1936

The development of Dr. Alfred North Whitehead's philosophy

Frederick Joseph Parker

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/masters-theses

Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation


This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF

DR. ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
in candidacy for the degree of
Master of Arts

Department of Philosophy

Frederick Joseph Parker

University of Richmond
June 1936
The modern writer in the field of Philosophy no doubt recognises the difficulty of gaining an adequate and impartial hearing from the students of his own generation. It seems that one only becomes great at the expense of death. The university student is often tempted to close his study of philosophy after Plato and Aristotle as if the final word has been said. The writer of this paper desires to know something about the contribution of the modern school of philosophers. He has chosen this particular study because he believes that Dr. Whitehead has given a very thoughtful interpretation of the universe.

This paper is in no way a substitute for a first-hand study of the works of Whitehead. It will have served a worthy purpose if perchance a reading of it prompts students to make other original researches. The writer does not claim that his inferences and deductions concerning Professor Whitehead's doctrines are all valid but will venture to say that no opinions are given without serious reflective thought. Such a paper as this could in no respects cover the vast lot of material in the many books which Professor Whitehead has written. He has aimed at an understanding of only the main doctrines of his philosophy.
Obviously, the author of such a paper must be indebted to a great many of his contemporaries. He has sought to acknowledge the sources he has used, so far as he is aware of them, by foot-notes. Specific mention should be made, however, of the best work which has helped him come to definite conclusions. He feels grateful in many ways to Dorothy M. Emmet for her book, *Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism*. The extent of indebtedness to Dr. B. C. Holtzclaw, his teacher, faithful counselor and friend, cannot well be measured or expressed. He has taught him an appreciation of man's attempt to explain the workings of the universe. The influence of his teachings and personality has been very stimulating during his university life.

F. J. P.

May 25, 1936
# CONTENTS

## chapter pages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introductory</th>
<th>1-4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The Development of Whitehead's Metaphysics</td>
<td>5-39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### A. Pure Realism

Events. Objects. Events and objects contrasted.  
Naturalism. Summary.

### B. Speculative system, beginning his "Philosophy of Organism."


### C. Philosophy of Organism (proper)


## 11. The Concept of God in Whitehead's Philosophy 40-48

Dr. Whitehead and the Christian Traditionalist on Religion

The Development of Dr. Alfred North Whitehead's Philosophy

Concerning Professor Alfred North Whitehead's most comprehensive work, *Process and Reality*, a reviewer has said, "Whether it is the product of thinking that is essentially unclear but capable of brief flashes of penetrating insight, or whether it is too profound to be judged by this generation, I do not know. Reluctantly I am inclined to accept the first alternative." 1.

As an humble student of Whitehead's writings I must confess there is an element of truth in the above quotation. Perhaps this reaction is a natural one. Few thinkers are prone to confess their slowness of acumen. It is my opinion that Dr. Whitehead has interpreted the "brute facts" in a brave manner. We owe much in the way of appreciation and admiration, for indeed, he has sought to make a new world view upon the wreckage of a Newtonian materialism. Like the great stock market crash of 1929 in the economic world, came the upheaval of philosophical systems in the metaphysical realm. The Non-Euclidian Geometry, the Special and General Theories of Einstein and the Quantum Theory have made it quite necessary to reconstruct a new metaphysics. Chaos is

1. Miss Stebbing, in *Mind*, October, 1930.
close at hand in the field of religion. It must be reinterpreted. After a reading of *Process and Reality*, one cannot help but feel that he is on the way to a metaphysics more really helpful to religion than anything recently developed in the field of philosophy. Many scholars welcome the approach of this man to the problems of religion.

In his earlier works, *Principle of Natural Knowledge*, *Concept of Nature* and *Introduction to Mathematics* he is a pure Realist. "Nature is that which we observe in perception through the senses.....Thus in a sense nature is independent of thought. What I mean is that we can think about nature without thinking about thought." But in his later writings he is inclined to a speculative philosophy, in which he thinks of nature as an aesthetic order. Whitehead has demonstrated that it is possible to be both a rationalist and a romantic. If Sir Walter Raleigh were now living, he might speak of Professor Whitehead as he did concerning Wordsworth, "who faced the fact and against whom the fact did not prevail. To know him is to learn courage; to walk with him is to feel the visitings of a larger, purer air, and the peace of an unfathomable sky." Who can withhold emotion and awe when these lines are read from *Religion in the Making*? The reading of this passage should prompt a strong desire to understand the thoughts of a gifted writer and thinker.

2. *Concept of Nature*, p.3
"The passage of time is the journey of the world towards the gathering of new ideas into actual fact. This adventure is upwards and downwards. Whatever ceases to ascend, fails to preserve itself and enters upon its inevitable path of decay. It decays by transmitting its nature to slighter occasions of actuality, by reason of the failure of the new forms to fertilize the perceptive achievements which constitute its past history. The universe shows us two aspects: on one side it is physically wasting, on the other side it is spiritually ascending. It is thus passing with a slowness, inconceivable in our measures of time, to new creative conditions, amid which the physical world, as we at present know it, will be represented by a ripple barely to be distinguished from non-entity. The present type of order in the world has arisen from an unimaginable past, and it will find its grave in an unimaginable future. There remains the inexhaustible realm of abstract forms, and creativity, with its shifting character ever determined afresh by its own creatures, and God, upon whose wisdom all forms of order depend." 3.

It is true that in many places Whitehead has obscured his thought by an excessive use of technical terms, but the fuller truth is that he quite understands the problem of creating a new metaphysics, and if following him, we enter into deep sincere mysterious moments of contemplation, he is well content, for he believes that the simplest of the simple theories adequate to account for the facts are those which challenge every fibre of our mental selves. He states that simplicity and trimness are not present in the world of brute facts.

"The materialistic theory has all the completeness of the thought of the middle ages, which had a complete answer to everything, be it in heaven or in hell or in nature. There is a trimness about it, with its instantaneous present, its vanished past, its non-existent future, and its inert matter. This trimness is very medieval and ill accords with brute fact. The theory which I am urging admits a greater ultimate mystery and a deeper ignorance....It is impossible to meditate on time and the mystery of the creative passage

of nature without an overwhelming emotion at the limitations of human intelligence. 4.

Professor Whitehead is a Realist. Realism holds that some or all known objects do not depend on the mind for existence. It is possible that objects exist without being known. Space and time, energy, matter, plant world, and values may exist independent of a mind. He is not a materialist nor an idealist. Not a materialist for he has thrown away the Newtonian physics nor an idealist for he states that minds are concrete events existing in space and time. There is much of Plato and Aristotle in his philosophy. He has also been greatly influenced by Bertrand Russell, who worked with him in Principia Mathematica and by S. Alexander, another Realist.

In the writing of this paper I wish to make three main divisions. First, the development of Whitehead's metaphysics; secondly, his concept of God, and thirdly and finally, the contrast and comparison of the religious ideas of Whitehead to the traditional Christian thought.

Chapter 1

The Development of Whitehead's Metaphysics

"The powers of man have not been exhausted. Nothing has been done by him that cannot be better done. There is no effort of science or art that may not be exceeded; no depths of philosophy that cannot be deeper sounded; no flight of imagination that may not be passed by strong and soaring wing." (anonymous)

Professor Whitehead's thought is continually developing, so that an attempt to evaluate any part of it is in some sense futile. We must follow him as he leads up the winding stairs in search for truth. If we find that he has turned to the left we shall soon discover that he descends a few flights and then again bravely climbs with eyes fixed upon the stars. It follows that it might be difficult for us to retrace his steps and new direction. There is much in his early works which runs through all of his philosophy. There are no sharp lines of demarcation but there is an ever development of his thought as given to us in The Concept of Nature, and Enquiry into the Principles of Natural Knowledge, and Introduction to Mathematics.

The first phase of his philosophy found in the above three publications is that of pure Realism. "It means that nature can be thought of as a closed system whose mutual relations do not require the expression of the fact that they are thought about. Thus in a sense nature is independent of thought.....Nature is not thought."5.

5. Concept of Nature, p.3
"The conditions which determine the nature of events can only be furnished by other events, for there is nothing else in nature." 6.

The whole truth of the world is found in the nature of events. Accordingly, Physics tells us the full truth about the physical world. Events are the ultimate facts of nature and the ultimate data of science. If this is true we cannot get very far in understanding this astounding metaphysics unless we know the nature of an event.

An event is a four-dimensional entity; in addition to time, it has the three dimensions of space. "Every event extends over other events which are parts of itself, and every event is extended over by other parts of which it is a part." 7.

Time and space both spring from the relation of extension. Time is a duration; space is extension, though timeless, according to Whitehead. Time and space therefore express relations between the events. Nature is a process; it is a becoming and the events are the essential elements of actuality and elements of becomingness. An event can never happen again for nature can never reproduce the same relations. An event is a system of relations; it is just how it is related. Another set of relations form a different event. Events do not change but they pass into other events which go to make up larger events. Thus the passage of events is extension in the making.

The event, however, is not the only type of entity.

