognize that agency autonomy in some cases would have to be sacrificed.
Chapter III

Management of the national parks changed drastically between the 1950's and 1960's, in part because of the parks' increasing popularity. As the public continually showed more interested in the parks, more people and political forces wanted a say in the management of these lands. For the first time, these forces began acting on NPS to significantly usurp its autonomy. Together, the power of these forces bespoke of a new era in park management.

It is important to note that there was no one single force impacting the Park Service during the sixties. Rather, the forces of change were many. For the purposes of this thesis, I would like to discuss three of these forces: Secretary Udall, environmental lobbies, and Congress. These are the three most significant forces of change during the sixties because of the legacy they left on park management.

The State of the Parks - 1960

In the early years of the Park Service, the directives for the Service had been relatively forthright. Mather and Albright knew they needed people in the parks in order to justify their existence and the question was how best to attract the people. The Park Service in the 1960's, however, was much different. Objectives were fused with the lack of consensus as to what was the appropriate role of
parks. In the face of an overwhelming number of visitors by 1960, the preservationist constituency was very concerned about their impact on the environment. They were also disturbed that the "modern style of tourism was depriving the parks of their central symbolism, their message about the relationship between man and nature, and man and industrial society." 1 The utilitarian was disturbed because there were not adequate facilities to provide for the tourists. Mission 66 was not keeping up with the demand as a private manager might be able to.

Mission 66 had been sold to Congress and the public by Director Wirth in 1955 as a catch all plan and conservation program for the parks to refurbish them. But it appeared as early as 1960, that Mission 66 was not all that the parks needed. Despite the Park Service's work to improve facilities, interpretation programs, and park protection under Mission 66, park visitation was increasing at such an astronomical rate that the program afforded in reality little protection for the park or improvements for the guests.

Seventy two million people visited the national parks in 1960, a sharp increase from the fifty-four million in 1955. 2 Consequently, facilities and services were still

1 Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p. 11.
inadequate. Park personnel could not keep up with the visitors demands. Even the protective efforts on the part of the Park Service were not ensuring that the geologic wonders many were coming to see were not being destroyed.3

As the preservationists described it, Mission 66 was "road-oriented and big-development oriented."4 As Edward Abbey noted in Desert Solitaire, "Industrial Tourism is a threat to the national parks."5 So long as we are willing to build more roadways and facilities in the parks, he argued, "rangers are going quietly nuts answering the same three basic questions five hundred times a day: (1) Where's the john? (2) How long's it take to see this place? (3) Where's the Coke machine?"6

In 1960, the Mission 66 program was reevaluated and reassessed. Secretary Seaton, in a letter to Director Wirth in 1960 indicated that more land should be set aside as parks, more personnel should be employed, but never was it mentioned that more facilities should be built to accommodate guests. Seaton's goal rather was to "preserve


4Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, p.207.


6Ibid., p.52.
the wilderness areas in the system."7 The National Parks Association took a similar view. It was their recommendation that visitors could do with "fewer and less-elaborate visitor accommodations", fewer roads, but greater amounts of "management, protection, and research in the parks."8

The Kennedy Administration and the New Frontier in the Parks

At the same time that Mission 66 was being reassessed in 1960, there was a changing of the guard in the White House. With the election of a new president: John Kennedy and his subsequent appointment of a new Secretary of the Interior: Stewart Udall, a new direction for the parks was declared. Udall led this new direction for parks guided by his own ideas about conservation and park management.

While previous Interior Secretaries had left the Park Service pretty much alone, deferring to the experienced career men that served as Directors, Udall did not. Coming into office, Secretary Udall "made no effort to disguise the fact that his first two loves within the Department were Indian affairs and the national parks".9 He took an active role in park management to a degree previous Interior

Secretaries had not. Consequently, Udall was to have a great impact on the parks and the Park Service during his tenure.

Mission 66, in Udall's mind, was not the direction that the Park Service should be taking. As Udall saw it, Mission 66 still "reflected a great faith in progress rather than a healthy distrust for it... Its building program reflected assumptions about the harmony of development and wilderness which were no longer in fashion."10 Without Mission 66, "there probably would have been a disaster of insufficiency".11 Much of the blame for the unpopular program was placed on Wirth who initiated it and still shared the progressive ideas of his predecessors towards the parks. So with pressure brought on from Secretary Udall, Wirth resigned in October, 1963 and was replaced by George B. Hartzog.12

Hartzog and Udall both found the Park Service in a turbulent time as it began to struggle for the first time with its equivocal mission both to preserve the parks and provide for their use. To realign park management, Udall

10Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, p.67.


12John Prokop, "Man in the Middle", American Forests, p.35.
decided that areas within the national park system would be divided into three categories: natural, historical, and recreational. In the natural areas, preservation would be emphasized. In the historical areas, historical facilities would be maintained while preservation of the land would be secondary. In recreational areas, "both natural and historic resource preservation would be subordinate to management for outdoor recreation." Management plans appropriate to these three different areas would then be drawn up and administered.

Park management plans under Hartzog were also revised so that each unit of the Park Service would have more autonomy in the decision made regarding that unit. While Mather and Albright had strived to achieve a sense of uniformity in park management, the diverse needs of the Service no longer found "one over-all policy of management" to be the most effective. Thus, Yellowstone biologists were permitted to solve the problem of their rapidly growing elk herd as they saw fit while the Master Plan in the Great Smoky Mountains National Park focused on enlarging the

13"Memorandum to the Director of the National Park Service to the Service from the Secretary of the Interior on Management of the National Park System", July 10, 1964.


15Prokop, "Man in the Middle", p.36.
Finally, both Udall and Hartzog firmly believed the Park Service should be expanded. In his July 10, 1964 directive to Hartzog, Udall specifically requested that NPS continue to take on additional areas of natural, historic, and recreational value. During the sixties, consequently, NPS made numerous recommendations to Congress of appropriate land acquisitions. With a conservationist-minded administration and Congress, it was possible to expand the NPS system by more than five million acres by 1969.16

The Rise of the Environmental Organizations

While the Park Service was rethinking its management plans for the parks, it was clear public concern for the environment was on the upswing. Spurred by books such as Silent Spring and Science and Survival, awareness of the threats to the environment were receiving a great deal of public attention.17

By the 1960's, it was becoming painfully evident to many Americans that true wildlands were diminishing at an astronomical rate. Industry "appeared destined to occupy all the unoccupied lands", while those set aside as parks

16Hartzog, "Over the Years with the National Park Service", National Parks, p.14.

were becoming more congested every year. The public responded with a outcry of concern. Their concern led to a surge in memberships in major environmental organizations throughout the United States. Throughout the sixties, environmentalists organizations, such as the Sierra Club and Wilderness Society, were growing rapidly in terms of followers, lobbying dollars, and political power.

The membership growth of the Sierra Club, alone, increased ten fold between 1945-65. Yet, for those connected with organizations such as the Sierra Club and Wilderness Society, it was not enough just to fight for environmental protection. They were determined to have a say in park management and did so by lobbying Congress for new legislation affecting the parks. The environmentalists had earlier shown how much power they could wield in Congress during the Echo Park controversy. At the time, it proved to be greater than that of the Park Service, even though the agency later chose to ignore "the wishes of its preservationists supporters in carrying out Mission 66." In the sixties, however it appeared, environmentalist organizations were to be a force to be reckoned with in deciding park management policies.

19Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, p.69.
One common concern shared by most of these environmental organizations was the rapid increase in park visitation. While the country's population increased 9.4 percent between 1960-1969, visits to the national park system increased ninety percent during the same time period. If parks were to remain great wilderness areas, it was clear park success could no longer be counted in terms of numbers of visitors as it had been for the past forty-five years. The land simply could not support the numbers entering the parks. Moreover, there was a recognized "saturation point beyond which the wilderness experience' was no longer possible." While there was no consensus what this maximum carrying capacity for the parks was, most were sure it was eminent and called for more prudent wilderness management.

The public raised such an outcry in the 1960's that the Park Service had no choice but to reevaluate their traditional park management practices. No longer would the progressive vision Mather had for the parks be acceptable to the public. Something new was needed as all the park's traditional sources of support began to fall away. The momentum as it was, lay with the environmental organizations.

20Hartzog, "Over the Years with the National Park Service", National Parks, p.14.

such as the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society. And they had lost faith in the idea that preservation accompanied progress.

The Wilderness Act

The first showdown between the Park Service and environmental organizations in the sixties came as a result of a proposed wilderness bill. This bill, under study in Congress since 1957, was designed to give "an unprecedented degree of protection to wild country." While the Park Service, Forest Service, and Bureau of Land Management all provided for the construction of roads and accommodations on their property, the proposed wilderness bill would ensure that there would be some land left as much as possible in its natural state.

The idea for such a wilderness bill came about in the mid-1950's. At that time, it was noted by scientist James P. Gilligan, that "wilderness in America was doomed to extinction under the prevailing conditions and that prevailing conditions could not be altered unless preservation interests formed a united front in support of some positive program of wilderness preservation." The Sierra Club picked up on this and proposed "a national

22Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, p.221.

wilderness preservation system based on legislation to be drafted through the cooperation of federal land-management agencies and conservation organizations."24 The organizations that actually drafted the bill, however, were the Citizens Committee on Natural Resources, the Council of Conservationists, the Wilderness Society, the Sierra Club, the National Wildlife Federation, the National Parks Association, and the Wildlife Management Institute along with the aid of others.

As it was proposed by Senator Hubert Humphrey on June 7, 1956, the initial legislation listed eighty areas in the national forests, forty-eight in national parks and monuments, twenty in national wildlife refuges, and fifteen on Indian reservations that would comprise the wilderness system. Its intent was "to secure for the American people the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness."25 The need for it lay in the fact that many people, including environmental organizations wanted a greater assurance that there would be land that was not developed.

It quickly emerged that the federal land agencies were opposed to any such wilderness preservation system. The Park Service opposed the idea of a congressionally-mandated

24Frome, Battle for the Wilderness, p.138.
wilderness system on federal land as it would limit their authority over park lands. After all, according to their enabling legislation, they were designated the supreme federal preservation agency. Wirth also "questioned the appropriateness of many Indian and wildlife refugee lands for inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation System."26

But the environmentalists organizations were adamant that there was a need for designated wilderness areas. Historically, land management policies in "national forests had been only an administrative decision subject to change at any time by Forest Service personnel. Even the laws creating the national parks and monuments deliberately left the way open for the construction of roads and tourist accommodations."27 The Park Service management philosophy at the time could not prove that there were indeed tracts of land that were totally safe from any future development. They were still of the mindset that land could have multiple uses. Land, as Wirth saw it, could be both used and preserved for future generations.

