Loy Wesley Henderson: A cold warrior in near eastern affairs

Anne Witt Perkins

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/masters-theses

Part of the History Commons

Recommended Citation

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
ABSTRACT

Loy Wesley Henderson was the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (NEA) in the Department of State from 1945-1948. A veteran Soviet observer, he persistently called for the use of economic aid in the Near East to increase American prestige and prevent Soviet expansion. Believing that American principles and national interests should be the basis of foreign policy rather than partisan politics, Henderson was a leading influence in the formulation of the Truman Doctrine but disagreed with the Truman Administration's support of a Jewish state in Palestine.

This work examines Henderson's views on United States foreign policy, its formulation, and goals, illustrating his devotion to that which he perceived as moral. In analyzing Henderson's record on the formulation of the Truman Doctrine and Palestine policy, it is evident that he remained true to beliefs deep-rooted in his foreign service background and brought to the fore by the Cold War.

Primary sources utilized include the Loy W. Henderson Papers. This collection was especially significant because Henderson disagreed with the accounts of Joseph Jones and George Kennan concerning the events surrounding the formulation of the Truman Doctrine.
LOY WESLEY HENDERSON:
A COLD WARRIOR IN NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,
1945-1948

By
ANNE WITT PERKINS
B.A., University of Richmond, 1975

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of the University of Richmond
in Candidacy
for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
in
History

August, 1987
Richmond, Virginia
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .................................................. 1

Chapter
I. EARLY CAREER: THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEAS ............. 8

Red Cross in World War I, the Baltic States, Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow, Assistant Chief in the Office of European Affairs, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Iraq, NEA and the hierarchy of the State Department, role of the State Department in policy formulation, State Department reorganization plan

II. THE COLD WAR SETTING 1945-1948 ..................... 24

Definition of Cold War, World War II Soviet-American relations and postwar planning, America fears Soviet expansion, the isolationists, communist ideology, Cold War rhetoric, importance of the Near East, policy of containment and its critics, Henderson and the Cold War

III. THE HERO: HENDERSON AND ORIGINS OF THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE .................................. 40

Henderson stresses importance of Near East and urges use of economic aid, Iran crisis and isolationist opposition, Turkish Straits crisis, Greek crisis, Henderson’s policy proposals, British notes, Henderson and NEA prepare policy statement on Greece and Turkey, Truman Doctrine speech and world reaction, Greek-Turkish aid bill in Congress

IV. THE VILLAIN: HENDERSON AND THE PALESTINE CRISIS ............................................. 78

Foreign policy complications, question of self-determination, State Department’s concern for Arab world, policy of full consultation and Truman’s reaffirmation, Truman’s concern for Jewish
Table of Contents (continued)

refugee problem becomes basis of foreign policy, Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Morrison-Grady Plan, Zionists press for partition of Palestine, Henderson’s policy recommendations and his critics, Palestine before the United Nations and partition recommendation, Truman supports partition, Austin’s speech recommends trusteeship, State Department accused of sabotage, American recognition of Israel, Henderson to India

V. CONCLUSION: 1945-1948 IN RETROSPECT. . . . . . . . 124

Henderson and the Truman Doctrine, Truman Doctrine and American postwar policy, Henderson and the Palestine affair, criticism thirty years later, Henderson and American principles

BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

VITA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
INTRODUCTION

Former State Department official Louis J. Halle, in the Preface of his book, The Cold War as History, wrote, "The essence of history, in a certain view, is the contrast between the immensity of its movement and the limitations of the individuals who, often with the greatest gallantry, put themselves at grips with it." (1) Loy Wesley Henderson was one of these gallant individuals. For thirty-nine years he faced the tide of events as a foreign service officer in the Baltic States, Moscow, the Near East, India, and Washington. At each stop along the way, Henderson left his mark, a mark that resulted in praise, criticism, and usually a great deal of controversy.

The most controversial years of Henderson's long career were 1945-1948 when he served as Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (NEA). Events in the post-war years were developing and changing rapidly with the commencement of the Cold War, and as the importance of the Near East became more apparent, the Director of NEA came to the fore. Henderson played a hero's role in the drama that led to the Truman Doctrine but was cast in the part of villain in the Palestine tragedy. Thirty years later, he wrote, "More

criticism has been aimed at me for what I did during my three years as Director for Near East and Africa than for what I did during all the other years in the Service."(2)

The criticism came from all quarters and on all issues. Isolationists accused Henderson and other State Department officials of leading the United States to the brink of another world war when the President presented the Truman Doctrine challenge to the nation. Cold War critics viewed the Director's anti-Soviet opinions as inflammatory and unnecessary. Indeed, Henderson was never a favorite in Moscow, as he noted in 1961, "The Russians consider me as one of the most dangerous American undercover agents. . . . During the period 1945-8 I opposed them vigorously. . . ."(3) No issue, however, aroused more intense criticism than the creation of the state of Israel. Henderson's opposition to United States support of Palestine as a Jewish national home drew charges of anti-Semitism and disloyalty. The controversy surrounding his attitude resulted in his "promotion" out of NEA in the summer of 1948.

Henderson survived the NEA battles and became a highly decorated civil servant. In 1954, he received the Distinguished Service Award, the highest State Department honor,


and the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civil Service in 1958 before retiring from public life in 1960. (4)

From his colleagues Henderson received much praise and admiration. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wrote to him, "Your devotion to duty, your moral integrity and your personal sacrifices have set an example for the entire Foreign Service." (5) Henderson was dedicated, energetic, and courageous in performing his duties. He was a man of principles first and foremost. He never hesitated to speak his mind and often paid the price for his forthrightness. (6) This devotion to principle and to pursuing the interests of the United States in the postwar world led ultimately to his fall from grace with the Truman Administration. As George Kennan wrote, "The process of government, after all, is a practical exercise and not a moral one." (7)

Loy Henderson never believed in sacrificing the moral for the practical. This work examines Henderson's views on United States foreign policy, its formulation, and goals,


illustrating his devotion to that which he perceived as moral. In analyzing Henderson's record on the formulation of the Truman Doctrine and Palestine policy, it is evident that he remained true to beliefs deep-rooted in his foreign service background and brought to the fore by the Cold War. His foremost concern was United States interests, not public or presidential opinion.

The source materials for Henderson's views and policy contributions are numerous. Many Cold War authors sought his opinions through interviews and occasionally the perusal of his private correspondence. (8) Others merely mention Henderson, a witness to the tide of events but not a major participant in them. (9) This work focuses on Loy Henderson's unique


role in American foreign affairs from 1945 to 1948 as revealed in public documents and his personal papers. Foreign Relations of the United States is the primary source of Henderson's statements on policy issues. The Papers of Loy W. Henderson, however, provide fresh insight into the man behind the public figure. Housed in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress and made available to the public in 1986, these papers consist of approximately eight thousand items stored in twenty-eight containers. They cover the years 1918 through 1978 with the late 1930s to late 1950s the dominant period. Henderson's fifteen hundred page unpublished memoirs are a part of the collection, but he stipulated the draft remain restricted until two years after his death (1988). The memoirs, however, tell his story only up to 1942.

While the papers provide little information on Henderson's personal life, his correspondence discloses his beliefs and ideals in a manner not conveyed by the words attributed to him in secondary sources. Henderson stated numerous times his dislike of personal interviews and his hesitancy to be quoted. He felt the interviewer seldom imparted the true meaning of his words. (10) The Henderson Papers provide for

(10) See Loy Henderson to Mr. Quandt, April 11, 1969, Israel-Palestine Correspondence File, Container 11, LWH Papers; Loy W. Henderson Interview, October 15, 1975, Israel-Palestine Correspondence File, LWH Papers; and Loy Henderson to Sister M. Agatha Aicher, June 6, 1949, Lilienthal File, LWH Papers.
the first time the personal written words of Loy Henderson, words which he carefully chose to express clearly his ideas and beliefs. While the reader is as free as the interviewer to interpret the meaning of words, there is less chance of misrepresentation of the written source.

Perhaps of greater importance, the Henderson Papers shed new light on some important topics. Loy Henderson disagreed with the accounts of Joseph Jones and George Kennan concerning the events surrounding the formulation of the Truman Doctrine, especially the role played by Kennan. Upon reading a draft of a portion of Kennan's memoirs, Henderson composed a four page letter to his long-time friend recalling in detail the events of that fateful weekend in February 1947, which are discussed herein in Chapter III. In this letter written April 2, 1967, Henderson stated, "... the decision to render aid to Greece and Turkey was made before you were brought into the consultations."(11) Marginal notes and other correspondence indicate that Henderson never mailed this letter. He sent to Kennan on April 28 a much abbreviated and less emotional version. Kennan acknowledges in his memoirs Henderson's differing recollections but views them as inconsequential. The Henderson Papers reveal that ten years later Henderson disputed Clark Clifford's oral

(11) Loy Henderson to George Kennan, April 2, 1967 (apparently never mailed), Greece File, Container 8, LWH Papers.
account of the 1947-1948 Palestine crisis, discussed herein in Chapter IV. In a letter to Dean Rusk, he privately answered Clifford's charges and highlighted their inaccuracies; however, Henderson made no public denouncement of the Clifford speech.(12)

The papers also provide unparalleled information on the career of this influential officer. As detailed later in this work, Loy Henderson left his mark from Washington to India. As a tribute to Henderson, the State Department auditorium bears his name. So profound was his influence on the foreign service that William Benton, former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, suggested this obituary, "Here lies the man most respected by his peers and regarded as the Dean of the Foreign Service for his distinguished attainments and contributions."(13)


CHAPTER I

EARLY CAREER:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEAS

When Loy Henderson came to the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs in April 1945, he possessed a wealth of experience earned in over twenty-five years of service to his country. Born in Rogers, Arkansas on June 28, 1892, he was a student at Northwestern University when World War I broke out. Upon receiving his A.B. degree in 1915, Henderson attended the University of Denver Law School for one year before entering graduate school at New York University. When the United States entered the war, Henderson applied for but was denied entrance to the First Officers' Training Camp because of a stiff arm, the result of a childhood break. Desiring to serve his country in some way, Henderson joined the American Red Cross and was stationed in France in 1918. (1)

In February of 1919, as a commissioned officer in the then militarized Red Cross in Europe, Henderson went to Berlin as a member of the Inter-Allied Commission to Germany. His duties were to inspect prisoner of war camps and facili-

(1) See Biographic Register, p. 3; Biographic Notes, Container 1, LWH Papers; and Loy Henderson to David Chalfan, December 26, 1974, American Red Cross File, 1919-1975, Container 5, LWH Papers.
tate the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war. He moved even closer to the Russian situation in the fall of 1919 when he went to Riga as a member of the American Red Cross Commission to Western Russia and the Baltic States. Besides the hardships which resulted from the continued fighting, the Red Cross encountered a raging typhus epidemic in Estonia. During these months, however, Henderson developed a love and deep respect for the Baltic people. His stay in Riga was brief, and in April of 1920 he returned to Berlin where he served until August 1921 as head of the Office of the American Red Cross.(2)

Loy Henderson's first foreign service post was in Dublin. His first Washington assignment came in 1925 in the Division of East European Affairs, but by 1927 he was back in Riga as the Third Secretary of the Legation to the Baltic States, assigned to the Russian Division. Since the United States did not have diplomatic relations with the USSR, the Russian Division observed Soviet activities from its vantage point in the Baltics. The situation gave Henderson an opportunity to make a marked impression on his superiors while serving in this area. In reports to Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, Louis Sussdorff, Jr., Charge d'Affaires, ad interim, noted the junior officer's energy, strength, and

(2) See Biographic Register, p. 3; Biographic Notes, LWH Papers; and Interview with Loy Henderson, March 1975, for The Good Neighbor, American Red Cross File, 1919-1975, LWH Papers.
ability to inspire his co-workers. In addition Henderson displayed enormous executive skills as well as the ability to study and analyze the complex Soviet situation. (3) Sussdorff concluded one memorandum to the State Department:

... I desire to state that both Mr. Macgowan [in charge of the Russian Division] and I feel that in our fifteen years experience in the foreign service we have never been associated with any junior officer who has possessed greater ability and energy as a political and economic reporter than Mr. Henderson. (4)

Henderson learned a great deal about the Soviet Union during his three years in Riga; therefore, he was selected to participate in the first diplomatic mission to the Soviet Union in 1934 as Second Secretary of the Embassy. Approximately forty men went to Moscow with Ambassador William Bullitt. Bullitt's post-World War I attempt to bring the Soviet Union into the Paris Peace Conference had been humiliatingly ignored by the Allies, who had sent him to negotiate with Lenin, so the Ambassador went to Moscow with a great deal of hope for the future of Soviet-American relations. These hopes soon were shattered. The cruelties, unscrupulousness, dishonesty, and degradation of the Soviet government left a lasting impression on all members of the American mission. These characteristics resulted in Henderson and

---

(3) See Biographic Notes, LWH Papers; Kuniholm, Cold War in Near East, pp. 238-40; and Louis Sussdorff, Jr. to Henry L. Stimson, March 6, 1930, Baltic States File, Container 6, LWH Papers.

(4) Sussdorff to Stimson, March 6, 1930, LWH Papers.
other embassy officials advising President Roosevelt to take a hard line. When the President rejected this policy, Bullitt resigned in 1936. (5)

Since Bullitt was seldom in Moscow during his final year as ambassador, administration of the embassy was left to the Charge d'Affaires, ad interim, Loy Henderson. Under Henderson's direction, the embassy developed into one of the most respected and informed missions in the Soviet Union. He impressed those around him with his dedication, intelligence, sincerity, and courage. Like others in the embassy, he was appalled by the Soviet police state and became convinced that ultimate Soviet aims were in direct opposition to American goals and principles. Both George Kennan and Charles Bohlen, who gained fame as Soviet experts, were with Henderson in Moscow. They acknowledged the profound influence which Henderson had on their careers and the development of their ideas. (6) Kennan expressed these ideas eloquently in 1946-1947, detailed herein in Chapter II, but in 1936 it was Henderson who wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull:

I am convinced . . . that the establishment of a Union of World Soviet Socialist Republics is still the ultimate objective of Soviet foreign policy. . . . it is my belief . . . that this objective is a


real one at the present time and is not to be ignored in discussions of Soviet-American relations. (7)

Henderson informed the Secretary in the same message that he believed the Kremlin used its international organizations to take advantage of the rebellious and discontented elements of other nations in order to strengthen the Soviet position in these countries. (8)

Henderson's warning appeared to fall on deaf ears in Washington, and the embassy staff was dismayed when Roosevelt appointed Joseph E. Davies to replace Bullitt as ambassador. They regarded Davies as unqualified for the post and believed that the appointment was politically motivated. They were deeply disappointed that the President seemed to place so little importance on the mission, and some, including Henderson, considered resigning from the foreign service. Henderson decided to remain despite the changes in information analysis and reporting techniques required by the "newspaper image" of Mr. Davies. Choosing to discuss issues with the press rather than his staff, Mr. Davies attempted to make Soviet-American relations appear cordial and to obscure the differences. In addition to the anxiety owing to these policy changes, Henderson became increasingly concerned with


(8) Ibid., p. 313.
Washington's neglect of the embassy. Repeating a common diplomatic grievance, Henderson complained about the reduction of the budget and staff and the insufficient pay of those who remained. (9)

Despite their differences, Henderson and Davies developed a cordial relationship. The same, however, was not true of Henderson's relationship with the Soviets. According to Philip J. Baram, Henderson stated that Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov informed Eleanor Roosevelt that the American charge d'affaires was an obstacle to Soviet-American friendship and urged his removal. Thus, unwelcome in the Soviet Union, Henderson left this distressful situation in March 1938, and shortly thereafter became assistant chief in the Office of European Affairs. His return to Washington did not lessen his concern about the USSR, as his main areas of responsibility was the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In a 1939 memorandum he again commented on what he termed the Soviet "spirit of aggressiveness." As the United States became involved in World War II, Henderson urged the government to look at Soviet-American relations realistically. He pointed out that the Soviets were challenging the independence of Finland, the Baltic States, and Poland. Henderson did not understand how the Roosevelt

(9) See Kennan, Memoirs, pp. 82-83; and Loy Henderson to George S. Messersmith, February 5, 1938, George S. Messersmith File, Container 1, LWH Papers.
Administration could be so blind and compliant with Soviet aggression. (10) Prompted by the attempt of Soviet troops in the Baltic States to install puppet governments, he asked, "Is the Government of the United States to apply certain standards of judgment and conduct to aggression by Germany and Japan which it will not apply to aggression by the Soviet Union? . . ." (11) In the same memorandum, he suggested that United States refusal to acknowledge these Soviet conquests might prove useful when negotiating a settlement for the postwar world. According to Henderson, American communists and liberals viewed his advice "to adopt a firm stand" as an attempt to sabotage presidential policy. Because his views were in disagreement with the administration, Henderson requested transfer from the Soviet field in 1943. (12) Charles Bohlen would later write, "With the departure of Henderson, the Soviet field lost one of its founders,


(11) Henderson Memorandum, July 15, 1940, LWH Papers.