6. Principles of Natural Knowledge, p.73.
Our perceptual knowledge of nature tells us that there exists other types of entities. When nature as a whole is broken up into its entities we find that there are five modes of diversification which are chiefly important in scientific theory. These types consist of: (1) events, (2) percipient objects, (3) sense-object, (4) perceptual objects, (5) scientific objects. These are all different types with a single common element, that is, they are all alike subjects yielded for our knowledge by our perceptions of nature.

There exists in nature events and objects. What are the differences between events and objects? What relations exist between them?

First, events and objects enter into our experiences by different means. Events are lived through and exist around us. We cannot escape them, they are the facts of life. They come and pass but objects are permanent. Objects are intellectually recognized. Amid the partial events of the present (which is a duration) we find that there is an element of permanence which is the object. Without recognition, experience would show us no objects. Amid the flux of events, the flow of the everlasting stream we find something permanent, which is recognized as self-identical amid different situations. However, there is a peculiar kind of change attached to objects.

The change of an object is the diverse relationships of some object to diverse objects. The object is permanent, because
(strictly speaking) it is without time and space; and its change is merely the variety of its relations to the various events which are passing in time and space...... Events (in a sense) are space and time, namely, space and time are abstractions from events. But objects are only derivately in space and time by reason of their relations to events."

The objects do not depend for their being on their relations. Events do, for they are what they are just because of their relations. Time and space could never fully describe the object for it is not dependent on its relations.

"The continuity of nature is to be found in events, the atomic properties of nature reside in objects. The continuous ether is the whole complex of events; and the atoms and molecules are scientific objects, which are entities of essentially different type to the events forming the ether."9.

We "apprehend" an event and "recognise" an object. The structure of events provides the framework of the externality of nature where our objects are located.

There are different types of objects. Let us note how Whitehead has characterised them.

"The percipient object is the unity of the awareness whose recognition leads to the classification of a train of percipient events as the natural life associated with one consciousness."

"The sense-object is the simplest permanence which we trace as self-identical in external events." The colours, tastes, sounds, are sense-objects. There are the perceptual objects such as the usual objects of common experience, as books, tables, chairs, trees, and rocks. The scientific

objects include electrons.

Perhaps, it would be wise to make a clearer distinction between an event and an object.

Before me, on the desk is a number of books dealing with the philosophy of Professor Whitehead. These would be the same books if they were back in the University of Richmond library. The books as books, whether here or there, are entities called objects. Yet these books do happen to be here. Their being here depends upon a vast past, present, and future world of interactions. If there existed other relations these books would not be here. The relations of an event are internal, and it is these relations which make it differ from an object.

We have found that Whitehead, like many other modern philosophers, has been influenced by modern physics, and calls the ultimate facts of nature events. Beyond events there is nothing, no space and time, no matter, no "laws of nature", no material substance like the ether in which they can take place. "The material called ether is merely the outcome of a metaphysical craving. The continuity of nature is the continuity of events."10.

As a Realist he objects to the bifurcation of nature. The secondary qualities are inherent qualities, states Whitehead. One gets an excellent understanding of Whitehead's ideas concerning bifurcation of nature. According to him all

of the present day natural philosophy accepts the fallacy of bifurcation which holds that quite untenable division of the components of objective nature into two diametrically opposed types of existence, the material and the mental, or the physical and psychical. The physicist holds that sound, color, heat, etc. belong purely to the mind and are not present in the physical world. He is not able to handle the so called secondary qualities, therefore, they do not exist except in the mind. Bishop Berkeley has gone so far in this direction as to assert that nothing exists outside of the mind. Most scientists hold that a red billiard ball acts on another ball in precisely the same manner as a green or a blue one. Where the color is of importance is the fact that it enables the players to easily locate the ball they are playing with. Without life, or consciousness there would be no color, taste or sound. Since it is argued that the secondary qualities have no important aspect in the behavior of physical objects, then they must fall outside of physical nature.

He rejects the above notion of bifurcation. Colors, sounds, are as truly physical as are the organs of vision and hearing. The sense organs are telepathic because they enable us to apprehend what exists in nature where the organisms themselves are not located; they do this in and through the secondary qualities. We do instinctively believe that there is redness in the sunset and not merely in
our minds. The "objective world" is more than bare spatio-temporal patterns consisting of solidity, shape, weight, rest and motion as the nineteenth century Idealist conceives of it. It is more than motion; it is all of the primary colors plus colors, odors, sounds and savors. What we need is an intellectual and a realistic epistemology. I gather that Mr. Whitehead supports his thesis in the following way.

Nature, or any part or parts of nature, possesses qualities which depend on a peculiar kind of relations. The state of qualities depend on relations between perceiving organisms. Nature is an organism; everything in nature is a part of an organism. The rock, the flower and the human being are all parts of the great organism. These parts range in importance as to their stages of consciousness. There is a certain kind of a feeling in this desk, and this feeling is as much a truth about the desk as feeling characterises me. This desk which I am writing upon appears to me as green; it would appear to any other normal sighted person as green, and this appearance is as much a truth about the table as it is about me.

When things are in certain relations, they really are in those relations. We recognize this as a doctrine of realism which is known as objective relativism. Does Whitehead believe that this is a full answer to the questions of
bifurcation? It is if we think of "appearing" as essential to being or in other words if we combine the above doctrine with a sort of pansychism.

If this doctrine of pansychism were not added to objective relativism the secondary qualities would not be inherently present in this desk or in any other aspect of the objective world. When I leave this room the greenness would leave the desk. In other words, if there were no sentient organisms—no feeling things—there would be no secondary qualities in the bare facts of life. If there were no sentient organism to perceive and recognise there would be no colors or sounds. This, of course, would result in the views of the Cartesian Philosophy. Nature would then consist of two parts, only one of which possessed qualities. If, before consciousness (as we commonly use the term) appeared on the scene of life in the progress of evolution, there were no sentient beings, then it must be admitted that a very drastic kind of bifurcation must have existed.

Therefore, objective relativism with a kind of pansychism gives one a much more intelligible meaning as to the nature of an object. Whitehead contends that the individual molecules or atoms, (maybe, the quanta) are not only felt by us but they themselves feel. When I feel the color green in this desk, it also feels me or the minute parts which go to make up my
body. Not only do these particles feel me but they feel or prefer the past, present, future of all other events or things. Therefore, when I stand in a certain relation to an object, I see green, because I am in that direction. The feeling of greenness is simply a feeling of feeling, or better still, a feeling of feelings. Later, in his philosophy, in his elaboration of the doctrine of eternal objects, he maintains that a green object feels or prehends the eternal object of greenness.

Whitehead's viewpoint of time also has an important part in his philosophy. Nature is not static; it is a process, always flowing on. Events are continuously happening. An event never happens again. All nature is a growing process. Change is ever present with us. He states that nature is not, as in the traditional view, a sequence of instantaneous events; for such a view comes from a false sense of time. "The relations of other events to this totality of nature form the texture of time."11.

"On the materialistic theory the instantaneous present is the only field for the creative activity of nature. The past is gone and the future is not yet. Thus (on this theory) the immediacy of perception is of an instantaneous present and this unique present is the outcome of the past and the promise of the future. But we deny this immediately given instantaneous present. There is no such thing to be found in nature. As an ultimate fact it is a nonentity. What is immediate for sense-awareness is a duration. Now a duration has within itself a past and a future; and the temporal breadths of the immediate durations of sense-awareness are very indeterminate and dependent on the individual percipient. Accordingly, there is no unique factor in nature which for every percipient is preeminently and necessarily the present. 11. Concept of Nature, p.53.
The passage of nature leaves nothing between the past and future. What we perceive as present is the vivid fringe of memory tinged with anticipation. This vividness lights up the discriminated field within a duration. 12.

Accordingly, if time is a duration, Whitehead has further proof for the existence of secondary qualities within the physical world. If the melody, say of the nightingale's song, "extending over a sequence of events, demands for its apprehension as melody, certain mental processes, namely, those which make possible recollection and anticipation", it, the melody, may really exist as an item in physical nature. The Newtonian physics does not acknowledge persistent melodies but it does believe in persistent electrons, atoms and molecules which are more or less in the same class. Whitehead points out that if traditional physics would be consistent and still hold true to the "instantaneous view" then these persistent electrons, atoms and molecules could not exist any more than the melody which is a secondary quality. Physics has built up a science. It has formulated laws of relations between successive physical phenomena. These persistencies of atoms, electrons and molecules, as rhythmic presuppose duration as truly as does a melody. One is instinctively in sympathy with Whitehead as he proceeds in his logical manner of attempting to prove that the tastes are as real as the texture of the meat, that the melody of the canary as well as the structure of the auditory sense organ, that the greenness of this desk as well as the rods and cones of the retina.

Space also is a conceptual derivative from the fact of the passage of nature. I understand that Mr. Whitehead accepts the general features of Einstein's Physics, but draws a set of different significances from it. He does not except the Einstein curvature in the space-time manifold. He does not believe that physical phenomena are due to the oddities of space. If nature is uniform, then the spatio-temporal relations must exhibit a basis for uniformity. Space and time are among the most systematic relations between actual entitess or events. "The whole which is present for discrimination is posited in sense-awareness as necessary for the discriminated parts. An isolated event is not an event, because every event is a factor of a larger whole and is significant of that whole. There can be no time apart from space; and no space apart from time; and no space and no time apart from the passage of the events of nature. The isolation of an entity in thought, when we think of it as bare "it", has no counterpart in any corresponding isolation in nature. Such an isolation is merely part of the procedure of intellectual knowledge."

