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THE EARLY ORIGINS AND EXPERIMENTS OF FASCISM:  
THE HEGELIAN STATE AND THE SECOND EMPIRE

by

SAMUEL T. SCHROETTER, JR.

in fulfillment of the requirement for term-paper

--for Government 3.

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## FOREWORD

The majority of people assume that Fascism is a purely recent phenomenon. This paper is an effort to prove by a historical formula, an analysis of fact, and a parallel of events that the finished product of Fascism today has been in the making for a century. It sees the manifest origins of Fascism in the philosophy of Hegel and the milieu out of which Hegelianism grew. Then Fascism first took political form in the preliminary experiment of Louis Napoleon. For some years after that passed it was merely an infiltrating element in the structure of democracy. But democracy broke down after the great World War, and Fascism took over the state. But all this fits in with the theory of historical movement I have attempted to use in this paper, and I will pass on to a completer statement of that below.

I intend ~~in~~ this paper to be a part of a larger whole. As it stands, it is enough to define the field and indicate the implications. But more is needed to supplement this, to fill it out and to drive home its conclusions. I have accordingly indicated in the table of contents the scope of what ought to be the complete study.

Even the complete study ought not to stand by itself. A complementary study would treat the rise of democracy out of Machiavellian monarchies of the early days of capitalism. Thus, together the two studies would view one aspect of capitalistic civilization:

- I. (1) The rise of democracy out of early forms of the period of initiation.
- II. (2) The rise of Fascism out of the democratic forms of the period of stability; and
- (3) The factors pointing to the supersession of capitalism by socialism after the failure of desparare Fascist dictatorships.

The first study and the second would meet in the person of Eman-

uel Kant, who was the last philosopher of rationalism, and cast the first shadow of coming pragmatism.

I hope I have not imposed too offensive a mold of theory or too obnoxious a burden of prejudices on the facts covered by this study. The material converges toward the dictatorship of Napoleon III which was established in 1852. Actually, it deals specifically with him in a small portion of the whole paper. Both these apologies for departing from the usual form of a term paper have their root in the same desire of mine: I feel strongly that the second Empire has long been in bad need of more than superficial interpretation from the point of view of an analysis of its character (which accounts for the theories and prejudices which in any man fill the supply-room of his hypotheses) and of an accounting of its antecedents, context, and consequences (which is a need subordinate to the analysis of its character and, in turn, accounts for the otherwise extraneous material). The specific facts have been covered often enough.

My theories are general ones for historical interpretation, and are best illustrated in such a complete study as I have indicated above. But as I view this paper as part of such a study, they are the categories in which my material is organized, and I shall briefly recount them here and apply them in detail in the main body of the paper:

1. That man is an adapting animal, continually improving his position in relation to the forces about him; that the mechanism of adaptation is economic.
2. That economic forces, in the broad sense, are "the basic causes of every fundamental change, whether in the world of things or in the life of thought," as Will Durant states in connection with Marx.
3. That this of course implies a periodic succession of "states", of industrial, societal, political, and psychological modes, in accordance with the economic bases; and further, within the fundamental changes, political rearrangements which have recently tended

to take the form of (1) initial awkward dictatorship, (2) refined, self-confident democracy, (3) final desperate dictatorship, for the last of which we may cite Fascism as an example.

4. That the growth of new movements follows a pattern of apprehension of the changed needs by philosophic thought, which changes the system through the motor agencies of political activity in analogy to our bodily response system-- both with the exception of direct reflexes.
5. That thus a period develops the origins of its successor in the philosophic thought (Hegel) of its early days of indecision; that soon, early, tentative experiments of the new (Napoleon III) are tried over the framework of the old; that as the old grows into its more sure-footed stride, these vanish and the new slumbers save for insidious permeation into the old (centralization-- Disraeli); that, as the old breaks down the new violently awakens and takes over the state (Mussolini)
6. That the last stage of the old state (see 2 (3)), which in our study is Fascism, develops, almost parallel to complete revolution, to a new state; that it is new in contrast to the second stage, but old in contrast to revolution, is both the principal opponent and a transition to the revolutionary state, and both a replacement and a conservation of the old; that it is, in short, a revision instead of a revolution, a coup d'etat only instead of a coup d'etat plus a revolution.

We might make a little amplification of the last two points, since they are the ones which bear directly on this paper, whereas the first four points are general themes from which the whole approach is made.

From the fifth point, it will be evident that the complete period will fall into four periods, of which we will in this essay deal with only 1 and part of 2.

1. 1814-1848, in which the ideas originate and come to fruit.
2. 1848-1871, in which the first experiments are made and allowed to decline.
3. 1871-1917, in which the movements slumber amid the general prosperity of the old order.

ADDENDA:

4. 1917- , in which the capture of the state is made amid general breakdown of the old order.

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In amplification of the sixth point, and to dispel any confusion in distinguishing the content, function, and historical rôles of Fascism and Communism, we may as well state that now that our findings in the essay proper clarify it to this extent:

1. Hegel and Fascism represent a reactionary revision of the present system, a partial change, i.e. a change of the political system erected on the same social system. Marx and Communism represent a progressive revolution against the present system, a total change of the social system and its political derivatives. If history carries us that far according to logical principles, Fascism will be the final, conservative stages of the old order; Communism, replacing it, will be the initial, inaugurative stages of a new order.

2. Hegel died after leaving a great introductory impress on the pragmatism that was to replace him, and an erratic, bobbing, decadent personal following which has aroused no great new philosophies and begun no tradition. Marx died the pioneer of a great tradition which was to follow him in philosophy. That may be considered symbolical. Fascism will die as sterile a death as Hegel now that these forces have finally and conclusively arrived on the political scene.

Finally, I will clear up the reason I have made this a study of Fascism rather than Communism. Having chosen such a theme, that might seem peculiar. However, we are living in a period of which Fascism is a continuation, while Communism is a clear break. Fascism throws more light on the phenomena of this era; Communism deals with the next. Fascism is easy to measure; Communism is still enveloped in a cloud of doubt. And despite this, because of our pioneering and crusading, and our disinterest in the transitional, I suppose, Communism is the hackneyed subject; Fascism

has never had adequate treatment. Thus I had some knowledge of what Communism was before I undertook this paper; but it is not until I "read up" on some of its factual history that I had a fairly clear understanding of the implications of Fascism.

This preface is the outline of my approach. I have included a regular outline of the development of the paper, and a thorough bibliography of my sources.

S. T. S.



OUTLINE  
OF THE PROJECTED SCOPE OF THIS PAPER.

PART I.

PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS

- I. EUROPE IN 1815: THE SITUATION.
- II. PHILOSOPHY IN 1815: THE RESPONSE.
  1. KANT AND HIS SCHOOL: GENERAL REACTIONS.
  2. HEGEL AND MARX: SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS.
  3. HEGEL: PRE-REVOLUTIONARY FASCISM.
  4. MARX: POST-REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNISM.
- III. ORIGINS OF THE NEW IDEAS BEFORE 1848.
- IV. GROWTH OF THE NEW IDEAS SINCE 1848.

PART II.

PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENT

- I. DEVELOPMENT OF FORCES TO 1848, with the institution of analogy.
- II. BREAKDOWN OF THE STATE, 1848, compared to events since the World W.
- III. THE FASCIST COUP D'ETAT, 1848-51, compared to modern instances.
- IV. THE DICTATORSHIP, 1851-56: POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS compared to present-day Fascism.
- V. THE RELAXATION OF THE DICTATORSHIP contrasted to possible breakdowns of Fascism today.
- VI. NAPOLEON III AKIN TO BISMARCK, LINCOLN, CAVOUR &c.

PART III.

THE LEGACY TODAY.

- I. FRANCE-- THE BOURGEOIS NATION OF TODAY.
- II. FASCISM-- THE DOMINANT GOVERNMENT OF TODAY.

PART IV.

THE VALUE OF FASCISM

**PART I.**

I  
of the rise of democracy

The grand drama ~~of the rise of democracy~~ came to a climax in the glorious French Revolution, and its spring waters seemed to sweep all the debris of collapsed aristocracy before it. But when its flood had been exhausted it was found that the contents of the favored ark was a peculiar, dirty menagerie; and that its backwash was bringing down a great deal of the mess which had been merely backed up against the hillsides, followed by a troop of the defiled who had camped up there. The fresh, clean ground the members of the ark had expected to find prepared turned out to be a nasty muck left by the receding waters themselves and by the returning debris. Was this, then, the result of the cleansing flood? All Europe in 1815 wallowed in pessimism. The returning "defiled" took an energetic, though half-way conforming part in the reconstruction, using old materials where they could; and the disappointed revolutionists, half of them already dead in the swirling waters, rather than keep a vigilant surveillance over the aristocratic relicts left the dreaming to the romantic young (Chateaubriand) or the senile old (Wordsworth) and schemed (Talleyrand) or went to sleep in the muck. Like late March, it was a dreary time. "Only the young men can live in the future and only the old can live in the past; men were most of them forced to live in the present, and the present was a ruin. Europe had a terrible headache in 1815." <sup>1</sup>

All this is a good representational picture: but what does the actual inspection and analysis reveal?

It reveals that <sup>while</sup> the ~~whole~~ revolution accomplishes its purpose, and and is the only instrument for broad accomplishment, in particulars it is disappointing. Men of action and their methods as often confuse as lead history, contrary to the cherished "leadership" theory for grammar grade students. Such a smear across economic necessity and philosophic thought

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<sup>1</sup> Durant, pp. 327, 373

had been made by 1815, when men forgot their principles and needs in the struggle of personalities, the grand melee, which the great revolution had turned into. Rousseau and Kant alike had been wiped out, it seemed, and there was only the profound impression that they had lived. The mass liberation was obscured, and men did not know whether in Napoleon or Pitt they had the liberal: whether the revolution of 1688 or that of 1798 was the genuine one. In short, Europe in 1815 did not know which man of action to pin their hopes on or what was the significance of specific issues. Thus were the clear instructions of the philosophers obscured.

But to say the revolution was not accomplished would be incorrect. History in its virile movements is not that futile. The bourgeoisie had triumphed in the French revolution. Metternich merely temporarily <sup>checked</sup> the realization, while he permitted the practice. It was an illusion that the old order was restored either in 1798, 1804, or 1814-15. The aristocracy was dead; where an aristocrat survived in appearance he survived as a folderol to the bourgeois state; where he survived as a force he survived in the function of a bourgeois capitalist. The aristocratic class had become entirely superfluous and disintegrate as a functional group in society. Furthermore, the proletariat had not yet achieved class consciousness: there were individual proletarians created by the now ruling bourgeoisie, but they did not form an organized proletariat.

