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Friedrich Nietzsche's reception as a marker of American intellectual culture: Crane Brinton and Walter Kaufmann's interpretations during the World War II and postwar eras

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ABSTRACT

Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy has endured a torrent of both insightful analysis and faulty interpretation in America. This thesis seeks to examine a corner of this intellectual history, specifically some of the connections between political events and American readers’ reception of Nietzsche’s work. Chapter 1 introduces the study, arguing that an intellectual row created during the World War I era persisted into the Depression and World War II years. Chapter 2 analyzes Crane Brinton’s *Nietzsche* and that historian’s attempts to explain Nietzsche in terms of World War II politics, namely fascist thought. Brinton’s efforts to establish a link between Nietzsche and contemporary ideology are presented as representative of the larger discourse during the Second World War. Chapter 3 explores the contrasting position of Walter Kaufmann’s fundamental reevaluation of Nietzsche’s philosophy in *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, appearing in 1950. Kaufmann’s interpretation, a more sober and relativistic account, includes a major effort to divorce Nietzsche from his classification as a proto-Nazi. Chapter 4 concludes that Kaufmann’s challenge to reconsider Nietzsche—a movement away from the failings of Brinton’s interpretation—not only profoundly changed the thinker’s academic and popular legacy, but also reflects a discipline-wide reevaluation of the connections between academic discourse and political motion and offers lessons for exploring this relationship within contemporary scholarship.
I certify that I have read this thesis and find that, in scope and quality, it satisfies the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Hugh A. West, Ph.D., Thesis Director

Sydney E. Watts, Ph.D., Thesis Advisor

Robert C. Kenzer, Ph.D., Thesis Advisor
There is no escaping Nietzsche. You may hold him a hissing and a mocking and lift your virtuous skirts as you pass him by, but his roar is in your ears and his blasphemies sink into your head.

H. L. Mencken, *The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche*
Richard Pipes once described Nietzsche as a “young man’s” philosopher, preferring in his older years Montaigne’s lessons of moderation and temperance. This sentiment is widespread and understandable; Nietzsche’s torrid pace is—even for the most capable—tough to maintain. As Walter Kaufmann remarked, “one cannot live all the time in lovely music . . . and one cannot endure it in perpetuity.” Much less, he reminds us, with philosophy—especially Nietzsche’s.

This not uncommon association of Nietzsche with exuberance and passion has been, and continues to be, ascribed reckless political dimensions. At best, Nietzsche is seen as something of an anarchist; at worst, he teeters dangerously close to fascism. Although a comprehensive evaluation of Nietzsche’s thought is usually absent from such interpretations—particularly those of the latter sort—these images have persisted. Yet, neither this reputation nor Pipes’ individual preference renders Nietzsche irrelevant in my own life.

Indeed, Nietzsche’s writings remain an affirmative force. They have heightened my sensitivity to the structures of the world and have revealed a wonderfully vibrant way of approaching life that teaches embracing the moment—with all its struggles and advances, defeats and victories—and recognizing the beauty of the possible . . . even in the most trying of circumstances. These lessons, which are fundamental within Nietzsche’s work, represent for me his greatest message.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank first my primary thesis advisor, Professor Hugh West, for his careful watch over my intellectual development throughout my graduate and undergraduate years at Richmond. He has guided me to consider complicated problems more deeply and explore them with greater precision in my writing—to bring clarity to something abstruse. Under his direction, I have begun to learn the historian’s craft.

I am also indebted to Professors Alexander Nehamas of Princeton University, who has truly been an open book—a consummate scholar—graciously offering his time and expertise; Sydney Watts, whose vibrant attitude and intellectual depth have been instructive and motivational; and Gary Shapiro for presenting creative and alternative frames of reference for interpreting Nietzsche’s work.

Within and outside of the academic setting, each of these teachers has demonstrated the necessity of applying one’s thought more honestly, more creatively and with a greater sense of purpose. Their leadership has been instructive and important in a world where talking heads and pop culture continue to appear as our cultural measuring sticks and intellectual dishonesty appears to be striving to reach new heights. I thank them for their example.

Most importantly, I wish to thank my family, particularly my mother and father, who have sacrificed greatly in support of my advancement.
CONTENTS

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Chapter

1. INTRODUCTION – FROM ATTRACTION TO AMBIVALENCE 1

Following its initial introduction in the early 1900s, American audiences react ambivalently to Nietzsche’s work during the World War I and Depression eras.

2. CRANE BRINTON – NIETZSCHE IN THE REAL WORLD . 15

Brinton’s highly popular biography, *Nietzsche*, strongly resembles the political environment of the Second World War.

3. WALTER KAUFMANN – EXITING IDEOLOGY . . . 32

*Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, Kaufmann’s most significant contribution to Nietzsche scholarship, reinterprets Nietzsche’s position outside of contemporary politics.

4. CONCLUSION – A RETURN TO LEGITIMACY . . . 49

Nietzsche’s postwar reception in America reflects a shift in the discourse surrounding his thought and reasserts the thinker within legitimate academic and popular discussion.

Appendix

RELEVANT PASSAGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION – FROM ATTRACTION TO AMBIVALENCE

At the dawn of a new century, a decade after invading France, Germany and England, Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy arrived in the United States. His influence spreading quickly in these years before the First World War, Nietzsche reached a generation of enthusiasts, captivating leading American intellectuals from independent writers to academics and political radicals. “More than the still subterranean Freud or the smoldering Marx,” writes Melvin Drimmer, “Nietzsche served as a living force for a generation, characterized by F. Scott Fitzgerald as ‘in love with change.’”¹ And, as change was the order of the day—one that witnessed profound shifts in art, literature and culture, and a swell of radical political movements—the ground was fertile for Nietzsche’s unique brand of iconoclasm.

Finding an inspiring voice that confronted many of the problems of the modern age, the earliest American commentators present a practical account of Nietzsche’s philosophy. There was no “preoccup[ation] with epistemological or metaphysical problems,” but rather a more pragmatic focus.² In his work examining this early American reception (Nietzsche in America: The spectrum of perspectives, 1895-1925),


² James Peter Cadello, “Nietzsche in America: The spectrum of perspectives, 1895-1925” (Ph.D. diss., Purdue University, May 1990), 300; 300-304.
James Cadello identifies four commentators as representative of this first generation: James Gibbons Huneker, a prominent essayist and social critic and among the first to publicly investigate Nietzsche's ideas in the 1890s; William Mackintire Salter, "a prominent actor in the movement surrounding the establishment, development, and promotion of ethical societies [who] gave the most complete analysis of Nietzsche's moral philosophy and idealism"; Emily Hamblen, author of Friedrich Nietzsche and His New Gospel in 1911, "the most sympathetic and thorough-going reading of Nietzsche's psychology"; and George Burman Foster, a noted liberal theological writer at the University of Chicago who challenged orthodox Christianity's traditionalism and explored the religious implications of Nietzsche's work. Cadello reports:

The predominant interest for the Americans in their [early] encounter with Nietzsche was his seeming preoccupation with the questions: How should I live? What kind of life evidences the most vitality?

Scholarly or technical concerns, while not entirely unrepresented, took a back seat, as readers largely focused upon Nietzsche's talent for stinging wit, social criticism and his dynamic worldview.

In Huneker's case—the most important of Cadello's group—the uses for and interpretation of Nietzsche was situational: not yet a shrill herald for fascism, Nietzsche

3 Ibid., 2.

4 Ibid., 2. Peter Wolfe corroborates this account, calling Hamblen's work a just "acknowledgment of the long range implications of Nietzsche's thought." (Peter Wolfe, "Image and Meaning in Also sprach Zarathustra," MLN 79, no. 5 [1964]: 547.)

5 Cadello also identifies several other major figures, including Jack London, Theodore Dreiser, Max Eastman and Emma Goldman, but restricts the bulk of his analysis to Huneker, Salter, Hamblen and Foster.

6 Cadello, 300.
was “a stimulus to thought, an antiseptic critic of all philosophies, religions, theologies, and moral systems, an intellectual rebel.” But for all Huneker’s influence, the standard-bearer for Friedrich Nietzsche’s ideas in the American mind during this era of “rugged individualism” proved to be H. L. Mencken. Indeed, shortly after Huneker and others greeted Nietzsche at the door, H. L. Mencken, producing in 1908 the first widely received biography, announced him from the balcony.

While Huneker “never intended to be, and could never be mistaken for, someone who attempted to offer ‘objective’ analyses of the art and the thought about which he wrote”-Nietzsche included—Mencken attempted to show in common terms “the exact bearing of his [Nietzsche’s] philosophy upon matters which every man must consider every day.” And while not entirely free from what contemporary experts might consider interpretive errors (for example, Mencken’s comparison of Nietzsche’s “will to power” to Schopenhauer’s “will to live”), Mencken’s *Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche* is not only successful in relating Nietzsche’s philosophy in everyday terms, but further impressive in its analytical and literary quality. Avoiding overly technical arguments,

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8 Cadello, 113.


10 Ibid., 64. “Now this will to continue living [Schopenhauer’s philosophy at its most basic level], if we are to accept words at their usual meaning, is plainly identical to Nietzsche’s will to power. Therefore Nietzsche’s amendment [from ‘will to live’ to ‘will to power’] was nothing more than the coinage of a new phrase to express an old idea.” The prevailing view now holds that the two ideas are indeed quite different.
Mencken maintains command of challenging subject matter without sacrificing intellectual depth or clarity. And though he occasionally leans on Darwinian interpretations of Nietzsche in his discussions of the Will to Power, Superman concept and Nietzsche’s deliberations on Christianity, the basic foundations for Nietzsche’s most central themes are almost wholly preserved in this seminal work.11

His assessment of Nietzsche’s views on morality and values represents but one example of his clear and logical execution. Wholly in line with Nietzsche’s basic message, Mencken explains, “good and evil were but relative terms [in Nietzsche’s estimation] and . . . it was impossible to say, finally and absolutely, that a certain action was right and another wrong.”12 This conclusion is congruous with Nietzsche’s discussions of morality and religion in On the Genealogy of Morals and Beyond Good and Evil, and it fittingly informs Mencken’s appraisal of Nietzsche’s thoughts on organized religion, whose “main function” has been

“to enforce and support [the chosen moral rules] by making them appear as laws laid down, at the beginning of the world, by the lord of the universe himself, or at some later period, by his son, messiah or spokesman.”13

Mencken’s analysis of Nietzsche’s Superman is also consistent with this evaluation, and his artful rendering of this component of Nietzsche’s thought is even more gripping, describing Nietzsche’s Superman as “a being who faces life as he finds it, defiantly and

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11 His commentary upon the Dionysian and Apollonian drives, morality as a “life-instinct” and aesthetic truth are particularly well crafted. And even Nietzsche’s treatment of women, a thoroughly dicey topic itself—especially in Mencken’s hands—is presented thoughtfully and carefully. (See Mencken, 72-75, 32-34, 58.)

12 Mencken, 38.

13 Ibid., 76.
unafraid—who knows how to fight and how to forbear—who sees things as they actually are, and not as they might or should be . . . .”\textsuperscript{14}

This enthusiasm is not unqualified, however. Mencken at times delivers harsh opinions of Nietzsche’s thought, at one point accusing him of falling into the “trap” of atheistic determinism and at another characterizing his theory of the origin of Christianity as “sheer lunacy.”\textsuperscript{15} His final conclusion is no more positive, arguing Nietzsche in the final review,

Took no account, toward the end, of the fact that stimulation comes only by opposition—that without enemies, there can be no heroes—that without abuses, there can be no reforms. He forgot, in a word, that morality has served the race by giving the strong man something to wield his sword upon—to fight, to wound, to hate. He forgot that every effect must have a cause. He forgot his own maxims and so thundered against himself. And this then is the one ineradicable fault in his philosophy: he showed the strong man’s need for an enemy and yet argued that all enemies should be enchained. There is no way to rid the Nietzschean system of this paradox.\textsuperscript{16}

Yet, this criticism notwithstanding, Mencken’s work for all its unassuming sophistication is primarily a celebration of Nietzsche. Reveling in the intoxicating prose, Mencken was enamored with the master’s brand of struggle and victory, the Will to Power and the Übermensch, and he does little to hide his own exuberance or mitigate the philosopher’s sharp points that proved so troublesome to some of his contemporaries and many later readers.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 115.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 161, 145.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 320-321. I personally disagree with this assessment and would argue that Nietzsche addresses these complaints quite convincingly in On the Genealogy of Morals.
Interestingly, the greater part of Mencken’s early audiences before World War I vigorously approved of this approach. S. L. Harrison, for one, identifies Mencken as Nietzsche’s most effective public advocate throughout the early twentieth century.\(^{18}\) Clearly, just as there was “no escaping Nietzsche”\(^ {19}\) in this era, his most popular patron was everywhere as well. Indeed, in the years following this biography, Mencken rightly came to be regarded not only as a journalistic and literary genius, but possibly the most widely influential man of letters during the first third of the twentieth century.\(^{20}\) Having penned some of the most memorable social commentary of the era while heading two of the leading magazines of the day—Smart Set and The American Mercury—William Manchester’s pronouncement that Mencken had by the mid-1920s, “r[isen] to the stature of a god” is hardly an exaggeration.\(^ {21}\) Writes Vincent Fitzpatrick: “The 1920s in America belonged more to Mencken than to any other individual.”\(^ {22}\) Yet, despite his prominence throughout the period, Mencken’s did not prove to be the definitive Nietzsche interpretation, particularly after the start of the First World War.


\(^{19}\) Mencken, 1.


With the opening of hostilities in Europe, for which Germany was ostensibly to blame, anti-German sentiment soured the minds of many American readers to the Nietzsche who Mencken had so enthusiastically promoted; Nietzsche no longer regularly appeared as the yes-saying champion of individualism, but rather a somewhat uncommon villain. (Indeed, the instances of his association in major newspapers with German militarism or Darwinism-run-amok are almost limitless.) William Mackintire Salter notes this sentiment in his “Nietzsche and the War” appearing in 1917: “The present European war is sometimes closely connected with Nietzsche. It is even called ‘Nietzsche in Action,’ or the ‘Euro-Nietzschean (or Anglo Nietzschean) War.’” Nearly thirty years later, Eric Voegelin reported, “Nietzsche has the distinction of being the only philosopher who has ever been considered the major cause of a world war.” Not surprisingly, Mencken himself was not only criticized for his thoroughly unpopular pro-German views—such as his defense of the Lusitania attack—but also for his association with this thinker. And his version of Nietzsche was challenged strenuously and suffered revision.