The debate over the wilderness bill droned on into 1964. One reason for its delay was the defensive front


27Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, p.221.
against any such legislation being led by logging industries, oil, grazing, mining interests, professional foresters, and other developers. But finally a ground swell of grassroots support lead by the popular environmental movement secured the legislation. On April 10, 1963 the wilderness bill passed in the Senate 73 to 12. It was later approved in a different form in the House, differences were reconciled, and it was signed into law September 3, 1964.28

The passage of the wilderness bill proved that the forces of the popular environmental movement were not to be easily dealt with in the 60's. Momentum was definitely in their direction.

The Leopold Report

At the same time the Wilderness Act was ratified, Staker Leopold, son of Aldo Leopold, and other environmentalists made public a government report detailing how parks should be managed. Written on the request of Secretary of the Interior Udall, the Leopold Committee concluded that national parks ideally should "represent a vignette of primitive America."29 The committee recognized

28Frome, The Battle for the Wilderness, p.140.

that most were not complete ecosystems, but they recommended "as a primary goal... that the biotic associations within each park be maintained... as nearly as possible in the condition that prevailed when the area was first visited by white man."30

It was a radical idea for national parks, which for the most part, had virtually no wildlife management policies based on science at all. Yet, the Leopold Report recognized too, at the time, they did not have all the necessary "ecological skills" to carry out such a plan. Not enough was known about the original state of parklands as most had been developed prior to being set aside. Thus, the Leopold committee recommended that "a greatly expanded research program... be developed by the Park Service itself... Both research and the application of management methods should be in the hands of skilled park personnel."31 The first priority of the Park Service, they argued, should be historical research.

Environmental groups lauded the idea. In their recommendations, the Leopold Committee "did not yield to Western pressures to open our parks to public hunting" in an


31Ibid.
effort to keep the wildlife populations under control. Rather, it made them "proud to be identified with conservation" as it seemed to be a definitive step in solving the wildlife management problems plaguing the larger parks. The Park Service was less certain. District rangers in both Yellowstone and the Grand Canyon who had been artificially controlling ungulate populations for years, had their doubts that a complete ecosystem could be recreated. Secretary Udall, as well, "was reluctant to accept the committee's findings." Yet, as Starker Leopold recalled, "the environmental community received it so enthusiastically, that Udall changed his mind." On May 23, 1963, Secretary Udall ordered the Service to "take such steps as are appropriate to incorporate this philosophy and the basic findings into the administration of the National Park Service."

Congress and the Parks

The shifting balance of power in park management in the

34Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, p.34.
35Ibid., p.34.
36Ibid.
1960's cannot entirely be credited to the rising environmental groups or Secretary Udall. A third key player was Congress.

In the 1960's, Congress began a move to "gain some control over their expanding workloads and over the increasing fragmentary nature of their work."37 They accomplished this by expanding congressional staffs, improving the Congressional Research Service, and expanding the responsibilities of the General Accounting Office. This move was to have a significant impact on the autonomy of the Park Service.

Prior to the 1960's, the Park Service was one of many agencies that operated with little Congressional control or oversight, primarily because Congress did not have the resources and the Park Service was a small agency and relatively non-controversial. With the increase in human resources in the 1960's, however, Congress was able to play a greater role in bureaucratic oversight and consequently was in a better position to monitor federal agencies, including the Park Service. Congressional oversight "heightened expectations and Congress came to expect more

control over the federal bureaucracy."38 The Park Service was no exception.

In the 1960's "Congress increased its sway over the Park System, (and) the environmental groups in turn increased their influence over Congress."39 Thus, environmental groups exhibited even more political clout as they exerted their force both on the Park Service and Congress. Park policy making in the sixties became public decision-making to be made by very powerful environmental and Congressional groups as well as federal land agencies.

In his book, *Parks, Politics, and the People*, Wirth provides a great deal of insight into NPS/Congressional relations during the sixties. Of special interest, he notes, was the strength of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, led by Congressman Wayne N. Aspinall (D-CO) from 1959-72. As he stated,

The record of the committee during that period is outstanding from a Park Service point of view. I don't recall a park bill reported out of committee that ever failed to pass once it was called up in the House for consideration.40

The number of NPS-related bills coming out of Aspinall's

38Foresta, *America's National Parks and Their Keepers*, p.75.


committee was impressive. Many of these bills to be passed into law enlarged the park system and defined policy and administrative matters. While many bills increasing the park system were passed after Wirth's retirement, arguably Wirth notes, "the big influx of proposed legislation to add new parks to the system result(ed) from studies made during Mission 66."41

This committee work was encouraging to NPS who had suffered since W.W.II when Congress "seemingly lost interest in the park system."42 The additions to the park system gave it the vote of confidence it needed. But it is important to note that the NPS legislation coming out of Congress was not entirely preservation oriented. A classic example of alternative legislation affecting the parks was The Concessions Act.

The Concessions Act

At the same time that the Park Service was trying to diffuse what the Wilderness Act and the Leopold Report meant for the parks, the Concessions Act was passed by Congress. It was a seeming antithesis to both the Wilderness Act and the Leopold Report. While the Wilderness Act and the Leopold Report stressed keeping things in their natural

41Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People, p.335.
42Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, p.200.
state, the Concessions Act made it more feasible for concessionaires to build facilities and provide services to visitors. It was in fitting with the age of the Great Society and the New Frontier's emphasis on recreation. After all, how can one recreate without the aid of recreation facilities? Albeit, the mission of the Park Service, it seemed, was again lost in the desires of outside interests.

The Concessions Policy Act of 1965 was designed to refine National Park Service policies toward concessionaires to make it easier for them to survive in a seasonal operation. Even with the hoards of tourists visiting the national parks, concessionaires were having a difficult time realizing a profit because of the NPS regulations.

The regulations as they had evolved since Mather's time had changed very little. Under the NPS organic act, the Park Service was permitted "to enter into contracts with 'responsible' persons or firms for up to thirty years, without having to advertise or accept competitive bids for projects." Concessionaires continued to act as "regulated monopolies" in the parks, however, they never owned the land nor did they have legal title to their buildings.


44Ibid., p.28.
there were informal agreements made between the Park Service and the concessioner in many cases, even so, this system gave a "great deal of discretion to" the Park Service. The Concessions Policy Act, evolving from a congressional review of the concession situation, set about to amend the discrepancies.

The Concessions Policy Act "recognized the existence of concessionaires and stated that their operations were proper if their services were appropriate and necessary." But more importantly, it gave concessionaires "all incidents of ownership except legal title." This was accomplished by giving concessioner a "possessory interest" in the parks which provided them with "more control". As long as concessionaires met their part in the contact with the Park Service, they had the right to operate concession facilities in the park and this could not be taken away "without just compensation." The concessionaires also benefited under


47Public Law 89-249, 89th Congress, H.R. 2091, October 9, 1965, "Relating to the Establishment of Concession Policies in the Areas Administered by National Park Service and for Other Purposes".


49Hummel, *Stealing the National Parks*, p.246.
the act as it guaranteed them a "preferential right' in renewing their contracts.50 This meant that the Park Service could not solicit or even consider any other concessionaires' offers until the existing concessioner decided not to renew the contract.

The Park Service Response to the Wilderness Act, Leopold Report and Concessions Act

As the 50th anniversary of the Park Service came and went, the Park Service was painfully aware that they were no longer the same autonomous agency that they were when the Service was established.51 While the Park Service had realized a great deal of success in the first fifty years, whether it be measured in the millions of acres of park lands, millions of visitors, or millions of federal dollars, in their success, they lost some of their independence. This was all too apparent in the passage of the Wilderness and Concessions Acts. It was also evident that the Park Service desperately needed a proactive plan for management that specifically spelled out its management objectives. As Edward Abbey noted in Desert Solitaire, "it is apparent that we cannot decide the question of development versus


preservation by a simple referral to holy writ or an attempt to guess the intention of the founding fathers; we should make up our own minds and decide for ourselves what the national parks should be and what purpose they should serve."52

The National Park Service responded to the Wilderness Act and the Concessions Act with little enthusiasm. Both laws clearly restricted their management options in certain areas. The Leopold Report, however, was to have the opposite effect on NPS. Both Secretary Udall and Director Hartzog were to use this highly publicized paper in the ensuing years to implement long overdue directives for change. In lieu of a well-accepted management plan emanating from NPS or the Interior Department, the Leopold Report would have to do.

The Park Service Response to the Wilderness Act

As designated by the Wilderness Act, the Secretary of the Interior was to review every roadless area in the national parks, national monuments, and wildlife refugee systems and make subsequent recommendations as to which were "suitable" for "wilderness" designation. These recommendations were to be sent to the President and then onto Congress, who would make the final decision. The

52Edward Abbey, Desert Solitaire, p.55.
Secretary had ten years to complete his study of all lands included in the Park System.53

Problems with this system were apparent right from the start. Neither the Park Service nor the Secretary of the Interior was anxious to classify land as it undermined the purposes of the parks' Organic Acts as well as that of the NPS's. They wanted to be able "to reserve flexibility in respect to wilderness in the parks."54 Moreover, there was no consensus as to what classified as "suitable" land. While the restrictions on wilderness areas were explicit, the classification of "wilderness" had been left to NPS. NPS promptly set up a complex zoning classification system that provided them with a number of loopholes by which to avoid classifying land as "wilderness."

The zoning system that the Park Service offered to the public came forth under the guise of the Master Plans for each park. As Hartzog described it in 1967,

It has long been the practice of the National Park Service to prepare and maintain a Master Plan to guide the use, development, interpretation, and preservation of each particular park. Graphics and narrative specify the objectives of management. These Master Plans in the true sense of the word are zoning plans. They not only define the areas for development, but also define the areas in


which no developments are to be permitted.55

The main difference between the wilderness areas set aside under the Master Plans for the parks, however, and the wilderness areas that could be created under the Wilderness Act was: Park Service control. The Park Service would always be in control of those areas they designated wilderness under their Master Plans. They would be free to change a particular area's classification if they cared to. The Wilderness Act would not afford them the same freedom.

In the meantime, however, Secretary Udall and Director Hartzog did make two recommendations for "wilderness" tracts to be instated in Craters of the Moon National Monument and Lassen Volcanic National Park. The combined acreage of both tracts of land was less than 100,000 acres.56 Environmental groups were clearly disappointed. Some accused the Park Service of "using the review process to set aside large tracts of land for park developments."57 In doing so, the parks would be able to accommodate more guests, win more supporters, who would in turn lobby Congress for more facilities in the parks.

55Hummel, Stealing the National Parks, p.249.