(12) See Henderson Memorandum, July 15, 1940, LWH Papers; Loy Henderson to Blake Ehrlich, March 31, 1948, Israel-Palestine Correspondence File, LWH Papers; and Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 125.
a man who probably did as much for the Foreign Service as any
officer, living or dead." (13)

Removed from the area he knew best, Loy Henderson pro-
ceeded to learn about another part of the world. He accepted
the ranking post of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipo-
tentary to Iraq in July 1943. Although the first state of
the mandated territory to receive independence in 1930, Iraq
was still very much under the influence of Great Britain.
Henderson was quite conscious of British interests in the
Persian Gulf and of the concern which British officials felt
about the growing American influence. He walked a tight
line, strengthening American ties through oil concessions
while not alarming the British. His interests in the area
were more than political, however. During his term in Iraq,
Henderson tried to learn as much as possible about the cul-
tures and religions of this unique group of people. He was
especially interested in the Shias and their beliefs. In the
spring of 1944, Henderson toured the Shia holy cities in an
attempt to better understand the Sunni-Shia schism. (14)

His knowledge of the Near East and its people proved to
be useful in his next assignment. On April 17, 1945, less
than a week after President Roosevelt's death, Henderson

(13) Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 125.

(14) See Don Peretz, The Middle East Today, 3d ed. (New
Henderson to Cordell Hull, March 1944 and May 1944, Iraq
Miscellany File, Container 10, LWH Papers.
became the new Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs. Gordon Merriam, Chief of the Near Eastern Division of NEA, was the logical choice to succeed Wallace Murray, but his tenure in the foreign service was not as long nor his personality as "dynamic" as Henderson's. Murray and Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew held Henderson in high esteem and believed he deserved the appointment. (15)

When Henderson returned to the State Department in the spring of 1945, the United States was in a state of shock over the death of President Roosevelt. For the first time in twelve years, someone new stood at the head of the government at a moment when the nation needed experienced leadership in world affairs. Presidents shape foreign policy, but Harry Truman possessed little experience in such matters. The primary task of the State Department was to provide the new president with the most accurate and up-to-date information on the world situation and United States foreign relations. (16)

During most of the next three years Henderson spent in Washington, the hierarchy of the Department of State consisted of the secretary of state, the under secretary of state, the directors of the territorial offices, the chiefs of the geographical divisions within each territory, and the

(15) Baram, Department of State in Middle East, pp. 77, 92.

country desk officers. The under secretary, especially during the term of Secretary of State George Marshall, was responsible for the day-to-day operations of the department. The General was accustomed to delegating authority as well as seeking advice from subordinates, practices which he brought to the State Department. Marshall also encouraged personnel of the department to anticipate and plan for future events. Henderson acquired this habit early in his career and easily utilized it in his new post. (17)

The Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs was one of the four territorial offices of the Department of State. Each office was responsible for a particular part of the world, assisting the government in the formulation and coordination of United States policies and actions in the specific region. NEA covered an area of thirteen million square miles and included eighteen Near Eastern countries and all but two African nations. The 600 million people ranged from the world's richest to poorest. To handle this vast territory, NEA was divided into three geographical divisions each headed by a Division Chief. Within each division there were "country desks" where concerns were even more specialized. It was imperative that the Director of the Office, the Chiefs of Divisions, and the desk officers understand the govern-

(17) See Interview with Loy W. Henderson, October 15, 1975, Israel-Palestine Correspondence, LWH Papers; and Balfour, The Adversaries, p. 81.
ment's foreign policies both in general and as regarded their special area or country. (18)

This knowledge was necessary to insure the proper handling of all situations from the sublime to the ridiculous, and some of the routine work did seem ridiculous in comparison with the more pressing issues of the day. While Henderson spent the majority of his time on crises in Iran, Turkey, Greece, and Palestine, he also had to tend to the needs of the various diplomatic missions of his territory, including staffing problems, salaries, and housing. Of particular concern to Henderson were the rights of Americans living and traveling abroad, such as the question of whether American citizens should be tried under Saudi Arabian laws. Some issues were of importance to diplomatic relations but were not of the crisis variety. These included such things as the recommendation to elevate the Consulate in Tunisia to a Consulate General and the approval of a visit to the United States by the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. (19)

Henderson had well-developed ideas concerning the nature of American foreign policy and how this policy should be applied to all aspects of diplomatic relations whether large or small. He believed that there were two categories.


of American policies. Long-term policies were stable and permanent, based on lasting American tradition. Short-term policies were extensions of the long-term policies that were formulated to meet specific world situations. He felt that each decision of the State Department should comply with these policies and the will of the American people. Conflict between policy and public opinion should receive the special attention of the Secretary of State and the President. (20)

Henderson believed that the principles embodied in American tradition, rather than shortsighted objectives, should be the basis of United States foreign policy. While he acknowledged the claim of political theorists that blind devotion to principle led to inflexibility and the inability to bargain in foreign relations, Henderson feared the consequences of a policy guided only by opportunism. He stated:

I urge that . . . you bear in mind that if the United States in pursuit of its objectives — regardless how noble these objectives may be — jettisons the principles on which it was founded and on which our democratic and free society is based, we may well dissipate our national purpose and find ourselves helplessly and aimlessly adrift in a sea of opportunism. . . . (21)

Henderson was well aware of the difficulties of pursuing such an idealistic policy in the real world, but he believed that

(20) Henderson, Foreign Policies, pp. 2-5.

choices based on traditional principles and American interests would result in the best foreign policy decisions. It was important, therefore, that the United States persevere in its pursuit of a policy based on principle and not be lulled into destructive compromises due to the weariness brought on by hard negotiations. Such compromises usually resulted in only "an illusory relaxation of tensions." (22)

Henderson realized that it was the President who determined United States foreign policy, based on his foreign relation objectives, the advice of counselors and officials, and subject to Congressional approval and public opinion. Henderson believed, however, that the State Department played a very important and definite role in the formulation of this foreign policy. It was the duty of each territorial office to gather and analyze information from the diplomatic missions and other sources. The Director would then convey his staff's opinion to the Secretary of State. This opinion should be based on a thorough professional assessment of the facts devoid of influence from emotions or political pressures. Henderson felt that the Secretary and President should always receive the department's honest opinions, even if they were contrary to the beliefs of the administration and/or the American public. Foreign Service officers had to perform their duty regardless of criticism. The department,

(22) Carr Lecture, LWH Papers.
however, should implement whatever policy evolved regardless of its compliance with its recommendations, for the department served the President. During the Palestine affair, detailed herein in Chapter IV, critics accused Henderson and NEA of failing to implement properly Truman's Palestine policy. Henderson vigorously denied these charges of disloyalty. (23)

His belief that the gathering of accurate information was vitally important to the territorial offices brought Henderson into rare contention with Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson. In 1946 Acheson supported the Budget Bureau's reorganization plan which called for an Office of Research and Intelligence. Under the new organization, this office would gather and analyze all information and issue information to the geographic offices on request. The primary responsibility of the geographic offices would be to engage in "operations." Henderson and Assistant Secretary for Administration Donald Russell opposed the reorganization. Henderson did not believe that information-gathering should be removed from the geographic offices. These offices were uniquely qualified to analyze information since each had intimate knowledge of the people, culture, and conditions in their countries as well as the diplomatic missions located there. In order for personnel in these offices to perform

(23) See Henderson to Ehrlich, March 31, 1948, LWH Papers; and Carr Lecture, LWH Papers.
their duties, they needed firsthand rather than distilled information, and he believed it was necessary for them to help determine the type of research to be conducted. (24)

Acheson referred to this opposition as "civil disobedience in the State Department," but Secretary of State James F. Byrnes approved Russell's modified reorganization plan, which was acceptable to Henderson and the geographic offices. The Office of Research and Intelligence would carry out its function through new research divisions assigned to each geographic office. Henderson later recalled that its primary function was to coordinate technically the Department's information-gathering as well as to engage in its own research. The new office necessitated the new post of Special Assistant to the Secretary for Research and Intelligence. Acheson, however, disliked the reorganization, and Henderson believed the Under Secretary took advantage of the resignation of Byrnes in 1947 to change the Department's intelligence operation at the expense of the geographic offices. (25)

Henderson behaved in his customary manner during this situation. He gave his honest opinion regardless of the


opposition. According to Henderson, Acheson found his objections disturbing; however, it did not appear to interfere with their working relationship on other issues. Acheson wrote in his memoirs that Henderson was an "entirely loyal and competent officer." (26) As a dedicated State Department official, Acheson probably understood Henderson's compulsion to air his honest beliefs. He depended on Henderson's candor in the early stages of the Cold War.

(26) See Henderson to Satterthwaite, September 13, 1954; and Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 158-161, 170.
CHAPTER II

THE COLD WAR SETTING

1945-1948

In the November 1, 1954, issue of Time, a brief article appeared in the "Foreign Relations" section announcing the presentation of the Distinguished Service Award to Loy Henderson. The title of the article was "Honor for a Cold Warrior." At the height of Cold War rhetoric in the United States, Time portrayed Henderson as a paragon of free world virtues, a fighter for the cause. But what was the cause? What was the Cold War and how did it start?(1)

The label "Cold War" was coined in 1947 by columnist Walter Lippmann to describe the faltering relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The title was unique, but the situation was not. Powerful states have always had difficulty living and working together. Differences in ideology, culture, language, and political goals have invariably led to rivalry and conflict with each side blaming the other. The most obvious difference between the Cold War and history's hot wars was the inconsequence of military encounters, but the other elements of war were present - arms build-up, name-calling, public fear and patri-

(1) "Honor For a Cold Warrior," Time, November 1, 1954, p. 20.
otism. The war, however, did not begin with a single shot heard around the world. Instead it evolved gradually from wartime alliance to postwar hostility. (2)

The early stages of World War II had pointed out the military weakness of the Allies. They needed Soviet help, and it did not come cheaply. Roosevelt followed hopefully a policy of fostering Stalin's personal trust. Henderson cautioned the administration to be wary of Soviet conduct, but there was little sense outside of the State Department that the Soviet Union represented a threat to United States interests and principles. (3) As John L. Gaddis noted, "Through a curious kind of illogic the Russians' vigorously successful resistance to Hitler purified them ideologically in the eyes of Americans." (4) A former member of NEA, John H. Stutesman, Jr., also wrote of American naivete in his 1966 Thesis for the National War College:

To paraphrase a Russian proverb, To get to the other side it is alright to walk over the bridge


(4) Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, p. 33.
postwar world. The dream of a new world order embodied in
the United Nations had been the focus of American postwar
plans. The Soviet Union, however, sought security through
territory and spheres of influence. Unprepared and unsure,
the United States saw another monster threatening the deli-
cate balance and reacted accordingly.(6)

For the second time in less than five years, circum-
stances forced the United States to acknowledge its vulner-
ability. This sense of insecurity was new. Americans had
always felt insulated from world problems. The United States
bothered no one, and no one bothered it. Traditionally Great
Britain had served as the bulwark to any threat from the
Continent. The British Empire kept a watch on the balance of
power, assuring its own safety and that of its friends.

Great Britain's inability to exert a strong influence created
a vacuum in the world power structure that the United States
had to fill in order to prevent what it believed to be the
threat of Soviet expansion.(7) Ambassador W. Averell Harri-
man wrote from Moscow on September 20, 1944, "If the policy

(6) See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Tides of Crisis: A Primer
of Foreign Relations (Westport: Greenwood Press, Publishers,
1975), p. 107; Kennan, American Diplomacy, p. 85; Balfour,
The Adversaries, pp. 12-13; Norman A. Graebner, Cold War
Diplomacy: American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960 (Princeton: D.
Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962), p. 21; Kennan, Realities
of American Foreign Policy, pp. 26-27; Halle, Cold War as
History, pp. 8, 102; and Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, pp.
3, 47-48, 61-62.

(7) Kennan, American Diplomacy, pp. 3-5.
is accepted that the Soviet Union has a right to penetrate her immediate neighbours, penetration of the next immediate neighbour becomes at a certain time equally logical." (8)

The United States perceived the Soviets as a threat to the freedom of their neighbors and to American interests in those areas. In the months immediately following the war, American policy makers had to define concrete American interests and objectives. Truman had told Stalin at Potsdam that America wanted a "free world." This meant a world based on American values, values not compatible with the Soviet system. The principles born of these values, such as self-determination and the Open Door, could not be invoked in areas under Soviet influence, and the United States was not prepared to militarily challenge the Soviet position. These principles, which Henderson believed should be the basis of American foreign policy, blocked compromise and thus became a hindrance at the postwar bargaining tables. (9)

While the perceived Soviet threat drove most American officials toward a more active role in world affairs regardless of how ill-defined, the isolationists called for Ameri-

(8) Balfour, The Adversaries, p. 11.

can withdrawal from the world scene. Still in Congress were Hamilton Fish (Republican - New York) and Louis Ludlow (Democrat - Indiana), among the leading interwar isolationists, while the Chicago Tribune and John O'Donnell of the New York Daily News attacked American interventionist policy in the press. The isolationists believed the "Red Scare" was overblown, being used as an excuse for imperialism. Imperialism was the deadly sin to isolationists, and the devil was Great Britain not the Soviet Union. However, their most prominent spokesman, Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan, officially left the isolationist ranks in early 1945. In a speech before the Senate on January 10, Vandenberg expressed his views on America's place in the world. He cautioned against the deterioration of national defense but also called for a United States-Soviet agreement which would provide the Soviet Union with the security it so desired. The Senator believed a treaty of this type would eliminate the Soviet need for a "circle of buffer states" thus placing the United States in a position to demand that all military gains be subject to postwar revision under the anticipated United Nations. In this way, he believed the United States could resolve its differences with the Soviet Union and take its place in world affairs. There is no evidence that either Roosevelt or Truman seriously considered Vandenberg's suggestion, but this speech placed one of the most influential
members of the Senate on the side of internationalism, a fact which Truman used to his advantage in 1947. (10)

It is doubtful that the isolationists would have prevailed even with the influence of Senator Vandenberg, for the United States was reacting to the new bully on the block. Even staunch isolationists, such as Congressman Ludlow, were slowly changing their views. Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe was not likely to win many friends in the West. Americans viewed Stalin's quest for satellite states around the Soviet Union's borders as a return to the Marxist-Leninist plan of world conquest. George Kennan, Deputy Chief of Mission in Moscow and later head of the Policy Planning Staff, believed that Soviet foreign policy had its roots in communist ideology and history. The seeds of this belief were planted in the 1930s while under Loy Henderson's tutelage at the embassy in Moscow. (11) In his 1947 Foreign Affairs article entitled "The Source of Soviet Conduct" and signed "X," he wrote:

The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the


power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia. (12)

According to Kennan, this ideology preached the hostility of the rest of the world and the duty to destroy these opposing political forces wherever they existed. The communist way was the only way. Although capitalism was sowing the seeds of its own destruction, the Soviets believed they could quicken the process, although there was no need for haste. Since the outcome was inevitable, the Communists could afford to take their time. Kennan saw this unresolvable conflict between communism and capitalism as the major obstacle to Soviet-American relations. Their distrust of all other nations made it impossible for the Soviets to deal honestly, openly, and in good faith. (13)

Henderson shared Kennan's view that it was impossible to negotiate in good faith with the Soviet Union. Henderson's experience in the Baltic States and the Soviet Union taught him to be skeptical in dealing with the Soviets. In studying Soviet agreements, he found that the Kremlin usually failed to keep its promises. Henderson did not believe that the Soviet Union had abandoned what he termed "its basic aggressive objectives." (14)


(13) Ibid., pp. 570-75.

Others, however, disagreed with Kennan's assessment. American columnist Walter Lippmann believed that Stalin was merely continuing a czarist line rather than a new communist line. Like the Russian regimes of old, the Soviet regime sought security in a limited European domain, not world conquest. (15) Louis Halle later wrote, "The behaviour of Russia under the Communists has been Russian behaviour rather than Communist behaviour." (16) According to Halle, fear rather than ambition drove the Russians to expansion. Russia's policies were defensive, therefore, not aggressive. (17) Regardless of the reasons for expansion, whether ideological or practical, the Soviet Union was extending its influence. The result of either motivation was extremely disturbing to the United States.

Heated rhetoric on both sides worsened the situation. In a February 9, 1946 election speech, Stalin took all the credit for the defeat of the Germans, stating that the victory proved the superiority of the Soviet social system. The West viewed this rare radio address as evidence of the Premier's true feelings about Soviet-Western relations. Ken-


(16) Halle, Cold War as History, p. 11.