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23 Emily Hamblen responded to some of these charges in her April 1, 1915 letter to the Editor of New York Times, writing: “It is as unjust to lay at his [Nietzsche’s] door the responsibility for the course which modern Germany has taken as to ascribe to the teachings of Jesus the wars and the persecutions of the Christian Church. The truth is, Nietzsche preached with all the strength and consistency of his nature the duty of bringing into existence a united Europe.” (Emily S. Hamblen, Letter to the Editor, The New York Times, April 4, 1915, page XX3, database online, available from Proquest Historical Newspapers.)


25 Eric Voegelin, “Nietzsche, the Crisis and the War,” The Journal of Politics 6, no. 2 (1944): 177., pp. 177-212
John Neville Figgis’s 1917 essay, “The Danger of Nietzsche”—a compilation of presentations delivered two years prior at Lake Forest College’s Bross Lectures (a series devoted to exploring the Christian underpinnings and authority of scripture in academic scholarship)—provides an illuminating example of such a challenge. A conservative-minded Honorary Fellow at Cambridge and minister who “stressed the importance of individual piety,” Figgis was wholly uncomfortable with Nietzsche’s idol smashing, Mencken’s “exhilarating tonic against . . . [many] forms of stupidity.” Ideas of the Overman and the will to power proved specially problematic, though admittedly Figgis backpedals from the least forgiving accusations declaring that a will to power necessarily excuses barbarism and inhumanity. (He sheepishly describes the doctrine as “a spirit rather than a code.”) Nietzsche’s Overman concept, however, can find no such safe harbor and is fingered for Figgis’s special reproach:

The non-moral company promoter, who achieves eminence in riches, by eminence in lying, [sic] the organizers of the slave trade, the oppressors of native races, the promoters of the Putumayo atrocities, all these might be condemned by Nietzsche himself. Yet they would find excuse in his principles.

Figgis does not shy from reminding his readers “Nietzsche admitted that according to all existing standards his superman is a criminal.” Such warning is representative of the

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29 Figgis, 284.

30 Ibid., 272.

31 Ibid., 269.
most significant unifying principle of Figgis’s essay on Nietzsche: that those who subscribe to Nietzsche’s system, claiming privilege in his “cult of pride,” present a most unwanted and dangerous prospect for society.\textsuperscript{32}

This less favorable appraisal was nothing exceptional. By the close of World War I, Figgis’s style of analysis came to be the rule rather than the exception. And though the view prompting some critical accounts of the day—that Nietzsche had somehow helped bring about World War I—had lost credibility shortly after the war, Nietzsche’s influence did not soon return to its pre-war heights.\textsuperscript{33} Overshadowed by the innovative ideas of Freud and Lenin, argues Melvin Drimmer, “newer intellectual currents now dominated the American scene. ‘Beyond good and evil,’ ‘transvaluation of all values,’ ‘Superman,’ no longer seemed fresh battle cries.”\textsuperscript{34} Moreover, the association of Nietzsche with fringe groups—labor struggles, Social Darwinism and militarism (of course)—hardly helped to cleanse his image.\textsuperscript{35} With the arrival of the Great Depression,

Only H. L. Mencken and Benjamin De Casseres remained to preach an arch-individualism to an audience concerned with larger economic and political questions, and by 1935 both spokesmen [sic] found themselves estranged from an American audience. . . . Unable to differentiate between a Roosevelt and a Hitler, between a Babbitt and a storm trooper, between a bourgeois society leaning towards reform and a bourgeois society becoming totalitarian, Nietzsche’s teachings reached a dead end in the hands of Mencken. . . . Nietzsche had become totally irrelevant as a guide through the Depression. . . .\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 267-270.
\textsuperscript{33} Strong, 583-585.
\textsuperscript{34} Drimmer, 22.
\textsuperscript{35} Strong, 580-582.
\textsuperscript{36} Drimmer, 24.
If it can be said that Nietzsche’s work had already fallen out of vogue during the Depression Era, his subsequent connection with Germany’s political excesses during World War II would render him almost completely illegitimate.

The movement of the public intellectual elite from Nietzsche resembles a similar shift among American academic philosophers and intellectual historians. Allan Bloom rightly attributes at least part of Nietzsche’s enduring negative reputation among academics to a “discomfiting relation to fascism” during the 1930s. However, as with non-academics, academia’s turn away also preceded this political development: despite his influence upon the generation’s more popular German thinkers, Nietzsche was either ignored or shunned in academic circles before the fascist movements gained strength in his name. “Substantive ethical, political, and aesthetic questions [common to the “Continental” school years later],” notes Ivan Soll, “were deemed beyond the reach of philosophical analysis.” The discipline of academic philosophy in particular had come to focus squarely upon the analytic model, the interwar period witnessing a general departure from prevailing German thought in favor of more restrictive Anglo-American methods. Within a system of rigid, scientific analysis of language—ironically something at which Nietzsche excels—there was increasingly little room for Nietzsche’s grandiose goals and inflammatory language. And, as among public intellectuals, Nietzsche’s image was further debased with the rise of fascist politics in Europe in the 1930s. Certainly, any


39 Soll, 118-121.
systemic preferences guiding philosophical study up to that point were discarded: Nietzsche had come to be considered—through his connection with the politics of repression—unrespectable within the academy of professionals and among casual readers alike.

Noting this shaky history of reception, Bryan Strong maintains that Americans of this era were intellectually ill-equipped to fully understand Nietzsche’s philosophy, much less comment upon his writings with any degree of exactitude. In the American mind, thought was invariably united with political action: “Ideas,” he tells us, “tended to be regarded as ideological weapons in which the thought equaled the deed.” Conversely, Europeans were able to restrict ideas to the realm of the mind without being driven to set them into motion politically, socially or culturally. Thus, he argues, outside the context of this European intellectual tradition—and perhaps European culture itself—Nietzschean ideas are easily manipulated in service of dangerous or socially irresponsible ends.

Allan Bloom supports this position emphasizing the importance of a thought system’s political-intellectual context. In Nietzsche’s case, “we chose a system of thought that, like some wines, does not travel”: the “richness and tension” of modernity that Nietzsche hoped would propel mankind towards new heights out of the failures of religion and the inadequacy of late-nineteenth century values never emerged in

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40 Strong, 576.
41 Ibid., 576-589.
42 Ibid., 575-577.
America.43 "We are a bit like savages," he writes, "who, having been discovered and evangelized by missionaries, have converted to Christianity without having experienced all that came before and after the revelation.44

Though intriguing, this thread contending that the political environment precludes a full comprehension of Nietzsche's writings among American readers is not overly convincing (or overly worrisome).45 Simply, the claim is never born out by the evidence. However, the widely-held parallel argument taken up by Bloom and many others that Nietzsche "invited misinterpretation" by employing highly deceptive symbols within an outwardly unsystematic and disorienting structure is undeniable.46 (Even Walter Kaufmann, one of Nietzsche's most committed defenders, is somewhat critical of Nietzsche on this matter.)47 Compounded by this issue and a shortage of satisfactory explanations in an oppressive intellectual environment concerned with dangerous political realities, it's hardly surprising that Nietzsche's body of work encountered a wide

43 Bloom, 91, 92-93.
44 Ibid., 93.
45 Given the nature of some of the truly errant interpretations forwarded by Nietzsche's early commentators, Strong's argument is slightly more plausible, yet not terribly convincing either.
46 Bloom, 90.
47 Melvin Drimmer notes this critique, citing Kaufmann's suggestion that "everyone is entitled to his own Nietzsche," and seems to partially misrepresent the complexity of Kaufmann's thought on this subject [see Walter Kaufmann, From Shakespeare to Existentialism: Studies in Poetry, Religion and Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), 307-308]. Kaufmann certainly never equates entitlement to truth (i.e. "everyone" may be entitled to his own Nietzsche, but that hardly makes "everyone's" Nietzsche true). Any concern that he subscribes to such hyper-relativistic nonsense is absolutely cleared up in his semi-biographical work, The Faith of a Heretic. Additionally, Kaufmann's painstaking efforts to dissociate Nietzsche from any fascist connections in Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist further supports this contention. This evidence, however, does not negate Drimmer's contention that Kaufmann believed Nietzsche "allowed his language to run away with his ideas making it relatively easy to interpret whatever one wished." (Drimmer, 25)
range of resistance and a host of disparate explanations in the minds of many American readers.

Yet, whatever the reason for the multitude of interpretations of Nietzsche, the scope not only reflects the complexity of Nietzsche’s system, but also the intellectual and political climates informing his later observers. Undoubtedly, the range of work produced by the early generation of Nietzscheans indicates a change in the American intellectual climate, pre-war commentaries differing greatly from those of World War I. Comparatively, the rise and decline of radical political movements and general instability in Europe ten years later provoked a similar trend—Nietzsche’s philosophy encountering harsh scrutiny before and during World War II, only to be largely shelved (in academic circles in particular) soon afterwards. Moreover, the postwar reception of Nietzsche is special, particularly among academic philosophers and intellectual historians, and signals a profound turning point in this trend—a shift, first, in the formulation of Nietzsche’s association with radical political movements (fascism specifically), and more broadly, a signal of the discipline-wide reevaluation of the connections of scholarship and political motion.

Two leading academics sitting at the forefront of these changes during and after World War II, Crane Brinton and Walter Kaufmann, illuminate this development. Their seminal works on Nietzsche, Brinton’s highly successful *Nietzsche* appearing in 1941 followed by Kaufmann’s *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* in 1950, offer a case study of sorts that characterizes the progression of Nietzsche scholarship from the thinker as Nazi-forbear to one well within the boundaries of legitimate philosophical
study. Crane Brinton’s publication of *Nietzsche* in 1941 shall serve as the first case in our examination of these changes.
CHAPTER 2
CRANE BRINTON – NIETZSCHE IN THE REAL WORLD

The bonds between ideas and politics in Nietzsche's thought certainly were not lost on Crane Brinton. Writing during the late thirties at a time when Hitler and Goebbels were portrayed, as Brinton describes, "in the present tense", the intellectual climate at the time Nietzsche came to press was clearly precarious. A second world war starring Germany as the primary aggressor had intensified a departure from things-German in America, and Nietzsche's message—already marginalized politically and intellectually to some degree in the United States—does not appear to have resonated in an era focused upon more urgent concerns. Acknowledging the work "must bear some marks of [these] contemporary events", Brinton presents an interpretation of Nietzsche that basically follows the Nazi version, but is forced to square this supposed political legacy with Nietzsche's obviously significant contributions to philosophical discourse.

The days of glorious arch-individualism past, it's hardly surprising that Brinton's critical effort would take on this character. With the rise of fascism, the atmosphere


49 Ivan Soll perceives not only a departure from Nietzsche individually, but a broad shift away from Continental philosophy as well: "The veering away of philosophy in the English-speaking world from that in Germany took place largely in a period marked by two world wars in which Germany was the major enemy." (Soll, 124) World War II appears to have widened this split.

surrounding Brinton nurtured such a viewpoint. Indeed, the American academy, particularly Brinton’s Harvard, was almost wholly engaged against Nazi doctrine, a struggle that projected itself upon all manner of scholarly endeavor. Noting that “Harvard men, whatever their political stripe, like to be leaders,” E. J. Kahn outlines the contributions of Harvard scientists to the war effort, from gas masks to explosives and underwater sound-detection devices. Even Harvard’s President, James Bryant Conant, was intimately connected with the war effort, specifically in the development and production of the atomic bomb while serving as chairman of the National Defense Research Committee in the early 1940s. Indeed, as Charles Wagner reports, “the vast scientific facilities of Harvard were thrown open completely and promptly to war needs.” So too with the Humanities. As Robin Winks discovers in his Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961, social scientists were highly committed to the anti-German effort as well. Oftentimes this effort came in the form of service to America’s intelligence forces. Crane Brinton was himself among the OSS’s numbers, joining a group comprised of many prominent academicians and a true “Who’s Who” of American historians.

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53 Ibid., 257.

It's quite clear that Brinton was part of the professional academic resistance, and it would be naïve to assume that this commitment would have no bearing upon his scholarship, especially given the historian's personal distaste for a thinker he considered "unpleasant" and whose influence he judged "on the whole regrettable." Yet, in spite of his personal motives and closeness to the Nietzsche-Nazi formulation, Brinton often shies away from overstating Nietzsche's connection to the cause. Mindful of the complexity of Nietzsche's thought and the myriad interpretations and many faces of the "old philologist," Brinton is reluctant to exaggerate this theme at the outset, cautiously developing a multi-layered approach to Nietzsche. "If there really was a Nietzsche-in-himself, a 'true' Nietzsche," Brinton remarks, "he is gone, and what lives after him in his books is not one thing but many." The result is a nuanced account that reflects such complexity, and put simply, makes allowances for Nietzsche's slipperiness. Toward this end, Brinton devotes a considerable portion of the discussion to Nietzsche's contributions to philosophy, beginning with Nietzsche's keen eye for uncovering the veils, structures and assumptions that distort man's understanding of reality.

In Brinton's eyes, Nietzsche possessed an almost unparalleled ability to pull back the curtain and "bring to light perhaps more clearly than anywhere else in our literature, some of the basic illusions men live by." Highlighting Nietzsche's declarations against intellectual absolutism, Brinton methodically outlines Nietzsche's rejection of the

55 Brinton, ix.
56 Ibid., 232.
57 Ibid., 167.
"gentle, orderly world of love and pity [of] idealistic philosophers" as well as nineteenth-century positivism in philosophy, history and science.\(^5^8\) He recounts expertly Nietzsche's fundamental concept that "all thinking is an arrangement, an interpretation of facts (receptor-experiences) which must be tentative, changing, relative,"\(^5^9\) as well as Nietzsche's warnings against the deception of the senses and any knowledge that seeks the thing-in-itself or static truth.

Skillfully relating the philosopher's penetrating views of parliamentary government, politics (including European and American democracies) and, of course, Judeo-Christian religious tradition, Brinton's treatment of Nietzsche's general distaste for "mass society" in its many forms is also quite strong. And though recent arguments have called into question whether Nietzsche's views might square with, say, contemporary American democracy,\(^6^0\) Brinton's work is compatible with the most widely accepted scholarship on these topics. Popular political movements are rightly explained in terms of their "attempt[s] to bring the unlovely and impossible Christian heaven down to earth"; nineteenth century nation states of their corruption and elevation of the mediocre and the profane; organized religions of their subjugation of greatness.\(^6^1\)

\(^5^8\) Ibid., 90, 151-153.