Such was the peculiar complex of the post-war period. There was a titular rule of the aristocracy when the aristocracy no longer existed in the Atlantic nations; there was the mere potential triumph of the bourgeoisie when the bourgeoisie had actually triumphed in the great upheaval. This period was in effect an interregnum.

The revolution was born in an era of idealism and carried through under its firm impulse. But as a sign that it was accomplished, yet incomplete, the termination of the strife produced an age of sickly romanticism, of inertia and bewilderment. It was an atmosphere that was

stultifying of action yet provocative of hope for the completion of the undertaking. What Europe needed was an age of materialism to settle the foundation of the new social structure upon. But that age could not come until this romantic interregnum, this quiescent age for dreaming and thinking, could produce new ideas which accepted this revolution as a fact and built new hopes of further changes. By that time Europe could have found its bearings in the new atmosphere, and by the very fact that new challenges were being issued to it as a de facto regime, could take stock of its position, assert itself against both this new challenge and the old vestiges of a society now past. Europe, in short, would derive courage and faith in itself enough to entrench against the new-- and also perhaps accept some of the new as inevitable developments of itself and as insurance against the extreme and revolutionary doctrines of the new. That this last thing happened by about 1850 and that it is characteristic of history, is the main theme of this paper. That the former was happening, that such was the mood of Europe in the uprisings of 1819-20, 1830-32, and finally, 1848, is proof of the development I have just outlined, and of the effectiveness of Hegel and Marx. But before we go on to see the results, let us survey the origins of these new thoughts.

For man had set out to reconstruct philosophy.

## II

Kant, as we have explained in our introductory essay, was both the climax of one period of thought, and the beginning of another. "Kant closed the 18th century and ushered in the 19th."<sup>2</sup> ... He marked the climax of the natural metaphysics of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, and his political philosophy was essentially that of Rousseau and the French revolutionaries. But Kant was also a pioneer in the romantic thought of the early Nineteenth Century; he emphasized the moral 'duties' of man and he stressed the concepts of 'spirit' and 'will'.<sup>3</sup> As mysticism proved

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<sup>2</sup>C. J. H. Hayes: Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe, V. I, P. 510

<sup>3</sup>Id., P. 739

inadequate to a world which needed freedom, so its successor, rationalism, proved inadequate to a world which needed dynamics. It turned out to be the notion of instinct which was usable for that purpose, and Kant was the spokesman of that notion. Probably Kant was not even conscious of these possibilities of his philosophy; were he asked, he would have undoubtedly stated merely that his philosophy was a perfection of the notion of the rational democratic state.

But Kant did start a new philosophy, and he was not alone. First, there were men before him, as our theme has stated, who had earlier introduced the new elements into thought; these men differed from Kant merely in that they are not climactic in character; the most important of these was Rousseau. Certainly from the very nature of their position, these men would be even less conscious of the eventual consequences of their thought than Kant was.

Second, there were the men who followed him. These men were not unconscious of their tendency, but semiconscious; the only two outstanding men in the first generation after Kant were Fichte (right) and Bentham (left). Fichte surveyed Prussian society and came to the conclusion that "freedom does not realize itself on the separate individual, but in human society" and the National State.<sup>4</sup> Bentham examined British government and announced that the secret of its success was the cabinet system of administration. At the same time, but under a different school, Lamarck was developing the idea of evolution which was to confirm instinct and prepare the ground for pragmatism. Following them came Schelling and Herbart, who weaved intricate systems of philosophy, Schelling after Fichte and his idealism, Herbart after Bentham and his utilitarianism, both somewhat in harmony with the age to come; and in addition to them, Hegel. Hegel stood on the threshold of change and forbade God to enter.

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<sup>4</sup>Weber, P. 486

It was not Hegel, but Schopenhauer, of the German idealist tradition (with his recognition of evolution and voluntarism) and Comte, of the French materialist tradition (who also accepted evolution and introduced positivism) who gave, in the midst of the deadened romantic period, the impetus to the new philosophy; who brought forth the Age of Darwin and ancestors <sup>and</sup> Nietzsche, and Spencer, and James; of whom it was said: "Intellectualism fell sick with Rousseau, took to its bed with Kant, and died with Schopenhauer [the same <sup>and</sup> applies to Comte]". The secret of this change was that there was a gradual consciousness of a new notion. This thing that changed all philosophy was less a new arrangement than a new knowledge: the recognition of evolution and its slow impact since Kant, giving thought a bio-psychological emphasis. "After two centuries of introspective analysis, philosophy found, behind thought, desire; and behind the intellect, instinct; -- just as, after a century of materialism, physics finds, behind matter, energy."<sup>5</sup>

2.

But it was not Schopenhauer, nor Comte, nor even Darwin, who defined the concepts by which humanity was to mold its political structure, that structure of which it is most conscious. It was to the formulae of Hegel and his logical successor, Marx, that that honor fell. Today one hears constantly of the "Hegelian State" and the "Marxian State".

If we examine these two social philosophies we are face to face with the theories that underlie the revolutionary states of today. One of these is an earlier, confused, reactionary doctrine which recognizes the crisis but stands, as we have said, on the threshold, hostile to the former conception of the State, but bulwarked against the logical progress to complete revolution. The second is the logical development, both in historical theory and political framework, of this transitional, reactionary Hegelian dogma.

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
<sup>5</sup>Durant, PP. 379-380

CHART II




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1 Descartes 2 Diderot \* Hartley - Priestley - La Mettrie (Reed - Hamilton)

- II age of Schopenhauer
- III age of James.




[see supplementary table on Schopenhauer]

- <sup>1</sup> Kant
- <sup>2</sup> Fichte, Lotze
- <sup>3</sup> Bentham
- <sup>4</sup> Schopenhauer
- <sup>5</sup> Marx
- <sup>6</sup> Edwards
- <sup>7</sup> Lenin
- <sup>8</sup> Pareto

a 1855-1916


# I Hegel table

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# II Comte table.

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<sup>1</sup> Hartley - J. S. Mill, Sr.

<sup>2</sup> Smith - Bentham

<sup>2</sup> Wundt?


<sup>3</sup> Hegel

<sup>4</sup> Mark, Spencer

<sup>4</sup> Darwin

# III Schopenhauer table

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|-----------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 1 Chorcat | 3 Lamarck       | 5 Kant, Edwards |
| 2 Wundt?  | 4 Marx, Spencer | 6 Darwin        |

3.

Why is it, you may ask, that we dogmatically call Hegel reactionary? The secret is easily found: his philosophy is not based on real perception, but is a synthetic doctrine. There was good reason for that: Hegel was one of the first to see clearly the faults of the bold program of the French revolutionaries, but he was looking at a moving, changing, unsettled spectacle, the outcome of which was not determined. Hence, to oppose to it any revision, he must rely largely upon a static rather than a tentative philosophy, one complete within itself rather than one resting upon a material reality (for there was no settled economic surety at that time), a pure theory instead of a revolutionary theory. Hegel framed his bold, new discoveries in an absolute system of logic that rendered it impotent for revolution and conducive to reaction.

Consequently, he "demonstrated<sup>[ed]</sup> that being is becoming, logical development, history, and that history is not only a science among others but the science of sciences", and thereby largely created "the historical movement of the nineteenth century, and impressed upon it the stamp of impartial objectivity which characterizes it, and which was foreign to the eighteenth century"<sup>6</sup> (that rational eighteenth century which produced the Liberal Revolutions.) But though he prepared for the instrumentalist state, and accepted the evolutionary concept, he placed it on a self contained, a priori basis, not the relative, pragmatic foundation natural to it.

He begins with the positive assertion that only on the condition we think according to reason, method, and logic will the result tally with nature and history.<sup>7</sup> And though we say the absolute is movement, process, evolution, the law which governs unconscious nature and human thought is reason; hence the terms reason and absolute

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6-Weber, Pp. 523-533  
7-Id., P. 499

are synonymous.<sup>8</sup> We still find this alliance between idealism and the Fascist movement which occupies the same unstable and transitional position, in political history, as we shall see, that Hegel held in the development of thought from Kant to Marx. The Fascist philosophers are all absolute idealists, neo-Hegelians, like Croce, Spengler, and Gentile, because Fascism needs a synthetic and illusory philosophy to justify its untenable position between two periods of history.

Now, the basis of the state is the prevailing idea of Society (the objective mind.) All states are derivative from this, the state is merely its embodiment or extension, as in Marx it is an extension of the prevailing economics. Both men refute the great men theory: "Great men are not so much begetters, as midwives of the future; what they bring forth is mothered by the Zeitgeist, the Spirit of the Age,"<sup>9</sup> as in Marx it is brought forth by the forces of production. A cruder statement of this Hegelian idea is mouthed by the contemporary Fascist politicians. If you have ever heard Mussolini or Hitler prattle of the Roman idea or the German idea or of the Totalitarian principle, you will grasp its significance.

Since the state is the derivative of idea, history is a succession of such ideas. "History is a dialectical movement, almost a series of revolutions, in which people after people, and genius after genius becomes the instrument of the absolute."<sup>10</sup> Each state "differs from civil society in that it no longer pursues the good of the individuals, but aims at the realization of the idea, for which it does not hesitate to sacrifice private interests... The State is the kingdom of the idea..."<sup>11</sup> When an idea comes into existence, it calls forth its contradiction, and the ideas do battle to produce a new era. "History is merely an incessant struggle between states of the past and those of the future..."

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<sup>8</sup> ibid.    <sup>9</sup>Durant, P. 323.    <sup>10</sup>ibid.    <sup>11</sup>Weber, PP. 516-517.

In spite of appearances to the contrary, the most vigorous people, the state representing the most viable idea, always succeeds in gaining the mastery... The idea of the state is gradually realized by means of such defeats and victories. The historical states are temporary forms in which it appears and which it discards when time has worn them out, only to assume new forms. Since the absolute is not restricted to a particular existence, but is always found in the whole, we cannot say the ideal state is anywhere <sup>12</sup>...