The notion of simple location in modern philosophies of nature is bound up with the bifurcation of primary and secondary qualities. In his chapter on "The Century of Genius" in Science and Modern World, he gives a stimulating discussion showing how this notion of simple location has resulted in bringing about the sharp line of cleavage between the dualist and the monists. The whole quarrel he asserts, was introduced by the ascription of "misplaced concreteness" to the scientific scheme of the seventeenth century.

Whitehead gives his ideas concerning the notion of simple location. 13.

location. "To say that a bit of matter has simple location means that, in expressing its spatio-temporal relations, it is adequate to state that it is where it is, in a definite region of space, and throughout a definite duration of time, apart from any essential reference of the relations of that bit of matter to other regions of space and to other durations of time. Again, this concept of simple location is independent of the controversy between the absolutist and the relativist views of space and time. So long as any theory of space, or of time, can give a meaning, either absolute or relative, to the ideas of a definite region of space, and of a definite duration of time, the idea of simple location has a perfectly definite meaning. This idea is the very foundation of the seventeenth century scheme of nature. Apart from it, the scheme is incapable of expression. I shall argue that among the primary elements of nature as apprehended in our immediate experience, there is no element whatever which possesses this character of simple location. It does not follow however, that the science of the seventeenth century was simply wrong. I hold that by a process of constructive abstraction we can arrive at abstractions which are simply-located bits of material, and at other abstractions which are the minds included in the scientific scheme. Accordingly the real error is an example of what I have termed: The Fallacy of Displaced ConcreteNESS."14.

Therefore, in place of the old ideas of matter as space-occupying bodies, Professor Whitehead has given to us his conception of events. Throughout this paper we will find that he is continually enlarging and changing his ideas of the events. In the phase of development of his thought which is of a speculative nature, we shall learn that the guiding idea in understanding his events appears to be derived from the facts of visual perception. The term prehension carries a discussion of this idea.

Dr. Whitehead begins his thought concerning change and permanence very early in his philosophy. As change is expressed in the "doctrine of events", so permanence is accounted for in the "doctrine of objects".

"Whatever passes is an event: But we find entities in nature which do not pass: namely, we recognise samenesses in nature....The green itself is numerically one self-identical entity, without parts because it is without passage." 15 From the writing of this paper we have really learned three characteristics concerning the brute facts, or things which form the very "stuff" of the universe. When we experience occurrences we find that some "things are here, others are there". This characteristic is denotive determination or spatial differentiation. The second truth we find concerning the events of life is that of change, or temporal differentiation. No thing or event is ever exactly repeated. An event never has its unique individuality again. If there is one relation changed the event becomes another event. From this aspect of an event, we understand why time is real. Again, we find in the midst of these changing events the characteristic of eternality, or temporal identity. A form of Platonism is resorted to here for there are some qualities which are peculiarly recurrent. These are objects, and as we have found out, they differ from events in that they are factors in nature which are without passage. "Events are named after the prominent objects situated in them, and thus both in language and in thought the event sinks behind the object, and becomes the mere play of its relations." 16.

Here we have the idea of a real process taken very seriously and in addition a form of Platonism. He has built

16. Ibid., p. 135.
his entire philosophical system around the event and the object of change and permanence. As we shall later discover in the chapter on "God" in the Science and Modern World, he treats fully the role of the Divine in the "permanences" of life. The process is like that of Bergson's Creative Evolution for each new event is conceived of as a "real plunge into novelty" The "Creativity of the world is the throbbing emotions of the past, hurling itself into a new transcendent fact. It is the flying dart of which Lucretius speaks, hurled beyond the bounds of the world." 17 This continuous passage of events is not entirely novel for we recognize that some characters or forms are repeated again and again. There is a chapter on "Rhythms" in The Principles of Natural Knowledge, the reading of which gives one a fine understanding of the permanences of existences. The repetitions as recognized are rhythmic occurrences. (This is the electronic wave theory of matter). In his later books he expounds more concerning rhythms which works out better with his interpretations of events. In this first phase of his philosophy he thinks of nature as a passage of events, later he implies that it is a passage of processes of experience.

In many respects he is like Hegel in his views about the process as the main truth about the universe but he differs in the respect that he admits novelty. If I understand correctly, Hegel's unfolding of the universe is a natural and logical outcome of what was already implicitly there. Whitehead closes his chapter on "Rhythms" in The Principle of Natural Knowledge.

with these words.

"So far as direct observation is concerned all that we know of the essential relations of life in nature is stated in two short poetic phrases. The obvious aspect by Tennyson,

"Blow, bugle, blow, set the wild echoes flying,
and answer, echoes, answering, dying, dying, dying."

Namely, Bergson's elan vital and its relapse into matter.
And Wordsworth with more depth,

"The music in my heart I bore,
Long after it was heard no more."

Nature is orderly in all of its aspects. "There can be no living science unless there is a widespread instinctive conviction in the existence of an order of Things, and, in particular, of an order of Nature." 18 "It is not the case that there is an actual world which accidently happens to exhibit an order of nature. There is an actual world because there is an order in nature. If there were no order, there would be no world. Also, since there is a world we know there is an order. The ordering entity is a necessary element in the metaphysical situation present by the actual world."

It seems to me it is at this point that he leaves his descriptive philosophy and begins his speculative thought.
Beginning in the Science and the Modern World, he attempts to answer why nature is orderly and tries to give an understanding of the natural world in terms of metaphysics. As one reads the

last page of *Process and Reality* he will rightly guess that there are no problems of realities left over for discussion. It should be highly interesting to follow Mr. Whitehead in the important doctrines of the second phase of his philosophy. Some of these doctrines are "prehension", "ingression", "concretion", and that of "feeling".

In the paper so far we have treated his early views of events, objects, bifurcation of nature, time, space and time, simple location, change and permanence, and the orderliness of nature. Professor Whitehead now begins to launch out into the deep. He develops a philosophy of organism. Many thinkers have been surprised and astounded at the comparatively easy style in which he discusses "actual entities" and their internal and external relations. The doctrine of "organism" is developed into a unique and comprehensive philosophy. Much of his later writings are built upon his early ideas in a sense but throughout his entire system we find him adding or modifying many of them. For instance in his *Process and Reality* he gives a divergence from his antecedent philosophical thought in the treatment of "actual entities", "prehension", and "ontological principle". "Events" are continued but now have new names, "actual entity" and "actual occasion"; "actual entities" also termed "actual occasions", are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real." 19.

19. "Process and Reality", p.27
The "objects" are becoming "more eternal" and are also used throughout the system but they have become differentiated into two aspects—the objective and the subjective.

At this stage in Whitehead's philosophy we find him laying more stress on the idea that nature is a process. Throughout his writings he takes nature as a process rather seriously. The final real thing is the going-on, or happening of something. Even our intuition of nature makes us feel that it is a process. Everything that might be said about the universe which contains any element of truth must be related to the final atomic events or actual entities. In order to emphasize the fact that an actual entity is what it is and where it is; that is, because of its relations, Professor Whitehead uses term "actual occasion" in place of the term "actual entity". Again the term "event" in *Process and Reality* has a more definite meaning. "I shall use the term event in the more general sense of a nexus of actual occasions, inter-related in some determinate fashion in one extensive quantum."20. One must keep in mind that nature is a passage of experiences.

The doctrine of prehension is very important in this system of thought. Prehension is a general word meaning the grasping, taking hold, or unifying of one thing by another. Apprehension suggests consciousness but prehension implies no mind or consciousness. "For Berkeley's mind", Dr. Whitehead writes:

"I substitute a process of prehensive unification...The things which are grasped into a realised unity, here and now, are not

20. *Process and Reality*, p.113
the castle, the cloud, and the planet simply in themselves; but they are the castle, the cloud, and the planet from the standpoint, in space and time, of the prehensive unification. In other words, it is the perspective of the castle over there from the standpoint of the unification here. It is, therefore, aspects of the castle, the cloud, and the planet which are grasped into unity here. You will remember that the idea of perspectives is quite familiar in philosophy. It was introduced by Leibniz in the notion of his monads mirroring perspectives of the universe. I am using the same notion, only I am toning down his monads into the unified events in space and time. 21

This mirroring is a kind of generalised unconscious perception. The actual world is a manifold of prehensions. But these prehensive unities do not possess simple locations in space and time for space and time are only abstractions from the "totality of prehensive unification as mutually patterned in each other." "A prehension has simple location at the volume A in the same way as that in which a man's face fits on to the smile which spreads over it." 22 We might draw conclusions: prehension is the complex content of a possible act of perception conceived as independent of the perceiver.