\(^5^9\) Ibid., 153.


\(^6^1\) Brinton, 107, 125. He clearly held Nietzsche's thoughts on these topics in high regard: "Had Nietzsche never produced anything but *The Genealogy of Morals* [arguably Nietzsche's most convincing discussion of language and Judeo-Christian morality] and especially the admirable chapter on 'Ascetic Ideals,' he would still have to be ranked high among writers who have helped us know ourselves." (167) Brinton also lauds Nietzsche's critical output, noting his commentary on music and the philosophy of art.
Yet, however compelling Brinton's handling of Nietzsche's take on human nature and society, his evaluation of Nietzsche's larger political worldview remains the more serious commitment. Cleverly developed, Brinton's argument follows a clear thread that seeks to establish Nietzsche within a contemporary political context by charting first, Nietzsche's association with nineteenth century German intellectual and political culture and, ultimately, twentieth century fascist thought. The exigencies of the modern political and academic atmospheres appearing to inform this account, the groundwork for these eventual connections begins with a refigurement of Nietzsche's psychological condition.

Reduced to something he admits is "absurdly simple", Brinton's alignment of Nietzsche and fascistic ideology rests upon an interpretation attributing Nietzsche's body of critical work to a compensatory psychosis. "Adler and Jung and Freud", he scoffs, "are hardly necessary here..." Nietzsche, Brinton explains, fools his audiences through misdirection; the wide disapproval appearing in his writing is actually something quite the reverse. Take, for instance, Nietzsche's criticisms of the German Reich, arguably among his most central themes: "Here Nietzsche's hatred is most transparently disappointed love. He had wooed his fellow-countrymen, and they had turned him down... paid him no attention at all." Far from the picture of Nietzsche as individualist and free-thinker, Nietzsche is reintroduced as a man who collected "innumerable wounds..."
with profit if not with pleasure," a figure suffering from "forty different kinds of inferiority complex."

This construction is plausible at face value. However, it must be said that its connection to later conclusions is somewhat tenuous, as Brinton employs this evidence to align Nietzsche with an unflattering imagery of German aggressiveness. His commentary upon Nietzsche’s criticism of “so final a Frenchman as Sainte Beuve”—a figure, one assumes, close to this Francophile historian’s heart—provides a useful example:

That phrase about “virile spirits” is the stock German defense against France. . . . What Nietzsche mistook for a lack of masculine fire in Frenchmen like Sainte Beuve is really a kind of tranquillity [sic] rarely attained by Germans. . . . Here, as so often, the labored originality and fierce individualism of Nietzsche turns out to be the old feeling of the [German] tribe.

Despite Brinton’s protestations that his book “is not meant to indict the German nation”, this functional portrayal of Nietzsche within “the old feeling of the tribe” is problematic. If not an indictment of Germany, it certainly represents a highly crude statement on Nietzsche’s worldview, which informs the framework for Brinton’s broader interpretation linking Nietzsche with contemporary politics.

Brinton complements this argument by highlighting the ideological similarities between Nietzsche and Nazism and the Nazi appropriations of his philosophy. Founded upon Nietzsche’s closeness to nineteenth century Germany and its habitual drive for power, Brinton by turns moves to suggest a strong resemblance to modern day National

65 Ibid., 46.
66 Ibid., 44.
67 Ibid., 80.
Socialism. Despite the Nazis’ frequent and categorical misrepresentations of Nietzsche’s work (a point Brinton indeed highlights), Nietzsche, Brinton argues, “occasionally . . . comes very close indeed to the Nazi program.” Having shifted the perspective from nineteenth century philosopher to a modern political figure, Brinton implies an intellectual association between Nietzsche and Nazism. And though left unresolved until the final pages of this work, it is the primary contention of his biography.

This charge is rendered more convincing when merged with Brinton’s application of what he considers Nietzsche’s lone absolute, the Will to Power. Stripped of any condition of self-discipline, this critically important tenet of Nietzsche’s philosophy is offered as evidence that Nietzsche’s thought licensed unbridled self-assertion and ascendant basic instinct:

“Good” for the masters is the pure exertion of the Will to Power, which in our decadent times we cannot even name without using words of ill repute, like fighting, cruelty, greed, lying, voluptuousness. “Good” for the herd we herdmen and Christians can describe in nice words, like peace, compassion, obedience, self restraint. And similarly, of course, with “bad.”

When presented in this context, the Will to Power serves to sanction almost any behavior, race hatred included, which is introduced as the final springboard for discussing the relationship between Nietzsche and the Nazis.

Though careful to avoid assigning total blame to the Master for his disciples’ latter-day sins, Brinton’s contentions are clear: there exists not only a significant

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69 Idem, 214.
70 Ibid., 215.
71 Ibid., 99-100.
relationship between Nietzsche's work and fascist politics, but an intellectual closeness that extends beyond direct influence. The Nazi's excesses, Brinton suggests, were a likely consequence and a plausible derivative of Nietzsche's system of thought:

Nietzsche is held in high honor today in his native land. He has become one of the Early Fathers of the revolutionary Nazi faith. Point for point he preached, along with a good deal else which the Nazis choose to disremember, most of the cardinal articles of the professed Nazi creed—a transvaluation of all values, the sanctity of the will to power, the right and duty of the strong to dominate, the sole right of great states to exist, a renewing, a rebirth, of German and hence European society. More vaguely, Nietzsche preached the coming of the Superman; and though many different ethical values can be, and have been, attached to this concept of the Superman, both the Nazi idea of the Master-race and the Nazi appeal to the principle of leadership (Fuehrerprinzip) are among the most obvious and congruous derivatives of that concept. Finally, the emotional tone of Nietzsche's life and writings, as distinguished from his ideas, is much like what we hear of the emotional tone of inner Nazi circles. The unrelieved tension, the feverish aspiration, the driving madness, the great noise Nietzsche made for himself, the Nazi elite is making for an uncomfortably large part of the world.72

However questionable the method of judging a philosopher's ideas in light of their latter-day developments—Brinton's rather rough classification of "Gentle" and "Tough" Nietzscheans notwithstanding73—Brinton concludes that "Mussolini and Hitler answered the call."74

72 Ibid., 231.

73 Brinton explains Nietzsche's appropriation as basically divided between two groups of disciples—the famous "gentle" and "tough" distinction. Acknowledging that "any attempt to classify them will be unworthy of their variety" and conceding that many fell somewhere outside this rigid distinction, he nonetheless believes that "the simple polar distinction is a useful one" for understanding Nietzsche's influence, particularly his reception by Nazi circles. (Brinton, 184) "Gentle Nietzscheans" regarded Nietzsche as a humane thinker who fits into America's religious and ethical tradition, despite his occasional fits of shock: "Nietzsche was a most Christian anti-Christian; he hated the sham Christianity of his age as only a true follower of Jesus could hate it." (185) Theirs is an interpretation that excessively softens Nietzsche's harsher message, erecting classifications for even his most pointed remarks, defining his Will to Power in Darwinian terms and—as W.M. Salter had done—expurgating "all the impatience, all the drum-beating, all the mystic exaltation." (190) Though not completely Bowdlerized, Nietzsche is largely declared. (186-187) Brinton's tough Nietzscheans, on the other hand, conformed more closely to popular perception. Here Nietzsche is couched as an aristocratic libertine, disgusted with the middle-class's corruption of the noble soul through the seduction of language and the traps of Christianity. Generally
But which "call" specifically had modern fascist demagogues answered?

Brinton’s clearest arguments identify the racial concepts peppered throughout Nietzsche’s writings as the clearest indication of the thinker’s closeness to modern fascism. Citing several examples of what he terms “the stock of professional anti-Semitism”, this evidence—more than Brinton’s formulations of Nietzsche’s transvaluation of all values or will to power—serves as the basic foundation for his Nietzsche-Nazi thesis. Yet, curiously, the dubiousness of this argument identifying Nietzsche with race-mongering seems unmistakable.

comfortable with the more severe outgrowths of Nietzsche’s philosophy, Brinton’s tough Nietzscheans were “at first recruited from literary and artistic circles, and their toughness was entirely a matter of words. ... [They were] like ... perpetual adolescents in rebellion, on the hunt for new Byrons like themselves.” (194) George Bernard Shaw, “sound[ing] so much like Nietzsche ... that we are confronted, if not with a case of influence, at least with a most touching meeting of noble minds”; Mencken, responsible for “one of the best and liveliest accounts of Nietzsche’s ideas taken literally, cheerfully, and with a fine disregard for the bowing and scraping to Philosophy and Depth so common in German writing on Nietzsche”; and Lodoivci, whose “social and political ideas are more closely patterned after Nietzsche’s loudest affirmations on such matters than is usual outside Nazi circles,” typify the best and most committed of this group. (195-196) Brinton admits that both lenses of interpretation appear somewhat deficient, yet believes the political outgrowths licensed by this “hard” interpretation render Nietzsche most dangerous.

74 Brinton, 171.

75 Ibid., 215-216. Brinton references the following sections in support of this claim: The Gay Science §301; Twilight of the Idols, Part IV §26; The Will to Power §184 and 864; Beyond Good and Evil §251; The Antichrist §24-27. Full text for each passage appears in the appendix. According to Walter Kaufmann, the selection as listed above from The Gay Science is actually a misprint; Brinton intended to reference section 361. (Section 301, for the record, is clearly irrelevant to any argument about anti-Semitism. Titled “The fancy of the contemplatives,” Nietzsche here focuses upon awareness, thoughtfulness and creativeness as a condition necessary for human growth: the poet, the higher type he says, has "vis contemplativa and the ability to look back upon his work, but at the same time also and above all vis creativa"—contemplative and creative powers—the ability to produce something new. The consequences of these powers? The contemplative poets—in their direction of creative power and application of creative authority—have the ability and responsibility to assign values, which are taken up by lesser humans, mere actors. Nietzsche is directing these higher humans to recognize these abilities and establish themselves—“Only we have created the world that concerns man! ... [yet] we fail to recognize our best power and underestimate ourselves, just a little. We are neither as proud nor as happy as we might be.” [Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), 241-42.]
For starters, though Brinton dismisses that Nietzsche supported any narrowly German or Teutonic ascendance, he clearly misstates Nietzsche’s views respecting race, specifically in his identification of Nordic, Teutons and “blond beasts” as Nietzsche’s “purified races.” More recent scholarship, including Walter Kaufmann’s work, has repudiated this accusation very convincingly.\(^{76}\) Further, Brinton’s claims concerning Nietzsche’s ostensibly anti-Semitic views are highly suspect: the relevant context of the references in question is often ignored—an absolutely critical step for extracting Nietzsche’s intended meaning—and nuance and sarcasm are often accepted literally. In certain cases, Brinton bases his findings upon scant or even non-existent evidence\(^{77}\) and in sum mismanages and almost categorically misinterprets Nietzsche’s intended meaning.\(^{78}\)

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\(^{76}\) Kaufmann’s work is highlighted in the next chapter. See also R. J. Hollingdale, *Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965).

\(^{77}\) Brinton’s reference to *Twilight of the Idols* IV §26 cannot be found. Part IV of this work has only six sections, and elsewhere, in the two parts with at least 26 sections—“Maxims and Arrows” and “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man”—neither Jews nor anti-Semitism is mentioned. This miscitation is accompanied by others throughout the work (see page 129, “What Nietzsche Wanted”) in addition to, for all its truly good commentary on a range of issues, several more rather elementary mistakes. For instance, Brinton mischaracterizes Nietzsche’s famous catchphrase of “philosophizing” with a hammer to represent something destructive, rather than something instructive—the ring of a tuning fork in this case—as was intended. (Brinton, 83) He also misinterprets Nietzsche’s position in his second Untimely Meditation (his claim that Nietzsche believed “History . . . can really tell us nothing important about the present” [82] is clearly false) as well as Nietzsche’s view of Socrates (he contends that “Socrates . . . is for Nietzsche a villain”, [83] which is, almost assuredly, untrue. See Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* §340).

\(^{78}\) If nothing else, should the following counter-interpretations prove unconvincing, Jews in these examples are portrayed *more* positively than almost any other group, which precludes any singular or definitive anti-Semitic label (i.e. by Brinton’s logic, Nietzsche would more appropriately be rendered nearly “anti-everything” and his perceived anti-Semitism would hardly be noteworthy). It is my opinion that careful attention to Nietzsche’s comparisons and his distinctions by degree is critical in evaluating his thought, by which the Jewish race maintains its high place in Nietzsche’s mind. I further suggest that the alternate conception—that Nietzsche was “against” everything—is unsound.
Section 361 of *The Gay Science* offers an illuminating example of Brinton’s problematic analysis of Nietzsche’s work. This passage’s outward purpose is to investigate the nature of power within society—a regular topic for Nietzsche—specifically, the relationship of the powerless to the powerful. In this case, Jews, a race long subjected to persecution, are offered as an example of a group disenfranchised from the structures of power “who had to survive under changing pressures and coercions,” and Nietzsche’s consideration of their collective response is more an inquiry into large-scale socialization than an anti-Semitic statement. Undoubtedly, conjuring such images like a mastery of the press or an exercise of power “by virtue of . . . histrionic gifts” when discussing Jews hardly helps clarify his message, yet the imagery in itself suggests nothing anti-Semitic whatever—especially when evaluated within the passage’s broader interpretive framework.

In Brinton’s second example, Nietzsche continues his discussion of power within society in an examination of the priestly class in *The Antichrist* 24-27. These sections focus upon the foundations of Christian morality by tracing the rise, struggle and ultimate victory of the priestly caste to reorder and “determine the value of things.” The priests’ hegemony over the concept of God, Nietzsche writes, referring to the development as a “tool in the hands of priestly agitators,” was applied with drastic consequences towards

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80. Ibid., 317.


82. Ibid., 595.
the creation of an anti-natural Christian code of morality. While Nietzsche discusses both the Jewish and Christian roles in this progression of events, the distinction he makes between Christianity and Judaism in these passages is crucial: the usurpations of the priestly classes are presented always in relative terms, as a perversion of a purer and more noble Jewish faith. On the other hand, the culmination of this development, Christianity, is presented as fundamentally priestly, and thus, inherently unnatural. This point is illustrated through a basic examination of Nietzsche’s comparisons of Hebrew and Christian sacred texts (for example, he as a rule preferred the Old Testament to the New) and in his portrayal of Jesus. In several instances, Nietzsche laments the death of Judaism’s more “true” religion at the hands of, first, its own priests and, later to a more treacherous Christian worldview.