"The victorious state is truer, nearer to the ideal state, better in a word, than the vanquished state. The very fact that it has triumphed proves this: its triumph is the condemnation of the principle represented by the vanquished; it is the judgment of God... The God of history has successively 'chosen' the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Greeks, the Romans, the French. The national minds are grouped around the infinite Mind of which history is the temple, and one after the other, become its privileged organs. "<sup>13</sup>

"History is the progressive solution of the political problem... Each state represents the ideal from a certain side; none realizes its fullness; none is, therefore, immortal. Like the logical notions, which are absorbed by a more powerful rival, and by virtue of the same law, the nations, one after another, succumb to each other, and transmit to their successors, in a more developed and enlarged form, the political idea of which they have been the depositaries, the civilization of which they have been the guardians.

"This passage of the civilization of one people to another constitutes the dialectics of history. "<sup>14</sup>

There is, however, a tendency in history, and as Hegel grew older, the climax of this tendency took a more definite form as the ideal Hegelian state. "The three phases of every evolution: being, expansion, and concentration, recur in three great epochs of history...

[1] The absolute monarchy is superseded by [2] the republic... The

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12 - id., P. 518

13 - id., P. 520

14 - id., Pp. 518-519



classical republics last as long as the individual elements and the State remain in equilibrium. They are imperiled as soon as the demagogue's regime substitutes for the national interests the selfish interests of the individual ambition. The [3] Caesarean reaction forces the rebellious individual into obedience; the habitable world is conquered; the most diverse nations are thrown into one and the same mold and reduced into an inert and powerless mass. "<sup>15</sup> The Caesarian reaction: Mussolini! We have already the liberal era of the capitalistic period (substituting the scientific classification of period which Marx employs for Hegel's absurd classification of history into the Oriental, Classic and Modern.) Mussolini himself explains it to us, often using the words Caesar and Caesarism: "It cannot be said that Liberalism, a method of government good for the nineteenth century... should be necessarily suited to the twentieth century which already betrays characteristics different considerable from those of its predecessors... Now is the time to speak of 'Force'." <sup>16</sup>

But a peculiar aspect of Hegel's theory, and one which rendered it especially valuable to the Fascists, was a point we have made, but hardly stressed enough: that this last stage in the modern epoch is his ideal, and that this point, contradictorally enough, his dialectic freezes. It becomes, in effect, an end, when his philosophy does not, with consistency, admit any end. It imposes certain dicta when it should rigorously exclude permanent dicta. Marx was later to commit the same error, but at least he was able to carry his analysis as far

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15 - id., Pp. 520-521.

16 - Por, P/ 173

as the next epoch, that is, as far as it was possible to foresee and yet not to look to the past for a regeneration of an old political concept as the end of society. Marx at least has found certain factors in his final stage of "pre-history", as he calls all history before Utopia, that would, he had reason to think, terminate its operation according to the laws which have so far prevailed in history; whereas Hegel has committed the unpardonable mistake of overlooking the fact that a reaction is <sup>likely</sup> ~~nearly~~ a prelude to drastic revolution. Hegel, in his old age, ignored his first principles and followed his followers of the right, who had deduced a set of shallow principles from his theory. He condemned the radicals and before long he "began to think of the Hegelian system as part of the natural laws of the world; he forgot that his own dialectic condemned his thoughts to impermanence and decay," as Durant reminds us.

If society were to be petrified at this ideal point in history when the Hegelian state is achieved, Socialism would be cut off like a still-born child. "Each legal person has, by virtue of his free activity, the right ~~to~~ to possess, and consequently, also the right to transfer his property."<sup>17</sup> That is, unless he transcends his superior obligation to authority and legality, or totality. For the individual realizes in the Caeserian state, that freedom belongs to the totality of society; "the freedom of his fellow creatures becomes the law, the bridle, the limits of his own freedom. By giving way to this power, which is higher than the individual,"<sup>18</sup> the individual yields to society, or the state.<sup>19</sup> It is on exactly this basis of

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<sup>17</sup> - Weber, P. 514

<sup>18</sup> - italics mine

<sup>19</sup> - *ibid.*

capitalism (subject to this restriction by the principle of totalitarianism) that the function of the Fascist state rests. Almost any speech of either Hitler or Mussolini will state the main or subsidiary principle, if not both. What labor value is to Marx, property right is to Hegel.

This property right must be supervised by and this totalitarian principle vested in a dictator. "The state is nothing but an abstraction unless personified" in a dictator, - "the depository of its power, its political traditions, and the idea which it is called upon to realize." Il Principo or Il Duce is "the state made man, impersonal reason~~s~~ become conscious reason~~s~~, the general will become personal will."<sup>20</sup>

The third feature of the Hegelian state is one that recurs again and again in his history. It seemed to Hegel that nations ~~were~~ more nearly embodied a unifying idea than any other social concept. Hence, to him, the nation is the ultimate political unit. If objective mind is higher than subjective mind, then the individual idea and liberty is less clear, less real, less important than the national. "Though Hegel condemns political liberalism, he favors national liberalism and the principle of nationality... State means nationality, and nationality means unity of language, religion, customs, ideals."<sup>21</sup> But for progress, since nations are the only important entities, the greater nations must impose their idea on civilization. "Annexation is not a crime that justifies rebellion unless the annexed nation represents an idea which is as great, fruitful and viable as the idea represented by the conquering people"<sup>22</sup>. These are nationalities which represent no idea and have lost their raison d'être (Bretons, Basques).<sup>23</sup>

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20 - Weber, P. 517

21 - Ibid.

22 - What a peculiar clause! If a rebellion is not successful, then it is of no consequence; if it is successful, then, according to previous Hegelianism, it is a greater, better force,

Such nations are to be condemned."<sup>24</sup> Thus Hegel is, by a little logic, able to justify both nationalism and imperialism, those twin goddesses of the later nineteenth century. Such was the justification for the crimes of Mexico and Indo-China, Fiume and Ethiopia, and the Juden-Strassen of a thousand German cities.

It seems to me, and to most impartial observers of the political scene, that without the qualification of some important economic, social, or other advancement, this doctrine takes on a strong tinge of unmitigated reaction; and that was exactly ~~was~~ what Hegel, disgusted with the liberal revolution, relied upon. Dictatorships may be useful to inaugurate to the people some new revolutionary change in the state, and of such use is the dictatorship of the proletariat in the initial stages of a socialistic system. But its use in an already established system which had long since progressed beyond that stage of its development, is conservative of that system to an extreme; and conservation of a system which begins to fail after it has passed beyond the expected incapacity of childhood is conservation of something which is in a process of decay and which ought to be allowed to pass quietly; it is pure, despicable reaction. But, as Marx reminds us, a losing master will not give up his control without a struggle; and so the capitalists regime call in the bulldog which was used to guide its childish footsteps, and bids it protect it again in its senile infirmities, to guard over during its final days. "Entrez, Mussolini. Je desire votre protection féroce." In order to perpetuate its obsolete rule a while longer, Hegel, that canny ~~man~~ prophet, referred it back to its former days and to Machiavelli; grandfather

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23 - By the same token, the whole point is a petitio principii. This may, however, be Weber's fault.

24 - Id. P. 518

Machiavelli now occupies equal honor with father Hegel and consort Spengler in Lady Fascism's eyes. 25

Before we leave Hegel, perhaps a word should be said also of Spengler. Spengler at least corrected the notion that history reaches its ideal end in the Fascist state. He does, it seems, hold that Fascism is the apex (before the death) of each civilization. But civilizations follow one another in a rigid periodicity, following a course from simplicity (Nietzsche's "Dionysus") to complexity (Nietzsche's "Appollo") to decline. He, however, still holds to an ideal-dialectic instead of a material-dialectic, and seems to see a dark age between each period, ignoring the fact that there is no great retrogression in the living standards of the average population during a so-called "Dark-Age", and that a "Dark Age" is but the early stage of an improved, readjusted civilization; that instead of distinct civilizations in definite, recurring patterns, there was a diversity of civilized units following similar development of material conditions through several stages of the forces of production, and continually fusing from tribal diversity to increasing "international" unity, and if one follows Marx whole-hogged, terminating in the great unity of socialism.

4.

But we turn now to a much earlier, more important, vastly different disciple of Hegel. Instead of following Hegel down his later, declining path to the right (with Weisse, etc.) Karl Marx completed the work of those men who derived a thrill from the important, interpretative, thrillingly fresh contributions of Hegel's

first principles and the sceptical "higher criticism" <sup>26</sup> of his youth-- the Hegelians of the Left.

It seems rather strange to connect Marx with Hegel, but connected they are, as definitely as Hegel and Fascism or Marx and Communism, or (though that too, is not so well recognised) Fascism and Communism. Marx, like Burbank, brought to fruit what was not particularly valuable under the more common care of Hegel. He corrected the errors into which Hegel had fallen. It is Marx who fostered the complete revolution out of a revisionist plan. Finally, ~~(ii)~~ it was Marx who pioneered along a fruitful river, which, following him and Darwin, grew to the greatest philosophical stream of the nineteenth century, rather than as the Hegelian movement, turn out a few English academicians and Fascist rationalizers. Today Marx begins to be recognized by philosophers as a leader in what is now a great tradition; Hegel is considered an important stuffed owl in a curiosity gallery.

We have seen a little of Marx's reconstruction of Hegel in our discussion of the latter, for I have interpolated bits of Marxist critique in the account. We have spoken before of the need for an age of materialism. Marx gave us this. His heritage was from Comte as well as Hegel, though he actually carried on the tradition of Schopenhauer, from whom he received~~y~~ nothing direct, as far as my evidence goes. But by the time Marx had evolved his theories<sup>see</sup>, Europe had settled down and a materialist interpretation of society was possible.

Marx was the Newton, Boyle, and Darwin of social science. He reconciled economics to politics and politics to philosophy, and made the relation a transitive one: "He was, in fact, well on the way towards the theory that all philosophy is an expression of economic

circumstances."<sup>27</sup> Out of this he developed the first history that was both scientific and philosophic. That alone would mark him the greatest historian of the nineteenth century, whatever his advocacy.

Marx, first, had a sound basis in his philosophy of knowledge, and therefore of human experience, that is above all others capable of explaining the dynamics of history without recourse to purely synthetic conceptions. It was the real beginning of pragmatism, for Marx took no more recourse to the lifeless mechanism of the eighteenth century than to the illusory idealism of Hegel: rationalism was completely out, and evolution was allowed a free hand unbound by stale philosophies. "The philosophy advocated by the earlier part of these theses is that which has since become familiar through Dr. Dewey, under the name of pragmatism or instrumentalism. Whether Dr. Dewey is aware of having been anticipated by Marx, I do not know, but undoubtedly their opinions as to the metaphysical status of matter is practically identical."<sup>28</sup> Their challenge to the old empiricism, sensationalism, is the same. Matter, as with Locke, is existant. It is the cause, the raw material, but not alone the object of experience: in this radical empiricism, the passive conception is out. "Marx maintains that we are always active, even when we come nearest to pure 'sensation': we are never merely apprehending our environment, but always at the same time altering it. This necessarily makes the older conception of knowledge inapplicable to our actual relations with the outer world. In place of knowing an object in the sense of positively receiving an impression of it, we can only know it in the sense of being able to act upon it successfully. That is why the test of all truth is practical. And since we change the object when we act upon it, truth ceases to be static, and becomes something which is continually changing and developing. That is

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27- Russell.

