

5-2006

The Lawrencian becoming of Deleuze

Saffana Manoun

Follow this and additional works at: <http://scholarship.richmond.edu/masters-theses>

Recommended Citation

Manoun, Saffana, "The Lawrencian becoming of Deleuze" (2006). *Master's Theses*. Paper 657.

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

The Lawrencian Becoming of Deleuze

By Saffana Manoun


Master of Arts in English

University of Richmond 2006


Thesis director: John Roger Marx

Gilles Deleuze and D.H. Lawrence, the philosopher with a poetic writing and the literary man with a philosophical project, invite us to consider their affinities and differences. An unavoidable trace of the Lawrence in Deleuze has not received the attention it should. This lack of critical attention makes the enterprise more worthy of initiation. To demonstrate something of the relationship between them, this essay is divided into three parts that gloss their main points of intersection and difference. I begin with the question of what is at stake in such a comparative endeavor. In the second section, I focus on the problem of subjectivity in Lawrence, and compare Lawrencian selves in such novels as *The Rainbow* and *Women in Love* to the fluid subjectivity associated with some Deleuzian concepts. Lastly, I consider how Deleuze's concept of the assemblage is at work in Lawrence's stories of different sorts of subjectivities that combine.


I certify that I have read this thesis and find that, in scope and quality, it satisfies the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "John Marx". The signature is written in black ink on a white background.

John Marx, Ph.D. Thesis Advisor

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Anthony Russell". The signature is written in black ink on a white background.

Anthony Russell, Ph.D.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Gary Shapiro". The signature is written in black ink on a white background.

Gary Shapiro, Ph.D.

The Lawrencian Becoming of Deleuze

BY

Saffana Manoun

Graduate School of Arts and Science, University of Richmond, 2006

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty

of the University of Richmond

in Candidacy

for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in English with a concentration in theory

May, 2006

Richmond, Virginia

Acknowledgment

I would like to thank my parents Zeinab Sahyouni and Ahmad Manoun who had taught me not only to read and scribble my first letters, but more significantly to travel on the spot with a book in my hands. Waiting for the bus or walking in the street, the little girl always had new books to read, and new poems to recite. Years and years later, my line of flight is still my books and my letters, and the rainbow that shines in my life and inspires me ever and ever again is the rainbow my parents taught to me to catch. I would like to thank Jesus Diaz Villarejo Oliva (my fiancé), whose love and support never stopped to vividly colour my life with enabling happiness and hope. I would also, like to thank Sally Manoun, and Ayham Manoun for always being my support system even with oceans and continents separating us, and sure my deep gratitude to Mary Evans who made my stay in the U.S very different and who taught me that a woman's love is always infinite. Finally, I would like to thank Dr John Marx whose instructions and advice made this project possible and who is always becoming something other more than an English professor.

Gilles Deleuze and D.H. Lawrence, the philosopher who writes poetically and the literary man with a philosophical project, cannot but invite us to consider their affinities and differences. This invitation becomes even more insistent as we read them carefully and sense an unmitigated Lawrencian influence in the Deleuzian world. An unavoidable trace of the Lawrencian understanding of and experimentation with desire in Deleuze has not received the attention it should. And this lack of critical attention makes the enterprise more challenging and worthy of initiation.

Though these figures may use the same terms and employ remarkably comparable concepts, this affinity does not transform either of the two into a replica of the other. On the contrary, Deleuze's line of flight for example, tends to connote uncompromised freedom and unhindered openness. It is triggered by desire that punctuates our lives and experiences with unconscious breaks of creativity. These experiences remain emphatically amorphous in Deleuze. Not so in Lawrence. His line of flight habitually appears as a line of *traveling* that leads off the beaten track. In this respect, it might appear to anticipate Deleuze. However, in Lawrence getting off the beaten track becomes so habitual, so predictable; we may not wish to identify his line of flight with the Deleuzian line. It is, as I shall explain, neither produced in the same way nor represented as the same sort of amorphous quality. It is possible, in Lawrence, to execute a line of flight and yet to remain in a rut.

