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Johnson v. DeGrandy

Henry L. Chambers, Jr.

*University of Richmond, hchamber@richmond.edu*

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prejudiced. Johnson’s death was unexpected. In July 1834, he traveled to New York for jaw surgery; shortly after the painful procedure, he died, apparently of "exhaustion."


SANDRA F. VANBUREN

JOHNSON v. LOUISIANA, 400 U.S. 356 (1972), argued 1 Mar. 1971, reargued 10 Jan. 1972, decided 22 May 1972 by vote of 5 to 4; White for the Court, Blackmun and Powell concurring, Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart in dissent. The issues in Johnson, and its companion case Apodaca v. Oregon (1972), which had been left unresolved by *Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), were whether the *Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection clauses required states to observe *jury unanimity in criminal cases, as is required in the federal courts. A jury had convicted Johnson of robbery by a 9-to-3 vote. Since Johnson’s trial began before Duncan was decided, and that ruling had not been applied retroactively, its *Sixth Amendment protections were not available.

Johnson contended that he had been denied due process because a nonunanimous verdict meant the reasonable-doubt standard of guilt had not been met. The fact that three jurors disagreed with the verdict indicated doubt, and the nine-person majority could not have voted conscientiously in favor of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

*Voting Rights Act of 1965 by diluting minority voting strength. Yet the plan yielded functional proportionality in Dade County by providing a proportion of majority-minority districts that roughly equaled the proportion of the minority voting-age population.

The plaintiffs specifically argued that more majority-minority districts could have been drawn had the legislature not lessened minority voting power by packing minority voters into districts in some instances and cracking minority voting strength by dividing cohesive minority populations among multiple districts in other instances. The federal district court found that Florida’s failure to create as many majority-minority districts as possible necessarily yielded a section 2 violation. In response, the Supreme Court reiterated the totality-of-the-circumstances test, finding that the plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to establish vote dilution in substantial measure because the plan provided rough proportionality for minority groups in the Dade County area. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia dissented on the grounds that an apportionment plan is not subject to section 2 challenge.

De Grandy reiterated that districting is more art than science and stressed that voting rights violations do not always flow from proof of certain background facts. Though the Court’s analysis cut against the minority plaintiffs in De Grandy, its general thrust would later benefit minority voters in cases such as Easley v. Cromartie (2001).

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