Later, three more tracts of land were recommended by the Secretary and Director to be included in the wilderness system: Petrified Forest, Pinnacles, and Lava Beds. Yet, the real battle over the Wilderness Act emerged in the Great Smoky Mountains National Park. There, as part of the NPS Master Plan for the area, the Park Service desired to build a major road running in between the mountains and connecting many of the remote mountain areas. Director Hartzog argued the road would provide better access to wilderness threshold areas. As Hartzog stated, "the only facilities planned in these natural-environment lands are the minimum required for public enjoyment, health, safety, preservation, and protection of the features, such as one-way motor nature trails, small overlooks, informal picnic sites, short nature walks, and wilderness-type uses." To Wilderness Act advocates, this proposal was in direct violation of the NPS commitment of preservation. As Anthony Wayne Smith, President of the National Parks and Conservation Association stated, "the actual purpose of the so-called wilderness thresholds, whether acknowledged or not, is really to reserve such areas for road, parking lot, and facility


In June of 1969, one hundred prominent environmentalists met with Interior Secretary Hickel and requested that the road proposal be abandoned. Hickel instead offered an alternative roadway, one which still included visitor services, but instead it skirted along the edge of the park instead of through the middle of it. The Park Service eventually succeeded in their fight to build this new roadway in the Great Smoky Mountains. But in doing so, they were acutely aware of the power of the environmental groups against them and the force of legislation which threatened their autonomy. To combat this, the succeeding NPS Master Plans for the parks were prepared "behind closed doors." The Impact of the Leopold Report

Ironically, while the Wilderness Act proceeded to estrange the Park Service even farther from the thinking of many environmentalists, the Leopold Report brought them closer together. The Park Service was quick to accept the

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Leopold Report, not only because of the pressure brought on by the environmentalists, but because it provided the Park Service with an excuse to instigate change. The Park Service's approach to wildlife management had traditionally been less than scientific. By the sixties, NPS was realizing tremendous wildlife management problems, most notably in Yellowstone National Park, and any move toward new solutions was welcomed.

In 1968, Director Hartzog published the Green, Red, and Blue books which elaborated on new policies for the parks which corresponded with the management plans recommended by the Leopold Committee. Natural primitive parks were to be managed:

...so as to conserve, perpetuate, and portray as a composite whole the indigenous aquatic and terrestrial fauna and flora and scenic landscape. Management will minimize, give direction to, or control those changes in the native environment and scenic landscape resulting from human influences or natural processes of ecological succession. Missing native life forms may be reestablished, where practicable. Native environmental complexes will be restored, protected, and maintained, where practicable, at levels determined through historical and ecological research of plant-animal relationships. Non-native species may not be introduced into natural areas. Where they have become established... an appropriate management plan should be developed to control them.63

Thus, the parks were to be returned to a "vinaigrette

of primitive America." And yet, while the Leopold committee recognized that parks were not complete ecosystems, Hartzog directed that they were to be managed as if they were. What is important, he stated, is "the concept of preservation of a total environment as compared with the protection of an individual feature or species." This policy, very similar to the one proposed by V.E. Shelford in the 1930's, came to be dubbed as "ecosystems management."

For parks, such as Yellowstone, ecosystems management was to have a profound effect on their policies towards regulating wildlife. While park management had evolved from a period of non-management (1872-1930) to a period of active management (1930-1968), it seemed as if non-management, under the guise of scientific ecology, was in vogue again.

As discussed earlier, Yellowstone NPS officials had been artificially controlling the northern range elk herd by shooting a number of them annually since the 1930's. Artificial control seemed the best way to avoid an ungulate population irruption seeing as the park itself was not a complete ecosystem. However, in 1960, the NPS elk shootings were publicized on television. Environmentalists were so outraged that they brought the issue before Congress. In Senate Hearings in 1967, there was a great deal of

64Ibid., p.40.
controversy "over just what elk management in Yellowstone was expected to accomplish." 65

The elk controversy put the NPS in a catch-22 position in the late 1960's. Park biologists firmly believed there were too many elk for the land to support, yet, public outrage over the elk shoots was costing them public support. Fortunately, Hartzog and his new "Leopold" management directives were being issued at this time. The NPS interpreted these new policies to mean that parks could be left alone to manage themselves, although the Leopold Committee specifically commended the elk shooting in the park as an appropriate means of control. Regardless a new experiment was begun in Yellowstone: that of natural regulation. The elk populations, park scientists argued, would take care of themselves. Even though the elk no longer had any natural predators in Yellowstone, save for the grizzly bear, the elk populations, nevertheless, would naturally stabilize.

In other parks, mainly McKinley in Alaska And Isle Royale in Lake Superior, the new "ecosystems management" policy had a much better chance of success. In these parks, lack of NPS staff had, in effect, put natural regulation in

practice a long time ago. Populations of predators and prey appeared to live in balance and "by these two populations being together the vegetation habitat is conserved."66 In Yellowstone, the overgrazing of range land had shown that no "biotic whole" existed as such.

The Impact of the Concessions Act

The changes in the law governing park concessions made concessions very appealing to corporations. Almost overnight, small family operations... were bought out by conglomerates."67 These were corporations who were often running operations in several parks while concessions were only a small part of their business.68

The new conglomerates quickly expanded concession operations in order to accommodate the ever increasing numbers of tourists in the parks. But as they invested millions of dollars in concession operations, they also endeavored to ensure that their investment would be protected. Corporate concessions began to exert a much greater voice in park management than their predecessors had. The Concessions Policy Act of 1965 protected their


67Zaslowsky, These American Lands, p.41.

right to do so.

**Conclusion**

By the close of the 1960's, numerous pieces of legislation impacting on park management had been ratified. Clearly, Congress was exerting its influence on park management as was Secretary Udall and the environmentalists. Conservation was politically popular in the New Frontier and Great Societies. NPS and the parks were also affected, however, by the nationwide environmental movement coming to fruition in the early 1960's.

Under the mandates of the new legislation, the new public interest in the parks, and the administration of Secretary Udall, it was clear that the Park Service would never enjoy the same degree of autonomy as it had prior to the beginning of the decade. Hartzog had tried to restore some of the autonomy to the parks by shifting much of the park management decision-making down to the individual park level. He had also moved to lessen the public response to park Master Plans as a reactionary measure. But neither plan of action restored the Park Service's autonomy that they had lost.

Hartzog and the Park Service were fortunate in the

69Hummel, *Stealing the National Parks*, p.248.
1960's, however to have the support of the Secretary of the Interior and his staff in their congressional battles. Secretary Udall was very much concerned with the parks and worked closely with Hartzog on park policies. While the Park Service was unenthusiastic about the new laws as they dictated to some extent future park management directives, nevertheless, they were not out of line with the policy directives that the Park Service had created and implemented themselves.
Chapter IV

Congressional influence over the federal bureaucracy was expanded between 1960-1980 generally as a result of burgeoning congressional staffs accompanied by the support of an enlarged Congressional Research Office and General Accounting Office. Congressional control over the Park Service was to be enlarged by two additional factors as well. The first was "the reluctance of recent Presidents to make use of the 1906 Antiquities Act".1 Without Presidential initiative, the Park Service became reliant on laws enacted by Congress for expansions and improvements. Secondly, the low priority of NPS in Nixon's administration agenda transferred much initiative to Congress. Fortunately for the national parks and the National Park Service, there was an NPS Director in place who was willing and able to take a stand in Congress.

Director George Hartzog and Congress

From the time he was appointed as Director in 1964, George Hartzog made it a practice to make "courtesy calls" to all key Congressional members.2 He was very much aware

1Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, p.75.

of the power Congress held over the Park Service. Thus, he made it a point to know the people that held the authority to preserve the parks. In addition to personal visits, Hartzog also led tours of the nearby parks for Congressional members which he used as an opportunity to discuss park policies. Hartzog made sure all members of Congress had reason to take note of these discussions. He made it clear that the establishment of parks represented tangible benefits to constituents. Congress duly reacted to his sage advice. With the establishment of the National Wilderness Preservation System (1964), the National Trails System (1968), the Historic Preservation System (1966), and the Wild and Scenic Rivers System (1968) there was an NPS administered tract of land in every congressional district.3 Pork barrel parks had come of age.

**Director Hartzog and President Nixon**

While Hartzog had become a popular and well respected figurehead within the NPS and on the Hill by the 1970's, he was not popular with President Nixon. When rumors leaked from the White House in 1969 that Hartzog would be replaced, "congressmen and senators heated up in sufficient numbers to evaporate the rumor."4 Hartzog, nevertheless, only remained

3Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, p.138.

a part of the Nixon Administration until 1972. Upon the reelection of President Nixon in 1971, Hartzog was fired. Some park critics argue that NPS lost control of the Park Service with his dismissal.

Nixon replaced Hartzog with Ronald Walker, "a White House staff aide who knew nothing about either agency administration or national parks."5 Totally "unfamiliar with park operations, Walker's appointment dismayed the career employees, loyal park service alumni and the citizen conservation organizations."6 As a result of Walker's inexperience, Secretary Rogers Morton asked Assistant Secretary Nathanial Reed to oversee NPS matters. Reed instead wound up running the Park Service. Fortunately, for the parks and NPS, Reed "was an environmentalist and he took a personal hand in ensuring that the agency managed the Park System in accord with the Wilderness Act and the National Environmental Policy Act."7 His actions "did not significantly disrupt park policy or operations."8

While Reed managed the parks in an ecologically

5Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, p.85.

6Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, p.263.

7Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, p.85.

sensitive manner, it was clear that the NPS was not in control of itself. Even after Director Morton resigned in January 1975 and was replaced by a well-liked NPS careerman, Gary Everhardt, the power of the director was not restored. Reed continued to "dabble in day-to-day operational management" while his assistant became the associate director for National Park Service legislation.9

The Interior Department was not the only usurper of NPS control, however, during the early seventies. A second major influence on the Park Service was the revived Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Nixon's OMB gave him and later presidents a cadre of loyal men who had the ability to control agency budgets. Consequently, the OMB was able to control agency policies. OMB also permitted the President and staff to play a greater role in park management.

OMB and NPS

From its inception, OMB argued that the Park Service's problems "could be solved through greater management efficiency."10 This translated into a "no-growth policy" for the Park Service.11 As OMB Associate Budget Director

9Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, p.264.


James L. Mitchell noted, "park Superintendents almost always want more personnel and funds... They will just have to do the best job they can with what they get."12

In 1963, Glacier National Park in Montana had 72 permanent personnel and 261 seasonals to help the 800,000 annual visitors. By 1975, Glacier had only 56 permanent personnel and 273 seasonals to cope with 1.6 million annual visitors. This was the scenario in many of the "crowned jewels." While total national park visitation increased by 27 percent between 1971-1975, there was no significant increase in park personnel. Congress "had authorized an increase in permanent staff positions totaling seven percent, from 7,925 to 8,491, but the Service never received these increases."13 On March 1, 1974, the Park Service summarized its situation:

As the Service continues to spread manpower over greater numbers of areas... maintenance, resource management, safety, and visitor services are not being conducted at prescribed standards.14

Roads deteriorated in the parks along with visitor services. As Representative William Moorhead noted, "I can find no

12Mary Alice Kellogg, "The Shame of the National Parks", Newsweek, May 10, 1976, p.70.


other phrase to better describe the OMB's attitude toward the existing conditions in the parks than that of 'thoughtless neglect'."15

During the same time period, NPS properties increased seven percent. Congress was clearly much more receptive to the idea of aiding and expanding the system than was the OMB. Pork barrel parks that were created included urban parks in New York and San Francisco in addition to Big Thicket National Preserve in Texas and Big Cypress National Preserve in Florida. These tracts were definitely not on the scale of the "crowned jewels" of the system, but they were important nevertheless.