28- *ibid.*

why Marx calls his materialism 'dialectical', because it contains within itself, like Hegel's dialectic, an essential principle of progressive change."<sup>29</sup>

The fundementum of the state, according to Marx's theory, is the conditions of production then existent in society. "There exist, in any society, certain material 'forces of production' and a certain knowledge of their use in man's service. These form the 'conditions of production', and for their employment there is required an arrangement of the powers of society, implying a certain relationship among the members, and the establishment and maintenance of appropriate social institutions. If, for example, at a particular stage of development the 'forces of production' are to be fully exploited certain forms of private property must be recognized and secured, and certain members of society endowed with authority both over the material means of production and over the other members, who must accept [what is] assigned to them by the dictates of economic circumstance. This recognition and this authority imply and require a power able to enforce them, and this power is found in the state<sup>30</sup>, which takes its special form from the character of the economic institutions it exists in order to uphold. Political and social institutions are thus dependent upon and derive their powers from the underlying economic circumstances of the society in which they exist."<sup>31</sup> Political power, as in Hegel, is a derivative power, but in Marx it depends for its validity "on its correspondence with the needs forced on men by the conditions of production."<sup>32</sup>

And history "do move". As the conditions change, the superstructure erected on them also changes. "But institutions, once established are highly resistant to modification."<sup>33</sup> Therefore there is a lag until the

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29- *ibid.*

30- *italics mine.*

31- G. D. H. Cole.

32- *ibid.*

33- *ibid.*



accumulated disharmony operating according to the mechanics of change overthrows the entire system by violent revolution, and a new system is erected that is in harmony with the new conditions of production. The mechanics of change are not, as with Hegel, vested in national governments corresponding to ideas, but in social classes produced by economic forces, appropriate to dominate their particular stage of productive conditions; yet the struggle between classes is as real as any warfare between nations for the supremacy of the globe. Hence Marx's kinship to Hegel, and herein his departure from him. As with Hegel a new idea which is embodied in the triumphant state calls forth its contradiction, so in Marx a class which has created the state in its own image calls into being and educates, conditions, organizes it for efficiency a dominated class which is in more direct contact with the conditions of production and hence with change (in Hegel, the new state becomes more viable than the old-- same thing) , and thereby coming to represent a mastery of the new conditions of production, eventually challenges the power of the now-decadent, superficial old class-in-authority.

The Marxian system, as the Hegelian, also comes to a close-- when all this pre-history process ends and history begins.<sup>34</sup> When the proletariat, or actual producing classes, come to control, they will not create a new class, but abolish property, complete centralization, and reduce the mass of population to proletarian status in which no one will have a weapon over the other. This is the ultimate revolution, and a classless society is created in which the mechanism used in his dialectic will, of course, be removed, i. e., the mechanism of class war. Like Hegel's ideal state, this ultimate society will have three features: (1). Not property, but value, will be the basis on which the function of the Marxian state will rest. The value of a commodity is determined by the amount of labor that goes into it. If that is true, then labor value rather than property is fundamental. Hitherto, in

our present system, the capitalist masters have appropriated the surplus value over a subsistence wage to the producing slave. When the Marxian state is achieved, all value will become a social possession, for it is not individuals but society that produces the value. <sup>35</sup> Hence labor value subject to the higher principle of the social right will be the formula of the Marxian state.

- (2). This labor value must be handled by and this Socialist principle vested, as in Hegel, in, not quite a dictator, but a dictatorship, or functional <sup>bureaucracy</sup> beaurocracy, of the proletariat. This dictatorship, however is a desirendum in the iniatia, but not the final stages of the socialistic state. Though the future is not clearly stated, dictatorship would presumably give way to freedom and from freedom would involve, as for as that was possible, an ideal state of anarchy in distant centuries, perhaps. There, after the foundation of the early dictatorship, Marx, of course, would have to place a big question mark. One could see no farther from that distance.
- (3). So far from seeing nationalism as the ultimate entity of the state, Marx saw through nationalism as a vestigial show. Nationalism, and perforce national imperialism, must give way to internationalism of right . Nations can be units, but not unities.

The doctrines of Marx are deservedly better known than those of Hegel (though not the philosophy proper) because they are vastly more important. Because of this, and because this discussion does not deal primarily with Marx and the Marxian state, but with Hegel and the Hegelian state thrown in relief against Marx, we have not given him the space in discussion we have Hegel. But this important observation must be made, that Marx is essential to our study because henceforth Fascism (we shall speak no more of Hegelianism or Marxism) plays the role of reaction to

35- ibid.


Marxism. As long as the essentials of a system remain in working order so as not to call into opposition a diametrically opposed system, a reactionary revision such as Fascism is not introduced for its protection. Had inadequacies of capitalism never manifested themselves, communism would never have been called into play. Hegel would have been, without the fear of Communistic assault, allowed to pass into the limbo of useless reactionaries, and Capitalism would have clung to Laissez-faire. But Capitalism did have weak spots, and Socialism did advance at weak sectors, and every time it did so in history, Fascism was used as counter-revolution as anti-toxin, or <sup>as</sup> toxin anti-toxin, when the need was to forestall rather than to combat.

### III.

We have so far considered Hegel and Marx in relation to themselves. Suppose for a moment we speak of both as unconnected points in parallel lives. We have already noted that Europe was to pass from Romanticism to Materialism and its pragmatic philosophies, and noted that Hegel and Marx were points of transition in this passage, themselves the heralds of the mortal sickness of the Romantics of the Napoleonic epilogue to the Liberal revolution, and in which the Napoleonic *melee* had ingloriously petered out. Accordingly, we might assume that the Hegelians of the Right and the Marxian Socialists had such romantic antecedents, and we would be correct.

We will find more poverty of this in the Fascist movement, because, as we saw, Fascism is less a theoretical active movement than a political reactionary reflex. Yet we find several men who were enamored of romantic absolutism, including, notably, Fichte <sup>36</sup> who was a romantic devotee of Prussianism as a "Savior" of the German nation--and if we laugh at this romantic attitude as mere sentimental patriotism, we must remind ourselves! Yes, but what is Fascism if not an attempt to save the capitalist mechanism and its indigenous web of sentimental ideology <sup>37</sup> in the form 36-1762-1814  
37-Not to be taken as an aspersion; proletarianism or any other structure

national state? Fichte was a romantic pioneer of Fascism. Later came Saint--Simon<sup>38</sup>, who, like Hegel, had a kinship to Socialism in his first principles, but whose effect was Fascistic; Saint-Simon bore with him not only a romantic attitude, but a definite program, and was of but little less value than Hegel himself. Hegel<sup>39</sup> came next, and was not, either in his generation or the completeness, the contemporary in the Fascist movement, of Marx. Weisse<sup>40</sup> later took over his contribution and completed the transformation; Hegel in his later Fascist days did not follow Hegel, but Weisse's "Hegelianism"; he merely gave it the distinction of his name and sponsorship. Fichte, Sohn<sup>41</sup>, hardened the movement to a degree capable of combat with Marx, and brought it down to a time representing contemporaneity with Marx.



Similarly, early socialism began in pure sentiment: Fourier<sup>42</sup> called his Socialism Utopia, would have it a mystic community system, and was a thorough romantic. "Sentimental and imaginative Socialism is simply the manifestation of the Romantic Spirit in the economic field."<sup>43</sup> The riotous fancy of the early Socialists cools down somewhat in Robert Owen<sup>44</sup>, but he maintains the community and humanitarian emphases. But in Louis Blanc<sup>45</sup> and P. J. Proudhon<sup>46</sup> positivism had replaced sentimentalism, even if the pragmatic consequences were not drawn. Finally the evolution from local Utopian schemes to universal dialectic analysis came in Marx<sup>47</sup>.

37 (con't) has such a set of ideological sentiment.

- 38 1760--1825                      45- 1811--1882
- 39 1770--1831                      46- 1809--1865
- 40 1801--1866                      47- 1818--1883
- 41 1797--1879
- 42 1772--1837
- 43 Guérard, Pp. 194
- 44 1771--1858

These first approaches to these new attitudes seem sickly and pale, but they grew progressively more realistic, and it must be borne in mind that the first contest between the forces, Paris (1848-49), was under the inspiration of Saint-Simon and Louis Blanc, and that Hegel and Marx played minor roles in this important historical event.

Europe, with Fichte and Marx, had now entered the earlier days of Victorianism--an aggressive, healthy age, on the whole. Marx, in his "dogmatic optimism of the Communist doctrine must be regarded as a relic of Victorianism",<sup>48</sup> says Bertrand Russell. During this period both Communism and Fascism were vigorous minority parties of the left and right. But soon Europe settled down to the complacency of mid-Victorianism, the crisis past, and democracy functioned. Even revolution and reaction were permeated by sweetness and light, and declined in vigor. After growing from local utopian schemes to the pragmatic realism of the International, the majority of later socialists melted into Social democracy. The conservatives who had shifted their counter-tactics from romantic Prussianism, etc., to the pragmatic violence of Louis Napoleon, later slid into simple national imperialism. All this follows our formula: as the difficulties of capitalism in its first inner crisis were adjusted, the system aroused less strenuous opposition from the proletariat, the capitalists, as the incumbent majority, always taking limits from the aggressive minority party's tactics, and appropriating Socialism's development to themselves, consequently now <sup>gave up</sup> released Fascism, which had been employed as a violent repression of violent Socialism, in favor of a peaceful pursuit of their interests.

But both these early struggles on behalf of both forces to capture the state and their later quiet, modified, taken-for-granted existence made it easy for the state to take on an increasing cargo of their method and program. As we have noted, the democratic era could not accept itself

48- Russell

until its existence was challenged, when it would come awake and accept in modified form the most compatible and desirable features of its challengers' plan. Hence, a <sup>superior</sup> ~~supreme~~ position, infiltration, and penetration of the new ideas was effected on the growing, thriving movement of the present. These new ideas came into being and mingled their waters with the old, growing with the dominant stream's flow and influencing it--manifesting itself in such successive forms as cabinet/administration, the first semi-fascist regime of about 1848-1856, paternalistic and imperialistic policies--and began to permeate the social structure through the two-fold assault arising from philosophic thought on one hand and expedient politics on the other. As Marx was outlived, the new forces modify the old until the disharmony grows too great, whereupon violent revolution occurs.