Section 184 of The Will to Power offers another useful case of Brinton’s misinterpretation of Nietzsche’s “Jewish question.” In this example, as with any of Nietzsche’s unfinished fragments comprising The Will to Power, an eye toward its place within Nietzsche’s published work is exceedingly important. Written during the time Nietzsche began his work on The Antichrist, Brinton’s interpretation neglects this background and, thus, fails to grasp Nietzsche’s intended meaning, which continues the development of his descriptions of the priestly classes and his concept of ressentiment as established in The Genealogy of Morals and Twilight of the Idols. Admittedly, Nietzsche’s proclamation again seems rather troublesome at first glance (the Jewish chandala “brought into their religion enmity toward the noble, ... toward the ruling orders”), but any unease over his actual attitude is resolved by considering the next
passage in the context of his message in *The Antichrist*. And indeed, as Nietzsche continues his description of Christianity as “the ultimate conclusion of this [priestly] movement”, its rise is regarded as a further perversion of the Jewish faith. Additionally, Nietzsche’s most scathing imagery—*ressentiment*, an intensification of the degeneration of something more noble, “the rancor of the sick, instinct directed *against* the healthy,”[^83] “the chandala who repudiates the priest—the chandala who redeems himself”[^84]—is employed to explain the development of Christianity, not of Judaism. While hardly uplifting, the claim linking this passage and its related material in *The Antichrist* with anti-Semitism again does not withstand close scrutiny.[^85]

Titled “Why the weak conquer,” the image of the Jew reappears in section 864 of *The Will to Power* as Nietzsche outlines the development of cultural decadence and his hope for the resuscitation of high culture. Far from casting the Jew as a cause of what he outlines as the tyranny of the sick and weak against the strong, Nietzsche places Jews within a preservative cultural counter-revolution engaged against these Decadents. To be sure, though Nietzsche assigns this counter-movement a rather unflattering name (mediocrity) and warns against its own particular “seductions,” his rhetoric is hardly anti-


[^85]: Walter Kaufmann contends, “When the *Antichrist* is considered in this setting, in the context of Nietzsche’s thought, it becomes perfectly clear that Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity was not motivated anti-Semitically at bottom and that he did not develop a racial interpretation of history.” (Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950], 262-263. [Hereafter cited as “Nietzsche: PPA”. Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent page references are to this first edition.] )
Semitic despite the critical label—especially when juxtaposed by his descriptions of the Christian worldview. Nietzsche clearly elevates Jews toward his foundation for high culture in defiance of the rise of "social hodgepodge,"86 which he defines as a "feminine" conspiracy of sympathy against the strong, "the superstition of 'equal men'" and culture's bow to the least common denominator. The Jewish role within this construction, while not exalted, is undeniably preferable to the decadence Nietzsche perceives elsewhere in mob culture, and their conserving power is portrayed as essential for the fulfillment of Nietzsche's highest aspiration—the advancement of humanity—and clearly inimical to the anti-Semitic overtones of fascism.

Finally, Brinton's mischaracterization of the now famous section 251 in Beyond Good and Evil is attributable, not necessarily to a deficient interpretation, but rather to his poor presentation of the evidence in question. Outlining National Socialists' uses of Nietzsche's most noteworthy passage concerning the "Jewish question", he includes the following excerpt:

I have never yet met a German who was favorably inclined to the Jews: and however decided the repudiation of actual anti-Semitism may be on the part of all prudent and political men, this prudence and policy is not perhaps directed against the nature of sentiment itself, but only against its dangerous excess, and especially against the distasteful and infamous expression of this excess of sentiment:—on this point we must not deceive ourselves. That Germany has amply sufficient Jews, that the German stomach, the German blood, has difficulty (and will long have difficulty) in disposing of this quantity of "Jew"—as the Italian, the Frenchman, and the Englishman have done by means of a stronger digestion:—that is the unmistakable declaration and language of a general instance, to which

86 "A high culture can stand only upon a broad base, upon a strong and healthy consolidated mediocrity." (Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 462)
one must listen and according to which one must act. “Let no more Jews come in! And shut the doors, especially towards the East (also towards Austria)!”87

Though Brinton briefly touches upon the ease of transforming even Nietzsche’s most benign ideas, he in this case chooses to omit the relevant context of the quotation, which is brought to light by continuing with Nietzsche’s full thought without a break in the sentence:

... thus commands the instinct of a people whose type is still weak and indefinite, so it could easily be blurred or extinguished by a stronger race. The Jews, however, are beyond any doubt the strongest, toughest, and purest race now living in Europe. ... It might be useful and fair to expel the anti-Semitic screamers from the country.88

In the end, Brinton leaves the reader fully unaware of the passage’s true meaning, which earlier served as a foundation for his case in concluding his chapter on “Nietzsche and the Nazis”. Initially utilizing the passage among the evidence that ostensibly establishes his case for Nietzsche’s anti-Semitic leanings, Brinton in this instance deliberately excludes the content that best serves to clarify Nietzsche’s actual position. While he qualifies his omission in a footnote (“a discerning Nazi would need to make suppressions here, but the substance is good Nazi doctrine”),89 the passage as reported remains extremely misleading and his explanation wholly inadequate. As in previous examples, Brinton’s


88 Ibid., 187-188. The preceding matter also helps clarify Nietzsche’s actual message:

It must be taken into the bargain if all sorts of clouds and disturbances—in brief, little attacks of hebetation—pass over the spirit of a people that is suffering, and wants to suffer, of nationalistic nerve fever and political ambition. Examples among the Germans today include not the anti-French stupidity, now the anti-Jewish, now the anti-Polish ... . Forgive me, for during a brief daring sojourn in very infected territory I, too, did not altogether escape this disease and began like everyone else to develop notions about matters that are none of my business: the first sign of the political infection. For example about the Jews: only listen! (186-187)

89 Brinton, 216.
failure to place his evidence within its proper context severely damages his case for including Nietzsche among modern anti-Semites or fascists.

Clearly, Nietzsche’s presentation, tone and subject matter deservedly raised eyebrows during Crane Brinton’s time, and this fact may help explain Brinton’s sensitivity to Nietzsche’s rather uncompromising views, bombastic presentation and highly suggestive imagery. To be sure, Nietzsche commented before a time when racial sensitivity demand that he censor himself completely, and Brinton in many cases is able to look past his idol smashing and glean Nietzsche’s true message. To Brinton’s credit, there is little room for debate on several significant points that are highlighted in his biography: Nietzsche was a misogynist, a hater of the egalitarian ideal, suspicious of the tyranny of the herd and hopefully confident that new leadership, the Supermen, would emerge triumphant. His declaration that “Nietzsche, wherever he led, did not lead towards the Rights of Man”90 is perhaps less clear (one might argue, for instance, that his work was about little more than the Rights of Man), but plausible at the least. However, despite his harassment of most every nation and “race” (Germany, Germans and Jews included), placing any special emphasis upon Jewish race-hatred is erroneous; Nietzsche’s work overwhelmingly suggests the opposite. While full of varied and seemingly contradictory ideas, his sometimes-uncomplimentary remarks appearing offensive at the surface are often either ironic in their intent or mitigated by a more scathing indictment of another group a paragraph further, only to be dismissed unequivocally elsewhere. Indeed, many now believe Nietzsche to be “one of the more

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antifascistic and anti-anti-Semitic writers of his time. . .”91 Yet, Brinton’s work represents the standard fare—if not the definitive statement—in American Nietzsche scholarship during the World War II years. But after the clouds lifted in the late 1940s, small pockets within academia began to reconsider Nietzsche in ways contrary to the fascistic and anti-Semitic paradigm that had gained currency previously. Walter Kaufmann, who sought an almost complete reconstruction that attempts to divorce Nietzsche from the modern fascist context, spearheaded this effort.

CHAPTER 3
WALTER KAUFMANN – EXITING IDEOLOGY

In the wake of Brinton’s attempt to place Nietzsche within the “general currents of ‘opinion’ in our time,”92 Walter Kaufmann sought to remove Nietzsche from this context in the late 1940s. Citing little agreement even about Nietzsche’s basic ideas, Kaufmann found it necessary to “buck the current prejudice against Nietzsche”93 and return the thinker to “contemporary relevance.”94 Indeed, it is Kaufmann’s opinion that Nietzsche’s ideas had been “overgrown and obscured by rank fiction”,95 a result, partly, of his sister’s deficient interpretations—and in many cases, deliberate perversions of Nietzsche’s message—that continued to wield significant influence throughout the World War II era.96 “Nietzsche,” Kaufmann concludes, as a result “is perhaps best known as the prophet of great wars and power politics.”97


95 Ibid., 3. He even goes so far to claim, “no commonly accepted account has been given previously of even a single part of Nietzsche’s philosophy.” Kaufmann touched upon this subject—along with many others—previously in his doctoral dissertation, “Nietzsche’s Theory of Values.” (Walter Kaufmann, “Nietzsche’s Theory of Values” [Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, March 1947], ii.)

96 Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: PPA*, 3-5.

97 Ibid., 361.
Divorcing Nietzsche from the politics of the 1940s required what Kaufmann would term a “comprehensive reconstruction”\(^98\) beginning with a reassessment of the prejudices surrounding Nietzsche’s thought. These prejudices—which when taken together appear somewhat contradictory—span quite a wide range of beliefs, including the notion that Nietzsche lacked any coherent philosophy (often explained in terms of his later madness), that he was an anti-Semite or subscribed to an uncommonly callous worldview. The popularity of this first charge, Nietzsche’s disjointedness—a thread that was taken up by Brinton—is partly attributable to Richard Oehler’s influential interpretation that fabricates an impression of discontinuity within Nietzsche’s thought by dividing it into three stages. “The second [stage of Nietzsche’s thought], with its enlightened views represents,” Kaufmann argues, “a temporary departure from the true Nietzscheanism.”\(^99\) However, any effort to compartmentalize Nietzsche’s work was to Kaufmann patently absurd: Nietzsche’s thought is wholly coherent, he maintains,\(^100\) and the principles of this “middle period” hardly anomalous. In fact, these “enlightened views” achieve their most prominent emphasis in Nietzsche’s later writings, which Kaufmann considers as the culmination of Nietzsche’s basic worldview. Historians like Oehler and later Brinton, by judging a portion of Nietzsche’s work (Nietzsche’s “middle period” in this case) to be intellectually discontinuous, Kaufmann says, have created a

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\(^98\) Ibid., vii.

\(^99\) Ibid., 350.

\(^100\) Kaufmann is not alone in this belief. Mencken, though without Kaufmann’s sophistication, had argued essentially the same point: “As his knowledge broadened and his scope widened, he expanded and developed his philosophy, and often he found it necessary to modify it in detail. But that he ever turned upon himself in fundamentals is untrue. Nietzsche at 40 and Nietzsche at 25 were essentially the same.” (Mencken, 33-34)
perception of incoherence and effectively marginalized some of Nietzsche’s most important and groundbreaking work.

In Kaufmann’s estimation, Nietzsche’s late writings had suffered unfairly from such specious analysis fueled at its root by little more than a psychological hunch about his sanity.\textsuperscript{101} While Kaufmann does recognize the inclination to discount the writings completed during the twilight of Nietzsche’s literary life (the late efforts—\textit{The Antichrist} or \textit{Ecce Homo}, for instance—certainly show slight stylistic changes from Nietzsche’s earlier form), he summarily dismisses the suspicion that madness had already taken hold by that time: “What seems important today is merely whether any of his books can be discounted as the fabrications of a madman. To this the answer is an unreserved No.”\textsuperscript{102} Kaufmann contends that even the ranting of Nietzsche’s last work (\textit{Ecce Homo}) is not only deceptively well-crafted and wholly in line with the major elements of Nietzsche’s philosophy, but moreover exceedingly useful in its repudiation “in advance [of] the forces which were later to claim Nietzsche as their own.”\textsuperscript{103}

\footnotesize{\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{101} Nietzsche went fully insane in January 1889, but had exhibited signs of instability somewhat earlier.
\item \textsuperscript{102} Kaufmann, \textit{Nietzsche: PPA}, 50. The collapse, Kaufmann insists, comes in 1889, not earlier (at the time of \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, for example): “The contents of his books . . . can not be disposed of lightly. There is a decided break in Nietzsche’s sanity which comes only later, after his collapse in the street.” Kaufmann takes special issue with Brinton’s dismissal of \textit{Ecce Homo}’s significance, even comparing it to Socrates’ \textit{Apology} in its attempt at a justification of his philosophic efforts. (Kaufmann, 357-358. See also Walter Kaufmann, “Nietzsche’s Admiration for Socrates,” \textit{Journal of the History of Ideas} 9, no. 4 (1948): 489.)
\item \textsuperscript{103} Kaufmann, \textit{Nietzsche: PPA}, 95. He engages Crane Brinton on this topic as well, taking issue specifically with Brinton’s dismissal of Nietzsche’s autobiographical effort (Brinton downplays \textit{Ecce Homo}’s significance in favor of \textit{The Will to Power}). Indeed, Kaufmann goes so far as to compares it to Socrates’ \textit{Apology}, regarding Nietzsche’s autobiographical effort as both Nietzsche’s affirmative repudiation of the misuses of his philosophy as well as his attempt at to justify his philosophic efforts.
\end{enumerate}}
Kaufmann identifies Nietzsche’s sister’s special handling of this work as a prominent development in the story of Nietzsche’s intellectual legacy before World War II and his later reclamation. According to Kaufmann, Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche, who laid claim to Nietzsche’s literary legacy upon the onset of his mental illness, not only deliberately withheld Ecce Homo from publication\(^{104}\) and, as a result, “unwittingly laid the foundation for the myth that Nietzsche’s thought is hopelessly incoherent, ambiguous, and self-contradictory,” but also “prepared the way for the belief that Nietzsche was a proto-Nazi.”\(^{105}\) Kaufmann suggests, first, that Förster-Nietzsche’s “jealous guard” over Nietzsche’s unpublished material (Ecce Homo specifically) precluded an opportunity for an honest and sober account before World War I of Nietzsche’s work. He further contends that Förster-Nietzsche’s publication of The Will to Power was both illegitimate (Nietzsche had abandoned the idea in favor of his Revaluation of All Values, of which the The Antichrist is the first part) and carefully tailored to fit Förster-Nietzsche’s ideologies.\(^{106}\)

Principal components of her political worldview, “Teutonic ‘Christianity’ and chauvinistic racism” most notably,\(^{107}\) were thus wrongly and unfairly folded into Nietzsche’s philosophy without the chance for impartial outside review—not in small part owing to her suppression of Nietzsche’s conflicting corpus of personal letters,

\(^{104}\) Ecce Homo was harshly critical of Förster-Nietzsche and largely flew in the face of her own aims for Nietzsche’s philosophy (i.e. a justification of her own narrow racial bias and nationalistic leanings).