(17) Ibid., pp. 12, 17.
nan's "Long Telegram" from Moscow on February 22 affirmed this view. Writing a year and a half before his "Mr. X" article, Kennan examined Soviet thought and behavior in an attempt to forecast future Soviet activity and to guide American policy. (18) He wrote that Soviet power was:

Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw - and usually does - when strong resistance is encountered at any point. (19)

Winston Churchill expressed this sentiment publicly in a speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5. In what has become known as the "Iron Curtain Speech," the British Prime Minister described the split that existed in world affairs. He called for the Western democracies to put forth a united front based on military strength in order to insure their security. The response from Moscow was heated as Stalin compared Churchill's views to those of Hitler's on racial superiority. Still not ready to acknowl-


(19) Kennan to Byrnes, February 22, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VI, 707.
edge publicly a get tough policy, the White House disassociated itself from Churchill's views. (20)

By fall the White House Staff added its own voice to the cry for action against communist expansion. In a September 1946 summary of Soviet-American relations, Special Counsel to the President Clark M. Clifford stated that the only way for the United States to insure its future security was to halt further Soviet aggression. He called for a vigorous resistance to Soviet expansion into certain strategic areas. Not only should the United States prepare itself militarily, said Clifford, but it should give assistance to any democratic nation threatened by the Soviet Union in the form of economic aid and political support. Clifford also felt that it was important to win public support for American policies by educating the people on the aims of Soviet policy. (21)

Supporting Henderson's views on the significance of the Near East to United States interests, Clifford called for


specific resistance to Soviet expansion in the area. The State Department's evaluation of the importance of this part of the world emphasized the need for a definite American policy even though it had long been a special British preserve. Henderson and NEA experts believed that the vast oil resources of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula as well as the strategic location of the Northern Tier states (Greece, Turkey, and Iran) were crucial to American security. Russian interest in the area dated back centuries, and the State Department was concerned about Soviet activities in the Northern Tier. If the Soviet Union established a foothold in the area, it could not only shut off Near Eastern oil to the West, but the Soviets could also control the Eastern Mediterranean and South Asia. (22)

Oil and strategic needs were not the only ties between the United States and the Near East. The cultural and religious bonds were also tight, especially with Palestine. The Arab-Jewish conflict heated up as Jewish refugees sought admission to Palestine at the end of the war. This issue caused a split between Henderson's office and the Truman Administration and between the Administration and Great

Britain, the mandatory authority in Palestine. (23) Not only was this a break in the unity which Churchill urged between America and Britain, but it created the type of unstable situation in the Arab world on which the Soviet policy of expansion seemed to thrive.

Soviet actions concerning Iran, Turkey, and Greece in 1946-1947 indicated to American officials that the Soviet Union was not content with its Eastern European buffer. It was in response to these issues that the Truman Administration embarked on a policy of standing firm in the face of Soviet pressure. Kennan had advocated this policy in the Long Telegram, and it was given public airing in his *Foreign Affairs* article. Secretary of State Byrnes called this policy "patience with firmness," but it was in Kennan's article that the strategy was first given the name "containment." (24)

Kennan stated:

... Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy. . . . (25)

American foreign policy finally took shape in Kennan's containment concept. European recovery programs such as the

---


Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were attempts by the United States not only to bolster sagging economies but to show that free enterprise and democracy were a better alternative than Soviet communism. Henderson constantly urged the use of economic assistance to achieve security goals, a policy which enabled the United States to avoid the criticisms which would have come with a direct military response. (26)

This policy also had its critics. Even before the Truman Doctrine, the Soviet Union had opposed what it believed to be American expansion into areas which bordered it or its satellites. The Soviets felt threatened by American attempts to exert influence in Iran and Turkey. Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace pointed out that the Soviet position among her neighbors was similar to the relation between the United States and Latin America. It was thus up to the United States to seek understanding and cooperation with the Soviet Union. The Secretary's public criticism of

administration policy in a speech on September 12, 1946, led Truman to ask for his resignation. (27) Walter Lippmann also spoke out against confrontation as the only answer. Lippmann doubted that true cooperation was possible, but he suggested that "an accommodation, a modus vivendi" was preferable. (28)

Loy Henderson rejected both accommodation and cooperation with the Soviet Union. He stated in 1962:

... we have uniformly discovered that our flexibility and willingness to accommodate have tended only to strengthen the prestige and international position of the Soviet Union and to weaken our own. (29)

Henderson did not reach this conclusion hastily, as he was well-informed in Communist ideology and tactics. Among his personal papers is a worn copy of the Theses and Statutes on the Third (Communist) International adopted in 1920. As Henderson saw it, the Cold War was the struggle between the free world led by the United States and the Communist aggressor led by the Soviet Union. (30) Gaddis wrote, "American


(29) Carr Lecture, LWH Papers.

(30) See printed material, Communism File, Container 6, LWH Papers; and Carr Lecture, LWH Papers.
leaders did not want a Cold War, but they wanted insecurity even less."(31) The struggle for security and American interests in the Near East dominated Henderson's policy considerations during his tenure as Director of NEA.

(31) Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, p. 353.
When Loy Henderson took the position of Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs in April 1945, he brought with him twenty-five years of experience, but only two of these years had been spent in Near Eastern affairs. Fortunately, the Director was able to rely on an experienced staff. Knowing he was not an expert on the area, he listened to those on his staff who had the expertise which he lacked. The Near East was not the focus of world attention in early 1945. The devastation in Western Europe and the fate of Germany and Eastern Europe dominated the postwar scene. Henderson, however, realized the importance of the Near East to peace and security, and he was determined to keep the Near East free of Soviet dominance. (1)

As he did with all diplomatic questions, Loy Henderson looked at the situation in the Near East in light of American interests and the American policy of maintaining world peace. He tried persistently to persuade the administration that the Near East was as important to the United States as Eastern Europe. Henderson pointed to the strategic value of the Near

East as the highway which linked three continents and to the natural resources of the area, most especially oil. In addition the Director of NEA noted the weakening of Near Eastern-Western European ties as well as growing discontent among dissatisfied citizens. These factors along with the ravages of the war caused great instability in the area and opened the door for the spread of international communism or more specifically, Soviet aggression. Henderson viewed the situation in the Near East as a threat to world peace and called on the United States and the other powers to reach an agreement on the area. He realized, however, that the likelihood of achieving an understanding was slim due to the conflicting interests each power had in the region. (2)

The end of World War II brought these conflicting interests sharply into focus. The world was divided into spheres of influence, and Eastern Europe was solidly in the Soviet camp. Henderson and NEA were concerned with this division of the world into opposing sides, but they believed that Soviet aggression made it inevitable. It was thus necessary for the United States to insure its own position. NEA emphasized the strategic importance to American security of Greece and

(2) See Loy W. Henderson, "American Political and Strategic Interests in the Middle East and Southeastern Europe," The Department of State Bulletin, 23 November 1947, pp. 996-99; and Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, James Dunn, and John Hickerson, undated, FRUS, 1946, VII, 4-6.
Turkey, the only two countries which blocked the Soviet Union's total control of the Eastern Mediterranean. Henderson and Near Eastern experts believed that it was contrary to United States interests for this strategic and petroleum laden area to fall under Soviet domination. (3)

In a report prepared by the Coordinating Committee of the Department of State, entitled "American Economic Policy in the Middle East," Henderson and the other committee members called for an active Near Eastern economic policy. The extension of credit and removal of trade restrictions along with technical assistance would aid the United States in achieving its political objectives in the area. These objectives included peace, security, stability, and the assurance of political freedom to choose their own way of life. Raising the standard of living in these countries would eliminate economic discontent and reduce the attraction of the Soviet Union. It was also important for the United States to ease Near Eastern fears of Western imperialism. Gordon Merriam, Chief of the Near Eastern Division of NEA, wrote in a draft memorandum to President Truman that it was imperative for the United States not to make the same mistakes as Great Britain. American policy should emphasize

(3) Henderson to Acheson, October 21, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VII, 241-42.
the development of the native peoples, not the economic interest of the United States.(4)

Henderson agreed that loans for construction and development were the best way to boost American prestige. The Director of NEA viewed the extension of credits to deserving nations as an "important diplomatic weapon." He felt that the financial commitment was justified since the region was rapidly becoming a major political issue. Even though Henderson realized that economic aid alone would not be enough to win the political struggle in the Near East, he believed it could yield certain diplomatic gains.(5)

Henderson's battle to gain administration support for a more active American role in the Northern Tier proved difficult, as administration officials viewed the area as part of the British sphere and thus advocated that the United States stay out of the affairs of these countries. In addition many within the government still looked on Germany as the enemy and the Soviet Union as the ally. Henderson, however, continued to press for a stronger American presence in the Near East. In Merriam's memorandum prepared for the President, NEA stressed the need to restore Near Eastern stability. It


(5) Henderson to Acheson, Dunn, and Hickerson, undated, FRUS, 1946, VII, 8-9.
stated that British and French failure to raise the people from poverty and disease provided the Soviets an opportunity to take advantage of the situation. It particularly emphasized the perils to Western interests of Soviet designs on Turkey and the continued presence of World War II Soviet occupation forces in Iran. (6)

In late 1945 Truman agreed that the Near East deserved a more prominent position in foreign policy considerations. Accordingly, policy formulation for the Northern Tier passed to the capable control of Dean Acheson and Loy Henderson. These State Department veterans shared the view that since the region was vital to the United States, the administration should stand firm against the Soviet Union. This view prevailed when the Northern Tier became a main target of Soviet activity in 1945-1946. Acheson and Henderson skillfully guided the formulation of a definite Near Eastern policy. (7)

Iran was the first Northern Tier country to feel the pressure of Soviet-American antagonism. Called "a classic case of competition for spheres of influence," the Iran crisis of 1945-1946 centered on four questions: the removal of foreign troops from Iran, oil concessions, the political

(6) See Kuniholm, Cold War in Near East, pp. 242-44, 397-98; and Merriam to Truman draft, August 1945, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 45-46.

(7) Kuniholm, Cold War in Near East, pp. 242-44.
influence of the United States and Great Britain in Tehran, and Soviet activity in the northern province of Azerbaijan. (8)

The issue of oil concessions caused tension as early as September 1944. Realizing that the United States and Great Britain were nearing agreement with the Iranian government for oil concessions in the country's southeast, the Soviet Union demanded exclusive rights to the oil and mineral deposits in the north. The Iranian government's alarm at the Soviet demand moved the parliament to terminate all negotiations for oil concessions to foreign governments. (9)

Their demands thwarted, the Soviets proceeded to fuel growing discontent in Azerbaijan and among the Kurds. The USSR supported the Kurd independence movement, and Soviet troops in northern Iran refused to intervene while restricting Iranian troop movement into the Soviet zone. Fearful of losing the north, Iran expressed concern to the State Department, but the United States chose not to interfere, suggesting that Iran and the Soviet Union negotiate their differences. Believing that their internal turmoil was due to the presence of foreign troops, the Iranians requested the early withdrawal of Soviet, British, and American forces. In June 1945 the United States and Great Britain obligingly agreed to

(8) Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, pp. 177-78.
(9) Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 50-53.
begin partial withdrawal of troops eight months before the March 2, 1946 date established by the 1942 Tripartite Treaty of Alliance between Iran, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. (10)

The Soviets were not so accommodating, and Loy Henderson became increasingly concerned about the Iranian situation. In an August 1945 memorandum to Secretary of State Byrnes, he identified the two main problems: the traditional rivalry between Great Britain and the USSR for supremacy and the growing instability of Iranian internal affairs. The problems of the Iranian government reached the crisis point in Azerbaijan. Strapped in poverty and neglected by Tehran, the province's communist-led Tudeh Party called for autonomy and in September formed the National Government of Azerbaijan. With apparent Soviet backing, the nationalists revolted against the central government in November 1945. Soviet troops prevented the Iranian army from entering the province to suppress the rebellion. (11) United States Ambassador Wallace Murray reported to the Secretary of State, "There is no question but that Russians are interfering with all defense measures taken by Iranians in north and it

(10) See correspondence between American Embassy in Iran and the State Department, February through June 1945, FRUS, 1945, VII, 362-380.

(11) See Loy Henderson to James Byrnes, August 23, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 398; Feis, Trust to Terror, pp. 63, 66; and Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 50-53.
seems reasonable supposition that they are actually directing planned military campaign."(12)

Iran formally complained about Soviet actions to the United Nations in January 1946. Resolving that both sides were willing to negotiate a settlement, the Security Council suggested that Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam visit Moscow to negotiate with Stalin and Molotov. According to the Iranian Foreign Office, the main Soviet aims in Iran were oil concessions in the north, internal as well as international transport rights, and a special position at the Caspian Sea port of Pahlavi, which had been controlled by Russia prior to 1921. In addition Stalin told Qavam that Tehran must recognize Azerbaijan's autonomy. These conditions were unacceptable to Iran as it feared these concessions would lead to loss of sovereignty. Qavam thus brought the matter before the Security Council again in late March.(13)

In the meantime, the March 2 deadline for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran passed. Great Britain and the United States, adhering to the 1942 treaty, evacuated their remaining troops. The Soviet Union refused to comply with the treaty until they received a satisfactory agreement on oil concessions. Reports that Soviet troops were moving south

(12) Ambassador Wallace Murray (Iran) to James Byrnes, November 28, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 464.

(13) See Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 50-53; Ambassador Murray to Byrnes, November 26, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 456; and Feis, Trust to Terror, pp. 69-70, 81.
toward Tehran and Turkey further aggravated the situation. The Soviets defended their presence on the grounds that the hostility of the Iranian government threatened Soviet oil fields in Baku and that the 1921 treaty gave them the right to intervene in Iran's internal affairs if conditions warranted. The United States called these claims absurd since the 1921 treaty only permitted intervention if there was a threat from a third power. (14)

While the Security Council considered the Iranian complaint, negotiations continued in Tehran between the Soviet ambassador and Qavam. They announced an accord on April 5, 1946 that provided for Soviet troop withdrawal and the formation of a Soviet-Iranian oil company. The Soviet agreement that Azerbaijan was an Iranian internal problem further diffused the Russo-Iranian crisis. Conclusion of the accord with the Soviets prompted the Iranian government to withdraw its complaint to the Security Council on April 15. (15)

The crisis in Iran appeared to be over. "However," wrote Dean Acheson, "in the Near East things are not always what they seem." (16) By October 1946 the Iranian government

---


became nervous again and sought assistance from the United States. The Iranian ambassador informed Loy Henderson that his government was at a crossroads and felt pressure to follow the Soviet line despite popular opposition to this course. Henderson recommended to Acheson that the United States offer Iran economic and political aid to protect her sovereignty. In keeping with his earlier proposals, the Director of NEA suggested this assistance include development loans and combat supplies for internal security. (17) A memorandum prepared on October 18, 1946 by Henderson and his staff for Secretary of State Byrnes stated NEA's view of the importance of Iran:

In brief, the Iranian question transcends the mere bilateral relations between Iran and the United States. Politically, it involves our policy of supporting the independence of small countries in the spirit of the United Nations. Strategically, it involves the defense of our military interests in the entire Near and Middle Eastern area. . . . Both the political and strategic aspects of this problem are an integral part of the broader question of United States relations with the Soviet Union. (18)

Armed with the assurance of United States economic and combat aid, the Iranian army moved against the rebels in Azerbaijan in November 1946. Believing it had obtained the desired oil concessions, the Soviet Union had withdrawn its

(17) See Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, October 8, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VII, 523-24; and Feis, Trust to Terror, p. 86.

(18) "Implementation of United States Policy Toward Iran," prepared by NEA, October 18, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VII, 535.
troops. The rebels were on their own, and the northern province once again returned to the rule of Tehran. The Iranian government and American Ambassador George Allen agreed that the swift victory in Azerbaijan resulted from the recognition of all concerned that Iranian sovereignty enjoyed United States support. (19)

American influence was apparent again in October 1947 when Ambassador Allen persuaded the Iranian parliament to reject the oil concession agreement with the Soviet Union, leaving the Soviets with neither the coveted oil nor the northern province. The outcome of events in Iran gave credence to the belief that a strong American position could contain Soviet expansion. Supporters of the theory of containment and the Truman Doctrine later pointed to the success in Iran when opponents questioned their views. (20)

Not all factions of the American government supported the American position in Iran. Isolationists did not see the need to confront the Soviet Union over this affair. They did not believe that the USSR posed a direct threat to the United States, and they distrusted British "aggression" more than Soviet. New York Republican Representative Hamilton Fish asserted that Soviet claims in Iran were as valid as those of the British. American protests of Soviet aggression while

(19) See Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, p. 181; and Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 198.