#### IV.

Thus we are brought down as far as this survey of origins takes us-- to 1848 and a glimpse at what continued in the same spirit of 1848. We should, however, to preserve a continuity in which to fit in our data of the second part of this paper, make a preliminary survey of the rest of our field.

We have already just said that a decline was to set in both in Socialism and Fascism beginning about 1856, the end of the Crimean War, and definitely after the events of 1870-72. This corresponds to the decline in liberalism after 1660, and its only effect was the final confirmation of democracy but in a centralized, industrial state, just as the only effect of the decline of 1660 was in the complete enthrone-ment of monarchy but in a legalized, commercial state, both, excepting a few instances of continued laissez-faire or continued absolutism. Thereby the "pragmatic" ideas leavened liberalism in the very period of its predominance, its major elements almost uniting with and certainly modifying liberalism. The chief thing of both periods after 1848 was that

capitalism and the bourgeoisie were looking for the best, most tolerable system to operate under, to protect their ideals; to build their notions strong and leave their notions alone, and so produce prosperity and foster business in the best way required.

The great change<sup>is</sup> that from 1917 to 1932 and since, the forces of pragmatic reaction and of pragmatic revolution took over the state entirely, a state now weakened by the great catastrophe of 1914-18. Here pragmatism prevailed again in purified form and complete triumph, divided into two hostile forces, each ascendent save for the other.

Now we may turn from these general origins to the first specific application of the new ideas.

**PART II.**



I

France was to be the scene of this advance guard of the new movement. France had been brought into line with the other nations of Europe after the revolution. She was set back into legitimacy in 1815; then as Metternich lost absolute control in 1830 and England advanced to reform in 1832, France made her advance just as calmly to constitutional monarchy; again, in 1848 revolution broke loose in Europe, followed by nationalistic consolidation, and France followed again, first with L. Blanc's republic, and then with L. Napoleon's dictatorship. It is with the latter that we are interested, and the former as creating its conditions.

None of these changes had any particular correspondence to French thought, but the bourgeoisie, in their selfish and tenacious manner, inclined to let well enough alone as long as they were permitted their profit and enterprise. Legal tolerance, laissez-faire, and status quo were what they wanted government to guarantee the economic system, governments that would provide stability and protection.

Legitimacy sometimes outraged these classes, and did not represent, under Polignac and Charles X, the spirit of the French. However, the Orleans Monarchy was quite what they wanted. But it was not long until the bourgeois monarchy began to suffer disintegration. Guizot became its head; the big capitalists, its "aristocracy". However, the petit bourgeoisie were disfranchised, and the working-men were "worse off under the new regime than they had been under the old, because their employers, who were now in control, had a direct interest in keeping them in subjection."<sup>1</sup> The capitalists have since learned better manners: either a nice drape of aristocratic reserve or a fine display of democratic fraternity have now gone to make their position less distasteful, for the stench of nouveau-riche is an abominable thing. Guizot, moreover, proved tactless to say the least: one authority<sup>2</sup> would call his ministry corrupt; two others<sup>3</sup>, incompetent; a third<sup>4</sup>, repressive. Certainly, it was true that every sub-

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<sup>1</sup>Schapiro, p. 78    <sup>2</sup>Schapiro    <sup>3</sup>Bourgeois, Lebon    <sup>4</sup>Guerard

stratum in French society was calling for "reforme", and Guisot denied it. Revolutions, according to Marx or anyone else, whether or not they believe it polite of them, have an irresistible habit of starting in such situations.<sup>4</sup>

The bourgeois heaven we described as hanging over Europe was now dissipated. The aristocracy might be gone, but the capitalists have to organize the proletariat for their purposes, and the proletariat was muttering with disappointment. They had not yet been slaughtered but they had twice been cheated-- in 1795 and 1830. They had not yet been alienated, but they had been segregated. They developed socialism and devoted their attention to economics through the trade unions (illegal-- Albert), to journalism thru the Reforme (often illegal-- Caussidiere), to politics through the "Socialist" party (illegal-- Blanc), to militaries thru the secret societies (illegal-- Blanqui). Thru these agencies, and the thinkers, Blanc, Proukhon, Blanqui, the principal danger to the monarchy arose.

If Socialism was represented by so spontaneous and homogenous a group, Fascism cannot be ascribed the same honor, or disadvantage, or advantage, or whatever it be. The Fascists in the field were, as usual, unscrupulous adventurers, malcontents, renegades, and black sheep from every party, whose principal object is to scout the field for the most gullible "lost class" to hold, and sell, when their moment comes, to the highest bidders-- i.e., the wealthy class, when the latter are in straits and seem to hold a lost cause, and need both a screen and an armed guard. These men were few in number, fewer in scruples, and in search of a philosophy that would be useful. If Fascist adventurers seem to pull the same identical tricks, it is not because of principles, but because the plan of action outlined above is the most profitable possible for them, and they follow it as a groove. If Socialists may be called

demagogues, then I crave the privilege of calling Fascists pimps. Their invariable course is: (1) When society faces a threat from the most homogenous group in the class order, the class-conscious proletariat (Socialists), to excite the least homogenous, most frightened-- because in closest contact with the former--, most "least" group in the class order, <sup>which</sup> ~~when~~ is inevitably the petit bourgeoisie and peasants, or the "lower middle classes", as we call them. (2) To shower them with bonbons from platitudinous, though violent philosophy, which is inevitably one of nationalism ("France!"), glory ("Bonaparte!"), property ("small farms!"), order ("your leader!") and for which the principles of Hegel have since become indispensable. (3) To deliver them over to the capitalists who keep their state in industrial running-order and in funds for their little games (wars and like adventures), and where in turn they give the protection of mass diversion, police patrol, and mob suppression. Examine the Fascist movements, and see how they originate-- Napoleon, Saint-Simonian ~~and~~ crackpot writing utopia books, and playing as a Carbonaro in Italy, and a constable in England<sup>5</sup>; Mussolini, an ex-socialist newspaperman who reneged from the party to organize a war-spoils group; Hitler, a house-painter and army corporal Socialist who turned fanatic to hatch a beer-putsch; de las Rocque; the Spanish flier; Mosley; the Louisiana Kingfish; Pilsudski; the Hungarian aristocrat-horseman; Stahremberg; the Dutch "veteran". ~~France--~~ Bonaparte-- the emperor; Italy-- Caesar-- il duce; Germany-- Bismarck, der feuhrer; and what not! Never have you seen a Fascist fail to organize a middle class movement, or fail to advance his supporters, the capitalists. Thus was Fascism in the July Monarchy scantily, though adequately, represented only in the personalities of Louis Napoleon, Persigny, and Morny; thus did it enlist the remaining anti-Guizot class of the petit bourgeoisie and the peasantry with the magic of the "Napoleonic legend"; thus did it deceive when it seemed opposed to the interests of big capital.

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<sup>5</sup> Schapiro, P 80

For while it was these two dissatisfied classes, and their movements, Socialism and Fascism, and their respective legends, Jacobinism<sup>7</sup> and Bonapartism<sup>8</sup>-- while it was these sub-classes that procured the fall of Guizot and bourgeois monarchy, the regime of Louis Philippe was ready to be relinquished by all France, which was indignant and bored.

2.

On the basis of the events just recounted, we may set up the frame for a rigorous analogy between what I call this "first experiment" and the same development of forces today, which are the same to a certain point on which the outcome depends-- Communism or Fascism. Thus, no differentiation need be made in this section on the development of forces on the basis of the outcome, but a classification following three rough types may be made on a basis of variations in the course which this development follows. Accordingly:

Type A: Formula: France, 1830-1852, and Germany, 1918-1934. Aside from the fact that the development was much slower in the first case than in the second, both of these cases are alike in the respect that there were two revolutions before the final conflict was <sup>united</sup> weighed. Differentiae: (1) A number of minor differences can be found within this type, but it would be safe to say that Germany after 1918 followed almost the same course which France would have followed in 1830 had Lafayette set up a bourgeois republic instead of a bourgeois monarchy. Both the German republic and the Orléans' monarchy followed a similar development: first, the liberal age in which the parties of Lafayette and Ebert, respectively, had control, and then, the second period in which Guizot's and Von Hindenburg's cliques had dominated. (2) No revolution was necessary in Germany, 1928-30, as it was in France in 1848, because the republic was more flexible-- ancillary of the preceding point.

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<sup>7</sup> Guerard, P 194  
<sup>8</sup> Bourgeois, I, P 186

(3) Another corollary is that the first revolution proceeded <sup>much farther</sup> in Germany than in France and that the forces merely lay dormant in a quieter atmosphere until the second crisis, which was provoked in France by the weak foreign policy concerning the Spanish question, and in Germany by the same concerning the reparations problem. Moreover, because of this dormancy, part of the events practically recurred in Germany during the second crisis; i.e., in the first crisis in Germany affairs proceeded through the "idealistic" provisional government, corresponding to the period of de l'Eure and Larmartine in the France of the 1848 period; and including the concessions of a limited worker's council, its disappointment, and the subsequent <sup>of a 1</sup> Spartacist uprising, all of which corresponds to the workshops, their caricature of the hopes of the proletariat, and the June-days, events in the second crisis in France. Consequently, when Germany again split into hostile extreme right and left after the quiescent republican period, it took the bitterness aroused in the leftists and the fear in the rightists caused in 1930 by the Breunig plan for a permanent National Economic Council and its subsequent parliamentary defeat to set the forces again into extreme activity.

Type B: Formula: Russia, 1905-18, and Spain, 1933-- . This group is marked by its period of extreme repression akin to Fascist government which appears before the collapse of the old state. One can hardly call this Fascism, since it exalts no notion of a planned state, but it resembles it in its origin and methods, if not in its ideology. The origin of both of these has been in the <sup>cm</sup>weaking of states by riots after some such crisis as the Russo-Japanese war in Russia or the Riff war in Spain and in connection with the rebellions of Poland in the former and of Catalonia in the latter, and by subsequent necessary concessions to the Duma or Cortes (parliament). To counteract tendencies, Nicholas II in 1905 and Alphonso XIII in 1923 fostered the seizure of the government by a "strong man", Stalypin and De Riveria, to set up a dictatorship at the right.

