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The diplomatic mission of Alexander Wilbourne Weddell at the inter-American conference for the maintenance of peace December 1-23, 1936

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THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION OF
ALEXANDER WILBOURNE WEDDELL
AT THE
INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE
DECEMBER 1-23, 1936

BY

PETER NICHOLAS PROSS

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THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION OF
ALEXANDER WILBOURNE WEDDELL
AT THE
INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE
DECEMBER 1-23, 1936

by

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INTRODUCTION

The Good Neighbor Policy is associated with President Franklin D. Roosevelt although its origins can be found in the foreign policy of Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover as well as Woodrow Wilson. Roosevelt pledged the United States to follow the policy of a good neighbor in its international relations during his inaugural address, and specifically applied the good neighbor concept to Latin America in a speech before the Pan American Union on April 12, 1933.

Under the direction of Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Assistant Secretary of State Summer Welles, the Department of State utilized various strategies and tactics to implement the Good Neighbor Policy such as the termination of military occupation in Haiti and Nicaragua, the abrogation of the Platt Amendment, and the development of reciprocal trade agreements. Likewise, the State Department utilized Pan American conferences throughout Roosevelt’s presidency to effectuate policy objectives. These conferences, convened at regular intervals of five years, provided a Pan American forum at which the United States accepted and ratified the principles of non-intervention and hemispheric consultation.

The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace was an extraordinary conference which convened in Buenos Aires on December 1, 1936. The Buenos Aires Conference of 1936, was not a regular conference as it fell between the Montevideo Conference of 1933 and the 1938 Conference at Lima. Convened at the request of FDR, this
extraordinary conference marked the further development of the Good Neighbor Policy and the initiation of hemispheric machinery for collective security. Indeed, past and contemporary historians date the multilateral application or "Pan Americanizing" of the Monroe Doctrine from the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace.

Although the Buenos Aires Conference has been adequately discussed in various monographs and articles, primary emphasis has centered on the activities of President Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs Saavedra Lamas. The diplomatic mission of Alexander Wilbourne Weddell, United States Ambassador to Argentina, has otherwise received scant attention. Ambassador Weddell, while not one of the major decision-makers of the Conference, carried out important, though routine, diplomatic functions which supported the objectives of the State Department. In addition, most historians discussing the Conference have utilized a limited number of primary sources (most notably the reports of the United States delegation and Pan American Union), and overlooked the Weddell Papers at the Virginia Historical Society and certain record groups at the National Archives.

This thesis evaluates the diplomatic activities of Ambassador Weddell at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. Weddell's accomplishments are analyzed against the background of the Conference and the objectives of the State Department. The approach is both chronological and topical, and new or different interpretations of the Conference are not offered. However, the author utilizes heretofore overlooked primary materials and presents a different point of view on the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace—the perspective of Ambassador Weddell.
CHAPTER I

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF
ALEXANDER WILBOURNE WEDDELL

1. Early Life and Initial Diplomatic Career

Alexander Wilbourne Weddell was born on April 6, 1876, and was thus sixty years old when the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace convened in Buenos Aires, Argentina on December 1, 1936.¹ The son of Alexander Watson Weddell, a highly respected Episcopalian minister, he was of old Virginia stock dating to the settlement of the Old Dominion.² He was raised in Richmond, Virginia, and he grew up with a fondness for the Confederacy. Although educated in public and private schools as well as by tutors, Weddell was unable to continue his education beyond secondary school because of his father's death and monetary limitations.³

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Weddell held a variety of positions with local businesses including The Southern Churchman, Southern Bell Telephone and Citizens Bank, and he was a clerk and private secretary for John Skelton Williams, one of the organizers and the first president of Seaboard Air-Lines Railway. Weddell was also active in Richmond society, attending church functions, literary meetings and local parties. An avid reader and bibliophile, Weddell studied classical languages, literature, history and international law.  

The future Ambassador, however, was unhappy and frequently depressed in the business world. Weddell's unfinished autobiography, "Parson's Son," contains numerous references to his displeasure and depression. Seeking a change in both occupation and locale, Weddell moved to Washington, D.C. in 1904 to work as a clerk at the Library of Congress. His appointment to the Library of Congress was sponsored by Thomas Nelson Page and Egbert G. Leigh, Jr., both notables of Richmond society. During his tenure at the Library of Congress, Weddell achieved his coveted but delayed desire for professional training. He studied international law at George Washington University as a special night student, and, in 1908, he received a L.L.B.


5 For examples, see Chapters II and III. Weddell, unfortunately, emphasized literary and social events rather than diplomatic affairs in his autobiography and personal correspondence. Still, diplomatic students can acquire valuable information and insight from Weddell's discussion of foreign affairs and society.
degree. 6

Weddell remained unhappy with his career despite his relocation to Washington, D.C. and his love for books. He especially reacted against the drudging monotony and bureaucracy of the Library of Congress. An event occurred, however, which eventually led to personal fulfillment and a life-long career. One day in 1907; as he was rushing from the Library of Congress, Weddell stopped to tie his shoelace and missed his street car. Weddell caught the next street car and met a man who told him that the American Minister to Denmark, Dr. Maurice Egan, was seeking a private secretary. Weddell secured the position and thus embarked upon a varied and notable foreign service career. 7

In addition to serving as private secretary to the Minister, Weddell also served as a clerk at the American Legation in Copenhagen. He described the activities of the American Legation as routine and socially oriented. It was a mementous occasion when the Legation received a despatch from the Department of State. As a result, Legation personnel, including Dr. Egan and Weddell, concentrated on social and cultural activities. The American Legation was not

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involved exclusively in social activities, however, for Dr. Egan was responsible for negotiations between the United States and Denmark which resulted in the sale of the Danish West Indies.\(^8\) Due to his positions at the Legation, it can be surmised that Weddell was involved in the negotiations.

Weddell studied languages while in Copenhagen to prepare for the foreign service examination. Out of a class of 35, Weddell finished second among the ten who passed the exam in 1909. He won an appointment to the United States consular service and was appointed consul to the East African island of Zanzibar on January 11, 1910. Weddell's responsibilities consisted of filing periodic trade reports and serving American citizens in Zanzibar. This last duty was not extremely strenous, however, for there was only one American in Weddell's colony. Following this duty, Weddell filled a similar post at Catania, Italy beginning on August 22, 1912. The King of Italy awarded the collar of the Crown to Weddell for his services to earthquake victims. Even though he had served at two undesirable posts, Weddell earned a high reputation after only four years in the Consular Service. As a

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\(^8\) Weddell, "Parson's Son," Weddell Papers; United States Department of State, Register of the Department of State, July 1, 1936 (Washington, 1936), p. 282. This publication will hereinafter be cited as USDS, Register, followed by the appropriate date. On August 4, 1916, the United States purchased the Danish West Indies for $25,000,000 in cash. Denmark gave up her entire sovereignty over the islands. With the outbreak of World War One, the United States was particularly desirous to acquire the islands because of the German threat to Denmark (Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation, Reprint [New York, 1967], p. 193).
result, he was named Consul General at Athens, Greece in June, 1914.\(^9\)

Weddell was responsible for the repatriation of American citizens in Greece during the First World War. The arrival of thousands of Serbian refugees, many with friends and relatives in the United States, posed another problem. The Serbian government decorated Weddell with the Order of Mercy for his service during the Great War; The King of Greece also awarded him the collar of the Commander of the Order of George the First.\(^10\) During the course of the war, Weddell offered his resignation to President Wilson so that he might enter the war effort. Wilson refused to accept the resignations, however, due to Weddell's valuable work in Greece.\(^11\)

In December, 1916, Weddell was detailed to Beirut as Consul General. Enemy action, however, prevented him from reaching this post, and, he was reassigned as attaché to the American diplomatic agency in Cairo from January to May, 1917. He was then transferred back to Athens on April 10, 1917, and remained at this post until 1920. In addition to his grade of Consul General, Weddell held several offices while in Athens. He was named commercial delegate

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of the United States to the Inter-Allied Commercial Bureau and delegate of the War Trade Board for Greece. The former position with the Inter-Allied Commercial Bureau involved the preparation of allied black lists for the Mediterranean region. The Richmond native was also a provisional delegate on the Inter-Allied Financial and Military Commissions for Greece. He served as Commercial Advisor with diplomatic rank and was twice Charge d'Affairs ad Interim for the American Legation. Weddell was appointed Consul General of class four on September 5, 1919.  

Weddell later reminisced that the event which gave him the greatest satisfaction of his career occurred while he was Charge d'Affairs ad Interim in Athens. Several weeks before the general armistice, Weddell was advised that he could report to the United States that the Bulgarian army had sent a flag of truce to the allied lines requesting a cessation of hostilities. He was the first official in Greece to bring the news of this break in the solidarity of the Central Powers to the attention of the State Department.  

It seems unlikely that a diplomat who would later host the President of the United States in a foreign country and who would serve as Ambassador to Argentina and Spain would describe this event

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12 Weddell, "Memorandum," Weddell Papers; USDS, Register, July 1, 1936, p. 282.

as his most memorable. One might suggest that Weddell's sense of patriotism and national honor was stronger than his personal pride and that the significance of Roosevelt's visit to the 1936 Buenos Aires Conference was not yet evident. Even though he personally was not responsible for bringing about the surrender, this event represented Weddell's first diplomatic success or triumph. The forty-two year old Consul General had the opportunity, after serving at dreary posts for seven years, to report an event of considerable diplomatic and military importance.

Weddell was next assigned to Calcutta as Consul General, on July, 1920 where he was the highest ranking officer of the United States government. His duties included negotiating with the British imperial government at Delhi on various matters concerning American interests in the Indian peninsula. He was appointed Consul General of class three November 19, 1921. 14 Weddell met his future wife during his service in Calcutta. Mrs. Virginia Chase Steedman was the childless widow of a prominent St. Louis businessman, and she met the American Consul General while touring the Far East. Weddell and Mrs. Steedman were married in New York City May 31, 1923. 15

Shortly thereafter, Weddell was detailed to the Department of State. He was appointed Foreign Service Officer of class two July 11,

14 Weddell, "Memorandum," Weddell Papers; USDS, Register, July 1, 1936, p. 282.

15 Weddell, "Parson's Son," Weddell Papers; Rouse, "Making Friends," Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 19, 1942, p. 1; "Alex. and Virginia Weddell," Richmond News Leader, January 2, 1948, p. 10. During the month of his wedding, Weddell was a delegate at the Ninth Foreign Trade Convention in New Orleans (USDS, Register, January 1, 1927, p. 204.)
1924 and assigned to Mexico City August 1, 1924. Weddell served four years in Mexico, acquiring the rank of Foreign Service Officer class one December 17, 1925. During his tenure in Mexico City, Weddell obtained the maps of the American frontier explorer Zebulon Pike from the Mexican government. The maps were later presented to the War Department as a gift. While on leave in 1925, the Weddells toured England and came upon the ancient and unoccupied Priory of the Holy Sepulchre at Warwick. Originally erected in 1125, the Priory was dismantled, transported and reconstructed in Richmond. Weddell called his resurrected home Virginia House, a tribute to both his wife and his native state. A portion of Virginia House was also modeled after Sulgrave Manor, the ancestral English home of George Washington. On May 31, 1929, Alexander and Virginia Weddell conveyed the entire property of Virginia House to the Virginia Historical Society, retaining a life interest.

2. Retirement and Appointment to Argentina

Alexander W. Weddell, after serving twenty-two years in the Foreign Service, advanced from private secretary to Consul General and obtained the highest class of Foreign Service Officer. According to the Richmond News Leader, his performance constituted a quiet victory for career diplomacy. Despite these accomplishments,

16 USDS, Register, January 1, 1927, p. 204; Mobley, "Playing Host," Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 6, 1936, p. 9; Alexander Wilbourne Weddell, A Description of Virginia House in Henrico County near Richmond, Virginia The Home of Mr. and Mrs. Alexander Wilbourne Weddell (Richmond, 1947), pp. 1-12.

however, Weddell had fared only moderately well. He was nearly fifty-two years of age and had not yet attained the coveted rank of ambassador, the highest in the intricate hierarchy of diplomacy. Also, the possibility of being appointed was politically remote because Weddell was a Democrat and the 1920's were years of Republican rule. As a result, Weddell notified the Department of State on July 7, 1928, that he intended to resign from the Foreign Service; he cited pressure from personal affairs in the United States as a reason for his retirement. 18

Weddell's correspondence does not contain an explicit explanation of his personal pressures. However, Weddell's personal pressures in the United States most likely involved the recent purchase and reconstruction of Virginia House. More important in his decision, perhaps, was Weddell's displeasure with the Coolidge-Kellogg Administration and its failure to promote him to ambassador. This disgruntlement is reflected by one of Weddell's colleagues who wrote in August, 1933, that "many times since our talk in your office in Mexico City have I regretted my ready concurrence in your plans to leave the Service following your disappointment at the hands of Mr. Kellogg [Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg] ... It was a pity for you to leave the Service in full stride as you did." 19


19 Reed Paige Clarke to Weddell, August 8, 1933, Weddell Papers.
His superiors in the Department of State also stressed that there was no doubt that he would be recommended for chief of a mission when the opportunity arose. William R. Castle, Jr., Acting Secretary of State, wrote to the retiring Consul General and remarked that he was "very much distressed today to receive your telegram saying that you thought you would resign from the Service. The upper ranks of the Service are, as you very well know, lamentably weak and for one of the best men we have to resign seems to me a real tragedy. . . . all I know is that you are very highly considered. . . ."²⁰

James R. Sheffield, the American Ambassador to Mexico from 1924 to 1927, also consoled Weddell.

It seems to me a great loss to the Service to have you resign. You are so eminently fit for a ministerial post, and would so easily fit in to the scheme of advancing the highest Consular Officers to ministerial rank that I have a sense of pity for the Department that it does not see the wisdom of thus promoting you. In loyalty, in ability, in devotion to the Service and in intellectual and personal charm, you are an outstanding man.

Sheffield went on to comment that "if men of your calibre and your attainment are not to be recognized, then our Foreign Service is indeed a pie-eyed affair."²¹

On July 7, 1928, Weddell notified Dwight W. Morrow, American Ambassador to Mexico, of his intentions to resign. Morrow observed that the Consul General had undertaken valuable work in Mexico, and


²¹James R. Sheffield to Weddell, July 18, 1928, Weddell Papers.
expressed the hope that the State Department's reply to his notification would cause him to reconsider. Weddell, however, disregarded these efforts of dissuasion and resigned on October 5, 1928.22

Weddell returned to his native city in 1928 to spend what he thought would probably be the remainder of his life. He did not fade from public service, however, as he undertook projects which he had long contemplated. "I retired from service in 1928, and found much work to do in Virginia. I managed to turn out two rather creditable works on Virginia and local history ... I have also done much social service work, child welfare, etc."23 With the assistance of others, Weddell assembled a memorable exhibition of Virginia portraits at Virginia House. In 1930, he edited the monumental, and still very valuable, reference work entitled Virginia Historical Portraiture. He collected the illustrations and wrote the text for Richmond Virginia in Old Prints. Weddell was also elected president of the Richmond Community Fund and was a founder of the Virginia Museum of Fine Arts. For five years the Weddells were closely associated with most of the civic and artistic events in Richmond.24

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22 Morrow to Weddell, July 9, 1928, Weddell Papers; USDS Register, July 1, 1936, p. 282.

23 Weddell to Alan H. Lloyd, August 11, 1933, Weddell Papers.

The former Consul General likewise pursued his literary and historical interests. In 1930, he received the degree of Litt. D. from Hampden-Sydney Institute. Weddell's other scholastic citations included L.L.D.'s from the University of Richmond and the College of William and Mary. He was also admitted to the parent chapter of Phi Beta Kappa in 1929, and on two occasions served as president of the parent chapter. He expressed his interests in Virginia history by contributing his time, talents and money to the Virginia Historical Society. Weddell later became president of the Virginia Historical Society and confided that he appreciated this honor more than any honor bestowed on him. The Weddells believed that the Virginia Historical Society would receive few large benefactions and that they could not dedicate their wealth more fruitfully than to the preservation of Virginia's records and history. When they died without issue in 1948, the bulk of their estates was bequeathed to the Virginia Historical Society. 25

Weddell, however, did not remain separated from government service. After a five year retirement from the Foreign Service, Alexander Wilbourne Weddell was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Argentina by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Weddell's return to the Foreign Service and his attainment of ambassadorial rank took place when he was fifty-seven years old.

25 Weddell, "Memorandum," Weddell Papers; "Alex. and Virginia Weddell," Richmond News Leader, January 2, 1948, pp. 2 and 10. The Weddell's were mourned and eulogized by local papers after their death in an early morning train wreck. Douglas Southall Freeman was editor of the Richmond News Leader during this period; he was also a close friend of Weddell. Although "Alex. and Virginia Weddell" was unsigned, one can reasonably surmise that Freeman was the author of this sentimental eulogy.
Even though Weddell had become deeply involved with community and academic events, he experienced a "terrible nostalgia for the old life" during his short retirement. Weddell's diplomatic longings coincided with the 1932 presidential campaign between Republican incumbent Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Democrat challenger. The Weddells were strong admirers of Roosevelt and they contributed liberally—$150,000, some said—to the Democratic fund.26

It is not possible, unfortunately, to identify who initially suggested Weddell for an ambassador's post. Nevertheless, one can determine that Weddell's nomination was engineered and supported by several of Roosevelt's political supporters. After Roosevelt's victory in November, 1932, Senators Carter Glass and Harry Flood Byrd, both Virginia democrats, conferred with Roosevelt's campaign manager, Jim Farley. These men, along with Virginia Governor John Garland Pollard, suggested Weddell for the embassy in Rome; Weddell was also mentioned for missions to Madrid, Brussels and Brazil.

Andrew Jackson Montague, Governor of Virginia from 1902 and 1906 and

26 Weddell to Lloyd, August 11, 1933, Weddell Papers; Rouse "Making Friends," Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 19, 1942, p. 1. A colleague of Ambassador Weddell later commented that Weddell still had diplomatic longings in him after his retirement. Having contributed to the Roosevelt campaign, Weddell intimated that he would be happy to serve as Minister to Greece, of which he was fond (Spruille Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues: The Memoirs of Spruille Braden [New Rochell, N.Y.], p. 118).
United States Congressman from 1913 to 1937, likewise sent a testimonial to Roosevelt in 1933 concerning Weddell's appointment. 27

Noting Weddell's dissatisfaction with his separation from the Foreign Service, it can be reasonably surmised that he indicated a desire to reenter diplomacy. The election of Roosevelt and subsequent shifting of government patronage from Republicans to Democrats opened various diplomatic posts. With his financial backing of Roosevelt and his long diplomatic career, Alexander Weddell was a suitable choice for an ambassador's post. Likewise, it is reasonable to surmise that Congressman Montague, Senators Glass and Byrd, and Governor Pollard were favorable towards Weddell because of his social and political background, and that they would desire to bring about the appointment of a Virginian to the highest rank of the Foreign Service. The initiation and support for Weddell's nomination, therefore, can be considered a result of his dissatisfaction with retirement, his previous diplomatic career, and, perhaps most important, his political affiliations with the National Democratic Party.

As previously mentioned, Weddell was initially suggested as ambassador to several countries not including Argentina. An examination of Weddell's characteristics as well as his personal correspondence provides numerous reasons for his eventual appointment to Argentina. The former Consul General's appearance and demeanor

was an important and obvious attribute. A Virginia gentleman and
career man of the "old school" of diplomacy, Weddell looked the part
of an ambassador. 28 Robert F. Woodward had a "worm's-eye" viewpoint
as vice consul in Buenos Aires, and commented that Weddell "seemed to
those of us who regarded him from rather afar as the quintessence of
the Classical-Regional Tradition of Virginia." 29 Woodward's colleague
and fellow vice consul, John C. Pool, described the Ambassador as
"an unusually attractive and charming southern gentleman," 30 while
Heyward G. Hill, a vice consul who also served in Buenos Aires,
characterized Weddell as a true intellectual as well as a fine and
courtly gentleman in the best tradition of the "old school." 31

The Ambassador was further described by his contemporaries as
being affable, easy to work with, and a very experienced diplomat.
He was tall, handsome and debonair, as well as distinguished in
appearance. Also, Weddell was mildly fond of bourbon whisky and
fashionable society. 32 Vice consul and third Secretary William C.

28 Rouse, "Making Friends," Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 19, 1942,
p. 1; Willard Beulac, Career Ambassador (New York, 1951), p. 184; E.
Wilder Spaulding, Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary (Washington,

29 Robert F. Woodward to Peter N. Pross, October 7, 1975.

30 John C. Pool to Pross, October 18, 1975.

31 Heyward G. Hill to Pross, December 2, 1975 and November 15, 1977.
Weddell was also typified as a Virginia gentleman in his speech, cour-
tesy and manners. Since he took great pride in his ancestry, he in-
vitably wore the Society of Cincinnati rosetta in his lapel (William
C. Trimble to Pross, January 11, 1976).

32 Raymond C. Cox to Pross, November 17, 1975 (Cox was first Secre-
tary of the Embassy from 1933 to 1936); Trimble to Pross, January 11,
Trimble described Weddell in detail:

The Ambassador was around 6'3" in height with erect carriage and weighing . . . about 180 lbs. He had light hair which was turning gray, blue-gray eyes, rather high cheekbones, regular features and a somewhat ruddy complexion. He invariably wore a pince-nez glasses which gave him a rather piercing expression. He was well dressed in a conservative manner favoring dark blue or brown suits and frequently wore spats and had white piping on his waistcoat [sic]. Initially he wore stiff collars but later turned to soft ones . . . . The Ambassador was rather reserved in manner, possibly because of shyness, and took himself quite seriously. He did, however, have a good sense of humor and, when he got to know one well, would display a warmth and friendliness.\footnote{Trimble to Pross, January 11, 1976.}

Weddell possessed other attributes that were important for the chief of a diplomatic mission. He was conscientious, a man of good will, and always eager to learn about any nation to which he was assigned. Likewise, Weddell was a man of artistic tastes and a scholar of literature and history.\footnote{Charles R. Halstead, "Diligent Diplomat, Alexander W. Weddell as Ambassador to Spain, 1939-1942," \textit{Virginia Magazine of History and Biography} 82 (January, 1974), p. 4.} Being an experienced and career diplomat, he was fluent in French, at that time the language of international diplomacy. While in Mexico Mr. Weddell studied Hispanic culture and Spanish assiduously, and possessed a usable knowledge of that tongue as well as Italian and Greek.\footnote{Weddell, "Memorandum," Weddell Papers; J.C. Satterthwaite to Pross, November 23, 1975; Woodward to Pross, October 7, 1975; Trimble to Pross, January 11, 1976.} He had been a court re-
porter and secretary as young man, and could put his knowledge of shorthand to good use in drafting despatches, letters and speeches. Weddell also had an astonishingly retentive mind for certain things, and was capable of interspersing his conversations with quotations from the classic Greeks, Uncle Remus or whatever happened to suite his purpose.  

An attractive woman of wealth and fashionable society, Mrs. Virginia Chase Weddell was a further assett. She was lady "equal to every occasion," and was noted for her philanthropies. Like her husband, she was handsome and distinguished in appearance.

Mrs. Weddell was also tall and also had blue-gray eyes and blonde hair turning gray. Although not fat, she was a bit plump and, I would imagine, had to watch her diet. Mrs. Weddell must have been a beauty in her youth and was still very good-looking. . . . Mrs. Weddell was more out-going [than her husband] but was always the "Ambassadress."  

Mrs. Weddell's private income was likewise influential in bringing about her husband's Argentine appointment because Buenos

36 Satterthwaite to Pross, November 23, 1975; Beaulac, Career Ambassador, p. 184; Rouse, "Making Friends," Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 19, 1942, p. 1. Weddell, for instance, extemporaneously quoted Chateaubriand's sonnet to the temple at Suhuriu on two occasions seven years apart--in French (Edward P. Maffitt to Pross, November 21, 1975).

37 Cited in Halstead, "Diligent Diplomat," p. 5.

38 Trimble to Pross, January 11, 1976. Mrs. Weddell was disposed to be arbitrary and to command everyone around her (Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues, p. 118).
Aires was then one of the most expensive posts in the Foreign Service and the Democratic Party of that day had few millionaires. In fact, Weddell's colleagues and contemporaries viewed his appointment as a reward for political contributions to the Democratic Party, even though he was a career Foreign Service officer.  

Weddell's secretary at Virginia House explained that "Mrs. Weddell was a wealthy widow and after their marriage I imagine this helped him become ambassador. I do not think these positions come for 'nothing'."  

Weddell's appointment to the Argentine Republic was influenced by another important factor--his friendship with three of Roosevelt's advisors and friends. He later commented that he was back again in the Foreign Service after "one or two close friends of the President's were able to persuade him [Roosevelt] that I could do the Argentine job . . ." According to Fortune, Senator Byrd and Louis McHenry Howe were the two close friends who helped make Weddell an Ambassador.  

As previously noted, Byrd was among the Virginia Democrats

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39 Trimble to Pross, January 11, 1977; Halstead, "Diligent Diplomat," p. 4; Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues, p. 118; Beaulac, Career Ambassador, p. 183; For further discussion, see Fortune "Their Excellencies, Our Ambassadors: There are Sixteen of them. Who, What, Where, and Why?" 9(April, 1934), p. 108.


41 Weddell to Lloyd, August 11, 1933, Weddell Papers.

who initially suggested Weddell to Roosevelt's campaign manager. Byrd's further interest was manifested on May 8, 1933, when he met with President Roosevelt. Senator Byrd dispatched the following telegram to Weddell after the meeting:

Have seen President today and he advises your appointment will be sent to Senate tomorrow. Will arrange for immediate consideration. Again congratulate you and the country. 43

Howe was Roosevelt's close friend of twenty years and the President's personal secretary. He was also a friend of the Weddells, as described by Mrs. Dugdale: "[He] had been an old beau of Mrs. Weddell and [had] paid a visit at Virginia House. He was not very well and he 'took a nap' on a 17th century red damask spread which came to pieces."44 Due to his position as personal secretary to the President, Howe was aware of proposed Foreign Service personnel changes and appointments. It is reasonable to surmise that he was closely involved with the decision to name Weddell to Argentina. 45

Under Secretary of State William Phillips likewise influenced the President's decision. In fact, Weddell's correspondence indicates that Phillips was one of the close friends and advisors who

43 Weddell to William Phillips, May 9, 1933, Weddell Papers.
44 Dugdale to Pross, September 19, 1975.
persuaded Roosevelt that Weddell could "do the Argentine job."

Phillips had been the examination officer when Weddell took the
Foreign Service entrance examination, and had shown a previous interest in Weddell's career. 46 As under Secretary of State, Phillips assisted President Roosevelt in choosing new ambassadors. He prepared a memorandum for Roosevelt which consisted of a list of countries and suggested appointments, and submitted the following request on April 8, 1933:

If you are ready to make the changes in the Diplomatic Service which I had the pleasure of discussing with you some days ago, I should be very grateful if you would so indicate on the accompanying memorandum. Perhaps you could do this by writing the word "approved" after each country or indicate such other wishes as you desire.47

Weddell discussed his impending appointment with Phillips on May 8, 1933, and Phillips indicated that he would discuss Weddell's appointment with the President. Later that day, Weddell received Byrd's telegram which indicated that Roosevelt was sending Weddell's appointment to the Senate. Weddell thereupon thanked Phillips:

Having in mind our telephonic conversation of yesterday morning, and your thoughtful suggestion that you would speak to the President concerning the subject of my appointment, I am happy to conclude . . . that I am again in your debt for your kind interest in my affairs. . . 48

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46 Weddell to Phillips, May 9 and July 31, 1933, Weddell Papers. Howe had recruited Roosevelt's old friend William Phillips as Under Secretary to relive Secretary Hull of expensive entertaining (Rollins, Roosevelt and Howe, p. 372).

47 Nixon, Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, I, pp. 50-51. Weddell was listed on the memorandum although he was not suggested for Argentina. Roosevelt made only one notation. Under Brazill he wrote: "Weddell--of Va Pollard's man?"

48 Weddell to Phillips, May 9, 1933, Weddell Papers. As of May 13, 1933, Weddell's prospective appointment had been prepared and on the
Weddell inquired on June 10 if the State Department desired that he take his oath on August 1. Phillips authorized Weddell to take his oath on August 1, and transmitted instructions regarding Weddell's appointment and travel.⁴⁹

3. First Three Years of Argentine Duty

Before departing for Buenos Aires, Weddell attended a luncheon on August 15, 1933, given in his honor by the Pan American Society. He cited President Roosevelt's hopes of establishing "a new ideal in the relations between states," and "a Foreign Service not solely concerned with the development of our own interests." The newly appointed Ambassador conveyed Roosevelt's assurances that no matter was "nearer to his brain and heart than our relations with the republics of the Americas." Likewise, he declared that "we want no big brother attitude, no paternalistic attitude but a neighborly and exact reciprocity" in all the relations between the United States and the other American republics. In his concluding remarks, Weddell emphasized that it was important to "exorcise" the old type of utterly selfish diplomacy if world relations were to be improved; he also linked the success of

desk of the Chief of the Division of Foreign Service Administration "for a while." The appointment had not yet been authorized by Roosevelt (Herbert C. Hengstler to Weddell, May 13, 1933, Weddell Papers).

⁴⁹ Weddell to Phillips, May 9, 1933; Phillips to Weddell, June 28, 1933, Weddell Papers. The official date of Weddell's appointment was June 3, 1933 (USDS, Register, July 1, 1936, p. 282). Fortune characterized Weddell as being a career ambassador type and not reflective of the tenets of the New Deal. The magazine also indited the New Deal for standing pat in the conventions of filling South American embassies with less promising political appointees or with "fair-to-middling" Ambassadors (Fortune, Their Excellencies," pp. 108 and 120). Roosevelt appointed five career Foreign Service Officers, including Weddell, to ambassador's posts. (William Barnes and John H. Morgan, The Foreign Service of the United States: Origins, Developments, and Functions
peace efforts to personal disarmament.

Do not let the cynics and materialists make merry over this intimation of a new diplomacy. They had their way for a thousand years, and we see the nations starving for lack of that which they need, for lack of that which is expressed in the words, 'Where there is no vision, the people perish'.

There is a personal disarmament which we must all practice if the efforts of the nations are to amount to anything; a jettisoning of prejudices, a jettisoning of any feelings of imagined superiority and an avoidance of that inordinate affection for certain nations which is so often accompanied by dislike of others.  

A participant at the luncheon wrote to Secretary of State Hull and noted that Weddell's tolerant spirit and wide knowledge were apparent. "I am sure everyone felt that the representation of our Government in Argentina would be in most capable hands."  

The Weddells left New York City August 19, 1933, on the steamship S.S. Southern Cross, and arrived in Buenos Aires September 7, 1933. The new Ambassador, according to the New York Times, received wider and "more friendly publicity than has been accorded to any other arriving diplomat in years." Weddell presented his credentials as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Argentine President Agustin P. Justo on September 18, 1933.

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50 As quoted in "Weddell Extols a 'New Diplomacy',," New York Times, August 16, 1933, p. 20. These final comments foreshadowed an address which he made on December 19, 1936 before the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace.