(20) Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, pp. 182-83.
accepting British colonialism brought charges by the Chicago Tribune that the United States was living by a double standard. (21)

The United States had gained confidence in get-tough measures, however, and from 1945 to 1947 the Truman Administration followed the advice of Henderson and Acheson and stood in firm opposition to Soviet aims in Turkey. While Iranian sovereignty was needed to insure the continued flow of Persian Gulf oil, Turkish sovereignty was of even greater value to United States security. Situated between the Balkans and the Middle East and between the Mediterranean and Black Seas, Turkey's strategic importance was second to none. This firmly anti-Soviet country provided a barrier to Soviet expansion and could serve as a base for major military operations if armed conflict occurred. Turkey's apparent political and economic stability, a rarity in this area of growing unrest, further enhanced its importance. The Departments of State, War, and Navy believed that the loss of Turkey to the Soviet Union would lead ultimately to Soviet control in Greece and the Near and Middle East. Such a shift in the

(21) Doenecke, Not to the Swift, p. 63.
balance of power toward the USSR was unacceptable. (22) A 1946 memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated:

[...]

The Soviets had raised the issue of control of the Dardanelles even before World War II ended. The 1936 Montreux Convention, the most recent Strait's agreement, which gave Turkey exclusive control of the Straits in time of war as well as the right to fortify them, placed the Soviet Union in a precarious position during the war. Turkey, as a non-belligerent, allowed the Germans access to the Straits, and Stalin rightly felt threatened. The United States and Great Britain agreed that revisions to the Montreux Convention were justifiable, but Soviet demands were too high. Not only did they want the Straits under joint control of the Black Sea powers (USSR and Turkey), but they also sought boundary changes through the annexation of the former Russian dis-

---


(23) Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of War Patterson and Secretary of Navy Forrestal, August 23, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VII, 858.
tracts of Kars and Ardahan and the establishment of a base in Turkey. The Turks, firmly opposed to Soviet interference, reacted to the demands by strengthening their army. (24)

On August 24, 1945, the Turkish ambassador expressed to Henderson his concern about apparent American disinterest in the Soviet demands, but the State Department's proposals of September 3 for modification of the Montreux Convention did not ease Turkish fears. (25) Turkey was concerned with the build up of Soviet troops in the Balkans, especially in Romania and Bulgaria, but the United States believed the action was merely part of the Soviet war of nerves and advised the Turks to remain calm. In late October 1945 the United States sent its proposals on the modification of the Montreux Convention to Ankara. The Turkish government accepted the proposals in principle, but it felt the point calling for free passage of warships of all Black Sea powers posed a definite security threat since it was the only non-Soviet satellite on the Black Sea. The Turkish government feared that the Black Sea would become a Soviet naval base. The Soviets, however, rejected the proposals, claiming they did not provide ade-

(24) See Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, pp. 190-91; Feis, Trust to Terror, p. 179; Ambassador Harriman to Edward Stettinius, March 21, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 1220; Ambassador Steinhardt (Turkey) to Stettinius, March 22 and 31, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 1224, 1230; and Ambassador Winant (United Kingdom) to Stettinius, June 14, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 1235.

(25) For details of American proposals see Byrnes to President Truman, September 3, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 1242-45.
quate security for the USSR, and they continued to favor a bilateral agreement with Turkey. (26)

In the early months of 1946, Soviet rhetoric and propaganda combined with the situation in Iran to heighten tension in Ankara. The rumor of Soviet troop movement from Iran to Turkey resulted in the United States sending a small force, headed by the **U.S.S. Missouri**, to Istanbul in March. Ignoring this display of "toughness," the Soviet Union continued to pressure the Turkish government. On August 7, 1946 Dean Acheson learned of additional Soviet demands. Although making concession to the American call for universal commercial access to the Straits, the Soviets advocated a joint defense of the Dardanelles with Turkey. Acheson and the State Department concluded that such an arrangement would result in Soviet occupation of Turkey. (27) John L. Gaddis wrote of this conclusion, "The real problem was that American leaders, by the summer of 1946, simply were no longer willing to trust the Russians." (28) President Truman expressed this distrust

(26) See Ambassador Wilson (Turkey) to Byrnes, October 27 and November 12, 1945, *FRUS, 1945, VIII, 1260-61, 1275; Byrnes to Wilson, October 30, 1945, *FRUS, 1945, VIII, 1266; British Embassy to State Department, August 28 and November 5, 1945, *FRUS, 1945, VIII, 1241-42, 1273; Winant to Byrnes, November 16, 1945, *FRUS, 1945, VIII, 1279-80; memorandum of conversation between Turkish Ambassador and Henderson, August 24, 1945, *FRUS, 1945, VIII, 1240.


in his memoirs:

We had learned from the experience of the past two years that Soviet intervention inevitably meant Soviet occupation and control. To allow Russia to set up bases in the Dardanelles or to bring troops into Turkey, ostensibly for the defense of the straits, would, in the natural course of events, result in Greece and the whole Near and Middle East falling under Soviet control. (29)

Loy Henderson suggested to Acheson that the United States government issue a warning to the Soviets and prepare to support Turkey militarily if the Soviets attacked. On August 15, Henderson and Acheson visited the White House where they made the recommendation to President Truman. (30) The departments of State, War, and Navy, along with the Chiefs of Staff, recommended to the President that the United States stand firm in its call for international control and Turkish defense of the Straits. After Truman's concurrence, Washington informed Moscow on August 19. Once more a stand-firm policy proved effective. (31)

Loy Henderson and the staff of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs had the responsibility of forming a detailed Turkish-American policy. Even though Turkey was the strongest, most stable country of the area, Henderson real-


(30) A draft of the proceedings in the President's office can be found in the Turkey File, Container 13, LWH Papers. Truman is referred to as "Mr. Smith."

(31) See Feis, Trust to Terror, p. 181; and Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 62-63.
ized that Turkey alone was no match for the Soviet Union. NEA recommended diplomatic, moral, economic, and military support for Turkey, even calling for the United States to supply military equipment, either through Great Britain or directly, if the British were unable to do so. (32)

Greece, the third country of the Northern Tier, presented the United States with a more complex policy problem. It had been invaded by both the Italians and the Germans during World War II. At the conclusion of four merciless years of occupation, Greece was in political and economic ruins. The withdrawal of the Germans, though, did not bring an end to the strife. By December 1944 a civil war raged between the leftwing resistance fighters and the British-supported rightwing government. Retreating to the hill regions, the rebels, calling themselves the National Liberation Front (EAM), carried on a guerrilla war with the aid and protection of the communist regimes of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. (33)

The antagonism between Greece and these three nations was not merely the result of the normal capitalist-communist distrust. As a result of long-standing disputes in these


(33) See Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, p. 183; and Feis, Trust to Terror, p. 175.
recently formed nations, Greece coveted territory in all, and all coveted territory in Greece. Greece, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia claimed the Macedonian region, while the Epirus region was the bone of contention between Greece and Albania. Each side accused the other of atrocities and border violations. The United States did not support Greek territorial claims, feeling that Greece could obtain nothing strategically or politically important in these areas. A Greek victory in these disputes, however, would probably invite Soviet intervention on behalf of her communist brothers.\(^{(34)}\)

Greek internal affairs were in a state of chaos even without these border disputes. The government was floundering, the British were desperately trying to maintain their influence, and the economy was in ruins. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Greek government sought financial assistance from the United States. The United States could not support the EAM because of its sizeable communist element, yet the repressive government was in complete opposition to American democratic principles. Henderson believed that the Greek crisis was a threat to world peace and a potential threat to United States security. As the only non-communist Balkan country, Greece was critical to the United States position in the area. Henderson and NEA urged inter-

\(^{(34)}\) See "Greek territorial claims and other problems in relations between Greece and neighboring countries of interest to the United States," September 1944 - December 1945, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 300-58.
nal reforms in Greece as a prerequisite to American assistance, and the Director warned the Greek embassy that government moderation was imperative to maintain United States support. (35)

Increased guerrilla activity, caused by the return of King George II in the fall of 1946, brought renewed pleas for United States assistance. The inefficient Greek government was unable to decide how to spend a twenty-five million dollar loan from the Export-Import Bank in January 1946; therefore, the State Department was reluctant to discuss further aid. The belief that Greece was the object of Soviet aggression, however, persuaded Byrnes and Acheson to listen to the request of the Greek economic mission. Once more the administration pointed to reform as the condition for increased assistance. (36)

The threats along the border combined with food shortages and rampant inflation to create a perilously unstable situation by late 1946. The United States, therefore, sent an economic mission to Greece in January 1947, led by Paul A. Porter, to evaluate the state of affairs. The mission

(35) See Greek Ambassador Diamantopoulos to President Taylor of the Export-Import Bank, August 20, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 234; Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, p. 185; and memorandum of conversation between Greek Charge Gouras and Loy Henderson, September 5, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VII, 200.

(36) See Feis, Trust to Terror, p. 177; Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 198; and Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, p. 187.
reported that Greece immediately needed extensive United States economic and military assistance and that an American mission rather than the Greek government should administer this aid in Greece. (37)

In constant communication with the American Embassy in Athens, Loy Henderson realized that the Greek crisis was becoming more acute even prior to the report of the Porter mission. In October 1946 Henderson proposed to Byrnes and Acheson a United States policy for Greece. After summarizing Greece's internal and border problems and the importance of Greece to the United States, the Director of NEA urged a policy of political and economic assistance before civil war erupted. He suggested that military aid might be necessary if the British were unable to continue to provide the equipment necessary for the Greek government to maintain internal order and territorial integrity. (38)

The State Department feared that an economically depressed Great Britain would be unable to meet its obligations in Greece. Greece had been under British protection since it won its independence in 1829 and for more than a century stood along with the other Northern Tier countries as a barrier to Russian designs in the Near and Middle East. Although American and British interests were similar in the

(37) Jones, *Fifteen Weeks*, pp. 74-76.

(38) Loy Henderson to James Byrnes and Dean Acheson, October 21, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, VII, 240-44.
Northern Tier, the State Department believed the area was a British responsibility. Under Henderson's direction, NEA followed a policy of working in alliance with the British against the Soviet Union. (39)

The United States viewed the presence of British troops in Greece and the British support of the Greek government as the only elements of stability in the otherwise chaotic Greek situation. Great Britain, however, was on the brink of financial disaster. The biting winter of 1947 brought such severe fuel shortages that the British economy all but ground to a halt. This occurred at a time when Great Britain was already in financial trouble due to heavy expenditures on the postwar Continent. The State Department learned on February 3, 1947 that the British government had decided to remove its troops from Greece. This was followed on February 20 by information from the American embassy in London that the British might also end financial assistance to Greece. Acheson and Henderson uneasily noted these developments. (40)

The British government interpreted American interest in and aid to Greece to mean that the United States was commit-


(40) See Truman, Memoirs, 2:98-99; Jones, Fifteen Weeks, p. 75; Hammond, Cold War Years, p. 20; and Balfour, The Adversaries, p. 47.
ted to protecting Anglo-American interests in the country. British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, and other officials assumed that the United States would fulfill Britain's role when it withdrew. Although this was a logical assumption, the United States was not as anxious to assume this responsibility as the British government thought. The United States was hesitant to make such a large financial commitment, yet to do nothing would mean the loss of Greece and the Northern Tier to the Soviet sphere of influence. (41)

The possibility that all opposition to Soviet expansion into the Near East might disappear became a major concern to Loy Henderson. Despite his support of the United Nations principles, he doubted its ability to maintain world peace. He would later recall his lack of faith in the "U.N. boys." Henderson thus felt that the United States must stand against the aims of the Soviet Union in the Northern Tier. On February 20, 1947, Henderson sent a memorandum to Dean Acheson entitled "Crisis and Imminent Possibility of Collapse," which Acheson edited and forwarded to the Secretary of State. In this document, the Director of NEA spelled out the problems in Greece and the importance of Greece to the non-communist world. He recommended reorganization of the Greek government into a national coalition of "loyal Greek parties" and reforms in the corrupt civil service aided by American and

(41) See Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, p. 186; and Reitzel, The Mediterranean, p. 89.
British experts. To help Greece with these necessary changes, Henderson proposed that the United States extend economic and military aid. Citing the inability of the British government to provide the necessary funds or military equipment, he recommended a direct Congressional loan and prompt military assistance. (42) Henderson concluded:

> Under present arrangements Greece will receive neither adequate economic aid from the United States nor adequate military aid from Britain.

> We recommend reconsideration of our policy and decision to assist Greece with military equipment. (43)

As a result of this memorandum, the newly appointed Secretary of State George Marshall instructed Acheson on the morning of February 21, 1947, to prepare a bill for Congress to provide a direct loan to Greece. In addition, he instructed the department to seek executive clearance for the transference of military equipment to this embattled Balkan nation. Acheson concurred with Marshall's directives. He was well aware of the grave economic situation in Greece and the problem of Communist insurgents; however, he believed there was still time to implement a favorable solution. (44)

---


(44) Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 4, 131.
Time ran out several hours later when the British Ambassador telephoned the department requesting an immediate appointment with the Secretary of State. In the Secretary's absence, Dean Acheson dealt with the delicate crisis. A call to the British embassy disclosed that Lord Inverchapel, the British Ambassador, had two notes dealing with a British decision to stop aid to Greece and Turkey which he wished to present to the Secretary of State. Acheson arranged for Loy Henderson and John D. Hickerson, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs, to receive copies of the notes. Since Hickerson had a previous appointment, Henderson met alone with H. M. Sichel, First Secretary of the British embassy, who presented copies of the two documents. (45)

Despite the Department's awareness of the British economic situation, officials were not prepared for the content of the memoranda. As Dean Acheson wrote, "They were shockers." (46) Although neither was long, their content was overwhelming. Recounting the financial, political, and military crisis in Greece, the first note informed the United States that British financial support of Greek armed forces would terminate on March 31 and urged the United States to decide whether it could assume the financial responsibi-

---

(45) Jones, *Fifteen Weeks*, pp. 4-5.

lity. (47) It went on to state:

Since, however, the United States Government have indicated the very great importance which they attach to helping Greece, His Majesty’s Government trust that the United States Government may find it possible to afford financial assistance to Greece on a scale sufficient to meet her minimum needs, both civil and military. (48)

The note on Greece concluded with the hope that the United States would respond favorably to this position. (49)

The memorandum on Turkey was even briefer. Even though the Turkish situation was not as critical as that in Greece, the British felt that Turkey would not be able to carry out needed plans for both economic development and military reorganization without foreign aid. Since Great Britain was in no position to provide further financial assistance, Turkey would have to look to the United States. The note suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the United States and Great Britain consider measures for the improvement of the Turkish armed forces and means for financing such a program. (50)

Henderson immediately realized the significance of the notes. With the British withdrawal from Greece and Turkey,
it appeared that Great Britain was reducing its role in world affairs and was asking the United States to take over the job. No area was of greater importance to Western security than Greece and Turkey. The United States was now faced with a dilemma. Historically, the American government was reluctant to involve the nation in international commitments, but the abandonment of Greece meant the vital Near and Middle East would be lost to the Soviet sphere of influence. (51)

The facts of the British memoranda were not new to the State Department, but the United States suddenly confronted a six weeks deadline to shape a policy. Henderson immediately went to see Dean Acheson to discuss the British notes. Acheson agreed that the United States had to act quickly, but only Congress could grant the large level of funds necessary to provide adequate aid to Greece and Turkey. To NEA the situation was clear. Either give the needed assistance to Greece and Turkey, or accept Soviet domination of the Near and Middle East. For Henderson and Acheson there was only one decision, and the State Department had to execute that decision immediately. Acheson asked Henderson to mobilize his staff in order to prepare a policy statement on the Greek-Turkish situation for the Secretary of State by Monday. He also instructed the Director to show him the NEA memoran-

dum upon its completion. With this charge Loy Henderson took
the lead in preparing a program to aid these nations. (52)

Henderson assembled his best qualified staff, including
Henry Villard, Jack Jernigan, and William Baxter. Working
under Henderson's direction nearly around the clock from Fri-
day evening through Sunday morning, these men prepared a
position document entitled, "Position and Recommendations of
the Department of State Regarding Immediate and Substantial
Aid to Greece and Turkey." The paper made clear the depart-
ment's conviction that the United States should accept the
new responsibility and alleviate the crisis in Greece. Hen-
derson recommended that the departments of State, War, Navy,
and Treasury discuss the Greek-Turkish affair and present
their findings to the President. A consensus of need for aid
would necessitate consultation with Congressional leaders and
drafting of legislation. The paper also recommended advising
the American people of the grave state of affairs in Greece
and Turkey. (53) John H. Stutesman wrote of Henderson's
influence on the memorandum:

(52) See Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 7-8, 131; Kuniholm,
Cold War in Near East, pp. 7-8, 10; and Henderson to Kennan
(draft), April 2, 1967, LWH Papers. Henderson's account of
the weekend of February 21-23 does not always agree with that
of Jones. Where discrepancies occur, Henderson's version has
been used.