The move was successful for a number of years, until final revolution broke loose, in which the course followed is the same as the rest.

Differentiae: in Spain the forces after Azana turned right as the prelude to Fascism, and Lerroux corresponds to the familiar figure of Cavaignac, von Pappen, Dolfus, Facta, etc.; whereas in Russia after the Mullikoff regime which corresponds to Azana, the forces turned left and Kerensky (the Blanc of the revolution) assumed control. After this, Russia went to Communism instead of Fascism, and this is one of the reasons. However mild Kerensky was, at least he did not hopelessly crush the Communists as Cavaignac did-- and they had a chance to <sup>seize</sup> see the government by the time their strength had accumulated.

Type C: Formula: Italy 1917-23 and Hungary 1916-20. The marked characteristics of this group are that there is no previous crisis, for which a crisis is, at any rate, only an incident in preparation of the conflict between Communism and Fascism. Most of the nations in this type, however, developed their breakdown and their subsequent conflict directly from the old state in the crisis of meeting new problems which it could not solve. Thus, both Italy, and Hungary, and Bulgaria passed thru a great crisis in the war, and emerged, each according to their own purpose, in defeat. In each it seemed that the old order, which had degenerated, or centrifugated, into a chaos, which was to pass into extreme revolution after the "Wilsonian" elements had failed utterly to bring the state into order, and revolution actually proceeded farther in these nations than in any others in which it was ultimately overcome by reaction. The occupation of the factories, the program of Bela Kun, and the "reforms" of Stambuliski were really Bolshevik measures, and were really ~~intensive~~ <sup>intensive</sup> control of the nation when reaction set in. Consequently, the reactionaries were, as in Russia, much harsher when they organized their Fascisms, the White Terrors, than in any country except Russia-- and unlike in Russia, they were successful. Similarly, there were not only June-Days but real, protracted civil war in

this group. Also, it may be noted that due to the "interludes" being really more chaotic continuations of this old state <sup>in</sup> and crisis <sup>than</sup> that short-lived idealistic republics following the complete breakdown and scrapping of the old government, and in each case, there was enough left in the old monarchy and monarchial ideas to ally itself to the Fascisti and have itself retained as a useful feature in the Fascist triumph. *Differentiae*: the differences in this type are mainly of degree. For instance, in Hungary the break with the old order was much stronger under Karolyi than in Italy under Giolitti, and the power of Bela Kun much stronger than that of the Massimalists-- therefore notice that while the monarchy is "retained", Hungary has had no monarch, ~~and this is~~ not only because of Allied hostility to a Hapsburg, but because Horthy does not care to so modify his control over Hungary.

3.

With this classification of our case histories in mind, we may return to France, and pay attention to only the events in other countries that are illuminatingly analogous to this period of French history, remembering that although these particular analogies may not be strictly applicable in the same order to every nation in our general classification, our formulae and differentiae have shown their general similarity of development, and that generalities are already considered proved. In this way we may avoid petty digressions and direct our proofs toward the point that is the theme of this part II, and which would naturally be met with more skepticism; i.e., that this struggle was manifest, and Facism put to a first experiment as early as the general period, 1830-71, in France. Further, from this we may hope to illustrate the general characteristics of Fascism and of the events that lead up to it.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Russia will of course be included in our field of analogy only because and only in so far as, the situation preceding Facism, and the forces in the field in which Facism originates and battles Communism, are the same.

CHART II.

TYPE A

1. France

1830 July 22 Ruets

July 30 Polyeudismos

Aug 4 Charles I juos

Aug 7 Louis Philippe

1830 Louis XVIII

"Pencil & Labyrinth"

1834 Reptenansu werrus

"Pencil & Labyrinth"

1848 Feb 22 Ruets

Feb. Vall. Basset, prunus

Louis Philippe abdicates

Proo. Govt (de l'Eme)

May: Laurantine

June: Cevalagrac

Dec: Louis Napoleon

1851 Camp dietat

also

3. Portugal?

2. Germany

1918 Nov 9 Ruets

Nov 9 Max Reichgus

William II abdicates

Nov 10 Proo. Govt.

1919 Ebert, President

Schubert, Chancellor

1925 Hindenburg, President

Nationalist cabinet

to 1928

1930 Ewinggung 1907

Bismarck.

1932 Von Papen

1933 Hitler

Camp dietat

also:

2-a Austria

TYPE B

1. Spain

1930 Ruets

Alfonso abdicates

Proo. Govt (Zuano)

Apr 1931

Apr 1931

1935 Lermans

[?]

1923 Cortes crisis

Puercas, President

(republicans)

1905 Duma crisis

S tolypin, Premier

(republicans)

1917 Nov Ruets

Loeff, premier

Nicholas abdicates

Proo. Govt (Lunin)

May: Malia Kov

Aug. Leninist

Nov. Lenin

revolution

with identical

TYPE C

1. Italy

1919 Ruets

Crisola, Premier

Crisola and

Sucessors

1921 Fada

1922 Mussolini

Camp dietat

also

3. Poland?

2-a Bulgaria

also:

2-a Bulgaria

not

identical

\* on rising, of Gai 30f

not

identical

MISCELLANEOUS: Aracunia, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Rumania, etc.



II.

Thus we are already able to notice that from about 1840 (or perhaps as early as 1834, when the July monarchy entered the "Gnizot period", and the bourgeois monarchy was doomed as the Weimar republic was when the Nationalists came to power in 1925), France's government was undergoing the same loss of prestige that Italy felt after 1915 and Germany after the reparations failure. Undermined by the growing Socialist reform movements and the imperialist Napoleonic tradition, the monarchy of Louis Philippe fell in 1848 under a general resistance to its obstinate repressions. The French government fell as every old government of a nation which has latter been host to Fascism (or Communism) has fallen, in a crisis and amid general unpopularity. Superficially it might appear that our parallel were violated in the case of those nations in which the government "merely decayed into chaos", but the actual Italian government really fell also at this point, and gave way to a transition common to all countries. It must be realized that by such means Orlando was passed out, and that Victor Emanuel was allowed to remain on his throne only because the rioters of 1918-19 did not feel strongly that he was essentially tied up to the old system.<sup>9a</sup> When the history of the case is thus stripped of its deceiving appearance, it is realized that Italy, too, went thru exactly the same fundamental transition by the same methods.

The passage of the old state was practically undefended. (1) As in Petrograd in 1917, in Budapest in 1918, and in every instance in which Communism and Fascism have <sup>eventually</sup> waged war for the possession of a collapsed state, there was no great revolution to overthrow the old government itself. The disorders in each case consisted chiefly of bread riots and street fighting, of strikes or barricades with almost no bloodshed. (2) The soldiers in each case were asked to fire on the rebels, and in each case either made an empty gesture, or openly refused and fraternized with the mobs. "The constant relations between workingmen and soldiers, the propaganda in books and democratic" <sup>9a</sup> Villari.

journals, all combined, in spite of the orders of the government, to develop among the soldiers democratic ideas and sentiments".<sup>10</sup> The bourgeois National guard, when ordered to fire, refused<sup>11</sup>. These soldiers were the tie between workers and bourgeoisie.

The bourgeoisie were now unwilling to support a government which could no longer be strong enough to keep the situation in control for their benefit; after the affair was over, they felt, they would, if they did not turn it against them by their present obstinacy, be able to control it or to create new forces of their own; hence the government in its weakness aroused only their contempt. "It was the National Guard and the bourgeoisie, who, by paralyzing the efforts of the government, hindered the struggle, played into the hands of the insurgents and obliged the crown to retreat. 'There', said Tocqueville, 'was that middle class whose every wish had been servilely met for eighteen years; public opinion had succeeded in carrying it away and hurling it against the men who had flattered it to actual corruption.'"<sup>12</sup> Under these circumstances in each case the ministry was obliged to give way, while almost as soon and in all but one case, the monarch was forced to abdicate in short order under advice from all hands, and flee the capital or remain under protective guard. Thus did these governments give up the ghost amid but slight violence, without support of soldiery or bourgeoisie, or even sometimes quite literally, benefit of clergy, and in disgrace.

In other words, no one thought the old government was worth saving and there was no civil war waged over its existence. The Red vs. White wars were always waged considerably later over who should possess, or rather disposses, the new republic. Instead, at this juncture, under this surprising new cooperation of all classes, a provisional government was set up which aimed at tiding over the crisis, and providing for the republic which would be based on the idealistic will of the nation. Immediately

<sup>10</sup> B. I, P 294

<sup>11</sup> id., P 295

<sup>12</sup> id., P 295

a constitutional convention was called into being to prepare that instrument which was destined never really to work, because its basis in the circumstances under which it came into being could not be uniform-- either Socialistic or capitalistic. Keeping in mind the fact that the first German revolution of 1918 was both an 1830 and an 1848, we may point to this as an excellent example. The Italian situation rewards us less, because the constitutional change, per se, was lacking, but there was a provisional government in the sense that Giolitti was a premier who represented this same attitude, and met this same fate.

The make-up of provisional governments was about the same in all countries. That in France, 1848, was headed by Dupont de l'Eure, and contained Ledru-Rollin and various other elements. Soon it passed to Lamartine and Louis Blanc was admitted. This corresponds closely to the influence of Muliakov (=Lamartine) and Kerensky (= Ledru-Rollin or Blanc) in the Russian cabinets of Prince Lvoff, or to Schiedemann (=Lamartine)<sup>13a</sup> and Haase<sup>13a</sup> in the Ebert governments. All these governments were headed by a moderate-- Lamartine, Ebert, Giolitti, Karolyi, Zamora, Muliakov, etc., who were neither right nor left, but liberal or "benevolent" toward labor, as for instance the high consideration for the trade unions in Italy in 1919-21, and the advantages given them.