51 Robert H. Patchin to Cordell Hull, August 15, 1933, Weddell Papers.

52 New York Times, August 19 and September 18, 1933.

53 Weddell to Robert Woods Bliss, September 18, 1933, Weddell
In many respects, Weddell’s mission was ideal and yet portentous. The Roosevelt Administration had recently proclaimed the Good Neighbor Policy and was attempting to reverse past policies and built-up hostilities. Weddell recognized that the United States was embarking on a new course. "The job, as you suggest, is a difficult one, but it is nice to feel that I came here at a time when we are entering on a new era in our relations with South America, one in which there is more heart and conscious and neighborly feeling than before."54 Argentina was among the major Latin American republics, and was the leading spokesman for Latin American freedom from the United States. Driven by isolationism, by devotion to Europe and to the League of Nations, and by a deep urge to lead the Latin American states, Argentina maintained a spirited rivalry to America’s leadership of the western hemisphere.55

Weddell initially described his task as difficult and a little bewildering, and could only compare himself "to a man walking down a

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Papers; Satterthwaite to Pross, November 23, 1975. Bliss was the United States Ambassador to Argentina from 1927 until Weddell’s appointment.

54 Weddell to Clifford Smith, January 11, 1934, Weddell Papers.

street strewn with banana peels." However, after serving in Buenos Aires for four months, he viewed his task more positively:

The task of learning a new job and a new language and a new people has been rather trying and I still feel that I am by no means out of the wood. But things are getting a little more into their true perspective and if I can make a little more progress in Spanish, I feel that the work before me will be greatly facilitated.57

There are differences of opinion concerning Weddell's knowledge of Spanish. When he arrived in Argentina in 1933, a sound knowledge of Spanish was essential for any diplomat serving in that country. The Ambassador had served four years in Mexico and had studied Spanish assiduously. Yet, as noted above and by others, Weddell was handicapped by his Spanish. William Trimble described Weddell's Spanish as less than fluent, and noted that the Ambassador admitted to sounding "like a phonograph" since he had learned the language mostly from language records. According to Trimble, this shortcoming circumscribed Weddell's ability to conduct negotiations, and continued to be a handicap, although his Spanish gradually improved.58

Conversely,

56 Weddell to Hugh S. Cummings, October 23, 1933; see also Weddell to Clark, September 9, 1933; Weddell to William E. Chapman, September 11, 1933; Weddell to Arthur Garrells, September 28, 1933.

57 Weddell to Thomas Benjamin Gay, January 18, 1934, Weddell Papers.

58 Weddell, "Memorandum," Weddell Papers; Trimble to Pross, January 11, 1977. Another colleague indicated that he was weak in Spanish despite years in Latin America (Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues, p. 137).
several of Weddell's colleagues indicated that his knowledge of the language was thorough and that he was quite fluent. 59

Weddell was involved with various projects and conferences from the date of his arrival until the initial planning stages of the Buenos Aires Conference. Perhaps his most important assignment was the improvement of commercial relations which had been greatly affected by the Great Depression, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930, and an American embargo against Argentine beef. Specifically, Weddell was responsible for the negotiation of a reciprocal trade agreement and the "unfreezing" of blocked or frozen American credits.60 Since he had undertaken similar "spade work" during his previous Foreign Service career, Fortune predicted that "Ambassador Weddell bids fair to turn out well."61

His duties included the "routine of citizenship, extradition et cetera," as well as reporting on political and diplomatic events within Argentina. Although he rarely prepared a despatch or cable for the State Department, Weddell meticulously reviewed the drafts written by his subordinates. The Ambassador did carry on active correspondence with many friends and associates, notably with Courtney Espil, the American-born wife of the Argentine Ambassador in Washington.

59 Maffitt to Pross, November 21, 1975; Satterthwaite to Pross, November 23, 1975.

60 Weddell to Courtney Espil, July 16, 1934, Weddell Papers; Mobley, "Playing Host," Richmond Times-Dispatch, December, 1936, p. 8. Argentine-United States commercial relations during the Ambassador's tour of duty were somewhat difficult for the American Embassy. The two countries were competing in the export of cattle and agricultural products, and Argentina strongly opposed the United States high tariff policy (Satterthwaite to Pross, November 23, 1975).

61 Fortune, "Their Excellencies," p. 120.
Weddell kept Mrs. Espil informed of Argentine social and political events. He often entertained his friends with witty and humorous remarks about major personalities of the Argentine Government. He described President Agustin P. Justo as having the taciturnity of a soldier, and noted that Justo "translates my close attention as a sign that I am deaf so that the several times I have seen him he has drawn his chair up close to me and bawled." Weddell got along well with General Justo, President from 1932 to 1938, and with his successor Robert M. Ortiz. The Ambassador from Virginia had a more difficult relationship with the inordinately proud Minister of Foreign Affairs who was "rather inclined . . . to upstage lesser mortals." With black mustache, high stiff collar, and imperious manner, Carlos Saavedra Lamas was a throwback to the school of diplomacy practiced by Bismarck and Disraeli. Weddell described the Foreign Minister as being a vain man, and commented that "the way I hang on his words in an endeavor to catch just what he is trying to say should make me extremely popular. . . ." Likewise, Weddell felt it was difficult to get his ideas across to Saavedra Lamas.

He is always willing to do all of the talking, but even he gets out of breath at times and I, having carefully memorized or mentally prepared my remarks, or even having reduced them to writing, watch my

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62 Weddell to Gay, January 18, 1934, Weddell Papers; Trimble to Pross, January 11, 1976.

63 Weddell to Gay, January 18, 1934, Weddell Papers.

64 Woodward to Pross, October 7, 1975. See also Trimble to Pross, January 11, 1976.
opportunity either to declaim or read. . . .

It is interesting to note that one of Weddell's colleagues perceived the fine hand of Assistant Secretary of State Summer Welles behind Weddell's appointment due to similarities between Saavedra Lamas and Weddell. According to Robert F. Woodward, who served as a vice consul in Buenos Aires and who later achieved the rank of ambassador, Saavedra Lamas and Weddell both represented the quintessence of parallel traditions. Summer Welles, when confronted with the need to appoint Weddell, matched the Virginian up with Saavedra Lamas. Even though Weddell and Saavedra Lamas were similar in some respects, the Ambassador tended to avoid the Casa Rosada, in which the Minister of Foreign Affairs was housed. He usually sought the Minister's overworked but courteous and cooperative Secretary General when he had business with the Ministry.

The Ambassador was a delegate at several Pan American conferences including the Montevideo Conference of 1933 and the Pan American Commercial Conference of 1935. Neither Weddell nor several other American chiefs of mission present at the Montevideo Conference played a substantial part in the discussions. Mr. Weddell was of help, but major credit for the success of the Conference belongs to Secretary

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65 Weddell to Gay, January 18, 1934, Weddell Papers. For further discussion of Saavedra Lamas, see Peterson, *Argentina and the United States*, p. 380.

66 Woodward to Pross, October 7, 1975.

67 Trimble to Pross, January 11, 1976.
of State Cordell Hull. Fortune indicated that Weddell, along with other American Ambassadors, disappointed Secretary Hull during his tour. The Ambassador was a co-chairman of the United States delegation at the Buenos Aires Commercial Conference of 1935. Again, his role was largely titular in nature, and most of the work was undertaken by senior officials of the State Department and Embassy staff. Weddell also served as a delegate at the Chaco Peace Conference. He frequently commented on the negotiations, and remarked on one occasion that "[I'm] trying to settle a war with my right hand and protect American interests with my left." The Ambassador received credit, along with fellow negotiator Spruille Braden, for saving the peace talks at several critical points.

Representational and social duties are an important part of an Ambassador's responsibilities. Ambassador and Mrs. Weddell took their representational duties seriously, and, at frequent receptions, luncheons, and dinners of an official nature, they entertained effectively for the United States. They were exceptionally good at this

68 Satterthwaite to Pross, November 23, 1975; Fortune, "Their Excellencies," p. 120; Trimble to Pross, January 11, 1976. On the other hand, Hull noted that Weddell was one of the most valuable delegates at the Conference (Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, (New York, 1948), I, p. 327).

69 Weddell to Mrs. Shearman Turner, September 6, 1934. For further examples of Weddell's comments on the Chaco negotiations, see Weddell to Gay, January 18, 1934; Weddell to Meredith Nicholson, October 5, 1934; Weddell to Douglas Gordon, July 11, 1935, Weddell Papers.

70 Peterson, Argentina and the United States, p. 389. See also, Bliss to Weddell, June 19, 1935; John Stewart Bryan to Weddell, July 10, 1935, Weddell Papers.
function, and used the fine Embassy residence to very good advan-
tage. The American Embassy was a magnificent building which had once
been the property of a former Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs.
It cost the United States more than $1,000,000 to purchase the Embassy
in 1929. 71 The expenses involved in operating the Embassy and
representing the United States, however, substantially exceeded the
Ambassador's official income ($17,500 per annum) and representational
allowance of several thousand dollars plus part of the operating costs
of the Embassy. The difference between his total salary and the total
expenses of the Embassy was made up by Mrs. Weddell from her income. 72
Fortune attested to the Weddell's social success in Buenos Aires and
commented that the Ambassador and Mrs. Weddell actually managed to
make Argentines like Americans. His wit and tact, as well as his
wife, made Weddell popular in intensely social Buenos Aires. "Since
Americans are exceptionally unpopular in Argentina, that's all to the
good." 73

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71 Satterthwaite to Pross, November 23, 1975; Trimble to Pross,
January 11, 1976; Mobley, "Playing Host," Richmond Times-Dispatch,
December 6, 1936, p. 8; Rouse, "Making Friends," Richmond Times-
Dispatch, April 19, 1942, p. 1. Weddell derided the decision to
purchase the Embassy: "In the fierce white light of our experience
over the past four years, it seems an asinine thing to have purchased
such an imperial establishment but perhaps some day Congress will be
willing to pay for its proper unkeep which it is not now disposed to
do" (Weddell to Gay, January 18, 1934, Weddell Papers).

72 Trimble to Pross, January 11, 1976.

73 Fortune, "Their Excellencies," pp. 112 and 120. The Ambassa-
dor was also a good public speaker and used this ability to good
advantage (Satterthwaite to Pross, November 23, 1975.).
Ambassador Weddell experienced modest diplomatic success in Argentina prior to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. By December 1936, he had acquired considerable knowledge of the people, customs and diplomatic affairs of his host country. He had participated in several Pan American conferences and taken an active role in the Chaco Peace Conference. He had been involved in negotiations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding blocked American credits, a sanitary meat convention and a reciprocal trade agreement. Of more importance perhaps, was his acceptance by the Argentines. Since he was the ranking representative of the United States, he was a major focal point of Argentine public opinion vis-a-vis the United States. The Ambassador was highly popular with and trusted by the Argentine Government and ruling circles, comprised of the conservative landholding class.\(^7^4\) Weddell's popularity with these groups is noteworthy since they had been openly hostile to the United States. Furthermore, his popularity was a positive force which contributed to the success of Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy in Argentina.

Weddell's initial success and popularity in Argentina were also to become important factors for the United States during the 1936 Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. As early as July 1935, President Roosevelt considered discussing inter-American peace machinery at a special conference.\(^7^5\) Invitations were issued to

\(^7^4\) Maffitt to Pross, November 21, 1975.

\(^7^5\) Josephus Daniels to Hull, July 25, 1935, United States Department of State, _Foreign Relations of the Department of State, 1935_ (Washington, 1953), IV, p. 1. This volume and other published
twenty American Republics in January, 1936, and the conference was later scheduled to meet in Buenos Aires. In his position as Ambassador to Argentina, Weddell became extensively involved with the planning and activities of the Conference and President Roosevelt's visit. Experience gained from his pre-retirement Foreign Service career and his three years in Buenos Aires would enable Weddell to accomplish the responsibilities entrusted to him by the Department of State. Although he would not participate as a major delegate, he would undertake important support and representational duties which promoted the specific objectives of the State Department regarding the Conference and the overall goals of the Good Neighbor Policy.

Diplomatic documents are hereafter cited as FRUS followed by the appropriate year and volume.
CHAPTER II

THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY OF

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

1. Baptism of the Good Neighbor Policy

Although antecedents can be found in the foreign policy of Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover, the Good Neighbor Policy was baptized, publicized and glamorized by Franklin D. Roosevelt. He built upon the foundations of his predecessors, and convinced Latin Americans that the United States had adopted a new attitude towards hemispheric relations. Latin Americans accepted the United States as a trustworthy and sincere friend. Consequently, the Good Neighbor Policy is associated with and credited to Franklin D. Roosevelt.¹

Roosevelt previewed his future Latin American policy when he wrote a campaign article in *Foreign Affairs* during the 1928 presidential election. He criticized United States intervention in the Carribean and Republican dollar diplomacy, and indicated that recent Republican policy had allowed a dislike and mistrust of long standing to grow into positive hate and fear. He stated that in the event a Latin American republic might require assistance to restore order and stability:

> It is not the right or the duty of the United States to intervene alone. It is rather the duty of the United States to associate with itself other American republics. . . . Single-handed intervention by us in the internal affairs of other nations must end; with the cooperation of others we shall have more order in this hemisphere and less dislike.2


Roosevelt also linked good will in Latin America to increased trade, and called for a new chapter in relations with that area. He stated that it was the spirit behind American leadership which mattered, for if the spirit behind United States leadership were great, the nation could regain the world's trust and friendship, advance towards armament reduction, and permanently renounce the practice of arbitrary intervention into the domestic affairs of "our neighbors." Although written as a campaign document, this article is significant because it contains five themes which became dominant in the Latin American policy of the Roosevelt Administration: 1) a genuine concern to secure good will in Latin America; 2) the belief that increased trade would result from good will; 3) a favorable attitude towards working in association with Latin American republics; 4) opposition to arbitrary intervention in the domestic affairs of Latin American countries, and 5) emphasis on the spirit of United States policy.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt entered office on March 4, 1933, at the close of twelve years of Republican rule and in the midst of an unprecedented depression. Drafted in part by future Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the platform of the Democratic National Party called for "no interference in the internal affairs of other nations . . . and cooperation with nations of the Western Hemisphere to maintain the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine." In a memorandum to the president-elect, Sumner Welles suggested methods of implementing a new Latin

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3 Ibid., p. 586.

4 Wood, Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, p. 129.

American policy. Roosevelt's intimate friend proposed that the keystone of the United States foreign policy should be the creation and maintenance of cordial and close friendship between the United States and the other republics of the American continent. Welles, who was to become Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Latin America, indicated that in order to establish this type of relationship the United States had to abolish the impression that its policies involved a threat to Latin American sovereignty. The application of these policies "should never again result in armed intervention by the United States in a sister republic." Likewise, Weddel favored "the principle of consultation between the governments of the American republics wherever there arises in this Continent any question which threatens the peace and well being of the American world."6

There were initial misgivings about Roosevelt among Latin Americans because, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, he had been involved in the occupation of Vera Cruz (1914) and had written a new constitution for Haiti when she was occupied in 1918. Nevertheless, his victory was viewed by Latin Americans as a "beautiful episode" in democracy as well as proof that the United States was intent on a policy of democratic and liberal action.7 At his inauguration, the


7 Dozer, Are We Good Neighbors?, pp. 16-17; Connell-Smith, United States and Latin America, p. 158; Bemis, Latin American Policy, p. 193. President Roosevelt claimed in 1942 that the Good Neighbor Policy resulted from regret over the Vera Cruz intervention (Wood, Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, p. 130).
On the eve of the World Economic Conference at London and the Geneva Disarmament Conference (May, 1933), Roosevelt made an appeal for an universal non-aggression pact. He asked the nations of the world to agree not to send troops across the frontiers of other states except in accordance with treaties, and indicated his willingness to forego the practice of armed intervention in the Caribbean and elsewhere. Unequivocal acceptance of nonintervention was vital to the success of the Good Neighbor Policy since Latin Americans were embittered by the continued presence of American troops in Latin America as well as the memory and practice of intervention. Furthermore, depressed nationalism in Latin America had developed a "full head of steam" by the time Roosevelt entered the White House. Consequently, the doctrine of nonintervention became the foundation and capstone of the Good Neighbor Policy.

2. First Stage of the Good Neighbor Policy

Historians have noted that the Good Neighbor Policy underwent two stages, and that the basis for this policy was founded before the rise of Nazi Germany and subsequent hemispheric threat during World War Two. The first stage of the Good Neighbor Policy involved many months before the people of the western hemisphere seized upon the good neighbor phrase as the label for the policy pursued by the United States (Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision [New York, 1944], pp. 192-193).

10Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses of Roosevelt, II, p. 187; Meecham, United States and Inter-American Security, p. 114.

Washington's concentration on national problems, domestic pressure to avoid overseas intervention, and the sincere desire to accommodate Latin America as a means of cultivating commerce and good will. The second stage, which commenced in the mid-1930's, featured United States anxiety about developments in Europe and Asia, and the fear that Nazi Germany might obtain footholds in the Americas. As will be subsequently discussed, the 1936 Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace was a result of this anxiety.

Although Roosevelt supplied the inspiration and general objective of the Good Neighbor Policy, he left the development of the policy to Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles. The President only acted as a publicist and conduit for policies conceived by the Department of State. The appointment of Hull, a devout advocate of lower tariffs and liberal trade, was viewed positively by Latin Americans as an indication that the United States would embark on a "new deal" in Latin America. Hull maintained a firm adherence to Wilsonian moral principles; likewise, he was attached to broad formulas of action and persistent in expressing American policy in terms of aspirations.


and ideals. 14

The veteran Congressman from Tennessee believed as a general proposition that economic rivalry was a basic cause of war and that international adherence to the principles of liberalized trade would produce prosperity and peace. He predicated political settlement upon economic pacification and based his hope of peace and prosperity on a broad program of trade agreements. Although opposed by some of his New Deal colleagues, Hull's economic orientation was supported by policymakers who were equally convinced that domestic problems reflected world problems. Secretary of State Hull devoted himself with almost fanatical single-mindedness to getting legislative authority and then negotiating mutually beneficial reciprocal trade agreements to reduce tariffs on a basis of equal application to all nations. 15

Hull's New Reciprocity was formally accepted as a policy tool when Congress approved the Trade Agreements Act on June 12, 1934. The President was authorized to conclude reciprocal trade agreements with foreign nations according to the unconditional most-favored-nation


The Good Neighbor Policy advanced rapidly during 1933 as a result of Roosevelt's public pronouncements and successive steps of policy by the State Department. As previously discussed, Roosevelt appealed to the nations of the world to make a nonaggression pact pending complete agreement on disarmament, and, in 1934, the United States withdrew its troops from Nicaragua and agreed to evacuate Haiti. Also, the Roosevelt Administration took a more sympathetic attitude, in contrast to the Hoover Administration, toward efforts of the League of Nations to supplement the conciliation of the Leticia conflict and the Chaco War. 17

The first test of the doctrine arose in 1933 when American commercial interests in Cuba were threatened by successive revolutions. Sumner Welles, acting temporarily as Ambassador to Cuba, was worried by rioting and army mutinies, and twice requested limited intervention in contradiction to his earlier memorandum to Roosevelt. The United States adhered to the policy of direct nonintervention despite Welles' request, although warships were dispatched to the island and its vicinity. 18 Also, upon the advice of Welles, the

16 Bemis, Latin American Policy, p. 303; Guerrant, Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy, pp. 93-94; The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act eventually guided the United States back onto an internationalist path, and the Roosevelt Administration shifted from unilateral competition to international cooperation in the face of the Axis threat (Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy [Madison, Wis., 1964], pp. 22-23).

17 Bemis, Latin American Policy, pp. 258-259.

Roosevelt Administration refused to recognize Grau San Martin's revolutionary government which eventually led to his overthrow and the formation of a new government. The United States quickly recognized the new conservative government. Negotiations on a commercial agreement were undertaken and an Export-Import Bank loan was granted to Cuba. The Roosevelt Administration, satisfied that the fire had "burned itself out," formally renounced the Platt Amendment in 1934 and with it the right to intervention.

3. The Montevideo Conference of 1933

Before the Cuban experience was concluded, the Seventh International Conference of American States took place in Montevideo, Uruguay (December 3 to December 26, 1933). Cordell Hull noted in his Memoirs that lack of confidence in the ability of the Montevideo


20 Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy, p. 57. The abrogation of the Platt Amendment was described by sophisticated diplomats of the Old World as an incredible self-denial of a vitally strategic island and United States capital (Bemis, Latin American Policy, p. 282). In another judgment it was an inexpensive gesture to Cuban nationalism (As cited in Smith, United States and Cuba, p. 157).
Conference to achieve results was abysmal, especially in South America. 21 Delegates to the Montevideo Conference were hostile toward the United States in light of the failure of the nonintervention proposal at Havana and the non-recognition of Grau San Martín's government in Cuba. Also, two important world conferences had already failed within the space of six months—the London Economic Conference and the Geneva Disarmament Conference—resulting in the derailment of Hull's trade program. Hull even considered cancelling the meeting after receiving reports that Mexico planned to force the issue of intervention. The State Department attempted to diffuse any potential conflict by instructing the United States delegation (of which Alexander W. Weddell was a member) to avoid discussion the Monroe Doctrine or its corollaries. 22

The President indicated that the primary objective of the United States was to destroy barriers preventing amicable relations with Latin America and to restore harmony with the hemisphere. Furthermore, in order to emphasize the importance of the Montevideo Conference to

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22 Hull, Memoirs, I, p. 317; Guerrant, Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy, p. 6; Garder, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy, p. 58; Connell-Smith, United States and Latin America, p. 163.
the United States, Roosevelt directed Cordell Hull to serve as delegation chairman and to participate in the sessions of the meeting. Hull was also instructed to take the opportunity to establish contact and personal relations with the statesmen of Latin America, especially Mexico. Through the use of "folksy," personal diplomacy, the Secretary of State avoided confrontation at the Montevideo Conference. The delegation of the United States likewise assumed an inconspicuous role; leadership was left to Dr. Carlos Saavedra Lamas of Argentina. Samuel Flagg Bemis noted that most of Hull's influence for hemispheric peace and friendship was made unpretentiously and sympathetically behind the doors of hotel rooms.

Led by Hull, the United States reversed previous policy by accepting, with reservation, the Convention of Rights and Duties of States. This proposal stipulated that "no state has the right to

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23 Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses of Roosevelt, II, pp. 459-464. Hull was the first Secretary of State to attend an inter-American conference since 1889 and the first to act as chairman of the American delegation. Charles Evans Hughes was a former Secretary of State at the time of the Havana Conference (Hull, Memoirs, I, p. 318).

24 Mecham, United States and Inter-American Security, pp. 114-115; Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy, p. 58; Bemis Latin American Policy, p. 271. Roosevelt preferred to leave leadership at international conferences to smaller nations so that they would be made to feel their own position and standing. He declared that the success of the Montevideo Conference and, later, the Buenos Aires Conference was due to the fact that the smallest republic, El Salvador, was considered on the same plane as Argentina, Brazil and the United States (Hull, Memoirs, I, pp. 551-552).
intervene in the internal or external affairs of another."

By accepting the nonintervention proposal, the United States reversed its long-standing policy of maintaining the right to intervene and provided Latin America with ample proof of its neighborly intentions. The Convention on the Rights and Duties of States was a sweeping triumph for Latin American jurisprudence and diplomacy on such important matters as recognition, equality, inexpungibility of rights, nonintervention and inviolability of territory. The United States also accepted an Argentine Anti-War Pact (written by Saavedra Lamas and intended as a substitute for the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris) and secured resolutions on economic and political cooperation. Hull interpreted the latter to mean Latin American acceptance of his trade program.

The Seventh International Conference of American States marked a new epoch in inter-American relations and the official existence of the Good Neighbor Policy. Latin Americans, in contrast to the 1928 Havana Conference, became optimistic after the Montevideo Conference and held a new conception of the United States— that of an altruistic, anti-imperialist, peace-loving neighbor whom Latin Americans could admire and respect. Cordell Hull reflected hemispheric sentiment when he stated:

It is my unqualified opinion that the achievements of this recent Conference of American Nations were such as to mark

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27 Guerrant, Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy, p. 8; Dozer, Are
the beginning of a new era—a new epoch—in this hemisphere, and that at the same time the Conference set a wise example of initiative with a genuinely constructive program to the disorganized and low-spirited forces of peace, economic and social order in the nations beyond the seas.28

President Roosevelt felt that the attitude and actions of the American delegation were successful in convincing Latin Americans of the United States sincerity and its determination to remain a good neighbor. He noted that the outstanding achievements specifically included (1) the creation of a new spirit of friendship and confidence among the Republics of America; (2) the beginning of a strong liberal trade policy; (3) steps toward the establishment of peace machinery; (4) steps in the improvement of inter-American communication and transportation; (5) collective adoption of the principle of non-intervention. On the whole, Roosevelt felt that the meeting "was responsible for improving and promoting a new era of permanent friendliness, understanding, and economic and neighborly cooperation which now exists throughout the Western hemisphere."29

As previously mentioned, Alexander W. Weddell was a member of the United States delegation at the Montevideo Conference. The Ambassador to Argentina provided his colleagues with an "on-the-spot" summary of the meeting:

I have just returned after a month in Montevideo at the Pan American Conference. I feel that a great deal

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28 Cordell Hull, Addresses and Statements by the Honorable Cordell Hull in Connection with His Trip to South America to Attend the Seventh International Conference of American States, Montevideo, Uruguay (Washington, D.C., 1935), p. 92.

was accomplished. A source of pride and gratification was to see the way Secretary Hull sat serenely on top of the whole thing, accomplishing a vast deal by sheer force of character, added to his remarkable skill as a negotiator... for the first time I am beginning to believe in Pan Americanism... The experience was wonderfully educational and also brought me into personal contact with a number of leaders in various South American countries.  

He returned from Montevideo with a great respect and admiration for Secretary Hull.

The deliberations resulted in a great triumph for him [Hull] and I think after the London Conference, so barren of results and so sadly disillusioning, that the really practical good accomplished at this last Conference was deeply gratifying to him as well as it was to others.  

The Virginia diplomat also noted that there were two "spiritual streams" apparent at Montevideo: (1) continental solidarity; (2) Hispanic genius and Spanish intellectual ties to Latin America.  

It was interesting to see how the Hispanic spirit was at work; I think there is an element in this hemisphere and in Spain that is beginning to dream of the reconquest by or renaissance of the Iberian genius of the territories once held.  

4. Second Stage of the Good Neighbor Policy  

In the years immediately following the Montevideo Conference up to the 1936 Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, the Roosevelt Administration undertook further efforts to implement the Good Neighbor Policy. Positive action was necessary because

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30 Weddell to Robert B. Tunstall, January 4, 1934, Weddell Papers.  
31 Weddell to Gay, January 18, 1934, Weddell Papers.  
32 Weddell to Tunstall, January 4, 1934. Also, see Weddell to Vincent G. Byers, January 4, 1934, Weddell Papers.
after Montevideo the eyes of Latin America were turned on Washington, D.C. to see if the United States intended to abide by the resolutions of the meeting and basic policy of the Good Neighbor Policy. Hull was aware that any faltering would revive old suspicions and antagonisms as acutely as before, if not more so. "On the other hand, definite actions in the right direction would solidify the friendship attained for years to come."33

Cuba was the "kernal" of the new and positive policy towards Latin America, and, as previously discussed, the United States negotiated a new treaty with Cuba, abrogating the Platt Amendment. Further positive acts of the Good Neighbor Policy included the withdrawal of the last detachment of United States Marines from Haiti in August, 1934; the commencement of negotiations with Haiti concerning financial control exercised by the United States; and, a new treaty with Panama (March, 1936) which specifically ended the United States right to intervene.34 The Roosevelt Administration likewise advanced the Doctrine of Nonintervention by the abandonment (January, 1934) of the special recognition policy applied by the United States to the five Central American republics. The abandonment of this policy was initiated after the recognition of a revolutionary government in El Salvador, and marked a turning point in American policy. Thereafter, the United States did not again apply constitutionality, deeply resented by Latin Americans, as a condition of recognition.35

33 Hull, Memoirs, I, p. 342.

34 Ibid.; Bemis, Latin American Policy, p. 281; Connell-Smith, United States and Latin America, pp. 166-167.

35 Bemis, Latin American Policy, pp. 282-283; Guerrant, Roosevelt's
By 1935, the Roosevelt Administration had developed and successfully implemented a new policy of friendship and cooperation with the Republics of Latin America. Latin Americans consequently softened their harsh attitudes towards the United States and accepted their powerful neighbor as a trustworthy friend. Ambassador Weddell recognized that the efforts of Roosevelt and Hull had resulted in a new attitude of friendship among Latin Americans.

There would seem to be no doubt that since President Roosevelt came into office, and more especially since Secretary Hull visited South America, that not alone in official but in general circles the feeling of respect, confidence and friendship in South American countries toward the United States has been stronger than at any time in our history. In Argentina certainly there is belief in the essential singleness of our motives, while the personalities of the President and of our Secretary of State have impressed themselves on our friends to the south of us. They are considered "hombres simpaticos" and that means a vast deal in Latin American countries. The repeal of the Platt Amendment, the conclusion of a mutually advantageous treaty with Cuba, the withdrawal of the marines from Haiti, the assertion of our Good Neighbor Policy, the steps taken thus far to bring about other treaty relations, all these things have had their very positive effect. . . .

Until 1935, the inter-American system revolved around problems and conflicts between the United States and Latin America. The two years that followed the Seventh International Conference of American States witnessed great changes both within and without the western

Good Neighbor Policy, pp. 31-32.

36 Dozer, Are We Good Neighbors?, p. 20.

37 Weddell to Hudson Strode, October 21, 1934, Weddell Papers.
hemisphere. By implementing the Good Neighbor Policy, the Roosevelt Administration created a spirit of cooperation, heretofore nonexistent, between the United States and Latin America. Shortly after the Montevideo Conference, however, the center of hemispheric conflict shifted as Nazi/Fascist military and political aggression advanced unchecked by the League of Nations. The ascent of militaristic governments in Germany, Italy and Japan occurred contemporaneously with the first term of Franklin D. Roosevelt and boded the end of continental security for the United States and Latin America. 38

Japan acquired Manchuria in 1931 and expanded into northern China; Italy attacked Ethiopia in 1935; and, in 1936, Germany occupied the Rhineland and the Spanish Civil War erupted. The developing crisis in Europe and Asia raised the specter of another world war and the chances of American involvement. 39 The League of Nations failed to curtail Nazi/Fascist aggression, and enthusiasm of member Latin American nations was dampened, especially after the spoilation of Ethiopia. The obligations of League membership became more apparent than the


39 Bemis, Latin American Policy, pp. 223 and 325; Mecham, United States and Inter-American Security, p. 122; Inman, Inter-American Conferences, p. 160.
privileges; this induced some Latin American republics to consider favorably an exclusive American security system. Also, the contrast between the policies of the United States and those of Germany, Italy and Japan was keenly appreciated in Latin America after the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. 40

At the same time, the United States continued to pursue a policy of narrow isolation and to erect a neutrality barrier in the hope of insulating itself from world conflict. The Neutrality Act of 1935, both pacifist and isolationist inspired, was the Roosevelt Administration's reaction to international disorder. Concurrent with the increasing threat of world war was a vigorous trade drive by Germany, Italy and Japan into the western hemisphere. The State Department was quite uneasy about non-American competition, and spent a great deal of time in the 1930's fending off European challenges to the Good Neighbor Policy. German and Japanese competition worried Americans because the effective competition directly opposed United States plans, and was a product of aggressive national governments. 41

German efforts to protect itself against world economic fluctuations and to undermine United States trade relations in Latin America led to a German policy of barter trade and currency arrangements. This policy, initiated in September, 1935, blocked multi-lateral trade


41 Mecham, United States and Inter-American Security, p. 122; Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy, p. 60; Smith, Yankee Diplomacy, p. 27.
and aroused State Department concern. German imports from Latin America were paid for in special "aski" marks placed to the credit of Latin American exporters. The "aski" marks could be utilized only for the purchase of German goods to be exported to Latin America. Germany's percentage of the total Latin American trade began to rise perceptively after the initiation of the barter trade program. A powerful link formed between Latin America and the European dictators because Latin American republics could not afford to neglect Europe either economically or politically. Likewise, the United States was an economic competitor for markets, and, despite the advances under the Good Neighbor Policy, cultural ties were stronger with Europe than with the United States.

