The "Inevitable" recall: a historical, psychological and conflict management style assessment of the leader-follower relationship between Harry S. Truman and General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War

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By

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Spring Semester 1998

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Introduction:

The historical account of the Korean War serves as an excellent resource for a case study surrounding the dynamic complexities involved in the relationship amongst civilian and military leaders. Additionally, it serves as a prime example of the importance of developing effective leader-follower relations during a crisis situation. Not only is an overall understanding of the historical record of the Korean War imperative to developing a working knowledge on such gripping issues, but also in addition, it is helpful to understand the motivations, needs, and goals of the principal actors involved in the context. The story of the Korean War illustrates the dynamic relationship that existed between civilian leader President Harry Truman, and military leader, General Douglas MacArthur. This relationship was one marked with such overwhelming disagreements in policy, approach, and values that it ultimately ceased with Truman’s official dismissal of MacArthur from the position of the United States and United Nations Chief Military Commander.

From a leadership perspective the dysfunctional relationship between President Truman and General MacArthur throughout the Korean conflict serves as an explicit reminder of the importance in developing functional leader-follower relations in any given context. Based on a general historical account of the Korean War up to the point of MacArthur’s dismissal, this research will attempt to provide an understanding of the dysfunctional professional and personal relationships that existed between the President and the General. The focus of this research will begin by outlining all pertinent historical facts relating to the developing conflict between Truman and MacArthur during the Korean War. The historical account will examine those critical events in between the United States’ official involvement in Korea and MacArthur’s dismissal that exemplify the strained relationship between the primary actors. This fundamental
understanding of their differing political and military objectives will support the assertion that Truman and MacArthur had a dysfunctional leader-follower relationship. Next, this research will reveal unique insight into both men's personality styles so as to depict their distinct psychological traits and behaviors. From these assessments, it will become evident that the conflict between Truman and MacArthur was not only based on the historical findings of opposing military and political objectives, but that it was also deeply rooted in their differing personality attributes. Finally, building upon the historical and psychological variables, a close examination of Truman and MacArthur's preferred conflict management styles will be employed in order to determine in what manner and how effectively each individual managed conflict.

Taken together, the historical, psychological, and conflict management variables will suggest the "inevitability" of the emergence of conflict between Truman and MacArthur during the Korean War. Therefore, the fundamental proposition this research will explore is as follows:

President Harry Truman's official dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War was inevitable because of the fundamental differences in their policy objectives, personality behaviors, and preferred conflict management styles.
The Korean War: A Historical Account

A thorough review of the literature suggests that there is little, if any, discrepancies involving the historical chronology of the events leading up to and throughout the Korean War. Therefore, the majority of the historical framework is cited from political historians and Korean War scholars, Richard Rovere, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., and Trumbull Higgins. The history of the War begins with the United States' official involvement and ends with General MacArthur's dismissal. Although the events after MacArthur's removal from office are critical components of the Korean War, and probably reveal great insight into the affects of his dismissal on the American public, they have not been included in this historical account because they go beyond the focus of this research. Rather than specifically detailing every account of the War's unfolding, this discussion provides the reader with an accurate account of critical points in time, which tell the story of the Korean War and the mounting conflict between Truman and MacArthur. More importantly, however, the account of the Korean War presented will reveal unique insight regarding the motives for action, personality behaviors, and conflict styles of both President Harry Truman and General Douglas MacArthur.

The War Begins:

On June 24, 1950 at 8:00 p.m., the United States State Department first received the news that Communist forces from North Korea had invaded the Republic of Korea. Upon immediate receipt of this information, President Truman issued a public statement condemning the spread of Communism and announcing that he had ordered United States air and sea forces "to give the Korean government troops cover and support." In seeking both to contain Communist territorial ambitions and to prevent a full-scale war, Truman ordered the

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interposition of the Seventh Fleet between Formosa and Mainland China. Taking the advice of his Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, Truman decided that the U.S. would “neutralize” Formosa. Neutralization therefore meant that the United States would protect the island from an attack by the Communists, and at the same time would prevent any aggressive attacks against the Communists. On June 30, 1950, MacArthur advised Pentagon officials to immediately employ American ground forces. The basis of his appeal for American troops was his feeling that the South Korean forces lacked cohesion and leadership, while they remained ill prepared and improperly equipped to engage in battle. It was only once MacArthur had given his recommendation to use U.S. ground troops that Truman authorized the use of American soldiers in South Korea. Truman, operating from the typical pre-Cold War and Communist fearing mindset, remained adamant that he would not allow “even the slightest implication of any American intention to go to war with the Soviet Union over issues related to Korea.”

The Inchon Project:

Even before MacArthur’s official appointment as Chief Commander of UN and U.S. forces in South Korea, he had begun to initiate plans for a full-scale military offensive. On July 2nd, MacArthur learned from the U.S. Naval Commander in the Far East, Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy, that a Marine regiment was available for an amphibious operation. The very next day, MacArthur obtained the authority to deploy the regiment from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (J.C.S.), and began to plan an immediate assault on the Inchon-Seoul area, the logistical center of Korea.

On July 7, 1950, Truman, responding to the United Nations’ request for the United States to designate an American commander for the UN forces in Korea, finally announced MacArthur

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3 Rovere and Schlesinger, 125.
5 Higgins, 27.
in this capacity. As a result, MacArthur’s troops in Japan were re-directed to Korea despite the fact that they desperately needed to be rebuilt, retrained, and re-equipped. Seeing that he could not command inadequate and insufficient troops to victory, MacArthur, on July 10th, bombarded the Joint Chiefs of Staff with requests for the prestigious 1st Marine Division and for more army troops. It was also during this time, on July 13th, that MacArthur first expressed his desire to cross the 38th parallel, an action, if carried out, would be in direct violation of his military directives. 

Following up on his initial request to the J.C.S. for more American troops, on July 15th, MacArthur informed the Administration that a decision regarding the employment of the trained amphibious unit, the 1st Marine Division, to Korea was “absolutely essential to achieve a decisive stroke at Inchon.” The Chief of Staff of the Army, General J. Lawton Collins, along with Admiral Sherman, was extremely hesitant of the potential for success of MacArthur’s Inchon Project. Both agreed that the dangerous tides at Inchon were too severe and that the beaches were highly inadequate for troop landings. Retreat would be impossible after the Yellow Sea’s waters receded, leaving the soldiers trapped behind three miles of mud. Planning officers for the operation also agreed that Inchon was the least desirable, and a highly risky site for a UN landing since it was well behind enemy lines.

Despite such obvious resistance to the Inchon Project from many of the major players involved, across all hierarchical levels, MacArthur remained certain that his initiative would be a success. In an eloquent and persuasive presentation to military and political leaders of the United States and the United Nations, he reasoned that the boldness and element of surprise of

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6 Higgins, 43.
7 Higgins, 41.
8 Higgins, 44.
9 Higgins, 44.
his Inchon assault alone would enable the UN troops to succeed. He urged those present that “the amphibious landing is the most powerful tool we have. To employ it properly we must strike hard and deeply into enemy territory.”\(^{10}\) More importantly, however, and perhaps more insightful of MacArthur’s character was his closing of the address when he said, “We shall land at Inchon, and I shall crush them.”\(^{11}\)

MacArthur’s persuasive talents proved successful as he managed to influence the viewpoints of many senior military officials. Vice Admiral Joy, for example, said after listening to MacArthur’s speech, “My own personal misgivings about Inchon were erased. I believe that the General had persuaded me and all others in the room that Inchon could be successful.”\(^{12}\) Despite his passionate soliloquy, MacArthur remained in opposition with Rear Adm. James Doyle, in charge of the actual landing, who professed the Navy’s general belief that a landing at Inchon was impossible at that time. However, by using his persuasive and rhetorical talents, MacArthur won over his greatest opposition, the U.S. Navy, by admitting that although he knew that success at Inchon was a gamble, with odds at 5000 to 1, he was inclined to take such odds since the Navy had never let him down before. In order to subvert impending conflict with a division whose support he greatly needed, MacArthur praised the Navy’s previous record with the hopes that his blatant confidence in their abilities would stimulate a degree of certainty and motivation for success that would eliminate their uncertainties. MacArthur’s argument with Major General O.P. Smith, Commander of the 1st Marine Division, was equally effective. Again, MacArthur utilized his persuasive talents to convince the Marine Commander of his utmost confidence in their abilities. In his meeting with Smith, MacArthur said, “The landing of the

\(^{10}\) Higgins, 45.  
\(^{11}\) Higgins, 45.  
\(^{12}\) Higgins, 45.
Marines at Inchon will be decisive. It will win the war, and the status of the Marine Corps will never again be in doubt."\textsuperscript{13}

While plans for MacArthur’s Inchon Project were being laid out, the Administration, on July 27, agreed to grant military aid to the Chinese Nationalists so that they could build up their defensive positions on Formosa. MacArthur was subsequently ordered to survey their military requirements. MacArthur interpreted this directive to mean that he had the authority to personally visit Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa.\textsuperscript{14} At their meeting, MacArthur explained to Kai-shek that the UN already had too many poorly trained and equipped troops in the South Korean Army, therefore, any additional troops would create an enormous logistical burden on the U.S. Army. MacArthur’s “sugar-coated” message to Kai-shek was in reality based on both his and the J.C.S.’s agreement on the ineffectiveness of Chinese Nationalist forces for offensive warfare in Korea.\textsuperscript{15}

Immediately after MacArthur’s meeting with Chiang Kai-shek, the Generalissimo announced that “the foundation for Sino-American military cooperation has been laid.”\textsuperscript{16} Kai-shek also referred to MacArthur as his “old comrade-in-arms,” an explicitly Communist phrase, which greatly concerned the United Nations and the Truman Administration. The distrust and embarrassment generated in Washington, and with the United Nations as a result of Kai-shek’s characterization of MacArthur as an “old comrade,” led to an official warning from the Secretary of Defense reminding MacArthur that he must continue to prevent any Nationalist attack from Formosa on the Asian mainland. In addition, the directive concluded by stating rather explicitly, “No one other than the President as Commander-in-Chief has the authority to order or authorize

\textsuperscript{13} Higgins, 46.
\textsuperscript{14} Higgins, 36.
\textsuperscript{15} Higgins, 36.
\textsuperscript{16} Higgins, 37.
preventative action against concentrations on the mainland . . . the most vital national interest requires that no action of ours precipitates general war or gives excuse to others to do so.”¹⁷ In direct response to the Administration’s directive, MacArthur felt the need to justify his reasons for traveling to Formosa. His defense targeted at Truman and his advisors was as follows:

“My visit has been maliciously represented to the public by those who invariably in the past have propagandized a policy of defeatism and appeasement in the Pacific . . . I hope the American people will not be misled by the insinuations, speculations, and bold misstatements . . . which tend, if they are not indeed designed, to promote disunity and destroy faith and confidence in the American nations and institutions.”¹⁸

This issue of Executive authority was bluntly presented in MacArthur’s comment on August 5th. In an effort to appear as a subordinate officer of the military, MacArthur professed, “It is extraordinarily difficult for me at times to exercise that degree of patience which is unquestionably demanded if the longtime policies which have been decreed are to be successfully accomplished without repercussions which would be detrimental to the well-being of the world, but I am restraining myself to the best of my ability and am generally satisfied with the progress being made.”¹⁹ Sensing MacArthur’s displeasure and potential opposition to the current military and political situation in Korea, Truman sent Administrative representative Averell Harriman on August 6th to Tokyo to reiterate to MacArthur the Administration’s official objectives. Upon his return to the United States, Harriman briefed Truman and his advisors on MacArthur’s views on a variety of issues. He summarized MacArthur’s beliefs to be extremely aggressive toward Communism, despite the fact that MacArthur did not believe that either the Russian or Chinese Communists had any inclinations of becoming involved in a general war.

¹⁷ Higgins, 37.
¹⁸ Rovere and Schlesinger, 128-129.
¹⁹ Higgins, 37-38.
MacArthur wanted more soldiers in order to initiate an offensive against the North Koreans, all the while urging that "time was of the essence" since the Communists were continuing to strengthen the North Koreans. MacArthur went beyond his duty of providing military recommendations and dove into the political policy-making arena, in asserting his view that "the United States was not improving its position by kicking Chiang around." By the end of their conversation, however, as an obedient soldier of the U.S. Military, MacArthur agreed to obey the orders he received from the President.

Ostensibly after his encounter with Harriman, MacArthur appeared to be willing to go along with the Administration's military and political initiatives in Korea. However, with only three weeks having passed since their meeting, the General decided to send a public message to the annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars to be held in Chicago. Although the release date of the letter was not until August 28, the text found its way to the desks of various newspaper editors well before the deadline. Interestingly enough, the message never journeyed as far as the Secretary of Defense's desk. The text itself basically stated that Formosa was an ideal location to initiate and to carry out our offensive strategies. He then went on to pontificate that, "Nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument ... that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia. Those who speak thus do not understand the Orient. They do not grasp that it is the pattern of Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute, and dynamic leadership." Upon hearing the content of MacArthur's polemical offensive, Truman promptly ordered it withdrawn. Although the text was never read before the Veterans of Foreign Wars, it was widely circulated throughout the press.

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20 Higgins, 38.
21 Higgins, 38.
22 Rovere & Schlesinger, 131.
23 Rovere & Schlesinger, 131.
While the General and the President struggled for ultimate influence over the American public’s interpretation of the escalation of the Korean War, on August 28th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave qualified approval of the Inchon Project. The objective was simple. It included the destruction of the North Korean Army, south of the 38th parallel.24 Needless to say, MacArthur’s project was an overwhelming success, resulting in South Korea having been completely occupied by UN forces in a little over one week. MacArthur was lauded by the Administration along with international leaders. He praised his troops and rewarded their valiant efforts in saying, "The star of the [U.S.] Navy and Marine Corps [had] never shown brighter."25 With a heightened sense of confidence in his decision-making abilities, General MacArthur informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the military objective in Korea was now the "destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces in North Korea."26 Upon hearing the military’s new objectives, Truman, acting on the advice of the J.C.S., reissued to MacArthur clarification of his directive regarding the possibility of Chinese Communist intervention. The directive read,

"Hereafter, in the event of the open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units, without prior announcement, you should continue . . . as long as, in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success. In any case you will obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military action against objectives in Chinese territory."27

MacArthur’s military gamble at Inchon had served as a vindicating event against all of the political opposition that he had met in trying to get his plan approved. Yet despite all of the immediate praise the General had received, President Truman could not forget his politically loaded comments addressed to the VFW. It was therefore MacArthur’s statement to the VFW,
along with Truman’s refusal to forget the past and his fear of escalating military objectives that led to the first and only meeting of the Titans during the Korean episode, at Wake Island, on October 15, 1950.

Wake Island Meeting:

The meeting between the General and the President was not an encounter unfamiliar to MacArthur who had met with Franklin Roosevelt in Hawaii in 1944. The circumstances of the Hawaii meeting, however, was different from the Wake Island meeting in that both players were in the Pacific at the time the meeting was called, and neither had to go to great lengths to meet one another. The Wake Island meeting, however, was in a rather inconvenient and obscure location for the President in particular, and therefore suggested “that two magistrates of mighty power were meeting in some war-scarred neutral zone to fashion a truce and a new alliance.”