\(^{105}\) Kaufmann, Nietzsche: PPA, 7.

\(^{106}\) Ibid., 5-8.

\(^{107}\) Ibid., 4.
careful editing of his body of unfinished work and her suspicious and “increasingly precise memory for what her brother had said to her in conversation.”

Kaufmann is quick to note that, despite the association with these rather unflattering views, Nietzsche’s “contempt for anti-Semitism . . . had been established unmistakably about the time of his breach with Wagner, and Human, All-too-Human (1878) leaves no doubt about it.” Furthermore, he had, in personal correspondence to both his sister and Franz Overbeck, characterized his association with the anti-Semitism of the period as laughable.

The wide currency afforded to this perception of Nietzsche as anti-Semite—partially attributable to Förster-Nietzsche’s hegemony over his intellectual estate and the misguided scholarship supporting her ideas—has in many respects been founded upon a more basic reputation for harshness or insensitivity. Such accusations, ostensibly the most egregious and fundamental inaccuracies confronting Kaufmann’s re-evaluation, have historically strengthened the alignment of Nietzsche and Nazism, and have found a common application in the association of Nietzsche’s Superman with some wayward brand of Darwinism—a categorical misinterpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of power that lends credence to a belief that almost “anything goes” in Nietzsche’s world.

Kaufmann considers this latter example and the more general overarching fallacy—that

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108 Ibid., 5. She even hijacked a title abandoned by Nietzsche (Zucht und Züchtung) for her own purposes in representing her construction of Nietzsche’s much more complicated—and rather unfinished—thoughts on ‘breed and breeding’, which (incidentally) appeared only once and only within Nietzsche’s unfinished notes. (267-269)

109 Ibid., 37, 37-39. “It is a matter of honor to me to be in relation to anti-Semitism absolutely clean and unequivocal, namely opposed, as I am in my writings.” (Quoted in Ibid., 40)
Nietzsche is somehow generally insensitive or necessarily harsh—to be at variance with the central premises of Nietzsche's philosophy. Nietzsche's actual worldview, he argues, is quite different in many respects. First and foremost, our focus is wrong; Nietzsche was primarily concerned with values:

Modern man finds that his values are worthless, that his ends do not give his life any purpose, and that his pleasures do not give him happiness. Nietzsche's basic problem is whether a new sanction can be found in this world for our values; whether a new goal can be found which will give an aim to human life; and what is happiness?\textsuperscript{110}

Secondly, Kaufmann rejects the oft-cited notion that cruelty, insensitivity or harshness are in any way congruent with or licensed by Nietzsche's conception of power. The most powerful, he remarks, "have no need to prove their might either to themselves or to others by oppressing or hurting others."\textsuperscript{111} Third—and this point is significant despite Kaufmann's admonitions against reducing Nietzsche's thought to "biographical of psychological data"—the facts of Nietzsche's personal life suggest the opposite:

"Nietzsche . . . was himself a kindly and charitable person."\textsuperscript{112} Even his most caustic personal criticisms (e.g. his polemic highlighting David Strauss, \textit{David Strauss: The Confessor and Writer}) are not intended to be cruel, but are chosen rather "to represent the outlook which he opposes."\textsuperscript{113} Nietzsche's high ideal of friendship\textsuperscript{114} and the history of

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 100.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 166.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 361.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 111. Elaborating on this particular point, Kaufmann notes a page later that Nietzsche would later write in \textit{Ecce Homo}, "Attacking is with me a proof of good will, and sometimes of gratitude."
\textsuperscript{114} See Kaufmann, \textit{Nietzsche: PPA}, 320-321. Also see Kaufmann, "Nietzsche's Theory of Values": "While Nietzsche repudiates altruism, he values friendship as conducive to self-perfection." (4a)
his personal relationships are cited as additional evidence in Kaufmann's opposition to this view.

Having outlined some of the fundamental misinterpretations of Nietzsche, it should be said that Kaufmann's reconstruction is more than simply a crusade to save us from our sloppiness, an exercise in what we can't say. Rather, it is more of an affirmative venture that attempts to guide the reader toward answering the question of how he should be interpreting Nietzsche and evaluating the thinker's place within history. The primary launching point of Kaufmann's affirmative construction of Nietzsche's worldview entails a reconsideration of Nietzsche's method, basic premises, and his relationship to world politics, and is culminated by a new conception of the thinker's position within philosophical discourse. We shall first look into Kaufmann's account of Nietzsche's method.

"Nietzsche's literary style," Kaufmann posits, "reflects a way of thinking"—problem-thinking as opposed to system-thinking—that focuses attention upon attacking presuppositions and considering problems individually. Recognizing that "the coherence of a finite system could never be a guarantee of its truth," Nietzsche concentrates instead upon specific problems, working with what Kaufmann terms thought "experiments": "the willingness to question, to submit one's opinions to experiments and to revise one's beliefs in the light of new evidence. Not to do this is a manifestation of


116 Ibid., 71.
irrationality, a weakness, and a lack of power." In Kaufmann’s analysis, Nietzsche was deliberate and methodical in his approach but avoided the uniformity of a system. "He was not primarily ‘for’ or ‘against,’” Kaufmann concludes. “He tried to comprehend.”

While Kaufmann clearly rejects the tendency to allocate Nietzsche’s thought to any overarching system, if there exists a single tenet of Nietzsche’s worldview that alone figures into the rest of his thinking—a monad serving as his basic foundation—it is Nietzsche’s will to power. Explained as “the basic drive of all human efforts,” most of Nietzsche’s thought can be considered on its terms. Essentially conceiving Nietzsche’s foundational standard as a drive toward perfecting the self, Kaufmann focuses his most targeted attention upon contrasting his own perception with the commonly held opinion of the day, which regarded any “will to power” as tantamount to an excuse of cruelty, barbarism and hatred as a means of increasing power. (By such an account, for example, the viciousness of Nazism—merely an outgrowth of pure and unadulterated will to

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117 Ibid., 202. In spite of Nietzsche’s wide breadth and reluctance to resort to a set of premises, Kaufmann cautions his readers against viewing his works as a “universe of monads or aphorisms . . . .” There are unquestionably, he explains, “specific interrelations” and carefully laid themes within Nietzsche’s thought. (Idem, “Nietzsche’s Theory of Values,” 10-12.)

118 Idem, Nietzsche: PPA, 343. While the immediate context of the quotation moderates Kaufmann’s position to some extent (“Though Nietzsche’s uneven style brings out the negative and critical not most strongly . . . .”), this interpretation remains somewhat troublesome; Nietzsche was certainly against a great many things. Kaufmann’s more important point, however,—that Nietzsche’s primary motivation was to understand the world—is accurate.

119 Ibid., 165.

120 Ibid., 217. “The will to power is “essentially a striving to transcend and perfect oneself.” This definition and his explanation that Nietzsche has suggested “an ethics of self-realization” (133) is founded upon the work of his doctoral dissertation, describing Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power as a will to self-perfection—a “striving for self-perfection” (Idem, “Nietzsche’s Theory of Values,” 368)—which serves as the backdrop for much of his commentary upon the principle in his later Nietzsche biography.
power—is effectively licensed by this Nietzsche’s most fundamental principal. Brinton, for one, apparently holds this view, which was hardly unusual.)

Explaining his opposition to this formulation, Kaufmann emphasizes (as before) that “great power does not manifest itself in overcoming others but in self-overcoming” and further insists that despite the idea’s prominence and apparent autonomy within Nietzsche’s philosophy, the will to power is fully regulated by other elements of Nietzsche’s thought. For example, his maxim is “inseparable from his idea of sublimation.” Citing Goethe’s example describing the transfer of human action to stage performance, Kaufmann explains that in order to fulfill the higher requirements of any true will to power, human action—as in Goethe’s model—must be “wrought, prepared, sublimated.” Nietzsche “realized fully,” says Kaufmann, “that power involves self-discipline: that is, in fact, the central point of his conception.” Kaufmann adds further to his hypothesis that true power entails impulse control and self-discipline in his description of the employment of one’s impulses: power must be directed toward “noble goals,” toward the realization of something more profound, more beautiful and more rational. Reason, art and (in certain ways) ascetism thus mark the high development of Nietzsche’s will to power. For in

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121 To be sure, while certain of Brinton’s views tend to be less-forgiving than those of “garden variety” readers who appear decidedly more ambivalent about Nietzsche’s outwardly inconsistent views, this assessment indeed seems representative of much of the commentary during both World War I and World War II. “More often than not,” Kaufmann reports, “his [Nietzsche’s] critics have misconstrued his notion of power and have lavished their invective upon a straw man.” (Kaufmann, “Nietzsche’s Theory of Values,” 349.)

122 Ibid., 2a.

123 Idem, Nietzsche: PPA, viii.

124 Ibid., 190 (emphasis mine).

125 Ibid., 366.
these pursuits, man exhibits his most perfect humanity and rationality, the only means through which true power “can realize its objective most fully.”

Such calls for “rational” application of power figure prominently in Kaufmann’s consideration of Nietzsche’s connection to politics, specifically the strange perception of his partnership with fascistic ideology. As has been outlined in previous chapters, Nietzsche’s philosophy remained closely affiliated with Nazi politics at the time of *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* at the end of the 1940s, and exposing this ostensibly unfair association lay at the heart of Kaufmann’s study. It is perhaps his single most immediate and plainly stated goal:

What is important here is merely that Nietzsche’s views are quite unequivocally opposed to those of the Nazis—more so than those of almost any other prominent German of his own time or before him—and that these views are not temperamental antitheses but corollaries of his philosophy.

However, Kaufmann’s piece is not merely an exposition of the state of Nietzsche’s political legacy. Rather, it is an all-out attack targeting Nietzsche’s association with nearly the entire range of standard fascist dogma—racial supremacy, militarism, mass culture and exaltation of the state. Complementing these specific rebuttals with myriad criticisms of Crane Brinton’s prevailing image of Nietzsche, Kaufmann’s arguments are founded upon the premise that these beliefs violate the basic spirit of Nietzsche’s philosophy, which is fulfilled only when engaged in pursuit of rational and noble ends.

Perhaps the most important—and to some extent, easily recognizable—topic amidst this general reassessment is the notion that Nietzsche advocated a “master race” or

126 Ibid., 198.
127 Ibid., 267.
Teutonic ascendance within his philosophy. Factually, while he did believe in the importance of heredity, Nietzsche is quite opposed to anything approximating racial determinism. Indeed, he recognized the desirability of mixing cultures ("race might favor the attainment of culture") and almost categorically rejects the anti-Slavic or anti-Semitic positions of fascistic politics. Through Nietzsche, quotes Kaufmann, "we learn that the concept of 'pure blood' is the opposite of a harmless concept."  

In spite of the rampant misuse of these ideas, however, it is Nietzsche's conceptions of master- and slave-moralities, "blond beasts" and Übermenschen (Supermen) that most seriously obfuscate his larger intentions and have served to fan the flames of his perceived "race hatred." Nevertheless, Kaufmann summarily dismisses any ascription of these intellectual constructs (master-/slave-moralities, the blond beast or the Superman) to race or breeding, and presents them rather as archetypal descriptions of basic positions of humanity—not racial classifications. For example, Nietzsche's conceptions of master-morality and slave-morality are explained as sociological distinctions. "What Nietzsche is concerned with," Kaufmann explains, "is the contrast of those who have power and those who lack it." Nietzsche's famous blond beast, which is "used to symbolize the people who have strong animal impulses which they have not

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128 Ibid., 252.


130 Ibid., 260. Furthermore, to be sure, master-morality is not necessarily in agreement with Nietzsche's ethics: "one should keep in mind that it does not follow from Nietzsche's 'vivisection' of slave-morality that he identifies his own position with that of the masters . . ." (260)
yet learned to master," is similarly unappealing within Nietzsche’s larger worldview and equally useless in any discussion of racial identification:

The “blond beast” is not a racial concept and does not refer to the “Nordic race” of which the Nazis later made so much. Nietzsche specifically refers to Arabs and Japanese, Romans and Greeks, no less than ancient Teutonic tribes, when he first introduces this notorious term.

The most recognizable of Nietzsche’s symbols within contemporary Nazi racial theory, Nietzsche’s Superman, is plainly rejected as grounds for this interpretation as well. Much attention as it has received, Kaufmann makes it clear that the Superman cannot be considered on lines of race; insisting upon the enhancement and progress of the individual, Nietzsche’s Superman transcends such constraints. In accord with much of Nietzsche’s thought, final significance is placed upon the individual—not the group—to exert power toward the improvement and ultimate perfection of the self. And at the end of the bargain in all cases, whether implied within the example of larger historical conditions or expressed outright as the singular ambition, his individual focus renders the group-oriented Nazi racial theories somewhat toothless. These individualist leanings are similarly relevant to a discussion of Nietzsche’s political position, particularly his association with fascist movements.

Nietzsche’s stance toward his own Reich is perhaps best described as defiant. Of the Nazi’s later mission to restore this glorious past, Kaufmann demonstrates

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131 Ibid., 260-261.
132 Ibid., 196.
133 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, for one (Nietzsche’s most comprehensive exploration of the Superman principle), held a prominent place within the Nazi canon and was, incidentally, standard-issue to German soldiers during World War I. Its focus upon the development of humanity, racial schemes were easily place into service in its name.
convincingly that Nietzsche would have assumed a similarly critical posture. First, Nietzsche’s frequent denunciations of the Fatherland effectively discredit the argument that he embraced anything resembling German political culture.\(^{134}\) Second, the model of the Nation State, Kaufmann asserts, which would reach an apex of sorts at the height of National Socialist influence, not only represents an enemy of culture but “seemed to Nietzsche the archenemy of non-conformity, self-realization, and the ‘single one’s remaking of his own nature.’”\(^{135}\) Further, noting again Nietzsche’s principal commitment to exploring value systems and awakening the potential of the individual, Kaufmann maintains that Nietzsche’s philosophy clearly is neither a political program nor a more general call to the masses. Wholly in agreement with the “thought experiment” structure of his philosophy, “Nietzsche begs his readers,” Kaufmann tells us, “to keep in mind that he does not write to endorse a course of action. . . . [He] wants to stimulate thought, ‘nothing else’. . . .”\(^{136}\)

However, despite Kaufmann’s clarification of Nietzsche’s opinions of politics, race hatred and mass movements in general, Nietzsche’s comments upon war require further consideration. Even given the interpretive structures discussed above, certain passages, such as Nietzsche’s famous directive, “You should love peace as a means to new wars,” continue to sound somewhat fantastic or peculiar. And recognizing

\(^{134}\) This sentiment appears in nearly every work after The Birth of Tragedy, including his “Untimely Meditation”, Schopenhauer as Educator, Twilight of the Idols (particularly Chapter VIII) and Ecce Homo.