But whatever the significance of these specific parallels, the real point is that these republics were in an impossible and unfortunate position. When the government attempts to consolidate "the revolution", to meet its problems with a program, it must bow to either its bourgeois members or to its labor members. It becomes the seat of a conflict that undermines its authority and creates bitter antagonisms. It is continually wracked by schisms, or its policy rendered futile by vacillations and

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<sup>13a</sup> Leibnecht had resigned.

and compromises. The real government becomes vested in the forces that are struggling to possess the state. Ten years after the idealism of such a state, it is sneered at by both the victors and the vanquished of the class struggle that ended its existence. Steering between Scylla and Charybdis is too dangerous. It is better to go into port first, but at least a provisional government has the doubtful honor to cast the government toward either Scyllans or Charybadians, before they go on the rocks. Of course that is not as well as if they steered ~~to~~ into port, but it is a partly enviable position.<sup>13b</sup>

When people went to consolidate their gains, the state which had been supported by both the conservative Odilon Barrot and the radical Ledru-Rollin broke asunder. It was originally composed of Conservative republicans and the Groupe National<sup>14</sup> on one side, and the Left Republicans and Groupe Reforme<sup>15</sup> on the other, as follows: de l'Eure (N), Lamartine (C), F. Arago (N), E. Arago (R), Goudchaux (L), Ledru-Rollin (R), Fremieux (R), Bedeau (C), Cavaignac (C), Carnot (C), Bethmont (N), Marie (N), Blanc (R), Marrast (R), Flacon (R), and Caussidiere (R), Prefect of Police, and Garnier-Pages (N), Mayor, of Paris. Thus they stand nine to eight, with the advantage and the key positions to the conservatives but a number of them-- de l'Eure, Lamartine, Garnier-Pages-- in a mediative position.

Soon, however, a crisis came and the government veered to the left under the influence of Blanc. The unemployed were demanding bread, and national workshops had to be set up. The Lamartine government was forced to cooperate with the Socialists or face a downfall. Similar events occurred under the parallel government of Breuning in 1930<sup>16</sup>, when Breuning set up a working alliance with the Social-Democrats and attempted to revise Ebert's National Economic Council.<sup>17</sup> Again, there is a close connection with the occupation of the factories in Italy to which Giolitti opposed no measures and to which he offered compromises-- and "in certain localities

<sup>13b</sup> Lore in Recovery Through Revolution, P 185

<sup>14</sup> The moderate newspaper    <sup>15</sup> The radical newspaper

and provinces the 'red' Trade Unions, united in the Local or Regional Chamber of Labor (Trade ~~Councils~~), virtually usurped the authority of the central power." <sup>18</sup> Similar power was seized in Russia by the Soviets with little opposition from Kerensky. The spirit of the movement was not wholly <sup>Socialist,</sup> but a method of direct control of management (not resources) by labor, and a direct relief of starvation conditions. That capitalists still held capital ~~was~~ shown by the fact that, "terrified... by the menace of total expropriation the capitalists hastened to forestall it by offering to finance the industries that had been seized by the ~~Trade~~ Unions."<sup>19</sup> That the <sup>immanence</sup> ~~immanence~~ of a Communistic order was in these Trade Union measures <sup>existed</sup> is shown by the statement that "the whole movement seemed on the point of becoming a ~~Soviet~~ social revolution; and that seemed to be the conscious aim of many of its supporters." That the ~~immanence~~ of Fascism existed in the support of the government was proved by the fact that the tolerance was given only because the government did not know quite how else to deal with a touchy situation, and was merely retreating for position for a new reaction and retort and many of its leaders, too, had the conscious intention of handing over the government to a Fascist ~~Capital~~ reaction if ever the situation got out of hand. The first of these three sentences deals with ~~the~~ situation, the last two with its immanencies. The situation was shortly to become changed, and the possibilities, actualities.

For Trelat<sup>20</sup> was the next day to decide that his reluctant emergency measures had gone far enough, and to revoke them; and simulatneously Blanc<sup>22</sup> <sup>16</sup> Again remembering that Hermann Muller and Heinrich Breuning were "repetitions" of the first and second "Ebert" cabinets.

17 Munro, P 653

18 Por, P 60

19 id., P 65

20 Minister of Public Works

21 Secretaire de Ministerie

was to realize that his compromises with the old order had made his plans unworkable and the institutions he fostered but a caricature of his hopes, and decided to insist upon a complete capitulation. Blanc's insistence upon capitulation and Trejat's on revocation were met face to face and disrupted the cabinet. Ledru-Rollin who leaned to Blanc's, and Lamartine, who favored Trejat's point of view, gave up <sup>S</sup>partian<sup>A</sup>ship and tried to save the situation by continuing the present moderate status of the workshops and the Luxembourg Commission which directed them: but they were impudent as Giolitti was, in the vital conflict/<sup>and</sup> impending rampant strife between capitalist and socialist interests, and so were discredited. As we have shown, they were not, in any case, strong governments with decided positions, and now, especially, they stood between two firing lines, for the situation demanded, and the general feeling favored, either "measures for the reorganization or [for] the dissolution of the National Workshops."<sup>22</sup> As a matter of fact, due to its divided basis, the republic was nothing but a puppet of its two ~~masters~~, both of which <sup>whichever</sup> sought to have the government blamed for a violent assault on the other.<sup>23</sup> Behind Trejat, de Falloux<sup>24</sup> and Cavaignac<sup>25</sup>; behind Blanc, Blanqui and Barbes. "M. de Falloux, a stout Conservative, but skillful in concealing his intentions under fairly moderate language, inveigled the Assembly into a conflict with the working-class, without letting them see the danger".<sup>26</sup>

By this time, then, the government had no authority. "The Executive Commission hesitated, seeing it was caught between the threat of a worker's revolt and a bourgeois reaction in the Assembly." Falloux and his coterie were making friendly gestures to Louis Napoleon, while cries of "Vive l'Empereur" were heard.<sup>27</sup> Blanc had long since decided to cooperate with

22 B, I, P 333

23 id., P 332

24 Later one of Napoleon III's Conservative parliamentary leaders

25 General, Minister of War

26 id., P 334

27 id., P 332

Blanqui, and cries of "Vive la revolution" were heard no less<sup>28</sup>. The government "yielded" to the bourgeoisie on June 21, 1848, and dissolved the workshops. Then civil war broke out. As in Italy in 1920, both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat <sup>divided somewhat:</sup> strike-breakers vs. strikers, and the former and others in the minority joined the Fascists<sup>29</sup> trade unions as against the socialist trade unions; radical bourgeoisie vs. Conservatives and petit bourgeois minority leaders (like Ledru-Rollin) supported the socialist riots.<sup>30</sup> But nevertheless it was a war between Fascists and Communists, for society was now forced to abandon liberalism for violence, and split in favor of either a capitalistic or a proletarian state. First, "the threats of the bourgeoisie stiffened <sup>the ranks of</sup> the working-man"<sup>31</sup>. That is in line with the events just recounted. Now, the bourgeoisie handed over power to the army, and the proletariat said "go" to the secret societies. "The bourgeoisie [in anticipation of the insurrection] had entrusted the defence of order to a Minister of War, who, though a Republican, was above all a soldier, and <sup>when</sup> fighting was necessary only thought of winning-- General Cavaignac"<sup>32</sup>. And at the same time "during the night the staff employed on the workshops prepared for insurrection."<sup>33</sup>

The fighting known to history as the June Days, lasted from June 23 to 26. Both fought savagely, for they knew their cause was vital. "The workers were completely persuaded that this Republic had played them false and was plunging them into want; the bourgeois were equally convinced the insurrection was high treason toward the Republic. 'The question', said Arago, 'was one that could only be settled by force'<sup>34</sup>. General Cavaignac, to whom the Executive Commission (Lamartine) had given up their power in final signification that, however liberal, they were still

28 id., P 317

29 Earlier, Catholic

30 Tor, P 59

31 B, I, P 333

32 id., P 335

33 ibid

34 P 336

bourgeois, proclaimed a state of seige, established an absolute dictatorship<sup>35</sup>, and in short, won against the Socialists.

Two classes "had been at deadly war"<sup>36</sup>, the old order had won and by such methods that Fascism, whether by name or not was already in power. This was violent class war, although it was a preliminary enactment of what was to occur seventy years later. "The terrible 'June Days' was the first war between bourgeois and proletariat, and it left a legacy of bitter antagonism between them" which was to become an ever deepening hostility.<sup>37</sup> Henceforth it was not "Liberal Democracy" vs. "Social Democracy", but Communism vs. Fascism-- for twenty years in France, and then it was to be revived on a world's stage seventy years later. "The people yielded to a decisive superiority of force, but a deep-seated ill-will and class hatred remained, which prepared the ground for the silent reception of the seed just then being sown by Karl Marx in his attacks on capital and on the bourgeoisie... [And at the same time] the memories of the Consulate inclined the bourgeoisie to look for the Saviour of Order, of public peace, and of its own private interests among the heirs of Bonaparte."<sup>38</sup>

Now, while Hegel and Marx, Napoleon and Blanqui rose to power, Blanc and especially Cavaignac became men without support. We shall forget Blanc, because he was no longer a factor in history, but had he been in the position of Cavaignac, he too would have been no less repudiated by those he had put into power. For it happened to Kerensky, and Kerensky is what Blanc would have been if the French provisional government, like the Russian, had decided to turn left and pass power in that direction to solve the difficulties destroying its shaky basis, instead of turning, as it did, to the right and Cavaignac. For it was by

<sup>35</sup> *ibid.*,

<sup>36</sup> *id.*, P 337

<sup>37</sup> Schapiro, P 192

<sup>38</sup> B, I, Pp 337-338



the accident, or rather, course of events, that put the leftist Kerensky in power, as much as any other factor, that turned the tide to the Bolsheviks instead of to the "Whites", who would have set up a Fascist dictatorship-- not the old monarchy, Chamberlain contends-- in Russia. Similarly, Cavaignac, whom bourgeois calls the "spokesman and saviour" of the bourgeoisie, was, however, not owned by the Fascists and their conservative cohort; and yet he was-- along with the commensurate predecessors of Fascism in other countries, von Papen, Facta, Lerroux-- a chief factor in the success of Fascism.

We have a bad habit of exercising very poor historical judgement in reviewing the acts of the predecessors of Fascistic dictatorships. We call Lamartine, Breuning, and Giolitti "last stands of parliamentary democracy" with some justice; at least we could call them half-stands. But when we go to call Von Hindenburg and his Papen cabinet, Victor Emanuel and his Facta cabinet, and Cavaignac "saviours of the republic", as the world in each case stood by and did, and as certain authorities (Emile Bourgeois, for instance) still insist on doing, we are dead-wrong. These men represented reaction and reaction invariably gives way, in the face of ~~fronants~~ revolutions it had suppressed, to counter-revolution. Willingly: Hindenburg would rather call Hitler to power than even Breuning; Victor Emanuel would rather permit the government to Mussolini than to the reformist Socialists, Turati; and Cavaignac would rather lose the election to Bonaparte than to the reformist radical, Ledru-Rollin. You might say that was because Hitler was to win a great election, that Mussolini had just won by 87,000 to 45,000 over Turati in a Milan election, that Bonaparte carried 5,500,000 votes <sup>by</sup> to 510,000 of Ledru-Rollin. But the real thing is that although the Fascist treated the Nationalists (and Cavaignists) with utter contempt and denied them a birth in the

political Pullman , they intended to carry out the same fundamental ideas, only by downright violence instead of mere suppression.