The leader on national park matters in the 95th Congress was Representative Philip Burton, Chairman of the House subcommittee on Conservation, Energy, and Natural Resources. Burton realized that a healthy environment was indicative of a healthy society. Yet, Burton was "also an astute politician who realized that parks, because of their distributive value, were good bargaining chips and that therefore his subcommittee had control of a powerful political currency."16 Under Burton, the subcommittee made a vigilant search for new park additions. In their efforts

15Mary Alice Kellogg, "The Shame of the Parks", p.70.

16Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, p.80.
to acquire more additions, they convinced Congress in 1976 to pass legislation that established the "park-of-the-month club."17 This legislation ensured that the subcommittee had a continuous list of park proposals for the committee to act on.

While Congress took an interest in the parks in the early seventies, the Nixon and Ford administrations did not. Their arguments against the Park Service had a basic reoccurring theme: "the need for decentralization of government, complex management and acquisition problems, emphasis on state, local, and private efforts; and the scarcity of federal dollars."18 The Park Service had been hopeful that President Ford would take more of an interest in the parks as he had been a former ranger in Yellowstone National Park, but that did not prove to be the case. Only during his election campaign in 1975 did he visit the park and promise $2.5 billion for the parks.19 Unfortunately, his last minute efforts were viewed as campaign rhetoric. Many asked, "why hasn't he done it before?"20

Pressing Issues for NPS

17Ibid., p.81.
18"Closing the Door on the National Parks", p.23.
19Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, p.264.
While personnel shortages and funding problems plagued NPS continuously, there were two looming NPS issues that begged to be resolved during the seventies. The first issue was concessioner control in the parks. While the Concessions Act of 1965 had established ground rules for concession operations, it also created new problems. The second issue was the fate of the wild, mineral rich Alaskan public lands.

Concession Control of the Parks

As a result of the Concessions Act of 1965, many family run concession operations in the parks were bought out by large corporations as the law made it advantages for them to do so. For many of these large corporations, "business goals of seeking the maximum profit... penetrated the National Park Service planning process and... led to the promotion of national parks as amusement parks rather than areas to be preserved."21 For example, in the early 1970's, the Park Service desired to phase out overnight lodging facilities in Zion and Bryce National Parks. Being relatively small parks, the Park Service felt it would be more environmentally advantageous to return the land to its natural state. However, the concessioner, TWA, publicly fought this plan and eventually won out. In a report issued

by Congress in 1976, the Subcommittee on Conservation, Energy, and Natural Resources found that concessionaires had "a disproportionate degree of influence in relation to the general public in the preparation of Master plans for the national parks."22

To combat concessioner control of the parks, Congress released a report calling for reform of NPS policies relating to concessionaires. NPS argued however, that they were powerless to act due to staffing shortages and inadequate funding. As was noted, there were 300 concessionaires operating in the parks while the NPS staff overseeing their operations consisted of thirty people.23 At the same time, however, OMB ordered the Director to abolish "all authorized permanent NPS positions that were unfilled as of December 31, 1975."24 The problem of concessioner control remained unresolved.

The Alaska Lands Issue

The second issue facing NPS was the Alaska lands issue. NPS had proposed that certain tracts of land in Alaska be set aside as national parks and monuments in compliance with

22Ibid.

23Ibid.

the Alaska Claims Settlement Act of 1971. But these lands were also rich in minerals and oil. As a specialist with the Interior Department noted, these lands have "very high scenic value, very high mineral value--classic war."26

The Alaska Claims Settlement Act of 1971 gave land and federal funds to native Alaskans. It also gave the Interior Secretary the option to withdraw all Bureau of Land Management (BLM) lands for study and possible reclassification. The Secretary could classify these lands as national parks or monuments, national wildlife refuges, scenic rivers, or national forests. Within "five years of the Secretary's recommendations, Congress was directed to establish the areas directly and set their boundaries."27 In December, 1973, Secretary Rogers Morton recommended that 83 million acres be set aside and reclassified. By 1976, Congress had not taken any action while more mining claims were being staked on these lands.28

Environmental groups took on the challenge of securing the Alaska lands, arguing they were "America's Last


Frontier". 29 They submitted their own requests for land acquisitions in Alaska; acquisition requests that were far greater than either the Administration or the Department of the Interior had expected. Securing Alaska's lands was to be their primary mission in the late 1970's.

Considering the problems facing the parks by 1976, one would wonder why the public did not respond with more force. After all, the environmental movement begun in the 1960's was alive and well in the 1970's. Richard Sellers, a National Park Service historian, argues the general public did not respond because they did not comprehend the ramifications of these issues. As he notes,

Despite the environmental movement of the 1960's and 1970's, facade management based largely on aesthetic conditions is still acceptable to many people. Pretty scenery creates an impression of biological health and provides such overwhelming satisfaction that the general public gives little more than cursory consideration to... greater ecological complexes. Few visitors can recognize when certain animal populations are too great or too small... And even when human-caused ecological damage is explained..., the new conditions are often accepted as simply 'another change in scenery.' 30

The Carter Years

When James Earl Carter, an acknowledged environmentalist, succeeded Ford in 1977, many believed the


Park Service would regain its independence and self respect. However, even under this new leadership, NPS was unable to regain control. The Interior Department and Congress continued to extended a heavy hand in management.

Under Carter, Robert Herbst became the new Assistant Secretary in charge of the national parks. Like Reed, Herbst was an environmentalist and committed to conservation. Like Reed, Herbst, worked under a Secretary, Cecil Andrus, who was also an environmentalist but did not have time to delve into park affairs. Herbst, like Reed, was also interested in running the parks. As one insider noted, "Reed ran the Park Service with Walker as director and when Herbst came in he saw this and decided to do the same."31

Director Gary E. Everhardt, who had replaced Walker at his retirement as Director in 1975, was replaced by William Whalen in 1977. Whalen, a young career NPS administrator, lacked agency confidence. This lack of support for the new Director allowed Assistant Secretary Herbst to run the show with Whalen concentrating on day to day management. It was Herbst who introduced park policies and implemented them with help from friends in Congress.

Assistant Secretary Herbst worked closely with

31Foresto, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, p.86.
Representative Burton on park legislation. Like Burton, "and most of the other leaders of the environmental movement, his views of the Park System were expansionist; he took a broad view of the types of units which should be included in it and he was little concerned with conventional national park standards." 32 Herbst was not concerned that national park appropriations were not keeping pace with NPS acquisitions. Rather, he argued, "as new park authorizations built a large enough demand for appropriations in the House, the problem would take care of itself. 33

Assistant Secretary Herbst worked closely with Representative Burton and their efforts paid off. On October 12, 1978, the largest park bill in history was passed, providing for more that 100 parks and preservation projects in 44 states. 34 While it authorized many ecologically important park expansions, the legislation was dubbed the "park barrel bill" because it impacted so many states. As Senator Robert Dole noted, "is there any state other than Kansas that did not end up with a park?" 35

32 Foresta, *America's National Parks and Their Keepers*, p. 86.

33 Ibid., p. 86.


35 "Omnibus Parks Bill", p. 705.
However, no one would dub the 95th Congress the Environmental Congress. It "sustained the President's veto of... (a)... pork-barrel public works appropriation bill with its environmentally damaging water project... (and)... it failed to act on the Alaska lands measure."36

Resolution of the Alaska Lands Issue

When the 95th Congress failed to take action on the Alaska lands issue, President Carter took the initiative in December of 1978 and declared seventeen national monuments in the state. The action gave many of the debated Alaskan wilderness areas federal protection. But Carter's action was only intended to force Congress to act on the issue. The imposed national monument status was "a temporary stopgap insurance so that Congress--instead of development interests --could decide their fate."37 It was the first time a President ever used the powers granted to him under the National Monument Act for this purpose.

After a long and bitter fight between environmentalists and developers, on November 12, 1980 Congress agreed to


restrict development on 104.3 million acres in Alaska. Of that acreage, 43.6 million acres were set aside as national parks.

This one piece of legislation alone increased the NPS land holdings by one third. For the Park Service, the real challenge came after the legislation had been passed. As NPS Regional Director John E. Cook noted, in Alaska,

There'll be more acres per ranger... than this agency has ever known before, and those will contain some of the most sensitive natural systems on earth. Add to this the management of mining claims, long-standing subsistence activities--and visitors already showing up--and we have a challenge that calls for the most dedicated and able field staff, and a support system that won't let them down.39

To provide for the additional staff and funding necessary to keep the enlarged Park Service operating, Congress passed the largest ever appropriation package for NPS. While the Congressional appropriation was less than the Carter administration had recommended, the Service nevertheless received $468.5 million to administer the 323 units in the national park system.40

Concessionaires' Role in Park Management


40"Interior Appropriations Cleared by Congress", Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1980, p.179.
While the Alaska Lands Issue was resolved by 1980, the problem of concessions in the parks had not. This problem had primarily not been resolved as a result of the tremendous influence the large conglomerate concessionaires had on the Park Service. Yet, by 1980, the issue had come to a head in America's first national park, Yellowstone. It was a classic case illustrating the power of the concessioner under the Concessioner Act of 1965.

Concessions Management in Yellowstone

Under the 1965 Concessions Act, the General Host Corporation's possessory interest in Yellowstone gave them "All incidents of ownership except legal title." General Host agreed to maintain the buildings in a manner in which they saw fit. The Park Service was responsible to pay for any additional physical improvements they desired.

Under this contract, General Host was able "to provide and operate facilities and services which he deems desirable for the accommodation of visitors" in compliance with Park Service regulations. The government would receive a percentage of concessioner's profits paid as a franchise fee for the privilege of operating in the park. Any fees

41Public Law 89-249, 89th Congress, H.R. 2091, October 9, 1965, "Relating to the Establishment of Concessions Policies in the Areas Administered by National Park Service and for Other Purposes".

42Ibid.
collected from the concessioner were deposited in the United States Treasury.