(53) See Henderson to Kennan (draft), April 2, 1967, LWH
Papers; Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, undated, FRUS, 1947,
V, 52-55; and Stutesman Thesis, LWH Papers.
Drafting the President's speech proved to be a difficult assignment. Loy Henderson, Gordon Merriam, and Joseph Jones drafted preliminary versions of the message. Although none became the final message, Acheson now had a valuable guide. The Under Secretary of State personally presided over a drafting conference on March 4 but chose Jones to prepare the final message. In preparing the speech and legislation, Jones and Acheson chose to minimize the questions of national security and military aid, since the department did not want to alarm the American people. Instead the draft emphasized the economic issues. (56)

When Dean Acheson and George Marshall met with President Truman and Congressional leaders, the Secretary of State presented the State Department's draft and explanation. Sensing they were not impressed, Acheson proceeded to recount instances of Soviet aggression in the Near East and the threat of Soviet influence spreading to other areas. The Under Secretary's remarks persuaded Senator Arthur Vandenberg, and he agreed to support the program. According to Acheson, Vandenberg stated, "Mr. President, if you will say that to the Congress and the country, I will support you and I believe that most of its members will do the same." (57) Despite his dislike of "crisis diplomacy," the Senator

---


believed that American self-interest should be coupled with positive action. A broader scope also appealed to the President who thought the State Department’s draft sounded like an "investment prospectus." Mr. Truman and Clark Clifford edited the speech to place its emphasis on the broad issues of world affairs. (58)

During the weeks of preparation, Henderson kept the Greek government abreast of developments. On February 28, he informed the Greek Charge d’Affaires, Paul Economou-Gouras, of the British retrenchment and of the intention of the United States to offer substantial assistance. Henderson helped Economou-Gouras draft a request for aid on behalf of the Greek government so that the United States could avoid the appearance of interfering in the internal affairs of a foreign state. The extent of the United States investment meant, however, that the American government would interfere considerably in Greek internal affairs. Henderson underscored the necessity for the complete cooperation of the Greek government. On March 10, the Director of NEA expressed optimism to the Charge d’Affaires that the bill for Greek aid would receive Congressional approval despite the growing

feeling that the United Nations, rather than a single nation, should act on this matter. (59)

The situation in Turkey was not quite as clear cut. Acheson suggested that Henderson meet with George Kennan, then serving as Faculty Advisor at the National War College, in order to obtain his ideas on the situation in Turkey and Greece. Kennan supported Greek aid, but he believed that assistance to Turkey could possibly lead to armed conflict with the Soviet Union. Henderson, however, felt that ignoring Turkish needs would be demoralizing enough to the Turks to move them to give up their anti-Soviet stand. Even though Turkey's internal affairs were relatively stable, department officials were alarmed over the consequences of possible Soviet control in Turkey. The country would be dangerously weakened by its military expenses if American assistance did not fill the void of British withdrawal. Kennan apparently shared his concerns with Acheson, but Turkey remained a part of the program. (60)


Even though assistance to Turkey remained in the proposed aid program, it did not include aid for Iran, the third country of the Northern Tier. Henderson had given consideration to including Iran in the NEA proposal, but he abandoned the idea since the British had not mentioned that they were relinquishing their role in Iran. He was keenly aware of British possessiveness of the Persian Gulf region from his service in Iraq. The State Department decided that there was no immediate threat to Iran's independence internally or externally, and that Congress might be reluctant enough to aid the hard pressed Greeks and Turks. Henderson encouraged Iran, however, to seek credit through ordinary channels. (61)

Thus with Turkey in and Iran out, President Harry Truman delivered his address to a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947. Robert J. Donovan called it "probably the most enduringly controversial speech that has been made by a president in the twentieth century." (62) According to Daniel Yergin, "... it was deliberately written as a 'sales job.' ... the All-out speech represented a deliberate effort to create a public consensus for the private beliefs within the

(61) See Kuniholm, Cold War in Near East, p. 409; memorandum of conversation between Loy Henderson and Gholam Aram (Iranian Embassy), April 14, 1947, FRUS, 1947, V, 905.

Administration." (63) John Gaddis concisely called the speech "a form of shock therapy." (64) Truman set the tone in the first few sentences when he maintained that the situation involved national security as well as foreign policy. He explained the Greek crisis in vivid terms and the urgent need for a United States response due to the pending British withdrawal. The President avoided mention of the Greek government's problems, while emphasizing its democratic aims. His reference to Turkey was brief, merely stating that Turkey needed United States assistance in order to maintain its national integrity. He set the price of peace and security at four hundred million dollars. The remainder of the President's address placed the Greek and Turkish situations into the perspective of world affairs. (65) Truman said:

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. . . . One way of life is based upon the will of the majority. . . . The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. . . . I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. (66)

There were thus two main themes in President Truman's speech. One dealt with the foreign economic responsibilities

---


(64) Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, p. 351.


(66) Ibid., pp. 178-79.
of the United States, and the other expressed American concern over the spread of totalitarianism, more specifically communism. This emphasis led many to view the speech as a commitment to help all free nations resist communism. (67)

Reactions to President Truman's address were numerous and varied. Greece, of course, had been waiting anxiously for promised United States assistance, but Turkey was somewhat surprised by the urgency of the President's comments. Although it welcomed aid in improving its armed forces, some Turkish officials feared it would lead to American intervention in Turkish internal affairs. There was also concern about the vagueness of the American commitment to Turkey and how long the financial aid would last. Despite some apprehension Turkey was pleased with the security that arose from association with the United States. (68)

European reaction was mixed. In Great Britain the Foreign Office was elated, but the Labour Party government accused the United States of attempting to establish an empire. Most European leaders saw the program as an extension of American influence, but they differed in their feelings about this occurrence. Generally, those seeking an obstacle to Soviet expansion applauded the President's speech, while communists and socialists expressed their dis-

(67) See Freeland, Truman Doctrine and McCarthyism, p. 86.; and Jones, Fifteen Weeks, p. 12.

(68) Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 27-29.
pleasure. The reaction from the Soviet Union was particularly virulent, accusing the United States of expansion, but Stalin made no move to retaliate. In Yugoslavia Tito charged "American imperialism" with threatening war.\(^{(69)}\)

Truman's speech received both praise and criticism from American officials. Loy Henderson lauded the doctrine as an example of American "determination to preserve freedom and independence," while George Kennan recalled that he criticized the speech at the time precisely because of this broad commitment. Kennan felt that the grandiose language of the address implied that United States action in response to the Greek crisis would be taken anywhere in the world such circumstances arose. He did not oppose the specific decision to aid Greece and Turkey, but rather the universal policy that seemed to grow from the speech. Kennan believed that such a policy was not only questionable but impossible. Walter Lippmann criticized Truman for beginning a world-wide crusade on behalf of democracy rather than dealing with a single American security issue. Henry Wallace charged the President with creating a crisis when he should have been revitalizing the Greek economy. Truman later acknowledged the risks that were involved with this policy, but he believed the risks

were necessary to protect the freedom and security of free people. (70)

Despite criticism of the President's address, the bill to aid Greece and Turkey moved rapidly through Congress. Public hearings began the next week, and debate in the Senate commenced on April 8. Although there was little delay, the path was far from smooth. Supporters of the President stressed the need to maintain his credibility. Even Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, who had long warned against overcommitment, was afraid of how opposition would affect Truman's ability to bargain. Congressional critics, however, were outspoken. Isolationists such as Lawrence H. Smith (Republican - Ohio) charged the President with bending to the will of the large oil companies. In the process the United States was bolstering reactionary, undemocratic governments. Of major concern also was the high cost. William Lempke (Republican - North Dakota) and Senator C. Wayland Brooks (Republican - Illinois) accused the President of imperialism that could lead to war, while Harold Knutson (Republican - Minnesota) and Senator William Langer (Republican - North Dakota) complained about the bypassing of the United Nations. Senator Vandenberg, however, succeeded in having the bill amended to bring it under the United Nations Charter by giving that

body authority to halt the program if conditions warranted. Dean Acheson tried to draw attention away from the global implications of the doctrine by emphasizing the idea of economic reconstruction. He insisted that the United States would consider each request for aid on its own merits. The bill passed the Senate on April 22, with two-thirds of the old isolationists voting for it, and a slightly different version passed in the House of Representatives on May 8. After the necessary compromise, the bill was approved in both houses on May 15. On May 22, 1947, President Harry S. Truman signed the bill to aid Greece and Turkey. (71)

Loy Henderson kept a close eye on the aid program in Greece. Almost from the beginning, some accused the American Mission for Aid to Greece, headed by Dwight Griswold, of intervening in Greek politics. The Director of NEA acknowledged the need for changes in the Greek government, but he urged Griswold to be discreet. Griswold did not heed the warning, however, so Henderson went to Greece to ease tension and help resolve the situation. With American Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh, Henderson was able to negotiate a center-right coalition government. This obvious political interven-

tion as well as the growing use of propaganda in the Balkans were controversial issues. Henderson, however, supported both intervention and propaganda along with the use of the military if it was needed to save Greece from communist aggression. (72) Henderson did not see American intervention as a threat to Greek sovereignty because the United States had no designs on this or any other nation. It merely wanted to rescue Greece from economic and communist deprivation.

The program to aid Greece and Turkey was one of the earliest "costs of containment." For years Henderson stressed the need to bolster American interests through economic assistance. He believed that nations with stabilized economies could meet the challenges of communist propaganda. Later events of the Cold War, such as the Berlin blockade and the Korean conflict, confirmed the global implications of the Truman Doctrine speech, but the speech overshadowed the real purpose of the Greek-Turkish aid program - to strengthen these nations to resist the threat of communism. While Kennan, Jones, and others acknowledged Henderson's contributions to the formulation of the Truman Doctrine, their focus on the consequences of the speech overshadowed the fact that the original aid program was the product of Loy Henderson and the NEA staff.

CHAPTER IV

THE VILLAIN:
HENDERSON AND THE PALESTINE CRISIS

On May 21, 1947, Loy Henderson wrote, "Crisis seems to be our normal state." (1) Congress was still debating the Greek-Turkish aid bill when a special session of the United Nations General Assembly began considering the Palestine issue. What seemed an appropriate policy for Greece and Turkey was not as workable in the Arab areas of the Near and Middle East. Economic aid programs were of little use to the backward, agrarian economies of these peoples. They lacked the institutional means of carrying out such programs, and the Arabs were reluctant to develop institutions which they considered Western and foreign. The establishment of a foreign policy for these areas was further complicated by the Arab-Jewish conflict which raged in Palestine. Not only did it create instability in an oil-rich part of the world, making it ripe for the feared communist expansion, but it split the heretofore united front presented by the United States and Great Britain. (2) Twenty years later a critic


(2) See Henderson to Office, May 21, 1947, LWH Papers; and Reitzel, United States Foreign Policy, pp. 209-11.
wrote in a book review, "If God as some now say is dead, He no doubt died of trying to find an equitable solution to the Arab-Jewish problem." (3) This conflict in Palestine presented the American government with a unique policy problem.

The land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River had occupied a special place in the hearts of Jews, Christians, and Muslims for centuries, but the American government took only a vague interest in Palestine prior to the 1922 League of Nations Palestine Mandate which fixed its borders. With the emergence of Palestine as a political entity, the United States faced the challenge of formulating an appropriate foreign policy. During the interwar years, the complexities of the Palestine situation came to the fore. The plight of European Jews during World War II heightened interest in Palestine as did the growing fear of the Soviet menace. It seemed that every corner of the world had a stake in the fate of the area. (4)

The concerns of the British, Arabs, and Jews are simply stated. To Great Britain Palestine was an integral part of her colonial empire, and the British faced the same problem there as in their other colonies - growing nationalism. Arab

---


and Jewish nationalists were in constant conflict with the British authorities and with each other. The Arab majority viewed the land as rightfully theirs, while the Zionists were determined to have Palestine for their national home. (5)

In the United States the issues were more complex. The situation in Palestine was both a domestic issue and a foreign policy issue. A large part of the American Jewish population supported Zionist aspirations, and their potential voting strength forced politicians to take notice. When combined with the humanitarian desire for the permanent settlement of Europe's displaced Jews, Zionist influence on American politics was inescapable. Because of the political pressure on elected officials, Henderson believed that the State Department had to maintain a completely objective point of view. He assessed the situation in Palestine without emotion, prejudice, or political considerations. In this manner the departments of State and Defense viewed the Palestine issue in the context of American foreign policy and world affairs. With the United States embarking on a policy of Soviet containment, the experts in these departments believed that Arab oil was vital. Henderson and other policy makers in State and Defense were convinced that it was necessary to strengthen relations with the Arab nations, not alienate them by a pro-Zionist policy in Palestine. The

(5) Peretz, Middle East Today, pp. 107-08.
conflict that existed between the domestic concerns, usually voiced by the White House Staff, and the foreign policy concerns of the two departments resulted in confusion and mistrust among the presidential advisors. (6)

At the core of the Palestine issue for many Americans, including Henderson, was the question of self-determination. In the Atlantic Charter of 1941, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed, among other things, that their countries would "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." (7) Conflict and contradictions arose over this issue. It was impossible to reconcile the Arab majority's call for self-government with the 1917 Balfour Declaration's promise of a Jewish national home in Palestine. (8) American Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East, James M. Landis, wrote to President Roosevelt in January 1945, "The political objective implicit in the Jewish State idea will never be accepted by the Arab nations and is not consistent with the


principles of the Atlantic Charter." (9) Henderson feared that the abandonment of the principle of self-determination in Palestine would harm American prestige. Other nations would judge the United States as no more trustworthy than the Soviet Union. (10)

Prior to World War II, United States government interest in Palestine was limited. The State Department usually filled foreign service posts in the Near East with officers well acquainted with the area. As in the Far Eastern Division, the unique problems of these non-Western territories required the diplomatic skills of knowledgeable officers. The close association between the foreign service officers serving in the Near East and the Arab nations gave rise to charges of pro-Arabism and even anti-Semitism. Indeed the State Department was generally sympathetic to the Arabs' desire for self-government, and it believed that the Arab majority would succeed to power when the Mandate ended. The department thus considered Zionist goals in Palestine a detriment to American relations and interests in the Near East although every president since Woodrow Wilson affirmed United States support for the Jewish National Home. (11)

(9) Director of Economic Operations in Middle East (Landis) to Roosevelt, January 30, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 681.


(11) See Baram, Department of State in Middle East, pp. 51-52; and Wilson, Decision on Palestine, pp. 6-7, 18.
Other than the obvious importance of Near Eastern oil to the war effort, American government interest in Palestine was also in the background during the war years. The United States, however, realized the necessity for postwar planning for the Near East. A series of State Department studies attempted to determine the basis for a Palestinian settlement. In all, the Near East Office prepared ten comprehensive planning papers for Palestine. Despite this planning, a definite formula for Palestine proved to be elusive. (12)

The State Department was not alone in the making of preparations for postwar Palestine. As the horrors of European Jewry emerged, Zionist activities in the United States increased rapidly. Zionist leadership centered in Europe prior to the war, but the 1942 Zionist conference in New York signaled the shift in leadership to the United States. The Zionists embarked on a propaganda campaign intended to win the support of the American people and government for the Jewish State. The idea was to link the Jewish refugee problem with the need for a Jewish nation. (13)

The Zionist campaign was an overwhelming success. All areas of the government began to feel pressure to support


Zionism. In 1944 Congressional resolutions supporting Zionist aims passed overwhelmingly in both houses of Congress. In the summer of 1944, both parties included planks in their presidential campaign platforms backing Zionist aims. The Jews, however, were not the only ethnic or national group with a refugee problem, and the narrow focus on displaced Jews greatly concerned Henderson. State Department pleas for restraint still went unheeded.\(^{(14)}\)

The State Department was especially concerned about the effect that American Zionist activity had on the Arab world. Arab leaders were anxious and confused about the United States position on Palestine. These concerns were expressed to President Roosevelt in a letter from King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia in 1943. In reply the President promised that the United States government would take no actions regarding the situation in Palestine without first consulting both Arabs and Jews. This formula of full consultation was the first formal American policy on Palestine. Though vague, and open to wide interpretation, it provided Henderson and NEA with a guideline in dealing with disgruntled Arab leaders.\(^{(15)}\)

Roosevelt never formulated a coherent policy on Palestine. He was sympathetic to the Zionists and was aware of


\(^{(15)}\) Wilson, *Decision on Palestine*, pp. 32-34.
the political strength of this segment of the population; however, he also knew that not all American Jews supported Zionism, nor could a Jewish State survive without military force. The situation in Palestine, while important, was not a critical issue during the war years, and Roosevelt successfully evaded a decisive position. He believed he could find a solution to the conflict in Palestine after the war. (16)

By 1945 it was obvious the issue of Palestine was going to be one of the major challenges of the immediate postwar years. Roosevelt revealed his concern when he included a meeting with Ibn Saud as part of his agenda for the Yalta Conference. Despite promises to Ibn Saud, the President continually vacillated as the American wartime feeling was decidedly pro-Zionist. On March 16, 1945, Roosevelt authorized Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, Chairman of the American Zionist Emergency Council, to make a statement affirming his support of Jewish aspirations in Palestine. (17) On April 5, however, the President sent a letter to Saud reaffirming the policy of full consultation. Roosevelt wrote, "Your Majesty will also doubtless recall that during our recent conversa-

(16) See Wilson, Decision on Palestine, pp. 54-56; and Wilson, "Palestine Papers," p. 40.

discontent by reaffirming American commitment to full consultation in letters to Arab leaders. (20)

This marked the last time, however, that the State Department was able to influence Truman's Palestine policy. Perhaps one reason for this was the lack of interest of Stettinius' successors. James Byrnes was seldom in Washington. One official complained, "The State Department fiddles while Byrnes roams." (21) Byrnes wanted no part of the Palestine affair and left it almost entirely to the new Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Secretary of State George Marshall also delegated Palestine issues to the Under Secretary since he viewed the problems as being more domestic than foreign in character. According to Loy Henderson, Marshall only gave his personal attention in cases of "extreme urgency." Under Byrnes and Marshall, therefore, the Director of NEA in consultation with the Under Secretary dealt with routine issues. Under this format the White House decided policy questions almost entirely on its own. (22)

Truman's view of Palestine was simple in 1945. He wanted the British to open Palestine to the immediate immi-

(20) See Wilson, Decision on Palestine, 59-60; and Truman, Memoirs, 2:132-33.