We are now ready to say that the actual entities are "prehensive occasions" that is, they are what they are because of the nature of other occasions. In this philosophy of organism the actual entity becomes identified with feeling, for each new fact is a new center of experience, a new core of sentience. From what is said, the reader might surmise that this is only a peculiar way of expressing the Hegelian philosophy of organism. But if we remember Hegel, he tells us how the one, the absolute becomes the many, but Whitehead is concerned

22. Ibid p.105
with the problem of how the many becomes the one. In other words, there is a long train of inductive thought in the evolution of matter or events before one reaches the Absolute in Hegel's universe. But in a grain of sand, plant, animal or man, one can see the universe in either entity from a new center. Like Leibnitz the actual entity mirrors the universe from its own point of view. This view of the actual entity differs from the similar view of Leibnitz, however, in that we have a growing out, new occasions arising which give new comprehensive pictures of the universe. Actual entities arise out of their prehension of other entities. There are no two entities alike for they have their individual and unique characteristics.

The theory of perception is none other than that of prehension. Whitehead has used the new term in order that he might get away from the ordinary meaning of perception. Prehension means more than just a sort of passive awareness of things presented to experience. Perception now is a unification of experiences. Prehension differs again from the common way of thinking about perception: the term prehension is used for "uncognitive apprehension". "The word perceive is, in our common use, shot through and through with the notion of cognitive apprehension. So is the word apprehension, even with the adjective "cognitive" omitted. I will use the word prehension for uncognitive apprehension: by this I mean apprehension which may or may not be cognitive."23

The non-cognitive aspect of prehension is the more important in understanding Whitehead's philosophy. This is identified

with feeling. In the Categories of Explanation, "positive prehensions" are identified with "feelings". These positive feelings are the feelings of a subject. The "negative prehensions" are those which are said to "eliminate from feeling".

If each thing prehends every thing else, what limitations keep every thing from knowing all things? If there are no distinctions or limitations placed upon actual entities then we might expect to find a static universe. There would be no plunges into novelty, no real evolution. We find two limitations upon actual entities. The "doctrine of satisfaction" and the "principle of creation", or God.

The doctrine of satisfaction tells us that every actual entity is a society of feeling which is as it is because of its subjective aim. The Categories of Subjective Unity and of Objective Identity treat of this doctrine of satisfaction. "The many feelings which belong to an incomplete phase in the process of an actual entity, though unintegrated by reason of the incompleteness of the phase, are compatible for integration by reason of the unity of their subject." And from the latter category we read. "There can be no duplication of any element in the objective datum of the "satisfaction" of an actual entity, so far as concerns the function of that element in the "satisfaction". Here as always, the term "satisfaction" means the one complex fully determinate feeling which is the completed phase in the process."
The subjective aim of every actual entity is to seek its own satisfaction. Every thing seeks a value and because it is satisfied when it reaches it, then this must be a limitation. "The element of value, of being valuable, of having value, of being an end in itself, of being something which is for its own sake, must not be omitted in any account of an event as the most concrete actual something. "Value" is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an event."24. There would be no world of actual entities if there were no value for it is the key to existence. The Gray Castle Rock in Edinburgh as well as human subjects seeks the subjective aim of satisfaction.

The second limitation placed upon actual occasions is the principle of concretion. There is the more inclusive actual entity which is God who gives the subjective aim to less inclusive actual entities. This principle makes a cosmos out of the universe. It sets up an order. This constitutive principle gives actuality to the universe for it gives concretionness to all things. (This word used, concretion comes from the latin, concrescere, meaning the process of many diversities growing together into a new unity, which, at the culmination of the process realizes its full nature and so it is concrete (concretum).

"God is the ultimate limitation, and His existence is the ultimate irrationality. No reason can be given for just

that limitation which it stands in his nature to impose. God is not concrete, but He is the ground for concrete actuality. No reason can be given for the nature of God, because that nature is the ground of rationality."25.

In my next chapter, I shall discuss at further length this principle of concretion.

In Process and Reality Whitehead has brought his thought to a close. At the beginning of this work he gives us his categorial scheme which begins with "Four Notions" followed by four sets of "Categories", one of which is in turn subdivided into eight "Categories of Explanation?" while a third "category" is subdivided into nine "categorial obligations." He uses the term "categories" quite differently from the way in which Kant uses it. He is like Aristotle here for he uses categories to express the different ways into which reality can be classified. The categories having nothing to do with the mind and are not innate by any means. They are closely associated with the actual entities themselves. "Every entity should be a specific instance of one category of existence, every explanation should be a specific instance of categories of explanation, and every obligation should be a specific instance of categorial obligations. The Category of the Ultimate expresses the general principle presupposed in the three more special categories".26

From the quotation above it is learned that there is an ultimate which underlies the other three special categories. In the philosophy of organism this ultimate is termed "Creativity" and as we shall later find, God is its primordial.

non-temporal accident. This notion of "creativity" seems to imply that it is the basic and most general reality which underlies the world of things. Whitehead says that "creativity", "many", and "one" are the ultimate notions connected with the understanding of "things" or "entities". We do not quite understand the nature of this "creativity" for it is the ultimate irrationality. It is present, but as for its exact nature and the why of its existence, we do not know. The notion "one" does not mean the integral number one for it is more general. It implies the singularity of an occasion. "One" and "many" do not stand apart for the notion "one" implies the notion "many" and vice versa.

The universal of all universals is "creativity". This ultimate is the means by which the many, the "plurality" of occasions, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively. It lies in the nature of things that the many enter into complex unity.

Not only is Creativity the universal of universals but it is also the principle of novelty. No two entities are alike. Novelty is always present with the coming of new relations. "Becoming" is the important thing. Being and relatedness are considered as actual entities. It seems to me that "relatedness" is dominant over "qualities". "The ultimate metaphysical principle is the advance from disjunction to conjunction."
a novel entity other than the entities given in disjunction."27

This notion of the "many" and the "one" presupposes the term "concreteness". Whitehead himself states that the "Category of the Ultimate" replaces Aristotle's category of "primary substance".

Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism has two implications. First, it attempts to describe how creativity is the means by which the "one" comes out of the "many" and "many" out of the "one" and secondly, it is an attempt to exhibit fact as something concrete, that is, it seeks to show how concrete facts exhibit characteristics, which can be considered as abstract from itself, and described in some kind of symbolism. We should not ask how concrete particular fact can be built up out of universals but the real philosophic question is how can concrete fact exhibit entities abstract from itself and yet participated in by its own nature. This Philosophy of Organism is an explanation of abstraction and not of concreteness. "It is by reason of their instinctive grasps of ultimate truth that, in spite of much association with arbitrary fancifulness and statisitic mysticism, types of Platonic philosophy retain their abiding appeal; they seek the form in the facts. Each fact is more than its forms, and each form "participates" throughout the world of facts. The definiteness of facts is due to its forms; but the individual fact is a creature, and creativity is the ultimate behind all forms, inexplicable by

27. Process and Reality, p.33
forms, and conditioned by its creatures."28. So it seems to me that in the Philosophy of Organism, it is not "substance" which is permanent but "forms".

We come to the doctrine of the "ontological principle". All real things are actual entities, therefore, any reason or description about anything must be due to actual entities and their characteristic. This does not seem strange for Whitehead has gone so far as to say that God is an actual entity. "Actual entities also termed actual occasions are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real. They differ among themselves: God is an actual entity, so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space."29

Thus we find that Whitehead has changed the emphasis from the primary and secondary qualities of spatio-temporal and sensible qualities to a "neutral monism". The "stuff" of which things are made is neither material nor mental, but neutral. If we are to take this ontological principle seriously then the very essences, or universals as "forms of definiteness" cannot merely float, detached from any form of existence. They must have a place in the actual entities. This category of explanation, which is the Ontological Principle, means that actual entities are the only reasons; so when we search for a reason we search for one or more actual entities. Thus we have the "organism" for the principle is only a description of the

28. Process and Reality, p.30
29. Ibid, p.27
the universe as a solidarity of many actual entities. Something cannot float into the world from nowhere. We shall treat this principle again in further discussions. According to it, many thinkers are wrong in placing mathematical formulae as ultimate and independent in themselves, for there are no formulae nor laws of nature apart from descriptions and characteristics of actual entities—either God or a less inclusive society of occasions.

We have already entered into a rather comprehensive treatment of events or actual entities as prehensive occasions, but it would do well for us to discuss the doctrines of Subjective aim, objectification, and satisfaction. The latter, has already been mentioned as a limitation on the process of prehension.

Every actual entity is what it is because of the nature of other events which it feels. The world of occasions influence and condition each other. It is not possible to abstract an individual entity from its setting in the world of events, for all events are being acted upon and are themselves acting upon other events. Though each of these stand or fall with the other events they have their own unique and individual nature so that it becomes a new picture of the universe. Whitehead states that each of the entities have their own subjective aim, that is they have an end in view. This looks like a form of an immanent teleology. Their subjective aim is to realize their
individuality by becoming a unity through their prehension or feelings of other entities. This relation of feelings is as true of the rock as of the human subject. "Science is taking on a new aspect which is neither purely physical nor purely biological. It is becoming the study of organisms. Biology is the study of the larger organisms; whereas, physics is the study of the smaller organisms."30. From this one might hold that Whitehead says that there exist a varying degree of purpose (whether conscious or unconsciousness) in every realm of occasions. The primordial nature of God which is outside of space and time, has a subjective aim as well as the other entities which might exist in space and time.