General Host moved to successfully operate concessions in Yellowstone for a number of years. Albeit, over time their service to visitors began to lapse and by 1978, "the situation was too dismal to ignore any longer."43 General Host could no longer keep all hotel and dining facilities open because they could not entice people to work for them. Losses forced them to announce they would not "invest... in the refurbishment of the buildings because it could not be guaranteed an adequate return."44 The Park Service consequently decided to evict their management prior to the expiration of their contract. They received permission to do so on November 10, 1978, under the Omnibus Parks Act.45

Under the conditions of the Concessions Act of 1965, the Park Service was forced to buy General Host out of its possessory interest in the park. While the company had failed to "comply with certain capital expenditure requirements", the possessory interest made it very

45"Omnibus Parks Act", National Parks, January, 1979, p.27.
difficult to remove them. After what proved to be a "long and expensive battle", the Park Service regained control of the concessions in Yellowstone in 1981 at a cost of $19 million.

The battle with General Host made it clear to the Park Service that reform was desperately needed in the area of concessioner management. The Service was certain to approach future contracts with trepidation. Yet, because of all the long-term contracts the Park Service held with park concessionaires, reform would not take place overnight. Hearings were led in Congress, but no imminent solution appeared.

The Shift in Control

By 1980, the Park System made some major strides in the areas of land acquisition and funding during the late seventies. But while NPS gained in trusts, it lost in independence. This loss of independence occurred primarily as a result of the rising power of Congress in tandem with high-level Interior Department officials using "their prerogative to influence park management." This influence


48Cahn, "Disputed Territory", p.30
could have been extremely detrimental for the parks' ecological health and the public's enjoyment. But fortunately for both, park policy continued to be environmentally sensitive as Assistant Secretaries Reed, Herbst, and Representative Burton recognized that time was not on the side of the environment.

In May of 1980, Director Whalen was fired. Secretary Andrus stated he was dismissed because of "serious morale and management problems in the service and because of Mr. Whalen's poor health." He was the fourth Director to be fired within a span of ten years. Prior to 1970, not one park service director had been fired.

Many felt Whalen deserved to be fired. He had allowed the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation to simply takeover many NPS historic preservation programs without fuss. This sudden relinquishment undermined his credibility "both within the Park Service and among its unusually loyal and active alumni." A temper tantrum in the middle of a concessioner' meeting sealed his fate as NPS director.

50 Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, p.265.
51 Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks.
To placate angry regional directors who were upset about the loss of the preservation programs and the long-term lack of good leadership, Secretary Andrus asked them to recommend a new director. Not surprisingly, they chose one of their own. Russell Dickerson, the former Pacific Northwest regional director became Director in the summer of 1980.

Conclusion

With Russell Dickerson as the new Director, the Park Service felt confident it would regain the independence that it had lost. But loss of control had occurred gradually in the past twenty years and it would not easily be won back.

Some critics argue this loss began with the firing of George Hartzog, others argue that it began with Watt's tenure. I would have to agree with Ronald A. Foresta that it actually began in the early 1960's when there began "a widespread sense that the agency was pursuing the wrong goals."53 While the Park Service was actively undertaking "park improvement" projects under Mission 66, society was calling for more preservation and less misuse of its resources. Secretary Udall certainly believed it when he took charge of park policy. Environmental groups also abandoned the Park Service at this time when they sent their

53Foresta, America's National Parks and Its Keepers, p.90.
lobbyist to Congress to push for policy reforms. Instead of working with NPS, they began to try to control them. In the 1970's, weak directors further contributed to NPS's management problems. They allowed the Interior Department and Congress to take over. This left the parks much more susceptible to political ebbs and tides. But fortunately, this shift in decision-making did not damage the parks. In the 1960's and 1970's environmental standards were maintained, even if the Park Service was not in control, thanks to key environmentalists in the Interior Department, Congress, and the Administration. But future administrations would show just how vulnerable the integrity of the parks were under this shift in control.
Chapter V

By law, the Park Service must maintain the parks "for the enjoyment of future generations." While there has never been any consensus as to how they should best accomplish this task or what state the parks should be in, the orientation of the Park Service has traditionally dictated that use which distracts from the future enjoyment of others should be eliminated. Traditionally, they have acted under this principle.

Even when the Park Service's independence began eroding away, those in positions of authority continued to follow this principle. The parks were managed with a sense of the organic mission. They were protected for succeeding generations while providing for the enjoyment of those living now. Congress and the Department of the Interior insured that the growing concern for our natural resources was augmented by expansion of the national park system. During the Carter administration alone, total national park acreage increased by one-third.

With the election of President Ronald Reagan and his subsequent appointment of Secretary of the Interior James Watt, however, management policies would change. This

1 Public Law 65-235, as cited in United States Statutes at Large, p. 535.
change initiated from the Reagan Administration's opposition to federal restrictions on federal lands. To counter "unnecessary regulations", Watt initiated policies that were substantially different from those traditionally implemented by the National Park Service.2

The Department of the Interior's new goals combined with the economic strategies of this administration departed sharply from those established previously. However, they were part of a broader Reagan Administration strategy. Within the Reagan Administration's "strategy of bureaucratic control" was "its effort to pare down the federal budget and bureaucracy by having state and local governments and private business assume increasing responsibilities for the provision of goods and services once provided by the federal government."3 Reagan's goals for the bureaucracy, thus, were somewhat similar to Nixon's. However, Reagan was much more successful at reorganizing the bureaucracy so as to meet his agenda. Because of the "high priority the President and his aides assigned to White House control of personnel", Reagan "achieved a degree of loyalty and coherence in the bureaucracy that other Presidents (including Nixon) have


longed for."4 The consequences of this reorganization, attention to personnel selection, and revamping of policy is of great importance as it will last long after the end of the Reagan administration.

Watt's hand in the National Park Service

Watt was not new to the Department of the Interior in 1981. Prior to 1981, he had served as head of the Interior's Bureau of Outdoor Recreation during the Nixon Administration, an agency that frequently had pitted itself against NPS over departmental acquisitions.

With the advent of Secretary James Watt's appointment as Secretary of the Interior in 1981, the Department of the Interior promoted an "antigovernment 'sagebrush rebellion' philosophy and a tilt toward development and privatization, which they aggressively sought to impose on the Park Service."5 Secretary's Watt's promised policy reforms "time and time again...broke with the Department's traditional role of preserving parklands."6 Watt's plans for reform, however, followed the Administration's theme that the


5Robert and Patricia Cahn, "Disputed Territory", p.30.

"public sector should be smaller and less intrusive, and that the private sector should be strengthened and made more influential."7 His drive was to maximize the involvement of private businesses in the parks and this was certainly in accord with the President's desire to strengthen ties with the business community.8 While "Watt's views reflected those of the Reagan administration and pro-development interests that he represented from 1977 to 1980 as head of the Mountain States Legal Foundation, some conservationists have suggested that his appointment as Secretary of the Interior was like 'hiring a fox to guard the chickens.'"9

In order to carry out his plans with minimal interference from NPS, Watt proceeded to remove "five of the top-level managers in the park service."10 For example, he removed the career deputy director, "replacing him with a political loyalist inexperienced in park management and


9Current Bibliography, 1982, p.431.

10Rick Resse, Greater Yellowstone, No. 6, Montana Geographic Society, (Montana Magazine:Helena, MT) 1984, p.98.
lacking empathy for career park professionals."11 He also demoted the Alaska regional director and forced another regional director into retirement. These men were "from the Carter administration...(and)...were too committed to the environmentalist views he opposed."12 This move signalled a "reversal of Interior's long-standing conservationist stance, and in the ensuing atmosphere of uncertainty, there was a noticeable deterioration of morale."13

Watt did announce early on that he would retain Russell Dickerson as Director of NPS. Dickerson shared neither the same park philosophy nor management style and critics argued Watt would have liked to replace Dickerson.14 Dickerson proved not to be any match for Watt, however. Under pressure, he allowed the Secretary to set park policy as his recent predecessors had.

Watt used the shift in power to his advantage. The Secretary encouraged the President to appoint a number of like minded political appointees to the positions of Undersecretary and Assistant Secretary for Fish, Wildlife,


12Current Bibliography, 1982, p.433.

13Ibid., p.433.

14Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, p.268.
and Parks. With utilitarian-minded men such as Donald Hodel and Ray Arnett in these respective positions, Watt was more easily able to carry out his reforms.

Watt was aided by shifts in control within the Department of the Interior that had occurred in the 1960's and 1970's. As the Secretary and Undersecretary had taken a greater role in park management since the early 1960's, Watt was able to capitalize on this control in his own policymaking. Yet, in previous administrations, the Secretaries and the Undersecretaries had worked with the Park Service officials. Watt would not. This caused some park critics to argue that "career park service officials were no longer in charge as a result."15 Power struggles were increasingly evident in the news after 1981 pitting the political appointee posts of Secretary of the Interior and the Assistant Secretary of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks against the professional career-personnel within the Park Service.

**Watt's Plans for the Parks**

After taking office, Watt immediately imposed a moratorium on new park acquisitions. He argued that the government could not manage the lands they currently

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15Ibid., P.98.
possessed. As he noted, a General Accounting Office report completed in 1980 showed "a number of parks to have substandard physical structures." The GAO had estimated $1.6 billion would be necessary to make the essential repairs. Watt reacted by "calling park conditions 'shameful' and 'a disgrace,' and declared that no more money should be spent on parkland acquisition on the grounds that we should first take care of what we have." In an abrupt reversal of policy, Watt abolished the Land and Water Conservation Fund which had supplied money for park acquisitions since 1964.

Environmentalists were outraged at the moratorium. Environmental organizations, such as the "Friends of the Earth, the League of Conservation Voters, the Wilderness Society, the National Wildlife Federation, the Isaak Walton League, and the National Audubon Society sought the removal of Watt from office." The Sierra Club alone lead a


17Fred Powledge, "Toward the Twenty-first Century", *Wilderness*, Spring, 1983, p.34.

18Ibid.


20Current Bibliography, 1982, p.434.
national campaign to remove Watt, obtaining more than one million signatures by October 1981 demanding his replacement.21

A second goal of Watt's was to increase the role of concessionaires in the parks while decreasing government responsibility. Even as park concessionaires had historically functioned as "perpetual monopolies", Secretary Watt, with the support of President Reagan, promised more far-reaching plans for them.22 Watt would give "the concessionaires a greater role in the management of natural resources, even though they have absolutely no expertise in this area."23 This was extremely disturbing news to NPS officials who had felt for some time that the concessionaires already had an undue influence on park policy. But Watt nevertheless persisted. Addressing a national convention of park concessionaires, he stated in 1981, "we will use the budget system to be the excuse to make major policy decisions....('We seek') an aggressive program with private entrepreneurs...('and if any member of the National Park Service gives us a problem)...We're going

21Ibid.


to get rid of the problem or the personality, which ever is fastest."24

Watt pushed for the privatization of park concession operations to fulfill the Reagan Administration's promise "to get the government off the backs" of American businessman.25 Reagan insisted on "'contracting out'" services in order to pare down the federal government's role in economic affairs.26 The Reagan Administration was not concerned with the environmental responsibility of the park concessioner. Rather, the Administration firmly believed that "environmentalists had gone too far" in their demands for environmental protections.27 With large corporations controlling most concession operations by the 1980's, Watt's program of concession privatization promised them greater freedom to expand operations, thus, maximizing corporate profit.