\(^{135}\) Kaufmann, Nietzsche: PPA, 143.

\(^{136}\) Ibid., 217. It should be noted that Nietzsche did not entirely degrade the state in his writings. However, I think it’s not unfair to say that the nineteenth-century nation-state—to which the National Socialist system compares in many respects—represents for Nietzsche an example of “what not to do.”
Nietzsche’s deliberately deceptive word choice and style—and his inflammatory nature—Kaufmann expends quite a bit of effort explaining this portion of Nietzsche’s thought. Ultimately, his interpretations of Nietzsche’s statements in these instances correspond faithfully to his conclusions elsewhere.

Concerning Nietzsche’s specific use of the word “war” in his philosophy, “one may generalize that . . . the word is used metaphorically. . . . [Nietzsche] is surely not speaking of ‘war’ in the literal sense any more than he is speaking of soldiers. It is the quest for knowledge that he discusses.” Kaufmann takes particular pains to underscore Nietzsche’s outward opinion that the noble struggle is directed inward toward the self and the greatest use of power is in mastering this particular war. Individual struggle and real power—which must have a very rational and personal dimension—are again closely related. Thus, political strength or military might, while an exertion of power, does not fulfill Nietzsche’s vision for its highest application. Yet, one should not entirely misconstrue Kaufmann to suggest that Nietzsche never speaks of wars to come in the literal sense. Nietzsche does; And—“with amor fati—he seems glad of it.” But, in the final judgment, “it would be perverse,” Kaufmann tells his reader, “to claim that Nietzsche means to condemn ‘peace’ and advocate ‘war.’”

Kaufmann’s conclusions about Nietzsche reflect this characterization. Absolutely defying the prevailing opinions of Nietzsche at the time, Kaufmann presents a reflective

137 Ibid., 338.
138 Ibid., 190-195.
139 Ibid., 339.
140 Ibid., 340.
and penetrating thinker. His calls “to establish values which are not based on any supernatural sanction”; to recognize and confront the nihilism facing modern man and society; and to achieve mastery over the passions in the creation of a meaningful reality represent unique and affirmative contributions to the history of philosophy.\textsuperscript{141} In Kaufmann’s estimation, Nietzsche provided “a new picture of human dignity.”\textsuperscript{142}

This analysis is one (among several that have served to shake the foundation for Nietzsche’s intellectual association with Nazism) that Brinton appears to have discarded in his own Nietzsche study. For certain, Brinton rejects the more contemplative or compassionate picture of Nietzsche, and any suggestion to the contrary would be fundamentally at variance with his account. Kaufmann’s basic interpretation is clearly at odds with this version, and he offers pointed criticism of several other themes, including: Brinton’s reliance upon Alfred Bäumler, the father of the Nietzsche-as-Nazi interpretation, whose arguments in many cases “are for the most part too absurd to merit serious refutation”; his rough gradations of “Gentle” and “Tough” Nietzscheans that “misinterpret Nietzsche to an almost equal degree”; and his discarding of Nietzsche’s final works.\textsuperscript{143} Kaufmann also finds fault with Brinton’s characterization of Nietzsche’s historical-intellectual position, especially his interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophical distance from Socrates.\textsuperscript{144} Whereas Brinton may be among those who place Nietzsche as

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., 81, 87, 224, 246.

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., vii.

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., 138, 59n.

\textsuperscript{144} Brinton’s contention that Socrates was for Nietzsche “a villain” appears to have struck a particularly raw nerve in Kaufmann, who proclaims that Nietzsche “appears to have modeled his entire philosophic enterprise in the image of Socrates” (Kaufmann, “Nietzsche’s Admiration for Socrates,” 472)
“Schopenhauer’s wayward disciple or a lone epigone of the pre-Socratics,”\textsuperscript{145} Kaufmann situates Nietzsche—in his conception of the metaphysical realm, reliance upon philosophy for providing moral direction, close affinity to classic Greek thought and rejection of German Romanticism—among Socrates and Plato, Luther and Rousseau, Kant and Hegel.\textsuperscript{146}

Yet this disagreement is relatively mild when compared with the argument separating these two observers’ conceptions of the will to power. The division in this case is nearly unmistakable: Kaufmann thought the theory groundbreaking and life-affirming in its elevation of reason;\textsuperscript{147} Brinton clearly regarded it as an antagonist of reason and fundamentally dangerous. Such an unforgiving conception of the will to power, as has been shown, has major implications with respect to an analysis of Nietzsche’s thought, and is applicable to political and non-political themes.\textsuperscript{148} But in any discussion of the principle, we must continue to return to its political dimension; it is, in certain respects, unavoidable. Even in Kaufmann’s decidedly apolitical conclusions, the implication that Nietzsche’s reputation has endured political indignities in its name is not far removed from the mind. There is good reason for this. Indeed, for all his exploration of other topics, it is Kaufmann’s primary intention to guide his reader back to a

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and devotes a whole chapter—from an earlier and almost identical journal article—in Nietzsche’s defense. (See Kaufmann, \textit{Nietzsche: PPA}, 343-360)
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\textsuperscript{145} Kaufmann, \textit{Nietzsche: PPA}, vii.

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 79, 303, 87, 108, 334-336.

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 204-205.

\textsuperscript{148} Though, in fact, considering the will to power primarily on the political terms seems a little foolish to Kaufmann.
reconsideration outside of Nietzsche’s political legacy. And at the heart of his call to reconsider this thinker lay the fundamental premise that Nietzsche and National Socialism are absolutely incompatible: where Brinton sees a natural development of Nietzsche’s thought, Kaufmann finds any association of the two fundamentally misguided and illegitimate. His proof in favor of this thesis—the primary objective of this work—effectively provoked a paradigm shift from the Nietzsche-as-fascist interpretation, serving to re-establish Nietzsche’s position within legitimate intellectual discourse in America.
CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION – A RETURN TO LEGITIMACY

The most robust ideas almost always have multiple political dimensions, and to ignore this connection is, as G. R. Elton proclaims, “not a mature state of mind.”\textsuperscript{149} At the meeting point of the earth and heavens, thought is animated in politics and a focus upon political event becomes a necessity. It would appear based upon his body of work that Brinton shared this opinion, and one can certainly understand why he chose to place his intellectual history within the “currents” of the day. But at that time, the currents proved exceedingly problematic, and in \textit{Nietzsche} he clearly falls victim to the seduction of injecting political ideology into his discourse. Brinton fails to explicate the doctrine from its application and presents a misleading, politicized account that does not sufficiently reflect Nietzsche’s original ideas. His treatment illustrates—perhaps more clearly than anything—that the interactions of philosophical language and political experience do not necessarily improve our understanding of the thinkers in question.

Kaufmann, in responding to a legacy of what he considers shoddy, politically-inspired Nietzsche scholarship, attempted to remove Nietzsche from this context, to “rehabilitate Nietzsche not only philosophically, but also politically and personally.”\textsuperscript{150} Toward this end, his is a work that accomplishes two goals. It places Nietzsche’s thought


\textsuperscript{150} Soll, 123.
in first position, relegating the psychological and biographical data largely to the periphery. Further, it demonstrates the shortcomings of judging a thinker in relation to his later influence. "Nietzsche's thought," Kaufmann explains, "has been obscured rather than revealed by its impact." 151 His work confirms this point clearly and powerfully—and the academy-at-large seems to agree.

Described as "the doyen of post-war American Nietzsche scholarship . . . after the Third Reich had made it appear as though this thinker could belong nowhere else but amongst the heralds of National Socialism," 152 Kaufmann's more even-handed interpretation became the standard. "Brinton's Nietzsche," argues Bryan Strong, "was the last of its kind. Thereafter studies of Nietzsche took on a wholly different character." 153 Effectively illuminating the fallacy that Nietzsche's true ideas were fulfilled in the political developments of the 1930s and 1940s, Kaufmann's work enjoyed several more printings, sold considerably more copies and was distributed over a wider base of scholars. The Nazi conception compromised, "what Kaufmann did was not to 'reappropriate' Nietzsche. It was to introduce him—really—as a respectable subject in American academics and American intellectual life." 154


153 Strong, 585.

154 Alexander Nehamas, interview by author, 17 March 2004, Princeton, digital recording, Princeton University, Princeton. Professor Nehamas is insistent upon this point—that Nietzsche was not merely re-introduced or re-fashioned by Kaufmann. Kaufmann's contribution to Nietzsche study in America, Nehamas argues, was something more fundamental.
Despite his success, however, Nietzsche’s acceptance—especially within academic philosophy—was by no means immediate. The most significant American scholarship in the discipline continued to be produced in the field of analytic philosophy, which remained generally uninterested in and incapable of handling Nietzsche’s aphoristic structure and bombastic style. As Alexander Nehamas suggests, there was “no intellectual place for Nietzsche in an American philosophy department at the time.”

Thus, Kaufmann’s commitment to Nietzsche’s inclusion within the philosophical canon—“tantamount to a redefinition of the limits of philosophy and philosophic values”—was met by some level of resistance. Relating his perception of the state of affairs as a doctoral candidate at Columbia ten years after the initial publication of *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, Gary Shapiro corroborates this view, writing, “In 1960 serious students of philosophy did not do Nietzsche. . . .” Kaufmann maintains that by the late 1960s, “the same remark would only suggest that the speaker was wholly out of touch with the American scene.”

This statement is certainly plausible, though the reception appears more complete outside the discipline at this point; indeed, it seems there are two separate histories of reception unfolding simultaneously: one within and another outside of philosophy proper.

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155 Ibid. Nehamas cites Arthur Danto’s *Nietzsche As Philosopher* (1965) as responsible for ultimately “connect[ing] many of Nietzsche’s concerns with concerns that actually were respectable within analytical philosophy. . . . [This seminal work] suggested not only that Nietzsche could be read—which is what Kaufmann accomplished—but that perhaps Nietzsche should be read.”

156 Soll, 125.

157 Shapiro, 251-252. Professor Shapiro obviously did not share in this opinion.


159 A quick review of the Humanities Citation Index confirms this point.
Outside the discipline, scholarly attention to Nietzsche was considerable and had reached some level of maturity by the late 1960s. Well before Nietzsche’s widespread acknowledgment within philosophical discourse, academics—and popular writers—in the fields of religion, literature, art and history had already begun to consider his thought in unique and innovative new lights. Most academic philosophers, on the other hand, remained largely disinterested until the mid- to late 1960s. Owing partly to the political chauvinism set into position by Brinton’s dominant viewpoint, structural obstacles within the field facing Kaufmann’s account—evidenced by the lukewarm scholarly response among philosophers during the fifties through the mid-1960s—were almost equally unfavorable and their effect can not be overstated.

Clearly, though the association with fascism had rendered Nietzsche illegitimate politically, no restoration on purely philosophical grounds was probable in a discipline focused upon completely different works. “If Kaufmann had written an academic book trying to recover Nietzsche’s thought for academics,” Nehamas suggests, “however good the book would have been, it wouldn’t have made much of a difference.”\(^\text{160}\) Almost assuredly recognizing this “systemic” resistance among academic philosophers that accompanied Nietzsche’s political reputation, Kaufmann’s introduction of this thinker as “a respectable and worthwhile object of attention”\(^\text{161}\) required not only a rehabilitation of Nietzsche’s politics, but also an audience beyond academic philosophers. It is on these

\(^{160}\) Nehamas, 17 March 2004.

\(^{161}\) Soll, 125.
terms that we gain a better understanding of Kaufmann’s intellectual response to the barriers confronting a philosophical biography of Nietzsche.

Owing to its close connection to the immediate reality of institutional resistance and political illegitimacy, a reclamation of Nietzsche—even a mostly neutral presentation such as Kaufmann’s—would necessarily entail a response tailored to these political issues. Given this conclusion that Kaufmann was guided at least in part by this rationale, is it not unfair to castigate Brinton on ostensibly similar grounds? Would it not be more appropriate to concede that Kaufmann’s attempt to recast Nietzsche, while perhaps more plausible, demonstrates an equally political agenda all its own to present Nietzsche in more palatable liberal democratic terms? Certainly, this conception of rehabilitating Nietzsche outwardly places us at odds with this paper’s basic premise that Kaufmann essentially sought to remove Nietzsche from the politically inspired discourse that reached a summit of sorts in Brinton’s interpretation. However, I hold that Kaufmann’s work is fundamentally different from Brinton’s effort specifically along these political lines.

The initial justification for this claim lies with Kaufmann’s intent: I hold that his objective of returning Nietzsche to “contemporary relevance” was patently different from Brinton’s placement of Nietzsche within the “currents of ‘opinion’ our time.” Having established that Nietzsche was effectively marginalized within American intellectual and political culture, Kaufmann undeniably deals with political undercurrents.

162 Kaufmann, Nietzsche: PPA, ix.
Yet, while his motive to expand Nietzsche's audience (and his own) may be considered a political maneuver in the broad sense of the term, his work primarily attempts to minimize the discussion of politics beyond this boundary. Brinton's effort, on the other hand, despite enjoying circumstances much more conducive to an impartial review of Nietzsche's thought, seeks an opposite end that transcends the limited political goals of Kaufmann's work. I consider Brinton's work to be motivated not merely by political, but ideological concerns, which are illuminated by the ultimate execution of a modern-day political agenda throughout his Nietzsche biography. Whereas Kaufmann did not affirmatively tie Nietzsche to modern political discourse, Brinton is primarily committed to arranging Nietzsche's thought in terms of contemporary ideology, namely fascist politics. His pure use of political imagery (even if practical for purpose of illustration) and his reliance upon a specific political-ideological system (fascism) in his appraisal of Nietzsche's philosophy represents the contradiction of Kaufmann's final product, which to be sure is almost entirely devoid of anything even approximately ideological.