In order to demonstrate something of the complex relationship between Deleuze and Lawrence, this essay is divided into three parts that gloss their main points of intersection and difference. I begin with the question of what exactly is at stake in such a

comparative endeavor. I elaborate on what one might call lines of flight both literary and philosophical. In the second section, I focus on the problem of subjectivity in Lawrence, and compare Lawrencian selves as they appear in such novels as *The Rainbow* and *Women in Love* to the fluid subjectivity associated with concepts such as the body without organs in Deleuze. Lastly, I consider how Deleuze's concept of the assemblage is at work in Lawrence's stories of couples and families and other sorts of subjectivities that combine. The complexity and intensity of assembling in Lawrence, I show, is clarified and amplified through comparison with Deleuze. In all three parts, the question of desire remains essential. Desire receives major attention from both writers throughout their careers and, furthermore, it proves inseparable from the range of concepts invoked by my comparison.

Lines of Flight both Philosophical and Literary

"Writing is a question of becoming, always incomplete, always in the midst of being formed, and goes beyond the matter of any livable or lived experience" (ECC 1). What goes beyond the livable or lived for Deleuze might find its best articulation in the Lawrencian commentary on poetry: "It is a tissue of incongruity....It means nothing, and it says nothing. And yet it has something to say. It even carries a dim suggestion of that which it refuses to be said. And therein lies its charm. It is a glimpse of chaos not reduced to order" (P 258). Deleuze and Lawrence, the philosopher and the writer each becoming the other and in becoming rewriting and revising each other. On the same plane of

immanence they create their concepts not heeding theft but always triggering a world of becomings, myriad lines of flights, and aspiring to liberate through literature a spirit of plurality.

Reinvigorating a desire for a paradoxical immanent transcendence that leaves no subject or will intact, Deleuze following Lawrence creates his own concept of desire in a “foreign” language that doesn’t conform to a binary law and whose fascination with the symbolic is motivated by its defiance of fixation and logical relationships (ECC 52). The Deleuzian concepts acknowledge their source of inspiration in Anglo-American literature and pay their homage to certain names—canonizing them in its own way—as the Lawrencian vocabulary and concepts seem to become Deleuzian. D. H. Lawrence, who is left out of the postmodern body of literary criticism, is no doubt a favorite Deleuzian inspiration. Perhaps the writer who first initiates what we might recognize as a Deleuzian becoming, and points out the line of flight that decades later reappears in Deleuze.

Deleuze’s invocation of Lawrence tends to take the shape of scattered remarks, here and there in the Deleuzian texts. *The Apocalypse* is the only spot where a Lawrencian text is given an independent and a separate existence from the Deleuzian rhizomatic expansion. In all its other invocations of Lawrencian inspiration, the Deleuzian text uses Lawrencian terminology and thought as its example and its point of reference without attempting to engage in a further exploration of Lawrence. And yet, despite the insubstantiality of Lawrencian presence in the Deleuzian text, it awakens a new interest and invites a rereading of Lawrence with a new appreciation that acknowledges Deleuze’s debt. In turn, Deleuze’s invigorating influence on Lawrence

begs new questions about Lawrence's intellectual project as well as Deleuze's philosophy. This is especially so if we reconsider the post-structuralist critical scene that has sealed Lawrence in modernism and crossed him out of the list of its revivals, as Earl Ingersoll indicates in his study of Desire and narrative in Lawrence: "[W]e have only to attempt to imagine Derrida addressing a D.H. Lawrence conference or Cixous embracing a Lawrence text in her *écriture féminine* or an editor aspiring to gather essays for a post-structuralist Lawrence to begin to gauge in the manner in which the larger movements of later twentieth-century theory have swept past 'Lawrence'" (2).