Watt's Plan for Development Near The Parks

A third goal of Watt's was to make Forest Service and


26Peter Benda and Charles Levine, "Reagan and the Bureaucracy; The Bequest, the Promise, and the Legacy", p.124.

27Ibid.
BLM lands more accessible to timbering, mining and exploration. Again, this was done on the premise that regulation was stifling the American man's opportunities and economy. While timbering and development was encouraged outside of the national park boundaries, it often were slated for areas that served as buffer zones for parklands.28 As most of the parks, especially the "crowned jewels", were not complete ecosystems, development in these vital buffer zones jeopardized the integrity of the parks.

Watt's Programs in Action

Watt's opportunity to induce change in park management came almost immediately in Yellowstone National Park. Since the summer of 1979, the Park Service had been negotiating with a new concessioner, T.W. Services, over their contract to operate Yellowstone's hotels and restaurants. From the administration's standpoint, the timing was right to introduce major changes with respect to concession operations. The resulting agreement between T.W. Services and the Park Service, subsequently signed by Secretary Watt on November 1, 1981, was "hailed by the administration as a model of Reaganomics."29


Under this agreement, T.W. Services was permitted to be the sole operator of the hotels and restaurants within the park. Its only competitor within Yellowstone for the annual two and a half million visitors' dollars was the long-standing, family-owned and operated, Hamilton's Photo Shops. Thus, the federal contract offered T.W. Services the traditional monopoly over concessions. Yet, it also granted them the privilege to operate the concession with no prior investment in the park facilities, more commonly known as a "possessory interest".30 T.W. Services' minimal investment subsequently translated into "minimal risk".31 As Don Hummel, former Chairman of the National Park Concessions noted...With no "possessory interest, no inventory, no capital investments that might depreciate...They were practically guaranteed a profit."32

The unprecedented 1981 contract with T.W. Services also allowed the Park Service in Yellowstone, for the first time in history, to become "a partner of private enterprise."33 The Park Service retained ownership of all concession facilities while it required the concessioner to provide the

30Dyan Zaslowsky, "Black Cavalry of Commerce", p.28.
31Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, p.226.
32Ibid.
33Ibid.
funds for maintaining them. These funds, amounting to "twenty-two percent" of T.W.'s annual gross revenues within the park, were to be spent at the discretion of the Park Service on capital improvements.34 As the amount of revenue the Park Service received on an annual basis varied in accordance with the concessionaires profits under this unprecedented agreement, the Park Service now had an economic interest in ensuring that the concessioner profited. Hence, there was a motivator, an unprecedented economic one, for increasing concession operations.

The Administration's Role in the Park Buffer Zones

Outside Yellowstone National Park, the Reagan Administration appointees within the Forest Service encouraged increasing timber production on the seven national forests that surround it. Along with logging, there was an "extensive road building campaign."35 Between 1980-1986, hundreds of roads were plowed out in "critical wildlife habitats."36 The roads also contributed to sedimentation problems. As the roads were plowed on steep grades, the disturbance accelerated the rate at which sediment was dumped into streams, thus destroying prime fish

34Ibid.
35D. Leal, "Saving An Ecosystem", p.62.
36Ibid.
habitat.

All of this work was done at a financial loss to the federal government. Between 1979-1984, "annual timber program costs exceeded timber receipts in all seven of the region's national forests."37 Yet, private logging companies benefitted from the deficit timber sales. Deficit timber sales were also in accord with the Reagan Administration's idea that private developers should have more access to public lands regardless of the cost.

Profits and the Parks

To make parks more profitable for the private concessioner, Watt supported a plan that would improve visitor facilities within them. In 1981, he unveiled "PRIP", his Park Restoration and Improvement Program, and requested $1 billion dollars for it. PRIP would "restore sewage systems, roads, buildings, and other facilities while ignoring programs to protect natural resources."38 In 1981, Congress authorized "$1 billion...(for a)...crash fix-up" for all parks to be spent over a period of five years.39 While certainly PRIP provided much needed funds for visitor

37D. Leal, "Saving An Ecosystem", p.58.
38Robert and Patricia Cahn, Disputed Territory, p.30.
facility improvements, many felt the funds were not offered in a spirit of conservationism. As one critic noted, "of what value would Yellowstone National Park be with beautiful, modern hotels and restaurants, high-standard roads, modern administration offices and remodeled buildings if it lacked free-ranging wildlife populations, naturally functioning biosystems, clean air and water, and vast stretches of unmolested lands?"40 As another park critic agreed, "if the profit motive is allowed to dominate, the beauty and sense of history our parks preserve will be lost."41

To counter Watt's plans for the parks, Congress took action. In reviewing the 1980 State of the Parks report which cited air quality threats, water resource problems, visitor overuse problems, and external development problems in some parks, Congress moved to add "$7 million a year to the NPS budget for a Natural Resources protection Program (NRPP)."42 This money was targeted toward projects to deal with these identified threats. But the threats persisted, even with the Congressional aid. One of the most obvious threats was visitor overuse.

40Rich Reese, Greater Yellowstone, p.96.
41Michael Frome, "Park Tourism as Big Business", P.16.
42Robert Cahn, "Taking a Count of the Threats", National Parks, July/August 1987, p.33.
Park Visitation

Since the 1960's, there was a substantial boon in national park visitation nationwide. Public interest in wild lands translated into increased visitation. Yet, as total numbers visiting the parks rose above four billion annually by the late 1970's, the Park Service recognized too that the increasing use would threaten the park's natural resources. This problem was especially evident in the "crowned jewels".

In Yosemite, holiday traffic caused congestion for hours. In the Grand Canyon, the sublimity was distracted by planes from 42 companies zooming below the rim. And if you wanted a chance to run the Colorado rapids, but were not a part of a concessioner tour, the wait was five years. Americans clearly were "loving their parks to death." 43

In 1978, Congress had moved to mandate that the Park Service set "visitor carrying capacities" in an effort to preserve and protect the parks. 44 Yet, it was a problem in the 1980's that both Secretary Watt and Director Dickerson chose to ignore. As Director Dickerson stated in 1991, "the parks serve their highest purpose when they are used by as


many people as possible...It is a cop-out to set a limit on visitors."45 While park visitation continued to rise at a rate of four-percent a year, any plans to implement park carrying capacities were shelved.46 Any within the Park Service who cared to contest this game faced demotion or removal.

For environmentalists, however, it was not a problem that could just be ignored. Watt outraged them and his lack of support nationwide found him under increasing pressure to resign.47 He did so in the fall of 1983. Watt was replaced by William C. Clark.

Evaluating NPS under Watt

Watt had not been popular either with the Park Service or Congress. His eagerness to change park policies angered both parties.48 Watt had been quick to reverse long range programs for the parks, primarily by ignoring park programs to protect natural resources.49 His unending loyalty to the


46Ibid.


49Cahn, "Disputed Territory", p.30.
Administration frustrated both as well.

It is difficult to discern to what extent Watt was circumventing Congressional intentions while altering park policies. The national parks emerge as an area today where Congress affirms its intentions primarily at budget-making time. This leaves the Secretary of the Interior with a great deal of decision-making authority by Congressional default. For example, in 1983, Watt, with the support of Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) and Senator Don Young (R-AK) ordered Director Dickerson to transfer the NPS Alaska regional director, his deputy, and the Superintendent of Glacier National Park because "they imposed restrictions on tour-boat operators in Glacier Bay in order to protect endangered humpback whales."50 This was not an issue Congress as a whole felt obligated to deal with, so the decision fell to Watt, spurred by two congressional officials who served on NPS related committees and subcommittees.

Watt was commonly thought within the scientific community to have been the worse thing that ever happened to the national parks. He opened border areas to development, he ignored visitor overuse, and he gave concessionaires power that rivaled that of NPS. Overall, his policies were

50Ibid., p.30.
utilitarian oriented, in keeping with the Reagan Administration's ideals, but environmentally insensitive.51 His disregard for the national park ideal made him extraordinarily unpopular with NPS, environmentalists, and the public as a whole.

Watt was especially unpopular within NPS because of his reorganization of their decision-making infrastructure. As a result of Watt's reorganization, professional NPS directors and their director, "were being forced to accept decisions they felt were inimical to the Service, made by people who had never managed a park and whose outlook was toward development."52 This did little for NPS morale as the professionals were forced to accept "policy changes of a kind" that in the past the Park Service had been able to resist.53

Watt's decision to halt new park acquisitions, however, was one policy that met with some support. While environmentalists were disappointed, others saw NPS as becoming a collect-it-all agency similar to the General Services Administration (GSA). Many recognized that the parks established in the past few decades were not on the

51Ibid.


53Ibid.
level of the "crowned jewels" and they challenged their merits as national parks. Others saw the crumbling roads and tarnished visitor facilities in the "crowned jewels" and understood Watt's argument. As the editor of the Los Angeles Times noted, "Americans go to Yosemite for rest and recreation, not to face the same crumbling environment that they deal with at home." But for an agency whose funds had not increased in proportion with its acquisitions, it was difficult to keep up.

After Watt

William Clark served as Secretary of the Interior through February, 1985. During his tenure, he "softened many of Watt's stands, improved relations with Congress and opened dialogue with environmental groups." Clark also attempted to return some of the park policy making to NPS, but his tenure was so brief that he really had very little impact.

In February of 1985, Secretary Clark was replaced by


Donald Paul Hodel, the former Undersecretary of the Interior under Watt. With the appointment of Hodel, "the Watt agenda quietly reappeared."58 Without the flamboyant Watt, it seemed his policies were gone, but in fact they were there, alive and well under Hodel.

Hodel and NPS

Shortly after Hodel's administration began, Dickerson retired under pressure from Hodel in March of 1985. Yet, Hodel "delayed choosing a new NPS director...(and) in this leadership vacuum, the regional directors moved to complete the isolation of these territories from the control and direction of the park service Washington office."59 Regional "directors and superintendents were now taking orders from political bureaucrats in the office of the assistant secretary for Fish, Wildlife, and Parks."60

On May 19, 1985, William Penn Mott was appointed Director. He was not Hodel's first choice, but he was a NPS careerman who had served as Governor Reagan's Director of California State Parks and Recreation.61 Immediately, he set about trying to revamp NPS from its political problems

59Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, p.269.
60Ibid.
61Robert and Patricia Cahn, Disputed Territory, p.31.
with the Department of the Interior. He replaced the deputy
director Watt had appointed with a career NPS man, Denis
Galvin. He also fired other political appointees as well,
but two, "Smith and Fitzsimmons simply moved 'upstairs' to
become assistants to the new Assistant Secretary for Fish,
Wildlife and the Parks, William Horn.62 This put them "in a
position to give orders to the NPS director."63

The Chapman Controversy

The strength of the Secretary of the Interior was again
realized with the resignation of NPS western regional
director, Howard Chapman. Upset with the Interior's
policies which repeatedly emphasized use over preservation,
Chapman had not seen eye to eye with Hodel on a number of
issues, including scenic flights over the Grand Canyon.64
As a punishment, Assistant Secretary Horn ordered Mott "to
give Chapman a below-average rating and to transfer him or
to force him into early retirement".65

Mott refused to give Chapman a low performance rating.