Regardless of how the meeting appeared to those on the outside, it was clear that it was truly not a meeting of equal players. The event consisted of two meetings each lasting an hour. The first was only between the President and the General, while the second meeting involved both men and all of their present advisers. The official records of the meetings suggest that in their private session, MacArthur apologized to Truman for his infamous Formosa statement of August 5th. Despite MacArthur’s apology, Truman felt the need to assert his authority over the General by specifically outlining the United States’ policy in Korea; a policy that MacArthur would have no choice, but to accept. In the end, the records reflect that the General informed the President that he had regretted any inconveniences to the American government caused by his ill-advised statements.

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28 Rovere & Schlesinger, 132.
29 Rovere & Schlesinger, 132-133.
Once the meeting had culminated, MacArthur authorized Truman’s “publicity man,” Charles G. Ross, to speak on his behalf. MacArthur’s message to Ross, which was ultimately conveyed to the American people was as follows: “No commander in the history of war has had more complete and admirable support from the agencies in Washington than I have during the Korean operation.”\(^{30}\) Similarly, Truman issued the following statement: “I’ve never had a more satisfactory conference since I’ve been President,” as he pinned a medal on MacArthur.\(^ {31}\) Back in Washington, Truman remained consistent with his overall impression of the meeting’s success in stating, “He is a member of the government of the United States. He is loyal to the government. He is loyal to the President. He is loyal to the President in his foreign policy.”\(^ {32}\)

Immediately after the Wake Island affair, MacArthur led his troops into the city of Pyongyang, and fortified it with ease. Despite this apparently swift takeover, the North Koreans were reluctant to give up, and retaliated with great force.\(^ {33}\) On October 24\(^ {\text{th}}\), MacArthur, acting on his own initiative advised his field commanders that all UN troops, other than the South Korean forces, could now occupy any part of North Korean territory. He justified this directive on the grounds that there no longer appeared to be any prospect of an enemy surrender. Upon learning of MacArthur’s instructions to his subordinates, the J.C.S. informed him that his directive was not in consonance with their earlier instructions that allowed for only South Korean troops to approach the Chinese or Russian frontiers.\(^ {34}\) In the end, however, MacArthur won this battle with the J.C.S., as they ultimately accepted his explanation without ordering any changes. It was MacArthur’s staunch refusal to compromise his objectives, and his claims that it was “a

\(^{30}\) Rovere & Schlesinger, 134.
\(^{31}\) Rovere & Schlesinger, 134.
\(^{32}\) Rovere & Schlesinger, 134.
\(^{33}\) Rovere & Schlesinger, 136.
\(^{34}\) Higgins, 64.
military necessity” to employ total strength near the frontier since the South Korean Army alone was dangerously feeble, that enabled him to win over the J.C.S. 35

The Controversy Begins:

As part of his efforts to escalate the United States’ militaristic involvement in the Korean operation, MacArthur ordered the Far East Air Force to bomb the principal bridge that supplied the Chinese in North Korea from across the Yalu River. President Truman, however, fearing Chinese Communist retaliation, and remembering his agreement with Britain, namely that the U.S. would not bomb Manchuria targets without first consulting London, ordered him not execute his bombing plans. Upon hearing Washington’s response, MacArthur issued the following message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

“The only way to stop this reinforcement of the enemy is the destruction of these bridges and the subjection of all installations in the north area supporting the enemy advance to the maximum of our air destruction. Every hour that is postponed will be paid dearly in American and other UN blood. Under the gravest protest that I can make, I am suspending this strike and carrying out your instructions. What I had ordered is entirely within the scope of the rules of war and the resolutions and directions which I have received from the UN, and constitutes no slightest act of belligerency against Chinese territory, in spite of the outrageous international lawlessness emanating therefrom. I cannot overemphasize the disastrous effect, both physical and psychological, that will result from the restrictions which you are imposing. I trust that the matter be immediately brought to the attention of the President as I believe your instructions may well result in a calamity of major proportion for which I cannot accept responsibility without his personal and direct understanding of the situation. Time is so essential that I request immediate reconsideration of your decision pending which complete compliance will of course be given to your order.” 36

35 Higgins, 64.
36 Higgins, 69.
The tone of MacArthur’s message reveals the fervor and adamancy of his fundamental belief that his superiors were incorrect in their military policy in Korea. MacArthur viewed Truman’s efforts to limit the United States’ involvement in the Korean War as potentially fatal restrictions to his troops’ success. At this point in the War’s development, MacArthur most definitely did not agree with Truman’s concept of a limited war leading to an all out victory. MacArthur believed in the inherent “aggressive belligerency of the Chinese Communists.” In an essential disagreement with the Administration on fundamental assumptions, MacArthur conceived the Chinese Communist activities in Korea to have always been aggressive, and not defensive in motive, as Truman had believed. In defense of his aggressive policy of advancing toward the Yalu River, MacArthur stated, “To give any portion of North Korea to the aggression of the Chinese Communists would be the greatest defeat of the free world in modern times.”

As a result of MacArthur’s incessant politicizing from the military front, President Truman, on November 16th issued the following public statement:

“Speaking for the United States Government and people, I can give assurance that we are supporting and are acting within the limits of United Nations policy in Korea, and that we have never at any time entertained any intention to carry hostilities into China; so far as the United States is concerned, I wish to state unequivocally that because of our deep devotion to the cause of world peace, and our longstanding friendship for the people of China, we will take every honorable step to prevent any extension of the hostilities in the Far East.

If the Chinese authorities or people believe otherwise, it can only be because they are being deceived by those whose advantage it is to prolong and extend hostilities in the Far East against the interest of all Far Eastern people.”

37 Higgins, 72.
38 Higgins, 74.
Within one week of Truman’s November 16th public address, MacArthur issued a special communiqué to the United Nations proclaiming his final drive to end the war, which ordered his troops to march directly to the Chinese frontier. Upon hearing MacArthur’s plans, the J.C.S. advised him once again to keep his non-South Korean troops away from the immediate vicinity of the Yalu River, so as not to provoke the Chinese Communists unnecessarily. Despite the Administration’s warnings, MacArthur commanded all of his troops toward the Yalu River. Within just two days of the commencement of his final launch, Chinese Communists struck in force, ultimately crippling MacArthur’s troops. In a special communiqué to the United Nations on November 28th, MacArthur described the intense enemy reaction to his assault operation. He warned that the Chinese and North Korean forces had overwhelmed his troops, and as a result, the United States now faced “an entirely new war.”

Immediately after MacArthur sent his message informing the UN about his troops precarious situation, he asked for 50,000-60,000 Chinese Nationalist troops from Formosa to be sent as reinforcements, since his need for manpower was urgent. The J.C.S., however, did not agree with MacArthur’s assertion to used Chinese Nationalist troops under the current conditions. As a result, their response to MacArthur’s request was rather non-committal, and did not engender the same sense of urgency that MacArthur had generated in his communications. Despite MacArthur’s immediate need for manpower, the J.C.S. took into careful consideration the effect that involving Chinese Nationalist troops would have on the conflict’s development. They responded as follows:

“We shall have to consider the possibility that it would disrupt the united position of the nations associated with us in the United Nations, and have us isolated. It may be wholly unacceptable to the commonwealth countries to have their forces employed with Nationalist

39 Higgins, 79.  
40 Higgins, 80.
Chinese. It might extend hostilities to Formosa and other areas. Incidentally, our position of leadership in the Far East is being most seriously compromised in the United Nations. The utmost care will be necessary to avoid the disruption of the essential Allied line-up in that organization.”

As the United States government witnessed MacArthur’s inability to lead his troops to victory once the North Koreans had retaliated, the Administration became less and less likely to acquiesce to his requests for more materials and his suggestions for policy alternatives.

Since he did not get the kind of positive response he had wanted from Truman and his advisors, MacArthur felt a heightened sense of animosity and disrespect toward the Administration. Acting in the only way that he perceived would generate an acceptable response from Washington, MacArthur issued another message to his superiors on December 3rd. The essence of this message maintained that unless he received ground troops immediately, his troops would be forced into a steady attrition, with complete defeat a definite certainty. By the end of this message, MacArthur had called for, “new political decisions and strategic plans in implementation thereof, adequate fully to meet the realities involved.” Sensing another potential change in official policy, Truman ordered General Collins to the Far East to check on the situation in Korea and the manner in which MacArthur was handling it. MacArthur told Collins nothing that neither he nor the Administration had never heard before. He said that a continuation of the Administration’s limitations of his actions in light of the Chinese Communist attack “would represent essentially a surrender.” Disheartened by the severe limitations forced upon him and his troops, MacArthur could not conceive of any possibility of military victory.

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41 Higgins, 84.
42 Higgins, 86.
43 Higgins, 86.
As a result, he supported an armistice along the 38th parallel as long as the Chinese Communists were willing to accept such terms.\textsuperscript{44}

Collins visit with MacArthur did not amount to much more than the two opposing sides venting their frustrations and concerns with the other’s policies. As the Chinese and North Korean aggression intensified against MacArthur’s troops, the General grew chagrin over his blatant defeat in North Korea. He became extremely sensitive to the many negative comments that were made about him in the American press. In an effort to maintain his reputation as a heroic officer of the military, MacArthur issued a series of press interviews in which he denied that his strategy had caused the Chinese Communist assault. He claimed that the attacks were conducted without prior warning, and that he had to therefore operate under the handicap of “enormous limitations without precedent in military history.”\textsuperscript{45}

Needless to say, the Administration was extremely embarrassed by MacArthur’s public and discrediting rejoinders. As a result Truman, through the J.C.S., issued a public statement ostensibly addressed to all field commanders, that they should “exercise extreme caution in public statements.”\textsuperscript{46} Field commanders were also prohibited “from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines, or other publicity media in the United States.” Furthermore, the commanders needed to receive State or Defense Department approval for all future press releases.\textsuperscript{47}

Feeling more and more desperate about the UN forces situation in the Far East, Truman attended a National Security Council meeting on December 11th, where he agreed to a gradual withdrawal from Korea, if the situation deemed itself to be necessary. Directly arising from

\textsuperscript{44} Higgins, 91.
\textsuperscript{45} Higgins, 90.
\textsuperscript{46} Higgins, 91.
\textsuperscript{47} Higgins, 91.
these talks, the UN offered the Chinese Communists a cease-fire along the 38th parallel on December 14th. The Chinese, however, refused this proposal only two days later by crossing the dividing line. The UN forces were forced into a deadly retreat. Responding to the current defensive situation, the J.C.S. advised MacArthur that in the face of the increased threat of general war, he should not expect further American ground troops as reinforcements.48 MacArthur's response to the J.C.S.'s message eliminating the possibility for more ground troops violated the Administrations current policy of withdrawal. He responded once again by advocating the bombing and blockade of Red China, as well as the employment of Chinese Nationalist troops. Consequently, the Administration issued a message to MacArthur on January 9, 1951, maintaining that his primary objection remained the defense of Japan, "to which he must retreat if faced with severe losses of men and matériel in attempting to hold a Korean bridgehead. Stronger blockade action against the Chinese Communists depended upon current negotiations with the British."49 MacArthur was further ordered that he could not attack Communist China with neither American nor Chinese Nationalist forces without "a prior enemy action against the United States outside of Korea."50

On January 10th, MacArthur responded to the Administration's clarification of objectives by asserting that his resources did not allow for him to hold control of both Korea and Japan. He said that his troops, "embittered by the shameful propaganda that has falsely condemned their fighting qualities and courage in a misunderstood retrograde maneuver, were tired from a long and difficult campaign."51 Given the perilous limitations imposed by Truman and his advisors, and excluding any overriding political considerations, MacArthur advised that his command be

48 Higgins, 93.
49 Higgins, 95.
50 Higgins, 96.
51 Higgins, 96.
evacuated from Korea "as rapidly as it is feasible tactically to do so." Furthermore, if the situation deemed it politically necessary that he remain in Korea, MacArthur maintained that he would do so, "regardless of the risk to Japan and whatever casualties might result up to the complete destruction of his command."  

Sensing the General's despondency toward his hopeless military context, along with MacArthur's inability to perceive the political implications of American policy, President Truman issued a personal letter to him on January 13th. The essence of the letter read as follows:

"We recognize, of course, that continued resistance might not be militarily possible with the limited forces with which you are being called upon to meet large Chinese armies. Further, in the present world situation, your forces must be preserved as an effective instrument for the defense of Japan and elsewhere . . . In the worst case, it would be important that, if we must withdraw from Korea, it be clear to the world that this course is forced upon us by military necessity and that we shall not accept the result politically or militarily until the aggression has been rectified. In reaching a final decision about Korea, I shall have to give constant thought to the main threat from the Soviet Union and to the need for a rapid expansion of our Armed Forces to meet this great danger."  

Truman ended his letter with a positive spin, praising the General for all that he has contributed to the United States efforts in Korea. He concluded, "The entire nation is grateful for your splendid leadership in the difficult struggle in Korea and for the superb performance of your forces under the most difficult circumstances."  

Attrition, subsequently became the United States' new policy in Korea, and this policy did not sit well with MacArthur. This defensive orientation was in sharp contrast with his temperament, with his mode of operation, and with his absolutist tendencies. MacArthur firmly believed and frequently stated, "In war there is no substitute for victory . . . war's very object is

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52 Higgins, 96.
53 Higgins, 97-98.
victory, not prolonged indecision."\(^{55}\) In light of this fundamental belief, MacArthur led his
troops in a retaliatory effort against the Communist Chinese troops, and began to make small, but
steady gains in the area just below the Parallel. By early March, MacArthur announced that any
further advance on land would "involve a savage slaughter" by an army that displays "a
complete contempt for the sanctity of human life."\(^{56}\) He therefore called for "decisions" which
he, as "military commander" could not make, but were needed to "provide on the highest
international levels an answer to the obscurities of Red China's undeclared war in Korea."\(^{57}\) The
Administration responded with the J.C.S. relaying the message that in agreement with the United
Nations, the United States maintained that diplomatic efforts should prevail over further military
initiatives. MacArthur answered the J.C.S. message on March 21\(^{st}\) with a final request that no
further limitations be imposed on his command.\(^{58}\)

Truman, along with his advisors never got the chance to respond to MacArthur's final
request. Before they could even begin to assess the possibility of diplomatic relations in Korea,
MacArthur issued a new plan of his own. Sensing that his request to lift all military restrictions
on his command be denied, MacArthur issued the public statement of March 25\(^{th}\) that would lead
to President Truman's decision of his final dismissal. It began with a proper military estimate,
and a summary of the current state of affairs in Korea. However, once again, MacArthur went
well beyond his military responsibilities and began to politicize the 'proper' policy course. (See
Appendix I for entire message.) Upon receiving MacArthur's de facto, presidential ultimatum,
Truman consulted his advisors to determine how to handle this problem. Clearly, MacArthur
had gone well beyond the legitimate authority vested in his official position as a military leader.