(22) See Wilson, Decision on Palestine, pp. 59-60; Truman, Memoirs, 2:132-33; and Henderson Interview, October 15, 1975, LWH Papers.
gration of 100,000 Jews then occupying displaced persons camps in Europe, but he did not want to assume responsibility for such action either politically or militarily. The President believed that the western world must keep the Balfour Declaration's "solemn promise" of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Truman regarded this promise as fundamental to the principle of self-determination, a principle which he affirmed in his Navy Day speech on October 27, 1945, stating, "We shall approve no territorial changes in any friendly part of the world unless they accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned." (23) His view seemed to ignore, however, the question of self-determination for the Arab majority. (24)

The State Department was well aware that American support of large-scale Jewish immigration into Palestine would generate hostility in the Arab world. The President, though, was more concerned with the Jewish refugee problem than with State Department warnings of repercussions in the Arab world. Deeply troubled by this situation, Truman's solution to the refugee problem was the lifting of British immigration restrictions in Palestine. After Earl G. Harrison, the


(24) See Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 170; Truman, Memoirs, 2:132-33; and Shadid, United States and Palestinians, p. 33.
United States representative on the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, reported on conditions in the displaced persons camps and the desire of the Jews to go to Palestine, Truman again urged the British to open Palestine to Jewish refugees. Truman, however, overlooked the other displaced persons of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. The President's disregard of the broader refugee problem deeply concerned Loy Henderson. In Henderson's view none of the displaced person's had an ethnic sanctuary. (25)

President Truman focused his efforts on an immediate solution to the Jewish refugee problem. He viewed the short and long-range considerations as completely separate. Truman believed the question of a Jewish State was a matter that the United Nations should address at a later date. (26) In his Memoirs the President later wrote, "In my own mind, the aims and goals of the Zionists at this stage to set up a Jewish state were secondary to the more immediate problem of finding means to relieve the human misery of the displaced persons." (27)


(26) See Truman, Memoirs, 2:140; and Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 170.

(27) Truman, Memoirs, 2:144-45.
His Palestine policy satisfied no one. The British resented Truman's pressure to increase immigration into their Mandate territory, for they had to consider both the Arabs and the Jews. The Zionists wanted the administration to endorse the Jewish State. The Arabs viewed Truman's position as hostile. (28) Egyptian Prime Minister Nokrashy Pasha wrote, "Why, from a perfectly objective point of view, one small nation of 1,000,000 people living in a small territory should be forced to accept in 25 years immigrants of an alien race up to nearly 50 per cent of their own number is hard to understand." (29)

Loy Henderson realized the problems involved with any policy that gave advantage to one side over the other. He suggested to Secretary Byrnes that the United States try to reach an agreement with the British, Soviets, and French for the future of Palestine. In this way no one country would have to bear the responsibility. Henderson recommended a Palestine trusteeship with Jewish and Arab autonomy. (30)

Whether the President learned of this advice is unknown, but Truman continued to follow his own course. (31)

---

(28) See Snetsinger, *Truman, the Jewish Vote*, p. 18; and British Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman, September 16, 1945, *FRUS, 1945*, VIII, 740.


(30) See Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 170; and Wilson, *Decision on Palestine*, p. 66.

as September 1945 Gordon Merriam wrote to Henderson, "It seems apparent to me that the President (and perhaps Mr. Byrnes as well) have decided to have a go at Palestine negotiations without bringing NEA into the picture. . . ."(32) In October 1945 the President agreed to join with the British in forming the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The British suggested that the committee study the problem of Europe's displaced Jews with Palestine as one possible alternative for meeting their needs. As the Mandate authority, the British realized the hostility that existed between Arabs and Jews because of their conflicting aspirations in Palestine. Great Britain feared that any change in immigration policies would only add fuel to the fires of discontent.

Unknown to the State Department, President Truman informed the British that the United States would only take part in the committee if Palestine was the focal point. The British reluctantly agreed. The Anglo-American approach to the Palestine issue without including the other major powers gave the Soviets the opportunity to incite Jewish and Arab opposition to the committee's proposals. Henderson's concern that the United States would have to bear responsibility for Palestine proved correct.(33)


Despite the administration's apparent lack of interest in the department's advice, Henderson continued to express his views on the Near East. Early in 1946 he prepared a memorandum for Acheson and Hickerson offering his opinion on the danger the Near East presented to world peace. He stated that America's most important interest in the area was not oil, but the preservation of stability and the principles of the United Nations in order to prevent actions that might lead to another world war. Henderson explained that the Great Powers were pursuing four different policies in the area. The United States was not going to use force to implement its policies, nor was it inclined to provide the economic assistance needed in the Near East. He further stated that America's seeming support for the Zionist cause in Palestine which was opposed by two-thirds of the population was having an adverse effect on attempts to carry out government policies in the region. Henderson was aware of the growing nationalism in the Arab world and of the people's desire to improve their living standards. He believed that only political and economic stability would protect the Near East from outside powers. As in Greece and Turkey Henderson urged that the United States economically aid in developing
Near Eastern countries and encourage the adoption of American principles. (34)

While Henderson's advice appeared to fall on deaf ears in the White House, the report of the Committee of Inquiry supported several of his earlier suggestions. Published on May 1, 1946, the report proposed ten points regarding Palestine. The committee stressed the necessity of adopting the entirety of its proposal with concessions balanced on each side. The report stated that while Palestine offered the best location for settling large numbers of displaced Jews, it could not and should not bear the entire burden. The report recommended the immigration of 100,000 Jews but prohibited either the Jews or the Arabs from dominating the other. Since there was so much hostility, the committee recommended continuation of the Mandate until the establishment of a United Nations trusteeship. Arabs and Jews should have equal educational, political, and economic opportunities under both the Mandate and the trusteeship.(35) Henderson praised the report for being "a thorough and conscientious piece of work" which "produced a set of general recommendations which con-


(35) See Wilson, Decision on Palestine, p. 87; and Dean Acheson to American Diplomatic and Consular Offices, April 25, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VII, 585-86.
STITUTE A REASONABLE AND INTELLIGENTLY-DEFINED COMPROMISE SOLUTION. . . ."(36)

Feelings toward the report outside of the State Department were not quite so positive. Truman endorsed the admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine and several other of the points, but he reserved judgment on the rest of the report pending further study. His partial acceptance angered the British. Prime Minister Clement Attlee stated that Great Britain would not undertake the long-term commitments the report required until it determined how much responsibility the United States would share. He also rejected the admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants as long as Jewish terrorism continued since the United States was unwilling to accept obligations in Palestine which would require a military presence. In the United States the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that not only would military involvement harm American interests in the Near East but that the armed forces did not have enough manpower to police the region in light of other commitments.(37)

Jews and Arabs alike strongly opposed the committee report. The Zionists wanted a Jewish State, and the Arabs desired an Arab State. The trusteeship proposal satisfied

(36) Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, April 24, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VII, 587.

(37) See Wilson, Decision on Palestine, p, 89; Truman, Memoirs, 2:149; and Joint Chiefs of Staff to State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, June 21, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VII, 632.
neither group. The Arabs especially resented the interference of the American government in the affairs of an Arab country. (38)

Despite the lack of agreement on the Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Truman continued to press the British for the admittance of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. Henderson suggested that the administration needed more than pressure. He believed that joint planning between the United States and Great Britain was necessary to overcome such barriers to mass immigration as transportation, housing, financing, and terrorism in Palestine. To facilitate this planning, Truman appointed the Secretaries of State, War, and Treasury as a Cabinet Committee on Palestine. Most of the Committee's work was done by three alternates - Henry F. Grady of the State Department, Goldthwaite H. Dorr representing the War Department, and Herbert E. Gaston from the Treasury Department. With Grady chairing the trio, the alternates went to London on July 10, 1946, to discuss the findings of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. (39)

In London the British proposed a plan which called for a Jewish province and an Arab province. Although each province was to be basically autonomous, a central government would


(39) See Truman, Memoirs, 2:150-51; Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 174; and Wilson, Decision on Palestine, p. 92.
retain control over some policies among which was immigration. The British plan advocated the admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine only after Jews and Arabs approved the entire program. Grady urged the President to accept the plan even though the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry had rejected this alternative. The Ambassador believed that due to British resistance this was the only way mass Jewish immigration could occur in the near future. Truman recalled Grady and his committee, however, when information leaked to the press, arousing angry Zionist opposition to the proposal. Despite Truman's resulting unwillingness to give immediate endorsement to the plan, the British published the proposal as a joint program which became known as the Morrison-Grady Plan. (40)

Opposition to the Morrison-Grady Plan was widespread. The Zionists refused even to discuss the plan with the British, while the Arabs rejected all alternatives other than Palestine becoming an Arab country. Public opinion in the United States was so opposed to the plan that on August 12, 1946, Truman informed Prime Minister Attlee of his inability to support the proposal. (41)

Truman's rejection of the Morrison-Grady Plan virtually ended hope for a joint British-American solution to the

(40) Wilson, Decision on Palestine, pp. 93-94.
(41) Truman, Memoirs, 2:152-53.
Palestine issue. The Zionists, however, were beginning to realize that the 1942 Biltmore Program's goal of Palestine as a Jewish State was unrealistic in light of Arab hostility. Nahum Goldmann, Chairman of the Administrative Committee of the World Jewish Congress, supported by the Jewish Agency Executive, began to press for the partition of Palestine. Headquartered in London, the Jewish Agency had promoted the idea of a Jewish national home since 1929, leading the worldwide fundraising effort. In Jerusalem the Jewish Agency Executive, led by David Ben-Gurion, organized and represented the Palestinian Jews. The new Zionist program advocated the creation of a Jewish State in part rather than all of Palestine. While Zionists viewed this as a compromise on their part, the Arabs disagreed. The fact that the Zionists claimed only a part rather than all of Palestine represented an unacceptable Arab concession. Despite Arab opposition to the proposal, President Truman reacted favorably to the partition plan.(42)

By September 1946 the Zionist leaders pressured Truman to endorse publicly the Agency's partition plan. The State Department once more counseled the President to act with caution. Henderson and other department officials feared a presidential statement would impede the Anglo-Arab negotiations in progress in London. The dissolution of the London

(42) See Wilson, Decision on Palestine, pp. 94-96; and Peretz, Middle East Today, p. 274.
meetings, however, prompted Truman to act. On October 3 the President notified Attlee that he intended to make a statement on Palestine. In his message to the Prime Minister, he included the text of a speech he planned to deliver the next day, the eve of the sacred Jewish holiday Yom Kippur. In the statement Truman recounted his efforts to achieve a solution to the refugee problem, calling again for the admission of 100,000 Jews. (43) Although he did not actually endorse the Jewish partition plan, he expressed the "belief that a solution along these lines would command the support of public opinion in the United States." (44)

Acheson recalled that Republican candidates attacked the so-called Yom Kippur Statement "as a blatant play for the Jewish vote." (45) In fact, gubernatorial and Congressional election campaigns were raging. Believing that the Republican candidate for governor, Thomas Dewey, was going to support Zionism publicly, the New York Democrats pressured Truman to issue this statement. Rumors also spread that members of the White House Staff, such as Administrative Assistant

(43) See Wilson, Decision on Palestine, p. 97; and President Truman to Prime Minister Attlee, October, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VII, 703.

(44) President Truman to Prime Minister Attlee, October 3, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VII, 703.

(45) Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 176.
David K. Niles, had influenced the President to help Democrats obtain the Jewish vote. (46)

President Truman defended the Yom Kippur Statement as being "simply a restatement of my position." (47) He explained to Prime Minister Attlee that the purpose of the statement was to express America’s continued concern for the welfare of the displaced Jews in Europe. The President reiterated his appeal for the British to increase Jewish immigration to Palestine. (48)

The State Department did not share Truman’s narrow focus on the admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. Echoing Henderson’s views, Gordon Merriam, Chief of the Near Eastern Division, stated that a worldwide refugee program as well as a resolution of the entire Palestine question were both necessary to achieve the objective of Jewish immigration into Palestine. Merriam accused the administration of basing its Palestine policy on expediency rather than principle. He believed that the United States should strive for the independence of all Palestine based on an agreement between Arabs


(47) Truman, Memoirs, 2:154.

(48) President Truman to Prime Minister Attlee, October 10, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VII, 706-07.
and Jews. While Palestine prepared for independence, Merriam recommended a United Nations trusteeship. (49)

In transmitting Merriam's views to Under Secretary Acheson, Loy Henderson noted his concern for the direction of American policy. The administration's support for the partition of Palestine made Henderson uneasy, for he questioned whether this policy conformed with American principles. Despite his misgivings, Henderson forwarded suggestions to the administration to aid the government in preparing the United States delegation to the United Nations. The United States delegation entered the discussions with three position papers. The first paper called for the American delegation to state United States policy only if another delegation raised the question of Palestine. This suggestion reflected the inability of the United States to present a detailed Palestine program. The second alternative was for the delegation to support strongly a resolution of the Palestine issue along Zionist lines. This action would clarify the American position on Palestine. The State Department warned that this alternative could have serious consequences for American economic and strategic interests in the Near East. The third position paper called for the delegation to recommend a moderate plan that did not specifically support parti-

(49) See Wilson, Decision on Palestine, p. 99; and Gordon Merriam to Loy Henderson, December 27, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VII, 733-34.
tion. This plan would attempt to bring about independence for the area while providing for the immigration of 100,000 Jews. The State Department again cautioned that the Arab world would probably react unfavorably to this position. If the government decided to follow either the second or third alternative, however, Henderson and NEA recommended that the United States inform both the British and the Zionists of America's exact position and its implications. Henderson continued to urge consideration of the entire international picture when making decisions on Palestine. (50)

Despite the efforts of the State Department to provide the Truman Administration with policy guidelines, some accused department officials of attempting to sabotage the President's Palestine policy. Bartley C. Crum, an American representative on the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, believed that department assurances to the Arab world served only to negate Truman's pro-Jewish policy. Crum was especially critical of Henderson. When asked by the press to be more specific in his accusations, Crum stated, "It would be a salutary thing if Mr. Loy W. Henderson's resignation were requested." (51) NEA and other department offices, in fact, had opposed Crum's appointment to the Committee of Inquiry,


believing him to be publicity-seeking and untrustworthy due to his association with some "United Front" organizations. But Henderson never understood why Mr. Crum chose to attack him personally. Other critics were more specific with their complaints, charging that Henderson was so anti-Soviet that he would do anything to bolster the British in the Near East.(52)

Despite the so-called pro-Arab State Department, the Arab world's distrust of the Truman Administration's Palestine policy reduced United States prestige in the Near East. Arab concern also stemmed from the Zionist activities in Palestine. Underground Jewish military organizations such as the Haganah and the Irgun conducted terrorist campaigns throughout the territory. In addition the Jewish Agency Executive was carrying out illegal immigration on a large scale. The Arabs viewed these actions as a threat to their present safety and to their future existence. In conversations with Henderson, Arab emissaries urged the United States not to confuse the refugee problem with political Zionism. They failed to understand how the United States, even in the name of humanity, could reconcile its support of the Jewish

minority with the American principle of majority rule.(53) In a letter to President Truman, King Ibn Saud wrote, "This is the fundamental basis of the whole problem. For the principles of democracy dictate that when a majority exists in a country, the government of that country shall be by the majority, and not the minority."(54) The United States and Great Britain were caught in a web of contradictory promises and principles. While some hope rested on the United Nations to untangle the mess, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., wrote, "In 1947, the grand halls of the U.N. were thick with chickens coming home to roost."(55)

When Great Britain referred the Palestine issue to the United Nations in April 1947, the Arab states called on the General Assembly to end the mandate and to proclaim the independent state of Palestine. The proposal failed, and on the recommendation of the United States, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was formed to investigate the entire Palestine situation. Composed of eleven neutral states, the General Assembly ordered the Committee to submit its findings by September. During the UNSCOP investi-

(53) See Forrestal, Diaries, p. 180; Wilson, Decision on Palestine, p. 67; and memorandum of conversation between Marshall, Henderson, and Abdel Rahman Azzam Pasha, June 17, 1947, Israel-Palestine Correspondence File, LWH Papers.