62Ibid.
63Ibid.
64Ronald B. Taylor, "Policy at Heart of Feud Inside
U.S. Park Service", Los Angeles Times, February 5, 1987,
p.23.
65Ronald B. Taylor, "Park Service Official at Odds With
Hodel Over Public Use, Quits", Los Angeles Times, April 24,
Horn then took it upon himself to change Chapman's rating and Chapman fought back by speaking out. He testified before House and Senate subcommittees that his rating had been altered. For many, Chapman stood "as a lighting rod"... (showing)... the sort of manipulation that the Administration has been pursuing with Park Service professionals, intimidating them or removing them."66

Horn also interfered with Mott's recommendations for the Senior Executive Service (SES) and numerous appointments to regional directors. Mott, finally outraged at Horn's interference, wrote

...If I am to be responsible for accomplishing your policy directions, I must have the authority to organize and fill key appointments within existing rules and regulations... your staff's initiatives on these delicate matters were not discussed with me or my Deputy Director.67

However, Horn took no action and continued to interfere in park policy. He tried to put a official from the Fish and Wildlife Service in charge of policy formation for NPS. When Mott appealed to Hodel, he sided with Horn. Finally, the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations, chaired by Senator Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) threatened to cut off Horn's

66Ibid.

paychecks if he did not return NPS policymaking to NPS.68

Director Mott was persistent and determined. He pushed to regain control over the Park Service's policymaking. It was a unending fight with the Reagan Administration men and Hodel and Horn within the Interior Department. They felt strongly that parks were areas of public recreation whereas Mott struggled to move NPS toward preservation. It was a classic battle of use vs. preservation. While Mott was pushing for park extensions, curtailing mining in ecologically sensitive border areas, and pollution control, the Reagan Administration appointees were pushing for development, private investment, and relaxing mining regulations.69

Controlling NPS

To keep the Service under control, the Administration proposed drastic cuts in the Park Service budget. For Reagan, "fewer people on the payroll meant "less meddlesome' activity and fewer rules and regulations."70 Every year, the Reagan Administration proposed cuts that were countered by Congress. Repeatedly, they appropriated more money for


NPS than the Administration recommended. Even when Gramm-Rudman was put into effect, Congress continued to appropriate monies above and beyond those recommended by the Administration. Nevertheless, NPS too was affected by the across the board cuts, cuts NPS "had no flexibility in making."73

While budget cuts were to be expected every year, user fees went up. In 1987 entrance fees in the "crowned jewels" increased from $2 dollars per car to $5 dollars per care. By the following summer, in Yosemite, the Grand Canyon, and Yellowstone, the entrance fee was $10 dollars per car. Senior citizens and disabled persons still were admitted at no cost. Yet, the increases in user fees did benefit the parks. In 1987, Director Mott convinced the OMB that fee revenues should remain in the NPS budget rather than be returned to the General Fund. It was means of keeping the


74Ed, "This Land Is Your Land?", Money, August 8, 1987, p.16.
Even with the Congressionally-granted increases in user fees, the cost to visit a park was still incredibly low. For the price of one movie ticket, a family could acquire a seven day permit to Yosemite. The price of an annual permit for Yellowstone National Park in 1988 was $15 dollars, the same price that it was in 1915. And a common sight in any park was a retired couple, in a $20,000 motor home, with a free park permit. Retirees, who clearly had the money to pay and could provide much needed revenue, were exempt from any entrance or user fees. While raising entrance fees might have been publicly unpopular, it would have aided the financially struggling parks and valued their worth more accordingly.

Pressures on the Parks

Without adequate revenue and protective legislation, pressures relating to overuse, boundary development, and pollution continued to mount. For example, visibility in the Grand Canyon was often decreased significantly from smog emanating from a nearby power plant. On the East Coast, pollution levels in Maine's Acadia National Park often


exceeded federal standards. In 1981, NPS had gathered data on important vistas in the parks and compiled a list of those that should be protected in compliance with the Clean Air Act. But Hodel never submitted the list to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Hodel rejected this list arguing that it would "'provide a false sense of security' and 'would not be good for the parks'."77 The provision to list important vistas for review under the Clean Air Act expired December 31, 1985.78

Establishment of the Great Basin National Park

During the entire eight-year administration of Ronald Reagan, only one new park was added to the system. This was the Great Basin National Park in Nevada. Commercial interests, particularly mining companies, had prevented previous legislative attempts from passing in Congress, but it was finally approved in 1986.79

The establishment of the Great Basin National Park was not a signal of change in the Interior Department's unprecedented moratorium on parkland acquisitions. Rather, the park came about from a motion in Congress, led by


78Robert and Patricia Cahn, "Disputed Territory", p.31.

Nevada's congressional delegation. The park was sort of "a farewell gift to Paul Laxalt." It was also a congressional reaction to national parks increasing popularity. Between 1980 and 1986, national park visitation increased almost thirty percent, bringing millions more into America's parks annually.

The California Park Controversy

Another proposed land acquisition of great interest was a section of desert in southern California. The proposed Mojave National Park was a pet project of Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA). Environmental groups aided him in the challenge to have this tract of land reassigned from BLM to NPS.

The East Mojave desert is truly one of the last wilderness areas in the United States. With only unpaved roads crisscrossing an area four times the size of Yellowstone, it is not only expansive but also difficult to navigate. The area contains the world's largest Joshua tree forest and some of the most valuable Anazazi Indian ruins known. And much of it is unexplored. The area also


81Ibid.

contains 750 species of wildlife, including bighorn sheep and many species of endangered birds.83

But the East Mojave desert is also valuable for the minerals it contains and much of it is leased out to local ranchers for cattle grazing. Neither industry nor the local ranching community supported the park idea. Rock collectors and off the road vehicle owners did not support the idea either as they saw NPS status as limiting access to the area.84 Hodel did not support it and Congress, in a time of budget cutting, did not support the idea either as they were not willing to take on such a potentially large expense.

The Yellowstone Fires- 1988

The Reagan Administration rounded out its tenure in office with the oldest national park in flames. While the uncontrollable fires were controversial in themselves, in the midst of coming to grips with them, the media also unfolded the power struggle between the Interior Department and the National Park Service. While the media showed the scientific ideals of "ecosystem management" was on shaky ground, they also portrayed a Park Service on shaky ground as well as it could not put the fires out. As the extent of


control the Reagan men in the Interior Department had on NPS was better understood, critics started calling for an independent NPS.

Robert Cahn was one of the first to promote the idea of an independent NPS. As he stated, "in the long run...the only way to assure minimal political interference with the National Park Service is to remove it from the Department of the Interior and establish it as an independent agency."85 Howard Chapman, who had been forced out of his job as the NPS regional director echoed his sentiments in January of 1988. As he noted,

The Hodel/Horn team has shown that they will do anything to advance their cause of use. The only force that has been able to shut them down is Congress. Clearly, the National Park Service has to get into a position where it has a greater ability to stand its ground against such adversity as presented now by the Interior Department.86 It is an issue that has come up before Congress, and while unresolved, will be certain to appear again should the political condition established under the Reagan Administration persist.

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85 Robert and Patricia Cahn, "Disputed Territory", p.33.

Conclusion

Since its inception in 1916, the Park Service has struggled with its "equivocal mission" of both preserving the parks and providing for their use.1 At times when they have desired to encourage public use, they have emphasized park development. Other times have marked them as the prudent park protectorate as they have removed established facilities and banned practices considered to be inappropriate in a national park.

By law, the Park Service must maintain the parks "for the enjoyment of future generations."2 While there has never been any consensus how they should best accomplish this task or what state the parks should be in, the orientation of the Park Service has traditionally dictated that use which detracts from the future enjoyment of others should be eliminated. Historically, they have acted under this principle.

Any apparent emphasis of either preservation or use over time, as evidenced in Park Service policy, normally can be traced to "lobbying power" influences emanating from


2Public Law 65-235, as cited in United States Statues at Large, p.535.
resources over park development. They adhered to the Park Service's mission as established in the enabling legislation. Watt, however, did neither.

Watt, rather, was one of Reagan's political appointees who was chosen for his ability to be a "team player" and carry out Administration initiatives. Watt's mission was to transform the Administration's initiatives into agency directives rather than follow the traditional mission of the agency. He received support for his efforts not from the agency he managed, but rather from Reagan's Cabinet.

The economic strategies of the Reagan administration brought about park policies that departed sharply from those of the last two decades. Reagan's economic strategies were radically altered in an effort to reverse a "decade of economic 'stagflation'." For NPS, it meant privatization of many public services and loss of agency independence.

In the case of the Park Service, the Reagan Administration also demonstrated that it could reshape "policy and the modus operandi" of an agency. Unlike


7Ibid., p.110.

8Ibid., p.102.

previous Administration, the Reagan team replaced career men with political appointees who had a like-minded attitude toward park management as did the Reagan Administration. This was done in the belief that "if you are going to run the government, you've got to control the people that come into it." \textsuperscript{10} Any one who did not agree with the changes made in park management by these like-minded political appointees, including the Director of NPS, was simply removed or harassed into retirement.

The Reagan Administration also tried to control the Park Service through budget cuts. \textsuperscript{11} Less money meant fewer administrators and fewer regulations. The Reagan Administration was not too successful in bringing about the massive cuts it envisioned because Congress controlled the budget. Congress, in recent decades, had become allies with the Park Service primarily because of the positive public image the national parks portrayed.

The new policies implemented for the national parks under the Reagan Administration were profit-oriented and designed to give private interests a greater role in park management.

\textsuperscript{10}Benda and Levine, "Reagan and the Bureaucracy: The Bequest, the Promise, and the Legacy", p.108.

management. Private business was the "beneficiary, and the federal bureaucracy (was) the target."12 It was another "aspect of the Administration's divestment strategy."13 Watt looked for government activities within the parks that could be more efficiently performed by the private sector. Thus, concessionaires were given greater freedom to establish operations in parks. To help the concessioner, visitor-use quotas were abandoned and development within the parks was encouraged.