The totalitarian powers of Europe also unleashed an aggressive campaign of propaganda and cultural influence upon the western hemisphere. Short wave broadcasts from Rome and Berlin praised fascism, and German news services, purveying news with a strong Nazi bias, were established. Free telegraphic news services were made available to Latin American newspapers which published news material slanted toward Germany. Fellowships were offered to Latin American students and professors, and the Reich subsidized German teachers to teach in

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42 Hull, Memoirs, I, pp. 495-496; Gardner, "American Foreign Policy in a Closed World," p. 56. By 1936-1937, Germany supplied more than 16% of Latin America's imports in exchange for only 9% of Germany's exports (J.F. Rippy, South America and Hemisphere Defense [Baton Rouge, 1941], pp. 49-50).

43 Smyth, America and the Axis War, p. 166.
Latin American schools and universities in exchange for instructors from "colonial" schools with large German populations. The Nazis also made efforts to establish intimate contacts with Latin American armies. Prior to the rise of National Socialism, unemployed German army officers were extensively utilized to teach South American armies. This trend intensified under Hitler, and Latin American army officers were invited to attend German military schools. Cordell Hull noted that the new might of a reawakened German Reich was thoroughly impressed upon Latin American military personnel.

With the assistance of German immigrants, Germany subsidized "colonial" schools, exhibits of books and art, and film distribution programs. Germans from Latin America were honored at celebrations staged in Germany in order to emphasize the importance of German communities in Latin America and to stress their ties with the Reich. Totalitarian propaganda, especially Germany's, was designed to secure the allegiance of all Europe nationals in Latin America and to turn them into centers of political influence. Both Germany and Italy sought to convert the people of Latin America to Nazi/Fascist philosophy.


45 Hull, Memoirs, I, p. 496. Also, see Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York, 1961).

46 Bemis, Latin American Policy, p. 326; Frye, Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere, p. 71; Smyth, America and the Axis War, p. 166.
As previously noted, President Roosevelt contemplated calling a special inter-American conference as early as October, 1935. The stimulus for the proposed conference was threefold: (1) to build upon the achievements of the 1933 Montevideo Conference; (2) to capitalize on the successful Chaco Peace Talks; and (3) to develop special peace machinery so that the peace and solidarity of the western hemisphere would be insured in the event of world war. The reaction of the Roosevelt Administration to Nazi/Fascist advances in the western hemisphere will be discussed in the following chapter. Also, President Roosevelt's invitation for the Buenos Aires Conference and Ambassador Weddell's initial planning activities will be examined.
CHAPTER III

INITIATION OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE FOR THE
MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

1. Reaction of Roosevelt Administration to Nazi/Fascist Advances

By 1935 the drive of the Axis powers to dominate the political and economic life of Latin America made it clear that established peace machinery and measures of common defense were not adequate and that the threat could not be postponed until the next Pan American Conference scheduled for 1938. The long continuance of the Chaco War and the resulting inter-American bitterness further revealed the weakness of existing Pan American peace machinery. The State Department was cognizant of hemispheric weakness:

Events swiftly developing beyond the Atlantic and the Pacific in 1936 called for new decisions in our relations with the Latin American Republics. The Montevideo Conference in 1933 had established a firm foundation of friendship between us and our neighbors to the south. The next Pan American Conference would meet at Lima, Peru, toward the end of 1938, to build new floors on this foundation. But, with Europe and Asia approaching a catastrophe, could we wait that long?1

Ambassador Alexander W. Weddell likewise recognized the threat of European war as early as July, 1934:

1Hull, Memoirs, I, p. 493. Also, see Inman, Inter-American Conferences, p. 3.
The foregoing [discussion of a trip to Europe] is based on the hope of peace in Europe. Personally I feel there are no governments who actually want war, and my alarm is principally lest some rash act of an individual inflame peoples in such a way that hostilities may begin somewhere without even a declaration of war.2

President Roosevelt and Cordell Hull were likewise distressed by the growth and success of discriminatory trade agreements and barter trade programs—two mechanisms claimed by some Latin American nations as necessary to protect limited dollar supplies and to obtain sufficient supplies for their economies. In fact, Roosevelt's antagonism toward German foreign policy began with the inauguration of the barter program. Hull considered the barter arrangements as unpeaceful and dangerous as well as a handicap to the efforts of the United States to carry forward its program for trade restoration. The Department of State exercised its influence whenever possible to endorse liberal trade policies, and made representations to all Latin American nations who entered into barter arrangements with Berlin. Although the United States avoided any hint of economic reprisal and adhered to the principles of the Good Neighbor Policy, the State Department expressed its desire to maintain previous trade agreements.3

As a result of mounting concern on the part of Roosevelt and his foreign policy advisors, the State Department began early in 1935 to plan a special inter-American conference. It is interesting to note that Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles, both closely associated with

2Weddell to Mrs. Henry D. Hooper, July 4, 1934. Also, see Weddell to Mrs. Alexander Kirk, November 4, 1935, Weddell Papers.

Roosevelt and the Good Neighbor Policy, disagreed over Roosevelt's role in the initiation of the special conference. Although Secretary Hull indicated that Roosevelt was among the first to accept the idea, Hull partially accepted credit: "Early in 1935 we began at the State Department to discuss the possibilities of holding a special inter-American conference in 1936." Assistant Secretary of State Welles noted that the later success of hemispheric defense and solidarity would never have been possible without Roosevelt's foresight in initiating a special conference for the preservation of peace. "That Conference is one of the few examples of prevision to be found in the annals of American diplomacy."

The President had two purposes in mind for the special peace conference: (1) to set an example to Europe of peaceful and neighborly relations; (2) to establish a mechanism by which to achieve a common policy in the western hemisphere in the event of world war.

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4 Hull, Memoirs, I, p. 493.

5 Welles, Seven Decisions that Shaped History, p. 103. According to Welles, Hull initially opposed the 1936 conference because the United States should wait for the 1938 Pan American Conference, and "anyhow the Latin Americans were bound to ask us for the moon!" See also, Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 104.

Roosevelt believed that collective security was one of the principles of good neighborliness and that cooperative action should replace unilateral intervention and power politics. He felt that he had produced an atmosphere of friendliness in the western hemisphere, and sought to create a spirit of hemispheric solidarity by capitalizing on the atmosphere of friendliness. In 1935, Roosevelt felt that a world war was looming and the structure of inter-American relations, although vastly improved, would not sustain the stresses of another world war. Thus, President Roosevelt believed it was imperative to secure a firmer and more detailed implementation of existing inter-American agreements. Roosevelt also hoped that the cooperative behavior of the United States and Latin America would be an example in stemming the trend towards world militarism. It was United States good neighborliness with Latin America, and of Latin American republics with each other, on which Roosevelt primarily relied to inspire moral reconstruction around the globe.

2. Preliminary Discussion of the Buenos Aires Conference

The Department of State undertook to learn the reaction of other American governments to Roosevelt's plan prior to making any official move. Assistant Secretary of State Welles initiated the discussion in Washington with the ambassadors of the Latin American republics, and United States ambassadors in the capitals of the other nations

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7 Range, Roosevelt's World Order, pp. 58 and 169; Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 204.

8 Range, Roosevelt's World Order, pp. 72-74.
were instructed to discuss the plans with the Foreign Ministers in complete confidence. 9 The proposed conference would afford an opportunity to revise certain inter-American treaties and to develop other treaties to improve the peace machinery of the American hemisphere. Furthermore, the special peace conference would not consider the question of the Chaco War because negotiations were still in progress in Buenos Aires. President Roosevelt and his State Department advisors did not want to establish a general conference which might possibly interfere with the mediation between Bolivia and Paraguay. 10

The State Department was also anxious not to offend Argentina, the host of the Chaco Peace Conference. On August 3, 1935, Ambassador Weddell reported that Saavedra Lamas felt it would be a mistake to consider the subject of another inter-American peace conference before the settlement of the Chaco War. Saavedra Lamas considered a general conference desirable after the settlement. 11 Fred Morris Dearing, United States Ambassador in Peru, submitted several despatches which supported Weddell's report. After discussion the proposed conference with the Peruvian Foreign Minister, Dearing indicated that Argentina was extremely sensitive about the general question of peace

9 Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 204. In replying to a despatch from the American Ambassador to Mexico, Hull indicated the conference was still in the formative stage. Pending further instructions, Josephus Daniels was instructed to consider it a confidential matter (Hull to Josephus Daniels, August 5, 1935, FRUS, 1935, IV, pp. 1-2).


and her prestige. Argentina, according to Dearing, might interpret the discussions of the conference as an indication the United States expected the Chaco Peace Conference to fail. Consequently, Argentina would not be receptive to the United States suggestion and might feel embarrassed by it. At the same time, Dearing reported that Peru was also sensitive about its prestige and was anxious not to be overshadowed by Argentina. 12

Secretary Hull replied to Dearing's confidential inquiry in a despatch dated August 12, 1935. Hull indicated that although the confidential reaction to Roosevelt's proposal had been favorable, the Argentine Government urged delay in proceeding with the initiative until it was ascertained if the Chaco Conference would prove successful. Roosevelt's plan of an extraordinary inter-American conference to consider the methods of perfecting peace machinery in the western hemisphere was predicated upon the successful termination of the Chaco Conference. Therefore, the President determined to defer taking any initiative in the matter for a short time, and it was imperative to prevent any publicity about the conference. 13

Ambassador Weddell filed a provocative despatch on October 12,

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12 Fred Morris Dearing to Hull, August 8 and August 10, 1935, FRUS, 1935, IV, pp. 2-4. The Peruvian Foreign Minister originally thought the proposed peace conference would take the place of the 1938 Lima Conference. Thus, when Argentina initially objected to the conference, Peru thought that Argentina was attempting to infringe upon Peru's pre-eminence as conference host.

13 Hull to Dearing, August 12, 1935, FRUS, 1935, IV, pp. 4-5.
1935 which indicated Argentina was reversing its earlier decision and attempting to unload the Chaco problem on the proposed general peace conference. Weddell met with Saavedra Lamas on October 11, and the Argentine Foreign Minister indicated the time might be ripe for acting on Roosevelt's proposed conference. According to Weddell, the Argentine Ambassador in Washington had been instructed to discuss the matter with Cordell Hull. Ambassador Weddell hinted that he was skeptical of Saavedra Lamas' intentions.

It was obvious from Saavedra's remarks that his sudden change of attitude toward the calling of a general conference was not based on interest in the elaboration of peace machinery to avert future conflicts. He is in a state of panic lest the present negotiations collapse and affect his personal prestige. His immediate aim . . . is to find a convenient scapegoat.

In his conversation with me he made it clear with startling naivete that he envisaged the general conference primarily as something on which the Chaco problem could be unloaded. In this connection he said that he felt that rather than "admit the failure" of the present negotiations we should call in the other American states and "make them shoulder their share of the blame: thus avoiding "the ignominy of having the question go back to Europe."

Weddell likewise reported that Saavedra Lamas disagreed with the intent of the special conference. The Argentine Foreign Minister felt that averting future wars was not a matter of practical interest at the time and that efforts should be devoted to getting American countries to participate in the Chaco question. "As usual he has no plan as to how this is to be achieved. The whole idea savors of going over Niagra Falls in a barrel."\(^{14}\)

The American Ambassador offered several comments to Hull regarding

the conference and Carlos Saavedra Lamas: (1) before making any commitments, the United States should reach a clear understanding with Saavedra Lamas about the conference's scope and mandate; (2) one of the greatest difficulties of the Chaco Peace Talks was the great number of mediators; (3) increasing the number would not serve to enhance the possibility of settling the Chaco problem; (4) there was some question of the advisability of convoking a general conference to expand future peace machinery when the Chaco War remained unresolved. Weddell concluded with a negative assessment and comment about Saavedra Lamas.

In the light of the unfortunate experience of this Conference it is clear that any conference entrusted to the guidance of Saavedra Lamas will be handled with a maximum of ineptitude and a minimum of hope.15

Although Hull did not reply directly to Weddell's suggestion, the Secretary of State utilized and, in turn, corroborated the information during conversations with Argentine Ambassador Felipe Espil. Hull notified Weddell by despatch that he had requested Espil to transmit five views concerning the approach suggested by Saavedra Lamas. The views were critical of the Argentine's suggestions, and Hull instructed Weddell to discuss them with Saavedra Lamas.

(1) The President's initiative did not contemplate that the proposed inter-American conference would deal with the Chaco dispute. Roosevelt's initiative was contemplated when a definite agreement had been reached with the Chaco War. It was believed that the pacific settlement of the Chaco dispute would provide a suitable "stepping stone" for the American republics to consider the action which might be jointly taken to safeguard themselves against future inter-American conflicts. And, if the President proceeded with the conference before a final agreement had been reached concerning the Chaco War, the original proposal would presumably be transformed into a mere enlargement of the Chaco Mediation Conference.

15 Ibid., p. 161.
(2) Since certain important American states, such as Mexico, Columbia and Cuba, were not participating in the Chaco Peace Conference, it might be difficult to persuade those states to deal with the dispute after the present conference failed.

(3) According to the wording of a Protocol signed at the Chaco Peace Conference, all the states represented were morally obligated to continue in session if the negotiations for a direct agreement failed. No single mediator could assume the responsibility of "having the question go back to Europe."

(4) The United States would not close the doors to any means whatsoever of obtaining peace. If, at some later date, it seemed the only hope was holding a special inter-American conference, the State Department would naturally be disposed to favorably consider such a proposal. However, it was the current opinion of the State Department that such a moment had not yet been reached and would not until every effort was conscientiously made to obtain a settlement.

(5) Finally, the United States felt that the Protocol of June 12, 1935 provided the best means of obtaining a satisfactory pacific settlement and that the Protocol obliged the continuous session of the Chaco Peace Conference until an agreement was reached.16

On October 18, Weddell met with Saavedra Lamas and discussed the views of Secretary Hull. According to the Ambassador, Saavedra Lamas had heard from Espil and appeared gratified by Hull's understanding reply. As a result, Saavedra Lamas had abandoned all thought of a general conference in order to devote himself to finalizing the Chaco dispute. "He is, however," reported Weddell, "in a highly changeable state of mind and I should not like you to take this resolution of his too seriously as there is no telling what attitude he may have tomorrow."

Weddell also reported that the Argentine Foreign Minister had told the

16 Hull to Weddell, October 17, 1935, FRUS, 1935, IV, pp. 163-164.
Mexican Ambassador on October 8 that Hull was "pressing" him to call a general American conference. 17 This incident further reveals the duplicity of Saavedra Lamas in view of the fact that he did not discuss the subject of the special conference with the American Ambassador until October 11.

3. President Roosevelt's Invitation to the American Republics

Discussion of the special inter-American conference lagged and eventually ceased during the last two months of 1935. However, the Chaco War formally ended on January 21, 1936 when Bolivia and Paraguay signed peace protocols negotiated at Buenos Aires. The conclusion of the Chaco War provided an opportune moment for the Roosevelt Administration to formally announce the special inter-American conference. 18 On January 30, 1936, President Roosevelt addressed a personal letter to Agustin P. Justo, President of the Argentine Republic which suggested convening a conference to consider the best method of safeguarding peace in the western hemisphere.

I cherish the sincere conviction that the moment has now arrived when the American Republics, through their designated representatives seated at a common council table, should seize this altogether favorable opportunity to consider their joint responsibility and their common need of rendering less likely in the future the outbreak or the continuation of hostilities between them, and by so doing, serve in an eminently practical manner the cause of permanent

17 Weddell to Hull, October 18, 1935, FRUS, 1935, IV, p. 165.

peace on this Western Continent. If the tragedy of the Chaco can be considered as having served any useful end, I believe such end will lie in our joint willingness to profit from the experience learned and to exert our common endeavors in guarding against the repetition of such American disasters.\(^8\)

Roosevelt accordingly suggested that an extraordinary inter-American conference be summoned at an early date "to determine how the maintenance of peace among American republics may best be safeguarded." He pointed out that steps taken to this end would advance the cause of world peace and would supplement the efforts of the League of Nations and of other peace agencies in seeking to avoid war. It was suggested that the Conference assemble "at Buenos Aires, should the Government of the Argentine Republic so desire, or, if not, at some other capital of the Continent."\(^9\)

The President concluded his invitation with a personal compliment and a request for Justo's opinion of such a conference.

With the conclusion of the Chaco War and with the reestablishment of peace throughout this Continent, there would appear to be offered an opportunity for helpful counsel among our respective governments which may not soon again be presented. Your Excellency's devotion to the maintenance of peace between the American Republics is well known, and I would therefore deeply appreciate such views as Your Excellency may care to express to me, as I would likewise value highly Your Excellency's opinion whether such a special inter-American conference of the American Republics would not in fact prove most beneficial.

Identical letters, mutatis mutandis, were also addressed to the chief executives of each American Republic. Instead of utilizing normal diplomatic channels, Roosevelt addressed the letters personally to

\(^8\) Roosevelt to Justo, January 30, 1936, FRUS, 1936, V, p.4.

\(^9\) Ibid., pp. 4-5.
each American president because he felt the issues in question were of such vital concern as to warrant a personal exchange of views between presidents of the American republics.  

The State Department issued confidential instructions to Ambassador Weddell on February 3, 1936, concerning the delivery of Roosevelt's letter. This letter was contained in a sealed envelope. He was instructed at first opportunity to request a personal interview with the President of Argentina in order to deliver the letter addressed to him by Roosevelt. "It is desired that you seize the occasion of your interview to indicate that the President attributes especial importance to the suggestion contained in his letter and that he would be gratified were it possible for him to receive an early reply."

Weddell was further instructed to cable the State Department after the delivery of the letter and to include any comments that might have been made by President Justo. The contents of the letter were cited as being strictly confidential, and Weddell was requested to convey the same to the Argentine Government.

Roosevelt's letter was not presented to President Justo until February 15, 1936, nearly two weeks after Weddell's instructions. In the interval, Saavedra Lamas inquired about the nature of the letter and expressed interest in studying it promptly. The Foreign Minister

21 Ibid., pp. 3 and 5. For explanatory notes by Roosevelt concerning his invitation, see Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses of Roosevelt, V, pp. 74-75.

22 Hull to Weddell, February 3, 1936, Decimal File 710 Peace/12 Records of the United States Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives. Unpublished records from Decimal File 710 Peace will hereinafter be cited as DF 710 Peace, RG 59, NA.
regretted that President Justo was unable to receive Ambassador Weddell until February 15 because of previous engagements and that this would delay his becoming fully acquainted with Roosevelt's suggestion. 23 The proposed conference received publicity in the United States and Latin America before the official release of Roosevelt's letter. Weddell reported on February 10 that La Prensa and La Nacion, Argentina's major newspapers, had discussed Roosevelt's plan. La Prensa summarized Latin American opinion as being in favor of the plan and, describing it as most opportune, attributed great importance to the proposed conference. 24

Reacting to press leaks in the United States, the State Department instructed Weddell and his ambassadorial colleagues that it was deemed desirable to publish the text of Roosevelt's letter as soon as possible. "Erroneous speculations are already current and can only be stopped by making public a factual release." However, the letter would not be released to the press until the last Latin American Chief of State received the text. Weddell was instructed to inform Justo of Roosevelt's desire to keep the entire matter confidential until after replies had been received from each Chief of State. 25

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23 Allan Dawson, "Memorandum of Conversation with Dr. Carlos Saavedra Lamas," February 13, 1936, DF 710 Peace/147, RG 59, NA.

24 Weddell to Hull, February 10, 1936, DF 710 Peace/39, RG 59, NA.

At 11:00 AM, February 15, 1936, Ambassador Weddell met with President Justo and communicated to him the contents of the sealed envelope and the State Department's instructions. Justo received Weddell with marked cordiality and stated that he was already aware of the general nature of Roosevelt's letter. The Argentine President cited the pacific motives inspiring his Government, and added that any plan "looking toward achieving and cementing peace would be cordially welcomed and supported by his Government." Justo further noted that the time was appropriate for common action and "that the nations of the Americas were in a position to give an example to the old world."26 Weddell's earliest personal thoughts on the plan are reflected in a letter written prior to his appointment with President Justo:

At this moment I have on my desk a portentous letter from President Roosevelt to the President of this Republic which I am instructed solemnly to place in his hands, together with a personal message from President Roosevelt. It relates to a peace conference which may be called, looking to the preservation of peace in this hemisphere. The whole subject is very nebulous just now, but I hope nothing will happen to prevent my getting away when the summer comes.27

Weddell and Saavedra Lamas met that same afternoon, and the Foreign Minister stated that Roosevelt's letter would not be translated until February 17, adding, however, that he was familiar with its contents. The letter would be studied sympathetically in a spirit of collaboration, and a reply would be despatched later that week to

26 Weddell to Hull, February 15, 1936, DF 710 Peace/72, RG 59, NA.

27 Weddell to Mrs. Will Gordon, February 15, 1936, Weddell Papers. Weddell's last remark is not complimentary of his diplomatic responsibilities. However, he frequently downplayed the seriousness of his
the Argentine Ambassador in Washington. According to Weddell, Saavadra Lamas felt the best time for holding the proposed conference would be after the presidential election in the United States. He added that if it were desired to convene earlier "for political reasons," the conference should move very slowly in order to study economic questions and pursue the spirit of the Montevideo Conference. The Foreign Minister made repeated reference to the importance of economic accords such as reciprocal trade treaties. He stated that economic considerations were the peculiar glory of Montevideo and added that Roosevelt had swept aside years of misunderstanding and had given a powerful impetus to Pan Americanism. 28

Countering the references to economic questions, Weddell referred Saavedra Lamas to the general terms of Roosevelt's letter and the possibility of "the creation by common accord of new instruments of peace." The Argentine indicated that, as a matter of fact, he had been working on something of this nature; he also referred to an issue of some controversy—the location of the proposed conference. 29 Saavedra Lamas had alternately warmed and cooled to the proposed conference partially because of uncertainty over whether "President Roosevelt's letter to President Justo is of such a nature to make it probable that it would be held in Buenos Aires." 30 The fact, as revealed by Roosevelt's position in his correspondence and this comment is in keeping with his humorous banter.

28 Weddell to Hull, February 16, 1936, DF 710 Peace/75, RG 59, NA.

29 Ibid.

30 Dawson, "Memorandum of Conversation," February 13, 1936, DF 710 Peace/147; also, see Spruille Braden to Hull, February 16, 1936,
letter, that the conference would be held in Buenos Aires revived Saavedra Lamas' enthusiasm. The Argentine Minister likewise advised Weddell confidentially that the French Government feared the proposed conference might weaken the ties binding American members to the League of Nations. Saavedra Lamas dismissed these fears as unwarranted, but he did point out that some American members were discontented with the League's recent conduct.  

4. Replies of Latin American Chief Executives

On February 17, Weddell filed a report with the State Department regarding the Argentine press reaction to Roosevelt's letter. He indicated that the text of the President's letter and extensive interpretive comment were given headline prominence in Buenos Aires papers. The leading newspapers commented editorially on the proposed conference and were generally laudatory although several were skeptical of practical results. All but one newspaper expressed great pleasure at Roosevelt's suggestion that the conference be held in Buenos Aires. La Prensa suggested there was no longer any need to fear hypothetical hegemonies or imperialism in the western hemisphere.  

DF 710 Peace/76. Saavedra Lamas was aware that there was opposition to the conference convening in Buenos Aires. See Braden to Hull, February 16, 1936, DF 710 Peace/76; Sidney E. O'Donoghue to Hull, February 11, 1936, DF 710 Peace/80; Daniels to Hull, February 19, 1936, DF 710 Peace/108, RG 59, NA.

31 Braden was disposed to believe that Saavedra Lamas would cooperate fully within his limitations and would be amenable to judicious guidance by the United States. (Braden to Hull, February 18, 1936, DF 710 Peace/102); Weddell to Hull, February 16, 1936, DF 710 Peace/75, RG 59, NA.

32 Weddell to Hull, February 17, 1936, DF 710 Peace/84, RG 59, NA.
During a meeting with Weddell and Braden at the Argentine Ministry on February 18, Saavedra Lamas expressed the warm approval of his government toward the proposed extraordinary conference. He indicated that he hoped to have a reply ready for President Justo's signature by February 21. According to Weddell, Saavedra Lamas had telegraphed his ideas concerning the program of the conference, including a few economic subjects, to Ambassador Espil in Washington. The Foreign Minister also discussed his decision not to insist upon the inclusion of economic subjects, although he felt they were pressing and might as well be considered by the peace conference since otherwise they would not be treated until the 1938 Lima Conference. He said he was delighted with Roosevelt's suggestion of convening the conference in Buenos Aires, and emphasized the tremendous good which he thought it might do. Furthermore, Saavedra Lamas reported to Weddell that the ministers of Chile, Mexico, Ecuador, and Columbia had all voiced warm approval of President Roosevelt's plan.

Saavedra Lamas delivered President Justo's reply to the invitation the morning of February 22, 1936. He suggested to Weddell that the text of the letter be telegraphed the same day in order to allow for public release of the Argentine reply on February 23. Justo's

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33 Weddell to Hull, February 18, 1936, _FRUS, 1936_, V, p. 7. For Saavedra Lamas' views and his instructions to the Argentine Ambassador in Washington, see Felipe A. Espil to Sumner Welles, "Translation of Cablegram and General Views of Saavedra Lamas," February 18, 1936, DF 710 Peace/12, RG 59, NA. Espil was instructed to officially announce that President Justo accepted Roosevelt's invitation with pleasure as well as the suggestion to convene in Buenos Aires.

letter to President Roosevelt was transmitted to the State Department later the same day. Ambassador Weddell also indicated that he had enclosed the original copy of the letter from President Justo. 35

President Justo expressed full agreement that the moment had arrived for American Republics to consider their joint responsibility for the security of peace in the western hemisphere.

Now that we find ourselves at a dark hour for the world, full of uncertainties for its stability and for the effective sway of international morality, a special Interamerican Conference would be beneficial.

Within the vast repercussions arising from the circumstances mentioned, a common mediation among the countries of America to assure the welfare and progress of our peoples is desirable as a work of foresight and prudence. That will doubtless counsel a revision of the instruments of peace with respect to their prompt ratification and a coordination which will consolidate them, thus assuring the harmony demanded by universal progress. 36

Justo complimented President Roosevelt for the shining perspectives in the life of American relations which resulted from his Good Neighbor Policy. The Argentine President stated that within the universal interdependence there was no room for regional distinctions nor for the separations of continents, but "that a consolidation of peace among the nations of America will always be a very valuable contribution. ..." Justo also accepted Roosevelt's suggestion and

35 Weddell to Hull, February 22, 1936, DF 710 Peace/142 and 202, RG 59, NA.

offered Buenos Aires as the seat of the proposed conference. He esteemed it a great honor for which he was deeply grateful. 37

During the month following the release of Roosevelt's letter, favorable replies were received from every chief executive in Latin America except Paraguay, Bolivia and Ecuador. Nine chief executives made recommendations with regard to the agenda of the conference. President Justo suggested the extension of discussions to include social, commercial and economic problems. President Alessandri of Chile suggested regional limitation of armaments and measures for stimulating international trade. Roosevelt's suggestion that the conference not conflict with the activities of the League of Nations was generally accepted although several chief executives favored an American League of Nations. In his reply to President Roosevelt, President Rafael L. Trujillo of the Dominican Republic suggested that the agenda should include a proposal to create a League of American Nations. 38 The President of El Salvador suggested that mutual action for defense of the Americas should be considered. The Italian conquest of Ethiopia made a powerful impression on him and "... brought home to him the helplessness of a small country like his in the event of attack by an aggressive powerful nation." 39


38 For full text of the replies to Roosevelt's suggestion, see "Proposed Inter-American Conference," Press Releases, April 18, 1936, pp. 313-340.

39 Frank P. Corrigan to Hull, April 21, 1936, DF 710 Peace/ 450. The President of Haiti noted that the proposed conference would be "most helpful by way of helping to check the wave of communism which
The proposed conference was received favorably by the Argentine press, and Roosevelt's policy of bringing American countries together in order to avoid European entanglements was lauded. El Mundo felt the conference was highly desirable since dollar diplomacy had been replaced by the Good Neighbor Policy. A great deal of prominence was likewise given to the opening date of the conference and to speculation that President Roosevelt might attend if invited by the Argentine government. The Argentine press also cited potential problems which might result from the conference, specifically difficulties concerning the Monroe Doctrine and the League obligations of Latin American republics. Weddell noted an "important section" of the local press insisted that the conference should not diminish the prestige and importance of the League. La Presna referred to the suggestion about the creation of a league of American nations, and asserted the initiative would not find acceptance or be included in the agenda. It added that the League of Nations might not have been as successful as desired, but it was the first great experiment of its kind. Likewise El Diario considered the conference to be excellent in principle and unobjectionable, but warned against the dangers of Argentina becoming involved in a conflict between the United States and some European or Asiatic

is now pronounced in various South American countries" (George A. Gordon to Hull, February 12, 1936, DF 710 Peace/51, RG 59, NA).

40 Eugene M. Hinkle to Hull, February 14, 1936, DF 710 Peace/151; Hinkle to Hull, February 28, 1936, DF 710 Peace/235; For further discussion, see Hinkle to Hull, February 21, 1936, DF 710 Peace/195; Hinkle to Hull, March 6, 1936, DF 710 Peace/258; and Hinkle to Hull, March 13, 1936, DF 710 Peace/278, RG 59 NA.
power. 41

In contrast to the "important section" of local press noted above, some Argentine newspapers desired establishing a League of American Nations in favor of the League of Nations. Weddell reported that La Razon, an important afternoon newspaper, questioned the benefits of the League of Nations to Latin American members. La Razon asserted the League had been "of no use to Latin America and of little use to the rest of the world." 42 Despatches filed by Weddell and his colleagues indicated that Latin Americans had mixed opinions about the League's importance. Although smaller republics deprecated the League's failure to prevent aggression, larger republics, especially Argentina, continued to view the League of Nations as a counterweight to possible domination by the United States. Debate before and during the conference focused on this difference of opinion among Latin American nations. 43

The State Department received replies from each American president, with the exception of Paraguay, by March 17, 1936. In a press release dated March 28, the State Department indicated that all replies expressed full and cordial approbation with President Roosevelt's

41 Weddell to Hull, April 30, 1936, DF 710 Peace/508; Hinkle to Hull, February 14, 1936, DF 710 Peace/151, RG 59, NA.

42 Weddell to Hull, April 30, 1936, DF 710 Peace/508, RG 59, NA.

43 For examples of this difference of opinion, see Daniels to Hull, February 26, 1936, FRUS, 1936, V, pp. 8-9; Hugh Gibson to Hull, April 6, 1936, FRUS, 1936, V, p. 14; Corrigan to Hull, April 21, 1936, FRUS, 1936, V, pp. 15-16.
initiative, and that a majority of the replies were written within forty-eight hours of Roosevelt's letter. It was also announced that President Justo had accepted Roosevelt's suggestion and that Justo had offered Buenos Aires as the site of the Conference. Copies of the various replies were transmitted to Weddell on March 25 for his personal and confidential information. Identical information was also transmitted to each United States ambassador and minister in Latin America, to the diplomatic representatives of each American republic, and to the Pan American Union.