(54) Ibn Saud to President Truman, November 2, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VII, 718-19.

gations, the United States pursued a policy of caution. With the Cold War heating up, the State Department did not want to risk a loss of American influence or a gain for Soviet prestige in the Near East. (56)

Although Great Britain was withdrawing from certain strategic areas, such as Greece and Turkey, her referral of the Palestine question to the United Nations did not indicate a desire to leave Palestine. The British merely wanted the General Assembly to advise them on administering the Mandate. As late as February 1947, they proposed to resolve the situation by reducing the problem to a local issue between the Arabs and Jews of Palestine rather than the world. Fearing the opposition which the British proposals would arouse, Loy Henderson advised that the United States refrain from commenting on the British program. While the United States and Great Britain had common economic and strategic interests in the area, the anticipated hostile American public opinion toward the proposals forced the State Department to be extremely cautious in its support of the British. (57)


Henderson urged that the United States remain neutral during the Special Committee's investigation. He believed that serious consideration of the Committee's report required United States impartiality. This need for impartiality was especially necessary when dealing with the Jewish Agency. Henderson feared that any secret conversation with the official representatives of the Palestinian Jews would raise suspicion among the Arabs and ruin any chance for the success of UNSCOP. He did, however, suggest that the Agency place its concerns before the Special Committee.(58)

The State Department's repeated call for caution, impartiality, and a Palestine policy consistent with the international objectives of the government led to public charges of anti-Zionism. Viewed as the embodiment of the pro-Arab State Department, Loy Henderson, as the Director of NEA, was the focus of this criticism. Regardless of his personal feelings, Henderson continued to urge the formulation of an acceptable Palestine policy based on cooperation between department officials, the President's staff, Congress, and interested Americans, including American Jews. He believed this was the only approach to formulate a policy that could withstand the pressures which were sure to arise during a

United Nations debate. (59) Henderson was extremely concerned with the increased emotionalism connected to the Palestine issue. On January 5, 1948, he wrote to Dr. Ellen Simon in Jerusalem, "It seems to me that the situation has developed to such an extent that actions are being motivated by emotion rather than reason. . . ." (60)

Within the State Department, Henderson continued to pursue the course of reason and to plan for the future of Palestine. A position paper dated June 4, 1947 called for a uninational Palestinian state, which was neither Arab nor Jewish, that provided equal rights and privileges to all citizens. Although not a Jewish National Home in the political sense, Palestine would provide a cultural and spiritual home for Jews with citizens of all religions participating in the governance. Immigration laws would be non-discriminatory. Until the governmental machinery was in operation, the plan suggested that the United Nations administer Palestine under a trusteeship of either one or more member nations or a trusteeship council. The trustee would prepare Palestine for self-government and independence. In a discussion with John C. Ross, Deputy to United Nations Ambassador Warren Austin,


(60) Loy Henderson to Ellen Simon, January 5, 1948, LWH Papers.
Henderson stressed that this plan was merely a working paper; however, it did indicate the policy which NEA hoped to persuade the administration to pursue. (61)

During the summer of 1947, the State Department's Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs and Office of Special Political Affairs prepared four alternative plans for the future government of Palestine: 1) a unipartisanal state as described above; 2) a binational state - one state with Jewish and Arab communities; 3) a partition plan calling for a Jewish state to consist of the 1,500 square miles in which there was a Jewish majority; 4) partition as in plan three but to include the 5,000 square miles of the Negev, largely a desert area. Neither of the partition plans gave the Jews control of areas in which there was an Arab majority. In presenting these four plans to the Secretary of State, Henderson stated that a unipartisanal state not only represented the best international interest of the United States, but it also conformed more to the principles of the United Nations Charter. He realized that this plan was idealistic and probably unattainable in light of the hostilities in Palestine. A binational state would also probably be unacceptable to Arabs and Jews; however, he expressed concern for the problems which would inevitably arise from any form of parti-

Henderson especially disagreed with plan number four since the Negev had an extremely small Jewish population and its incorporation in the Jewish State would create what he termed "another Polish Corridor." (63)

Henderson continued to recommend that the United States delegation act with caution. He suggested that the government withhold any solution until UNSCOP presented its report and the British, Jews, and Arabs had expressed their opinions. The United States should then take a position according to both the international climate and the results of the Assembly debates. Any presentation of United States views should be as an elaboration of the proposals of other nations. In this way Henderson believed that the United States could avoid having the adopted program labeled an American plan. (64)

The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine submitted its report on August 31, 1947. The eleven members unanimously agreed to terminate the Mandate and grant independence to Palestine. The United Nations would maintain responsibility for Palestine until independence and also protect the Holy Places. The majority of the committee also


agreed that Palestine alone should not bear the entire burden of the displaced Jews. The committee split on the nature of the government of Palestine. Seven members favored partition with economic union. This provided for a Jewish State, an Arab State, and an international trusteeship for Jerusalem. The committee, however, realized that problems existed with any form of partition. Arabs outnumbered Jews two to one, and no real territorial separation existed. The majority of the committee felt, though, that partition was the solution to the urgent problem. At that time almost 18,000 illegal immigrants were under British detention, and over 800 Palestinians were incarcerated. The minority report, stating the view that partition would only heighten Arab-Jewish separatism and cause irredentism, proposed a federal state. (65)

Reactions to the report were varied. Neither plan was acceptable to the Arabs, but the Jewish Agency reluctantly accepted the partition plan. Public opinion in the United States also favored the majority report. The British, however, viewed partition as unworkable and unfair. There was also opposition to the majority plan in the Pentagon and the State Department. (66)


(66) Wilson, Decision on Palestine, p. 115.
Loy Henderson believed it was not in the best interest of the United States to support any form of partition or the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, because it would alienate the Arab and Muslim worlds at a time when their friendship was crucial. In addition, the United States, as an advocate of the plan, would have to provide the necessary economic and military aid to implement partition. Henderson viewed the plan as unworkable since it was not acceptable to both the Arabs and Jews. Without cooperation between Arabs and Jews, economic unity would be impossible. He believed that the failure to cooperate would result in the Palestine question arising again in the United Nations in a few years. Henderson also opposed the UNSCOP plan because he felt it contradicted the principles of majority rule and self-determination. While he believed that the United States should insure equality for Jews in Palestine, he did not think that either the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate obligated the United States to aid in the creation of a Jewish State. Henderson, therefore, recommended that the United States take an impartial position in the upcoming United Nations debate. He urged American open-mindedness, while directing its efforts toward the agreements necessary for the establishment of a temporary trusteeship. This neutral trusteeship would administer Palestine for a stated period of time, at the conclusion of which the citizens of
Palestine would vote on the partition question. The General Assembly would then make its final decision on partition. (67)

President Truman did not share Henderson's views on Palestine. He believed that the UNSCOP plan would encourage Arabs and Jews to work together as neighbors. The President also felt that it was important to support the efforts of the United Nations in Palestine as an expression of confidence in that body. Under instructions from Mr. Truman, the United States delegation announced its support of the partition plan on October 11, 1947. Two days later, the Soviet Union also endorsed the plan in what some observers believed was an attempt to foster Arab rejection of the Western world. (68)

Once the United States publicly stated its support of partition, Henderson once more tried to formulate an acceptable policy position in light of the international scene. He advised that while the United States delegation should support the partition plan as instructed, the United States should not follow an aggressive policy in the General Assembly, since neither the government nor the American people were willing to bear the responsibility for the enforcement of the plan. He believed, however, that a non-aggressive


(68) See Truman, Memoirs, 2:156-57; and Wilson, Decision on Palestine, pp. 122-23.
policy would doom the plan to failure at which time the General Assembly could reconsider the trusteeship plan. (69)

The Zionists, however, exerted constant pressure on both the United Nations and the White House. While the President stated that the United States should not attempt to influence other nations to support partition, Evan Wilson noted that Nahum Goldman and David Horowitz of the Jewish Agency credited Truman with applying pressure to various delegations. According to Robert J. Donovan, members of the White House Staff, including Clark Clifford and David K. Niles, as well as members of Congress, used their positions to influence the votes of smaller nations such as the Philippines and Haiti. The United States delegation received conflicting instructions on whether or not to use persuasion on other delegations. Reports of United States pressure tactics caused bitterness among the Arab nations. Henderson informed the Under Secretary of State, Robert L. Lovett, that his office was deeply concerned about the effect that United States policy at the United Nations was having on American international interests, especially in the Arab world. Henderson believed that Near East security was vital and that Arab friendship was necessary. He also believed that American activities in the United Nations were generating mistrust and hostility among the Arabs. He again reminded the President

that partition would lead to violence and probably require United States military intervention. (70)

Despite these warnings the administration continued to support partition. On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly passed a recommendation to adopt an amended version of the UNSCOP proposal. This plan awarded fifty-three percent of Palestine to the Jewish State, although Jews owned only seven percent of the land in the area. The Palestine Commission would oversee the partition. The plan delighted Zionists around the world. Arabs responded to the vote the next day with the call for a general strike and an attack on Jews in Palestine. Henderson informed the Arab world that the United States decision to support partition was final and the use of violence would not cause the administration to change its position. He, therefore, urged the Arabs to accept the partition plan. The British reacted to the United Nations vote on December 3, when they announced that they would end their mandate on May 15, 1948. (71)


(71) See Wilson, Decision on Palestine, pp. 127-28; Memorandum of conversation between Loy Henderson and Foreign Minister Jamali (Iraq), December 11, 1947, FRUS, 1947, V, 1311; Truman, Memoirs, 2:159; and Schlesinger, Dynamics of Power, 5:342.
The United Nations recommendation to partition Palestine insured that United States Palestine policy would be an issue in the 1948 election. As in 1946, New York Democratic Party leaders called on the administration to take positive action on behalf of the Zionist cause in order to enhance the party's chances in November. Many government officials feared the consequences of a foreign policy based on political considerations rather than international concerns. James V. Forrestal, the first Secretary of Defense, was especially persistent in his quest to remove Palestine from the 1948 campaign. Although both the President and his opponent, Governor Thomas Dewey, agreed with Forrestal in principle, neither candidate believed it was possible to remove Palestine from the campaign. Forrestal's growing fear that this political issue would irreparably damage American-Muslim relations, or even result in war, led him to ask the Secretary of State to speak with Mr. Truman. All of Forrestal's efforts, however, were in vain. Democratic Party leaders, such as Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., believed that it was too late for the administration to retreat from its position on Palestine and that any agreement between the two parties would hurt Democratic chances in the election.(72)

Although Forrestal's attempts to remove the Palestine issue from the political arena failed, he continued to speak in opposition to the administration's endorsement of partition. The Arab nations, meanwhile, used American dependency on Near Eastern oil as a weapon in an attempt to force the administration into a more pro-Arab position. The possibility of the United States losing access to the oil fields of the Near East deeply concerned the Secretary of Defense. (73)

A more immediate problem was the growing violence between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. Each attack resulted in a brutal retaliation. Over one thousand people died from violence in Palestine from November 1947 to mid-February 1948. Neighboring Arab nations prepared to aid their brothers in Palestine. Reports reached Henderson that the governments of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq were training soldiers to fight in Palestine. There were rumors that some of these outside forces were already taking part in the disturbances in Palestine. It was evident that implementation of partition would require force, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were

(73) See Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, pp. 82-83; and Forrestal, Diaries, p. 357.
already on record as opposing the use of American troops in the Near East. (74)

The continued fear that the United States might be drawn into an Arab-Jewish war, as well as the concern for the loss of American prestige in the area, led Kennan's Policy Planning Staff to recommend that the United States refrain from any initiative to implement partition. Henderson pointed out that the General Assembly's plan was merely a recommendation and that peace in the area should be the main objective, not implementation of the recommendation. Since partition was unworkable in light of Arab hostility, NEA urged the administration to withdraw its support. (75)

These calls for a reevaluation of American Palestine policy came at a time when the international situation was growing more tense. The communist take over in Czechoslovakia fueled the fears of Soviet expansion. Peace in Palestine was of great importance in view of United States obligations in Western Europe. Unable to stem the mounting


violence, the Palestine Commission asked the Security Council to intervene, but the United States opposed the idea. With the President's consent, Ambassador Warren Austin presented a position paper to the United Nations Security Council on February 24, 1948. He asserted that while the Security Council could interfere in Palestine to maintain peace, it did not have the legal authority to enforce partition. The other Council members agreed.(76)

It was becoming increasingly obvious that any attempt to impose partition would result in even more chaos. Secretary of State George Marshall thus directed Ambassador Austin to make a previously authorized statement before the Security Council. On March 19, 1948, Austin recommended that the Council establish a trusteeship for Palestine in order to restore peace and to give Palestinian Arabs and Jews an opportunity to work out their differences. The trusteeship, however, was not to influence the final political settlement in any way.(77)

Austin's statement brought charges that the State Department's position sabotaged the President's policy and

(76) See Schlesinger, Dynamics of World Power, 5:342; Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, p. 85; and "Message to the President," prepared by State Department, February 21, 1948, FRUS, 1948, V, pt. 2, 637-40.

raised questions about the loyalty of some department officials. Members of the White House Staff, especially Clark Clifford, claimed that Truman had not given his consent to the trusteeship statement or the abandonment of partition. Clifford accused the State Department of not serving the President properly. Truman was fully aware that the department favored a temporary trusteeship. According to Under Secretary Lovett, he and Secretary Marshall met with the President on March 8 and advised him of the failure of the Security Council to accept the partition recommendation. At that time Lovett suggested trusteeship as an alternative. Mr. Truman instructed them to pursue the trusteeship alternative only if they could not obtain approval for partition. Lovett understandably viewed this as clearance from the President to pursue trusteeship if and when it was necessary. Also, the President had reviewed the text of Austin’s statement in February and supported the position. (78) Truman would later write of the trusteeship proposal:

This was not a rejection of partition but rather an effort to postpone its effective date until proper conditions for the establishment of self-government in the two parts might be established.

My policy with regard to Palestine was not a commitment to any set of dates or circumstances; it was dedication to the twin deal of international obligations and the relieving of human misery. In

this sense, the State Department's trusteeship proposal was not contrary to my policy. (79)

Reaction to the trusteeship proposal was swift. Whether he approved Austin's statement or not, the President did not appear to be aware that Austin was going to deliver the speech on March 19. Only the day before, Truman had assured Chaim Wisemann of the Jewish Agency of American support for partition. The President was embarrassed after Austin's speech, and the Zionists were angry. David Niles of the White House Staff called for Loy Henderson's replacement. Only the Arab leaders and some moderate Jews welcomed the announcement. (80)

Henderson realized that a trusteeship policy contained many of the same pitfalls as partition. There was danger of heavy American financial and military involvement in Palestine. Henderson's office believed that the success of the trusteeship policy depended on British, Arab, and Jewish cooperation. Henderson urged the British to remain in Palestine after May 15 since their stake in the area was as great as that of the United States. He also invited moderate Arabs and Jews to the United States to discuss the Palestine situation. (81)

(79) Truman, Memoirs, 2:163.

(80) See Clifford, "Factors Influencing Truman," p. 36; and Wilson, Decision on Palestine, pp. 135-36.

As the date for the end of the British Mandate drew near, Henderson became alarmed over the confusion and indecision in the United Nations concerning the Palestine situation. He believed that failure of the United States to act decisively for a solution to the Palestine problem would result in chaos in Palestine when the British withdrew their troops. He felt that the administration should seek a truce and temporary trusteeship in a confident manner and appeal for bipartisan support for a peaceful solution. (82)

These recommendations, which he made in late April, were too late. At 6:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time on May 14, 1948, the provisional government in Palestine proclaimed the State of Israel. Eleven minutes later the United States issued a statement of de facto recognition. The President had considered a proper United States response for some time in the event that the Zionists declared a Jewish State. He wrote later that though he realized violence would accompany the creation of Israel, Zionist preparations indicated that they were ready to govern and defend the new state. (83) The White House Staff urged immediate recognition. Clark Clif-


ford stated that recognition seemed both in accordance with Mr. Truman's overall Palestine policy and an appropriate act of humanity. Democratic Party leaders, ever mindful of the Jewish vote, also encouraged recognition. At a meeting with the President and members of his staff on May 12, Secretary of State Marshall urged Mr. Truman not to make a decision based on political motives. The President, however, decided to recognize the Jewish State immediately upon its proclamation. (84)

The end of the Mandate marked the beginning of full scale war in Palestine. The Arab Legion from Transjordan and small forces from Egypt and Iraq moved in to defend Arab areas, but they were no match for the well-trained Israeli troops. As the Israelis occupied Arab areas, civilians fled their homes. The plight of half-million Arab refugees became a new United Nations problem. The United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees helped during the first year, but there was no solution to the problem. Arab nations refused to aid the refugees as the return of the Palestinians to their homes was the only alternative acceptable to them. The Israelis rejected repatriation of the refugees for obvious security reasons since there was no provision for an Arab-Israeli

(84) See Clifford, "Factors Influencing Truman," p. 39; Wilson, Decision on Palestine, p. 142; and for details of meeting see Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, pp. 108-09.
peace. Consequently, the new Israeli state solved a Jewish refugee problem by creating an Arab refugee problem. (85)

During the weeks that followed United States recognition of Israel, the question arose of American diplomatic representation in Israel. In July President Truman appointed James G. McDonald to be the government's representative. He would later become the first United States Ambassador to Israel. In keeping with Truman's unilateral policy toward Palestine, McDonald was the President's man in every way, as the White House did not consult the State Department about the appointment. (86)

On July 14, 1948, a few days after McDonald became United States Representative to Israel, Loy Henderson's service as Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ended. The cold warrior, who only a year before had been one of the chief architects of Mr. Truman's foreign policy, was now an embarrassment to the administration because of his opposition to its Palestine policy. He left NEA for the less-sensitive role of Ambassador to India. His departure from NEA saddened colleagues in the State Department and Near Eastern embassies. All understood the pressures and criticisms to which he had been subjected, but they

(85) See Schlesinger, Dynamics of World Power, 5:343-44; and Arakie, Broken Sword, pp. 76-77.