\(^{54}\) Higgins, 98.
\(^{55}\) Rovere & Schlesinger, 166.
\(^{56}\) Rovere & Schlesinger, 167-168.
\(^{57}\) Rovere & Schlesinger, 168.
He took it upon himself to determine U.S. policy, an act that left the State Department to perceive no other alternative but to abandon its efforts made with 13 Allied nations to negotiate a settlement for the Korean conflict. The State Department therefore was forced to issue a statement that conceded that MacArthur had gone beyond his responsibilities as field commander, and that reassured UN member nations that the diplomatic issues were still being handled by intergovernmental consultations.\textsuperscript{59}

Truman immediately called a meeting with his advisors and State Department officials to clarify the meaning of his directive of December 6, 1951, which required theater commanders to check all of their public statements with Washington prior to their release. By the end of the meeting, the J.C.S. had drafted and issued the following personal directive to MacArthur:

\begin{quote}
"The President has directed that your attention be called to his order as transmitted 6 December 1950. In view of the information given you 20 March 1951 any further statements by you must be coordinated as prescribed in the order of 6 December. The President has also directed that in the event Communist military leaders request an armistice in the field, you immediately report that fact to the J.C.S. for instruction."\textsuperscript{60}
\end{quote}

Despite the Administration's blatant disapproval of MacArthur's public condemnations, the General went one step further when he led his troops across the 38\textsuperscript{th} parallel on March 27\textsuperscript{th}. It was not until April 3\textsuperscript{rd} when those South Korean troops were followed by regular United Nations troops, that Washington had specified that this advance did not constitute a general advance into North Korea.\textsuperscript{61} This advance, however, was not the culminating point from which Truman had finally decided to fire General MacArthur.

\textsuperscript{58} Higgins, 106-107.
\textsuperscript{59} Higgins, 110.
\textsuperscript{60} Higgins, 111
\textsuperscript{61} Higgins, 111.
The Dismissal:

The "straw that broke the camel's back" was a response letter that MacArthur had sent to House Minority Leader Joseph Martin on March 20, which incidentally, was the same day that the General received official word that his program had been rejected. (See Appendix II and Appendix III for Martin's letter and MacArthur's response.) Apparently, MacArthur's letter to Martin was not read on the floor of the House until April 5th because he wanted to see if the General wanted the letter to be withheld from the American public. After allowing ten days to go by, Martin read the letter, thus changing the course of American civilian-military relations forever.

Upon hearing the General's letter, on April 11, 1951, at 1:00 a.m., the President issued the following three announcements. The first read:

"With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his commands and have designated Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgeway as his successor.

Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. In time of crisis, this consideration is particularly compelling.

General MacArthur's place in history is fully established. The Nation owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional service which he has rendered his country in posts of great responsibility. For that reason I repeat my regret at the necessity for the action I feel compelled to take in his case."

62 Schlesinger & Rovere, 172-173.
The second message was addressed directly to General MacArthur:

"I deeply regret that it becomes my duty as President and
Commander-in-Chief of the United States military forces to
replace you as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers; Commander-
in-Chief, United Nations command; Commander-in-Chief, Far East;
and Commanding General, U.S. Army, Far East.

You will turn over you commands, effective at once, to
Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgeway. You are authorized
to have issued such orders as are necessary to complete desired
travel to such place as you select.

My reasons for you replacement will be made public
concurrently with the delivery to you of the foregoing order."

The third announcement was simply a message to Ridgeway giving him formal
notification of his increased responsibilities. In addition to these statements, however, the
Administration also released the relevant documents such as the December 6th and the March
20th directives and the Martin letter.

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63 Schlesinger & Rovere, 173.
**Personality Profile: Harry S. Truman**

Historians and biographers would be remiss if they simply recounted only historical fact as the primary means of providing insight into the motivations of their subjects' actions. Therefore, these next sections focus on the individual personality traits of both Harry S. Truman and Douglas A. MacArthur. This evidence, collected from sources providing in-depth examinations of each man's personality and life experiences, is intended to enhance the political and historical scenario leading up to their "inevitable" confrontation.

Harold Lasswell, author of *Power and Personality*, and the preeminent analyst of the relationship between personality and democracy, postulated a set of ideal democratic values, and therefore generalized about the "character" of the model democratic American. The democratic values included: personal freedom, suspicion of power, respect and tolerance for others, high standards of public morality, opportunity for and recognition of merit, and a commitment to minimum standards of wealth and education for all. Based on these values, he posited that the "democratic character possessed an 'open ego' that was caring about others, a 'multi-valued' disposition, an optimistic faith in human potential, and a freedom from destructive inner anxieties."

Alonzo L. Hamby recognized, however, in his re-evaluation of Truman's personality that Lasswell had left out a critical factor in the determination of an individual's personality. Hamby asserts that what is missing is "a sense of the way in which democracy itself may impose formidable obstacles to its ideal realization, especially in the imposition of counterproductive anxieties about one's identity." Since a democracy does not imbue a legitimized ruling class

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64 Harold Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (New York: Norton, 1948)
66 Hamby, 34.
structure, it is therefore inherently within its system that the individual member defines his or her own identity. And so, one will find the elite classes coming to expect a certain degree of reverence because of their immense wealth, and the lower classes expecting to exist within a certain degree of powerlessness. Those of the middle class, however, are expected to face the challenging task of defining their identity relative to the expectations of the upper and lower classes, and then to strive for their ultimate existence. To put it plainly, they must become, self-made.⁶⁷

Harry S. Truman, quite possibly more than any other President of the United States, has been characterized as the representative product of the middle class in American democracy. His life story, both inside and outside the world of politics, engenders both the strengths and strains of the democratic social and political institution. It was democracy that had allowed a common man from Independence, Missouri, to earn the highest honor of President of the United States. And with such an incomparable achievement, Truman was able to generate a true sense of his own identity, firmly rooted in his traditional upbringing, which, in turn, affected all of his leadership initiatives.⁶⁸

Truman came from a large family of mid-western farmers including grandparents, aunts and uncles, and cousins. However, he did not conform to the typical role of a farmer’s son under such conditions of male and female role expectations. He preferred helping his mother with chores around the house, learning to cook, and helping the family maid in the kitchen to working in the fields with his father and older brother. When he was only five years old, he helped take care of his younger sister Mary Jane by braiding her hair, singing her to sleep, and watching her

⁶⁷ Hamby, 34.
⁶⁸ Hamby, 34.
play outdoors. Yet despite such maternal inclinations, he also had a tendency to get himself into mischief, as any little boy would. In reflecting over his early childhood days, Truman commented in his Memoirs:

"Those were wonderful days and great adventures. When I was growing up it occurred to me to watch the people around me to find out what they thought and what pleased them most . . . I used to watch my father and my mother closely to learn what I could do to please them, just as I did with my schoolteachers and playmates. Because of my efforts to get along with my associates I usually was able to get what I wanted. It was successful on the farm, in school, in the Army, and particularly in the Senate."\(^{70}\)

Quite possibly one of the most important character-building conditions of Truman's early life was his poor eyesight. He suffered from the condition known as hyperopia, or flat eyeballs, which required him to wear very thick lens glasses. Truman was therefore, wary of getting involved in playground roughhousing, which consequently allowed him to fall into the role of mediator of such childhood disputes. Although he could not actively participate in the games with his schoolmates, Truman was always included as the umpire – a position in which a child with impaired vision must have required a good sense of decisiveness, diplomacy, and social acceptance.\(^{71}\)

The biographical literature on Harry S. Truman suggests that he did possess relatively healthy family relationships. Truman connected with his mother's feminine nature, while at the same time, he developed a unique bond with his father through the political arena. John Truman, Harry's father, first introduced his son to the world of politics when he took him to the Democratic National Convention in Kansas City in 1900.\(^{72}\) When John got involved in the

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\(^{70}\) Barber, 217.

\(^{71}\) Barber, 218.

\(^{72}\) Barber, 219.
Pendergast Machine, and became an election judge and road overseer, Harry was his clerk. His father died when Truman was 30, and he took over his father’s official post as road overseer. To Harry Truman, politics was his own personal linkage to his father, and also his means of connection to the world of politically and socially “prominent” men.

Truman’s view of the world had developed through his early childhood experiences. By age 12, for example, he had completed reading the Bible his second time through, and would cite chapters if any questions of morality happened to arise. However, it was the study of history, in particular, the ways in which individual men shaped the world, which interested him most. When he was ten, his mother gave him a four-volume set of Charles Francis Horne’s *Great Men and Famous Women.* According to his belief system, history was purely factual, and could not be overshadowed by any clashes of personal ideologies. He wrote in his *Memoirs,* “My debt to history is one that cannot be calculated. I know of no other motivation which so accounts for my awakening interest as a young lad in the principles of leadership and government.” Truman exhibited his early conceptions of leadership as a product of the historical accounts of great men in his biographical writings. In his *Memoirs, (Year of Decisions,)* Truman illustrates his early views about leadership and how leaders’ actions can be exemplified through a historical account:

> “I learned that a leader is a man who has the ability to get other people to do what they don’t want to do, and like it.”

> “I began to see that the history of the world has moved in cycles and that very often we find ourselves in the midst of political circumstances which appear to be new but which might have existed in almost identical form at various times during the past six thousand years.”

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73 Barber, 220.
74 Barber, 221.
76 Truman, 139-140.
Truman’s thirst for knowledge was quenched by his insatiable desire to become adept in the lives of history’s great men and women. He developed the learning pattern of absorbing the facts of every dilemma presented before him, and then judged the situation for himself. He therefore became a master of interpretation without depending on the qualification or the acceptance of others. Although he was open to suggestions from his closest advisors, and in fact, many times based his decisions on such recommendations, Truman did not dwell on his decisions once they were made. During his years as a United States Senator, Truman wrote:

“In reading the lives of great men, I found that the victory they won was over themselves and their carnal urges. Self-discipline with all of them came first. I found that most of the really great ones never thought they were great, some of them did. I admired Cincinnatus, Hannibal, Cyrus the Great, Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, Washington and Lee, Stonewall Jackson, and J.E.B. Stuart. Of all the military heroes Hannibal and Lee were to my mind the best because while they won every battle they lost the war, due to crazy politicians in both instances, but they were still Great Captains of History. I found a lot of heroes were made by being in at the death or defeat of one of the really great. Scipio, Wellington, and U.S. Grant are the most outstanding. I was not very fond of Alexander, Attila, Genghis Khan or Napoleon because while they were great leaders of men they fought for conquest and personal glory. The others fought for what they thought was right and for their countries. They were patriots and unselfish. I could never admire a man whose only interest is himself.”

Clearly, even before his presidency, Truman had developed a definite framework from which he evaluated an individual’s leadership qualities and potential. He valued those individuals who displayed honor, loyalty, and unselfish acts of courage, while he dismissed those individuals who only fought for their own best interests. In developing his basic assumptions about the world, Truman believed that the world was a place where values remained steadfast, and where any individual had the potential to shape the world’s events through decisive action. His determination to understand any given situation was aided by his tendency to analogize one

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77 William Hillman, Mr. President. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Young, 1952) 190.
set of facts from the past, to his current dilemma, without paying particular attention to abstract theory.\textsuperscript{78} He therefore dealt with adversity with an open and patient disposition by disciplining his mind to pay attention only to the facts, thus making his logical thought process extraordinarily empirical. Historical fact, therefore, was the philosophical framework from which he based the majority of his decision-making efforts.

Another important element of Truman’s decision-making style found its developmental origins in his experiences as an officer in the United States military during World War I. As a Captain in the Army, Truman had to mold his troops’ behavior to fit the official standards of the military, since they had been known for making trouble for their previous commander. One instance that epitomizes Truman’s ability to enforce his authority occurred while he was in France, in March 1918. During this time, his troops decided to engage in antics “unbecoming of U.S. military officers.” The next day, Truman, acting upon his official authority as their superior, reprimanded his troops: “I didn’t come over here to get along with you. You’ve got to get along with me. And if there are any of you who can’t, speak up and I’ll bust you right back.”\textsuperscript{79} His certain and absolute rhetoric, which so conspicuously distinguished him as president, had begun to develop and mature in his military days.

His Army experiences also provided him with a new sense of confidence in his own leadership abilities. For example, it was through the Army that he experienced his first political successes, independent of his family connections. Truman was a typical mid-western farm boy, with dreams of becoming a sergeant, who ultimately succeeded in getting elected by his peers to be promoted as a lieutenant. It was his military experience that also gave him confidence in the power of his voice. With all of his opportunities to imbue military rhetoric and aggressive

\textsuperscript{78} Barber, 223.
speech, Truman had begun to develop a style of articulation that embraced the simplicity of plain speech, but at the same time manifested high degrees of resoluteness and determination.

Truman’s decision-making style was made up of two overwhelming elements. The first was based on a combination of his painstaking attention to detail, his close reading and interpretation of historical fact, and his successful management of his troops in the Army. The second element was his decisiveness with every decision presented before him. Truman displayed this ability of seemingly impulsive assertion with definite solutions, almost to an extreme. Often times during his presidency, he was seen as always having “shot from the hip” whenever he was called upon to make a decision.\footnote{Barber, 226.} Likewise, Truman often over-emphasized his resolute decision-making style by continually harping on the fact that he was the epitome of decisiveness, in contrast with a less desirable alternative of being perceived as cowardly, vague, and dependent.\footnote{Barber, 226.} The most visible example of Truman’s sense of pride in his decision-making capacity along with his ability to stand firmly behind his decisions, was the slogan on his desk that read, “THE BUCK STOPS HERE.”\footnote{Barber, 249.} Reflecting on the origins and efficiency of his decision-making style in 1958, Truman made the following comment:

“All of my life whenever it comes time to make a decision, I make it and forget about it, and go to work on something else; and when these things came before me as President of the United States, I made the decision on them, and went into the next thing. You never have time to stop. You’ve got to keep going because there’s always a decision just ahead of you that you’ve got to make, and you don’t want to look back. If you make a mistake in one of those decisions, correct it by another decision, and go ahead.”\footnote{Barber, 249.}

Truman’s decision-centered style generated a constant flow of feedback, which could provide him with the opportunity to expand his knowledge with any given situation. In addition,
his incomparable ability to separate the moral implications from implicit factual evidence allowed him to make and live with his decisions, regardless any negative repercussions. It was his high degree of confidence in his decision-making base, which allowed him to continually make decisions of this nature throughout his presidency.  

Because of his incessant ability to make a precise decision, and then to move on to his next order of business, scholars such as James David Barber have classified Truman as bestowing an active-positive state of mind. What is meant by active-positive is that the individual has the ability to gain experience, through the decision-making process, without accumulating anxiety, frustration, and guilt about the consequences. With every decision Truman was required to make, he did not become embittered or morally exhausted. Quite to the contrary, his decisive nature allowed him to make up his mind on his own, to confront the issue directly, and to move on with a clear conscious. The active-negative type, according to Barber, displays the tendency of maintaining resentment or reluctance after a decision has been made. Therefore, the active-negative individual suffers from a conception of the existence of unresolved conflicts that have built up over time, consequently causing tremendous internal stress within the individual. The result of such internal tendencies, according to Barber, is the individual’s feeling constantly at odds with others outside of his decision-making circle, therefore causing him to see himself as a “lonely, virtuous, suffering fighter against essentially evil opponents.”