Thus, the initial stage of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace was concluded. The Roosevelt Administration, in an effort to further the progress of the Good Neighbor Policy and to provide for hemispheric security, had suggested to the Argentine Republic as well as the other twenty American republics the convening of a special conference to consider the cause of permanent peace in the western hemisphere. Each Latin American nation responded positively and enthusiastically to President Roosevelt's invitation. The proposed conference became a reality with the formal acceptance of President Justo.


45 Phillips to Weddell, March 25, 1936, DF 710 Peace/295; Phillips to Espil, March 26, 1936, DF 710 Peace/312, RG 59, NA.

Heretofore, Ambassador Weddell had not been directly involved with the proposed conference except to report the attitude, questions, and reactions of the Argentine Foreign Ministry and to deliver President Roosevelt's invitation. From this point on, Ambassador Weddell and his Embassy staff would take an increasingly active and central role.
CHAPTER IV

ESTABLISHMENT OF AGENDA FOR THE INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

The major task of preparing the agenda was undertaken by a special committee which represented each American republic. The State Department had originally hoped, because of the upcoming 1936 presidential election, to convene the special peace conference during the summer of 1936. The agenda required careful preparation however, and, for nearly seven months, the American republics exchanged frequent and extensive views regarding the topics of the Conference. Secretary Hull took part in the development of the United States proposals, though not in detail. Assistant Secretary Welles and the State Department's Latin American Division were assigned the task of formulating United States treaties as well as supporting the combined efforts of the special committee. While these activities were undertaken in Washington, Ambassador Weddell and the American Embassy in Buenos Aires kept the State Department informed of press comment and the planning activities of the Argentine government.

1. Development and Submittal of Argentine Peace Project

On March 4, Weddell indicated Saavedra Lamas was actively working on Argentina's suggestions for the peace conference program. The

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1Hull, Memoirs, I, p. 494; Cordell Hull, "The Results and Significance of the Buenos Aires Conference: An Address Before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, February 25, 1937," Addresses and
Argentine Foreign Office informed Weddell the suggestions might be ready the week of March 9, 1936. The Department of State, anxious to study Saavedra Lamas' suggestions, instructed Weddell to cable the complete text and a detailed summary as soon as he received the suggestions.² Saavedra Lamas was likewise extremely desirous of establishing the meeting date of the proposed conference, and, when Weddell called on the Argentine Foreign Minister on March 18, he discussed the conference's vital importance with Weddell and why it should not be postponed too long. First, a successful conference might have helpful repercussions on the situation in Europe; second, it could have a moral effect on the Chaco belligerents; third, a meeting in June would be more convenient to the host, the Argentine government; and lastly for a personal reason, Saavedra Lamas planned to depart for Geneva to attend sessions of the League of Nations in July. Since Buenos Aires would be the seat of the conference, Weddell felt the views of the Argentine government concerning the meetings date should receive every consideration.³

Statements by the Honorable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States, In Connection with his Trip to South America to Attend the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace (Washington, D.C., n.d., pp. 81-82.

²Weddell to Hull, March 4, 1936, DF 710 Peace/226; Hull to Weddell, March 5, 1936, DF 710 Peace/231, RG 59, NA.

³Weddell to Hull, March 18, 1936, FRUS, 1936, V, p. 10. Weddell partially corroborated these views in a personal letter written March 12. "The Argentine Government is enthusiastic over the movement [inter-American conference] and I think the moral effect on the Paraguayan and Bolivian Governments of the presence here of delegates from the twenty-one Republics will be strong and effective" (Weddell to Bryan, March 12, 1936, Weddell Papers).
Acting Secretary of State Phillips responded to Weddell's report and, in essence, rebuked Saavedra Lamas' views. He indicated Felipe Espil had already made similar representations to the State Department. Phillips concurred with the reasons cited by Saavedra Lamas. However, in view of the tremendous importance of the conference, Phillips deemed it highly undesirable to fix any date until each participating government was assured unanimous agreement as well as the opportunity to include all projects which warranted consideration. According to Phillips, the State Department hoped to ascertain the views of each government within three weeks, and, at that time, it would be feasible to fix a date for the Conference. He concluded that any date before the middle of July would be unlikely if the time required for the agenda and the journey of respective delegations to Buenos Aires were taken into account. 4

In an effort to obtain the suggestions of the Argentine government, Weddell sent a member of his staff to Saavedra Lamas' office the evening of March 18. Saavedra Lamas was stalling, however, and the suggestions were unobtainable at the prearranged time. The following day, Saavedra Lamas spoke to Weddell vaguely about his desire to consider the matter further. He would not tell Weddell when the document would be ready, and the Ambassador was suspicious of these maneuvers, feeling that the suggestions had already been forwarded to Espil on March 19. Saavedra Lamas continued to ponder the peace agenda, and informed Weddell on March 24 that he hoped to forward his suggestions on March 28. Referring to the discussion between Espil and Phillips,

Saavedra Lamas also indicated that President Justo had agreed to convene the conference on July 15. Although Weddell reiterated Phillip's comments and emphasized the inadvisability of fixing a date just then, Saavedra Lamas continued to discuss July 15 as the opening date for the conference. 5

Weddell filed a despatch on March 27 which reported the local press comment on the proposed Pan American peace conference. He noted there had been little or no press comment for two weeks because the "Europe situation" had practically the entire attention of the local press. La Nacion, however, stated the State Department was studying various proposals, and that a five-year tariff truce was being seriously weighed for inclusion in the agenda. La Nacion further discussed the tariff truce and the tariff difficulties between the United States and Argentina, such as the 1935 Sanitary Convention. In view of the bitter feelings expressed by La Nacion, Weddell suggested the article might be of special interest to the State Department. 6

On March 29, Saavedra Lamas traced the Bradens, by telephone, from their apartment to a private house, whereupon he invited them to tea. Saavedra Lamas stated he had something very important to discuss, and Braden felt his anxiety to talk was motivated by a desire to

5Weddell to Hull, March 20, 1936, DF 710 Peace/273, RG 59, NA; Weddell to Hull, March 24, 1936, FRUS, 1936, V, pp. 11-12.

establish July 15 as the initiation date of the Conference. Except for the last half hour when the Argentine Ambassador to Mexico was present, Braden and Foreign Minister met privately. Saavedra Lamas had been advised by Ambassador Espil that Secretary Hull and the United States delegation could not depart until July 4 because Hull would be attending the Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia. Accordingly, the United States delegation would arrive in Buenos Aires the 22nd of that month, and it would, therefore, be impossible to convene the peace conference before July 25. This date would be too late for Saavedra Lamas' convenience because he planned to depart for Europe on August 6 in order to attend the League of Nations. Mrs. Saavedra Lamas, while conversing with Mrs. Braden, mentioned her husband's desire to conclude the conference before August since they absolutely had to depart on August 6.  

Braden replied that the most strenuous efforts were being exercised in Washington to fix the opening date and to facilitate the Minister's trip to Europe. However Braden explained that Hull's presence was necessary during the entirety of the Democratic National Convention as well as the peace meeting. This subject "was gone over two or three times," and Braden repeatedly expressed strong personal doubts whether the conference could possibly convene on July 15.  

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7 Braden to Hull, March 30, 1936, DF 710 Peace/322 and 366, RG 59, NA. Since the conference would last at least two weeks, Saavedra Lamas wanted the United States delegation to depart by June 27 so it could arrive by July 15. The conference could then conclude its deliberations before his planned departure.

8 Saavedra Lamas also suggested that (1) Hull could "fly down" to Buenos Aires; (2) he might charter a special transatlantic liner; (3) Hull could miss the opening of the conference and send Welles in his place; (4) Hull could skip the Democratic National Convention
Saavedra Lamas discussed his proposals for the conference, which were grouped under three general headings: (1) peace instruments and maintenance of peace; (2) elimination of aggression, and (3) economic considerations. The American envoy noted proposals (1) and (2) would be finished by 8:00 PM on March 30 and would be forwarded to Ambassador Espil on March 31.  

It is interesting and somewhat paradoxical to note that, despite his anxiety, Saavedra Lamas discussed this subject with Braden before he conferred with Ambassador Weddell. The Ambassador's despatches indicate he was not apprised of Saavedra Lamas' anxiety until the afternoon of March 31, two days after Braden's meeting. Saavedra Lamas repeated his desire to Weddell and "wondered if Assistant Secretary Welles might not be on hand for the opening to be joined later by Secretary Hull." Weddell also noted that Saavedra Lamas delivered a copy of instructions for Ambassador Espil, including the first three chapters of a proposed treaty to consolidate peace efforts.

The following day, April 1, 1936, Weddell submitted a lengthy despatch which summarized the preamble and the first three chapters of Saavedra Lamas' proposed treaty. The preamble, referred in detail to instruments of peace already in force. It pointed out the necessity to put into treaty form various resolutions and recommendations adopted by previous Pan American Conferences.  

(Braden to Hull, March 30, 1936, DF 710 Peace/366, RG 59, NA).

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9 Ibid.

10 Weddell to Hull, March 31, 1936, DF 710 Peace/330, RG 59, NA.

11 Weddell to Hull, April 1, 1936, DF 710 Peace/331, RG 59, NA.
the reinforcement or at least the duplication of the work of the League of Nations particularly with regard to sanctions and maintenance of neutrality. Furthermore, the preamble stated that juridical doctrines in the Americas were sufficiently definite to warrant formulation into a single treaty in order to do away with "such remaining causes of war as collection of debts by force, excessive diplomatic protection of national residents abroad, and diplomatic intervention on behalf of companies and private parties abroad." The final suggestions of the preamble concerned the improvement of conciliation commissions and the importance of peaceful communications between nations, tariff truces and revision of sanitary restrictions. Weddell also devoted considerable space to a summary of the treaty's first three chapters and major topics: (1) strengthening instruments for the maintenance of peace; (2) abolition of the use of violence for settling disputes; (3) and, commercial interchange and inter-American maritime communications. The proposed treaty was, in essence, a binding repudiation of two "causes of war" (the forcible collection of debts and excessive diplomatic intervention) which Latin American republics had frequently decried before the Good Neighbor Policy.

This suggestion was particularly ironic because Argentina, despite eloquent speeches at Montevideo, had neglected to ratify the existing inter-American peace treaties with one exception—the Saavedra Lamas Anti-War Treaty of Nonaggression and Conciliation of 1933 (Bemis, Latin American Policy, p. 304 and FN15, p. 436).

12 Weddell to Hull, April 1, 1936, DF 710 Peace/331, RG 59, NA.
On April 3, the American Embassy transmitted the preamble and first three chapters of Saavedra Lamas' proposals as well as a translation of the covering instructions from Saavedra Lamas to Felipe Espil. The same day, Ambassador Weddell met with the Argentine Foreign Minister. Saavedra Lamas indicated that the two concluding chapters of his general treaty which concerned economic and immigration matters would not be completed for perhaps three weeks. Also, Saavedra Lamas informed Weddell he would be absent until the middle of April since he was going on leave.  

Second Secretary Eugene M. Hinkle filed a despatch on April 8 which reviewed Argentine press comment toward the conference. He indicated a number of despatches has been published, but the European situation continued to command the principle space. Hinkle specifically commented on an editorial which appeared in La Vanguardia, the newspaper of the Argentine Socialist Party. The editorial was noteworthy and of future importance to the State Department because it discussed a local movement to convene a popular peace conference in Buenos Aires a few days before the proposed Pan American Conference in order to influence its work.  

The Argentine government continued to develop the final chapters of its draft peace treaty during April, 1936. Weddell reported on April 16 that chapters four and five had not been drafted. He also reported that Argentine press comment was increasing and considerable publicity was given to a summary of the first three chapters of the
draft treaty. Saavedra Lanas conferred with Weddell and indicated his draft treaty was very similar to the proposals of a well-known Socialist, Nicholas Repetto. The Foreign Minister found it necessary to release the text of his treaty "lest he later be accused of including therein proposals originated by Dr. Repetto."15

2. Committee on the Program of the Conference

Secretary Hull conducted informal conversations during the last days of March in order to ascertain the most agreeable and practical manner of formulating the agenda for the conference. He reiterated the policy of the State Department that every government attending the conference should be given ample opportunity to present the projects it desired, and expressed the opinion that "the conference could only be successful if it was generally recognized that every one of the twenty-one governments had an equal share in the determination of the agenda."16 Two suggestions were offered to Hull concerning the formulation of the program: (1) entrust the program to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union; (2) entrust the agenda to a committee constituted by the diplomatic representatives of the American republics together with a representative of the United States. The Secretary of State felt the latter suggestion would probably be the most effacious method and would avoid the impression that a small group of major powers

15 Weddell to Hull, April 17, 1936, DF 710 Peace/447. Also, see Weddell to Hull, April 16, 1936, DF 710 Peace/400. Weddell was informed on April 21 that the final chapter had been transmitted to Washington, via Espil (Weddell to Hull, April 21, 1936, DF 710 Peace/428, RG 59, NA.

16 Hull to Gibson, April 2, 1936, FRUS, 1936, V, p. 13.
determined the agenda in advance. 17

The initial phase of the agenda was concluded in the manner suggested by Cordell Hull when a special committee, tentatively termed the Committee on the Program of the Conference, was established by the Pan American Union. The Committee on the Program was composed of the diplomatic representatives of the American republics in Washington under instructions from their respective governments. Each member submitted pertinent data to the Committee. At a press conference on April 11, Hull announced the release of the Latin American replies to Roosevelt's letter. When questioned about the inclusion of such topics as armaments and economics on the program, he replied (off the record) that there was another organized movement designed to treat financial and monetary topics. Therefore, the conference would not study those topics. 18

During the same week, Secretary of State Hull and Assistant Secretary Welles presented speeches which publicized the proposed Inter-American conference. Hull, speaking as chairman of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, delivered an address on the occasion of Pan American Day, April 14, 1936. The Secretary discussed the cooperative atmosphere which was prevalent in the western hemisphere as well as the progress of settling boundary disputes and bringing

17 Ibid. Hull also listed four suggestions which the State Department would present for consideration: (1) suggestions relating to amendments of existing peace instruments and projects for new peace instruments; (2) suggestions relative to the rights and duties of neutrals; (3) suggestions relative to trade and commerce; (4) suggestions relative to cultural questions. See also, Gibson to Hull, April 1, 1936, FRUS, 1936, V, p. 12.

18 "Memorandum of Press Conference, Thursday, April 9, 1936 - Pan
about economic rehabilitation; he also cited the enthusiastic response to Roosevelt's invitation. According to Hull, the goal sought by the United States was "an America in which the spirit of mutual helpfulness would determine international relations; an America in which the fear of aggression would disappear; and, an America in which the purpose of national security would be achieved." Secretary Hull expounded on the world example theory and offered his hopes on the success of the conference.

The forthcoming inter-American conference, which is to meet at Buenos Aires in accordance with the suggestion made by President Roosevelt to the Presidents of the other American republics, offers, I believe, a promising opportunity for the American nations to set an example to the world of friendly cooperation and enlightened internationalism. May the peoples of these Americas unite in supporting their governments in this effort to employ the forces of reason and justice in our international relations rather than the barbaric methods of the doctrine that "might makes right." It is my hope, and I believe it is the hope of all true lovers of peace, that this conference may attain its great objectives, that it may carry the standard of good will one step farther toward the realization of the ideal of perpetual peace, and that the peoples of the 21 American republics may unanimously support the efforts of their governments to banish forever the scourge of war from this hemisphere.19

Summer Welles further publicized the proposed conference during an address delivered to the Maryland Federation of Women's Clubs in Baltimore on April 15, 1936. His speech, entitled "The Way to Peace

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on the American Continent," was issued as a press release by the State Department and later printed as an issue in the Latin American Series. 20

The Committee on the Program conducted a meeting on April 15 at the Pan American Union with Cordell Hull presiding as Committee Chairman. The Committee passed a resolution which authorized Hull to appoint a subcommittee of three. The subcommittee was charged with the responsibility of preparing a draft project of the agenda by coordinating the different points of view and the suggestions of the various governments. Although the Minister of El Salvador suggested that Cordell Hull serve as a member of the subcommittee since the United States initiated the conference, the final resolution stipulated that the chairman name a representative from South America, another from the Antiles and Central American regions, and the other from North America. 21

Cordell Hull offered substantive proof that the United States would not attempt to dominate the agenda of the conference when he declined to support El Salvador's proposal and when he named the Mexican Ambassador as the representative from North America. Hull's actions


21 "Summary of the Resolution Agreed Upon April 15, 1936 By the Full Committee," April 15, 1936, DF 710 Peace/412; "Minutes of the Session of the Committee on the Program of the Conference for the Consolidation of Peace Held on April 15, 1936," Leo S. Rowe to Hull May 2, 1936, DF 710 Peace/447, RG 59, NA.
were in keeping with Roosevelt's preference of leaving leadership at international conferences to smaller nations. During the formulation of the agenda, Welles stated that as a matter of policy, he thought it desirable for the United States to avoid eliminating any topic suggested by another government. If there was to be any elimination of topics, the initiation should be taken by other governments. On April 17, Hull appointed Felipe Espil, Mexican Ambassador Francisco Najera, and Guatemalan Minister Adrian Recinos to the subcommittee. He informed the press that the draft project would be completed by May 2 and that the subcommittee would advise him when the project was finished. Hull also indicated he had not begun to consider the membership of the United States delegation and the date of the conference was still undetermined.

The State Department transmitted on May 2 a list of subjects to the subcommittee which the United States sought to have included in the preliminary draft of the program. The subcommittee was also advised that the State Department might desire to present further suggestions and proposals. The topics suggested by the United States were grouped into five categories and, with one exception, they embodied familiar objectives of the Roosevelt Administration: (1) the improvement of existing inter-American peace treaties and the negotiation of new treaties; (2) a clarification of the existing rights of neutrals; (3) the improvement of inter-American communication; (4) the facilitation of intellec-

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22 Range, Roosevelt's World Order, p. 59; Welles to Laurence Duggan, June 1, 1936, DF 710 Peace Agenda/25, RG 59, NA.

23 "Memorandum of the Press Conference - Pan America," Friday, April 17, 1926, DF 710 Peace/461, RG 59, NA.
tual cooperation through teacher and student exchange; and (5) the elimination of trade discrimination and promotion of equality of trade opportunity. 24

In his discussion of the agenda of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, George Coleman makes special note of the first two suggestions because many New World republics had failed by 1936 to ratify the five major peace treaties endorsed by the Montevideo Conference. 25 Item four is likewise notable since the United States was the last major nation to engage in government sponsored cultural exchange. Although the original motive for this suggestion was defensive, it nevertheless represented a departure from traditional opposition to the federal government engaging in cultural matters. The suggestion also marked the emergence of a new, though insignificant at the time, foreign policy tool for the United States. 26

Prior to May 13, 1936, the "extraordinary" peace conference did not have a formal title and was tentatively referred to as the Conference for the Consolidation of Peace. On this date, Welles suggested to Leo S. Rowe, Director General of the Pan American Union, that "the title of the Conference might more appropriately be 'The

24 Hull to Espil, May 2, 1936, FRUS, 1936, V, p. 16. The list of subjects submitted by the State Department was also released to the press on May 2, 1936 ("Proposed Inter-American Conference," Press Releases, Saturday, May 2, 1936, vol. 14: no. 344, pp. 390-391).


Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace'." Rowe, who was acting as secretary to the Committee of the Program, acknowledged Welles' suggestion, and indicated that the title of the upcoming Conference would thereafter be the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. Nearly one week later, the Committee submitted the program project for the Inter-American Conference to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union. The project was likewise transmitted to the governments of each participating republic, and each nation was requested to communicate their observations and suggestions before June 30 so the Governing Board could proceed with the formulation of the definitive agenda. The program was based on suggestions submitted by the various governments and was divided into six sections: (1) organization of peace; (2) neutrality; (3) limitation of armaments; (4) juridical problems; (5) economic problems; and (6) intellectual cooperation.

At a press conference on May 20, Hull was questioned about the draft program and the approximate date for the convening of the Conference. He stated that the draft agenda was intended to indicate the scope and character of the subjects which the Conference might consider. Hull went on to point out that it was not appropriate for him to discuss the merits of the subjects at the present time before they had been presented to the Conference. He also dismissed the immediate possibility of fixing the opening date of the Conference.

27 Welles to Rowe, May 13, 1936, DF 710 Peace/528; Rowe to Welles, May 14, 1936, DF 710 Peace/535, RG 59, NA.

28 "Project of Program Drafted for Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace - Governing Board of the Pan American Union
since "the question of the agenda was the first matter at issue and that in due course the time for the meeting of the conference would be determined by the participating governments." 29

The proposed peace conference was the topic of an address delivered by Donald R. Heath, Division of Latin American Affairs, to the Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. Heath summarized the six general topics of the Conference and discussed the historical antecedents and developments of the topics. Contemporary world problems were alluded to as well as the special timeliness of the Conference.

It is to be held in a period in which, perhaps more than at any time since the World War, events seem to support the proponents of nationalism in their assertion of the futility of internationalism in a world in which, they contend, might will ever make right. In this situation the governments and public opinion of the twenty republics to the south are looking forward to the forthcoming peace conference in Buenos Aires with unusual interest and hope.

In his concluding remarks, Heath admitted that no single conference could solve all the problems which obstructed Inter-American peace. But, he did remark that the Conference would undertake useful study and discussions and that the stage seemed set for a good measure of practical accomplishment due to the cordial relations among Pan American nations. 30

Transmits Projects to Governments for Examination and Comment," undated, DF 710 Peace Agenda/43; see also, Rowe to Welles, May 20, 1936, 710 Peace/596, RG 59, NA.

29 "Memorandum of the Press Conference," Wednesday, May 20, 1936, DF 710 Peace Agenda/5, RG 59, NA.

Uncertainty as to the scope and subject matter of the agenda was ended on July 22, 1936, when the Governing Board of the Pan American Union approved the Program and Regulations of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. The agenda was formulated with regard to regular Pan American Conferences, and each topic received the unanimous approval of the respective American republics. It is interesting to note, in light of today's emphasis on human and women's rights, that proposed topics eliminated from the Program of the Conference included "Consideration of the Civil and Political Rights of Women" and "Measures for the Improvement of the Intellectual, Moral, and Material Condition of Workers." The Governing Board also adopted a resolution which suggested the Conference give preferential consideration to questions relating to the organization of peace. Likewise, it was recommended that the Conference "determine which of the other topics merit general concensus of approval to make advisable their consideration, or whether they should be referred to special committees or to the Lima Conference." The Department of State transmitted, for information purposes, a copy of the Program and Regulations to Ambassador Weddell and to the American diplomatic officers in Latin America. The circular letter also indicated that the date of the Conference had not been established.

3. **Official Invitation of Argentina**

Upon the completion of the Program and Regulations, Saavedra

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31 Welles to American Diplomatic Officers in Latin America, August 3, 1936, DF 710 Peace Agenda/76, RG 59, NA. For the agenda and regulations of the Conference, see Report of the United States Delegation, pp. 6-8 and 57-63.
Lamas acted to fix the opening date of the Conference. On July 31, he inquired of the American Embassy if December 1, 1936, would be convenient for the opening of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. Charge d'Affairs ad Interim Raymond Cox reported Saavedra Lamas' inquiry to the State Department and noted similar inquiries were made of the other participating nations. Welles instructed Cox to inform the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs that the State Department appreciated his courteous inquiry and that "December 1 would be a date entirely satisfactory to the Government of the United States."\(^{32}\)

Following this preliminary exchange of despatches, Saavedra Lamas addressed Secretary Hull directly by letter. The Foreign Minister advised Hull that the Argentine government had devoted special attention to settling the date of the Conference, carefully considering the interests of the various American republics. The Argentine government reached the conclusion that December 1, 1936, would be the only suitable date. In conclusion, Saavedra Lamas expressed his pleasure that "the fixing of the time mentioned ... will suit you, being that which will best allow the Argentine Government and people to express the deep fraternal feelings with which we shall receive the delegates of your Government. ..."\(^{33}\) On August 11, Secretary Hull acknowledged receipt of Saavedra Lamas' letter, and repeated his earlier reply

\(^{32}\)Welles to Weddell, August 3, 1936, DF 710 Peace/685, RG 59, NA.

\(^{33}\)Saavedra Lamas to Hull, August 10, 1936, Press Releases, Saturday, August 15, 1936, vol. 15: no. 359, p. 156.
(delivered by Raymond Cox) which stated that the first of December would be a date eminently agreeable to the United States Government. Since 1936 was an election year, President Roosevelt travelled around the United States and made a number of "nonpolitical" speeches. One of his speeches, at Chautauqua, New York on August 14, deserves special comment. The speech was devoted entirely to foreign affairs and it was a forerunner of many which he would make prior to the Second World War. The President, according to Samuel Rosenman, was beginning to see clearly the crisis which was developing abroad. As events worsened in Europe (The Spanish Civil War broke out on July 17), Roosevelt's anxiety increased and he decided to make further and bolder reference to the impending crisis at Chautauqua.

In Roseman's judgment, the keynote of the speech, and perhaps of Roosevelt's foreign policy prior to World War II, was summarized in the famous and heartfelt words:

I have seen war. I have seen war on land and sea. I have seen blood running from the wounded. I have seen men coughing out their gassed lungs. I have seen the dead in the mud. . . . I have seen children starving. I have seen the agony of mothers and wives. I hate war.

The Chautauqua address also deserves comment because Roosevelt discussed

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34 Hull to Saavedra Lamas, August 11, 1936, FRUS, 1936, V, pp. 23-24. On August 12, the State Department announced that December 1 was agreeable to the United States for the convening of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace at Buenos Aires. The texts of Saavedra Lamas' telegram and Hull's reply were also released ("Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace," Press Releases, Saturday, August 15, 1936, p. 155).

the Good Neighbor Policy and the impending Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. He noted that the twenty-one American republics were united in determination to live together in friendship and peace, and that the upcoming Conference gave substance to this determination. Furthermore, the President stated that "it is, I know, the hope of all chiefs of states of the Americas that this will result in measures which will banish wars forever from this vast portion of the earth." 36

Nearly one week after the Chautauqua address, the Argentine government, through special instructions to Ambassador Espil, extended an official invitation to each American republic to send plenipotentiary delegates to Buenos Aires for the convening of the Inter-American Conference on December 1, 1936. 37 Saavedra Lamas also invited Secretary Hull to attend the opening day of the Conference "with a direct collaboration which would exalt the Conference and advance its noble purposes. . . ." 38 Hull expressed deep appreciation to Lamas' invitation, and indicated that his other duties could hopefully be arranged to permit him to attend. The Secretary also commented on his pleasant memories of the Montevideo Conference, at which Hull effectively "defused" and "courted the favor" of Saavedra Lamas by endorsing the principle

36 As quoted in Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, p. 108. For the entire text of speech, see Nixon, Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, III, pp. 377-384.

37 Report of the United States Delegation, p. 3. For the Argentine invitation transmitted to the United States, see Espil to Hull, August 20, 1936, DF 710 Peace/728, RG 59, NA.

38 Saavedra Lamas to Hull, August 21, 1936, DF 710 Peace/722, RG 59, NA.
of non-intervention and the 1933 Saavedra Lamas Anti-War Treaty. On September 1, Hull acknowledged receipt of the official Argentine invitation submitted by Felipe Espil. The Argentine Ambassador was likewise informed that the State Department would transmit the names of the United States delegates at a later date.\textsuperscript{39}

President Roosevelt assigned the function of choosing the United States delegation to Secretary Hull, as the President had done in the case of the Montevideo Conference. Sumner Welles requested to be named as a delegate, which Hull "did gladly since he (Welles) had taken a principal share in the work of preparation."\textsuperscript{40} The personnel of the American delegation was announced on October 31. With Cordell Hull serving as chairman, the delegates consisted of Welles; Ambassador Weddell; Adolf B. Berle, Jr., Chamberlain of New York City (and close friend of Welles); Alexander F. Whitney, President of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen; Charles G. Fenwick, Professor of Political Science, Bryn Mawr College; Michael Francis Doyle, Lawyer of Philadelphia; and Mrs. Elise F. Muser, State Senator of Utah.\textsuperscript{41} On November 3, President Roosevelt invested the delegates with full power and authority to meet with other duly invested delegates and to conclude and sign any treaties or acts which might be agreed upon at the Inter-

\textsuperscript{39} Hull to Saavedra Lamas, August 22, 1936, DF 710 Peace/729; Hull to Espil, September 1, 1936, DF 710 Peace/741, RG 59, NA.

\textsuperscript{40} Hull, Memoirs, I, p. 495.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., pp. 494-495; "Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace," Press Releases, Saturday, October 31, 1936, vol. 15: no. 370, pp. 348-349. For a complete listing of the United States delegation, including special and technical advisers, secretaries, and clerical staff, see Welles to Weddell, November 6, 1936, DF 710 Peace Personnel/204, RG 59, NA.
American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. 42

During the intervening months between the completion of the agenda and the departure of the various delegations, the majority of American republics undertook informally to consult with other participating governments to ascertain specific projects which they desired to submit for approval. These discussions, in Sumner Welles judgment, were invaluable in determining the views and reactions of the respective nations, and they "assisted materially in preparing the way for expeditious, constructive and conciliatory debates when the Conference assembled." 43 The American Embassy in Buenos Aires undertook a more active support function once the program was finalized. Chapter Five will address the planning activities of Ambassador Weddell and his staff prior to November 30, with particular emphasis on the arrangements for President's Roosevelt's visit to Buenos Aires.

42 Unaddressed document with seal from Roosevelt, attested by Hull, November 3, 1936, DF 710 Peace/889, RG 59, NA.

43 Sumner Welles, "The New Era in Pan American Relations," Foreign Affairs, 15 (April, 1937), p. 447. Hull later stated that few international meetings enjoyed more meticulous advance preparation since a year and a half elapsed between the time the Conference was first thought of and the day it convened (Hull, Memoirs, I, p. 494).
Preparations for the Conference were undertaken by the State Department and Ambassador Weddell's staff once the agenda was completed by the Committee on the Program and the Pan American Union. Although the American Embassy engaged in various planning activities between July and December, 1936, only four topics or "undertakings" warrant detailed discussion in this chapter: (1) reporting local press comment and plans of the Argentine government; (2) monitoring two popular peace organizations which met in Buenos Aires prior to the Conference; (3) preparations for the arrival of the United States delegation; and (4) arrangements for President Roosevelt's visit to Buenos Aires.