The essential indeterminacy of the self as a constantly deterritorialized flux and the substitution of the subject with the "individuation without subject" that both thinkers propose functions as both evidence of alignment and as a demarcating line of difference in the two projects. There is an unmitigated influence of the Lawrencian understanding of desire and sexuality in Deleuze's work, who learns from Lawrence and liberates him from the traditional reading as a writer fixated on the difference between country and city, stuck in a binary of romantic pastoral vs. industrial modernity. Deleuze derives from Lawrencian concepts and builds on them creating other concepts providing us thus with new tools better designed to experiment with the strange Lawrence. And yet, even in their proximity the two figures seem to harbor points of tension that complicate our attempt to indicate their affinity and stage their encounter. To illustrate how a Lawrencian thought becomes a Deleuzian concept and to trace the distinctive features that transform a rereading of Lawrence into a revision of the Deleuzian rhizomatic overflow of desire, *The Rainbow* together with its sequel *Women in Love* offers an exemplary Lawrencian

universe where different becomings register the fluidity of the self; which is always encountering animals, plants, moons, and so forth; where desire while seemingly defining and categorizing is ultimately indefinite and symbolic. These novels provide a stage for distinguishing Deleuze's horizontal movement of desire from the Lawrencian circuit of desire that, though always apt to be renewed, circulates deterritorializing and reterritorializing functioning within a closed circuit.

Deleuze's recognition of the passage of philosophy into literature and of literature into philosophy illuminates his own passage into Lawrence. Though he defines concepts generated in literature narrowly as concepts of the affects and percepts (WIP 66), the affinity between literature and philosophy that he acknowledges makes any attempt to separate their concepts more problematic. It is not clear that a differentiating line separates the constitution of immanence (philosophy) from the constellation of affects (literature). Deleuze explains in *What is Philosophy?*, "The plane of composition of art and the plane of immanence in philosophy can slip into each other to the degree that parts of one may be occupied by entities of the other" (WIP 66). Which leaves us to ask, is the line of flight in Lawrence a concept of the affect? And does the Deleuzian adaptation transform it into a constituted concept of immanence? Do Lawrencian becomings experience an alteration when they occupy the Deleuzian philosophical plane? How does the Lawrencian fascination with foreignness and unfinishedness find its immanence in the Deleuzian persistence on an infinite conjunction, a subversion of attention from the IS to the AND (D 34-35)?¹

¹ On Lawrence's fascination with these terms, see Chaudhuri.

Thinking in curved rather than straight lines is another Lawrencian gesture that is adapted by Deleuze: “Strange that we should think in straight lines, when there are none, and talk of straight courses, when every course, sooner or later, is seen to be making the sweep round, swooping upon the center. When space is curved, and the cosmos is sphere within sphere, and way from any point to any other point is round the bend is inevitable” (MIM 45). For Deleuze, we must think in broken lines “a zigzag which glides between” (D 32). While it is obvious how Lawrence and following him Deleuze think in non-straight lines, the movement of the lines seem to designate different paths where the zigzag movement suggest a deterritorialization and reterritorialization, the curved lines of Lawrence “swoop upon the center” in an indicative movement that seems to trace a circular bending recalling the circuit-like functioning of desire in Lawrence, and illuminating the distinctive Deleuzian fractured movement. Deleuze categorizes the lines of which we are made into “three lines, one of which would be like a nomadic line, another migrant and third sedentary (the migrant is not at all the same as the nomadic)” (D 136). Only one of these lines constitutes a line of flight, which like the other two lines, is pervasive. Here, it is significant to remember the unique attention dedicated to this line by Deleuze, and to examine closely how a Lawrencian character confronts a line of flight and what seems to be in both Deleuze and Lawrence the motivating and invigorating cause of the line of flight, namely *desire*.

In his study of the line of flight in Deleuze, Ronald Bogue gives a detailed account of the Lawrencian origin of the concept and points out that “Deleuze’s main inspiration for the ‘opposition of English-American literature and French literature comes

from D. H. Lawrence's *Studies in Classic American Literature*, Particularly the final chapter on Melville and Whiteman" (DOL 152). Moreover the Deleuzian account of the line of flight, which is also a line of becoming, seems to identify itself with the Lawrencian motif of "crossing the horizon into another life." "To flee is not exactly to travel, or even to move," Deleuze writes. "A clean break is something you cannot come back from; that is irretrievable because it makes the past cease to exist" (D 37-38).