In the twenty-fourth category of the "Categories of Explanation", Dr. Whitehead gives us an idea of what he means by "objectification". "The functioning of one actual entity in the self-creation of another actual entity is the "objectification of the former for the latter actual entity. The functioning of an eternal object in the self-creation of an actual entity is the ingestion of the eternal object in the actual entity." Therefore, one entity may help another entity to create itself or to realize its subjective aim by objectifying itself in that actual entity. The ways in which actual entities unify their prehensions in their process of self formation are enumerated in Category of Explanation, 13th, as emotions, valuations, purposes.

30. Science and the Modern World, p.150
adversions, aversions, consciousness." The nature of all actual entities is the result of the way in which they organise their perspectives of the other entities.

There are different intensities to the subjective experiences enjoyed by the actual entities. The greater the intensity the more selective of prehensions is the occasion. The subjective form determines the process of prehension enjoyed by a "thing". Therefore occasions prehend and ignore other entities. The mode in which an entity enters into or is concreted with another depends upon its subjective form.

The difference between a positive and negative prehension is that of feeling. A positive prehension is a "feeling". The negative prehension excluded feeling. When something occurs which is incompatible with an actual entity's subjective aim, it excludes it by not feeling it. For instance, red refuses to prehend in a positive manner red, but negatively, prehends it. Negative prehensions are associated only with eternal objects. Further treatment will be given in the discussion of "The Theory of Feelings".

The painter has reached an artistic satisfaction when he realizes that every element or part of the picture blends in harmoniously with the other parts. When an actual entity has achieved "definiteness" or a whole in which each element fits in correctly, then it has reached that stage called satisfaction. "The final phase in the process of concrescence
constituting an actual entity, is one complex, fully determinate feeling. This final phase is termed the satisfaction. It is fully determinate (a) as to its genesis, (b) as to its objective character for the transcendent creativity, and (c) as to its prehension—positive or negative, of every item in the universe."

In this paper so far, we should have gained a fair view of the fundamental notions of the Philosophy of Organisms. The treatment of forms, eternal objects and feelings has been rather sketchy. These merit a distinct treatment in themselves.

"Eternal objects" need to be considered for they have an important distinction in Whitehead's philosophy. Each "occasion" has a core of character of its own, and is integrated by the special way in which that "occasion" combines a number of what we call "universal" characters (shape, colour, savour, etc.). These are very much like the "forms" in Plato's Timeaus. These were called simply "objects" in his earlier works (chapter on "objects" in Concept of Nature) but later he named them eternal objects. It seems that he has also quite radically changed his notion of what the objects really are. He first thought of universals as recurrent types of uniformity exhibited in the process but without any status outside it. In the processes of becoming in the world, certain "patterns" or types of cohesion might recur again and again. We give this recognised form of similarity of patterns in repeated processes a general name. Objects are those forms of definiteness which are recognised. The real essences of objects called "living" is that they are

rhythmic.

But, as already mentioned in Science and Modern World and Process and Reality he calls the "objects" "eternal objects" and defines them broadly as "forms of definiteness" or "pure potentials for the specific determination of matters of facts."

"The word object thus means an entity which is a potentiality for being a component in feeling." 32

These potentials have to exist somewhere, or must characterise an actual entity, (according to the Ontological Principle). Something cannot come out of nothing. These "eternals" are components of the primordial nature of God. There are no new eternal objects. When we think that we recognize a new eternal object it is because we recognize only a new combination or permutation of the infinite variety of forms "primordially" envisaged in God. This gives God a distinctive place in Metaphysics.

Let us see how it is that the eternal objects are apart from the temporal course of events. God's Primordial nature is the ground transcending the temporal world in that it consists of the possibilities as yet unrealised in it. His Consequent Nature supplies what is lacking in the Primordial Nature by being an order of living experience in place of the abstract entertainment of possibilities. The existence of order in the world is due to the immanence of God in His Consequent Nature. So God is both transcendent and immanent. It seems that God is not only the sum total of possibilities but he is also the urge toward their actuality in space and time. No entity can reach its subjective

32. Process and Reality, p.136
aim until it prehends an eternal object. There is no dualism here, for the world of events, that is, the process of becoming, is really not actual until it includes the order of eternal objects.

Whitehead himself has said that his "forms" are somewhat Platonic. He saw the problem as did Plato, that of the disentanglement of the permanences in the universe from the passing flux.

God, however, is not the only formative element which constitutes the character of the temporal world. The all inclusive universe consists of the temporal world and the following formative elements:

1. "The creativity whereby the actual world has its character of temporal passage to novelty. 2. The realm of ideal entities, or forms, which are in themselves not actual, but are such that they are exemplified in everything that is actual, according to some proportion of relevance. 3. The actual but non-temporal entity whereby the indetermination of mere creativity is transmuted into a determinate freedom. This non-temporal actual entity is what men call God—the supreme God of rationalized religion." 33

One other interesting feature of Dr. Whitehead's philosophy of organism is the "critique of pure feeling". "The philosophy of organism aspires to construct a critique of pure feeling in the philosophical position in which Kant put his Critique of Pure Reason. This should also supersede the remaining Critiques required in the Kantian Philosophy." 34

It has been mentioned that Whitehead describes events in his later works as "processes of experiences". That is to say,

33. "Religion in the Making", p. 90
34. "Process and Reality", p. 173
they have subjective aims and these aims determine what type of actuality they will be. This is quite unlike Kant who states that the objective world is built up of the experiences of the subject. Whitehead means that the subject is constructed in the way that it feels its objective world. A thing grows into a unity, into a satisfaction realized, (a concrescence) because of the way it feels other actual entities. Some entities are eliminated, neglected or passed over, others are sought in the process of a concrescence. The future event which will be the outcome of the present entity is determined by the way it feels in its present phase. We must bear in mind that feeling as used here means any kind of experience between entities. It is a general term, including the action of an entity or its being acted upon. It seems that Whitehead would interpret the wavelengths and vibrations of modern physics as undulations or "waves or emotions". In the "Categorial obligations" he states his theories of the critique of feeling.

There are three classes of feelings, the last of which is somewhat peculiar. These are physical, conceptual, and "hybrid physical feelings".

According to Whitehead the actual entity is always dipolar. "Any instance of experience is dipolar, whether that instance be God or an actual occasion of the world." 35

The "physical pole" of an occasion is its feeling of other actual entities; the "mental pole" is its feelings of eternal objects. This conceptual feeling is any prehension of eternal

35. "Process and Reality, p.54
objects. This does not imply consciousness but a kind of feeling he describes by the word "appetition".

"Appetition" is at once the conceptual valuation of an immediate physical feeling combined with the urge towards realization of the datura conceptually prehended. For example—"thirst" is an immediate physical feeling integrated with the conceptual prehension of its quenching." 36. This conceptual feeling, therefore, must be defined as an urge, a desire for an unrealised something in the future, based on it being present in the form of an appetite at the same time.

The physical feelings are, more or less, a passive state of relations. Things are prehended in a passive sort of a manner.

The third class of feelings he calls "hybrid physical feelings". There are two sub-species of hybrid feelings which are those that feel the conceptual feelings of temporal actual entities, and those that feel the conceptual feelings of God. This third class of feelings is somewhat obscure and unclear. It seems that he means when we are prehending this desk as green we are feeling the desk as prehending conceptually the eternal object green.

As we have already said, the occasions are the result of the way in which they prehend or feel the other entities. The material bodies are the results of a genetic character inherited through an historic route of actual occasion. In fact some of these routes form these bodies. There is little deviation between the entities in their route of succession. They produce little or no novelty; the last feels the rest of the universe somewhat

as did the first entity. "The inorganic material body is simply
the reiteration of the same pattern through a succession of
events. But there comes a stage when "conceptual feelings"
begin to be present which is called the "organic" or living
stage. A high degree of subjective unity or form is present
in the higher forms of life. When the originative urge towards
an increase in sensitivity is high in the occasion then it is
a "mental feeling". This intensity of appetite describes
the high levels of life. When the process merely shows pure
repetition then a material and mechanistic level is the out-
come. Nature at times does show creative advance, for in
evolution we find orders of species reached and transcended.
The order of nature is aesthetic. It is at heart a center of
feeling or experience. The aesthetic order of nature implies
that as the things grow in sensitive feeling and as they
conceptually feel the "mental pole" of actual entities they
become members of higher levels of life.

In closing this chapter we might say that Mr. Whitehead
has sought to give a comprehensive, systematic philosophy of
the universe. He shows daring originality in his treatment of
many of the problems which have provoked serious thinking from
students of metaphysics. He has obscured his thought in several
places through the use of forbidding perplexing terms in his
attempt to escape ambiguity. His philosophy of nature as an
organism has unique distinctions, though it must be remembered
that he is not the first to formulate such a conception. He
differs somewhat from Hegel's theory of the world as an "organism" in that he emphasises the importance of the individual. He owes much to Plato and Aristotle in his construction of ideas concerning form and matter or the permanent and the changing. "Creativity" is nearly the same doctrine as Bergson's "Elan Vital". One of the greatest contributions which he has made to this generation of philosophers who are inclined to leave God out of the metaphysical realm is his concept of God. This contribution shall be treated somewhat fully in our following chapter.
The concept of God is an important factor in the Philosophy of Organism. Mr. Whitehead in his later works goes so far as to say that not only colour, sound, taste, etc. but also that our ideas of good and bad are intrinsic values of an aesthetic order. Science cannot be thought of apart from theology nor can Science and theology be sheltered from metaphysics, nor metaphysics from either of them. According to Professor Whitehead there would be no nature, no science without the presence and activity of God.