Kaufmann's careful guard against injecting ideological schema into his scholarship marks a definitive moment in the course of Nietzsche scholarship in America, profoundly altering Nietzsche's academic and popular legacy. In its presentation, subject matter and breadth, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* displays an acute awareness for the power of political exigency confronting Nietzsche's work in 1950 and serves as a model for navigating the sometimes politically-charged waters of academic

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164 This latter point refers to the period in which Brinton began his biography—slightly before the Holocaust. In all fairness, Brinton was faced with significant handicaps in his own right in the forms of poor translations and deficient scholarship. Though, in my estimation, these handicaps do not compare to those confronting Kaufmann's task in the wake of the Holocaust.
scholarship. His work figures prominently into the broader reconception of politics' relation to academics in the postwar era, demonstrating that thought, while brought to life by its surrounding politics, must be evaluated not only within its original context, but also with a very careful eye toward its place within an historical legacy.

This contribution perhaps hearkens a more widespread shift away from connecting ideology with academic discourse. As Daniel Bell suggests in his *The End of Ideology*, the theretofore acceptable interplay between ideology and scholarship "had come to a dead end" by the end of the 1950s. While this statement does not appear to have held true over time (it seems obvious that other political ideologies have since supplanted Communism and socialism in exerting pressure upon scholarship), Kaufmann's work and the popular reception that followed suggest at least some beginnings of this movement to remove hard politics from scholarly enterprise during this era.

Yet, in his sanitization of this political element for a readership that had clearly moved away from Nietzsche's thought following World War II, Kaufmann's work does not triumph in capturing the philosopher's essential feeling; readers certainly are not exposed to the "shower of sparks" that had so enraptured Mencken. It is in this respect that Kaufmann fails his audience: the "glorious tension" that makes Nietzsche so provocative—and so interesting—is absent from Kaufmann's work. This sterilized approach was very likely a necessity given the presumptions confronting Nietzsche's

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thought during and after World War II; it stands to reason that Kaufmann had to “overdo” some things to get Nietzsche back into the fold. But Kaufmann’s focus upon discrediting Nietzsche’s image as Nazism’s forefather and underplaying his political identity has the consequence of rendering Nietzsche lifeless in some respects. One certainly does not get a feel for the intense struggle, competition and upheaval that Nietzsche intended to evoke. For all its problems, Brinton’s version at least grasps at this character of Nietzsche’s thought, which is absolutely central in understanding the thinker’s dynamic nature.

In many ways, Mencken—who sits as a middle figure between Brinton’s essentialism and Kaufmann’s rigidity—seems to capture something both later figures missed and had it right in guiding his reader to deal with Nietzsche’s philosophy “in its surface sense.”166 With this in mind, should we at this point ask whether it’s right or good to separate out the politics from a discussion of Nietzsche scholarship? If we conclude that Kaufmann’s version suffers as a consequence of his minimization of the political dimension in Nietzsche’s philosophy, then what are we to do from here?

Within the discipline of history in the years following these seminal works, several interpretive structures have wrestled with the convergence of things-political and historical objectivity. Focusing upon the creation of “new referents that will challenge [intellectual] oppression” and the ever-present confluence of facts and political motives, feminist history, Marxist social history, psychoanalytical theory and postcolonial history have each attempted—with varying degrees of success—to understand the progression of

166 Mencken, viii.
historical event and the relevant contexts of ideology and political activity.\textsuperscript{167}

Interestingly, Nietzsche has made a big comeback in this atmosphere. Does this suggest that an examination of Nietzsche needs to have some "political" element to relate the full picture?

Not necessarily, but I believe the interchange between Brinton and Kaufmann's Nietzsche studies and the pattern of reception surrounding these works are instructive in understanding this delicate balance. In my view, history and ideas are best reported when individual politics or ideologies are acknowledged and responsibly considered. As ideas have life spans beyond their short stays on the printing presses and are—for all intents and purposes—recreated under changing circumstances, their treatment as historical events must take into account the intellectual environment in context. Specifically, the "political motive" or "ideology" are part of this environment and oftentimes they help illuminate just why a given idea or movement is so interesting—why it's worth writing about. However, a purely philosophical biography devoted to a review of ideas in a vacuum so to speak has no place for period ideology. And in the case of Nietzsche's thought, the story is quite interesting enough when left where it began—in the nineteenth century—without an eye toward 1914 or 1939, for that matter.

Kaufmann's work surely did not intend to justify a worldview or subvert a particular ideology beyond allowing Nietzsche an audience outside a political system. Yet, while we may laud his execution in this and many other respects, we cannot ignore

\textsuperscript{167} Norman J. Wilson, \textit{History in Crisis? Recent Directions in Historiography} (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1999), 133.
that Nietzsche endorsed not only individual struggle, but hoped for broad-sweeping political changes as well. And to report upon his philosophy without seriously acknowledging this call for profound changes in the way man shapes himself and his surroundings is to miss an essential part of his thought. While there is no need to lace Nietzsche's work with outside political messages—he has quite enough of his own material—a philosophical biography must also come to terms with the reality that historically and even philosophically, politics and Nietzsche are inextricably linked and investigating this relationship—with all its inherent dangers—is exceedingly important to a full account of Nietzsche's work.
APPENDIX

RELEVANT PASSAGES

The following passages included within this appendix are most important for the purposes of this paper, specifically with respect to my criticisms of Crane Brinton's argument detailing his views of Nietzsche's anti-Semitism. They are, in my estimation, worthy of full examination and, thus, are offered for that purpose. Full citations are not included here, but can be found within the notes and bibliography. All are from Walter Kaufmann's translations of Nietzsche's work with the single exception of the translation for *The Will to Power*, which was a collaborative effort of Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale.

*The Gay Science* 361

*On the problem of the actor.*—The problem of the actor has troubled me for the longest time. I felt unsure (and sometimes still do) whether it is not only from this angle that one can get at the dangerous concept of the "artist"—a concept that has so far been treated with unpardonable generosity. Falseness with a good conscience; the delight in simulation exploding as a power that pushes aside one's so-called "character," flooding it and at times extinguishing it; the inner craving for a role and mask, for appearance; an excess of the capacity for all kinds of adaptations that can no longer be satisfied in the service of the most immediate and narrowest utility—all of this is perhaps not only peculiar to the actor?

Such an instinct will have developed most easily in families of the lower classes who had to survive under changing pressures and coercions, in deep dependency, who had to cut their coat according to the cloth, always adapting themselves again to new circumstances, who always had to change their mien and posture, until they learned gradually to turn their coat with every wind and thus virtually to become a coat—and masters of the incorporated and inveterate art of eternally playing hide-and-seek, which in the case of animals is called mimicry—until eventually this capacity, accumulated from generation to generation, becomes domineering, unreasonable, and intractable, and instinct that learns to lord it over other instincts, and generates the actor, the "artist" (the zany, the teller of lies, the buffoon, fool, clown at first, as well as the classical servant, Gil Blas; for it is in such types that we find the pre-history of the artist and often enough even of the "genius").

In superior social conditions, too, a similar human type develops under similar pressures; only in such cases the histrionic instinct is usually barely kept under control by
another instinct; for example, in the case of “diplomats.” Incidentally, I am inclined to believe that a good diplomat would always be free to become a good stage actor if he wished—if only he were “free.”

As for the Jews, the people who possess the art of adaptability par excellence, this train of thought suggests immediately that one might see them virtually as a world-historical arrangement for the production of actors, a veritable breeding ground for actors. And it really is high time to ask: What good actor today is not—a Jew? The Jew as a born “man of letters,” as the true master of the European press, also exercises his power by virtue of his histrionic gifts; for the man of letters is essentially an actor: He plays the “expert,” the “specialist.”

Finally, women. Reflect on the whole history of women: do they not have to be first of all and above all else actresses? Listen to physicians who have hypnotized women; finally, love them—let yourself be “hypnotized” by them”! What is always the end result? That they “put on something” even when they take off everything.

Woman is so artistic.

*Beyond Good and Evil* 251

It must be taken into the bargain if all sorts of clouds and disturbances—in brief, little attacks of hebetation—pass over the spirit of a people that is suffering, and wants to suffer, of nationalistic nerve fever and political ambition. Examples among the Germans today include not the anti-French stupidity, now the anti-Jewish, now the anti-Polish, now the Christian-romantic, now the Wagnerian, now the Teutonic, now the Prussian (just look at the wretched historians, these Sybels and Treitschkes and their thickly bandaged heads!) and whatever other names these mistifications [sic] of the German spirit and conscience may have. Forgive me, for during a brief daring sojourn in very infected territory I, too, did not altogether escape this disease and began like everyone else to develop notions about matters that are none of my business: the first sign of the political infection. For example about the Jews: only listen!

I have never yet met a German who was favorably inclined to the Jews: and however decided the repudiation of actual anti-Semitism may be on the part of all prudent and political men, this prudence and policy is not perhaps directed against the nature of sentiment itself, but only against its dangerous excess, and especially against the distasteful and infamous expression of this excess of sentiment:—on this point we must not deceive ourselves. That Germany has amply sufficient Jews, that the German stomach, the German blood, has difficulty (and will long have difficulty) in disposing of this quantity of ‘Jew’—as the Italian, the Frenchman, and the Englishman have done by means of a stronger digestion:—that is the unmistakable declaration and language of a general instance, to which one must listen and according to which one must act. “Let no more Jews come in! And shut the doors, especially towards the East (also towards Austria)” thus commands the instinct of a people whose type is still weak and indefinite, so it could easily be blurred or extinguished by a stronger race. The Jews, however, are
beyond any doubt the strongest, toughest, and purest race now living in Europe; they
know how to prevail even under the worst conditions (even better than under favorable
conditions), by means of virtues that today one would like to mark as vices—thanks
above all to a resolute faith that need not be ashamed before "modern ideas"; they
change, when they change, always only as the Russian Empire makes its conquests—
being an empire that has time and is not of yesterday—namely, according to the
principle, "as slowly as possible."

A thinker who has the development of Europe on his conscience will, in all his
projects for this future, take into account the Jews as well as the Russians as the
 provisionally surest and most probable factors in the great play and fight of forces. What
is called a "nation" in Europe today, and is really rather a res facta than a res nata (and
occasionally can hardly be told from a res ficta et picta) is in any case something
evolving, young and easily changed, not yet a race, let alone such an aere perennius as
the Jewish type: these "nations" really should carefully avoid every hotheaded rivalry and
hostility! That the Jews, if they wanted it—or if they were forced into it, which seems to
be what the anti-Semites want—could even now have preponderance, indeed quite
literally mastery over Europe, that is certain; that they are not working and planning for
that is equally certain.

Meanwhile they want and wish rather, even with some importunity, to be
absorbed and assimilated by Europe; they long to be fixed, permitted, respected
somewhere at long last, putting an end to the nomads' life, to the "wandering Jew"; and
this bent and impulse (which may even express an attenuation of the Jewish instincts)
should be noted well and accommodated; to that end it might be useful and fair to expel
the anti-Semitic screamers from the country. Accommodated with all caution, with
selection; approximately as the English nobility does. It is obvious that the stronger and
already more clearly defined types of the new Germanism can enter into relations with
them with the least hesitation; for example, officers of the nobility from the March
Brandenburg: it would be interesting in many ways to see whether the hereditary art of
commanding and obeying—in both of these, the land just named is classical today—
could not be enriched with the genius of money and patience (and above all a little
spirituality, which is utterly lacking among these officers). But here it is proper to break
off my cheerful Germanomania and holiday oratory; for I am beginning to touch on what
is serious for me, the "European problem" as I understand it, the cultivation of a new
caste that will rule Europe.

The Antichrist 24-27

Here I merely touch on the problem of the genesis of Christianity. The first
principle for its solution is: Christianity can be understood only in terms of the soil out of
which it grew—it is not a counter-movement to the Jewish instance, it is its very
consequence, one inference more in its awe-inspiring logic. In the formula of the Redeemer: “Salvation is of the Jews.” The second principle is: the psychological type of the Galilean is still recognizable; but only in its complete degeneration (which is at the same time a mutilation and an overloading with alien features) could it serve as that for which it has been used—as the type of a redeemer of mankind.

The Jews are the strangest people in world history because, confronted with the question whether to be or not to be, they chose, with a perfectly uncanny deliberateness, to be at any price: this price was the radical falsification of all nature, all naturalness, all reality, of the whole inner world as well as the outer. They defined themselves sharply against all the conditions under which a people had hitherto been able to live, been allowed to live; out of themselves they created a counter-concept to natural conditions: they turned religion, cult morality, history, psychology, one after the other, into an incurable contradiction to the natural values. We encounter this same phenomenon once again and in immeasurably enlarged proportions, yet merely as a copy: the Christian church cannot make the slightest claim to originality when compared with the “holy people.” That precisely is why the Jews are the most catastrophic people of world history: by their aftereffect they have made mankind so thoroughly false that even today the Christian can feel anti-Jewish without realizing that he himself is the ultimate Jewish consequence.

In my Genealogy of Morals I offered the first psychological analysis of the counter-concepts of a noble morality and a morality of ressentiment—the latter born of the No to the former: but this is the Judaeo-Christian [sic] morality pure and simple. So that it could say No to everything on earth that represents the ascending tendency of life, to that which has turned out well, to power, to beauty, to self-affirmation, the instinct of ressentiment, which had here become genius, had to invent another world from whose point of view this affirmation of life appeared as evil, as the reprehensible as such.

Psychologically considered, the Jewish people are a people endowed with the toughest vital energy, who, placed in impossible circumstances, voluntarily and out of the most profound prudence of self-preservation, take sides with all the instincts of decadence—not as mastered by them, but because they divined a power in these instincts with which one could prevail against “the world.” The Jews are the antithesis of all decadents: they have had to represent decadents to the point of illusion; with a non plus ultra of histrionic genius they have known how to place themselves at the head of all movements of decadence (as the Christianity of Paul), in order to create something out of them which is stronger than any Yes-saying party of life. Decadence is only a means for the type of man who demands power in Judaism and Christianity, the priestly type: this type of man has a life interest in making mankind sick and in so twisting the concepts of good and evil, true and false, as to imperil life and slander the world.