In order to reach a better understanding of Lawrence's conception of the line of flight so that we can juxtapose it to Deleuzian one, it is mandatory to trace the Lawrencian line of flight in its actual literary context. Desire, a key note in *The Rainbow*, sets Lawrence's characters on lines of flights that approach the dangerous Deleuzian anticipation and yet struggle to disengage themselves from the destructive modes that threaten to turn them into lines of suicidal flight, retreating probably to what Deleuze designates as the migrant and the sedentary. Self annihilation, which characterizes Will Brangwen's flight in the cathedral and threatens to sever his connection not just with the past or the present but with the whole world, is resisted by Anna. Aware of the frightening consummation, she rejects her husband's plunging into the other than human, harshly disrupting Will's consummation by the mysterious Absolute:

When he was in the church, he took no more notice of his daily life....As for the welfare of mankind, - he merely did not realize that there is such a thing. He did not care about himself as a human being. He did not attach any importance to his life in the drafting office, or his life among men. That was just merely the margin to the text. And the great mysterious, illuminated capitals to the text, were his

feelings with the church. (TR 156-57)

This broken line of flight, which constitutes the main text in Will's life, is a detachment from human logic and rationality and a deterritorializing experience not only of Will, but more subtly of the church itself as an institutional organ regulating the human connection with a metaphysical God. His sense of freedom and jubilation in the church (a tangible construction of stones and arches enclosing the utter darkness of desire) transforms the church into a symbolic world which reduces everything outside to dead realities. The infinity and the mysticism represented by the church acquire a pagan spirit in Lawrence's account of Will's connection with the church where the scripture is irrelevant and the service is nothing to be noticed. It is there, in the "darkness of the womb" that Will catches his line of flight devoid of any human relation or interpretation: "he did not care about the Bible, the written letter. That which was human... He was no Christian. He... blind subterranean thing, just ignored the human mind and ran after his own dark-souled desires" (TR 171).

Will's flight without traveling or journeying precedes and exemplifies what Deleuze emphasizes about the insignificance of physical movement for the attainment of the line of flight. "[T]o flee is not exactly to travel, or even to move. First, because there are travels in the style of the French- too historical, cultural and organized- where they are content to transport their 'egos'. Secondly, because flights can happen on the spot, in motionless travel" (D 37). For Will, the flight occurs only on the spot without movement where time and space outside the church diminish, and what initiates the flight is abstract desire reterritorializing itself from his human limits to the mystery of a non-human,

impersonal realm that consummates him:

Away from time, always outside of time! Between east and west, between dawn and sunset, the church lay like a seed in silence, dark before germination, silenced after death...Here in the church, 'before' and 'after' were folded together...away from the horizontal earth, through twilight and dusk and the whole range of desire, through the swerving, the declination, ah to the ecstasy, to the touch, to the meeting and the consummation, the meeting, the clasp, the close embrace, the neutrality, the perfect, swooning consummation, the timeless ecstasy...here, here is all, complete, eternal: motion, ecstasy, and no illusion of time. (TR 199-201).

The interruption of Will's flight by Anna who, though fascinated by the subterranean beast that her husband becomes in his moments of flight, is bitterly set against the consummation and the detachment from the human world. In their battle of wills, Anna triumphs and demolishes Will's flight in the church. Yet her victory is a mere deterritorialization of Will's abstract desire from the body of the church to her own body and to the consummation of both of them in their sexuality:

[S]ometimes he felt mad with a sense of Absolute Beauty, perceived by him in her through his senses...This was what their love had become, a sensuality violent and extreme as death...It was all lust and the infinite maddening intoxication of the senses...He had always, all his life, had a secret dread for Absolute Beauty. It has always been like a fetish for him, something to fear. (TR 234-35)

So his desire does not suffer the same elimination that his church line of flight undergoes. It experiences only an interruption during which it alters its territory and generates a new

line of flight that though less obscure is by no means less consuming. Will's passionate consummation moves from the "Gothic form, which always asserted the broken desire of mankind in its pointed arches, escaping the rolling absolute beauty of the round arch" and reterritorializes itself "with infinite sensual violence...to the realisation of this supreme, immoral, Absolute Beauty, in the body of woman" (TR 235).