Little or nothing is said in Principles of Natural Knowledge and Concept of Nature concerning God. The full discussion of God and religion begins in the last three chapters of Science and the Modern World, Religion in the Making, and is completed in the last chapter of Process and Reality. In this part of the paper I shall somewhat limit my treatment to the concept of God alone, and intend to discuss the religious aspects of his philosophy in the next chapter.

First, let us try to understand the connection between his Category of the Ultimate (creativity) and God. If we remember we described creativity as the pure, formless, substantial activity which is the universal of universals. This creativity is boundless in possibilities and if there were no limitations we would
have no nature, no science, only a chaos. There is, of a necessity, an original limitation on this creativity, which is some order of values in the realm of possibilities, which Dr. Whitehead calls the Primordial Nature of God. "Unlimited possibility and abstract creativity can produce nothing. The limitation, and the basis arising from what is already actual, are both of them necessary and interconnected."

It is rather difficult to see why God comes into existence in the manner Professor Whitehead has explained it. Since all actual entities are creatures of creativity (God is an actual entity) it seems queer and quite impossible for unfettered and unbounded formless activity to create the primordial limitation. Whitehead explains it in this manner. "In all philosophic theory there is an ultimate which is actual in virtue of its accidental embodiments, and apart from these accidents is devoid of actuality. In the philosophy of organism this ultimate is termed "creativity", and God is its primordial, non-temporal accident." 38 We have here the old traditional Cosmological problem of the existence of God. Professor Whitehead is somewhat unclear in meeting the problem. He no doubt places a sharp distinction between creativity and God. If God is a "creature" then creativity is prior to God.

God has two natures, being viewed as primordial and consequent, that is a Primordial and a Consequent nature.

38. Ibid, p. 10
"Viewed as primordial, he is the unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality." 39 All of the forms of order depend upon this nature of God. Professor Whitehead states that God in this nature is unconscious for his feelings are only conceptual and lacks the fullness of actuality. Those conceptual feelings are unconscious because they are apart from complex integration with physical feelings. "God in His Primordial Nature is God as the Unmoved Mover." But God is also actual and conscious. God from the standpoint of His mental pole is unconscious but from the aspect of His physical pole is conscious. He becomes conscious when his conceptual feelings are interwoven with the evolving events of the physical world. "Thus, analogously to all actual entities, the nature of God is dipolar. He has a primordial nature and a consequent nature. The consequent nature of God is conscious, and it is the realization of the actual world in the unity of his nature, and through the transformation of his wisdom. The primordial nature is conceptual, the consequent nature is the weaving of God’s physical feelings upon his primordial concepts." 40 The primordial nature of God supplies the metaphysical underlying conditions, the initial urge toward the richest order possible which might be realized of the abstract possible ideals (eternal objects) in the process of becoming. In His Consequent Nature he saves the world though he did not create it. "He does not create the world, he saves it; or, more accurately, he is the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty, and goodness." 41


40. Ibid, p.524
41. Ibid, p.526
So God is both transcendent and immanent.

Dorothy M. Emmet has given us this comparison of creativity and God in Whitehead's philosophy with the Doctrine of the Trinity in the Alexandrian Fathers.

"But if we could say that he intends the distinction of priority in creativity and the Primordial Nature to be simply a logical one, we might say that we have something not unlike the Doctrine of the Trinity in the Alexandrian Fathers. (a) In the first place, we have the Father as creative power; (b) we have the "limitation" in virtue of which God is perfect; (c) we have the same ambiguity as there is between Origen's doctrine of the Eternal Generation of the Logos, and his Subordinationism in speaking of the Logos as a derived Deity (and so perhaps opening the way to Arianism). (d) There is the interest in cosmology, in God in His relation to the world, which looks on the creator and the creation as in some way correlative. I would suggest that this interest in cosmology was characteristic of the Platonic Christology of the Alexandrian Fathers, in contrast to the concentration on the Trinity in the Latin Fathers as a description of the nature of God alone by Himself, apart from the world and condescending to it. (e) If we rule out the Platonic, or rather Neo-Platonic dualism, and the view of matter as evil, if not illusory, which always casts its shadows on Alexandrian Christian Platonism, we might say that its view of creation is not unlike that of the Philosophy of organism, in so far as creation is regarded as a process made possible by the incoming of the wisdom of God—a gradual becoming of order with God's immanence as the measure of its aesthetic consistency. We might even suggest that the "aeons" of the Alexandrians were a mythological expression of a speculation similar to Whitehead's concerning other types of world order; whereas the perfect order would be achieved through the aesthetic harmony of God's complete immanence; when He will be "all in all" The Holy Spirit might be described as the Consequent Nature of God, as the measure of the creative order achieved in the temporal world (not, that is, the disastrous Platonic notion of an inferior deity which is the Soul of the world, but God as immanent in the creative advance of the world, and the reason for the order which makes this advance possible)." 42

At this point I shall enter into rather a detailed and simple account of the relation of God to the world.

This Principle of concretion is not a very difficult doctrine to understand. Was it not Tennyson who wrote these expressive

42. "Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism", Dorothy M. Emmet, p.253
lines about the flower in the crannied wall? "If I knew you, root and all in all, I should know what God and man is." Now it is precisely this that is implied by the principle of concretion. It means to say that all being, everything that has existed and which exists and that which shall exist is focussed or concentrated or made concrete in the flower. The flower is red just because of its setting among all the other things in the universe. Everything is focussed into something else and a thing is just what it is because of what other things are. The flower prehends all things and the whole universe becomes concreted in the flower.

Not only in the making of an existent thing is the prehension of other things but also the feeling (or entry into the thing) of the universals, principles, or possibilities. Though not an existent thing, the infinity of whole numbers, has also something to do with existent things. The abstract forms, such as goodness, beauty, truth, redness, hardness, etc. are concreted to some extent in any particular existing thing.

If nothing exists apart from anything else, then that which is concrete is not an isolated thing. The term concrete is used to designate the unification of the many into one. The flower is what it is because of temperature, the moisture, the season, the locality and other reasons. These things in turn are what they are because all other things are what they are. The principle of concretion is inherent in everything which causes the organization of all being in such a manner that all participates in each and each in all.
We might wonder why the principle of concretion causes all being to enter into all existing things. Is it because of some external Being, some transcendental Being? It stands to reason there can be nothing outside of all being; for all being is an inclusive term so, therefore, it cannot be due to some external agent. It is because God is immanent in nature. The inherent nature of God in all things is the cause for the orderliness of nature. If there were no order in nature there would be no world, no cosmos, only chaos.

God has a purpose in the temporal world which is the attainment of value.

"This line of thought extends Kant's argument. He saw the necessity for God in the moral order. But with his metaphysics he rejected the argument from his cosmos. The metaphysical doctrine, here expounded, finds the foundations of the world in the aesthetic experience, rather than, as with Kant-- in the cognitive and concepitive experience. All order is merely certain aspects of aesthetic order. The actual world is the outcome of the aesthetic order, and the immanence of God."43

"The order of the world is no accident. There is nothing actual which could be actual without some measure of order. The religious insight is the grasp of this truth; That the order of the world, the depth of reality of the world, the value of the world in the whole and in its parts, the beauty of the world, the zest of life, the peace of life, and the mastery of evil are all bound up together—not accidentally, but by reason of this truth: that the universe exhibits a creativity with infinite freedom, and a realm of forms with infinite possibilities; but that this creativity and these forms are together impotent to achieve actuality apart from the completed ideal harmony, which is God."44

The order of nature is aesthetic, rather than moral or concepitive because of the inherent being of the poet of the world.

43. Religion in the Making, p.104
44. Ibid, p.119
God in His Consequent nature. This order in which all being, everything (to a certain degree) is concreted into each actual occasion could be none other than an aesthetic nature. To have an aesthetic experience from the viewing of a piece of art is to realize that all of the elements, color, sound, etc., blend and harmonize so as to create a single total culminating effect. To have an aesthetic experience of nature is to feel all being focussed into a single concrete event. To become aware of the concrete fullness of things in an aesthetic experience of nature.

God is not pantheistic in nature; he is not the source of all being; he is not a creator, but the supreme principle of discrimination and distinction. He is the principle which places a distinction between good and evil. God is good and is the source of all goodness. "Among medieval and modern philosophers, anxious to establish the religious significance of God, an unfortunate habit has prevailed of paying to him metaphysical compliments. He has been conceived as the foundation of the metaphysical situation with its ultimate activity. If this conception be adhered to, there can be no alternative except to discern in Him the origin of all evil as well as of all good. He is then the supreme author of the play, and to Him must, therefore, be ascribed its short comings as well as its success. If he be conceived as the supreme ground for limitation, it stands in His very nature to divide the Good from the Evil, and to establish reason within her dominions supreme."