1. Press Comment and Plans of Argentine Government

Press comment regarding the Conference slackened, both in Argentina and in the western hemisphere, during the several months before the official announcement of the agenda. In a personal letter written nearly one week prior to July 22, Ambassador Weddell noted the slow development of the Conference, and linked this to the upcoming presidential elections. He also commented on his own future under a Republican Administration:

The Pan American Peace Conference, of which you say you hear nothing, is slowly maturing but naturally our Government has to soft-pedal this and not talk too positively
until election returns are known. . . . I think even a Republican Administration would have to go on with the scheme, but it might be in a rather modified form, and I rather think in the event of Republican success, they will prefer some other blue-eyed boy to myself to help carry on policies here.¹

Raymond Cox continued to monitor local press comment during July and August while the Weddells were on leave from Buenos Aires. On July 23, he reported that renewed interest had been recently shown in the Conference, including press despatches from Washington and editorial comments on the meeting's agenda.² Cox submitted an "unusually interesting" editorial from the Review of the River Plate on August 14. This magazine was published weekly in English, and Cox noted it was considered the official mouthpiece of British interests in Argentina. The magazine speculated the Conference might result in a practical combination among Latin American republics for means of defense against the economic exclusion and isolation which several European countries had been attempting for some time. The United States was termed "the great unknown factor" which, by just a moderate relaxation of its policies, particularly beef imports and sanitary regulations, might effectuate surprises "capable of making trade history in the American continent." Cox also noted that the announcement of the opening date of the Conference had served to renew interest in Buenos Aires, and that the Conference was again receiving

¹Weddell to Mrs. Helen K. Draper, July 16, 1936, Weddell Papers.
²Cox to Hull, July 23, 1936, DF 710 Peace/680, RG 59, NA.
a certain amount of prominence in the local press.\textsuperscript{3}

On August 20 the Argentine government announced that, with the exception of Nicaragua, it had received replies from all the American republics accepting December 1, 1936, as the convening date of the Conference. A summary of the program as approved by the Governing Board of the Pan American Union was also released and consequently published. Citing a news item appearing in \textit{La Nacion} on August 27, Cox noted the issuance of a decree by the Foreign Office which appointed a special committee to organize the forthcoming Conference. Saavedra Lamas would serve as Chairman, and the remainder of the Committee would be comprised by the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs and other officials of the Argentine Foreign Office. The United States Embassy was also informed that Dr. Daniel Antokoletz, Director of Economic Affairs of the Foreign Office, would serve as Secretary of the Committee.\textsuperscript{4}

The Argentine government appointed three additional members to the Committee for Organization: Dr. Carlos L. Torriani, Assistant Director of Economic Affairs; Dr. Paul Prebisch, General Manager of the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic; and Dr. Oridio V. Schiopetto, Director General of Rural Economy and Statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture. Weddell noted that Dr. Torriani was assistant to the Secretary of the Committee and that Dr. Prebisch was a leading member of the young men associated with Dr. Frederico Pinedo,

\textsuperscript{3}Cox to Hull, August 14, 1936, DF 710 Peace/720, RG 59, NA. The Review of the River Plate did not name the several European countries which had been attempting economic exclusion and isolation. However, keeping in mind its British affiliation and the international/economic policies of Germany and Italy, it is reasonable to surmise that the Review of the River Plate was referring to Germany and Italy.

\textsuperscript{4}Cox to Hull, August 21, 1936, DF 710 Peace/736; Cox to Hull,
Ex-Minister of Finance, at the time the Argentine financial and banking systems were reformed. The Ambassador also transmitted a press statement from the Argentine Foreign Office which summarized the replies received from the Foreign Ministers of various American republics. In Weddell's judgment the replies indicated that most of the Foreign Ministers planned to attend the Conference in person. 5

The Ambassador's weekly press summary of September 11 indicated the Conference was receiving an increasing amount of local attention. The summary also noted La Prensa's opposition to a reported proposal that the Conference should give the Monroe Doctrine the character of a continental of multilateral agreement. The Argentine government opposed the "Pan-Americanizing" of the Monroe Doctrine because this change would shift Latin American power and pre-eminence away from Argentina and would serve to equalize all republics. Argentina was also a traditional opponent of the Monroe Doctrine, and championed the League of Nations and its European relations. La Prensa's opposition was thus in keeping with Argentine tradition and hemispheric jealousies. 6

Weddell mentioned the upcoming Conference sparingly in his personal correspondence during this period, but he did repeat his

August 28, 1936, DF 710 Peace/744, RG 59, NA.

5Weddell to Hull, September 4, 1936, DF 710 Peace/755, RG 59, NA.

6Weddell to Hull, September 11, 1936, DF 710 Peace/768. In contrast to this opposition, a well known Argentine writer on international subjects proposed that the Inter-American Peace Conference consider a plan for collective insurance against war based on the writings of American professor Josiah Royce. Although Weddell considered the scheme impractical, he felt the scheme might be supported by a delegate or delegation at the Conference (Weddell to Hull, September 25, DF 710 Peace/789, RG 59, NA).
earlier thoughts about the outcome of the presidential election. On September 8, he noted that "matters are slowly warming up here for the impending Peace Conference; but I am warming up with them."\(^7\) He further discussed his appointment on September 21.

I shall probably be a delegate and we shall exhaust ourselves entertaining people. Even were the President defeated—which God forbid—the Conference would doubtless take place, if inspired by somewhat different ideals.\(^8\)

The Ambassador reiterated, on October 7, that he would probably be one of the American delegates, although he had not yet been officially notified. Since Buenos Aires would be the scene of the Conference, Weddell felt that he and his wife would have a heavy burden of work "thrown on" them in the way of entertaining apart from the meeting. While discussing the Conference, he again linked the future of his diplomatic career to the 1936 election.

Despite a fairly long service under the Government, I an doubtless classed as a "political appointee," even if my past and recent efforts in behalf of President Roosevelt have not brought me into that category. If the President should be defeated . . . my diplomatic career would come to an end . . .

And, in the event of Roosevelt's defeat:

We might leave here even earlier . . . or at least proceed abroad for a much longer stay than usual, provided the world has gotten around the present difficult corner of potential warfare.\(^9\)

Continuing his reports on the progress of the Argentine Organizing Committee, Weddell noted on October 2 that the Committee had

\(^7\) Weddell to Bryan, September 8, 1936, Weddell Papers.

\(^8\) Weddell to Elizabeth Weddell, September 21, 1936, Weddell Papers.

\(^9\) Weddell to Gordon, October 7, 1936, Weddell Papers.
adopted the suggestions made by the Pan American Union. The Organizing Committee established various divisions and offices, such as presidency, general secretariat and ceremonial, and determined to establish a committee of initiatives to settle requests for the inclusions of new topics in the agenda. Weddell's despatch and accompanying translation likewise indicated that (1) special arrangements would be made for a telephone system for interpretation; (2) each Delegation would be assigned a room within the Conference premises; (3) special arrangements would be made for the press; (4) a daily bulletin of the Conference, containing full reports or projects, resolutions, etc. would be issued each morning; and (5) the acts and instruments of the Conference would be drawn up in Spanish, English, Portuguese and French, the official languages of Pan Americanism. This information was later confirmed by the Secretary of the Organizing Committee while visiting the American Embassy.  

The Argentine press actively discussed the upcoming Conference and various proposed conventions during October, 1936. Weddell continued his practice of submitting weekly press summaries to the State Department, and cited a news item on October 2 which asserted that President Roosevelt might visit Argentina in connection with the Conference. He also discussed a news item published in La Prensa which contained the alleged draft of a convention on the rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents. According to the news item, the United States submitted the draft convention privately and confidentially to

10 Weddell to Hull, October 2, 1936, DF 710 Peace Equipment and Supplies/2, RG 59, NA.
the various Latin American republics for their consideration and comment. Weddell transmitted the original of this article for the possible interest of the State Department. One week later, he transmitted two clippings of an alleged draft treaty on cultural interchange as published in La Prensa. Similar to the draft neutrality convention, it was asserted that the cultural interchange treaty had been submitted by the United States to other American governments for their consideration before its presentation at the Inter-AAmerican Conference. La Prensa discussed the draft treaty and concurred with the exchange plan for professors and students. However, La Prensa indicated little could be achieved through cultural interchange unless governmental measures were adopted at the same time to eliminate barriers hindering the development of cultural interchange.

Weddell’s uncertainty about his role at the Conference was partially abated when he was officially appointed to the United States delegation. Weddell received a letter from Sumner Welles on October 28 which transmitted the President’s commission appointing the Ambassador to represent the United States government at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. Two days later, Weddell was officially notified by the Department of State that

11 Weddell to Hull, October 2, 1936, DF 710 Peace/805. He also cited La Prensa’s partial objection to the neutrality convention because “the project tends toward the formation of a circle of American nations which would rival with the groups of European and Asiatic countries, and in this sense it clashes with the ideal of making the League of Nations universal or of causing anti-war pacts to be such” (Weddell to Hull, October 9, 1936, DF 710 Peace/827, RG 59, NA).

12 Weddell to Hull, October 16, 1936, DF 710 Peace/835, RG 59, NA.
Roosevelt has approved his appointment as delegate to the Conference. 13

The presidents of the American republics, on November 6, 7, and 10, took part in the most extensive international broadcast ever attempted in the western hemisphere. Speaking directly from their respective capital cities, the presidents delivered short messages which called attention to the importance of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. Weddell was instructed to assist Justo and the Radio Corporation of America in order to assure success of the broadcast. The State Department also emphasized the importance of the English translation which would follow Justo's address. Weddell met with Justo's secretary and with agents for R.C.A. the morning of the broadcast, and reported that all arrangements were complete. Both President Justo and President Roosevelt participated in the broadcast on November 7. Roosevelt extended a word of greeting to the United States delegation which had departed for the Inter-American Conference. 14

The Inter-American Conference received considerable attention from the Buenos Aires press after Roosevelt's electoral victory.

13 Welles to Weddell, October 28, 1936, DF 710 Peace Personnel/121; R. Walton Moore to Weddell, October 30, 1936, DF 710 Peace Personnel/129, RG 59, NA. The State Department also tentatively planned to designate Spruille Braden as Special Advisor to the delegation. Braden, however, opposed this appointment because he felt he should be a delegate or nothing. Otherwise, he would lose face with his colleagues at the Chaco Peace Talks who were also delegates to the Inter-American Conference (Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues, p. 174).

14 Report of the United States Delegation, p. 10; Hull to Weddell, November 5, 1936, DF 710 Peace/865; Weddell to Hull, November 7, 1936, DF 710 Peace/877, RG 59, NA.
According to Weddell's weekly summary dated November 13, press comment was characterized by its friendliness to the United States, especially toward Roosevelt and Hull. Weddell indicated the press was optimistic regarding the success of the Conference. He transmitted an editorial by La Prensa which discussed the similarity of views in Roosevelt's and Justo's recent broadcasts. A second La Prensa editorial praised Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy after referring to the withdrawal of United States Marines from Nicaragua and Haiti and the negotiations of new treaties with Cuba and Panama. Likewise, La Prensa stated that these acts "inspired cordiality, and, above all, confidence in the purposes of the Washington government which must necessarily be reflected in the approaching Peace Conference." Weddell also transmitted an editorial from La Nacion which reviewed various interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine and possible discussions of the Doctrine at the Conference. La Nacion's asserted that any attempt to "continentalize" the Monroe Doctrine would "encounter firm opposition."  

2. The Popular Conference for the Peace of America and the Women's Peace Conference

Buenos Aires was the focal point of two popular peace organizations during November and December, 1936. The Popular Conference for the Peace of America and the Women's Peace Conference have not been examined by historians discussing the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. Most likely, this is because the unofficial

15 Weddell to Hull, November 13, 1936, DF 710 Peace/964. For Saavedra Lamas' reaction to the "collectivazation" of the Monroe Doctrine, see William C. Bullitt to Hull, October 19, 1936, DF 710 Peace Agenda/118, RG 59, NA.
peace movements did not greatly affect the events or results of the Conference. Yet, these organizations did vocalize contemporary public opinion regarding peace and further publicized the Conference.

As previously discussed, Weddell's staff noted on April 8 the early plans for convening a popular peace conference. In a circular letter forwarded to the Pan American Union and the State Department on August 30, the President of the Popular Conference for the Peace of America indicated the task of maintaining peace could not be left to governments only. This task should also spring from the will, freely and widely expressed, of the people. The purpose of the popular Conference was to increase public opinion to the importance of the Inter-American Conference and to "prepare the atmosphere for the official meeting so that it would have the enthusiastic support of the people." Weddell noted that the Popular Conference would be held in Buenos Aires from November 22 to 25, and that the leaders of the Conference were well intentioned ladies connected with the Argentine Socialist Party. Also, he felt the Popular Conference would mainly be Argentine in character. It appeared to Weddell that practically all the organizations listed by the press as sending delegates to the Popular Conference were either directly or indirectly connected with the Socialist Party or movement.

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17 Weddell to Hull, October 9, 1936, DF 710 Peace/827, RG 59, NA.
On November 7, the Woman's Peace Conference, a group not directly related to the Popular Conference, convened in Buenos Aires. Police closed the meeting the same day on the charge that the Women's Peace Conference was being used for the propagation of communist ideas. The State Department instructed Weddell to transmit any information available, without approaching authorities, regarding the closure of the conference. He was also requested to comment on the effect of the closure on the second women's conference scheduled from November 22 to November 25. Either through police pressure or hysteria, the president of the conference requested the police to close it. The sixty or seventy women's organizations not identified with the group causing the trouble protested this action, and, as a result, the police authorized the conference to resume its meetings. From other unidentified sources, Weddell noted that one out of approximately seventy women's organizations connected with the conference appeared to have some connection with the Communist Party. The Ambassador indicated the second conference referred to by the State Department was not exclusively for women although they were the principal organizers. According to Weddell's informant, the Popular Conference had received a subvention from the Municipal Council, and had the support of over 300 Argentine organizations. Furthermore, it was expecting delegates from other American countries, including the United States. Weddell felt it was unlikely that the closure of the Women's Peace

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18 Moore to Weddell, November 11, 1936, DF 710 Peace/902, RG 59, NA.
Conference would have any adverse effect on the upcoming Popular Conference. 19

There was no further communication between Weddell and the State Department regarding the Popular Conference. However, by tracing the progress of the unofficial peace movement through press reports, it is possible to demonstrate that Weddell was mistaken about the Women's Peace Conference not adversely affecting the later Popular Conference. On November 19, the Mayor of Buenos Aires temporarily halted the meeting by vetoing the subvention passed by the Municipal Council. His veto message charged that members of the organizing committee had police records as extremist agitators and were engaged in activities intended to disturb public order. 20 Despite the objections of the police and municipal officials, the Argentine Minister of the Interior overruled the veto after meeting with Mrs. Alicia Moreau de Justo, President of the Conference (but no relation to President Justo), and two members of the Argentine Socialist Party. The Popular Conference for the Peace of America, however, did not conclude without disruption as the sessions featured noisy debate and clashes over parliamentary proceedings and the equal rights issue for women. On the last day of the conference, Argentine policy broke up the bedlam ensuing from debate over the equal rights issue. The Popular Conference finally voted to recommend to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace the necessity of extending

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19 Weddell to Moore, November 12, 1936, DF 710 Peace/903, RG 59, NA.

equal civil and political rights, as well as equal pay for equal work, to all women of the Americas. 21

3. Preparation for the United States Delegation

The American Embassy in Buenos Aires began to prepare for the arrival of the United States delegation once the program and date of the Conference were determined. On August 14, the State Department informed Second Secretary J.C. Satterthwaite of plans to appoint him Secretary of the Delegation to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. J.C. Holmes, Acting Chief of the Division of Protocol and Conferences, indicated there were "a lot of preliminaries which we feel here should be attended to immediately." Holmes listed the probable composition of the delegation and estimated it would probably comprise about thirty persons. The first thing Satterthwaite was instructed to do was to acquire suitable space in a hotel for offices and living quarters. As Holmes remembered, the Alvear Palace and the Plaza were the only two acceptable hotels in Buenos Aires for the use of the delegation. Although Holmes, Secretary Hull and Sumner Welles preferred the Plaza, Satterthwaite was instructed to get quotations for both hotels for single and double rooms with bath, and for suites of sitting room and one bedroom and sitting room and two bedrooms. 22

Holmes further discussed at some length the requirements for offices and rooms.


22 J.C. Holmes to Satterthwaite, August 14, 1936, 710 Peace Personnel/25, RG 59, NA.
I have tried to give you the best picture I can at the moment of how the delegation will be organized, and shall have to leave to your good judgment the most convenient arrangement. I hope that you will be able to see the hotel people without delay and that just as soon as you can get definite offers from them you will send me a plan of the hotel with the proposed space indicated thereon.

The remainder of Holmes' preliminary instructions concerned the acquisition of office furniture and equipment, the hiring of stenographers, translators and messengers, and the furnishing of six automobiles with chauffeurs. These cars were to be of the "buick class or better," as five of them would be assigned to delegates and the sixth for the use of the Secretary General and Satterthwaite. Other members of the delegation would be given liberal allowance for local transportation so that they might hire taxicabs. Finally, Holmes indicated the State Department wanted to "organize things in such a way that we can do an efficient job," and, if he found some of the Department's ideas unworkable, Satterthwaite was urged to offer his suggestions. 23

In a personal letter to the Secretary of State, Ambassador Weddell indicated that Mrs. Weddell and he would be happy and honored to have Mr. and Mrs. Hull as house guests during the Conference. The Weddells offered to make a bedroom, bath and sitting room and an office available to the Hulls and his private secretary. The Secretary was deeply grateful for Weddell's invitation to be a house guest at the Embassy. Hull felt, however, that he "must stay with my delegation

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23 Ibid. Satterthwaite received instructions on August 17 to remain in Buenos Aires for duty assignment to the Inter-American Conference (Phillips to Satterthwaite, August 17, 1936, DF 710 Peace Personnel/26, RG 59, NA).
at the hotel because of innumerable callers and conferences.  

After meeting with representatives of the Alvear Palace Hotel and the Plaza, Satterthwaite transmitted accommodation proposals to the State Department. The proposal submitted by the Alvear Palace Hotel was considered to be the most satisfactory, and Satterthwaite was authorized to make specific reservations for thirty-four rooms for the use as offices. The Department indicated it was desirable and important that one whole floor, preferably an upper floor, be made available for offices and living quarters and that other living quarters be conveniently located on a nearby floor. Satterthwaite was likewise instructed to reserve a number of bedrooms sufficient to accommodate approximately thirty-four delegation members and to cable rates for double and single occupancy.

Satterthwaite notified the State Department that he had reserved the entire sixth floor of Alvear Palace Hotel and as much as necessary of the fifth floor for the delegation. On October 6, he was instructed to effect an exchange of letters with the Alvear Palace Hotel, making a definite agreement for the rental of thirty-four rooms for offices, including service charges. The agreement was to commence upon the arrival of the United States delegation and extend throughout the duration of the Conference. Satterthwaite was likewise instructed to conclude an arrangement previously submitted to the State Department for

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24 Weddell to Hull, August 17, 1936, DF 710 Peace Personnel/37; Hull to Weddell, September 5, 1936, DF 710 Peace Personnel/38, RG 59, NA.

25 Satterthwaite to Hull, September 3, 1936, DF 710 Peace Quarters/1; Hull to Satterthwaite, September 29, 1936, DF 710 Peace Quarters/2, RG 59, NA.
typewriters and to make further efforts to secure reasonable rates for furniture. 26

Ambassador Weddell met with the acting President of the American Society of the River Plate on October 21 and discussed a reception for the United States delegation. The Society was comprised of outstanding American citizens residing in Buenos Aires, and Weddell noted that "when this organization speaks, it may be said to be the authentic voice of our colony." He heartedly supported the invitation, and hoped it would be the pleasure of Cordell Hull to approve the reception. Hull accepted the invitation on behalf of the American delegation and suggested November 27 as a suitable date for the afternoon reception. 27

Satterthwaite contacted the State Department on November 3 and requested a complete personnel list of the delegation and accompanying members in order to arrange custom facilities. He also felt it would be advisable to officially inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the delegation's composition. Richard Southgate, Chief of the Division of Protocol and Conferences, forwarded a list of office assignments to Satterthwaite on November 4. Instructions on private

26 Satterthwaite to Hull, October 2, 1936, DF 710 Peace Quarters/3; Hull to Satterthwaite, October 6, 1936, DF 710 Peace Quarters/4. The Embassy ultimately resorted to borrowing office furniture from different American businesses because of high rental rates (Satterthwaite to Hull, October 13, 1936, DF 710 Peace Quarters/5; Moore to Satterthwaite, October 15, 1936, DF 710 Peace Quarters/6; Satterthwaite to Hull, October 22, 1936, DF 710 Peace Quarters/7, RG 59, NA).

27 Weddell to Hull, October 21, 1936, DF 710 Peace Personnel/169; Hull to Weddell, November 5, 1936, DF 710 Peace Personnel/170. Hull likewise accepted Weddell's invitation to give a reception for the Secretary and the delegation on Thanksgiving afternoon (Weddell to Hull, November 6, 1936, DF 710 Peace Personnel/166, RG 59, NA).
accommodations were transmitted as well as final instructions concerning personnel, equipment, and automobiles. Southgate indicated that he might arrive early in Buenos Aires and help the Embassy conclude arrangements prior to the delegation's arrival. He also noted that Satterthwaite's preparations were apparently almost complete and that the Department appreciated his efforts. On November 6, the eve of the delegation's departure from New York City, the State Department transmitted a complete list of the delegation. Weddell was requested to notify the Argentine government of its composition, with the exception of clerical staff. He was also instructed to request free entry for the delegation and official and personal baggage arriving at Buenos Aires on November 25.

4. Arrangements for President Roosevelt's Visit

After the public announcement of Roosevelt's invitation, Latin American newspapers published speculative reports that the President might attend the special conference for the maintenance of peace. Weddell's staff reported speculation of this nature to the State Depart-

28 Satterthwaite to Hull, November 3, 1936, DF 710 Peace Quarters/9; Richard Southgate to Satterthwaite, November 3, 1936, DF 710 Peace Quarters/10. For an inter-Department comment on the final composition and budget of the delegation, see Southgate to Hull, November 2, 1936, 710 Peace Budget/5-1/2. For Congressional appropriation of funds to cover expenses of the Conference, see Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives to Hull, April 10, 1936, DF 710 Peace Budget/1; Public Resolution No. 92—74th Congress Senate Joint Resolution 248, approved May 15, 1936, DF 710 Peace/584, RG 59, NA.

29 Welles to Weddell, November 6, 1936, DF 710 Peace Personnel/204, RG 59, NA. For comments by Hull and Roosevelt about the departure of the delegation, see "Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace," Press Releases, Saturday, November 7, 1936, vol. 15: no. 371, pp. 372-374. Roosevelt designated R. Walton Moore to serve as Secretary of State during Hull's absence (ibid., p. 377).
ment as early as February 28. The likelihood of Roosevelt visiting the Conference received renewed attention after his reelection on November 6, and the State Department began to make arrangements on this date. Ambassador Weddell received a strictly confidential message from Hull which indicated the President was "considering making a cruise in southern waters during the month of November which will include a visit to Buenos Aires. The fact that the President may make this visit should be kept absolutely confidential until further notice." In the meantime, Weddell was to report as quickly as possible whether a seven passenger open touring car with a competent driver would be available for Roosevelt's use in Buenos Aires. 30

In reply to the Department's confidential instructions, Weddell answered that the desired type of car and chauffeur was available. He asked to be advised as soon as possible when a definite decision was made, and noted the local press was giving wide publicity to reports that Roosevelt might visit Buenos Aires. The Ambassador also offered his opinion that the President "would be assured of a fine reception." The Argentine government became aware of Roosevelt's possible visit even though the matter was still undecided and strictly confidential. On the morning of November 7, the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs met with Weddell and indicated that he and President Justo had learned with great satisfaction about the possibility of Roosevelt visiting South America. The Acting Minister expressed his

30 Hull to Weddell, November 6, 1936, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/202A, RG 59, NA.

31 Weddell to Hull, November 7, 1936, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/203, RG 59, NA.
desire to extend to President Roosevelt an official invitation from the Argentine government and people to visit Buenos Aires. He indicated a telegram of this nature from President Justo would be forwarded to Roosevelt that same day. He also added, for Weddell's personal information, that the reason for the delay in extending the official invitation was the desire of the Argentine government to wait until the presidential election was over.  

Argentina's official invitation to President Roosevelt was duly sent on November 7 as well as a message of congratulations for FDR's electoral victory. Roosevelt thanked Justo for the kind message of congratulations, and expressed deep appreciation for the invitation to visit Buenos Aires on the occasion of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. He indicated he would give immediate consideration to the offer, but also requested Justo "to be kind enough to bear with me for a time until I am in a position to give my definite reply."  

Ambassador Weddell transmitted an urgent message to the State Department for President Roosevelt on November 10 which noted the immediately favorable and growing reaction in both popular and official circles to the news of his probable visit. Weddell expressed deep satisfaction and offered the use of the Embassy to FDR "with or without its occupants." Two days later, Weddell cabled Roosevelt again and

32 Weddell to Hull, November 7, 1936, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/205, RG 59, NA.

33 Roosevelt to Justo, November 8, 1936, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/211A, RG 59, NA.

34 Weddell to Roosevelt, November 10, 1936, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/209, RG 59, NA.
suggested the Inter-American Conference would be affected by his visit.

The popular enthusiasm and interest being manifested here at the prospect of your visiting Buenos Aires is so sincere and profound that I augur from it a distinctly favorable effect on the deliberation of the Peace Conference and I express the earnest hope these expectations of your presence will be fulfilled.\textsuperscript{35}

Weddell's despatches and contemporary news articles indicate a minor controversy developed between Argentine officials and the State Department over the landing site of Roosevelt's party. The Ambassador took a very active and persistent stance on this subject in his despatches to Roosevelt and the State Department. Even before Roosevelt decided to attend the Conference, the Argentine press reported that Roosevelt was considering landing at Mar del Plata, a seaside resort 250 miles south of Buenos Aires, and proceeding by train to the capital. Weddell ventured to suggest in his urgent message to Roosevelt on November 10 that the disembarkation at Buenos Aires would be preferable. The Argentine Minister of Marine had likewise broached this subject with a member of Weddell's staff and emphasized there were no difficulties in bringing the \textit{U.S.S. Indianapolis} alongside the dock in Buenos Aires since the \textit{U.S.S. Tuscaloosa} had docked in 1934. Weddell also suggested to Roosevelt that "the dramatic effect of your landing here in a space practically in the heart of the city would be lost by touching soil at the lower port named."\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{35}Weddell to Roosevelt, November 12, 1936, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/213, RG 59, NA.

\textsuperscript{36}Weddell to Roosevelt, November 10, 1936, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/209, RG 59, NA.
He repeated this suggestion to the State Department and indicated the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs had informally volunteered the opinion that "it would be far more desirable for the President to come directly to Buenos Aires than to land at Mar del Plata remarking that the ship on which it is reported that he will travel 'is a twin' of one which has visited Buenos Aires." Referring to his telegraph of November 10, Weddell restated his belief that a "first landing in Argentina practically in the heart of the capital would produce on the public here a striking impression that would be lost should the President touch Argentine soil elsewhere." He also pointed out the possibility of Argentines interpreting a landing as Mar del Plata as a reflection on Buenos Aires' port facilities. 37

As previously discussed, Weddell invited President Roosevelt to stay at the American Embassy during his visit to Buenos Aires. An urgent despatch submitted by Weddell on November 16 indicates the Argentine government likewise sought to provide accommodations for Roosevelt. The Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs mentioned informally to Weddell that the Argentine government desired to place a house at the President's disposal during his contemplated visit unless he had other preferences. Weddell also noted the owner of one of the hand-

37 Weddell to Moore, November 12, 1936, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/214. Laurence Duggan, Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs, disagreed with Weddell's suggestions. Duggan reported to Sumner Welles, who was en route to Buenos Aires, that the Navy did not look with favor on entering Buenos Aires with the Indianapolis. Although under normal wind conditions there was plenty of water, the Navy felt it was inadvisable to run the risk of insufficient water resulting from a strong south wind. Duggan agreed that it would be more dramatic for FDR to disembark at Buenos Aires, but "the idea of a cruiser with bristling guns in the harbor does not seem quite right for a peace conference" (Laurence Duggan to Welles, November 14, 1936, DF 710 Peace/907, 7/27, RG 59, NA).
some residences in Buenos Aires had offered his house to the Argentine government for this purpose. Thereupon, the Ambassador repeated the expression of honor and pleasure "it would give Mrs. Weddell and me if the President would stay at the Embassy with or without its present occupants. . . ." 38

This communication transpired before Weddell was informed of Roosevelt's decision to travel to South America. On November 16, President Roosevelt accepted President Justo's invitation to visit Buenos Aires on the occasion of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. Roosevelt's acknowledgements were transmitted to Justo that same day. 39 Weddell was likewise notified on November 16 that the President had accepted the invitation to visit Buenos Aires as well as Weddell's invitation to stay at the American Embassy. Roosevelt expressed the hope that "you and Mrs. Weddell will remain and allow [me] to be your guest." Despite Weddell's recommendations, however, the President did not change his plans to land at Mar del Plata. 40

38 Weddell to Moore, November 16, 1936, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/220, RG 59, NA.

39 Roosevelt to Justo, November 16, 1936, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/209, RG 59, NA. Roosevelt's decision to make the 6,000 mile sea voyage to Buenos Aires had been expected for several weeks, but it only became final at 5:00 PM on November 16 after Roosevelt met with his cabinet and mayors of various seaport cities about a maritime strike (Charles B. Hurd, "Roosevelt Will Sail Tomorrow for Buenos Aires Peace Parley," New York Times, November 16, 1936, p. 1; see also Roosevelt to Hull, November 17, 1936, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/230A, RG 59, NA). However, according to Summer Welles, Roosevelt had decided to travel to Buenos Aires long before the election (Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 205).

40 Moore to Weddell, November 16, 1936, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/223, RG 59, NA. According to newspaper accounts Roosevelt desired
The State Department proposed that the U.S.S. Chester and the U.S.S. Indianapolis would arrive at Mar del Plata at 7:30 AM, November 30. Roosevelt would disembark at this point and proceed by train to Buenos Aires, arriving there during the early afternoon. Roosevelt would visit Buenos Aires until December 2, at which time he would depart for Montevideo, Uruguay on the U.S.S. Phelps. Weddell was instructed to ask the Foreign Minister's Office if the proposed visits of the vessels were agreeable and, if so, to request that the usual courtesies and facilities be accorded.

Weddell was instructed that the President preferred to observe the program suggested by the State Department for his visit. If the Argentine government desired a procession, it should begin at the railway station and end at the Embassy. Roosevelt planned to call officially on President Justo at 5:00 or 5:30 PM, and wished to spend a quiet evening at the Embassy. On December 1, he wanted to be present at the opening of the Inter-American Conference and to address the Conference. Depending on the time of the opening session, Roosevelt wished to take a motor trip around Buenos Aires. The President also sought to give a luncheon or dinner for President Justo and any other visiting Presidents at a convenient time. In the event President Justo desired to present a few leading Argentine officials to Roosevelt, it was suggested that a reception might be arranged following

to land at Mar del Plata so he could "see something" of Argentina's interior (John W. White, "Roosevelt Plans Dismay Argentines," New York Times, November 20, 1936, p. 9).