The history of Israel is invaluable as the typical history of all denaturing of natural values. I indicate five points.
Originally, especially at the time of the kinds, Israel also stood in the right, that is, the natural, relationship to all things. Its Yahweh was the expression of a consciousness of power, of joy in oneself, of hope for oneself: through him victory and welfare were expected; through him nature was trusted to give what the people needed—above all, rain. Yahweh is the god of Israel and therefore the god of justice: the logic of every people that is in power and has a good conscience. In the festival cult these two sides of the self-affirmation of a people find expression: they are grateful for the great destinies which raised them to the top; they are grateful in relation to the annual cycle of the seasons and to all good fortune in stock farming and agriculture.

This state of affairs long remained the ideal, even after it had been done away with in melancholy fashion: anarchy within, the Assyrian without. The people, however, clung to the vision, as the highest desirability, of a king who is a good soldier and severe judge: above all, that typical prophet (that is, critic and satirist of the moment), Isaiah.

But all the hopes remained unfulfilled. The old god was no longer able to do what he once could do. They should have let him go. What happened? They changed his concept—the denatured his concept: at this price they held on to him. Yahweh the god of “justice”—no longer one with Israel, an expression of the self-confidence of the people: now a god only under certain conditions.

The concept of God becomes a tool in the hands of priestly agitators, who now interpret all happiness as a reward, all unhappiness as punishment for disobeying God, as “sin”: that most mendacious device of interpretation, the alleged “moral world order,” with which the natural concepts of cause and effect are turned upside down once and for all. When through reward and punishment, one has done away with natural causality, an anti-natural causality is required: now everything else that is unnatural follows. A god who demands—in place of a god who helps, who devises means, who is at bottom the word for every happy inspiration of courage and self-confidence.

Morality—no longer the expression of the conditions for the life and growth of a people, no longer its most basic instinct of life, but become abstract, become the antithesis of life—morality as the systematic degradation of the imagination, as the “evil eye” for all things. What is Jewish, what is Christian, morality? Chance done out of its innocence; misfortune besmirched with the concept of “sin”; well-being as a danger, a “temptation”; physiological indisposition poisoned with the worm of conscience.

The concept of God falsified, the concept of morality falsified: the Jewish priesthood did not stop there. The whole of the history of Israel could not be used: away with it! These priests accomplished a miracle of falsification, and a good part of the Bible now lies before us as documentary proof. With matchless scorn for ever tradition, for every historical reality, they translated the past of their own people into religious terms, that is, they turned it into a stupid salvation mechanism of guilt before Yahweh, and punishment; of piety before Yahweh, and reward. We would experience this most disgraceful act of historical falsification as something much more painful if the ecclesiastical interpretation of history had not all by deafened us in the course of
thousands of years to the demands of integrity in historicis. And the church was seconded by the philosophers: the lie of the "moral world order" runs through the whole development of modern philosophy. What does "moral world order" mean? That there is a will of God, once and for all, as to what man is to do and what he is not to do; that the value of a people, of an individual, is to be measured according to how much or how little the will of God is obeyed; that the will of God manifests itself in the destinies of a people, of an individual, as the ruling factor, that is to say, as punishing and rewarding according to the degree of obedience.

The reality in place of this pitiful lie is this: a parasitical type of man, thriving only at the expense of all healthy forms of life, the priest, uses the name of God in vain: he calls a state of affairs in which the priest determines the value of things "the kingdom of God"; he calls the means by which such a state is attained or maintained "the will of God"; with cold-blooded cynicism he measures peoples, ages, individuals, according to whether they profited or resisted the overlordship of the priests. One should see them at work: in the hands of the Jewish priests the great age in the history of Israel became an age of decay; the Exile, the long misfortune, was transformed into an eternal punishment for the great age—an age in which the priest was still a nobody. Depending on their own requirements, the made either wretchedly meek and sleek prigs or "godless ones" out of the powerful, often very bold figures in the history of Israel; they simplified the psychology of every great event by reducing it to the idiotic formula, "obedience or disobedience to God."

One step further: the "will of God" (that is, the conditions for the preservation of priestly power) must be known: to this end a "revelation" is required. In plain language: a great literary forgery becomes necessary, a "holy scripture" is discovered; it is made public with full hieratic pomp, with days of repentance and cries of lamentation over the long "sin." The "will of God" had long been fixed: all misfortune rests on one's having become estranged from the "hold scripture." The "will of God" had already been revealed to Moses. What happened? With severity and pedantry, the priest formulated once and for all, down to the large and small taxes he was to be paid (not to forget the tastiest pieces of meat, for the priest is a steak eater), what he wants to have, "what the will of God is." From now on all things in life are so ordered that the priest is indispensable everywhere; at all natural occurrences in life, at birth, marriage, sickness, death, not to speak of "sacrifices" (meals), the hold parasite appears in order to denature them—in his language: to "consecrate."

For one must understand this: every natural custom, every natural institution (state judicial order, marriage, care of the sick and the poor), every demand inspired by the instinct of life—in short, everything that contains its value in itself is made altogether valueless, anti-valueable by the parasitism of the priest (or the "moral world order"): now it requires a sanction after the event—a value conferring power is needed to negate what is natural in it and to create a value by so doing. The priest devalues, desecrates nature: this is the price of his existence. Disobedience of God, that is, of the priest, of "the Law," is now called "sin"; the means for "reconciliation with God" are, as is meet, means that merely guarantee still more thorough submission to the priest: the priest alone "redeems."
On such utterly false soil, where everything natural, every natural value, every reality was opposed by the most profound instincts of the ruling class, Christianity grew up—a form of mortal enmity against reality that has never yet been surpassed. The “holy people,” who had retained only priestly values, only priestly words for all things and who, with awe-inspiring consistency, had distinguished all other powers on earth from themselves as “unholy,” as “world,” as “sin”—this people produced an ultimate formula for its instinct that was logical to the point of self-negation: as Christianity, it negated even the last form of reality, the “holy people,” the “chosen people,” the Jewish reality itself. This case is of the first rank: the little rebellious movement which is baptized with the name of Jesus of Nazareth represents the Jewish instinct once more—in other words, the priestly instinct which can no longer stand the priest as a reality: the invention of a still more abstract form of existence, of a still more unreal vision of the world than is involved in the organization of a church. Christianity negates the church.

Jesus has been understood, or misunderstood as the cause of a rebellion; and I fail to see against what this rebellion was directed, if it was not the Jewish church—“church” exactly in the sense in which we use the word today. It was a rebellion against “the good and the just,” against “the saints of Israel,” against the hierarchy of society—not against its corruption, but against caste, privilege, order, and formula; it was the disbelief in the “higher man,” the No to all that was priest or theologian. But the hierarchy which was thus questioned, even though for just a moment, was the lake-dwelling on which alone the Jewish people could continue to exist amid the “water”—the hard-won last chance of survival, the residue of its independent political existence. An attack on this was an attack on the deepest instinct of a people, on the toughest life-will which has ever existed in any people on earth. That holy anarchist who summoned the people at the bottom, the outcasts and “sinners,” the chandalas within Judaism, to opposition against the dominant order—using language, if the Gospels were to be trusted, which would lead to Siberia today too—was a political criminal insofar as political criminals were possible at all in an absurdly unpolitical community. This brought him to the cross: the proof for this is the inscription on the cross. He died for his guilt. All evidence is lacking, however often it has been claimed, that he died for the guilt of others.

The Will to Power 184

The Jews tried to prevail after they had lost two of their castes, that of the warrior and that of the peasant; in this sense they are the “castrated”: they have the priests—and then immediately the chandala—

As is only fair, a break develops among them, a revolt of the chandala: the origin of Christianity.
Because they knew the warrior only as their master, they brought into their
religion enmity toward the noble, toward the exalted and proud, toward power, toward
the ruling orders—: they are pessimists from indignation—

Thus they created an important new posture: the priest at the head of the
chandala—against the noble orders—

Christianity drew the ultimate conclusion of this movement: even in the Jewish
priesthood it still sensed caste, the privileged, the noble—it abolished the priest—

The Christian is the chandala who repudiates the priest—the chandala who
redeems himself—

That is why the French Revolution is the daughter and continuation of
Christianity—its instincts are against caste, against the noble, against the last privileges—

_The Will to Power_ 864

_Why the weak conquer._ In _summa:_ the sick and weak have more sympathy, are
“more humane”—: the sick and weak have more spirit, are more changeable, various,
entertaining—more malicious: it was the sick who invented malice. (A morbid
precociousness is often found in the rickety, scrofulous and tubercular—.) _Esprit:_ the
quality of late races: Jews, Frenchmen, Chinese. (The anti-Semites do not forgive the
Jews for possessing “spirit”—and money. Anti-Semites—another name for
“underprivileged.”)

The sick and weak have had fascination on their side: they are more interesting
than the healthy: the fool and the saint—the two most interesting kinds of man—closely
related to them, the “genius.” The great “adventurers and criminals” and all men,
especially the most healthy, are sick at certain periods in their lives:—the great emotions,
the passions of power, love, revenge, are accompanied by profound disturbances. And as
for decadence, it is represented in almost every sense by every man who does not die too
soon:—thus he also knows from experience the instincts that belong to it:—almost every
man is decadent for half this life.

Finally: woman! One half of mankind is weak, typically sick, changeable,
inconstant—woman needs strength in order to cleave to it; she needs a religion of
weakness that glorifies being weak, loving, and being humble as divine: or better, she
makes the strong weak—she rules when she succeeds in overcoming the strong. Woman
has always conspired with the types of decadence, the priests, against the “powerful,” the
“strong,” the men—. Woman brings the children to the cult of piety, pity, love:—the
mother represents altruism convincingly.

Finally: increasing civilization, which necessarily brings with it an increase in the
morbid elements, in the neurotic-psychiatric and criminal. An intermediary species
arises: the artist, restrained from _crime_ by weakness of will and social timidity, and not
yet ripe for the _madhouse_, but reaching out inquisitively toward both spheres with his
antennae: this specific culture plant, the modern artist, painter, musician, above all
novelist who describes his mode of life with the very inappropriate word “naturalism”—
Lunatics, criminals, and "naturalists" are increasing: sign of a growing culture rushing on precipitately—i.e., the refuse, the waste, gain importance—the decline keeps pace.

Finally: the social hodgepodge, consequence of the Revolution, the establishment of equal rights, of the superstition of "equal men." The bearers of the instincts of decline (of ressentiment, discontent, the drive to destroy, anarchism, and nihilism), including the slave instincts, the instincts of cowardice, cunning, and canaille in those orders that have long been kept down, mingle with the blood of all classes: two, three generations later the race is no longer recognizable—everything has become mob. From this there results a collective instinct against selection, against privilege of all kinds, that is so powerful and self-assured, hard, and cruel in its operation, that the privileged themselves actually soon succumb to it: whoever still wants to retain power flatters the mob, works with the mob, must have the mob on its side—the "geniuses" above all: they become heralds of those feelings with which one moves the masses—the note of sympathy, even reverence, for all that has lived a life of suffering, lowliness, contempt, persecution, sounds above all other notes (types: Victor Hugo and Richard Wagner).— The rise of the mob signifies once again the ascendancy of old values.

Such an extreme movement in respect of tempo and means as our civilization represents, shifts men's center of gravity: those men who matter most, who have, as it were, the task of compensating for the vast danger of such a morbid movement;—they will become procrastinators par excellence, slow to adopt, reluctant to let go, and relatively enduring in the midst of this tremendous change and mixture of elements. In such circumstances, the center of gravity necessarily shifts to the mediocre: against the dominion of the mob and of the eccentric (both are usually united), mediocrity consolidates itself as the guarantee and bearer of the future. Thus emerges a new opponent for exceptional men—or a new seduction. Provided they do not accommodate themselves to the mob and try to flatter the instincts of the "disinherited," they will have to be "mediocre" and solid." They know: mediocritas is also aurea—indeed, it alone disposes of money and gold (—of all that glitters)—And once more the old virtue, and the entire dated world of the ideal in general, gains a body of gifted advocates.— Result: mediocrity acquires spirit, with genius—it becomes entertaining, it seduces.

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Result.— A high culture can stand only upon a broad base, upon a strong and healthy consolidated mediocrity. Science—and even art—work in its service and are served by it. Science could not wish for a better solution: it belongs as such to a mediocre kind of man—it is out of place among the exceptional—it has nothing aristocratic, and even less anything anarchistic, in its instinct.

The power of the middle is, further, upheld by trade, above all trade in money: the instinct of great financiers goes against everything extreme—that is why the Jews are at present the most conserving power in our intensely threatened and insecure Europe. They can have no use for revolution, socialism, or militarism: if they desire and employ power, even over the revolutionary party, this is only a consequence of the aforesaid and not a contradiction. They need occasionally to arouse fear of other extreme tendencies—
by demonstrating how much power they have in their hands. But their instinct itself is unswervingly conservative—and "mediocre"—Wherever there is power, they know how to be powerful; but the employment of their power is always in one direction. The honorable term for mediocre is, of course, the word "liberal."

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Reflection.—It is absurd to assume that this whole victory of values is antibiological: one must try to explain it in terms of an interest life has in preserving the type "man" even through this method of the dominance of the weak and underprivileged—-otherwise, man would cease to exist?—Problem—-

The enhancement of the type fatal for the preservation of the species? Why? History shows: the strong races decimate one another: through war thirst for power, adventurousness; the strong affects: wastefulness—(strength is no longer hoarded, spiritual disturbance arises through excessive tension); their existence is costly; in brief—they ruin one another; periods of profound exhaustion and torpor supervene: all great ages are paid for— The strong are subsequently weaker, more devoid of will, more absurd than the weak average.

They are races that squander. "Duration" as such has no value: one might well prefer a shorter but more valuable existence for the species.— It would remain to be proved that, even so, a richer yield of value would be gained than in the case of the shorter existence; i.e., that man as summation of strength acquires a much greater quantum of mastery over things if life is as it is— We stand before a problem of economics———
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BIOGRAPHY

David Marshall Schilling was born on May 5, 1978 in Annapolis, Maryland. Mr. Schilling received his primary and secondary education in Arnold and Annapolis, Maryland. From 1996 to 2000, Mr. Schilling attended the University of Richmond in Richmond, Virginia, where he studied history and completed a thesis entitled "George Wallace's Constituency in the Presidential Election of 1968." After graduating in May 2000, Mr. Schilling worked in the Transactional Finance practice group of Miles & Stockbridge P.C. in Baltimore, Maryland. He returned to the University of Richmond in August 2001 to begin his graduate work, concentrating upon modern European intellectual history. During this period, he concurrently undertook German language training at the University of Richmond and the Goethe-Institüt in Washington, D.C.