Evil is that force which hinders the full operation of the principle of concretion. It is that which keeps the many from participating in the one. Evil's purpose is to tear down the concrete world. It will never fully do this for if it does it will destroy itself because it would have no further task if all concreteness were destroyed.

God as the sum total of all possibilities is the constitutive order and as such be transgresses the world. But this realm of possibilities, this order of eternal objects enters to some extent in the actual world of events, therefore, God is also immanent. God intends to make the world ever more concrete.

Professor Whitehead has attempted to formulate his conception of God somewhere between the old doctrines of God as the impersonal order of the universe and the doctrine of God as the one person creating the universe. God is an actual entity and to be an actual thing is to be limited. This limitation is goodness or harmony. Therefore, He is finite or limited.

"The nature of God is the complete conceptual realization of the realm of ideal forms. The kingdom of Heaven is God.---The depth of his existence lies beyond the vulgarities of praise and power.---The power by which God sustains the world is the power of himself as the ideal.---He is the binding element in the world. The consciousness which is individual in us, is universal in him; the love which is partial in us is all-embracing in him. Apart from him there could be no world, because there could be no adjustment of individuality. His purpose is always embodied in the particular ideals relevant to the actual state of the world. Thus all attainment is immortal in that it fashions the actual ideals which are in God as it is now---He is not the world, but the valuation of the world."

It has been very stimulating to many religious philosophers to know that one who holds a chair in a distinguished university has sought to "place God, the eternal in time" restoring somewhat the ancient conception of a "living God," who is constantly seeking to sustain the world through the power of himself as an ideal. In his discussion, "Critique of Feelings", he has made all things "spiritual" in the sense of having sentience, feelings, prehension and value. These things are socially interlocked with one another in an aesthetic order. By making all things "spiritual" because

46. "Religion in the Making", ps. 149-160
of the presence of the principle of concretion, he is able to escape the problem which many theologians face when they claim the existence of lifeless dead matter in a world ruled by a spiritual all-inclusive being. The older theology looked upon God as a great intellect who ruled by force. Whitehead has put forth in its place a conception that God is love which is immanent in every process of becoming. But this love is a kind of an unconscious quality of harmony among things and it seems that his notions of God and religion are not quite adequate to meet the demands of a struggling people endeavoring to become completely adjusted in a changing world.

Though, perhaps, too many quotations have already been given, the writer finds it hard to refrain in concluding this chapter, from quoting the final summary of the relation of God and the world, which Mr. Whitehead has expressed in terms of a group of antitheses. "These apparent self-contradictions depend on neglect of the diverse categories of existence. In each antitheses there is a shift of meaning which converts the opposition into a contrast.

It is as true to say that God is permanent and the world fluent, as that the world is permanent and God is fluent.

It is as true to say that, in comparison with the world, God is actual eminently, as that in comparison with God, the world is actual eminently.

It is as true to say that the world is immanent in God, as that God is immanent in the world.

It is as true to say that God transcends the world, as that the world transcends God.

It is as true to say that God creates the world as that the world creates God."

47. Process and Reality, p.528
Chapter III

Dr. Whitehead and the Christian Traditionalist on Religion.

Dr. Whitehead has said many things concerning religion. *Religion in the Making* is devoted exclusively to the essence, foundation and role of religion in the realm of human values. Much has been said which present and future generations will deal with. This paper would not be complete unless it included a discussion of his ideas concerning religion.

The nature of religion and God are dealt with in much the same way as Whitehead has constructed his speculative scientific philosophy. He has consistently argued that science and religion depend on each other; neither one can be entirely explained apart from the other. He attempts to be as exact, concise and scientific about religion as he is when dealing with matter, with space and time and other physical concepts. Dr. Whitehead has a number of times spoken of the danger of speaking of God in human analogies but if we are not seriously mistaken, his conception of religion and God is somewhat anthropomorphic. Can one speak of God except his words be shaded by human experiences? God is love, beauty, goodness, our Ideal: nature is an aesthetic order, says Whitehead. These attributes of God and nature are purely human values. It
is rather difficult for us to understand why the birth or death of a star or planet has any aesthetic significance.

There has been a kind of a development in his ideas concerning religion. In *Science and the Modern World* he states that man has erred in paying metaphysical compliments to God, but in his later writings some Christian theologians have found reasons to rejoice. In our discussion we will try to discover if Mr. Whitehead has given us any reason to think of God as a "Personal Being". He expands, elucidates and amplifies his ideas about religion and God in *Religion in the Making*.

How does Mr. Whitehead define religion? In the following definitions it is noted that he chooses no narrow, strict technical meaning, but speaks of religion in a general sense. These pregnant phrases will give us some idea of the essences of his religion.

"Religion is force of belief cleansing the inward parts. For this reason the primary religious virtue is sincerity, a penetrating sincerity." 48

"Religion is the art and the theory of the internal life of man, so far as it depends on the man himself and on what is permanent in the nature of things." 49

"Religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness.—It is the transition from God the void to God the enemy, and from God the enemy to God the companion." 50

50. Ibid, p.16
51. Ibid, p.16
"Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real, and yet waiting to be realised; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest." 51

"Religion is the translation of general ideas into particular thoughts, particular emotions, and particular purposes; it is directed to the end of stretching individual interest beyond its self-defeating particularity." 52

It is rather difficult to draw any specific conclusions concerning the true nature of religion. They are rather vague and general and we need to follow him closely in his major treatise Religion in the Making.

He states that religion is not a social fact. He, unlike the founders of the great Christian institutions has revolted against collective enthusiasms, and revivals. Religion is solitariness and exists for the individual. Man's ideas about the Unseen have evolved through four stages, ritual, emotion, belief and rationalization. Rituals and emotions are only binding elements among group. When one feels a haunting sense of solitariness, a feeling of being forsaken by all, he is experiencing a depth of religious spirit. Whitehead ventures to say that this feeling was a part of the emotions of the man on the cross, and Buddha in the desert. Traditionalists would never agree that a person is experiencing a religious spirit when having a sense of being forsaken by God. Only sin can

52. "Process and Reality", p. 23
separate the children from the love of the Heavenly Father.

Belief and emotion are the early stages of man's religion and yet we find some of the great world religions using belief and emotion in the same manner as did primitive man, as ends in themselves. Whitehead states that ritual is the stimulus to emotion, and in many group activities, such as holy day festivals, revivals, bibles, etc. the rituals are only repeated in order to enjoy the emotion. Rituals and emotions go together and are the binding forces of savage tribes. I suppose that Durkheim's conception of religion would be considered very primitive for Whitehead regards a religion as decaying when it sinks back into sociability.

Rituals, emotions and myths interact reciprocally. Rituals usually precede myths for some animals observe ritualism and have no mythology. There is a person or a thing which is worshiped because there is a belief that something is to be gained thereby. We usually see a system of beliefs built up around this "hero-thing" or "hero-person". When the set of ideas are built around a thing we get magic, when a "hero-person" is worshiped we call it religion. Some have implied that this is all that is necessary for a religion because in many instances it has successfully passed the pragmatic test.

But Whitehead has gone one stage further and states that the last step is a system of coordinated beliefs which he terms as Rationalism. This final phase includes religion as a solitary
affair. This stage began about six thousand years ago when man first began to rationalise about religion. At the beginning of this period we see the prophets, a few men and then one man with twelve disciples who were nearly universally rejected. They felt the elements of true religion with its notes of solitariness. This "rational religion appeals to the direct intuition of special occasions, and to the elucidatory power of its concepts for all occasions." 53 The first beginnings of this stage began where the individual rebelled against tribal custom and used his faculty of ethical intuition. The prophet Hosea was an example of this type when he said, "For I desired mercy, and not sacrifice; and the knowledge of God more than burnt offerings." Religion began to have individualistic forms and lost its communal aspect. The individual is saved to heaven and not the group. All this is just as it should be, believes Whitehead, for enlightenment, tolerance, and respect for the individual comes with the appearing of the stage of rationalism. In the communal stage you obey God because it is His will, but in the stage of thought consciousness you obey because you wish to be like Him. "It is the difference between the enemy you conciliate and the companion whom you imitate." 54

It is rather difficult to find reasons for holding valid the above contentions of Whitehead. He may or may not be justified in stating religion is decaying when it sinks into sociability.

53. "Religion in the Making", p.32
54. Ibid, p.40
There are many students of comparative religions who would dispute his account of the origin of the great world religions. Frankly, I think that Mr. Whitehead has slipped up here in applying his metaphysics to religion. If he teaches any one thing in his metaphysics it is the note of universal values. If God, the Principle of Concretion, is the cause of the many to be unified into one than it certainly seems that progressiveness is present in the appearances of fewer and greater group religions. Of course, each occasion has a unique element, but it is largely determined by the nature of other occasions. If the world is an order of interlocking, interacting social forces, then it appears quite contradictory to assert that a religion is in decay when it sinks back into sociability. I do not think that we can follow him in this.