A close examination of Truman’s life, however, suggests that he did portray some manifestations of the active-negative personality type. From the time when he was a boy up

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84 Barber, 240.
85 Barber, 246.
86 Barber, 246.
through his years as the President of the United States, Truman consistently attempted to compensate for deficiencies that he had perceived in himself through hard work and dedication.\textsuperscript{88} As child, he concentrated such tremendous effort on his academic studies and the piano, that he eventually isolated himself from his peers. His personal papers also reveal that as chief executive of Jackson County, Truman dedicated the same degree of attention to his early political experiences, and ignored his feelings of overwhelming exhaustion. As a senator and as president, Truman suffered from repeated bouts of physical and psychological exhaustion, and many times found himself recuperating in the hospital.\textsuperscript{89} Yet despite his physical and emotional strains, Truman possessed the unique recuperative ability to overcome such stresses so that he could maintain his focus on those critical national and international details placed before him. Dean Acheson, Truman’s secretary of state, painted the following image of Truman as an inspiration and inexhaustible leader:

“Mr. Truman could work, reading and absorbing endless papers, and at times at play, until well past midnight and be up at six o’clock walking deserted streets with hardy Secret Service men and reporters. He slept, so he told us, as soon as his head touched the pillow, never worrying, because he could not stay awake long enough to do so.”\textsuperscript{90}

It is Truman’s aggressiveness and determination to prove himself a competent leader that could lead scholars such as Barber to believe that he possessed a combination of both personality types, and that in some ways or in some instances throughout his life, his low self-esteem caused his political activities to compensate for his poor self-image.\textsuperscript{91} Truman’s poor self-image resulted from his early childhood awkwardness in social settings. He was never one of the popular boys,

\textsuperscript{87} Barber, 246.
\textsuperscript{88} Hamby, 49.
\textsuperscript{89} Hamby, 49-50.
never one of the "fighters" as he recollected. David McCullough, in his Pulitzer Prize winning biography *Truman*, cites him reflecting on his childhood experiences and the teasing he had to endure because of his glasses, "To tell the truth, I was kind of a sissy." McCullough admits that he ran from fights and playground bullies. McCullough cites the following quotation from one of his childhood friends about Truman's being accepted by his peers:

"They wanted to call him a sissy, but they just didn't do it because they had a lot of respect for him. I remember one time we were playing ... Jesse James or robbers and we were the Dalton brothers out in Kansas ... and we were arguing about them ... we got the history mixed up ... but Harry came in and straightened it out, just who were the Dalton brothers and how many got killed. Things like that the boys had a lot of respect for. They didn't call him a sissy."

Although the evidence suggests that his childhood peers did not maliciously tease him, he was still trapped by his own insecurities about his physical appearance, and ultimately, his inability engage in their childhood antics. Yet despite his personal insecurities, Truman was dedicated to bringing about his active-positive personality style, rather than dwelling on the potential implications of his darker, negative side. Therefore, Truman's capacity to overcome such strenuous physical and psychological pressures illustrates the strength and consistency of his active-positive personality.

With the Korean situation, in particular, Truman displayed his active-positive personality type quite proficiently. From his initial decision to intervene in Korea, Truman did not allow for the United States' intervention to become his personal crusade, or to overcome his personal value system in a contest of courage between himself and the Communist World. His

91 Hamby, 35.
93 McCullough, 45.
fundamental flaw in dealing with this conflict, however, stemmed from his inherent nature to make split decisions, and then to bestow excessive trust in the information that he had received.\textsuperscript{94} From the very beginning of the United States' involvement in Korea, Truman based many of his critical decisions on the advice of those politically and militarily close to him, especially General Douglas MacArthur. As it was specifically outlined at the outset of this research effort, Truman fired General MacArthur for exceeding his authority as an officer of the United States military. The General was the war-hero of World War II, who had gone on to be the savior of Japan, and was at the time of his dismissal the Far East General for nearly 14 years. Clearly, there was no opportune time for Truman to fire an individual bestowing such immense respect from the American people. Even when MacArthur's forces were desperately losing in the field, Truman stuck by his man, and ultimately his decision to make him Commander in the Far East. He praised his accomplishments and rewarded his courage under such extreme conditions.

However, it came to the point when MacArthur's public statements undercut the high degree of loyalty that Truman expected from him, that the President had no other choice, but to relieve the General from his official duties. The MacArthur affair epitomized the problem that Truman had with instances of disloyalty.\textsuperscript{95} It was a combination of his family lifestyle, his Army experience, and his early experiences climbing the political ladder that had instilled in him a deep sense of commitment to those with whom he was closest. However, as Barber posits, "that kind of loyalty involves a dependence dangerous in the Presidency."\textsuperscript{96} As a politician, Truman depended on his close relationships, which were based on trust with his colleagues and advisors. Trust was the key element to every one of Truman's political and personal relationships. In a

\textsuperscript{94} Barber, 247.
\textsuperscript{95} Barber, 249.
\textsuperscript{96} Barber, 249.
letter that he wrote to his daughter Margie, Truman professed the critical importance of trusting relationships and reflected upon his own previous relationships:

“If you don’t trust people you love and those who work for you in all capacities, you’ll be the unhappiest and [most] frustrated person alive. Think of the immense number of people I’ve had under me – County Court, Senate, V.P., and President of the United States. I had two no-goods in the county setup, one in the Senate, and only two in the Cabinet, only two on the staff. Now the good ones added up to several hundred . . . Your dad loves you and wants you to be happy – you can’t be unless you trust and have faith in people.”

With Truman’s appointment of MacArthur as Chief Military Commander in the Far East, he expected for the General to fulfill the role of a highly acclaimed and well-accomplished professional soldier, with a sound mind, and willing to serve anonymously and unquestionably. With all of his military and political experiences, Truman expected from MacArthur an unwavering relationship firmly based on reciprocal trust. Yet despite his expectations, MacArthur was not willing to conform to such role expectations.

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Personality Profile: Douglas MacArthur

In examining the literature focusing on Harry Truman’s personality type, one is able to come to a clearer understanding of the motivations and the impetus behind his actions. Psychoanalytic explanations and theories have been offered in order to account for his political motives and decision-making styles. It is also within the tale of his life story wherein lies the key to understanding the qualities and consequences of his active-positive personality type. This same analytical approach holds true for a more thorough understanding of the manifestations and motivations of Douglas MacArthur’s public endeavors. Much of the literature available provides biographical and historical detail, rather than psychoanalytic explanations similar to the ones used to account for Truman’s life experiences. Those same ends, however, can be achieved with a thorough examination of critical moments in both Douglas MacArthur’s private and public life.

Douglas MacArthur was born in the Arsenal Barracks of Little Rock Arkansas. He came from a long line of military men, including his father, Arthur MacArthur, who was a Union colonel in the Civil War when he was nineteen, a captain who relocated Native Americans in the Southwest, and the military governor of the Philippines who defeated Aguinaldo’s insurrection. As a young boy, MacArthur very much admired his father’s military accomplishments, and therefore aspired to bestow those same levels of courage and strength. In fact, every night before he went to bed, his mother would assure him that some day he would be a great man, just like his father. Douglas MacArthur spent his childhood years on the western frontier posts where his father was stationed, with the sounds of Army bugles marking his earliest memories. For a young boy, growing up on the western frontier was exciting and adventurous, replete with encounters with real-life “cowboys and Indians.” Because of such curious distractions,

99 Wittner, 4.
MacArthur was a poor student, much more interested in military rather than formal education. In his *Reminiscences*, MacArthur reflected on his childhood upbringing, "I learned to ride and shoot even before I could read or write. Indeed almost before I could walk and talk."\(^{101}\)

MacArthur's relationship with mother, Mary "Pinky" MacArthur, was extraordinarily nurturing and supportive, as was Truman's bond with his mother. A review of the literature on the life of Douglas MacArthur reveals limited examples of the intimate relationship between mother and son before his enrollment at West Point Military Academy. However, beginning the tale of their close relationship at this point in his life provides sufficient evidence of their intimate relationship. It was also at this point in his life that MacArthur's mother emerged as his primary source for support and encouragement since his father was preoccupied with his official military obligations. Pinky monitored her son's education by requiring daily reports from him concerning his progress and participation in activities. Some of his classmates had even joked that MacArthur was "the first cadet whose other went through the Academy with him."\(^{102}\) On a more personal level, she wrote him notes of encouragement that provided him with a sense of empowerment, confidence, and pride in his abilities. One of these messages read,

"Do you know that your soul is of my soul such a part
That you seem to be fiber and core of my heart?
None other can pain me as you, son can do;
None other can please me or praise me as you.
Remember the world will be quick with its blame
If shadow or shame ever darken your name.
Like mother, like son, is saying so true
The world will judge largely of mother by you.
Be this then your task, if task it shall be
To force this proud world to do homage to me.
Be sure it will say, when its verdict you've won
She reaps as she sowed: "This man is her son!"\(^{103}\)

\(^{100}\) Wittner, 5.
\(^{102}\) Wittner, 4.
\(^{103}\) Wittner, 4.
Clearly, Mary MacArthur wanted and expected only the best for her son. She encouraged him to act in valiant and noble ways, and reminded him that any perceived wrong action would reflect gravely upon her. Interestingly enough, her warnings to her son foreshadow those unforgettable points in his life, especially the Korean controversy, in which he would be publicly scrutinized for his actions.

Much of MacArthur’s sense of his own identity was manifested in his early military experiences. He began his military career in 1904 when he was sent to the Far East as second lieutenant of engineers. He later joined his father’s staff in Japan where he mingled with Japanese military leaders, and diligently took note of their military capabilities.104 MacArthur’s curiosity and interest was sparked by what he termed, “the Oriental mind.” He believed the Far East to be the last frontier, and so ultimately, “the future, and the very existence of America, was irrevocably entwined with Asia and its land outposts.”105 Yet despite the “mystic hold” that Asia had over him, MacArthur returned to the U.S. in 1906 when he became military aide to President Theodore Roosevelt.106 And so began a tale of military victories and countless instances of courage and strength (See Appendix IV for a chronology of MacArthur’s military exploits).

As MacArthur became more deeply involved in the military, not only did he achieve superior status but he also developed a distinct personality style based on its institutional values that has helped to explain many of his public actions. John Gunther, in his book, The Riddle of MacArthur, provides an excellent characterization of our military legend. According to Gunther, MacArthur’s most dominating characteristic, next to his courage, was his ego, from which spilled his most useful characteristics, including his confidence, magnetism, and his ability to

104 Wittner, 5.
105 Wittner, 5.
106 Wittner, 5.
inspire unwavering devotion in his followers. Also from his ego spewed such negative characteristics as his extreme sensitivity to criticism, and his determination to present himself as a modest man, lacking any feelings of vanity or complacency. His pretending not to be vain, was perhaps, according to Gunther, the most obvious indication that he suffered from the “greatest of all vanities.” The fact that he deliberately wore no decorations, was in fact, the most obvious indication of his suppressed vanity. MacArthur had an impeccable and ostentatious style. He was the quintessential commander with an immaculate appearance. To attest to this fact of his outrageous “peacockry,” General Enoch Crowder, an eminent officer of World War I, remarked, “I thought that Arthur MacArthur [the General’s father] was the most flamboyantly egoistic man I had ever seen—until I met his son.” MacArthur as the master egoist could not accept any form of criticism. In his Reminiscences, this inward focus of MacArthur’s character is clearly illustrated as he incessantly referred to the following objects as, “my forces,” “my plan,” “my Alabama cotton-growers,” “my Iowa farmers.” He writes about his decisions and actions as if he were a sovereign unto himself by creating images of a tireless general “constantly beset by difficulties, the hostility of unnamed enemies, the stupidity of smaller men, and opposition from a government that has fallen under the influence of Communists.” James David Barber, would most certainly classify MacArthur’s personality type as active-negative, the direct antithesis of Harry Truman’s type. Throughout his autobiography, for example, MacArthur emerges as a paranoid individual, who has been forced to individually take on such monumental crusades as controlling the expansion of Communism and the re-moralization of Japan.

108 Gunther, 24.
109 Wittner, 97.
110 MacArthur, 26.
111 Wittner, 178.
Part of MacArthur’s egoistic tendencies can be attributed to his great sense of duty, and ultimately to the numerous responsibilities that he consistently found himself accountable to fulfill. It would be unfair for this examination of MacArthur’s personality to suggest that he should only be characterized as cold, pontifical, and defiant. Quite the contrary, MacArthur engendered remarkable qualities including his magnetic abilities to inspire and persuade. According to Gunther, however, few people outside his immediate entourage really liked the General. “They may respect him, admire him, emulate him, or even worship him (as many Japanese and Filipinos undoubtedly do,) but it is hard to imagine him as a universal mass leader, at least so far as the rank and file of the American public are concerned.”

MacArthur has also been noted for his high intelligence, despite the fact that as a child, he had little interest in academics. One aspect of his character that aided in his ability to synthesize vast amounts of information was his photographic memory and his exceptional speed reading abilities. Like Harry Truman, MacArthur was fascinated by historical studies, except his focus was solely on military chronologies. Also, like Truman, MacArthur submersed all of his efforts into every task or decision that he was required to carry out. Gunther illustrates MacArthur’s work ethic in the following quotation. “He throws himself into whatever task he has with complete absorption, he has inflexible belief in his own destiny, and he has the compulsive ego of the truly dedicated.” The lens through which MacArthur looked at the world was created and maintained directly from his military experiences.

He was a complex, arrogant, and forceful character with indisputable leadership abilities. Although his brilliance as a military leader remains unquestionable, MacArthur, was a controversial, ambitious, and transcendent figure who perhaps was, too able, too assured, and too

112 Gunther, 25.
113 Wittner, 99.
talented to be restricted to the limits of a soldier’s professional roles and responsibilities. He was a contentious leader, whose personal philosophy, founded on extraordinary examples of historical leadership, exemplified his views on the relationship between civilian leaders and the military. His views on this subject can be best explained by a quotation from Roman general Lucius Aemilius Paulus, who attacked the Macedonians in 168 B.C., which he had conspicuously displayed on his office wall in the Dai-Ichi Building.  

"In every circle, and truly, at every table there are people who lead armies into Macedonia; who know where the camp ought to be placed; what posts ought to be occupied by troops; when and through what pass that territory should be entered; where magazines should be formed; how provisions should be conveyed by land and sea; and when it is proper to engage the enemy, when to lie quiet...These are great impediments to those who have the management of affairs...I am not one of those who think that commanders ought at no time to receive advice; on the contrary, I should deem that man more proud than wise, who regulated every proceeding by the standard of his own single judgment. What then is my opinion? That Commanders should be counseled chiefly by persons of known talent...who are present at the scene of action, who see the country, who see the enemy...and who, like people embarked in the same ship, are sharers of the danger. If, therefore, anyone thinks qualified to give advice respecting the war which I am to conduct...let him not refuse his assistance to the state but let him come with me into Macedonia. He shall be furnished with a ship, a horse, a tent; even his traveling charges shall be defrayed. But if he thinks this too much trouble, and prefers the repose of a city life...let him not assume the office of a pilot. The city in itself furnishes abundance of topics for conversation; let it confine its passion for talking within its own precincts and rest assured that we shall pay no attention to any councils but such as shall be framed within our camp."

As a military leader, MacArthur believed, like Paulus, that those best suited to make strategic and military decisions were those individuals closest to the fire. He therefore based his decision-making procedures on his specific level of expertise in relation to the conflict. Consequently, he did not trust the information or advice given from those outside of the conflict’s immediate

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114 Gunther, 26.  
115 Rovere & Schlesinger, 121.
context. Especially throughout the Korean Conflict, MacArthur did not trust the informational sources, policy objectives, and strategic procedures offered by the diplomats and civilian leaders back in Washington D.C.

In addition to his subscription to the philosophies of historical military commanders, MacArthur’s ideology, was furthermore fundamentally based on religious, mystical, and emotional premises, which contrasted drastically with the military’s practical and realistic assumptions. His attitudes emphasized the moral and spiritual aspects of war, which in turn provided for him an unbridled optimism toward overly ambitious outcomes.\(^{117}\) For example, on January 26, 1955, he gave a speech at the 60\(^{th}\) annual convention of the Episcopal Diocese of Los Angeles concerning his attempts to foster the religious rehabilitation of Japan. In his speech he said,

> “I am a Christian- an Episcopalian- but I believe in all religions. They may differ in form and ritual, but all are good-all recognize a Divine Creator-a spiritual power transcending all that is mortal. I, therefore, felt that it became my duty as a soldier of God to attempt to restore and revive religion in Japan-to fill this moral vacuum-just as it was my duty as a soldier of the republic to revitalize the general welfare of the country; that to fulfill my obligation it must be of the spirit as well as of the flesh.”\(^{118}\)

In the above referenced quotation, MacArthur’s words illustrate his deep commitment to the supreme authority, which in fact superceded his loyalty to his military and political superiors. This speech also exemplifies MacArthur’s optimistic tendencies in attempting to satisfy his own lofty, noble, and overly ambitious goals.