41 Moore to Weddell, November 16, 1936, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/223, RG 59, NA.
the meal which President Roosevelt would take with Justo Moore emphasized that Roosevelt desired to leave Buenos Aires immediately after lunch on December 2 and that he wished to confine his visit to the national government. Speeches of welcome by local officials would therefore be eliminated from the program. Weddell was informed that Richard Southgate would leave the United States delegation at Rio de Janeiro and fly to Buenos Aires to assist the Embassy. Final arrangements were to be submitted to the President aboard the U.S.S. Indianapolis for his approval. 42

The remaining instructions transmitted to Weddell on November 16 concerned security measures for the President's protection. Moore instructed Weddell to get in touch immediately with appropriate officials and to tactfully request that arrangements suggested by the State Department be followed for any parades or processions. It was suggested that three motorcars abreast should directly precede the presidential auto and that one motorcar should follow behind. The three cars in the vanguard and the car-in the rear should contain personnel detailed to protect the President, and two Secret Service men should be included in each of these four cars. It was further suggested that this group of five cars should be enclosed by a rope 100 to 150 feet long, and that the rope should be manned at intervals of approximately three feet by dismounted soldiers who might be termed a personal Guard of Honor. In order to impress upon the local authorities the necessity of these precautions, Weddell was instructed

42 Moore to Weddell, November 16, 1936, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/228A, RG 59, NA.
to confidentially point out that the President was unable to move without assistance because of his physical condition and that the Secret Service men were specially trained to take care of him. The extraordinary measures were essential due to Roosevelt's physical condition and because there was a real element of physical danger to him in the closeness of even the most friendly, good-natured crowd. Moore indicated representatives of the Secret Service would arrive in Buenos Aires before Roosevelt and would immediately contact Weddell.43

On November 17, President Justo announced that Argentina would present an extensive military reception in Roosevelt's honor and that he would stay at the Palacio Errazuriz (the luxurious residential palace mentioned by Weddell) during his stay in Buenos Aires. These plans, however, were contrary to Roosevelt's wishes, on November 18, Ambassador Weddell called upon Saavedra Lamas to formally present a request from President Roosevelt that his reception "be as simple as it is possible to make it." Weddell also expressed Roosevelt's appreciation concerning the offer of the Palacio Errazuriz, but the Ambassador informed Saavedra Lamas that the President would reside at the American Embassy. As a result of Roosevelt's request for simplicity, the Argentine government was forced to cancel its elaborate plans. Saavedra Lamas announced after his meeting with Weddell that

43 Ibid. Weddell was likewise concerned about Roosevelt's safety, and he felt the responsibility was very great. Although it would be gratifying to have him with us, "I shall sign a relief when he starts north. I am always nervous about cranks or madmen; they were certainly responsible for the deaths of our three Presidents who were assassinated" (Weddell to Gordon, November 18, 1936, Weddell Papers).
the government would not appoint a special reception committee of notables and that the military display would probably be confined to a guard of honor. 44

Roosevelt's simple plans dismayed the Argentines and upset "one of the most elaborate celebrations in recent years." Although his request was granted, President Justo and officials of the Argentine Foreign Ministry openly expressed disappointment over Roosevelt's decision. 45 Plans for simplicity, however, were not expected to detract from the enthusiasm of a tremendously popular welcome. John W. White, in a special cable to the New York Times, reported:

It was no exaggeration to say that no visit by a royal prince, a hero or a notable statesman ever was awaited with such universal enthusiasm as that with which people of Argentina are awaiting President Roosevelt. His name is heard oftener than any other single word in snatches of conversation on streets. To Americans who have lived many years in South America it is a revelation to hear the admiration with which this American name is pronounced by all classes of society. 46

Argentine officials were also disappointed over Roosevelt's insistence on land at Mar del Plata rather than Buenos Aires. Saavedra Lamas informed Weddell on November 19 that he had discussed the matter with President Justo, and the latter shared the opinion that an arrival at Buenos Aires was preferable to Mar del Plata. Some of the Minister's views were similar to those advanced by Weddell in his previous telegrams. Saavedra Lamas also emphasized the physical unattractiveness


of Mar del Plata and the obvious advantages of landing in a port of two and a half million people rather than in a seaside resort which was dismantled and empty. Weddell explained to Roosevelt that, if he seemed to press this matter unduly, the emphasis and general tenor of Saavedra Lamas' remarks induced him to believe that the remarks correctly represented President Justo's own views. The Ambassador hoped his persistence would be ascribed to the sense of duty he felt he owed Roosevelt to report exactly the views of Argentine authorities.

Later the same afternoon, Saavedra Lamas and Weddell again discussed Roosevelt's visit. The Foreign Minister reiterated Justo's original viewpoint as to the inadvisability of landing at Mar del Plata, and emphasized that landing at Buenos Aires would follow established precedent. Roosevelt would be able to enter the city at the point of greatest physical beauty and to proceed over a route which was thoroughly familiar to municipal and police authorities, thereby facilitating the plans of the Argentine government. The American Embassy further reported to the President's party aboard the U.S.S. Indianapolis that everyone in Buenos Aires was "most sincerely interested in the maximum success of the President's visit" and there was a "practically unanimous impression that it will be a mistake to land at Mar del Plata." It was suggested that the "dignity and impressiveness of the reception would be adversely affected by using Mar del Plata" which involved a "rough and dusty train trip" as well as an "undignified entry at a

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47 Weddell to Roosevelt, November 19, 1936, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/243, RG 59, NA.
depot in the meanest part of the city." Conversely, "arrival by ship at the Buenos Aires dock would permit a thoroughly adequate reception."48

President Roosevelt, however, adhered to his decision and, on November 20, the Naval Attache of the American Embassy met with the Argentine Minister of the Marine to reiterate that Roosevelt would disembark at Mar del Plata.49 Although tentative plans for Roosevelt's visit were completed, Argentine officials continued to hope that he would change his plans. Saavedra Lamas still expressed hope on November 23, and cited the quest of the President's safety. According to the Foreign Minister, the line of march from the port of Buenos Aires to the Embassy had been repeatedly examined by the police, while the route from the station of the Southern Railroad had never been used before for a similar reception.50

The controversy over the embarkation point for Roosevelt's party ended on November 24 when the President finally yielded to Argentina's request. Weddell called on the Foreign Ministry the morning of November 24 to inform Saavedra Lamas that Roosevelt would accede to repeated requests and land at Buenos Aires rather than Mar del Plata. The Argentine government was highly pleased at this change of plans since it permitted a line of march through streets usually used for the reception of distinguished guests instead of through a section of

49 White, "Argentina Issues Program," New York Times, November 21, 1936, p. 5. It was also announced that FDR would stay at the American Embassy with Ambassador and Mrs. Weddell who were old friends of the Roosevelt's.

50 White, "Argentina's Hopes in Parley are High," New York Times, November 24, 1936, p. 10; see also, New York Times, November 22, 1936, p. 3.
Buenos Aires never before traversed by such a party. It was also announced that the Argentine high seas fleet would meet the President's squadron off Cape Polonia on the Uruguayan coast and then escort Roosevelt up the River Plate to the North Basin of the port of Buenos Aires. 51

Roosevelt finally yielded to the suggestions of the Argentine government and Weddell after nearly twenty-five days of press speculation, repeated requests, and firm adherence to the Mar del Plata landing site. Although Weddell duly carried out his instructions and repeated Roosevelt's preferences to Saavedra Lamas, the Ambassador still endeavored to alter the plan. He felt that a "first landing in Argentina practically in the heart of the capital would produce on the public here a striking impression," and his persistence was a result of his sense of duty to accurately inform FDR of the views of the Argentine government. 52 It is reasonable to conclude that Weddell's sense of duty and persistent efforts influenced Roosevelt to accede to the repeated requests of the Argentine government. In view of the security instructions transmitted to Weddell, it is also reasonable to suggest that the President and his staff decided to land at Buenos


52 Weddell to Moore, November 12, 1936, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/214; Weddell to Roosevelt, November 19, 1936, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/243. Weddell intimated that a "private source" also affected the choice of a port of arrival: "However, as the Department is equally aware, after the exchange of many messages between the Embassy and President Roosevelt and strong intimations to Secretary Hull, also on the high seas, from a private source it was finally decided that our President would come directly to Buenos Aires" (Weddell to Hull, January 7, 1937, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/302, RG 59, NA).
Aires because of the questionable safety of the Mar del Plata route. Weddell had been instructed on November 13 to transmit, when available, the program of the opening session of the Inter-American Conference with the names and times of speakers. The Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, did not announce the definite program of Roosevelt's three day sojourn, which included an address at the first session, until November 20. It is reasonable to surmise that the plans of the Argentine government for the opening session were contingent upon FDR's decision to visit Buenos Aires. The prestige and impact of the opening session would be increased dramatically if both President Roosevelt and President Justo addressed the delegates. As a matter of policy and protocol however, the Argentine government would seek to avoid embarrassment and not commit Roosevelt until he accepted the invitation to visit Buenos Aires on the occasion of the Inter-American Conference. The program for the opening session, as well as the entire meeting, was further delayed by the absence of Saavedra Lamas. According to the New York Times, final details of arrangement for the Conference were being rushed on November 18 following the return of Saavedra Lamas from the League of Nations.

Ambassador Weddell was finally able to report the details of the opening session on November 21. The Argentine Foreign Office indicated that (except for unforeseen contingencies) the Conference's opening


session would commence at 6:00 PM on December 1, and the addresses would be confined to Roosevelt and Justo. Weddell also reported that Justo planned to give a banquet for Roosevelt at 9:30 PM.  

Weddell endeavored to describe to his friends the prevailing attitudes in Buenos Aires before Roosevelt's arrival. In his own, inimical, tongue-in-cheek style, he also commented on security measures and final preparations at the American Embassy. The Ambassador explained to Raymond Cox, his former First Secretary, that "we are in the midst of beautiful days— but hectic days—as the President is due on the 30th." Since Roosevelt had expressed the desire "to have us as his hosts at the Embassy. . . . I am up early every morning polishing up the handle on the big front door and Virginia is busy with scrubbing . . . the impending arrival of our distinguished visitor has put the Foreign Office, especially the Protocol, into a state of Latin calm,—or frenzy."  

Weddell remarked on November 23 that "excitement runs high here—about the height of the Washington Monument—because of the President's coming." The Embassy was filled with painters, carpenters and electricians. Extra telephones were installed as well as "flood lights in every direction, and an enormous electric sign with the national colors immediately opposite the house." Weddell also discussed Roosevelt's accommodations at the Embassy and the traditional sleeping site of Ambassadors.

55 Weddell to Moore, November 21, 1936, DF 710 Peace/966, RG 59, NA.

56 Weddell to Cox, November 19, 1936. Weddell Papers.
The President will occupy my bedroom and have the sitting room next door. The two nights he is here I shall, of course, sleep on a mat in front of his door in the best ambassadorial tradition.57

The task of "looking after a President" was much more extensive than the Ambassador ever imagined.

The Chief of the Secret Service arrives today and there will be eight other rapidly following. Our house will be surrounded by guards and the garden flood-lighted at every angle. I am giving him my room and shall sleep on a mat across the door of his room for his added security.

Weddell believed Roosevelt's party would include a "huge darky [sic] who is said to be quite a character and comes from Virginia; that will be someone whose language I can speak." Weddell discussed at some length the schedule of events for Roosevelt's visit.

The President will only be here one full day. The evening of his arrival he wishes to be alone with just his family; the next day we plan to give a luncheon of fifty; that afternoon he speaks at the Peace Conference and at night attends a dinner of two hundred to be given by the Argentine President in his honor, and this to be followed by a reception. The next day he gives a luncheon in the Embassy for President Justo to which sixty people are invited and immediately after this he boards a destroyer which will take him to Montevideo.

The Ambassador also noted that "we are naturally thrilled by his coming and by the privilege of entertaining him." But Weddell would also "feel relieved when he is safely on board again."58

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57 Weddell to Elizabeth Weddell, November 23, 1936. Also, see Weddell to Trimble, November 21, 1936, Weddell Papers.

58 Weddell to William S. Weddell, November 24, 1936, Weddell Papers.
The next and final chapter will concern the various activities undertaken by Ambassador Weddell during President Roosevelt's historic visit to Buenos Aires as well as Weddell's role at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. As in preceding chapters, emphasis will be placed upon his accounts and reports.
CHAPTER VI

WEDDELL'S ACTIVITIES DURING THE
INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

Ambassador Alexander Wilbourne Weddell experienced the great and dual honors of acting as host to the President of the United States and serving as a delegate at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. The former was an honor which American Ambassadors stationed abroad rarely experienced before the era of jet transportation. Weddell was the first American Ambassador to entertain the President of the United States on foreign soil since 1928 when President Coolidge visited Havana on the occasion of the Sixth International Conference of American States. The importance of the visit to Buenos Aires was underscored by Roosevelt's decision to travel in spite of a disruptive maritime strike. As Roosevelt noted upon his departure, peace throughout the world and especially among the Americas was more important than a maritime strike.¹

It is interesting to note that Ambassador and Mrs. Weddell both recognized the historical significance of Roosevelt's trip. Mrs. Weddell provided the alumnae of her alma mater with a humorous comparison of the trip.

After all, certainly next to discovering a live specimen of the Dodo, the visit of an American President to a foreign country is one of the rarest of things. Some of you may recall that Mr. Taft walked to the middle of the international bridge separating Texas from Mexico and stopped there. And there are a few among you who will remember the visit made by President Wilson to Paris, which irreverent folk think was not an entirely wise move. Still later Mr. Coolidge went to Havana and only Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, whose frigid exterior is known to many, was able on that occasion to keep cool with Cal. These are the only times in the past of which history tells us where any of our Chief Magistrates have near-crossed or crossed our frontiers. (I am ignoring Mr. Roosevelt's visits to Canada.) So, I repeat, the voyage of an American president over twelve thousand miles of sea and a sojourn in this capital is something rare, unique, solitary, alone.

Ambassador Weddell likewise commented (incorrectly, however) on the trip's historical significance. He also anticipated future efforts such as this study.

In apologizing for the length of this communication I would point out that it is sent with the idea that an exact record of this visit by our Chief Magistrate to another State, the second time in the history of our Country, perhaps may be of some present and future historical interest.3

1. Final Arrangements by the American Embassy

Cordell Hull and the United States delegation to the Inter-American Conference arrived in Buenos Aires on November 25, 1936, and, according to Weddell, "the round of work and festivities began then."4

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2 Virginia S. Weddell to Lucille Kohn, December 16, 1936, Weddell Papers.

3 Weddell to Hull, January 7, 1937, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/302, RG 59, NA.

4 Weddell to Douglas Vander Hoof, December 31, 1936, Weddell Papers.
Six other delegations also arrived on the S.S. American Legion, which entered the harbor flying the American flag as well as the flags of those on board. A special correspondent for the *New York Times* noted the reception was marked by friendly informality "in decided contrast to the formal, glittering welcome being planned for President Franklin D. Roosevelt." Ambassador Weddell, Foreign Minister Saavedra Lamas and other visitors were waiting as the American Legion docked, and the Argentine Foreign Minister waved enthusiastically to Cordell Hull who was standing on the deck. As soon as Saavedra Lamas boarded the ship, Hull congratulated him for receiving the 1936 Nobel Prize for Peace after which they conversed privately in Hull's cabin.  

Although there were no formal speeches at the landing, Hull issued a statement concerning his expectations for the impending peace conference.

> We will achieve marked success in removing the remaining obstacles to the future peace and prosperity of this hemisphere. I have reason to know that the great leaders of the American Republics are animated by a sincere desire and determined resolve to banish forever from this continent the possibility of resorting to armed forces.

Hull restated his firm belief that lasting peace could not be attained without the removal of "the obstacles to intercourse both spiritual and commercial." He also linked the possible results of the Conference to a world example for peace.

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It is our sincere hope that we may establish a record for constructive accomplishment. This will be a shining example to the world of the results that can be obtained when nations joined as equals and collaborating in a sincere spirit of unselfishness, sympathetic understanding and mutual confidence prepare the path to peace.  

Secretary Hull and the American delegation spent a quiet first day in Buenos Aires except for courtesy calls upon the Foreign Minister and President Agustin P. Justo. A full meeting of the delegation was scheduled for November 26, at which time the various proposals and preparations of the delegation would be discussed with Ambassador Weddell. Enthusiasm over President Roosevelt's visit continued to mount in Buenos Aires, and most hotels were unable to accept reservations until after his departure because of the large number of people who came to the capital from the provinces. Some of the passengers arriving on the American Legion likewise found it difficult to obtain accommodations.  

On November 26, the United States delegation again enjoyed a quiet day resting after the excitement of landing and getting settled.

6 Hinton, "Hull Optimistic," New York Times, November 26, 1936, pp. 1 and 19. Secretary Hull's references to the threat of war were appropriate because he and his fellow delegates noted evidence of Axis penetration into Latin America in the days prior to the Conference. And, Hitler announced his Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan the same day they arrived in Buenos Aires. For further discussion, see Hull, Memoirs, I, pp. 495-497; Inman, Inter-American Conferences, pp. 164-165.

There was one full meeting during the morning with Secretary Hull and Ambassador Weddell. Also, Hull began his preliminary informal meetings with his colleagues from the other American Republics, including delegation chairmen. He was encouraged to determine that the heritage of good will left by the Montevideo Conference was substantial. It was the informality of these meetings at Montevideo, according to Harold B. Hinton, which first convinced Latin American delegations that the Good Neighbor Policy was more than a vague promise. The evening of November 26, Ambassador and Mrs. Weddell entertained the American community in Buenos Aires at a reception in honor of Secretary and Mrs. Hull and the other members of the delegation. 8

While Roosevelt's impending visit overshadowed public interest in the Conference, quiet exchanges of views continued between delegations. Secretary Hull also continued his practice of making informal, courtesy calls. The evening of November 26, Assistant Secretary Welles met with Saavedra Lamas in a long interview. The New York Times reported that the interview brought out the unity of purpose and viewpoint between Hull and Saavedra Lamas regarding the Conference's methods and objectives. It was also reported that Hull was resting "all that he can preparatory to the mass of work at the Conference," and that La Nacion praised the press statement which he issued upon

landing in Buenos Aires. 9

Ambassador Weddell continued his last-minute preparations for the President's visit during this period. The arrival of the United States delegation on November 25 added to his "honors and burdens," and he noted that while he was not exactly suffering from the jitters, "I was at least in a state of Latin calm and up to my ears arranging the details of his reception and stay here." 10 Mrs. Weddell relieved the Ambassador of much of the responsibility attendant to preparing to act as presidential host, but he was responsible for arrangements with the Argentine government and other delegations regarding the visit and the Inter-American Conference. 11 The task of converting a large Embassy almost overnight into a second White House offered difficulties, and Mrs. Weddell had quite a housekeeping task as there was a company of soldiers quartered in the adjoining garden and the household staff was increased to thirty. Also, twenty-four detectives were assigned to the Embassy by the municipal government, and sixteen Secret Service agents arrived from the United States as well as U.S. Marines from the Indianapolis. To this security contingent was added the President and four aides, his son Lt. Colonel James Roosevelt, two valets, a masseur, and a pharmacist. 12


12 Weddell to Vander Hoof, December 31, 1936; Weddell to Daniel, December 18, 1936, Weddell Papers.
Ambassador Weddell, as part of his final planning activities, delivered a radio broadcast to the United States concerning the impending arrival of President Roosevelt. His address was broadcast at 8:20 PM (one hour before Eastern Standard Time), November 27, over the facilities of the National Broadcasting Company. The Ambassador began the broadcast by discussing the significance and effect of Roosevelt's eminent arrival.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the enormous impression produced in this country and I believe generally in South America by the impending visit of President Roosevelt. From the moment of his departure from Charleston a far-flung telegraphic service has made each hour and incident of his trip available to the thousands who are interested in this history-making voyage and its many implications in avenues of harmony and economics.

And now every turn of the screw, every throb of the engine of the vessel that bears him to Buenos Aires, seems to find a sympathetic movement and echo in the hearts of this great and hospitable people, the Argentines, a people whose greatness I have been able to gauge in my three years of life among them and whose hospitality is proverbial even in lands where that great virtue is supposed to be practised in its highest form. At any time the visit of a President is a great and solemn thing; an outstanding act in the art of human intercourse as practised among the family of nations.

Weddell also picturesquely described "the physical environment in which our President will live."

It will interest my fellow countrymen to know that the President's home in Buenos Aires will be at our beautiful Embassy residence. This residence was built by an outstanding Argentine of exquisite taste and is a marvel of architecture inside and out. It is situated on the great broad Avenue Alvear which in beauty finds a rival only in the Champs-Elysees. In front is a marvelous monumental gateway over which in the season roses cascade. Behind and to the left are a series of gardens, one in the highly formal and classical shape, another a cutting garden, both those interspersed with rare trees which at this season are yielding their richest blossoms.
One enters the house and passes up a stairway of honor to the series of salons and the ballroom with its wonderful flooring of native woods. The diningroom is a model of its kind. On the floor above, on which the President will be lodged are ample quarters enabling him to have his handsome and stalwart son immediately beside him, as well as the representative officers of our naval and military forces who are acting as his Aides. To do him honor [sic] the Argentine Government has constructed on a lot adjoining the Embassy a temporary barracks and here will be lodged a special corps of soldiers from a crack regiment of mounted Grenadiers whose creation goes back to the earliest days of this Republic. The outlook from the house is on a really heavenly park and facing the residence is a huge luminous framework which will display at night the arms of our nation.

He concluded his address by detailing the events of Roosevelt's visit; Weddell also commented on his planning responsibilities.

And so it is that in the past week I in my capacity as the personal representative of the Chief Executive of our country in this outstanding Republic of South America have been in close and frequent and happy contact with the authorities of Argentina from the President himself down the line in order that the visit of President Roosevelt shall be an unqualified success.13

Buenos Aires began to assume a national holiday atmosphere in anticipation of President Roosevelt's arrival. On November 28, the Mayor of the capital city had enormous posters placed on all available wall space requesting citizens to honor Roosevelt. Hull met with Saavedra Lamas on the 28th to discuss the entire program of the Conference. A bloc of ten Latin American nations also resolved to

exclude all items not included in the agenda, especially Chaco War and feminist issues. There was no intimation that Hull or the United States delegation suggested the resolution but, according to Harold B. Hinton, it doubtless met their views. Hinton also reported that discussions between delegations had been largely tentative in nature because Conference delegates realized no serious business would be transacted until FDR departed and the fiesta spirit which prevailed in Buenos Aires subsided. 14

Final arrangements relative to Roosevelt's speech at the opening session were completed by the State Department on November 30, the day of his arrival. Cordell Hull transmitted to the Division of Current Information the advance release of Roosevelt's address and indicated that the speech was to be released at 6:00 PM, Buenos Aires time. Moore responded to Hull's instructions and noted the speech had been made available to the press for publication at 5:00 PM Eastern Standard Time. 15 On December 1, the American Embassy in Buenos Aires was instructed that the texts of Roosevelt's speech and Secretary Hull's speech for December 5 would be carried in full in the State Department's radio bulletin. At Weddell's discretion, it was suggested that the Embassy leave copies of the texts of these two addresses informally with the Foreign Ministry and distribute copies of the texts among Argentine officials and leaders. The State Department also suggested


15 Hull to Moore, November 30, 1936, DF 710 Peace/1011; Moore to Hull, November 30, 1936, DF 710 Peace/1012, RG 59, NA.
that the Embassy make copies available to the local press.  

2. President Roosevelt's Visit to Buenos Aires

The U.S.S. Indianapolis was originally scheduled to dock at the Darsena Norte at 1:30 PM, November 30. The Argentine Foreign Office was informed of this schedule by the Embassy, whereupon the Foreign Office indicated that it would be more convenient if the Indianapolis docked at 2:00 PM. Notwithstanding this intimation, the first lines were thrown to shore several minutes before 1:30 and by 1:40 the presidential gang-way was in place. President Justo and his cabinet did not arrive, however, until 1:50 (which explains the request of the Foreign Office) at which time an Argentine military band played "The Star Spangled Banner" and the band on the Indianapolis played the Argentine national hymn. Roosevelt appeared a few minutes thereafter accompanied by his son, Chief of Protocol Richard Southgate, and several aides. 

A roar of welcome went up from thousands of throats as President Roosevelt quickly covered the distance separating him from shore and the Reception Committee. Weddell was a member of the Reception Committee along with Secretary of State Hull, Assistant Secretary Welles, President Justo and Foreign Minister Saavedra Lamas as well as other members of the Argentine cabinet and legislature. President Justo heartily greeted Roosevelt, and the two presidents exchanged hand-clasps and the "abrazo" (a bearlike hug with which Latin American

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16 Moore to Weddell, December 1, 1936, DF 710 Peace/1019. A careful and literary Spanish translation of Roosevelt's speech was also made and placed in the seat of each delegate prior to the opening session of the Conference (Weddell to Hull, January 7, 1937, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/302, RG 59, NA).

17 Weddell to Hull, January 7, 1937, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/302, RG 59, NA.
friends greet each other). According to Weddell, President Justo embraced Roosevelt and exclaimed in Spanish "the Democracy of the South embraces the Democracy of the North." Roosevelt replied with warm words of thanks in English, after which the Reception Committee was presented. Weddell also had the opportunity to clasp the President's hand.

Roosevelt entered President Justo's open motor car, which had been parked at the end of the gang-way, and took a seat on the left-hand side. At the smiling insistence of Justo, however, he moved over to the right. The President's son and personal bodyguard, Gus Gennerich, were also seated in the car. Members of the Reception Committee were seated in additional motor cars, and a procession was formed and started for the American Embassy. The Ambassador and the Argentine Minister of the Marine were seated in the auto which directly preceded the auto seating Cordell Hull and Saavedra Lamas. Motor and bicycle policemen were close by and Argentine secret servicemen ran alongside the presidential car the entire length of the procession; the presidential car was also directly followed by a police car which contained American and Argentine agents. Mounted grenadiers, "whose traditions go back for more than a hundred years and who wear the picturesque uniform of that time," preceded and closed the motorcade.

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19 Weddell to Hull, January 7, 1937, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/302, RG 59, NA.

The procession followed a route from the dock to the limits of the maritime jurisdiction and thence to the Embassy via Calle San Martin, Plaza San Martin, Calle Sante Fe, Calle Callao and Avenida Alvear. Naval units lined the route up to the edge of the maritime district, and military and police personnel lined the streets from this point to the Embassy. As the procession started up the wide street which led from the pier, thousands of people suddenly broke through the ropes and police lines, completely surrounding the President's motor car. Spruille Braden described this incident as one of the worst scares of his life, and doubted if anyone in the procession was less petrified by fear to see the Presidents of the United States and Argentina helplessly exposed to assassination. Fortunately, the crowd was friendly and just overeager to show its admiration for Roosevelt. 21

The entire route was lined by an enthusiastic, orderly and vociferous crowd which, instead of throwing ticker tape and scraps of paper, expressed their welcome with flowers. "So it happened that the President's car had gone only a few hundred yards when its hood suggested that it might be competing in a floral parade at Nice." According to Mrs. Weddell, nothing marred the beauty of the program: "'It was roses, roses all the way'." The applauding crowd was moved to hilarious laughter on one occasion, however, when a huge army mule "quite losing its head backed straight toward the car as if it were going to clamber in; young Roosevelt remarked later that the mule

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was obviously of Missouri ancestry, had recognized two compatriots and attempted to climb in for a ride!"  

On arrival at the Embassy, Weddell went forward from his car before Roosevelt left his car. He and Mrs. Weddell stood inside the doorway to receive Roosevelt and Justo. Weddell accompanied Roosevelt and his son in an elevator to the first floor where they met Justo, his entourage and the Reception Committee. The two Presidents remained in conversation for a brief time with Weddell acting as interpreter. After Justo withdrew, Secretary Hull, Sumner Welles, Adolf Berle and Weddell were "then closeted in the Red Salon, called 'Ambassador's Study' to confer with Roosevelt on matters regarding the peace meeting." Mrs. Weddell and the ladies of the Embassy staff entertained the rest of the Reception Committee during this brief meeting.  

The President's speech for the opening session was reviewed, and Roosevelt amended it to the satisfaction of Welles and Berle. Assistant Secretary Welles was "tres emotionne as this was the culmination and fruition of many years at work. The President was also advised by Hull to use the 'steam shovel' in flattering Saavedra Lamas." Weddell discussed the speech with Roosevelt, who indicated he felt that he must sound a lofty note in Buenos Aires. The Ambassador commented on the

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22 Virginia Weddell to Kohn, December 19, 1936, Weddell Papers.


24 Berle and Jacobs, eds., Navigating the Rapids, p. 119.
religious nature of Latin Americans and assured the President that his speech "would go home." 25

Roosevelt retired to his rooms at the close of this meeting for a brief rest. About 4:20 PM, Saavedra Lamas arrived at the Embassy in an open car and escorted President Roosevelt to the Casa Rosada (Red Rose House) for his return visit to President Justo. Roosevelt was taken in an elevator to the main floor where he was met by Justo and escorted to the Salon Blanco, "a handsome room in which distinguished visitors are received, solemn acts confirmed, etc." The members of the Argentine cabinet and other high officials were gathered in the Salon Blanco, and were presented to Roosevelt by the Introducer of Ambassadors. President Justo seated "our President" on his right when the presentations were completed, and Ambassador Weddell was invited to act as interpreter. Roosevelt's knowledge of French enabled him to communicate with some degree of ease with President Justo who also had a slight knowledge of that language. 26

After ten minutes of agreeable conversation, President Justo asked Weddell if President Roosevelt desired to go out on the balcony of the Casa Rosada and greet the crowd which Justo thought would be assembled in anticipation of their appearance. Roosevelt inquired about the distance to the balcony and expressed his willingness to make the effort. The two chief magistrates went to the balcony and looked down on the crowd assembled in the Plaza de Mayo. (Weddell

25 Weddell to Vander Hoof, December 31, 1936, Weddell Papers.

26 Weddell to Hull, January 7, 1937, DF 811.001 Roosevelt/302, RG 59, NA.
noted it was conservatively estimated that 100,000 people gathered in the huge square below the balcony of the Casa Rosada for this spontaneous reception.) "The enthusiasm of the crowd knew no bounds and a series of welcoming roars went up" when they appeared and when Roosevelt, "with fine sense of dramatic effect, warmly wrung the hand of President Justo."27 The American President responded to the crowd which was wildly cheering and waving handkerchiefs by grasping a handkerchief from Justo's pocket and waving back. The crowd became delirious and Weddell witnessed "one of the most moving sights of his life!"28

The President returned to the Embassy about 6:00 PM with the same group which had escorted him to the Casa Rosada. Beginning at 7:00 PM, Roosevelt received about 100 individuals at a reception staged in his honor. Ambassador Weddell presented the guests to Roosevelt since Chief of Protocol Southgate personally knew few of the guests. The Rector of the University of Buenos Aires conferred upon Roosevelt the degree of Doctor, honoris causa, and the Museo Social Argentino presented him with a diploma of honorary membership (The Museo Social Argentino had similarly honored Theodore Roosevelt when he visited Argentina after leaving the Presidency.) Mr. and Mrs. Spruille Braden

27 Ibid.

28 Unaddressed letter by Virginia Weddell, December 7, 1936, Weddell Papers. Police lines were broken when FDR appeared on the balcony, and a small riot ensued as spectators pressed closer and tried to climb the walls of the Casa Rosada to touch the "great man" (Hinton, Cordell Hull, p. 311.)
and the United States delegation were also presented to Roosevelt as well as the staffs of the various American government offices in Buenos Aires. 29

The President found time to be "his altogether enchanting self" in his hours of relaxation. Prior to dinner, Roosevelt gathered his aides and Weddell in his bedroom and "there he took a manifest pleasure in preparing the cocktails and handing them to each one with some appropriate comment. In the morning it was almost the same way minus the cocktails!" 30 He had originally planned to dine very quietly with the "family," but later made known his wish to have the American delegates join him at dinner. Accordingly, Roosevelt dined with a "family" of twenty-two including Ambassador and Mrs. Weddell, Secretary of State and Mrs. Hull, Assistant Secretary and Mrs. Welles, Mr. and Mrs. Berle, the members of the delegation and their wives, and Roosevelt's staff. The President suffered a great personal loss during the night of November 30-December 1 with the death of Gus Gennerich, his faithful and devoted bodyguard. Gennerich had said goodnight to Mrs. Weddell in the hall of the Embassy just prior to dinner, "saying he was going out to 'see the town'." He died very suddenly after midnight in a cafe in the center of the city. This occurrence was not brought to the Presi-

29 Weddell to Hull, January 7, 1937, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/302, RG 59, NA. Mrs. Weddell entertained the visitors before the reception with a "clubby chat and a cup of tea" (Virginia Weddell to Kohn, December 10, 1936, Weddell Papers).