(86) McDonald, Mission in Israel, p. 8.
praised his fairness, patience, and integrity. (87) In a note to William Porter on August 12, 1948, Henderson wrote of his stay in Washington, "It was a thankless and almost killing job; nevertheless, in spite of the worries involved I rather enjoyed the smoke of battle." (88)

(87) Miscellaneous memoranda and notes, India Appointment File, Container 8, LWH Papers.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION:

1945-1948 IN RETROSPECT

From 1945-1948 "the smoke of battle" was thick for Loy Henderson and the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, but with his appointment to India, Henderson moved out of the line of fire. The Director of NEA left a lasting impression, however, especially with regard to the Truman Doctrine and Palestine policy. The Truman Doctrine was the product of many State Department and other administration experts, including such prominent officials as Dean Acheson and Clark Clifford, but it clearly also bore the stamp of Loy W. Henderson. When Henderson became Director of NEA in 1945, he brought with him a knowledge of the Soviet Union surpassed by few others. Understanding Soviet goals and motives, he persistently pointed out to the administration the importance of the Northern Tier to the United States and called for the use of economic aid to increase American prestige in the area. When, as Henderson predicted, Great Britain could no longer meet her obligations, the Director of NEA was a leading influence in the development of a program he had proposed for almost two years.

The Truman Doctrine was just one part of a postwar containment policy which included the Marshall Plan and the
North Atlantic Treaty. This policy attempted to produce an atmosphere in Europe which was conducive to the growth of democracy. The success of this policy is still debated, but the subsequent influence of the Truman Doctrine on foreign affairs should not be underestimated. The President's speech called for the preservation and even expansion of a "way of life." The belief in the rightness of the "American way" had a profound effect on United States foreign policy.(1)

This policy was not entirely new. The United States had opposed totalitarianism in both world wars, but the former ally was now the adversary. Some historians have questioned the doctrine's success and influence on American postwar foreign policy. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. credits the 1948 Tito-Stalin split for the collapse of the Greek civil war. John L. Gaddis asserts that United States policy did not shift from European to world concerns until the Korean War. It is apparent, though, that the action taken in 1950 would not have been as likely if the Truman Doctrine had not been couched in such broad terms and accepted by the American public. President Truman's speech effectively divided the world into two opposing camps - one free, the other subjugated. The doctrine's implied commitment to the containment of a perceived communist tyranny set the tone for American postwar foreign policy. It firmly drew the battle lines for

(1) See Gaddis, "Turning Point," p. 391; and Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, p. 194.
the Cold War. George F. Kennan has noted that the sweeping
language of the speech was not Henderson's, (2) but the doc-
trine clearly reflected Loy Henderson's belief that the
United States had to meet Soviet aggression in the Near East
with a decisive policy of economic and military aid.

The cooperation between the State Department and the
Truman Administration during the formulation of the Truman
Doctrine disappeared in the turmoil of the Palestine affair.
The same pursuit of American principles and national inter-
est which had determined Henderson's Greek-Turkish position
also determined his Palestine position. Viewing the situa-
tion in the context of world affairs and a policy of contain-
ment, he believed that it was dangerous for the United States
to advocate any position which might lead to the spread of
Soviet influence or to war in the Near East. Realizing the
Arab hostility to a growing Jewish presence in Palestine,
Henderson felt that governmental support of a Jewish State in
Palestine was not in the best interest of the United States.
He also believed that an attempt to establish such a state
was in opposition to the principle of self-determination.
Despite his misgivings about Truman's Palestine policy, Hen-
derson always remained loyal to the President; however, it

(2) See Gaddis, "Turning Point," pp. 387, 402; Berle,
Tides of Crisis, pp. 114-15; Freeland, Truman Doctrine and
McCarthyism, p. 88; Lawrence S. Wittner, "The Truman Doctrine
and the Defense of Freedom," Diplomatic History 4:2 (Spring
1980): 161; Kuniholm, Cold War in Near East, p. 425; and
Kennan, Memoirs, p. 315.
was his responsibility as a State Department official to present the best advice possible, even if this advice was not in accord with Mr. Truman's opinion. He wrote of President Truman:

I felt that he almost desperately desired to receive from the State Department the kind of advice that he was receiving from his White House advisers - advice to the effect that it would be in the interest of the United States, regardless of the difficulties and dangers involved, for it to take the lead in establishing a Zionist State in Palestine. Unfortunately, we could not with a clear conscience give that advice. (3)

In the end the President adopted policies based upon his own deep humanitarian concerns and pressures from members of the White House Staff, his political party, and Zionist supporters.

Loy Henderson was accustomed to the heat of battle which he encountered in Washington from 1945-1948. His foreign service career had been fraught with disagreements with the White House. Called "prematurely anti-Communist" by Time, Henderson's dislike and distrust of the Soviet Union and its leadership led to his departure from the American embassy in Moscow in 1938 and to his appointment to Iraq from the Division of European Affairs in 1943. His promotion to India in 1948 was another case of the White House removing the "embarrassment." Through it all Henderson remained a loyal

public servant, performing his duties to the best of his ability. (4)

Questions concerning Loy Henderson's loyalty arose almost thirty years later in Clark Clifford's speech before the American Historical Association. Clifford accused Henderson and NEA of doing everything in their power to block Mr. Truman's humanitarian policy in Palestine, supporting the pro-Arab position of the British rather than the President. Clifford supported his opinion by recounting an argument which he claimed occurred between Henderson and Truman on March 24, 1948, in which the Director of NEA pushed for a Palestine trusteeship rather than partition. (5)

Clifford's address shocked Henderson both in its charges of disloyalty and in its inaccuracies. He was reluctant, however, to respond to Clifford's accusations as he had found that his words were often misquoted or misrepresented. When he answered questions on any topic, Henderson always checked his recollections against public documents and with those who had been involved in the proceedings. Almost eighty-five years old at the time of the Clifford speech, he knew that his memory as well as his health were failing. In a letter to Dean Rusk, the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs during the Palestine crisis, Henderson

(4) "Cold Warrior," p. 20.

denied having attended the meeting with Truman, George Marshall, and Rusk on March 24, 1948. According to Henderson, he attended no meetings with the President in 1948 and certainly did not argue with him. He also pointed out other inaccuracies in the speech such as Clifford's pointing to certain documents as the product of NEA when they were in fact prepared by other State Department offices. (6)

It was Clifford's picture of disloyalty that was most painful to Henderson. He wrote:

I can take criticism for bad judgment, for poor performance, and for inadequacy, but attacks on my motives and charges of disloyalty and lack of honor leave scars that are slow to heal. . . . (7)

Henderson defended the NEA position, stating that its members believed their position was in the best long-term interest of the United States, Palestine, and world peace. (8)

Henderson's battle wounds came not only from the biting criticism, but also from a sense of having failed in his attempt to serve these interests. He believed that the United States had violated traditional American principles by its involvement in the creation of the Jewish State, but


(8) Ibid.
having done so it was obligated to protect Israel and the multitude of Jews that had chosen to live there. In 1977, however, Henderson looked with sadness at what he termed the "hideous thirty-year long nightmare" in the Middle East. (9)

The fight in Loy Henderson died slowly, if indeed it ever died, but the fire and passion evolved into disappointment and bitterness. The title "Cold Warrior" had been appropriate, as he approached each challenge with a zeal and dedication that few could match. His devotion to American principles and welfare was unwaivering in any situation. In a government motivated by the political and the practical, however, Mr. Henderson's ideals were often a stumbling block, but he never relinquished them. At the height of his NEA battles, he wrote:

I must admit that at times during by long connection with the Department and the Service I find myself falling into a state of depression, but it seems that something always happens which bucks me up again to continue the fight. I use the words "the fight" because I feel that unless we in the State Department approach the very vital problems which we are handling in a fighting spirit, we are licked before we have time to display our forces. (10)

Loy W. Henderson fought a gallant fight, but his principles and ideals could not protect him from the political realities

(9) See Loy Henderson to John W. Sutton, July 5, 1974, and Loy Henderson to Robert B. Steward, January 9, 1974, Israel-Palestine Correspondence File, LWH Papers; and Henderson to Rusk, November 20, 1977, LWH Papers.

of American foreign affairs. Foreign Service and State Department officials are expendable when they do not conform to the administration's they serve.
PRIMARY SOURCES

Manuscript Collection


The Henderson Papers consist of approximately 8,000 items, fully indexed and stored in 28 containers. Items concerned with Henderson's early career and the 1945-1948 period are located predominantly in containers 1-13. The papers reveal the personal beliefs and principles which shaped Henderson's foreign policy opinions during the postwar years. They also provide his recollections of people and events, accounts which differ from those of other participants such as George Kennan, Joseph Jones, and Clark Clifford. In detailing these remembrances, Henderson demonstrated his penchant for careful research and verification of facts, qualities which give credence to his accounts and establish his papers as reliable historical sources. The release in 1988 of Henderson's unpublished memoirs will add even more historical value to this collection for the period 1919-1942.

Documents, Reports, Speeches, and Government Publications


The White House staff's view of the Soviet Union in 1946.


Speech presented at a joint meeting of the American Jewish Historical Society and the American Historical Association, December 28, 1976. Henderson disputes Clifford's recollection of the events leading to the recognition of Israel.
Henderson, Loy W. "American Political and Strategic Interests in the Middle East and Southeastern Europe." Department of State Bulletin. 23 November 1947, pp. 996-1000.

Henderson's views on the importance of the Near East, presented at the Academy of Political Science, November 12, 1947.


A summary of the Truman Administration through the use of selected documents with editorial background and comments.


A compilation of important American documents on the Middle East.


Includes Truman's March 12 speech before Congress.


Selected foreign policy documents with useful commentaries.


Background information on foreign service officers.


Six volumes of FRUS noted above provide the primary
source material for the public views and actions of
Henderson and the State Department.

Foreign Policies: Their Formulation and Enforcement,
Henderson’s foreign policy philosophy and his view
of the State Department’s role in the formulation of
foreign policy.

Published Diaries, Memoirs, and Papers

Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State
Recounts the events leading to the formulation of
the Truman Doctrine as well as takes a brief but infor­
mative look at the Palestine problem.

Bohlen, Charles E. Witness to History, 1929-1969. New York:
Valuable insights into Henderson’s years in Moscow
and his influence on those who worked with him.

Forrestal, James. The Forrestal Diaries. Ed. by Walter
Provides insight into the evolution of his Cold War
view of Palestine policy.

Jones, Joseph M. The Fifteen Weeks. New York: Harcourt,
Considered the definitive account of the State
Department’s efforts in preparing the Truman Doctrine.
Henderson disagrees with Jones on the sequence and time
frame of the events of this period as well as the con­
tribution of Kennan.

Valuable information on Henderson’s years in Moscow
and his influence on Kennan. Henderson disputes, how­
ever, aspects of Kennan’s account of the formulation of
the Truman Doctrine.

McDonald, James G. My Mission in Israel, 1948-1951. New
McDonald’s account of his appointment to and years
in Israel.

Provides the President’s recollections of the for-
mulation of the Truman Doctrine and the events leading to the recognition of Israel.


Vandenberg's account of the evolution of American foreign policy and his abandonment of isolationism in the postwar years.


Former Palestine Desk Officer provides a detailed account of the events leading to the creation of Israel.

Journal, Magazine, and Newspaper Articles


Short article on the situation in Palestine in early 1948.


Article announcing Henderson's Distinguished Service Award.


Example of the political pressure placed on Truman.


A contemporary view of the use of pressure politics in the Palestine affair.


Example of public criticism of Henderson and the State Department.

"X". "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Foreign Affairs. 25 (July 1947) :565-77.

George Kennan's "Mr. X" article which expounded the idea of containment.
SECONDARY SOURCES

Cold War


Emphasizes British efforts to keep the United States involved in postwar Europe and the growth of an Anglo-American policy toward the Soviet Union.


A British government official's view of the chronological development of American policy toward the Soviet Union and the success of that policy.


A survey of American foreign relations in the postwar world. Berle credits the Tito-Stalin split rather than the Truman Doctrine with ending the crisis in Greece.


Tells the story of isolationist attempts to influence United States policy from 1943-1954.


Traces the change in the American perception of the Soviet Union during this period. Interviewed numerous participants, such as Kennan and Clifford, but not Henderson.


Analyzes the evolution of American policy toward the Soviet Union, emphasizing America's limited alternatives.


A short survey of American postwar policy.
Attempts to place the Cold War into an historical setting, treating it as a natural progression in foreign relations.

A survey of American foreign policy since 1945.

Extensive work on Acheson, Bohlen, Harriman, Kennan, Lovett, and McCloy and how they shaped American foreign policy. Authors interviewed Henderson and had access to LWH Papers and unpublished memoirs, but they used these sources merely to highlight the personal traits of their subjects.

A short survey of American foreign relations from the turn of the century through the early Cold War years.

Lectures presented at Princeton University in March 1954. A comprehensive statement of Kennan's views on the problems of American foreign policy in the postwar years.

Essays on Americans, such as Wallace and Lippmann, who questioned America's Cold War policy and their suggested alternatives, with an introduction by Paterson.

A revisionist assessment of American postwar foreign policy.

A reexamination of the bases of American foreign
policy decisions and an evaluation of those decisions ten years after the war.


Examines the "how" and "why" of the Cold War, emphasizing the importance of diplomacy and challenging its inevitability.

**Truman Doctrine**


A fine work on Truman's first term. Takes a close look at the President's March 12 speech and the United Nations Palestine proceedings.


Examines the events from 1945-1947 which led to the Truman Doctrine and generated anti-communist fears in the United States. Provides special insight into the Congressional debates.


Proposes that the Truman Doctrine was a statement of the established policy of balance of power, not a shift to worldwide communist containment.


Provides the Turkish view of the Truman Doctrine.


Examines the events in Iran, Turkey, and Greece which led to the formulation of the Truman Doctrine. Interviewed Henderson.


A contemporary account of America's aims in the postwar Mediterranean.

A post-doctrine account of relations between the United States and the Northern Tier.


Examines the evolution of these policies as documented in FRUS.


A candid account of America's dealings with Greece, recognizing both American economic concerns and its genuine fear of Soviet expansion.


Examines American support of the rightwing Greek government after the Truman Doctrine.


The Greek view of the events leading to the Truman Doctrine.

**Palestine and the Near East**


An Indian Muslim evaluation of United States policy toward the Arab world.


A pro-Arab view of America’s role in the creation of Israel.


Provides background for American postwar policies in the Middle East. Author interviewed Henderson in 1972.

A brief look at America’s tangled involvement in the Palestine affair. Author interviewed Henderson.


Examines the results of America’s Middle East policy.


A chronicle of Palestine history from the Mandate to the creation of Israel.


Examines America’s Palestine policy at the United Nations and provides useful bibliographic information.


Provides the State Department’s postwar plans for Palestine.


A Middle East textbook.


Provides background information on American-Palestine relations.


A short work on Arab history and development and the relation of the United States to the Arab world.


Explores the role of the United States in the creation of the Jewish State.


A Palestinian’s view of American policy.

Examines the political issues involved in the Palestine affair and American policy.

VITA

Anne Witt Perkins was born in Richmond, Virginia on September 14, 1953. She attended Westhampton College of the University of Richmond and received a Bachelor of Arts degree in History in May, 1975. While at Westhampton College, she was elected to Phi Beta Kappa and Phi Alpha Theta, the History honor society.

She has worked at the University of Richmond since October, 1976 and is presently Assistant University Registrar. She resides in Richmond.