Perhaps the most restrictive aspect of MacArthur’s personality was his absolute subscription to the Army’s code of loyalty: duty, honor, country. These three words symbolized

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116 Rovere & Schlesinger, 121-122.
117 Wittner, 176.
118 Wittner, 61.
the highest moral code, upon which the United States was founded. MacArthur believed that the military’s values should be foundation for the soldier’s character, “a code of conduct and chivalry of those who guard this beloved land of culture and ancient descent.”\footnote{119} In an address that he gave to the Corps of Cadets at West Point on May 12, 1962, MacArthur asserted his perception of the expectations of the military’s moral code as their fundamental resource for understanding and exercising leadership:

“They build your basic character. They mold you for your future roles as the custodians of the nation’s defense. They make you strong enough to know when you are weak, and brave enough to face yourself when you are afraid. They teach you to be proud and unbending in honest failure, but humble and gentle in success; not to substitute words for actions, not to seek the path of comfort, but to face the stress and spur of difficulty and challenge; to learn to stand up in the storm, but to have compassion on those who fall; to master yourself before you seek to master others; to have a heart that is clean, a goal that is high; to learn to laugh, yet never forget to weep; to reach into the future, yet never neglect the past; to be serious, yet never to take yourself too seriously; to be modest so that you will remember the simplicity of true greatness, the open mind of true wisdom, the meekness of true strength.”\footnote{120}

MacArthur’s construction and understanding of the military’s moral code, reveals great insight about his personality. He put such great moral demands upon both himself and the greater military institution, that he virtually eliminated possibility of not achieving his objectives. His words to the cadets and the nation as a whole suggested his ambitions to be the symbol of American independence. He created the image of himself as a stalwart, romantic hero, whose self-conceived objective it was to revitalize the great hopes, dreams, and ideals of the United States. He therefore undertook such self-serving obligations alone, in an attempt to bring about successful outcomes throughout his military career.

\footnote{119} Wittner, 65.
\footnote{120} Wittner 65-66.
History of Truman and MacArthur’s Personal Conflict:

Harry Truman’s aversion toward Douglas MacArthur has been documented well before the Korean controversy. Their acrimonious relationship dates back to 1942 when MacArthur was stationed in the Philippines. At this point in World War II, the General fled to Australia, and left his second-in-command, Lieutenant General Jonathan M. Wainwright, to surrender to the Japanese.\(^{121}\) Truman viewed MacArthur’s leaving as cowardly and unbecoming of a United States military leader. He recorded his views on this incident, and his feelings about the General in a message to Margaret. “I’m not very fond of MacArthur. If he’d been a real hero, he’d have gone down with the ship.”\(^{122}\) Another example of Truman’s antipathy toward MacArthur is evidenced through another letter that he wrote to his daughter on May 13, 1944. He wrote, “No good soldier is a speechmaker or a showman. That’s why we don’t like Dugout Douglas from Australia.”\(^{123}\) The showmanship that Truman was referring to was MacArthur’s announcement after walking through the surf at Leyte, once the infantrymen had gone ashore, that “I have returned.” His reference to “Dugout Doug” can be attributed to the nickname given to the General by his men on Bataan because of his seldom appearance on the front.\(^{124}\)

Perhaps the most critical Truman commentary on General MacArthur occurred directly after the end of the Pacific War, on June 17, 1945.\(^{125}\) In a private conversation with his cousin Ethel Noland, Truman revealed his intense aversion toward MacArthur:

“Mr. Prima Donna, Brass Hat, Five Star MacArthur. He’s worse than the Cabots and the Lodges— they at least talked with one another before they told God what to do. Mac tells God right off. It is a very great pity we have to have stuffed shirts like that in key positions. I don’t see why in hell Roosevelt didn’t order

\(^{123}\) M. Truman, 51.
\(^{124}\) Ferrell, 330.
\(^{125}\) Ferrell, 330.
Wainwright home and let MacArthur be a martyr. . . . We'd have had a real general and a fighting man if we had Wainwright and not a play actor and a bunco man as we have now. Don't see how a country can produce such men as Robert E. Lee, John J. Pershing, Eisenhower, and Bradley and at the same time produce Custers, Pattons, and MacArthurs.\textsuperscript{126}

By the close of World War II, General MacArthur had become the apparent disfavor of President Truman. He told his staff conference, for example that he was "going to do something with that fellow," as he was constantly, "balling things up," and he was tired of "fooling around."\textsuperscript{127}

Truman's apparent disfavor of MacArthur was equally reciprocated as the General maintained his independence from the Administration. In doing so, he therefore established and maintained his own authority as a military leader. He told author Paul H. Nitze, "I have absolutely no use for the people in Washington, including the President. Nobody in my command is going to have any relationships with anybody in Washington."\textsuperscript{128} And with both Truman's and MacArthur's unwillingness to compromise their ill-perception of the other, the President and the General maintained their individual agendas in advancing their political and military agendas without ever crossing paths until their Wake Island meeting.

Yet, in spite of their history of interpersonal conflict, Truman did not hesitate to appoint MacArthur as the Chief Commander of the US and UN forces in South Korea. With the interests of the United States foremost in his mind, President Truman understood the importance of appointing a courageous, assertive, and effective individual to fight against the spread of Communism. MacArthur, being a highly decorated war hero, fit the bill, and was willing to set

\textsuperscript{126} Robert H. Ferrell, Truman to Ethel Noland, November 17, 1950, Off the Record, 47.
\textsuperscript{127} Eben A. Ayers, Truman in the White House. Papers and Diary. September, 18, 1945, (Independence: Harry S. Truman Library) 81.
\textsuperscript{128} Paul H. Nitze. From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision. (New York: Grove, Weidenfeld, 1989) 39.
aside previous differences so that he could add another notch to his belt of military and legendary successes.
Interpersonal Conflict:

The literature on conflict makes up a voluminous collection of leadership studies. Conflict has become a pervasive, yet critical function of our organizational and interpersonal relationships. The focus of this section is to provide an expansive analysis of interpersonal conflict and the behaviors of Truman and MacArthur, so as to understand the "inevitability" of their conflict.

Definition of Interpersonal Conflict:

The precise definition of interpersonal conflict has been delineated and debated by many scholars. In general however, the literature has broken down interpersonal conflict into four basic approaches: 1) Interpersonal conflict as pervasive, 2) Interpersonal conflict as explicit disagreement, 3) Interpersonal conflict as a hostile episode; and 4) Interpersonal conflict as disagreement in particular episodes. All of these approaches attribute interpersonal conflict to either individual behaviors, situational variables called "episodes," or a combination of the two.¹²⁹ In order to provide the most expansive and thoroughly accurate analysis of the interpersonal conflict between Harry S. Truman and Douglas MacArthur, this research will be based on the fourth approach, which incorporates and accounts for both individual behavior and situational factors.

According to Hocker and Wilmot, interpersonal conflict is "an expressed struggle between at least two interdependent parties who perceive incompatible goals, scarce resources, and interference from the other party in achieving their goals."¹³⁰ This definition conceptualizes conflict both in terms of the actors' behavior, "expressed struggle," and in relation to systemic factors or episodes, including "the perception of incompatible goals, scarce resources, and

interference in attaining those goals.” Interdependency is a critical component of any interpersonal conflict situation. Braiker and Kelley assert, for example, that conflict exists at three different levels of interdependence. First Level conflict refers to problems involving the coordination of rather mundane behaviors, such as which television program to watch. Second Level conflict refers to the coordination of relational norms, roles, and rules, such as which partner in a relationship should perform specific domestic duties. Finally, Third Level conflict concerns problems with personal characteristics and attitudes. These types of conflicts therefore focus on an individual’s personality, motives, qualities, faults, and strengths.

Based on these three levels of interdependency, the individuals involved in any conflict situation engage in specific conflict tactics depending on the nature of the immediate problem. Conflict tactics have been most commonly referred to as “an individual’s specific action at a specific moment in the interaction.” Because of the innumerable behaviors an individual can employ during a conflict interaction, it is difficult to categorize all observable tactics. Therefore, it is more useful for the purposes of this research to examine conflict strategies (i.e., coherent groupings of tactics), which inevitably portray conflict styles, in order to effectively analyze the Truman/MacArthur Controversy.

132 Canary and Cupach, 13.
133 Canary and Cupach, 40.
Conflict Strategies:

As noted above, conflict strategies are the collection of conflict tactics into a coherent game plan during a conflict episode\textsuperscript{134}. According to Canary and Cupach, "conflict strategy, therefore, suggests the general approach that tactics specifically institute; that is, tactics are the communicative messages that represent how people are oriented toward each other."\textsuperscript{135} Researchers have consistently agreed that conflict tactics can be categorized into three general strategies: integration (working with other people), distribution (working against other people), and avoidance (working away from other people). Although the literature on interpersonal conflict has used different labels for these categories, the three strategic approaches have been cited in numerous studies (e.g., Canary & Cupach, 1988; Putnam & Wilson, 1982; Ross & DeWine, 1988; and Sillars et al., 1982.)\textsuperscript{136}

The integrative conflict strategy involves a direct and cooperative confrontation. Integrative strategy is fundamentally based upon a genuine desire to solve problems and to seek mutually acceptable outcomes.\textsuperscript{137} The critical tactics involved in this strategy are as follows: 1) Seeking and disclosing information, 2) Making supportive comments and listening in a supportive manner, 3) Mutually defining the problem, 4) Seeking areas of commonality and agreement; and 5) Negotiating fair solutions. Based on the tactics involved, it is obvious that the integrative style seeks to identify shared objectives in order to promote the interests of both parties involved. The fundamental assumption, therefore, of this approach, is that creative solutions, often times in the form of compromise that satisfy both parties can be reached.\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{134} Canary and Cupach, 42.
\textsuperscript{135} Canary and Cupach, 42-43.
\textsuperscript{136} Canary and Cupach, 43.
\textsuperscript{137} Canary and Cupach, 43.
\textsuperscript{138} Canary and Cupach, 43.
The distributive conflict strategy is similar to the integrative approach in that both are active and direct strategies. However, in direct contrast to the first strategy, the distributive approach is at the opposite end of the “agreeableness continuum.” Distributive behavior is generally competitive and based on the notion that one individual involved in the conflict episode can gain or win only at the expense of the other actor involved. Distributive conflict, therefore, is fundamentally based upon an individual’s needs, rather than on mutual interests. The conflict tactics involved in the engagement of this strategy are as follows: 1) Threats, demands, and prescriptions, 2) Coercion, hostility, and intimidation, 3) Personal criticisms, put-downs, and ridicule, 4) Defensiveness and hit-and-run tactics; and 5) Sarcasm and contempt.

Unlike the previous two conflict strategies, the avoidance strategy is rather low on the “activeness spectrum.” In fact, the primary purpose of employing the avoidance strategy is to keep problems and tensions buried. The tactics involved in this strategy include: 1) Withholding a complaint when a confrontation is deemed to be too costly, 2) Making irrelevant remarks to divert interaction from conflict to a non-threatening topic, 3) Acquiescing to the requests or demands of another, 4) Verbally denying that there is a conflict, 5) Withdrawing from the interaction; and 6) Not voicing complaints for fear of retaliation (more commonly known as the “chilling effect.”)
Conflict Styles:

Conflict styles reflect an individual’s tendency to use similar conflict tactics in different contexts. Although closely related to conflict strategies, conflict styles depict an individual’s tendencies and preferences for handling all conflict, whereas conflict strategies represent the individual’s general approach within a specific conflict episode. A more empirical view of conflict style is founded on the concept that an individual’s method for handling conflict reflects two dimensions: 1) The extent to which one satisfies his own goals, and 2) The extent to which one will satisfy the other person’s goals (Blake & Mouton, 1964, 1970; Kilmann & Thomas, 1977; Rahim, 1983). By crossing these two dimensions, the results yield five different conflict styles. According to the literature on conflict styles, many researchers have depended on this approach in their definitional approaches. The conflicts styles used here are based from Rahim (1982), who created “a self-report instrument to measure people’s conflict style in the workplace.” Additionally, Rahim’s approach has been successfully duplicated in more informal contexts (Hammock et al., 1990; Utley, Richardson & Pilkington, 1989.)

The five conflict styles are as follows:

1. Integrating – “shows a high concern for both the individual’s goals and the goals of goals of the other person. This style includes problem-solving communication, a desire to collaborate, and attempts at open exchange of relevant information. (This style is also similar to the integration strategy discussed earlier.”)

2. Avoiding – “reflects a low level of concern with both the individual’s own goals and the other person’s goals. Conflict avoiders tend to withhold complaints, avert open discussion of conflictual issues, and withdraw from interactions involving conflict.”

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142 Canary and Cupach, 48.
143 Canary and Cupach, 49.
144 Canary and Cupach, 48.
145 Canary and Cupach, 49.
146 Canary and Cupach, 49.
147 Canary and Cupach, 49.


3. **Dominating** – "shows a high level of concern for the individual’s own goals and a low level of concern for the other’s goals, and reflects competitive and power-oriented thoughts. (This style is similar to the distributive strategy discussed earlier.")\(^{148}\)

4. **Obliging** – "reflects a low level of concern for the individual’s own goals and a high level of concern for the other’s goals. This style involves minimizing conflict by accommodating the needs of the other person and giving in to their wishes."\(^{149}\)

5. **Compromising** – "shows moderate and roughly equal concern for the individual’s own goals and the other person’s goals. This styles involves attempts to negotiate, to give and take, and to seek a middle ground."\(^{150}\)

**Components of Conflict Situations:**

In addition to identifying the actors’ respective conflict styles, it is of critical importance that the researcher analyze the intervening situational variables that affect the outcomes of many conflict situations. According to Putnam and Poole, these contextual variables have traditionally been attributed to organizational conflicts\(^{151}\). However, this research will apply those variables identified by Putnam and Poole to the dynamic interpersonal conflict between President Truman and General MacArthur. Their research outlined four general types of independent variables. They are: 1) **actor attributes**, including predispositions, needs, personality traits, beliefs, attitudes, skills, and cognitive styles; 2) **conflict issues**, specifically substantive aspects of the conflict, emergence of conflict, the interests or “root issues” of those in conflict; 3) **relationship variables**, including trust, power, target of conflict, and interdependency between communicators; and 4) **contextual factors**, for example, organizational climate, precedent or past history, organizational norms, standard operating procedures, organizational complexity,

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\(^{148}\) Canary and Cupach, 49.

\(^{149}\) Canary and Cupach, 49.

\(^{150}\) Canary and Cupach, 49.

marketplace factors, and legal-political constraints. These intervening variables will be analyzed with respect to the situational aspects of the Truman/MacArthur controversy so as to demonstrate the "inevitability" of the conflict. The following sections will define, analyze, and evaluate the fundamental causes of the Truman/MacArthur controversy based on the actors' levels of interdependency, their conflict styles, and those intervening variables that affected the outcome of the conflict.