Lawrence's depiction and exploration of the line of flight is acknowledged as a concept in literary criticism only through the Deleuzian constitution when it becomes an assemblage in the philosophical plane of immanence. The philosophical text prioritizes the relationship between becoming and the line of flight suggesting desire, while the Lawrencian literary version is more emphatic in its articulation of the inseparability of the line of flight from desire, teaching the line of flight only in relation to the overwhelming desire of a character which becomes when it catches its line of flight. In "Many Politics," Deleuze brings back desire to the discussion of the line of flight while he exposes the potentially suicidal dimension of the line of flight, according to him (D 144). In Deleuze, desire and the line of flight seem to intersperse vaguely constituting what might seem as an assemblage or, to employ another Deleuzian concept, a body without organs. A body without organs is, as Deleuze defines it, a non-hierarchical representation. It is, further, a concept Deleuze employs to show how desire can be understood as inseparable from its object. A body without organs is itself "that which one desires and by which one desires. And not only because it is the plane of consistency or the field of immanence of desire" (TP 165).

The question of how to imagine such a body, an "assemblage of desire" and its

lines of flight and their outcome leads to a more primary question about desire and the body it inhabits, devastating it or carrying it on a line of flight. Lawrence's characters, whose lines of flight respond in their later development to the Deleuzian anticipation and become "like hardened empty envelopes, because their organic components have been blown up too quickly and too violently, an 'overdose'" (D 144), invoke the question of the self as an assemblage and its relation to desire. *Women in Love's* tracing of the development of some of *The Rainbow's* characters and its introduction of new ones emphasizes the necessity of the assemblage of desire for the occurrence of the line of flight, and at the same time posits another question about the kind of desire involved in any crossing of the horizon, in any step towards a plateau of intensity and consistency beyond the "dominant reality." For instance, Hermione's curse is her inability to go beyond her consciousness, her attempt to experience any momentary genuine loosening of consciousness is doomed to failure. The line of flight through which, and for which, one becomes a body without organs liberated from interpretation and subjectification is beyond Hermione's reach, since she sustains her existence solely by absorbing the whole world into her consciousness. Sexuality for her is just another function of the organism which becomes a sort of fantasy to be enjoyed through the mind. Rupert observes, "Even your animalism, you want it in your head. You want to be an animal, you want to observe your own animal functions, to get a mental thrill of them...passion and instincts- you want them hard enough, but through your head, in your consciousness" (35). Rupert's declaration coincides with Deleuze's insistence on the body without organ's state of unconsciousness and on the possibility it preserves to initiate lines of flight: "Tearing the

conscious away from the subject in order to make it a means of exploration, tearing the unconscious away from signification and interpretation in order to make it a veritable production” (TP 160).

The possibility of a Lawrencian flight is not restricted to sexual desire. There seems to be a line of flight that is triggered by a non-sexual productive desire, a desire for work and experience. What might be vaguely entangled with instrumentality and the machinic in *Women in Love* in particular. Gudrun struggles to awake from the stupor of the heated physical atmosphere of the laborers in Beldover’s streets, which exemplifies her fascination with the self-destructive desire brought with the machine:

[S]he felt herself drawn out at evenings to the main street of the town, that was uncreated and ugly, and yet surcharged with this same potent atmosphere of intense dark callousness. There were always miners about... They roused a strange, nostalgic ache of desire, something almost demonical never to be fulfilled. (108-09)

She experiences a loss of consciousness and a partial death in her moments of total surrender to the self-destructive mechanical desire which fascinates her and carries her on a line of flight that threatens to turn into a line of death and total destruction.