30 Weddell to Gordon, December 11, 1936, Weddell Papers.
dent's notice until early the next morning. 31

President Roosevelt's arrival in Buenos Aires on November 30 made history in that city. John W. White, a newspaper correspondent who had lived in South America for nearly twenty years, spent most of that day listening to comments of the crowds in cafes, streetcars, barbershops and the streets. He commented that Roosevelt impressed the Argentines as a great character, in his own right, rather like an invincible bullfighter, and his overwhelming electoral victory in November captured the popular imagination. "It was as a person, rather than a President, that he impressed the Argentines." White also explained that "here was a man who could beat the bankers," a reference to the practically unanimous opposition by the "monied people of the United States to the President's re-election." 32

Weddell likewise cited the significance of the welcome accorded to Roosevelt on November 30. His description provides the reader with an eye-witness account of the enthusiastic reception:

From all I have been able to learn the reception given our President by the citizens of Buenos Aires exceeded in warmth and spontaneity anything that has ever occurred here. The day was declared a national holiday, and special trains were run from all directions to bring eager visitors to the Capital. The streets through which the procession passed were solidly lined with people. Windows, roofs and balconies, all were filled with enthusiastic onlookers; American flags fluttered everywhere, and flowers were showered every few yards until the hood of the car bearing the President's present a floral appearance. Added to this was the unbroken applause which marked

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32 Hinton, Cordell Hull, pp. 311-312.
the entire four miles over which the procession passed.  

During the early morning of December 1, James Roosevelt informed his father of Gus Gennerich's death. His sudden death "brought the President real grief," and he requested that everything but official engagements be cancelled.  

Weddell informed President Justo of this decision and of the President's regret that he felt impelled to alter his plans. During the course of the morning Roosevelt accorded a private interview to the Chief of Police, General Juan E. Vaccarezza, who delivered Roosevelt's membership diploma for the Instituto de San Martin, an organization vaguely corresponding to the Society of the Cincinnati. Roosevelt also met privately with Dr. Honorio Puerreydon, former Argentine Ambassador at Washington, and a leader of the left wing of the Radical Party in Buenos Aires.  

The President lunched with a small group including Ambassador and Mrs. Weddell, James Roosevelt, three members of his staff, and Mrs. Delano Robbins who was the widow of his cousin Warren Robbins. At a quarter past two Roosevelt walked out on the Embassy terrace which overlooked the garden. Some 300 children from the American High School had gathered in the garden, and he spoke to them briefly. Mrs. Weddell "seized this opportunity to have him plant a tree," and, since the steps from the terrace to the garden were too steep for a ramp, he lifted a symbolical trowel full of earth and placed it at

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33 Weddell to Hull, January 7, 1937, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/302, RG 59, NA. For further discussion of FDR's reception, see Mobley, "Playing Host," Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 6, 1936, pp. 8-9; Dozer, Are We Good Neighbors?, p. 32

34 Unaddressed letter by Virginia Weddell, December 7, 1936, Weddell Papers.

35 Weddell to Hull, January 7, 1937, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/302, RG 59, NA.
the roots of a small indigenous tree (ficus pandurata). The tree was then planted in the Embassy garden "under his eyes" to commemorate his visit. After this ceremony was completed, the President went into the ballroom and received members of the local and visiting press including a dozen or more American correspondents. Roosevelt, in Weddell's opinion, was at his best on this occasion:

He found himself in his element and was ready, as in Washington, to have any questions that came into the mind of a newspaper friend presented to him, "Not," he added smilingly, "that I always answer them." He then referred in happy terms to the warmth of his reception, comparing it with one in New York, for example, where paper and especially ticker tape was showered on a distinguished visitor's head, "While here," he laughingly observed, "you say it with flowers." He then signed a number of autograph albums, identity cards, etc., to the great satisfaction of the favored individuals.

At half past five President Justo called for Roosevelt with a military escort, and he was conducted to the Legislative Palace, where he was taken immediately to the speakers' tribune. Saavedra Lamas declared the first plenary session of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace to be open, and announced, "The President of the United States." As he was advancing to the rostrum leaning on his son's arm, someone in the top gallery called out "down with imperialism." Roosevelt disregarded the heckler and

36 Unaddressed letter by Virginia Weddell, December 7, 1936; Virginia Weddell to Kohn, December 10, 1936; Weddell Papers; Weddell to Hull, January 7, 1937, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/302, RG 59, NA.

37 Weddell to Hull, January 7, 1937, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/302, RG 59, NA.

38 Ibid.
began the speech which he had travelled six thousand miles to deliver. "It was a speech well calculated to set the tone of the conference and to produce unity in the hemisphere against the growing threat of war in Europe." 39

President Roosevelt's speech began with a graphic description of the catastrophe which threatened other continents and the Americas.

Beyond the ocean we see continents rent asunder by old hatred and new fanaticism. We hear the demand that injustice and inequality be corrected by resorting to the sword and not by resorting to reason and peaceful justice. We hear the cry that new markets can be achieved only through conquests. We read that the sanctity of treaties between nations is disregarded.

Even though the Americas become involved in no war, we must suffer too. The madness of a great war in other parts of the world affect us and threaten our good in a hundred ways. And the economic collapse of any nation or nations must of necessity harm our prosperity.

He asserted that the citizens of the western hemisphere could contribute toward the maintenance of peace in the Old World, and offered two suggestions on how this could be accomplished.

Can we, the Republics of the New World, help the Old World to avert the catastrophe which impends. Yes, I am confident that we can. First, it is our duty by every honorable means to prevent any future wars among ourselves. This can best be done through the strengthening of the processes of constitutional democratic government—to make these processes conform to the modern need for unity and efficiency and at the same time, preserve the individual liberties of our citizens. By doing so, the people of our nations,

39 Samuel Inman witnessed this event, and Roosevelt remarked to him the next day, "Why was I so slow? After I retired last night, it came to me that I should have answered that challenge:" 'That's right! Down with imperialism. That's why we are meeting in this Conference.'" As quoted in Inman, Inter-American Conferences, p. 167. For the views of the Argentine "hero" of this episode, see Alberto Ciria, Parties
unlike the people of many nations who live under other forms of government, can and will insist on their intentions to live in peace. Thus will democratic government be justified throughout the world. In this determination to live at peace among ourselves we in the Americas make it at the same time clear that we stand shoulder to shoulder in our final determination that others, who driven by war madness or land hunger, might seek to commit acts of aggression against us will find a Hemisphere wholly prepared to consult together for our mutual safety and our mutual good. Secondly, and in addition to the perfecting of the mechanism of peace, we can strive even more strongly than in the past to prevent the creation of those conditions which give rise to war. Lack of social or political justice within the borders of any nation is always cause for concern. Through democratic processes we can strive to achieve for the Americas the highest possible standard of living for all our people.40

Roosevelt then described democracy as the hope of the world, and stated that it would spread and supersede other forms of government which opposed human liberty and progress "if we in our generation, can continue its successful application in the Americas. . . ." With faith and spirit in democratic government:

We will have peace over the Western World. In that faith and spirit we will watch and guard our Hemisphere. In that faith and spirit may we also, with God's help, offer hope to our brethren overseas.41

The delegates arose at the conclusion of the address and there ensued a prolonged applause. President Justo followed with appropriate remarks

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41 Ibid., p. 428.
of welcome, and praised Roosevelt's initiative as a noble inspiration. Justo likewise felt that the Inter-American Conference was meeting under favorable auspices. The spirit, in Justo's judgment, was uplifted and cheered.

In a world divided by hate and animosity, which opens gulfs between countries, the attitude of the nations of this continent stand out in contrast, for they have come together in a cordial reunion the better to coordinate the life of the American community, in the simple concept of the good neighbor.42

The meeting adjourned after President Justo's speech, and Roosevelt returned to his rooms at the Embassy by seven o'clock. At 9:30 PM the President, his son, and Ambassador Weddell left for Government House to attend a dinner and reception arranged in his honor by President Justo. Immediately on arrival the two Presidents went into the dining room and took their seats. They were followed by 500 invited guests, composed of chiefs of mission, members of the cabinet, and other high Argentine officials.43 Mrs. Adolf Berle's reminiscence provides the following account of the banquet:

It was the most brilliant affair of that kind I have ever attended... Soldiers presenting arms with their swords and dressed in blue and red uniforms were stationed on the stairs; all the diplomats wore gala uniforms, with plenty of decorations... My neighbor, Ibbara Garcia, Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, had been ordered to stop the band from playing the national anthems but claimed that the order had not come in time. When the Star Spangled Banner was played, Roosevelt blushed and remained seated; by the time the Argentine anthem started, James Roosevelt and someone else had arrived to help him up. President Justo toasted Roosevelt seated and Roosevelt rose to his feet to answer which was received with great applause. We are all used to

42 "Address of Welcome by Agustín P. Justo, President of the Argentine Republic, December 1, 1936," Report of the United States Delegation, p. 73.

43 Weddell to Hull, January 7, 1937, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/302, RG 59, NA.
his infirmity and take it for granted—to impose oneself thus on a new people and on a new country takes great courage and he did it very well.\textsuperscript{44}

Weddell also commented that the "charming and spontaneous act" of President Roosevelt provoked a "flutter of favorable comment." Mrs. Weddell likewise perceived that the Argentines were deeply touched by this effort as well as his effort to stand during the delivery of his graceful and appropriate speech. By two o'clock the morning of December 2, Roosevelt was again at the Embassy not the least fatigued by his very full round of activities. He insisted on chatting over events of the evening for quite a while after he got back.\textsuperscript{45}

At 10:00 AM December 2, services were held for Gus Gennerich. The President had requested that the funeral take place at the Embassy and a floral chapel was accordingly arranged in the ballroom. The remains were brought to the Embassy on a fire truck whose lamps were covered with black crepe and on which rode a small guard of honor. The President remained seated throughout the simple ceremony, as chief mourner, while appropriate prayers were read by the chaplain of the U.S.S. Indianapolis. Around Roosevelt stood the official family, secret service agents, and others. Mr. Gennerich's body was then taken to the U.S.S. Chester for return to the United States.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{44} Berle and Jacobs, eds. \textit{Navigating the Rapids}, pp. 119-120.

\textsuperscript{45} Weddell to Hull, January 7, 1937, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/302, RG 59, NA; Virginia Weddell to Kohn, December 19, 1936, Weddell Papers.

\textsuperscript{46} Weddell to Hull, January 7, 1937, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/302, RG 59, NA.
As Roosevelt had expressed the desire to leave for Montevideo during the early afternoon of December 2, the Embassy scheduled the luncheon to be given by President Roosevelt in honor of President and Senora Justo for a quarter past twelve. Roosevelt descended to the drawing room floor at twelve o'clock. On the arrival of Justo, the two Presidents stood together in the great hall to receive guests, who then preceded the Presidents into the dining room. Roosevelt and Justo followed the guests and took places facing each other from opposite tables. For his convenience, Roosevelt sat with his back to the wall, and Justo sat opposite with his back to a window which looked out on the garden. President Justo's wife and the wife of Vice President Roca sat on either side of Roosevelt, and Justo had Mrs. Hull and Mrs. Weddell, the hostess of the luncheon, on his right and left, respectively. Vice President Roca and Secretary Hull sat at the other two high points of the tables. Seventy guests attended the luncheon, representing the legislature, executive and judicial powers of Argentina and others.47

At the close of the luncheon, and after toasts had been presented, President Roosevelt spoke briefly on a subject which, in Weddell's judgment, provoked the keenest interest on the part of his Argentine guests. The Presidents remarks concerned the unratified sanitary convention and were "charged with happy political significance."48


Every nation has the right and the duty to adopt such measures as may be necessary, in the interest of its own citizens, in order to prevent the entrance into its territory from abroad of contagious or infectious diseases prejudicial to human, animal, or plant life. But it is equally clear that quarantine or sanitary regulations should neither be used as disguised tariff measures nor should they be ever applied except in accordance with strict justice.

About a year ago, the Argentine Government and the Government of the United States negotiated a sanitary convention which had for its purpose the removal of an inequitable situation which had arisen as a result of the all embracing character of legislation adopted by the Congress of the United States. The ratification of this convention would make it possible for Patagonia, a sheep raising area, where the hoof and mouth disease has not existed, and which territory is separated by natural barriers from the cattle raising regions of the Republic, to be relieved from the sanitary embargoes now placed upon it. This convention, which I had the honor of submitting to the Senate of the United States last year, affects in no way existing tariff rates. It is intended solely to remove an obvious inequity resulting from an unnecessarily wide application of a sanitary embargo. The ratification of this convention by the Senate of the United States would eliminate an injustice without detriment or prejudice of any kind to the legitimate interests of the cattle industry of the United States, and without relaxing in the least full sanitary protection of our own livestock. I intend to present these facts clearly to the attention of the members of the Senate of the United States, with the hope that our Senate may give its consent to the ratification of the simple instrument of justice.49

49"Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace—Remarks of President Roosevelt at Luncheon Given by Him for President Justo," Press Release, Saturday, December 5, 1936, vol. 15: no. 375, pp. 428-429. Roosevelt's statements encouraged the Argentines but did not reduce senatorial opposition. High-tariff senators insisted on drastic interpretations of the sanitary law, and Roosevelt was unable to fulfill his and Argentina's hopes (Hull, Memoirs, I, pp. 497-498; Wood, "The Department of State and Non-National Interest," p. 17).
colleague stationed in Czechoslovakia informed Weddell that the Inter-American Conference was taking place at an opportune time. J. Butler Wright noted that Secretary Hull's speeches before leaving and en route to the Conference had been remarkably well received in Europe, and, "of course, the President's address yesterday has commanded universal attention and interest here." In turn, Weddell explained to his friends and colleagues that "the President was under our roof for three days, seventy-two hours charged with movement and excitement." The Ambassador was with Roosevelt incessantly during this time, "sitting at his bedside, listening to his wonderful table talk and accompanying him on various visits."

The Argentine press had received the news of Roosevelt's plans with interest and pleasure, combined with strong emotion and flattery which might be described as superficial in character. Weddell, however, felt it was much more significant and profound that the Latin American press had recognized that Roosevelt was "justly entitled to gratitude for his policy of the good neighbor which has so effectively tended to dissipate the fears, suspicions and jealousies of the United States, formerly so prevalent, and nowhere more so than in Argentina." Weddell perceived that an even stronger influence, and one not unconnected with political conditions in Argentina, was the personal prestige of the President, enhanced as it was by his great victory.

52 J. Butler Wright to Weddell, December 2, 1936, Weddell Papers.

53 Weddell to Daniel, December 18, 1936; Weddell to Louise Ewell, December 10, 1936, Weddell Papers.
This victory, achieved in fair and free elections, made a tremendous impression on Argentine minds, particularly on those of the middle and lower classes. It personified him as the great champion of Democracy throughout the world and proved to the Argentines that Democracy is still a vital force and not a waning dream of idealists. The cries of "Viva la Democracia" which greeted the President on his passage through the streets of the capital were to an important degree the reflection of the sentiments felt by the numerous elements in the Argentine electorate which composed the Radical party, a group many of whose members consider that although they constitute the majority of Argentine voters they are being deprived by force and fraud of their right to rule the country. The warmth of the reception given the President by those persons can therefore be ascribed in part to their admiration of him as the embodiment of a great and real democracy and partly to a protest against the political situation in Argentina today.54

The Ambassador perceived that the speech delivered by Roosevelt at the inaugural session of the Inter-American Conference received uniformly favorable press comment and was received with every indication of satisfaction by the delegates. Roosevelt's affirmation of his faith and of man's dependence on his maker profoundly impressed a people who were unqualifiedly Roman Catholic. 55 Weddell noted this and commented on the President's speech, the last paragraph in particular:

His speech here was, I think, one of the outstanding ones of his life. He discussed the last paragraph with me in which he spoke of man's spiritual hunger and the necessity of faith saying that he felt he must sound this loftier note here. I assured him that in the hearts of a people interested in religion and profoundly Roman

54 Weddell to Moore, December 11, 1936, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/285, RG 59, NA. This dispatch contained Weddell's impressions of the effect produced by President Roosevelt on the Argentine people.

Weddell felt that everyone seemed to be in accord on one point concerning the President's visit: "The charm of his manners and his personality completely captured the Latin mentality and imagination of his hosts." While summing up his report to the State Department, he added:

The President leaves behind him a people whose sentiments and whose imagination he has captured. If the affections he has won are strengthened by the ratification of the Sanitary Convention, and by eagerly hoped for American concessions to Argentine trade, there is no doubt but that the relations between the United States and the southern republic will experience a great and lasting improvement. On the other hand, should the hopes now aroused be disappointed it is to be anticipated that the effects of the visit will be seriously weakened.59

From the moment Roosevelt set foot on Argentine soil until the Indianapolis dropped down the River Plate, there seemed to be an unbroken wave of cheering and enthusiasm. Weddell's book on Argentina, appropriately entitled Introduction to Argentina, also emphasized the enthusiastic reception.

The arrival and sojourn of President Roosevelt in Buenos Aires were marked by scenes of delirious cordiality, in which this warm-hearted people gave vent to their emotions of hospitality and good feeling toward this herald of good will—spokesman for the good neighbor policy.60

Roosevelt's "physical beauty" also helped to deepen the sympathies which he provoked. Ambassador Weddell recalled an incidence of this "sex-appeal."

59 Ibid.

60 Alexander Wilbourne Weddell, Introduction to Argentina (New York, 1939), p. 46; see also Weddell to Gordon, December 11, 1936, Weddell Papers.
One remark . . . promises to attain a certain immor­tality its author was a high functionary of the Foreign Office. Seeing the dense crowds gathered along the streets through which the President was passing, in which were hosts of beautiful women, hearing the enthu­siastic shouts of the multitude . . . he exclaimed: "'Ma foi, for the first time in my life I see sex-appeal being employed in international relations'." 

The Weddell's were likewise deeply impressed by President Roosevelt, and "his gaiety, his optimism, his courage, his patience, complete won Virginia and me." While they were exhausted by his visit, the Weddells felt a deep pleasure and honor in hosting President Roosevelt. The Ambassador was particularly impressed with Roosevelt's ability to go through "a rather heavy official program without flinching." He noted that FDR "found time to be his altogether enchanting self in his hours of relaxation."

He held a sort of grand lever and managed to get through an astonishing amount of work, to absorb a quantity of information concerning the country and its personalities, and generally showed that he was keenly alive to everything around him. If I had not already been to a great extent under the spell of his charm, those few days would have achieved the result. But all that apart, I was deeply impressed by the President's spiritual-deptths and resources. He illustrates in perfect measure Wordsworth's "The Happy Warrior"

"Who, doomed to go in company with pain,  
Turns his necessity to glorious gain;  
In face of these doth exercise a power  
Which is our human nature's highest dower;  
As more exposed to suffering and distress;  
Thence, also, more alive to tenderness."

He is as you are probably aware a complete cripple; the torso of an athlete and pitiful victim of Infantile Paralysis

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61 Weddell, Introduction to Argentina, p. 46; see also Virginia Weddell to Kohn, December 19, 1936, Weddell Papers.

from the waist down. But such courage, such optimism, 63 allied to such an indomitable will, I have never known. Weddell also felt that the President was a "fine and good and human" and that Roosevelt had "an appreciation of the situation of the less favored man and woman that had no parallel since the Republic was founded . . . I more and more feel that he is the Moses of our people and time." 64

In Weddell's judgment, there was no "hitch or breakdown" in the plans and schedule of Roosevelt's trip with the exception of the change occasioned by the sudden death of Gus Gennerich. A kind personal telegram from the President indicated that he was contented with his visit. "It was heart warming to receive within a few hours after his departure a most gracious and cordial telegram of goodbye and thanks." 65 At Weddell's initiative, a tablet was later placed on the great stairway of the American Embassy to record the visit. The tablet contained the President's name, the dates of his stay, and a quotation from his speech delivered on December 1 at the Congressional Palace: "Democracy is still the hope of the world." Although it would have been in keeping with Weddell's humorous disposition, the tablet did not indicate, as suggested by one writer, that "The

63 Weddell to Gordon, December 11, 1936; see also Weddell to Pollard, December 31, 1936, Weddell Papers.

64 Weddell to Ewell, December 10, 1936, Weddell Papers.

65 Weddell to Gordon, December 11, 1936; see also unaddressed letter by Virginia Weddell, December 7, 1936, Weddell Papers; Weddell to Hull, January 7, 1937, DF 811.001 Roosevelt Visit/302, RG 59, NA.
President of the United States slept here."\textsuperscript{66}

4. Committee Assignments and Radio Broadcasts

With the departure of President Roosevelt on December 2, Weddell's duties became much less glamorous and prestigious. He was assigned to the Second Committee (Neutrality), the Third Committee (Limitation of Armaments), the Sixth Committee (Intellectual Cooperation), and the Seventh Committee (Coordination of Texts). His assignments were relatively minor, and, although he was the chairman of the American delegations to the Third and Sixth Committees, Weddell was not a major participant at the Conference. The Seventh Committee was only responsible for the coordination and style of the various treaties and resolutions adopted by the Conference, and most of Weddell's work took place after the Conference adjourned.\textsuperscript{67} Likewise, the work of the other Committees was overshadowed by the First Committee (Organization for Peace) and the Second Committee since the expressed purpose of the Conference was to maintain peace. Nevertheless, Weddell's committee assignments deserve comment as well as his continued support activities for the United States delegation.

The first plenary session of the Conference was held on December 4, 1936, and Dr. Saavedra Lamas was elected permanent President of the


\textsuperscript{67}Report of the United States Delegation, pp. 40 and 64-72; Weddell to Elizabeth Weddell, December 30, 1936, Weddell Papers.
Conference. The first plenary session recessed until December 5, at which time Secretary of State Hull addressed the Conference and outlined the program of the United States government for the maintenance of peace. After the first plenary session, the work of the Conference was undertaken by appointed committees. The second plenary session met on December 16 and recessed to meet again on December 19. The third and final plenary session was held on December 21.68


1. Peoples must be educated for peace. Each nation must make itself safe for peace.

2. Frequent conferences between representatives of nations, and intercourse between their peoples, are essential.

3. The consummation of the five well-known peace agreements will provide adequate peace machinery.

4. In the event of war in this hemisphere, there should be a common policy of neutrality.

5. The nations should adopt commercial policies to bring each that prosperity upon which enduring peace is founded.

6. Practical international cooperation is essential to restore many indispensable relationships between nations and prevent the demoralization with which national character and conduct are threatened.

7. International law should be reestablished, revitalized, and strengthened. Armies and navies are no permanent substitute for its great principles.

8. Faithful observance of undertakings between nations is the foundation of international order, and rests upon moral law, the highest of all law.

For the entire text of Hull's speech, see "Address of Secretary Hull at the First Plenary Session of the Conference, December 5, 1936," Report of the United States Delegation, pp. 82-90.
One of Weddell's particular responsibilities as a delegate was to "steer through a treaty looking to the exchange of students and professors and this was accepted practically without change." The Ambassador was able to carry out his committee responsibility "to the entire satisfaction of the Secretary," and he felt "the project has elements of understanding and good feeling in it." The Ambassador also "headed our little group which discussed disarmament" before the Third Committee. He believed there was little of exact nature that could be accomplished, and noted the Third Committee’s activities were limited "to denunciation of the use of gas, etc. and an appeal to the countries to reconsider their own armament situation with a view to diminishing them were this possible." Weddell philosophically commented on the work of the Third Committee and the results of peace meetings:

All this latter is hardly more to the cynic than a pious wish and brings to mind the familiar remark that talking about religion is very often an excuse for not practicing it. Quite true, and it may also be the case with peace discussions. But in the one case at least attention is fixed on the ultimate goal of spiritual growth and perfection and in the other the attainment of that good and perfect gift which is promised to men of good will.

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69 Weddell to Vander Hoof, December 31, 1936, Weddell Papers.

70 Weddell to Pollard, December 31, 1936, Weddell Papers. For Weddell's comments during meetings of the Sixth as well as the Second, Third and Seventh Committees, see Imprenta Del Congresso National, Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace: Proceedings (Stenographic Reports, Buenos Aires, December, 1936) (Buenos Aires, 1937).

71 Weddell to Vander Hoof, December 31, 1936, Weddell Papers.
Weddell discussed the intent and progress of the Conference in his personal correspondence.

The task is a difficult one,—to reconcile the views of twenty-one countries—but I believe we are making progress and that good will result, quite apart from the fact that leaders of public opinion in all the Republics have been in daily contact over a considerable period.

Furthermore, Weddell described, tongue in cheek, his duties when the Conference adjourned.

The Conference will probably adjourn in another ten days. My job then will be to pick up the scraps of paper and generally clean up the room before handing the key over to the janitor.72

Ambassador Weddell delivered two radio broadcasts during the Conference. His first address is significant because it included his personal observations about the cause of war as well as his thoughts on how citizens could prevent war. On the eve of his first address, he indicated that the Conference was entering the second week of its labors. "I can only say that we are all trying hard to bring about some practical result, but as I am going to say over the radio tommorrow night the real battle-ground in our war against war is in our own hearts; we must personally disarm."73 The day of his broadcast, Weddell expressed sincere admiration for Hull and noted the Secretary of State had made a great speech at the Conference. "To this I have referred in a broadcast which I am making tonight."74

72 Weddell to Tucker, December 11, 1936, Weddell Papers.
73 Weddell to Ewell, December 10, 1936, Weddell Papers.
74 Weddell to Tucker, December 11, 1936, Weddell Papers.
Weddell's speech was broadcast over the facilities of the Columbia Broadcasting System on Friday, December 11, at 8:35 PM.

His initial remarks concerned the progress of the Conference. He indicated that participants and onlookers were both freely expressing the opinion that few peace gatherings had ever met in an atmosphere which was so favorable to the accomplishment of practical results.

In the first place we have just been vivified and enthused by the visit of President Roosevelt, and there are still sounding in our ears the noble concepts of our Secretary of State in his great speech of last Saturday in which he set up Eight Pillars of Wisdom [sic] on which must be built the fair structure we call Peace.

Weddell referred briefly to the first of Hull's Eight Pillars (Education). He then began to discuss phases of peace among nations:

In seeking to discover some of the fundamental obstacles in the great task of achieving world harmony, I cannot but recall that only a few years ago it was commonly believed, or at least asserted with parrot-like iteration, that international bodies for the maintenance of peace remain impotent to prevent armed conflicts between nations because a world court, for example, lacks a sheriff, while a parliament of states lacks a sergeant-at-arms, to enforce their decrees and acts.

We are growing wiser with the passage of time and are beginning to realize that the existence of either or both of these representatives of law would alone be inadequate to end war unless and until the individual man and woman has progressed farther than at present in their desire for peace and in their knowledge of peace and its factors, with a corresponding growth in a national and world public opinion hostile to war.75

Weddell next made a lengthy comparison between private duels and armed conflicts between nations. He cited an incident which occurred in his native state when, for the first time, a gentleman refused to accept a challenge to duel. The gentleman declared that the satisfaction which his challenger sought to obtain could no longer be obtained, and that as a Christian and citizen he could not, and would not duel. In Weddell's judgment, dueling came to an end in certain countries not through the force of law, but through the growth of public opinion. It persisted in other countries, despite its prohibition, because contrary public opinion had not developed. Public opinion similarly affected war between nations, and he based his conviction on "the fact that each belligerent seeks to capture world opinion for itself." Weddell felt that an enlightened attitude toward war on the part of nations must inevitably result in the disappearance of war as an instrument of policy. "And it is in the creation of this public opinion adverse to war that each of us can perform effective work for the promotion of harmony and peace among the peoples of the earth." 

The Ambassador also stressed that it was necessary to eliminate the profit incentive to war. His statements indicate that he shared contemporary public opinion and perceived that the profit incentive of the armaments industry caused the First World War.

Turning a moment to a consideration of what might be called a deterrent to war, I would emphasize the enactment of measures which would make it impossible for vast fortunes to be built up by individuals or organizations at a time when the body politic is being bled white. In other words we must strive to eliminate the profit incentive to war. And, as an inescapable consequence of this, either the elimination of the private

76 Ibid.
munitions manufacturer or else official supervision of his activities.

His conviction that the world was moving toward a better day was not shaken by the existence war. If established peace continued "to be a target for the jibes and the scoffers:"

Yet I draw positive comfort from these things in the bare fact of their existence. For if the efforts of statesmen and the conclusion of treaties by various countries, all in the interest of peace, too often are barren of practical results, yet the fact stands that such efforts are made, that such treaties are signed, that the work of education is going on.77

Ambassador Weddell concluded his address by citing the thoughts of Edmund Burke and calling for a Holy War against war. Weddell's final comments about world peace and personal disarmament echoed his speech of August 15, 1933 before the Pan American Society. They likewise provide insight into his religious personality and beliefs.

Edmund Burke tells us, in one of his brilliant passages, that we should be firmly persuaded that a virtue which is not practical is spurious. The virtue which I have tried to outline, a virtue which consists in a love of one's fellows, and a hatred of exaggerated nationalisms and unreasoning selfishnesses, meets Burke's test, and it is with this conviction that I place it before you for emulation.

The conclusion of the whole matter, as I see it, is that if we are to achieve world peace, there must be to start with a sort of personal disarmament by each one of us--a jettisoning of our superiorities, of our prejudices, or our dislikes, or our hatreds. These are, perhaps, hard things to accept—certainly they are for me—but if we can achieve them, the end we seek must inevitably be ours,—the attainment of that state of mind and body and spirit in which "we being defended from the fear of our enemies may pass our time in rest and quietness" and in continuing growth.