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152 Putnam and Poole, 555.
The Truman/MacArthur Conflict:

In discussing the Truman/MacArthur controversy, it is nearly impossible, of course, to present the full disagreement in all of its nuances. The purpose of this research, however, is to illustrate how an analysis of President Truman’s and General MacArthur’s conflict styles might be applied to achieve a better understanding of the “inevitability” of the conflict.

President Truman, as commander-in-chief of the United States armed forces, faced enormous difficulties in his attempts to influence the commanding general of the U.S. Army in the Far East, Douglas MacArthur, who was then also the commander of the United Nations troops in South Korea. There were many critical issues that both actors had vehemently disagreed upon. For example, one was MacArthur’s belief in the necessity of a full-scale American invasion of North Korea, in collaboration with the South Korean forces. The second critical issue was MacArthur’s willingness to accept Chiang Kai-Shek’s offer of Chinese Nationalist troops from Taiwan in support of such an invasion. A third issue was Truman’s adamant stance that MacArthur not give press interviews and public statements that attacked or undermined the administration’s official positions. Truman’s motives for influencing MacArthur not to engage in any of these three options is quite clear in his memoirs:

“Every decision I made in connection with the Korean conflict had this one aim in mind; to prevent a third world war and the terrible destruction it would bring to the civilized world. This meant that we should not do anything that would provide the excuse to the Soviets and plunge the free nations into an all-out war.”

At this point in the conflict’s development, the People’s Republic of China had not been formally involved in the direct nature of the conflict. Consequently, Truman felt that if the U.S. troops crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea, or if Chinese Nationalist troops were to become involved, then conflict would inevitably broaden, yielding disastrous results. Accordingly, most
traditional accounts of the Korean conflict, including testimony of Truman administration
officials before Congress, the memoirs of Truman (1956) and Acheson (1969), and academic
analyses by Spanier (1965), Neustadt (1960), and Millis (1958), emphasize the Administration's
failure to restrain MacArthur's insubordination. Traditionally, MacArthur is viewed as
continually ignoring and evading direct orders issued by the Administration, and seeking his own
military and political goal of absolute victory.

Levels of Interdependency:

Based on the three levels of interdependency presented earlier, the Truman/MacArthur
conflict encompasses aspects of both Level 2 and 3 interdependencies. From their official
positions alone as Commander-in-Chief and Commander of the U.S. and UN forces, Truman and
MacArthur were inevitably dependent on another in order to carry out their individual and
collective tasks. As Commander-in-Chief, however, President Truman, ranked as the ultimate
authority of the political and military institutional hierarchies, having the ultimate responsibility
for all United States military and political actions, as authorized by the U.S. Constitution.
Although MacArthur was most definitely a top-ranking military leader, nevertheless, his position
cast him subordinate to the official powers and directives of the President of the United States
and his administration. Those critical aspects of the conflict that qualify as Level 2
interdependency include instances in which both actors found difficulty in coordinating their
individual roles as institutional leaders. With such a leader/subordinate context as the President
of the United States and the Commander of the Far East directly engaged in the same crisis
situation, ostensibly seeking to attain the same objectives, it becomes imperative that relational
roles, rules, and norms be definitively and unquestionably established. If these roles are not
clearly defined and accepted by both actors, the interpersonal relationship becomes drastically

153 Truman, 345.
jeopardized. As is illustrated in the chronology of the Korean War, the institutional and leader/subordinate roles between President Truman and General MacArthur were neither absolutely understood nor were they accepted by both actors. Therefore in one sense, these actors were engaged in a Level 2 interpersonal conflict of interdependence. Although Truman maintained the legitimate authority of the US leader, MacArthur was not willing to accept his second-in-command position. Because of MacArthur's refusal to accept the leader-follower role relationship, the controversy escalated into a Level 3 conflict of interdependence. This high degree of interdependency is illustrated through each of their attempts to attain their own individual agendas. As they fought to reach their individual political and military goals, an interpersonal conflict developed that ignited a full-scale attack on each other's beliefs, values, motives, and personality qualities. However, before an analysis of the interpersonal conflict styles of the two primary actors can be examined, the larger external forces of the political and military institutions that had a profound affect on the development and final outcome of the conflict must be considered.
Institutional Divisions Between Truman and MacArthur:

Fundamentally, the principle divisions between Truman and MacArthur were a result of the responsibilities and authorities vested in their respective official positions. As President of the United States, it was Truman’s obligation to construct the United States’ official policy concerning the Korean situation. As Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, he also represented the military’s highest ranking authority, which left MacArthur, the commander of UN and U.S. troops in South Korea, as his direct subordinate.

As the prime representative of the U.S. civilian policy, Truman was obliged to consider, not only out military interests, but also our international diplomatic, economic, and political interests as well. Traditional accounts of the Truman/MacArthur controversy, including the memoirs of Truman (1956), and the academic analyzes by Spanier (1965) and Schlesinger (1965), acknowledge the restraining effects of the Administration which favored “alliances over unilateral action, limited war over world war, and civilian control rather than military usurpation.”

According to this same view, Lo, in his 1979 study, maintains that the Truman Administration subscribed to the “pragmatic” doctrine in formulating its official policy, as is typical of citizen leaders.

According to Janowitz, the “pragmatic doctrine” of civilian military leadership can be considered, “the liberal, internationalist foreign policy advocated by civilian policy makers.” Based on this philosophy, civilian leaders devise a foreign military policy that takes into account all potential implications of its implementation. Additionally, this doctrine calls for, “tempering military policy with diplomatic, political, and economic considerations.” The following

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155 Lo, 230.
quotation from Donovan’s *The Words of Harry Truman*, reveals Truman’s “pragmatic” approach to politics through his perception of the responsibilities inherent in the office of the presidency.

“The very fact that he’s the chief executive makes it necessary for the president to understand the nation, its relations with other nations, and its relations to the people here at home. If he does that, he’s well on his way to accomplishing the purposes for which he was elected. In other words, he’s got to be a good politician, and a politician is a man who understands government. I’m proud to be called a politician.”

Clearly, Truman had a firm grasp on the importance of both representing and fulfilling the domestic and international needs of his followers. Furthermore, his remark is founded on the assumption that presidents as national leaders must work in conjunction with leaders in differing contexts in order to become successful. Truman’s understanding of the importance of working with others in order to represent the needs of his followers leads into Janowitz’s second assertion about “pragmatic” leaders. He argues that leaders who follow a pragmatic doctrine often “have career histories that include positions such as handling negotiations, public relations, military occupations, and balancing the needs of the military personnel and the civilians.”

Because of such numerous demands placed upon the civilian leader, he must embrace a rather conservative value system that is cautious, limited, realistic, and efficient.

Truman’s abeyance to the “pragmatic” doctrine is evident in his blatant opposition to MacArthur’s ambitious initiative to accept military support offered by Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalist Chinese government in Taiwan in his gallant plan to cross the 38th parallel, and to assume total victory. Truman’s hesitancy stemmed from his ability to foresee the possibility of that the People’s Republic of China would then enter the war. Such a disaster was highly likely, according to Truman, if American troops crossed into North Korea, especially if accompanied by

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156 Donovan, 35.
157 Lo, 230.
Chinese Nationalists. Based on this belief system, and the chain of events that would ensue if here were to authorize MacArthur’s initiative, Truman foresaw dire effects on U.S. foreign policy in Europe and throughout the world. His memoirs reveal dramatic insights about Truman’s continual subscription and assertion of the “pragmatic” doctrine:

“Every decision I made in connection with the Korean conflict had this one aim in mind: to prevent a third world war and the terrible destruction it would bring to the civilized world. This meant that we should not do anything that would provide the excuse to the Soviets and plunge the free nations into an all-out war.”

According to Lo (1979), MacArthur, on the other hand, subscribed to the “absolutist” doctrine of military policy. This school of thought rests on the traditional military values of loyalty, duty, restraint, and dedication, which are believed to inevitably lead to complete victory. Janowitz (1960) explains that during the Korean episode, the absolutist doctrine advocated, “rolling back the frontiers of communism and seeking total victory in war.” Accordingly, MacArthur attributed his actions as military commander to his official duties outlined by the military’s fundamental value system.

His ethos was the “fighter spirit” and he envisioned himself as the heroic warrior always ready and willing to sacrifice his life for his country. MacArthur was resolute in his commitment to the United States’ complete victory in Korea. He was convinced that nothing less than an all out display of force would be sufficient in countering the aggression in the Far East. In a statement to the president of the United Press, MacArthur professed,

“If the fight is not waged with courage and invincible determination to meet the challenges here, it will indeed be fought, and possibly lost, on the battlefields of Europe. To pursue any other course would be to turn over the fruits of our Pacific victory to a potential enemy.”

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158 Truman, 345.  
With such conflicting theoretical bases, Truman and MacArthur each had their own military and political objectives that they sought to attain. As both of the quotations cited earlier in this section illustrate, Truman and MacArthur had drastically opposing goals and concerns. Besides seeking victory for the United States and the South Koreans, Truman was preoccupied with the task of restraining MacArthur from ordering American troops into North Korea and from accepting assistance from the Chinese nationalists. His efforts focusing on MacArthur would therefore avoid a plethora of unfavorable outcomes including the invasion of Chinese forces and the escalation into a full-scale world war. MacArthur, on the other hand, was primarily concerned with waging a full-scale effort against the North Koreans, and was willing to risk the possibility of Communist involvement, since he did not believe this potentiality to be highly probable. Ideally with an international crisis such as the Korean affair, one would hope that a country’s military and political leaders would operate from the same fundamental value system. Although the means through which these leaders would attain their common goal might vary, the fundamental moral belief of serving our national interests should be the dominant concern of both institutional leaders. Unfortunately, such an idyllic situation did not present itself as the Korean conflict developed. Truman and MacArthur were therefore not only left to fight the North Koreans and the communists, but they also had to “fight” one another for political and military supremacy.
Connection Between Personality and Conflict Style:

There has been much debate surrounding the impact of an individual’s personality on conflict development and resolution. For example, some researchers, (Brown 1983; Thomas, 1967), have attempted to include personality variables in their theories of conflict. On the other hand, other scholars, (Greenhalgh, Neslin, & Gilkey, 1985; Terhune, 1970), have asserted that personality variables account for very little toward the variance in an individual’s reaction to conflicts, as compared to situational variables and relationship variables between the primary actors. Despite such apparent discrepancies, Chanin & Schneer, (1984), and Kilmann & Thomas, (1977), have maintained a direct correlation between personality variables and reactions to conflict. Findings from these studies suggest: "Introversion leans toward a tendency to avoid conflicts or to collaborate, the desire for control leans toward competitive or assertive choices, and agreeableness leans toward the use of power tactics."\(^{160}\)

Additionally, a study done by Baron (1989) focused on Type A and non-Type A personalities in order to discover the degree of aggressive behavior exerted by individuals involved in the conflict event, and their respective personality type. Moreover, Baron’s results suggest that Type A participants, as compared with non-Type A participants, reported more conflict experiences and less collaborative tactics for conflict resolution.\(^{161}\) Aggressiveness is a “complex disposition composed of irritability, assertiveness, and coerciveness (Buss, 1961).”\(^{162}\) As hypothesized by many researchers, the results suggest that aggressiveness does correlate with confrontational tactics in conflict resolution.

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\(^{161}\) Ohbuchi & Fukushima, 100.

\(^{162}\) Ohbuchi & Fukushima, 100.
In the examination of the Truman/MacArthur controversy, personality variables including those traits emphasized in their profiles, along with other individual facets such as their influence tactics and respective power bases will be analyzed to predict the preferred conflict styles of the primary actors. The following sections will present a concise evaluation of their respective personality attributes and their connection to a preferred conflict style. Based on these findings, the fundamental conclusion will be drawn that suggests the "inevitability" of their confrontation, resulting in MacArthur's official dismissal.
Harry Truman: Personality Variables and Conflict Style:

Based on Truman's personality assessment, the findings from his early professional experiences with conflict, suggest that Truman embraced a vast repertoire of conflict styles and strategies. Many instances throughout his life dealing with conflict illustrate Truman’s ability to engage in a variety of approaches. Additionally, results from his personality profile suggest that his active-positive personality trait facilitated his ability to engage in a wide array of conflict styles. Examples of such conflict styles drawn from Truman’s personal and public life that will be cited within this section include the integrating, compromising, and dominating conflict approaches. However, with the primary thesis of this paper being the "inevitability" of Truman’s dismissal of MacArthur, the evidence will suggest that Truman perceived no other alternative, but to engage in a dominating conflict style so as to minimize and to manage MacArthur's incessant acts of insubordination.

The fundamental assumption of Truman's approach to conflict is that he possessed a broad repertoire of conflict management styles and skills. Much of his ability to engage in various styles can be attributed to his close study of history, and examples of effective leadership. This vast knowledge allowed him to mold his behavior to the specific conflict event so as to fit the needs of all interested parties. Although in many instances, he maintained his own needs as a fundamental concern, he also took into account the needs and beliefs of those involved in the conflict event. However, in situations where time was of the essence, especially in the Korean conflict, Truman exercised a more dominating approach toward conflict. Although he actively pursued the opinions of his close advisors, Truman's decisions were founded upon his having the final say. Truman's management of MacArthur's displays of insubordination best exemplifies his shift to a more dominating conflict style.
Beginning with his childhood years, it has already been mentioned in his personality profile that Truman abstained from direct conflict with his peers. Truman was so highly self-conscious about his impaired eyesight, that he avoided direct confrontation with his schoolmates. Instead, however, he regularly assumed the role of mediator, as one who managed conflict by seeking out areas of agreement and facilitating mutually acceptable outcomes. Truman’s unique understanding of the importance of a diplomatic approach to conflict at such a young age facilitated his ability to develop a wide range of conflict styles.

The first approach toward conflict that Truman portrayed during instances of both his private and public life was the compromising style. The fundamental premise of this conflict style is that the individual is required to demonstrate a “moderate” or “equal concern” for his own goals, and for those of the others involved in the conflict event, in order to attain a “middle ground.” Truman’s ability to develop and exercise this compromising style can be attributed to his early experiences as the role of the mediator. The mediating strategy and compromising style are related in that they both seek to determine and fulfill mutually acceptable outcomes. The following quotation previously included in Truman’s personality profile reveals the connection between his knowledge of mediating tactics and his ability to engage in a compromising approach to conflict:

“... When I was growing up it occurred to me to watch the people around me to find out what they thought and what pleased them most... I used to watch my father and my mother closely to learn what I could do to please them, just as I did with my schoolteachers and playmates. Because of my efforts to get along with my associates I usually was able to get what I wanted. It was successful on the farm, in school, in the Army, and particularly in the Senate.”

Truman’s reflection reveals great insight about his ability to recall his effective usage of mediating tactics that therefore enabled him to engage in a compromising conflict style. Based

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on his experiences engaging in mediating strategies and compromising tactics, Truman was able to address the beliefs and values of those involved in the conflict event (mediating), while at the same time maintain his own needs as a definite priority (compromising).

In dealing with the Korean conflict in particular, Truman exercised his compromising style in his initial recognition of MacArthur’s acts of insubordination. Truman’s approval of MacArthur’s Inchon project is a vivid example of his willingness to compromise with the general on an extremely tenuous military objective. Despite MacArthur’s obvious opposition to the Administration’s objectives and fundamental beliefs, Truman was willing to work out a “middle ground” solution that met both of their needs. Therefore, in the end, despite Truman’s well-reasoned hesitations, MacArthur was authorized to proceed with his Inchon attack, but not without the definite qualification that he could not cross the 38th parallel. Truman’s approval of MacArthur’s project with qualification vividly depicts his compromising conflict style. His willingness to “give in” to MacArthur’s immediate military objectives was facilitated by his demonstration of a compromising conflict style and mediating strategy that also prioritized his fundamental concern of the possibility of imminent defeat.