According to Professor Whitehead the notion of God is the fundamental religious dogma and all other dogmas are subsidiary to it. He gives a treatment of the three main simple interpretations of concepts of God which are popular today. He states them as follows: first, the Eastern Asiatic concept of an impersonal order to which the world conforms or the extreme doctrine of immanence. Second, the Semitic concept of a definite personal individual entity who is absolute and transcendent. This concept grew out of a rationalization of the tribal gods in the earlier communal religions. The third concept is that of Pantheism. God is the only reality and apart from him there is nothing. This is the doctrine of monism.
Christianity inherited the Semitic concept and its first founders somewhat reshaped it. They understood the difficulties which came with the acceptance of the entire concept. If he were fully absolute and transcendent, then he would be left out of the entire metaphysical realm of rationalization; we would know nothing about him. Again, there is the difficulty of proving this concept. Anselm and Descartes have suggested the "ontological proof" but for the most part it is superficial and useless. Whitehead further says that Christ was one of the first to introduce the ideas of immanence to this concept when he explained, "The Kingdom of Heaven is within you." When Christian theology was Platonic in essence it followed this thought of the immanence of God, but the modern world has lost God and is seeking him because of the return to the Semitic concept. The three-fold personality of God is a clear proof that Christian theology has returned to the ancient belief. The modern church has fallen to the temptation of explaining God and his relations to the world in too simple terms. It has become too idealistically rational and has not resorted to the various developments in the realm of metaphysics. It has sheltered theology from science which is wrong, for there is no short cut to truth.

Religion really needs a metaphysical foundation, so as to find and classify the meanings of the universal religious emotions.
Mankind is universally religious, but due to fear of a metaphysical examination, few real scientific ideas have been contributed by the various religions. Faith has played too great a part in human experiences. Let us seek for penetration and clarity in our search for the real elements of the world. All about us and in us we see the interdependence of the universe. Things are passing; things are all with us. Change and permanence are the real truths about the actual occasions of existence. There is the actual world of events which is passing in time, but there are, also, those elements which go to make this world's formation. Beyond the actual world and its formative elements, we know nothing for these two factors form an all-inclusive universe. (The writer has already stated these formative elements previously in this paper.) These elements, briefly, are creativity, which accounts for novelty; the realm of forms, not actual in themselves, but exemplified to a degree in everything that is actual; and God the actual but non-temporal entity. All of these elements enter into every actual entity.

God as one of these elements enters the temporal world for the purpose of attaining values. He has a creative purpose for without him the other formative elements would fail in their functions. In every creative phase he is present for it is because of him that the indetermination of mere creativity is made into a sort of determinate freedom. Creativity is boundless and would make for no real order of nature if it were not for God who places values or objectives for each phase of levels to seek, realise and enjoy. But he is not the cause of complete determinism for then he would be the cause of all things including evil. He
aids creativity to attain a measure of determination. God in his Primordial nature possess the ideals or possibilities, that is He is transcendent; in His Consequent nature he is immanent in the world struggling and helping the actual occasions to reach those possibilities. God is fully consistent with himself, he never changes, therefore, he does not include evil for the note of evil is the result of internal inconsistency.

There is an aesthetic order in nature due to the immanence of God. "The order of the world is no accident. There is nothing actual without some measure of order. The religious insight is the grasp of this truth: That the order of the world, the depth of reality of the world, the value of the world in its whole and its parts, the beauty of the world, the zest of life, the peace of life, and the mastery of evil, are all bound together—not accidentally, but by reason of this truth: that the universe exhibits a creativity with infinite possibilities: but that this creativity and these forms are together impotent to achieve actuality apart from the completed ideal harmony, which is God." 55.

As we have already said, Mr. Whitehead has rejected both the doctrines about the nature of God which states him as the impersonal order of the universe and as the one person creating the universe. His own conception of God which is construed in terms of a descriptive metaphysical system can somewhat be stated in this sense.

God is the Kingdom of Heaven; that is to say, his nature is the complete conceptual realization of the realm of ideal forms. He is complete in the sense that he has a conceptual realization of the possibilities of the ideal forms as elements of value in any creative act. He is not infinite for he has the limitation of goodness. God is not, however, altogether excluded from the

55. "Religion in the Making", p.119
fact of evil. He has in his own nature the knowledge of evil, pain, degradation but it is there as overcome with what is good. God is the mirror which discloses to every creature its own greatness. God's greatness and his existence lie beyond the vulgarities of praise or power. There need be no prayers for he is not a person or a super-person; he cannot interrupt the laws of nature in answer to a suffering soul. He does not insure a personal immortality nor does he send any one to atone for evil or to save anyone.

The power that God has is the power of himself as an ideal. The world is saved by its incarnation of God in itself. God is not the world, but the valuation of the world. He solves all indeterminations by setting forth all the values to be determined. In a certain sense all attainment is immortal in that it fashions the actual ideals which are God in the world as it is now. Nothing of value is lost under the image of "a tender care."

Christianity, according to Mr. Whitehead, is decaying because it has failed to modify itself in the light of science, method, critical thinking and history. It still clings to impurities, irrelevant tradition, and foolish dogma. Some dogma is necessary, but it should be only a means for a general interpretation of religious expression rather than an end. He, however, is rather hopeful when he says that religion is not dead or dying but it is "in the making."

It seems to me that the above discussions should give us rather a comprehensive understanding of Dr. Whitehead's view of
religion. For the most part he has touched upon many truths in calling attention to the inconsistencies of a few of the great religions. He has pointed out the fallacies of traditional conceptions of God and has urged the use of science in forming a theology. He has been fairly successful in attempting to tear away many of the scaffolds of organised religious thought, but on the other hand he has been equally unsuccessful in substituting anything that is of practical value for the Christian.

Throughout all of his writings, the word 'God' is used. He has a strange interpretation of the nature of God and his relation to the world. We wonder why he doesn't go further with the concept of God and give to him some personal attributes. Whitehead gives to him no name, personality or any other personal attributes. He himself confessed that he had a distaste for such words as Power, Force, Unknowable, and Spirit. Most philosophers either give God some personal characteristics or else call him as did Spencer, the Unknowable. It seems that the main purpose of a religion is to aid people to become adjusted in a changing world and there is very little in Whitehead's philosophy which would aid humanity in its struggle against the incompetence, greed and inertia which threatens civilized life. He believes in progress in an aesthetic nature, (that is in the moral realm). Things do not work out so neatly as he supposes. Many thinkers doubt moral progress. War, crime, revenge, cruelty, punishment, selfishness, misery, injustice, oppression, ignorance are present with us and
it seems only a short span of years before foolish nationalism and patriotism will bring human life to a close in a world conflict. Accordingly, if one holds altogether with Whitehead he must accept a progressive upward trend, never varying, toward the ideal of "goodness". The moral history of mankind tends to disprove this for if we must believe in moral progress, at least, we must face the fact that it comes in cycles and never a steady unvarying upward ascending plane. Traditional Christian theology has a better explanation of the presence of evil. Though many liberals think of heaven as a state of being traditional Christianity teaches about a place called heaven. Dr. Whitehead quotes Jesus, "The Kingdom of Heaven is within you." They differ in that God to the traditionalist is the omniscient, omnipotent, creator, the Heavenly Father who knows his creation, but to Whitehead he possesses none of these qualities. God here is used as the ideal, the highest type of justice, goodness and love that we know. But we may well wonder from where are we going to get our ideas of justice, goodness and love? Professor Whitehead implies that all our knowledge comes from the conditions, traditions, circumstances, science and logic.

Another thing which may be said is that Whitehead stresses the necessity of logic and science in finding God, traditional Christianity implies that God can best be found through faith. "Amid the halls of learning one meets God," says the philosopher. "No," answers the Christian, "one sees God in the slums having 'sup with sinners'."

Perhaps I have not been justified in expecting too much from Whitehead as he uses the concept "God". He no doubt used the word in his earlier works to make full and consistent his philosophy of the universe. We have a tremendous appreciation of this way in which he thinks of God and His role in nature. Mr. Whitehead, however, wanders too far from solid ground when he enters the midstreams of theoretical and practical theology in "Religion in the Making". Many will not follow him here, especially those who claim that there are perhaps two types of knowledge; the knowledge of the mind and the intuition of the "heart". He, however, is a model of inspiration and comfort to those who fear that God cannot be logically thought of in a philosophy of the universe.
Bibliography

Primary Sources

Whitehead, A. N.

Secondary Sources

Black, Max

Emmet, Dorothy M.
Periodicals

Emmet, Dorothy M.  A Philosophy of Civilization. 

Hartshorne, Charles On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy. 

Liddell, J. S. Contrasted Cosmologies. 

Mengo, E. J. Professor Whitehead's Philosophy. 

Moore, M. H. Mr. Whitehead's Philosophy. 

Murphy, A. N. Objective relativism in Dewey and Whitehead. 
Philosophical review, March 1927, v.36:131-144.

Robinson, D. S. Dr. Whitehead's Theory of Events. 
Philosophical review, 1921, p.21

Russell, Bertrand Science and the Modern world; review. 

Taylor, A. E. Dr. Whitehead's philosophy of religion. 

Wieman, H. N. Professor Whitehead's Concept of God. 

Wilson, E. Physicist and Prophet. 

Yarros, V. S. Dr. Whitehead and Professor Mather on Religion. 