A spectacular incident which illustrates Gudrun’s fascination with the mechanic that threatens to tear her consciousness apart is the memorable scene of Gerald’s spurring of his mare at the railway crossing. Gerald’s mechanical, repeated subjugation of the bounding mare and the later cruelty of spurring are read as scenes where power is implicated in the privilege of looking at and gazing. In that particular scene the gaze is

further endowed with a gender implication in Ingersoll's Lacanian analysis. Ingersoll gets so involved with the power dynamic of the gaze that he ignores the blank look in Gudrun's eyes, which expresses visually a passage into the unexplored domains of the unconscious, a momentary death, or a line of flight which is also a line of destruction rather than, simply, some power of gazing. "Gudrun was looking at him with black-dilated, spell-bound eyes....Gudrun looked and saw the trickles of blood on the sides of the mare, and she turned white. And then on the very wound the bright spurs came down, pressing relentlessly. The world reeled and passed into nothingness for Gudrun, she could not know anymore. When she recovered, her soul was calm and cold, without feeling" (103-04). Gudrun's attraction to Gerald is not motivated by a pure sexual desire. On the contrary, what draws her to him is his instrumentality as the "God of the machine." Recognition of the machenic, which involves the machine and the human as a possible plane of consistency, an assemblage through which intensities circulate, is already at work in the Lawrencian variations of the line of flight.

Yet, the danger of this involvement with the mechanic and its intensity is an overwhelming threat of finality and fixation capable of blocking the passage of desire and of transforming the line of flight, which is also a line of fulfillment², into a line of self-annihilation. Gerald's perfect mastery over the mines with all their elements (human, non-human) and his feverish involvement with their industrial resurrection seem to sweep him on a line of flight that decodes all meaning and interpretation, retaining an

² The line of flight is a line of fulfillment for Lawrence unlike Deleuze for whom fulfillment is a dead end of desire and of the line of flight. This notion is one aspect that reveals an existing gap between Lawrence and Deleuze's understanding of desire. The search for fulfillment is always a line of flight for Lawrence which contrasts sharply with the Deleuzian theory of desire which is set against both fulfillment and repression.

organization of labor which in its finality and “perfectedness” threatens to negate Gerald’s functionality and with it, not only his line of flight but also his line of life:

He had his life-work now, to extend over the earth a great and perfect system in which the will of man ran unthwarted, timeless, a Godhead in process... There was a new world, a new order, strict, terrible, inhuman, but very satisfying in its very destructiveness... It was the first great step in undoing, the first great phase of chaos, the substitution of the mechanical principle for the organic, the destruction of the organic purpose, the organic unity, and the subordination of every organic unit to the great mechanical purpose. (220-23).

In its finality and completeness, the machine deprives Gerald of his own instrumentality, exhausting his chances of finding a reason for his existence and a plane for his intensity and desire to circulate. “It was so perfect that sometimes a strange fear came over him, and he did not know what to do. He went on for some years in a sort of trance of activity... But now he had succeeded ... He was afraid, in mortal dry fear, but he knew not what of” (224). Lawrence’s vision of the introduction of the mechanic as a possible plane of immanence producing lines of flight seems to align this flight with freeing desire into the void. In other words, it offers no chance of salvaging the body, regardless of the precautions one might take.³ Lawrence traces the deterioration of the mechanic type of desire and its inevitable transformation into a mere mechanical function when he portrays

³ Deleuze’s warnings and full awareness of the suicidal dimension of extreme decoding is not particularly related to the flight on the mechanic axiom. It is more of a general warning that accompanies desire in its production of any line of flight: “what are your lines of flight...? Are they still tolerable, or are they already caught up in a machine of destruction and self-destruction which would reconstitute a molar fascism? It may happen that an assemblage of desire and of enunciation is reduced to most rigid lines, its devices of power” (D 144).

Gerald's attempt to find an alternative line of flight in his attachment to Gudrun. The glimpse of hope that his desire for Gudrun suggests is eclipsed by his inability and by Gudrun's inability as well to move beyond the mechanical aspect of their desire: "his brain seemed hard and invincible now like a jewel, there was no resisting him. His passion was awful to her, tense and ghastly, and impersonal, like destruction, ultimate. She felt he would kill her...it was always this see-saw, one destroyed that the other might exist, one ratified because the other was nulled" (435,36). Lawrence perceives the flight into the mechanic as a great danger, as a destructive force even, annihilating desire and the body it inhabits.