And what is the difference?

Even Bourgeois now goes to admit that "already the French people, seeing their own incapacity for reconciling order and democracy, were beginning to incline to a democratic monarchy, an inclination of which the dictatorship of Cavaignac has been the first symptom."<sup>39</sup> Fascism is established de facto with opposition by violence and dictatorship to change of the old order of capitalism. Fascism is established de jure with opposition to overthrow of capitalism by violence and dictatorship changing the old order for the sake of retaining its essential underlying system. There is not much difference, then, between Cavaignac and Louis Napoleon. Thus even a repression of Fascism by such methods is Fascism. "It is often asserted that in December, 1851, Louis-Napoleon strangled the harmless, generous, idealistic republic of 1848. As a matter of fact political and social reactions began immediately after ~~the~~ Days of June."<sup>40</sup> Then Cavaignac actually set up Fascism in a positive way by his acts.

Moreover, he actually set up Fascism in a negative way by his status. He was discredited and the constitution fashioned during his incumbency and administered with Louis Napoleon as president provided a further degeneration of the state which gave Louis Napoleon his opportunity for a coup d'etat. That the inclination to Fascism which Bourgeois describes in the quotation above was definite, is proved by the election of Louis Napoleon over Cavaignac by a huge majority-- 5,500,000 to 1,500,000. Thiers correctly maintained that the coup d'etat was , in the words of Guérard, "the natural consequence of the presidential election"<sup>41</sup> -- the repudiation of Cavaignac . The presidential election was won by Louis Napoleon because Cavaignac represented a decomposed state; Louis Napoleon

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<sup>39</sup> Id., P 343

<sup>40</sup> Guérard, P 127

<sup>41</sup> Id., P 128

was able to follow this by the coup d'etat because Cavaignac's constitution had not worked even with Louis Napoleon as president.

It also proves, as Pareto and Odon For contend, that the state was actually in a process of breakdown, and that the sentiment of the people was not in allegiance to the nominal government but in fact the people were patriots of one of two combatant-states-within-states, the Socialists or the Fascists. They looked to either Bonaparte or Blanqui rather than to Cavaignac, and regarded the latter as a tool to use against the former; or to Hitler or Thalman rather than to Von Papen and Sleicher; or in Italy it went farther, and the combatant states-within-the-state, the Soviets and the Fasci held actual power and Facta was helpless in veritable civil war, as Buchanan might have been had he remained president during the War Between The States.

But in the case of each of our parallels, the Fasci seized the government and gathered all power into its own hands-- as did also Bismarck in 1866, Lincoln in 1861, and, in a way, Cavour, in 1861; as did consecutively Bela Kun and Horthy in 1920, and as did the Soviets in the successful revolution of 1917. When Fascismo assimilates the national government into itself, then centripetal force, as Pareto calls it, is restored.

The case then is this: the Socialists undermine the government with the intention of superceding it. But at the critical moment, the Fascisti, acting as the White guard of the bourgeoisie intervene and strike at the state which they capture and repossess.

The next step after Cavaignac put Fascism at only one remove from power. People turned to a "Prince whose ancestors had ceased to reign long enough for their virtues alone to be remembered, whose name recalled both a period of military glory and a period of revolution, while seeming at the same time to combine the traditions of equality so dear to all Frenchman, and the autocracy which is welcome at moments of social trouble

and political indécision."<sup>42</sup>

One more move, and the March on Rome was complete in France: Napoleon, who had been in "Rome" for two years, had taken it for his own by means as sly as Mussolini's had been spectacular, but <sup>ev</sup>manœvers from the inside, <sup>while</sup> as Mussolini's preparedness had been from the outside, and by means altogether as effective. In the coup d'etat of 1851, "the army was prepared, and when the Paris mob rose it was swiftly and mercilessly suppressed."<sup>43</sup> Fascism was in.

We could expatiate on as for as many more pages as we have on the "causes" of Socialism's defeat and Fascism's triumph in France of 1851. We could develop the policies of Napoleon III and show how the new Fascist measures tally almost exactly with the large number of those policies, and show wherein he was not purely Fascist. We could analyze and explain Fascism endlessly although fruitfully, But we will not. We are able to perceive all these things in its origins. Besides, my <sup>is</sup> time <sup>is</sup> short and my pencil is blunt. We will therefore leave Fascism on the threshold of its first preliminary experiment-- its "try-out", and end with a broad, generalized quotation. "Some people, indeed, have seen in Louis Napoleon the father of the modern 'planned state', have even called him the 'first Fascist'".<sup>44</sup>

FINIS

<sup>42</sup> Lebon, P 275

<sup>43</sup> Schapiro, P 193

<sup>44</sup> "Napoleon No. 3", a review of Alfred Neumann's Another Caesar, Time, Jan. 21, 1935

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- VILLARI, LUIGI: Article, "Fascism", Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed. London: 1929.
- AGRESTI, OLIVIA ROSSETTI: Article, "Fascism, Economics of", *ibid.*
- LASKI, HAROLD J.: The State in Theory and in Practice. New York: Macmillan, 1935.

E. Book Reviews.

- of Laski, above: in New York Times Book Review. by John Chamberlain.  
in New Republic, LXXXII, 1062. by Max Ascoli.
- of Toynbee's A Study of History: in New York Times Book Review. by William MacDONALD.
- of Pareto's Mind and Society: in New Republic, LXXXIII, 1071. by Malcolm Cowley.
- of Neumann's Another Caesar: in New York Times Book Review. by R. L. Duffus.  
in Time. by T. S. Matthews.

## READING REPORT

Final Exam, Government 3, 1936.

Samuel T. Schroetter

Since I have reviewed the chief books I have read for Government with my monthly quiz papers, the last of which was only a week before final exams, I have decided to checklist the principal articles I have read since September in this reading report. I have made two lists: one of the fifteen best articles among those included; and the other of the remaining group. In the second list, those articles indicated by a are the fifty outstanding ones.

The list is not complete, since it was compiled by looking over my own magazines and the library stacks of those I read more or less regularly. It would therefore miss briefs, editorials (excepting those longer ones that easily belong in a list of the fifty best articles), and book reviews, too innumerable to mention, as well as articles in magazines sometimes read-- such as Round Table, Forum, etc. It also makes Time and Literary Digest impractical for reporting, and I read the former regularly. It leaves out articles I have read on unrelated subjects in McCall's, Stage, Philosophical Review, and the like. It omits, naturally, the hometown and Richmond newspapers, as well as the New York Times, The Daily Worker, The London Times, and The Manchester Guardian. But it is still a pretty impressive list, and I submit it without fear of being underread.

I intended to arrange the articles according to their subject matter, but the task loomed as too arduous, and I gave it up for a simpler logic.

List I.

TEN BEST ARTICLES OF THE PAST FIVE MONTHS

with five outstanding earlier articles I've read.

- ✓ 1. Christians and Communists. Harry F. Ward. Christian Century, Dec. 25, '35.
- ✓ 2. Russia Watches East as Well as West. Walter Duranty. Asia, Feb. '36.
- ✓ 3. Japan's Stake on Empire. William H. Chamberlin. Asia, Nov. '35.
4. Jefferson in America Now. Charles A. Beard. Yale Review, Winter '36.
- ✓ 5. Tug-of-War in Central Asia. Wilbur Burton. Asia, Sept.-Oct. '35.
- ✓ 6. John Marshall's Long Shadow. Max Lerner. New Republic, Sept. 18 '35.
7. The Constitution and States Rights. Charles A. Beard. Virginia Quarterly Review, Oct. '35.
8. Justice Roberts vs. Justice Stone. John T. Flynn. New Republic, Jan. 22 '36.
- ✓ 9. China Must Resist! Y. T. Wu. Christian Century, Nov. 6 '35.
- ✓ 10. They Cry "Peace, Peace." Bruce Bliven. New Republic, Oct. 23-Nov. 6-Nov. 20 '35.

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- ✓ 1. National Politics and War. Charles A. Beard. Scribner's, Feb. '35. The best article of the year, substantially reprinted in a September issue of Today.
  - ✓ 2. The Supreme Court and the N. R. A.. Charles E. Clark; with an Editorial, Social Control Vs. The Constitution. New Republic, June 12 '35.
  3. The Crisis of the Middle Class. Lewis Corey. Nation, Aug. 14-21-28 '35.
  4. The Unknown Soldier Speaks. John Haynes Holmes. Christian Century, Nov. 6 '35. A reprint.
  - ✓ 5. The Horrible South. Gerald W. Johnson. Virginia Quarterly Review, Apr. '35.



List II.

NEW REPUBLIC.

June 12, 1935.

Concerning Huey Long. Paul Hutchinson.

Sept. 25

My Town. Meridel Le Sueur.

Counter Attack at Pittsburgh. J. Alfred Wilner.

Where Does Hitler Get The Money? Paul Crosser.

Oct. 9

The People's Front in France. Henri Lefebvre.

The Movies Join Hearst. Selden C. Monefee.

Oct. 16

Ferment in The Colleges. James Wechsler.

Working for the Government: Toward a Better Public Service Personnel.  
Lloyd K. Garrison.

Oct. 23

Italy's African Balance Sheet. Vera Micheles Dean.

Oct. 30

The League in Action. H. N. Brailsford.

Off to Etheopia. Jack Harris.

Nov. 6

The Press Goes to War. Alexander Werth and Eleanor Clark.

Nov. 13

Dress Rehearsal For Neutrality. An Editorial.

The Fate of Europe: Four Expectations. George Soule.

Where Roosevelt Stands Today. Jonathan Mitchell.

Nov. 27

Civilized History. Lewis Mumford.

Dec. 4

The Nazi War on Medicine. Ralph Thurston.

Who But Hoover? John T. Flynn.

Regulation By Taxation. Irving Brant.

Dec. 11

British Foreign Policy. Gerald Barry.

Page Opposite Editorial. Bernard Smith.

Dec. 18

Recovery. Stuart Chase; with an Editorial, Recovery Is Possible.

Dec. 25, 1935-Jan. 1, 1936

Will Japan Crack Up? I. The Crisis on the Home Front. T. A. Bessor.

II. The High Cost of Imperialism. Geunther Stein.