77 Ibid.
From my own experience and observation I think that - in a world that pretends to be Christian - war ought to be impossible. As waged today it has no redeeming quality, and its results can be only evil. But whether there shall be new wars or not depends on the civilizing of the human race. It should be remembered that the angelic messenger of Bethlehem promised peace not to all mankind but to men of good will - to those who seek peace and ensue it. Whether the unspeakable horrors of war shall be renewed or not depends entirely, I reiterate, on the education of mankind - a task in which the least of us can take some part.

In the unpretentious plea which I have attempted to address to you I have attempted to preach a Holy War, a war against war. Our main weapon, - reason through education. The real battlefield, - our own hearts. The goal and guerdon of victory, - Peace. 78

Weddell also delivered a brief radio message for Cordell Hull on December 18. Hull's message stressed the importance of creating and maintaining democratic institutions in every American Republic in order to preserve peace in the western hemisphere. Weddell reviewed the work of the Conference and discussed agreements regarding commerce, cultural interchange as well as an inter-American highway which had been drafted and awaited. He also reported rapid progress, "'so much so that we are prepared to say that in the final outcome this conference will have represented the greatest forward move for peace in which a whole continent has every engaged'." 79

5. Conclusion of the Conference

On December 23, Roosevelt telegraphed his hearty congratulations to Saavedra Lamas on the splendid achievements of the Conference.

78 Ibid.

79 As quoted in "Weddell Reads Message of Hull on Radio," Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 19, 1936, p. 3.
The President indicated that the high hopes of the Conference had been fulfilled, and extended his warm greetings and good wishes for a Merry Christmas and prosperous New Year to the members of each delegation. The following day, Christman Eve, Roosevelt likewise telegraphed greetings and praise to the American delegation.

To you and Mrs. Hull and the Delegation and their families Mrs. Roosevelt and I send our Christmas greetings. In this millions of people join for yours has been an accomplishment in close accord with the spirit of Christmas.80

The closing session of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace was held on December 23, at which time Sumner Welles delivered an address for Secretary Hull. The closing addresses of the Conference were delivered by Dr. Carlos Concha, Chairman of the Peruvian Delegation, and Saavedra Lamas. In accordance with the established custom, the chairman of the delegation of the country selected as the host of the next conference addressed the closing session on behalf of the delegates.81

The work of the Conference went on "in a kind of cresendo movement up to the very last day." Weddell spent "some long hours and some very late hours getting the final proceedings into shape for the printer after the actual committee work was done." With this cleared up, "I was able to draw a deep breath." He also indicated that the activities of the Conference "tired Virginia very much as, due to an

80 Roosevelt to Hull, December 24, 1936, DF 710 Peace/1158; see also Roosevelt to Saavedra Lamas, December 23, 1936, DF 710 Peace 1161, RG 59, NA.

unfortunate kink in her psychology, she thinks she has the personal responsibility for the conduct of the entire world." Ambassador and Mrs. Weddell entertained the entire "official family" of the delegation at a dinner the evening of December 25. The dinner was held in the Embassy garden and approximately one hundred people were invited. Just as the dinner was ending, one of the delegates "made a lovely speech and presented Virginia and me with a lovely piece of plate." The afternoon of December 26, Ambassador and Mrs. Weddell 'pushed the entire delegation on board a ship bound for New York in an atmosphere of intense heat." The S.S. Southern Cross sailed from Buenos Aires at three o'clock, and the delegation departed with universal satisfaction and many expressions of regret. Several days after the departure of the delegation, Weddell noted that there was "something apostolic, at the same time Olympian, in Mr. Hull." He explained that Hull "did a good bit of work," although the Secretary did not accomplish

82 Weddell to Elizabeth Weddell, December 30, 1936, Weddell Papers.

83 Ibid.; Weddell to William S. Weddell, December 30, 1936, Weddell Papers. Hull followed FDR's example by planting, on December 25, a jacaranda tree in the lower garden of the Embassy. President Justo planted a similar tree in a corresponding position below the ballroom windows of the Embassy. Weddell quipped: "Both Presidents and plants are thriving at this writing, but in time the exuberant growth of the latter will have to be curbed" (Weddell, Introduction to Argentina, p. 241).

84 Weddell to Elizabeth Weddell, December 30, 1936; Weddell to William Weddell, December 30, 1936, Weddell Papers; Weddell to Moore, December 26, 1936, DF 710 Peace Personnel/1324, RG 59, NA. Saavedra Lamas did not extend the usual courtesy of seeing Cordell Hull off when he departed because of the near-violent confrontations between them resulting from the Argentine's adamant opposition and abusive behavior toward the United States. The amiable relationship they enjoyed at the Montevideo Conference disintegrated as a result of Saavedra Lamas' opposition to the compulsory consultation and neutrality proposals of the United States. The Foreign Minister felt that
"all that was hoped for." But at the same time, Secretary Hull and the United States delegation succeeded in laying some good foundations. "An interesting thing," in Weddell's judgment, "was to see how the Mexican, Cubans, Haitians, Central Americans, and Brazilians were especially inclined to back up."  

Weddell further summarized the Conference and Roosevelt's visit in the following letter:

December was naturally a very busy month with the visit of the President and the assembling of the Peace Conference. The President himself is a person of amazing charm and his visit here was an unqualified success. But it ran Virginia and me ragged and on top of this was the Peace Conference which represented a great deal of rather hard work. Some of our people were disappointed that we did not more perfectly carry through certain of the original projects, but I am not discouraged for, after all, in peculiar measure in the case of treaties it is the spirit that giveth life.

these proposals would "cut into" the prerogatives of the League of Nations, and was also convinced that Argentine's interest lay with her ties to Europe and the world, not to the western hemisphere. Hull was rankled by this opposition especially since he had supported Saavedra Lamas' candidacy for the Nobel Peace Prize. Their last meeting was heated and sharp words were exchanged. For a detailed account of the confrontation between Saavedra Lamas and Hull, see Bemis, Latin American Policy, pp. 285-291; Hull, Memoirs, I, pp. 497-500; Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History, pp. 104-105; Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues, pp. 175-176; Peterson, Argentina and the United States, pp. 390-393. Also, see Hull to Moore, December 8 and 10, DF 710 Peace Neutrality/13 and 17, RG 59, NA.

85 Weddell to Pollard, December 31, 1936; see also Weddell to Vander Hoof, December 31, 1936, Weddell Papers. "The delegation too did well under Mr. Hull's guidance. He is another person for whom I have deep respect; approaching affection. We did not get all we hoped for but what was done was substantial and all to the good."

86 Weddell to Tunstall, February 3, 1937, Weddell Papers.
CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Summary

Alexander Wilbourne Weddell experienced two separate diplomatic careers. During his initial career, Weddell served twenty-two years in the Foreign Service and advanced from private secretary to Consul General. He obtained the rank of Foreign Service Officer class one, serving in such diplomatic posts as Denmark, Zanzibar, Italy, Greece, Egypt, India, and Mexico. Despite these accomplishments, however, Weddell did not attain the coveted rank of ambassador, highest in the intricate hierarchy of diplomacy. Recognizing the remoteness of such an appointment under a Republican administration and citing pressure from personal affairs, he resigned from the Foreign Service on October 5, 1928 and returned to his native city to spend what he thought would be the remainder of his life.

Weddell did not remain separated from government service, and, after a five year retirement, the Church Hill native was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Argentina on June 3, 1933. His return to the Foreign Service was the result of his "diplomatic longings" as well as his financial contributions to the electoral victory of Franklin D. Roosevelt. At the age of fifty-seven, Weddell embarked on a second and more significant career which included perhaps the pinnacle of his diplomatic experiences—the
visit of President Roosevelt to Buenos Aires in December 1936 on the
occasion of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace.

This study has examined Ambassador Weddell's diplomatic mission
throughout the various stages of the Conference. His personal view­
point and comments have also be presented. Since these events re­
present one of the peaks of Weddell's professional career, it is appro­
priate to discuss briefly the results and significance of the Inter­
American Conference.

The twenty-one American republics represented at the Conference
adopted two treaties and eight conventions, an additional protocol
relative to non-intervention, and sixty-two resolutions, recommendations, and declarations. Most important, however, the Conference
erected four pillars to insure peace in the Americas--three conven­
tions and a declaration of principles. The topics of the conventions
include collective security, non-intervention and neutrality, and the
declaration pledged Pan American solidarity. The first pillar and
the foremost achievement of the Conference was the Convention for the
Maintenance, Preservation and Reestablishment of Peace. It was popu­
larly known as the Consultation Pact, and it stipulated that the twenty­
one republics of the Americas would consult and collaborate in the
event of menace either from outside or within the hemisphere. Although
there was no obligation to do more than consult and no provision for
consultation machinery, the mere obligation to consult represented a
significant and novel achievement. The republics expressed their
collective concern and common interest in hemispheric security. For
the first time, they prepared the groundwork for meeting threats to
their peace, and each nation became responsible for protecting the
continent from outside interference. Secretary Hull noted in his Memoirs that the American Republics took one step in the direction of a hemispheric Monroe Doctrine as a result of the Consultation Pact. 1

The Additional Protocol Relative to Nonintervention reaffirmed and exceeded the nonintervention principle approved at the Montevideo Conference in 1933. The Nonintervention Protocol stripped the United States of the legal right to intervene in an American republic under any circumstances, although intervention by joint action could take place after consultation. For the first time, an official delegation of the United States signed a pledge which condemned intervention in emphatic terms. The Nonintervention Protocol represented a momentous Latin American victory as well as a turning point in hemispheric diplomatic relations. One Latin American writer later commented that this Protocol alone justified the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. 2

To insure American neutrality in the event of any outbreak which might threaten peace, the twenty-one republics adopted the single instrument entitled the Convention to Coordinate, Extend and Assure the Fulfillment of the Existing Treaties between the American States, popularly referred to as the Neutrality Convention. It provided machinery for the coordination of existing peace treaties and likewise

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2 "Inter-American Conference," undated report DF 710 Peace/1495,
envisaged the general objective of a common neutrality policy. Furthermore, the Neutrality Convention stipulated that the American republics would consult and collaborate, as provided by the Consultation Pact.³

The Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Co-operation represented the fourth cornerstone of peace enacted by the Buenos Aires Conferences. Introduced by the Central American delegations, this declaration indicated a real desire on the part of the delegates to serve notice that an attack from abroad would find the republics of the Americas united. The American governments solemnly declared their unqualified respect for the sovereignty of governments and the existence of common democracy throughout America. They also declared that susceptible acts which disturbed the peace of America affected each and every one of them. Such actions, under this declaration, would justify consultation and collaboration as provided by the Consultation Pact. The Solidarity Declaration, together with the Consultation Pact and Nonintervention Protocol, profoundly changed the traditional spirit of the Monroe Doctrine. Historians, both past and contemporary, fix the "Pan Americanizing" or broadening of the Monroe Doctrine from the Solidarity Declaration of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. Likewise, this declaration


RG 59, NA; Coleman, "Good Neighbor Policy of Roosevelt," p. 278; Quintanilla, A Latin American Speaks, pp. 161-162.
was the heart of inter-American solidarity during World War II.

The Conference also reaffirmed approval of Cordell Hull's liberal trade policies (a virtually meaningless resolution because there had been no abatement of restrictive trade practices after the Montevideo Conference passed a similar resolution) and enacted conventions and recommendations relative to conciliation, bilateral peace commissions, juridical problems, and a Pan American Highway. A number of important conventions, resolutions, and recommendations designed to create a friendly spirit between the peoples of the Americas were also adopted, and these should be counted among the significant accomplishments of the Buenos Aires Conference. The most important was the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations which provided for the annual interchange of 240 professors and 480 students among the American republics. The United States was cognizant of the importance of intellectual cooperation between the American republics and introduced the Exchange Convention; Ambassador

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Weddell guided it through the Sixth Committee. This sponsorship was significant because it represented the first time the United States assumed leadership of cultural affairs at an inter-American gathering.  

Historians have noted that the results of the Buenos Aires Conference, though gratifying, fell short of the positive measures which President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull sought. Latin Americans did not totally accept the fears of the United States regarding the deteriorating European situation, and Saavedra Lamas adamantly opposed any direct or implied challenge to Europe or the League of Nations. In order to obtain complete agreement, Hull found it necessary to abandon his proposed permanent Consultative Committee as well as the multi-lateral extension of neutrality legislation enacted by the United States Congress. The various draft proposals, according to J. Lloyd Meecham, were drained of their very essence and the Conference produced a number of wordy and generally ineffectual pacts. The goals of the State Department were vindicated during succeeding years when the necessity of more effective machinery for common action made itself keenly felt by the growth of Nazi/Fascist organizations, the rapid expansion of foreign propaganda, and the extraordinary efforts of Nazi Germany to develop trade.

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Still, the special peace conference at Buenos Aires was a success. The adoption of the principle of consultation was the greatest contribution yet made to American security. The Consultation Pact strengthened the machinery of continental peace, and laid the foundation for defense against overseas threats. Inter-American solidarity during World War II, with the exception of Argentina, rested on the Consultation Pact along with the Neutrality Convention and the Solidarity Declaration. Likewise, the Nonintervention Protocol, the Consultation Pact and the Solidarity Declaration "continentalized" or "Pan Americanized" the previous, unilateral spirit of the Monroe Doctrine. This was a most noteworthy achievement for the nations of the western hemisphere. Finally, from the standpoint of good-will and trust, the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace represented a success for the Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Contemporary observers felt that the Conference signified progress in mutual understanding between the United States and its southern neighbors. President Roosevelt's visit also made an effective contribution, and, at the conclusion of the Conference, Latin American delegates expressed gratification with the efforts of the United States. They remarked that "The United States is with us now" and "The United States has at last joined the Pan American Family."7

2. Conclusions

Regardless of the nature or importance of his responsibilities, whether routine or prestigious, Ambassador Weddell conducted himself in a very competent manner during the Inter-American Conference

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for the Maintenance of Peace. During the initial planning stages, he delivered Roosevelt's invitation to President Justo and, in turn, transmitted Justo's reply to the State Department. Weddell conscientiously reported local press comment and the plans of the Argentine government. More important, however, he evaluated and offered suggestions concerning the attitude and reaction of the Argentine government, especially Foreign Minister Saavedra Lamas. The Ambassador and his staff also carried out the instructions of the Division of Protocol and Conferences regarding accommodations and preparations for President Roosevelt and the United States delegation.

These activities are not unlike the routine, unglamorous duties which ambassadors undertake on a regular basis. Yet, the importance of these routine duties should not be underrated since Ambassador Weddell was acting as the personal representative of the President of the United States. His reports contained valuable first-hand information which enabled the State Department to gauge the reaction and plans of the Argentine government. Likewise, the importance of making hotel accommodations, acquiring necessary equipment, personnel, autos, etc., and verifying security precautions should not be minimized. Without proper back-up and support, the efforts and performance of the delegation could have suffered. His sense of duty and persistence during the controversy over Roosevelt's landing site was also significant. By continuing to advance the objections of the Argentine government as well as his personal viewpoints, Weddell influenced the President to land in Buenos Aires rather than Mar del Plata. Therefore, it is reasonable to credit Weddell in part for Roosevelt's enthusiastic reception in Buenos Aires. The impact would have been diminished
by a first landing in Mar del Plata.

Ambassador Weddell's responsibilities became more prestigious and glamorous once the delegation and President Roosevelt arrived in Buenos Aires. His role as the Resident Ambassador was important, especially from the representational viewpoint. He and Mrs. Weddell entertained key members of other delegations during the Conference. He was an integral member of Roosevelt's entourage, and was with Roosevelt during most of the seventy-two hours the President spent in Buenos Aires. He sat at Roosevelt's bedside, listened to his intimate conversations, and accompanied him on various visits. Weddell was the President's interpreter as well as his confidant, as witnessed by their discussion of Roosevelt's address for the opening session. With the exception of the death of his bodyguard, there was no change or problem in the schedule of Roosevelt's visit. A kind personal telegram from the President indicated that he was pleased with Weddell's performance.

The Ambassador was a minor, but active, participant during the Conference. His first radio broadcast delivered on December 1 was significant because it voiced his religious personality and convictions. He attacked world cynicism of peace efforts and called for a Holy War against war as well as personal disarmament. Of the four committees to which he was assigned, his work for the Sixth Committee (Intellectual Cooperation) was the most important. He was responsible for steering through the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations and carried out his committee assignment to the entire satisfaction of Cordell Hull.
Weddell conducted himself in a very competent manner at the 1936 Buenos Aires Conference. His support functions were carried out effectively, and the objectives of State Department for Roosevelt's visit were executed without any major breakdown. He also represented the President of the United States effectively, and his committee work, radio broadcasts, and gracious entertaining contributed to the outcome and achievements of the Conference. Consequently, it may be concluded that Ambassador Alexander Wilbourne Weddell contributed substantially to the success of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, and, in turn, to the implementation of the Good Neighbor Policy.
THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION OF ALEXANDER WILBOURNE WEDDELL
AT THE INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

This bibliography does not list monographs and articles which were suggested as additional sources but not utilized by the author.

PRIMARY SOURCES

1. MANUSCRIPT COLLECTIONS


Although the entire collection of Weddell's Papers are not presently catalogued, the records concerning the years 1933-1942 are available to researchers. Weddell was a prolific letter-writer, and the Weddell Papers are comprised mainly of personal letters to colleagues, relatives and close friends. His letters include repeated but sketchy comments about his diplomatic duties, Latin American relations and the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. Correspondence regarding President Roosevelt's visit to Buenos Aires was, on the other hand, very detailed and extensive. The Weddell Papers provide an interesting and personal perspective of the diplomatic events under study.


Selection of Hull's correspondence regarding the Conference and Argentina, 1933-1944.


The records compiled by the Department of State are the most important primary source with regard to the Buenos Aires Conference. The records are divided into different parts such as agenda, budget, equipment and organization. Weddell's despatches to the Department of State as well as the correspondence of other American diplomats are included. Likewise, State Department press releases and committee reports of the Pan American Union are contained in this record group. The records, however, do not detail the daily activities of the American delegation and Weddell. Despite this shortcoming, Decimal File 710 Peace is the basic primary source of the Buenos Aires Conference.

Washington, D.C. National Archives, Diplomatic Branch. Records of the United States Department of State (Record Group 59),
1930-1939. Decimal File 811.001 Roosevelt Visit (three boxes).

The President's trip to Buenos Aires in 1936 comprises a section of this file. Weddell's despatches and reports are significant.

2. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS AND PRESIDENTIAL PAPERS


Helpful collection of Hull's speeches.

... Addresses and Statements by the Honorable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States of America in Connection with his Trip to South America to Attend the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace Held at Buenos Aires, Argentina, December 1-23, 1936. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, N.D.

Like the above, a useful collection of Hull's addresses at the Buenos Aires Conference, especially his "Eight Pillars of Peace" and "The Results and Significance of the Buenos Aires Conference."


Reference to Weddell's appointment and slight discussion of Buenos Aires Conference.


Several references to the moral example of the Conference and the death of Roosevelt's bodyguard; otherwise not significant.


The President's well publicized speeches and press releases.


Repetitive of other collected material about Roosevelt.

Selective source of published diplomatic correspondence which is limited in scope and not particularly helpful. Minor percentage (38 despatches) of records in Decimal Files 710 Peace and 811.001 Roosevelt Visit. Does not provide an extensive overview of Weddell's activities during the Inter-American Conference or Roosevelt's Visit.


A rather long and wordy account of the Conference which is not particularly useful.


Repetitive of Decimal Files 710 Peace and 811.001 Roosevelt Visit.


Information on Weddell's diplomatic career and assignments.


Useful for views of Cordell Hull and American delegation.


Basically a State Department synopsis of the Conference.

A pre-Conference statement of the objectives of FDR and the State Department.

3. REPORTS AND PROCEEDINGS


Similar to the Report of the United States delegation in that it summarizes the main events of the Conference as well as the various declarations, conventions and protocols.


Important source which includes the activities, discussions, debates and treaties of the Conference. Supports contention that Weddell was a minor participant and not a decision maker. Historians, with the exception of George C. Coleman, have not utilized the Proceedings.

4. PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS AND MEMOIRS


Description of the "old" State Department under Cordell Hull.


Contemporary account of the effects of the Conference on the Monroe Doctrine.


Beaulac served at the American Embassy while Weddell was Ambassador in Spain. Beaulac commented on Weddell's career and personality.


Unfortunately, Berle's diary does not commence until 1937. His wife's diary, however, provides a valuable insider's view of Conference activities. Emphasis on Roosevelt and the diplomatic antics of Saavedra Lamas, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs. No reference to Weddell.

The author was a colleague of Weddell on special assignment to the mediation of the Chaco War. His comments about the Buenos Aires Conference and the major personalities involved were helpful. The major emphasis of Braden's remarks, however, concern the Chaco mediation.


Unrelated, with the exception of one references, to the topic under consideration.


A member of the United States delegation, Fenwick reviewed the accomplishments of the six committees. He noted the Conference was a success, if for no other reason, because the delegates found that the issues which divided them were of lesser consequence than the issues which united them.

"Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace." American Journal of International Law, 21 (April, 1937), 201-225.

Similar to the entry above. Both of Fenwick's articles have been cited extensively by other authors.


Discussion of ambassadors appointed by Roosevelt and their prospects of success. Significant information concerning Weddell's appointment and first year in Argentina.


Features an account of the "Pan Americanizing" of the Monroe Doctrine; frequently cited by historians analyzing the Buenos Aires Conference.


Extensive coverage of the Conference as well as the evolution of the Good Neighbor Policy. Weddell is briefly discussed.


This article provides a sketchy insider's perspective.

Valuable retrospective views by one of the special advisors to the American delegation, especially with reference to cultural exchange.


Published prior to the Conference, the author discussed the possible achievements of the Conference based upon the published agenda. Discussion of western hemisphere setting an example to the world.


Not unlike other contemporary articles.

Roosevelt, Franklin D. "Our Foreign Policy: A Democratic View." Foreign Affairs, 6 (July, 1928), 573-586.

Roosevelt's campaign article previews basics of the Good Neighbor Policy.


Brief mention of Buenos Aires Conference and Good Neighbor Policy.


Interesting, personal account of Virginia House; no reference to Weddell's diplomatic career.


Unfortunately; Weddell emphasized cultural and social topics rather than his diplomatic activities. Slight discussion of President Roosevelt's sojourn to Buenos Aires and Weddell's involvement.


Discussion of the various conventions and protocols enacted at the Conference and the example of cooperation demonstrated by western hemisphere.
Weddell is not mentioned although the Conference is thoroughly discussed.

Emphasis on Roosevelt's initiation of the Conference and conflict between Argentina and United States.

5. NEWSPAPERS

Contemporary wire service and special reports.

Wire service reports and editorials concerning the Conference and Weddell as a participant. The News Leader published a front page story and an editorial about the Weddell's after their deaths in 1948.

Richmond Times-Dispatch, November-December, 1936; April 2, 1939; April 19, 1942; January 2, 1948.
Similar to the entry above. Signed articles by Radford Mobley and Margaret B. Seward, (December 6, 1936), Harry Nash, (April 2, 1939) and Parke Rouse, (April 19, 1942) contain significant biographical material about Weddell.

6. OTHER MATERIAL

The author corresponded with nine retired foreign service officers who served with Weddell either in Buenos Aires or Spain. Keeping in mind the number of years which have elapsed since 1936, it is not surprising that several of these gentlemen have fond but distant and sketchy recollections of Weddell. Still, Mr. Edward P. Maffitt and Ambassadors Satterthwaite, Trimble and Woodward provided significant information. The author also corresponded with a personal acquaintance of the Ambassador (private secretary of Virginia House) and a diplomatic historian who published an article concerning Weddell in Spain.

Cox, Raymond E. to Peter N. Pross, November 17, 1975.
Mr. Cox served as 1st Secretary of the American Embassy in Buenos Aires from 1933 to 1936.

Mrs. Dugdale was Weddell's secretary and the hostess of Virginia House from 1930 until 1972.
Flood, Douglas to Peter N. Pross, November 3, 1975.
Flood was a Vice Consul who served in Buenos Aires from October, 1933 to December, 1934.

Halstead, Charles R. to Peter N. Pross, October 9, 1975.
Dr. Halstead wrote an article regarding Weddell's term as Ambassador to Spain. His letter contained various suggestions about Ambassador.

Hill, Heyward G. to Peter N. Pross, December 2 and 11, 1975 and November 15, 1977.
Mr. Hill was stationed in Montevideo during the 1933 Montevideo Conference.

Mr. Maffitt was Weddell's secretary in Buenos Aires from 1937 to 1938. Prior to this assignment, Maffitt was assigned to the Embassy in Rio de Janeiro.

Pool, John C. to Peter N. Pross, October 18 and 28, 1975.
Mr. Pool was a Vice Consul in Buenos Aires from 1933 to 1934.

Satterthwaite, Joseph C. to Peter N. Pross, November 13, 1975 and November 22, 1977.
Ambassador Satterthwaite was 1st Secretary of the Embassy in Buenos Aires from February, 1934 to January, 1936. He was responsible for making necessary preparations for the Conference; he also served as disbursement and fiscal officer.

Ambassador Trimble served under Weddell in a dual capacity during 1936. He was 3rd Secretary of the United States Embassy as well as Weddell's private secretary.

Williams, Murat W. to Peter N. Pross, September 22 and October 22, 1975.
Mr. Williams was Weddell's private secretary during the Ambassador's mission to Spain.

Ambassador Woodward was assigned to the Consultate General in Buenos Aires as a Vice Consul.
SECONDARY SOURCES

1. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

   Halstead's article provided a stimulus for this thesis.

   Interesting perspective of Roosevelt's visit to Buenos Aires; otherwise not valuable.

   Standard biographical information.


   A very brief character reference to Weddell.

2. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND DIPLOMACY

   Helpful background material relative to the duties and characteristics of Ambassadors.

   Standard survey of American foreign policy and reference on United States and Latin American relations. Excellent, brief coverage of the Good Neighbor Policy and various inter-American conferences.

   Weddell is included in a discussion of Roosevelt's ambassadorial appointments. This volume is also a useful reference concerning the history and structure of the Foreign Service.
General reference on the Foreign Service.

Historical role of the U.S. Government in cultural exchange and brief discussion of Buenos Aires Conference.

Cultural convention of Buenos Aires Conference and the creation of the State Department's Division of Cultural Relations.

Similar to above entry and without significance.

3. LATIN AMERICAN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM 1912-1933

Helpful analysis of Wilson's Latin American Policy.


Sympathetic yet searching discussion of Hoover's role in formulation of Good Neighbor Policy.

Helpful analysis of Latin American policy of Secretary of State Kellogg.

This monograph offers an excellent survey of the Republican Restoration's Latin American policy.


One chapter is devoted to Latin American relations and draws heavily on DeConde's monograph of Hoover.


Not particularly helpful.


Principal reference for Wilson's foreign policy.

4. THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT


Discussion of Argentine-United States trade; somewhat peripheral to topic under discussion.


Biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt and overview of United States domestic affairs.


Principle of nonintervention achieved by American nations.

Coleman, George C. "The Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt with Special Reference to Three Inter-American Conferences, 1933-1938." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Iowa, 1951.

Valuable source of information and guidance which has not been utilized by historians writing about the Good Neighbor Policy. Weddell's correspondence with Roosevelt is cited.


General discussion of Conference within the framework of the Good Neighbor Policy.

Dozer, Donald M. Are We Good Neighbors? Three Decades of Inter-American Relations, 1930-1960. Reprint. Gainesville,

Adds nothing of significance except discussion of Roosevelt's visit and the United States-Argentine Sanitary Meat Convention.


Good overview of Good Neighbor Policy and Buenos Aires Conference.


Discussion of United States foreign policy and the effects of Germany's barter trade program in Latin America.


Worthwhile secondary source which discusses reciprocity, German economic competition, and reaction of United States.


Uneventful except for discussion of the Conference and threat of fascism.


Relatively early and extensive account of the Conference with emphasis on hemispheric defense.


Cursory discussion of American public opinion and Conference results.


Adds nothing new; emphasis upon hemispheric solidarity.


Discussion of relevant points.
Meacham extensively discusses the Conference and its various treaties in one chapter. No reference to Weddell.


Brief discussion of Roosevelt's Chautauqua speech and Good Neighbor Policy.


Overview of Roosevelt Administration and the Good Neighbor Policy.


Good discussion of relationship between Saavedra Lamas and Cordell Hull.


Utilizes Roosevelt's public papers and messages; provides interesting analysis of Roosevelt and Good Neighbor Policy.


Excellent discussion of Hull's foreign policy but peripheral to the Conference.


Adds nothing significant.


Discusses relationship between Buenos Aires Conference and the pre-war activities of Germany, Italy, and Japan.


Valuable index and reference source.

Trask, David P. et al., eds. A Bibliography of United States-Latin American Relations Since 1810. Lincoln: University

Discussion of Good Neighbor Policy and Roosevelt's publicist role. Differs from Welles and others regarding Roosevelt's views of Latin America.


Overview of diplomatic relations between the United States and Argentina with unexceptional discussion of Buenos Aires Conference.


Good discussion of the Sanitary Meat Convention.


Extensive account of Conference which utilizes standard references.


Adds nothing significant.

5. PAN AMERICANISM AND THE INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE


Provides Latin American perspective of Good Neighbor Policy and Buenos Aires Conference.


Defects of Buenos Aires treaties and discussion of Conference.


Insignificant discussion of the Conference's agreements and protocols.
Argentine perspective of Conference and the conflict between Hull and Saavedra Lamas.

Useful but standard account of Conference.

Slight discussion of Buenos Aires Conference; mainly concerns conflict between Argentine universalism and American hemispheric solidarity.

Discussion of Fascist propaganda in Latin America.

Helpful monograph on the trade and propaganda drive of Nazi Germany and the resulting policies of the United States and Latin America.

Good background material on Fascist intervention and tactics.

Journalistic and slight account of United States-Latin American diplomacy.

Not significant.

Broad account of Conference with the exception of discussion about intellectual cooperation.

Argentine perspective on the "give and take" of the Conference and Saavedra Lamas' policy.
Provides Latin American view of the evolution of the Good Neighbor Policy and effects on Latin America.

Broad survey of Pan American affairs which is only of general interest.

Useful contemporary account of the Pan American Union and the effects of Nazi trade upon United States foreign policy.

Survey of the Buenos Aires Conference which adds nothing significant.

Helpful reference source.

General and insignificant.
VITA

Peter Nicholas Pross was born in Quantico, Virginia on December 7, 1951. He attended the University of South Carolina at Columbia from 1969 to 1971, and graduated from East Carolina University at Greenville, North Carolina in May, 1973 with a Bachelor of Science Degree in History. While at East Carolina University, he was elected to Phi Alpha Theta, the history honor society.

He entered the Graduate School of the University of Richmond in August, 1973, and is currently a candidate for the degree of Masters of Arts in History. He plans to attend the T.C. Williams School of Law at the University of Richmond. He and his wife Roxanne presently reside in Richmond, Virginia.