The second conflict style that emerges from both Truman’s personality profile and from his conduct during the Korean War is that of integrating. In exercising this approach toward conflict, Truman often times assumed the roles of “information seeker,” “collaborator,” and “problem solver.” Often times his behavior in these roles was dictated either from his familiarity with similar experiences in the past or was the direct result of the advice given by trusted individuals. His lifetime fascination with history and great leaders of the past not only signified his thirst for knowledge and understanding, but it also served him with endless possibilities from

163 Barber, 217.
which he could exercise leadership in any conflict scenario. The following quotation from
Robert Donovan’s The Words of Harry S. Truman, best epitomizes Truman’s reliance on
historical examples in his display of an integrative approach to conflict.

“My debt to history is one which cannot be calculated . . .
The leader of any country, if he assume his responsibilities . . .
must know the history of not only his own country but of all other
great countries, and . . . he must make the effort to apply this
knowledge to the decisions that have to be made for the welfare
of all the people.”164

Based on the above-referenced quotation, Truman’s commitment to addressing the needs of the
American people is obvious. In order to fulfill such an ambitious commitment, he was
determined to seek out all relevant information in his best effort to solve impending societal
problems. Therefore, his approach to both actual conflict and in this instance the possibility of
conflict not only attempted to address the needs of all interested parties, but also attempted to
integrate into his behavior, historical examples of effective leadership.

Another example of Truman’s integrative conflict style emerges during his 1948 election
campaign. With the fear of McCarthyism at its peak, and suspicions of his Administration
harboring Communists abound, Truman found himself in a fragile domestic conflict situation. In
determining how best to address this delicate context, Truman realized that he had to address the
immediate needs and concerns of the American people. He therefore chose to exercise an
integrative style to manage this conflict. The following remark by Truman in 1948 epitomizes his
conception of an integrative approach to conflict as it relates to addressing the immediate needs
of the American people:

“On all sides [1948] there is heartening evidence of great energy—
of great capacity for economic development and even more important,
capacity for spiritual growth. But accompanying this great activity
there are equally great questions, great anxieties, and great aspirations.

They represent the concern of an enlightened people that conditions should be arranged so as to make life more worthwhile.

"We must devote ourselves to finding answers to these anxieties and aspirations. We seek answers which will embody the moral and spiritual elements of tolerance, unselfishness, and brotherhood, upon which true freedom and opportunity must rest."\textsuperscript{165}

Truman's address to the American people in this instance illustrates his commitment to assuaging their ultimate fears of Communist infiltration into American society and their need for a trustworthy leader whose primary concern was their domestic security. This domestic conflict event pitted Truman against an invisible Communist enemy. In dealing with such a predicament, Truman exercised his integrative conflict style in an attempt to address the most immediate needs and concerns of his followers.

During his tenure as President of the United States, Truman actively sought out information and input from his advisors before he formulated most of his final decisions. With the beginning stages of the Korean conflict, it is clear that Truman actively pursued such an integrative approach to conflict. His close circle of advisors, including MacArthur, helped to frame the United States' official policy, along with the political and military agendas. In dealing with this crisis situation, Truman displayed strong concerns for his own interests, while at the same time, he recognized the importance of MacArthur's objectives in dealing with the Korean situation. Truman's meeting with MacArthur at Wake Island best exemplifies his display of an integrating style during this conflict event. The motivation behind the Wake Island meeting was fundamentally based upon Truman's desire to meet MacArthur in person, and to ascertain his viewpoints on a number of critical potentialities, including the possibility of Chinese or Soviet intervention. Based on any relevant and reasonable information he gained in his meeting with

\textsuperscript{165} Donovan, 33.
MacArthur, Truman had intended to integrate into his official policy the general's primary concerns.

However, as MacArthur's reassurance at Wake Island of the limited likelihood for either Chinese or Soviet intervention was proven to be inaccurate, Truman's conflict style evolved from integrative to a much more profoundly dominating style. Evidence of this dominating approach to conflict can be seen in Truman's early leadership position in the army as Captain during World War I. As previously mentioned, Truman proved to be quite the authoritarian when he reprimanded his troops for exhibiting behavior unbecoming of an officer of the United States military. In this example, as is the case for his conflict with MacArthur, Truman would not tolerate disrespectful acts by his subordinates. Therefore, in dealing with both situations, Truman embraced a dominating conflict style in order to assert his leadership competency.

Having had prior experience assuming a dominating approach to conflict, Truman reasserted many of those same behaviors during his conflict with General MacArthur, especially after their Wake Island Meeting. Despite MacArthur's immediate military success at Inchon following his rendezvous with the president, President Truman still feared the grave possibility of Chinese Communist intervention. Consequently, arising from this resounding fear was Truman's determination to appear rigid in his representation and expression of the official policy position of the United States. Based on his strong informational base, including CIA intelligence reports and Pentagon estimates, Truman attempted to weaken MacArthur's resolute commitment to a full-scale military endeavor. Essentially, Truman attempted to exert informational power over MacArthur as a primary means of influencing the contextual outcome.166

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Despite Truman’s influence attempt based on informational power, MacArthur remained convinced that there was little chance of interference in Korea from either the People’s Republic of China or the Soviet Union. He also remained convinced that nothing less than a full display of force would be effective in countering the aggression in the Far East. MacArthur displayed his commitment to his beliefs in his direct communications with both President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Even as early as the final stages of the Wake Island conference, Truman realized that he had been unsuccessful in his use of informational power: “I had hoped and tried to convince him that the policy he was asked to follow was right. He had disagreed. He was openly critical.” 167 With his informational appeals having rendered him powerless to MacArthur’s commitment to his mission, Truman perceived no other viable alternative but to exercise a more dominating approach to impending conflicts.

The development of Truman’s dominating conflict style can be witnessed through his official communications with MacArthur once the general began to make public statements that violated the official position of the United States government. As mentioned previously, MacArthur advocated a plan that required an all out military effort, which in effect dramatically opposed the Administration’s official policy of limited war. His public statements, therefore, criticized the Administration’s official policy from which all political and military endeavors were based. In response to MacArthur’s public indiscretions, Truman at first ordered an official communications restraint, ostensibly aimed at all military personnel, which prohibited commentary on the Korean situation without the consent of his administration. To demonstrate his commitment to this directive, Truman, on numerous occasions, issued direct communiqués to MacArthur that reaffirmed the United States’ official objectives and policy stance. However, as

167 Truman, 441.
MacArthur's insubordinate acts became more bold and frequent, Truman felt compelled to alter his conflict style to include dominating tactics and strategies.

Quite possibly the most vivid displays of Truman's dominating conflict style was his final decision to fire General MacArthur. After numerous attempts to manage MacArthur's incessant displays of insubordination, Truman exercised his legitimate power as President of the United States and commander-in-chief of the U.S. armed forces, in the ultimate display of his dominating style. The following quotation from his memoirs illustrates Truman's commitment to his dominating conflict style as it pertained to his decision to fire General MacArthur. On relieving MacArthur of his command, Truman asserted, "I was sorry to have to reach a parting of the way with the big man in Asia, but he asked for it and I had to give it to him."  

Based on Barber's classification of Truman as demonstrating an active-positive personality type, it becomes clear how he was able to shift his conflict styles. As mentioned previously, Truman had the uncanny ability to make decisions based on his own personal belief system and the available information, and then move on without dwelling on the consequences. Therefore, he could easily shift from one conflict style to another, depending on the given event, without much hesitation or self-doubt. Personal and public accounts from his life prior to his presidency illustrate his ability to engage in a plethora of conflict styles.

In his attempts to manage MacArthur's aggressive tactics during the Korean War, Truman's active positive personality allowed him to first exercise an integrative conflict approach, and then move on to more appropriate measures. For example, it was his strong belief in the importance of loyalty that enabled Truman to decide not to reprimand MacArthur after the intervention of the Chinese. Reflecting on this moment, Truman remarked, "I have never believed in going back on people when luck is against them, and I did not intend to do it now."
Nor did I want to reprimand the general.” 169  Truman was able to make this decision, because of his willingness to recognize MacArthur’s overwhelming need to achieve military success. Such ability to first perceive and then to effectively manage the needs of the other primary actor involved in the conflict event is the fundamental requirement of the integrative conflict style.

However, as the stakes grew more threatening, especially after the intervention of the People’s Republic of China, Truman’s active-positive personality facilitates his shift to display a more dominating conflict style. With his continued assertions as the leader of United States policy, Truman’s official political and military decisions began to dominate or override MacArthur’s beliefs, needs, and objectives. No longer was he concerned with satisfying MacArthur’s self-perceived needs of immediate and full-scale victory. For example, when MacArthur asked for more troops and resources to be sent to Korea so that his initiative could be carried out, the Administration refused his request. At that point in the war’s development, Truman was committed to his policy of limited war, and therefore exercised his dominating style without recognizing MacArthur’s needs or objectives.

169 Truman, 383-384.
Douglas MacArthur: Personality Variables and Conflict Style:

As is the case with President Truman, a direct correlation can be established between the individual aspects of General MacArthur’s personality and his preferred conflict style. Based on an assessment of his personality, MacArthur assumed rather aggressive, belligerent, and resolute personality behaviors. Based on these characteristics, when a conflict event arose, MacArthur displayed little concern for any other individual’s or group’s needs besides his own. Specific examples throughout his public life suggest MacArthur’s tendency to engage in a dominating approach to conflict. Therefore, based on such habitual reliance, MacArthur was predisposed to exercise a dominating conflict style in dealing with his consistent disagreements with the Truman Administration during the Korean War.

Because of his intimate and decorated military background, MacArthur assumed many of the moral and ethical premises of this larger institution as his own. In a speech given on January 26, 1955, to the Episcopal Diocese of Los Angeles, MacArthur illustrates his life-long commitment to the values and beliefs of the military by stating, “Much of my life has been dedicated to the profession of arms. Much of my experience has been in the practice of the arts of destruction.” The above quotation reveals profound insight into MacArthur’s militaristic values, and his willingness throughout most of his life to engage in acts of belligerency.

From such an overpowering willingness to execute harmful acts and to embrace the military values, MacArthur practiced distributive strategies as the foundation of his dominating approach to conflict. In exercising such distributive tactics, MacArthur displayed his dedication to the fulfillment of his personal objectives during a conflict event, without giving much regard to the interests of the other interested parties. MacArthur therefore exuded a dominating conflict.

170 Wittner, 60.
style with his display of the basic components of the distributive strategy such as asserting demands, threats, ridicule, and contempt toward any opposing forces.

During his childhood years MacArthur began to display those characteristics associated with the dominating approach to conflict. His will to win and competitive nature were personality traits that emerged as formidable components of his dominating conflict style. Throughout his developmental years, MacArthur displayed a distinct competitive nature that was not only encouraged, but was acutely sharpened by his mother. Even at a young age, whenever he was presented with a task, MacArthur would stop at nothing to see his objectives fulfilled. For example, when he was thirteen, he took on a summer job as a paperboy. However, his neighborhood already had plenty of young boys trying to sell newspapers on the street corners, and they did not appreciate the new competition that MacArthur represented. Despite his initial inability to sell a single paper, MacArthur refused to give up. He took the advice of his mother who urged him not to come home the next day until he sold all of his papers. That next night, MacArthur returned “looking as if he had been in a train wreck. His clothes were ripped, he had a black eye, dried blood caked his nostrils and mouth, his knuckles were red and raw, but every newspaper had been sold.” MacArthur’s display of such resolute commitment to his goal of selling all of his papers is a vivid example of the emergence of such coercive and forceful tactics that would ultimately develop into his dominating conflict style.

Because of the fusion of military ideals with his own competitive and aggressive tactics, MacArthur was cast into the role of ‘political soldier’ or a military politician. According to Walter Millis, “from an early date he had taken a close interest in partisan politics; he was prepared to use his prestige as a soldier to influence civil policy decision, and the arguments of

172 Perret, 21.
military necessity to override the diplomatic or political objectives of his civilian superiors."\textsuperscript{173}

His was a complex figure plagued by the internal struggle of both admirable and deplorable attributes for ultimate domination. Manchester depicts MacArthur’s dichotomous character in his biography: “Valor and guile, military genius and obsequiousness toward his superiors – the admirable and the deplorable – would coexist until the last days of his active career.”\textsuperscript{174} With his characterization as a ‘political soldier’ who would stop at nothing to see his objectives to their fruition, MacArthur’s dominating conflict style would develop and mature with many of his professional exploits.

As is evident through a close examination of his military campaigns, MacArthur exuded a dominating approach to conflict by formulating coercive stratagems that included anguished appeals to the public so that his objectives would be the focus of attention. According to one of Dwight Eisenhower’s biographers, “MacArthur carried a reputation for battlefield gallantry, for intellectual brilliance, for aristocratic sentiments, for political ambition, and for personal arrogance. He seemed to go out of his way in personal actions to arouse antagonism, and this in the very areas of public opinion where he most needed support.”\textsuperscript{175} MacArthur’s critics attacked him for the aggressive and antagonistic tactics he employed while attempting to manage conflict. His conduct during the Bonus Army Demonstration best exemplifies how his behavior produced vast criticism of his dominating conflict style.

MacArthur’s routing of the Bonus Army and driving it out of Washington in July 1932, has perpetuated and further substantiated his reputation as the insubordinate general. The story of MacArthur’s management of the Bonus Army protestors depicts MacArthur,

\textsuperscript{174} Manchester, 142.
\textsuperscript{175} Manchester, 148.
"riding a white horse down Pennsylvania Avenue at the head of heavily armed troops, driving thousands of impoverished, unemployed demonstrators who were exercising their rights as citizens out of the capital at gunpoint with the naked blades of bayonets. Hundreds of women and children were caught up in this melee, and they too were mercilessly tear-gassed and clubbed, their wretched hovels set ablaze by MacArthur’s troops and their pathetic squatter camps razed.”

The majority of Americans thought of this domestic uprising as a direct insult to the nation’s moral values, and therefore blamed MacArthur for his arrogance and his determination to exercise unauthorized power over these helpless citizens. In his unauthorized assertion of military force, MacArthur defied President Hoover’s direct order not to allow his troops to enter the Bonus Army’s camps. When he assumed command of the army he reportedly told the policemen on the scene, “We are going to break the back of the Bonus Expeditionary Force.”

Many scholars disagree about the degree to which MacArthur behaved insubordinately in this instance based on varying accounts of what actually transpired. Nevertheless, the legend of MacArthur as “the brutal and insubordinate man on horseback, and the general who scourged the poor and unemployed and drove them out of town at the point of naked bayonets,” has endured.

MacArthur’s aggressive behavior during the Bonus Army March is just one example of how he engaged in a dominating conflict style. The tactics he embraced were typical of this approach, and included coercive, forceful, threatening, and hostile measures through which he intimidated and ultimately defeated his opponents. As he climbed both the military and political ladders, MacArthur’s dependence on a dominating conflict style became more and more apparent. This dependence resulted from his narrowly framed conception of conflict

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176 Perret, 155.
177 Perret, 158.
178 Perret, 161.
management, which can be directly attributed to his mother’s influence on his formative years as an “army brat.” However, with each exertion of his dominating conflict style, MacArthur found himself both formally and informally rewarded at least by some of the American people for his military exploits. Although his approach to conflict was dominating and often times perceived as coercive and threatening, he consistently basked in the adulation offered by the American people and national leaders. This seemingly skewed reward system appeared to have been taking form during the initial stages of the Korean War, however, as history has revealed, President Truman chose to break the cycle by dismissing MacArthur of all his official duties, after numerous displays of insubordination.