Using the criteria established by Lawrence E. Lynn in "The Reagan Administration and the Renitent Bureaucracy", it appears that the Park Service's extensive change during the Reagan Administration was not unique.14 Rather, changes that took place in the Park Service also took place in other agencies such as the Employment and Training Administration (ETA), the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture (FSDA), and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). This change came about as a part of a broader plan that the Reagan Administration had for the federal bureaucracy. Many

13Ibid., p.399.
agencies and their administrative appointees under the Reagan Administration had two primary aspects in common. Like the Park Service Directors Watt and Hodel, the agency head "appeared to reflect Reagan's philosophy and intentions in making appointments to subcabinet positions."15 Secondly, like Watt and Hodel, other agency heads "promoted Reagan's conservative ideology... dutifully executed administration policies concerning budget and staff reductions, and... formulated specific goals consistent with Reagan's general policies."16

The policies for the parks as established under the Reagan Administration were not new, however. They were very similar to those emanating from Park Service Director Steven Mather in 1916. Mather also encouraged development, visitation, and recreation in the parks. But Mather followed the principle that use which distracts from the future enjoyment of others should be banned. Watt clearly did not. Mather also set park policy in a different era. In 1916, for example, approximately 21,000 people visited Yellowstone annually. Today, approximately 21,000 people a week witness an eruption of Old Faithful. Use has increased tremendously, yet, Watt did not encourage any protective

16Ibid., p.344.
measures to compensate.

Another significant difference between the Mather era and the Watt era is that under Mather, the Park Service created and implemented park policy. Under Watt, the Administration's economic policies were imposed on NPS. The Director had little or no say in the policies themselves. By 1989, the Park Service was no longer in control of what it was supposed to protect.

Watt is not responsible for this Department's internal shift in control. This shift in control came about gradually. When Secretary Udall took over some of the park policy making responsibilities from Director Hartzog in the late 1960's, the shift in control was especially evident. While Secretary Udall and subsequent Secretaries played a major role in park policy-making, however, they did so in a preservation-oriented manner. For the most part, they followed the principle that use which detracts from the future enjoyment of others should be banned.

During Watt's tenure, he used this shift in authority to the Administration's advantage. Both Watt and Hodel were able to make broad, sweeping changes in national park policy because of the modus operandi that was in place. While the Reagan Administration worked to further channel the decision-making into Interior's political appointees positions, Watt and Hodel were able early on to work toward
internal restructuring because of the initial policy-making set up.

Watt's and Hodel's alterations in the areas of park management and personnel helped the Reagan Administration to accomplish its economic objectives. What did this mean for the Park Service and wildlands themselves? For the Park Service, it meant lower employee morale and fewer career employees. Historically, short term political plans have proven to be harmful to wildlands. Some examples are the Hetch-Hetchy controversy, the Echo Park controversy and the Yellowstone Park Grant Village controversy. Many land management decisions, once made, cannot be reversed.

Good land management requires long-range planning and scientific expertise. As America's "crowned jewels" stand as a symbol to all of our nations' bounty and wealth, they deserve just that. They provide us with an opportunity to view the past that cannot be replaced. Our responsibility to tomorrow's heritage should not be forgotten.
Appendix A

Letter from Secretary Lane to Director Mather as Reprinted in Report to the Secretary of the Interior, 1918

The administration policy to which the new service will adhere is based on three broad principles: First that the national parks must be maintained in absolutely unimpaired form for the use of future generations as well as those of our own time; second that they are set apart for the use, observation, health, and pleasure of the people; and third, that the national interest must dictate all decisions affecting public or private enterprise in the parks.

Every activity of the Service is subordinate to the duties imposed upon it to faithfully preserve the parks for posterity in essentially their natural state. The commercial use of these reservations, except as specially authorized by law, or such as may be incidental to the accommodation and entertainment of visitors, will not be permitted under any circumstances.

In all of the national parks except Yellowstone you may permit the grazing of cattle in isolated regions not frequented by visitors and where no injury to the natural features of the parks may result in such use. The grazing of sheep, however, must not be permitted in any national park.

In leasing lands for the operation of hotels, camps, transportation facilities, or other public service under strict Government control, concessionaires should be confined to tracts no larger that absolutely necessary for the purposes of the business enterprises.

You should not permit the leasing of park lands for summer homes. It is conceivable, and even exceedingly probable, that within a few years under a policy of permitting the establishment of summer homes in national parks, these reservations might become so generally settled as to exclude the public from convenient access to their streams, lakes, and other natural features, and thus destroy the very basis upon which this national playground system is being constructed.

You should not permit the cutting of trees except where timber is needed in the construction of buildings or other improvements within the park and can be removed without injury to the forests or disfigurement of the landscape, where the thinning of forests or cutting of vistas will improve the scenic features of the parks, or where their destruction is necessary to eliminate insect infestation or diseases common to forests and shrubs.

In the construction of roads, trails, buildings, and other improvements, particular attention must be devoted
always to the harmonizing of these improvements within the landscape. This is a most important item in our program of development and requires the employment of trained engineers who either possess a knowledge of landscape architecture or have a proper appreciation of the aesthetic values of park lands. All improvements will be carried out in accordance with a preconceived plan developed with special reference to the preservation of the landscape, and comprehensive plans for future development of the national parks on an adequate scale will be prepared as funds are available for this purpose.

Wherever the Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction over national parks it is clear that more effective measures for the protection of parks can be taken. The Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction over the national parks in the States of Arkansas, Oklahoma, Wyoming, Montana, Washington, and Oregon, and also the Territories of Hawaii and Alaska. We urge the cession of exclusive jurisdiction over the parks in other states, and particularly in California and Colorado.

There are many private holdings in the national parks, and many of these seriously hamper the administration of these reservations. All of them should be eliminated as far as it is practicable to accomplish this purpose in the course of time, either through congressional appropriation or by acceptance of donations of these lands. Isolated tracts in important scenic areas should be given first consideration, of course, in the purchase of private property.

Every opportunity should be afforded the public, wherever possible, to enjoy the national parks in the manner that best satisfies the individual taste. Automobiles and motorcycles will be permitted in all of the national parks; in fact, the parks will be kept accessible by any means practicable.

All outdoor sports which may be maintained consistently with the observation of the safe guards thrown around the national parks by law will be heartily indorsed and aided whenever possible. Mountain climbing, horseback riding, walking, motoring, swimming, boating, and fishing will be favorite sports. Winter sports will be developed in the parks that are accessible throughout the year. Hunting will not be permitted in any national park.

The educational, as well as recreational, use of the national parks should be encouraged in every practicable way. University and high-school classes in science will find special facilities for their vacation-period studies. Museums containing specimens of wild flowers, shrubs, trees, and mounted animals, birds, and fish native to the parks and
other exhibits of this character will be established as authorized.

Low-priced camps operated by concessionaires should be maintained, as well as comfortable and even luxurious hotels wherever the volume of travel warrants the establishment of these classes of accommodations. In each reservation, as funds are available, a system of free camp sites will be cleared, and these grounds will be equipped with adequate water and sanitation facilities.

As concessions in the national parks represent in most instances a large investment, and as the obligation to render service satisfactory to the department at carefully regulated rates is imposed, these enterprises must be given a large measure of protection, and generally speaking, competitive business should not be authorized where a concession is meeting our requirements, which, of course, will nearly as possible coincide with the needs of the traveling public.

All concessions should yield revenue to the Federal Government, but the development of the revenues of the parks should not impose a burden to the visitor. Automobile fees in the parks should be reduced as the volume of motor travel increases.

For assistance in the solution of administrative problems in the parks relating both to their protection and use, the scientific bureaus of the Government offer facilities of the highest worth and authority. In the protection of the public health, for instance, the destruction of insect pests in the forests, the care of wild animals, and the propagation and distribution of fish, you should utilize their hearty cooperation to the utmost.

You should utilize to the fullest extent the opportunity afforded by the Railroad Administration in appointing a committee of western railroads to inform the traveling public how to comfortably reach the national parks; you should diligently extend and use the splendid cooperation developed during the last three years among chambers of commerce, tourist bureaus, and automobile highway associations for the purpose of spreading information about our national parks and facilitating their use and enjoyment; you should keep informed of park movements and park progress, municipal, county, and State, both at home and abroad, for the purpose of adapting whenever practicable, the world's best thought to the needs of the national parks. You should encourage all movements toward outdoor living. In particular, you should maintain close working relationships with the Dominion parks branch of the Canadian department of the interior and assist in the solution of park problems of an international character.
The department is often requested for reports on pending legislation proposing the establishment of new national parks or the addition of lands to existing parks. Complete data on such park projects should be obtained by the National Park Service and submitted to the department in tentative form of report to Congress.

In studying new park projects you should seek to find scenery of supreme and distinctive quality or some natural feature so extraordinary or unique as to be of national interest and importance. You should seek distinguished examples of typical forms of world architecture, such, for instance, as the Grand Canyon, as exemplifying the highest accomplishment of stream erosion, and the high, rugged portion of Mount Desert Island as exemplifying the oldest rock forms in America and the luxuriance of deciduous forests.

The national park system as now constituted should not be lowered in standard, dignity, and prestige by the inclusion of areas which express in less than the highest terms the particular class or kind of exhibit which they represent.

It is not necessary that a national park should have a large area. The element of size is of no importance as long as the park is susceptible of effective administration and control.

You should study existing national parks with the idea of improving them by the addition of adjacent areas which will complete their scenic purposes or facilitate administration. The addition of the Teton Mountains to the Yellowstone National Park, will supply Yellowstone's basic need, which is an uplift of glacier-bearing peaks; and the addition to the Sequoia National Park of the Sierra summits and slopes to the north and east, as contemplated by pending legislation, will create a reservation unique in the world, because of its combination of gigantic trees, extraordinary canyons, and mountain masses.

In considering projects involving the establishment of new national parks or the extension of existing areas by delimitation of national forests, you should observe what effect such delimitation would have on the administration of adjacent forest lands, and wherever practicable, you should engage in an investigation of such park projects jointly with officers of the Forest Service, in order that questions of national park and national forest policy as they affect the lands involved may be thoroughly understood.
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UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND, Richmond, Virginia, 9/87-5/88
Masters Candidate in Political Science. Will complete degree 5/90.
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UNIVERSITY OF DENVER, Denver, Colorado, 9/88-Present
Teacher certification in secondary school social studies. Completed degree 5/89.

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Bachelor of Arts degree with Honors in Political Science, Graduated Cum Laude.
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Assistant Director of Education
Assist with tours and Museum education programs.

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Student Teacher
Taught U.S. History and Government to 11th and 12th grade students.

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Tour Guide
Taught visitors about wildlife, geology, and park history. Received Employee-of-the-Month, 6/86.

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Wrote letters to constituents and information papers.