A careful analysis of MacArthur’s professional behavior during the Korean War serves as the most profound case study from which to cite his disposition towards use of a dominating conflict style. Throughout the entire military campaign, MacArthur maintained the fundamental assertion that in war, “there is no substitute for victory.” This dominant statement alone, reveals MacArthur’s unwillingness to compromise on his fundamental objective despite the Administration’s overriding political concerns. As MacArthur viewed the context before him, he did not trust the Administration’s ability to devise a policy that would lead to victory, and therefore was not willing to sacrifice the lives of the soldiers under his command based on such ambiguous objectives. William Manchester in his biography, American Caesar, further supports this assertion with his remark that General MacArthur, “saw his men dying for nothing. If their sacrifice was to have any meaning, the UN’s political purpose needed reexamination. MacArthur’s critics pointed out that defining it wasn’t his job, and they were right. But someone had to do it. He didn’t try until his civilian superiors, despite his goading, had failed.”179

179Manchester, 623.
The following quotation from MacArthur’s Reminiscences reveals his fundamental objection with the Administrations’ official policy:

“The decision was made in Washington by men who understood little about the Pacific and practically nothing about Korea. While they idealistically attempted to prevent the South Koreans from unifying the country by force, they inevitably encouraged the North Koreans along opposite sides. Such a fundamental error is inescapable when the diplomat attempts to exercise military judgement.”

Based on this rationale, MacArthur saw no other viable alternative but to devise his own set of military objectives that would fulfill his ultimate goal of victory.

With the prolonged development of the Korean War, MacArthur became more and more resolute in his commitment to his military objective of victory, and to all of his ideological reasoning defending his position. After the Wake Island meeting, despite President Truman’s attempt to exercise informational influence over MacArthur, the general remained confident that nothing less than a full-scale military effort would be effective in countering the aggression. MacArthur neither respected nor trusted President Truman, his advisors’, or the military leader’s expertise in effectively dealing with the Korean conflict. He therefore relied on his own intelligence reports that he considered superior informational sources. Evaluating Truman after their Wake Island meeting, MacArthur concluded:

“He seemed to take great pride in his historical knowledge, but, it seemed to me that in spite of his having read much, it was of a superficial character, encompassing facts without the logic and reasoning dictating these facts. Of the Far East he knew little, presenting a strange combination of distorted history and vague hopes . . .”

180 MacArthur, 330.
181 Raven, 502.
182 MacArthur, 361-362.
Based on such overwhelming distrust and disagreement with Truman's historically-based arguments for a limited war, MacArthur, again, could not perceive any other alternatives, but to base his military objectives on his own information sources.

As presented in MacArthur's personality assessment, it is suggested that the general assumed an active-negative personality. Therefore, based on this assertion, MacArthur's insubordinate behavior would be expected. Furthermore, his aggressive approach toward conflict would naturally include forceful, coercive, threatening, and hostile tactics aimed at subverting the enemy at all costs. His early childhood and military experiences are replete with examples of his display of such dominating conflict strategies. Based on his familiarity with only one approach to conflict, MacArthur depended on his usage of dominating tactics to fight the Truman Administration for the supremacy of his military objectives. He therefore did not trust Truman's informational sources and political objectives, and believed his own intelligence to be far superior. As the Korean War waged on, MacArthur found himself fighting a political battle against the constitutionally supreme institution of the presidency, for the ultimate power to determine the United States official objectives. Lacking legitimate power over the Administration, MacArthur was therefore predisposed to engage in a dominating conflict style that allowed for the public attack of Truman's objectives and his engagement in insubordinate acts.
Conclusion:

The leader-follower dynamic between President Truman and General MacArthur during the Korean conflict is one that reveals unique insight into the study of leadership in crisis situations. The information presented in the historical chronology of the war, and the psychological assessments of both Truman and MacArthur, support the basic assertion that the conflict between the President and the General was inevitable. Based on the historical findings, MacArthur clearly exceeded his official authority as "the instrument" through which military policy was to be carried out, by directly engaging in policy-making initiatives. Additionally, the historical record reveals his consistent defiance of official directives issued by President Truman. As a result of the General's insubordinate acts President Truman ultimately perceived no other viable alternative but to fire Douglas MacArthur.

The personality assessments of both Truman and MacArthur reveal unique insight from which one can ascertain the motivations behind those actions that facilitated the development of their interpersonal conflict. Since the findings reveal that both men displayed personality behaviors that demonstrated high levels of certainty and resoluteness, the assertion of the "inevitability" of their interpersonal conflict is further supported. Additionally, the findings also reveal that both men engaged in different decision making processes that in turn led to their drastically opposing reactions to conflict. Overall, their individual personality assessments suggest a correlation between their respective behavior during the Korean War and the dramatically opposing personal and professional moral bases upon which their actions were founded.

However, when examining the findings of both Truman and MacArthur's preferred conflict management styles, the validity of the "inevitably" assertion is called into question.
Since the results suggest that Truman managed conflict throughout most of his life with a broad repertoire of tactics and strategies, one might therefore assume that he could have employed a less dominating conflict style that would not have led to his official dismissal of General MacArthur. Furthermore, while the evidence suggests that MacArthur depended on a dominating conflict style, the possibility remains that in previous conflict events throughout his life not mentioned in this research, he could have utilized different conflict tactics and strategies that might have enabled him to work through his disagreements with President Truman. Based on such speculation of the possibility of utilizing different conflict strategies and tactics, it is therefore difficult to maintain the assertion that General MacArthur’s dismissal was inevitable. However, the findings from both Truman and MacArthur’s preferred conflict styles do suggest that a relationship did exist between their competing approaches to conflict and MacArthur’s ultimate dismissal.

Given the urgency of the context at that time, it is difficult to hypothesize about conflict styles that could have or should have been exercised by President Truman and General MacArthur in an attempt to minimize the affects of their personal and professional disagreements. What this research does in fact reveal is the responsibility of the primary actors to examine all available approaches to conflict before actually engaging in conflict management tactics and strategies, so as to maintain a functional leader-follower relationship. If the leader or follower can manage conflict from a broad repertoire of strategies and tactics, the chances of a favorable outcome will be far more likely than if the individual is dependent upon a limited source of preferred alternatives.
**Implications for Leadership:**

The results of this research reveal the value of the Truman/MacArthur controversy as a case study to understand the dynamics of the leader-follower relationship. In particular, however, the events surrounding this conflict have established a correlation between an individual's personality attributes and his preferred conflict management style. This research represents a pioneer effort to establish this personality/conflict style connection between the President and his General, while at the same time accounting for situational variables such as institutional divisions and individual power bases which played a pivotal role in establishing the correlation.

Fundamentally, though, this research supports the historically debated argument of an acute demarcation of leadership roles and responsibilities between civilian and military leaders. This case study, however, illustrates the grave potentiality for the distinction of the leader/follower roles to become blurred as a result of individual personality attributes and preferred conflict styles, especially during the urgency of a crisis situation. During the crisis scenario of the Korean War presented in this case study, leader/follower cooperation never emerged as the dominant behavior between the primary actors. Instead, Truman and MacArthur engaged in a competition against one another for political and military supremacy, and the ultimate control over U.S. policy. Their vies for individual control added to the complexity of the crisis situation by creating the perception of a third enemy, in addition to the Chinese Communists and North Koreans, whose attempts to control official policy direction threatened the perceived omnipotence of their individual leadership efforts.
Limitations:

The primary limitation of this research endeavor was its heavy reliance on second hand sources. In putting together the chronology of the Korean War, I relied on the knowledge of "well-documented" historical and political scholars. A fundamental concern of mine during this process was that I did not cite as historical facts, events that were misrepresented. Without having a definite means of verifying each historian's assertions, my historical translation could have been tainted by the authors' individual biases or it could reflect the influences of revisionist history. In order to minimize the affects of this potential limitation, I only cited the works of "credible" authors whom I thought presented a balanced representation of the Korean War.

Another limitation of this project was the minimal availability of psychological analysis of both Harry Truman and Douglas MacArthur. Since there were few sources from which I could develop their personality assessments, I had to rely heavily on biographical sources. From these references, I extracted personal anecdotes and experiences that could illustrate and best represent their dynamic personality attributes. The process by which I obtained this information was random, therefore I could have overlooked an important biographical event in either of their lives that could have accounted for a different personality attribute not included in this research. However, I was able to obtain some level of certainty in my depiction of their respective personality behaviors since my primary sources cited many of the same biographical accounts and personality attributes. In terms of future research on this subject, it might be helpful if leadership scholars analyzed additional well-documented psychological research such as the Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator in order to devise a more thorough and conclusive personality assessment for both men.
A final limitation, and quite possibly the most difficult obstacle to surmount was the fact that no scholarly work had been done on either Truman or MacArthur's preferred conflict resolution style. Therefore, I had to rely solely on biographical and historical sources that cited how each individual managed conflict both in their private and public lives. Although many of my primary sources cited similar instances of conflict management, the manner in which the authors depicted the primary actors was slightly skewed. For instance, some authors were heavily "pro-Truman" and "anti-MacArthur" or vice versa. Therefore, in my assessment of their conflict styles, I had to be constantly on guard for extreme representations of both individuals.

Despite the apparent limitations of this project, the research reveals unique insight into the leader-follower relationship between President Truman and General MacArthur during the Korean War. Although the information is heavily dependent on second-hand sources, most of the supporting examples and quotations have been taken directly from primary sources, including personal memoirs and official government documents. Since neither Truman nor MacArthur are alive today, their psychological and preferred conflict resolution style assessments cannot be personally validated. However, the utilization of their personal and public remarks has proven to be the next best alternative in order to support my assertions.
Appendix I:

March 25, 1951 message from MacArthur to Truman:

Operations continue to schedule and plan. We have now substantially cleared South Korea of organized Communist forces.

Of even greater significance than out tactical successes has been the clear revelation that this new enemy, Red China, of such exaggerated and vaunted military power, lacks the industrial capacity to provide adequately many critical items necessary to the conduct of modern war. He lacks the manufacturing base and those raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even moderate air and naval power, and he cannot provide the essentials for successful ground operations, such as tanks, heavy artillery and other refinements science has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns. Formerly his great numerical potential might well have filled this gap, but with the development of existing methods of mass destruction, numbers alone do not offset the vulnerability inherent in such deficiencies. Control of the seas and the air, which in turn means control over supplies, communications, and transportation, are no less essential and decisive now than in the past. When this control exists as in our case, and is coupled with an inferiority of ground fired power as in the enemy’s case, the resulting disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bravery, however fanatical, or the most gross indifference to human loss.

These military weaknesses have been clearly and definitely revealed since Red China entered upon its undeclared war in Korea. Even under the inhibitions which now restrict the activity of the United Nations forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrue to Red China, it has been shown its complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest in Korea. The enemy, therefore, must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea, through an expansion of our military operations to its coastal areas and interior bases, would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse. These basic facts being established, there should be no insuperable difficulty in arriving at decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits, without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa or China’s seat in the United Nations.

The Korean nation and people, which have been so cruelly ravaged, must not be sacrificed. This is a paramount concern. Apart from the military area of the problem where issues are resolved in the course of combat, the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere. Within the area of my authority as the military commander, however, it would be needless to say that I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander-in-chief of the enemy forces in the earnest effort to find any military means whereby realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly take exception, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.\(^{183}\)

Appendix II:

March 8, 1951 – Senator Joseph W. Martin’s letter to MacArthur:

My dear General: In the current discussions on foreign policy and overall strategy many of us have been distressed that, although the European aspects have been heavily emphasized, we have been without the views of yourself as Commander in Chief of the Far Eastern Command.

I think it is imperative to the security of our Nation and for the safety of the world that policies of the United States embrace the broadest possible strategy, and that in our earnest desire to protect Europe, we not weaken our position in Asia.

Enclosed is a copy of an address I delivered in Brooklyn, N.Y., February 12, stressing this vital point and suggesting that the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa might be employed in the opening of a second Asiatic front to relieve the pressure on our forces in Korea.

I have since repeated the essence of this thesis in other speeches, and intend to do so again on March 21, when I will be on a radio hook-up.

I would deem it a great help if I could have your views on this point, either on a confidential basis or otherwise. Your admirers are legion, and the respect you command is enormous. May success be yours in the gigantic undertaking which you direct.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph W. Martin, Jr.  

184 Hearings, 3182; Whitney, 463.
Appendix III:

March 20, 1951 – General Douglas MacArthur’s response to Martin letter:

Hon. Joseph W. Martin, Jr.
House of Representative, Washington, D.C.

Dear Congressman Martin: I am most grateful for your note of the 8th forwarding me a copy of your address of February 12. The latter I have read with much interest, and find that with the passage of years you have certainly lost none of your old-time punch.

My views and recommendations with respect to the situation created by Red China’s entry into the war against us in Korea have been submitted to Washington in most complete detail. Generally these views are well known and clearly understood, as they follow the conventional pattern meeting force with maximum counter-force, as we have never failed to do in the past. Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition.

It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe’s war with arms the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose this war to Communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable; win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you pointed out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory.

With renewed thanks and expressions of most cordial regard I am,

Faithfully yours,
Douglas MacArthur\textsuperscript{185}

\textsuperscript{185} Hearings, 3182; Truman, Vol. II, 445-6.
Appendix IV:

Military Exploits of General Douglas MacArthur:

1903 Commissioned Second Lieutenant, Corps of Engineers, and assigned to Philippines.

1904 Promoted to First Lieutenant

1905 Aide-de-Camp to his father, Major General Arthur MacArthur, in Tokyo

1906 Aide-de-Camp to President Theodore Roosevelt

1911 Promoted to Captain

1913 Member of the General Staff, Washington, D.C.

1914 Participates in Vera Cruz expedition

1915 Promoted to Major

1917 (August) Promoted to Colonel
(September) Chief of Staff, 42nd (Rainbow) Division, American Expeditionary Forces in France

1918 Promoted to Brigadier General

1918 Commanding General, 42nd Division, France and Germany

1919-22 Superintendent, United States Military Academy at West Point

1924 Commanding General, Philippine Division

1925 Promoted to Major General

1927 President, American Olympic Committee

1930 Promoted to General

1930-35 Chief of Staff, United States Army

1932 Routes the Bonus Expeditionary Force at Anacostia Flats

1936-41 Field Marshal of the Philippine Army
Appendix IV Continued:

1941 (July) Recalled to active service and named Commanding General, United States Army forces in the Far East. 
(December) Japanese attack Pearl Harbor and invade the Philippines

1942 (March) Abandons the Philippines for Australia 
(April) Named Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area

1944 American forces land at Leyte Beach. MacArthur returns to the Philippines

1945 MacArthur named Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan

1948 Enters Republican Presidential Primary in Wisconsin

(September) Landing at Inchon 
(October) Wake Island Meeting 
(November) Chinese enter Korean War

1951 Truman relieves MacArthur of his commands\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{186} Wittner, 17-18.
Bibliography


29. Truman, Harry S. *Hearings, Vol II*