Lawrencian Selves

How much affinity and difference is there between the Deleuzian and the Lawrencian understanding of the assemblage that generates the line of flight to begin with? Is Deleuze's notion of the body without organs the same as that of Lawrencian flux? Or does the Lawrencian flux, no matter how undefined it might be, seem always keen on retaining its contact with something material, a world less figurative than that detailed in Deleuze's philosophy? Recalling the Lawrencian resistance to interpretation in the *Apocalypse* tackled by Deleuze in *Essays Critical and Clinical*, the discussion of the subject as a signifier in the *Dialogues* introduces the self as a flux where the personal is torn apart and what is left is only the constant becoming of the self and its malleability as a site of experimentation. "[B]ecome capable of loving without remembering, without the

phantasm and without interpretation...Let us just be fluxes, which sometimes dry up, freeze or overflow, which sometimes combine or diverge. A man and a woman are fluxes. ..On line of flight there can be no longer but one thing, life experimentation” (D 47). The self as an assemblage, a collective site of affects and an indefinite “grey area” seems as much a Lawrencian as it is a Deleuzian concept. We may well wonder how Lawrence can be absented from the postmodern scene when we read him closely and carefully anticipating the postmodern rejection of the subject when he depicts the self as “relative” (Will), “unsatisfactory flux” (Uncle Tom), and “unfixed something-nothing” (Ursula). Yet, the Nietzschean tendencies of a character like Ursula or Anna as a little girl require a different vocabulary; maybe a Deleuzian one: “individuation without a subject” that maintains the remarkable aspect of these characters and at the same time emphasizes the plurality of the assemblage of the self.

This Lawrencian anticipation of the Deleuzian “individuation without a subject” is probably better understood in the light of Amit Chaudhuri’s investigation of “difference and the working class” in Lawrence. He quotes Lawrence inveighing, “‘Let our Democracy be in the singleness of the clear, clean self, and let out *En Masse* be no more than an arrangement for the liberty of this self.’ However, [Chaudhuri notes,] the word ‘self’ is not used by Lawrence to signify a fixed plenitude, but a partially knowable grey area...For Lawrence, ‘self’ is ‘difference’ and marginality” (DHLAD 181). The “clean self,” which designates an indefinable zone according to Chaudhuri, responds to and revises the Deleuzian adaptation of the self as a flux. Though individuation without a subject seems to solve an apparently Lawrencian contradiction, the experimentation and

the fluidity that characterize the self in Lawrence insists on the site of becomings and pluralities as a recognizable self, thus resisting thus the Deleuzian rhizomatic version.

Ursula Brangwen in her girlhood (her becoming- woman) represents what might be thought to exemplify a no-self stage, lost between two selves the one conforming to the molar lines of the week days and the other to the molecular lines of the Sunday world: “how to become oneself? One was not oneself, one was merely a half- stated question. How to become oneself, how to know the question and the answer of oneself, when one was merely an unfixd something- nothing, blowing about like the winds of heaven, undefined, unstated” (TR 282). Yet, Ursula whose proper name does not reduce her to a fixed signified, is also the later young woman who “within all the great attack of disintegration upon her, she remained herself. It was the terrible core of all her suffering, that she was always herself. Never could she escape that: she could not put off being herself”(TR 341).

This is not a contradiction in Lawrence’s concept of the self, rather it exemplifies what Chaudhuri concludes about the “clean self” in Lawrence’s peculiar democratic vision. It is the self as “difference and minority.” Probably Lawrence’s appreciation and reverence for the Etruscan art is a very well articulated testimony of his unique perception of the self as a flux. It is a visual expression of the “dusky” surfaces of encounter between the self and the other, human and non-human, which gives the Etruscan paintings a very distinctive feature praised as “natural” by Lawrence.

The subtlety of the Etruscan painting, as of Chinese and Hindu, lies in the wonderfully suggestive *edge* of the figures...It is the flowing contour where the

body suddenly leaves off, upon the atmosphere. The Etruscan artist seems to have seen living things surging from their own center to their surface. And the curving and contour of the silhouette-edge suggests the whole movement of the modeling within...It must have been wonderful world, that old world where everything appeared alive and shining in the dusk of contact with all things, not merely an isolated individual thing played upon by daylight; where each thing had a clear outline, visually, but in its very clarity was related emotionally or vitally to strange other things, one springing from another...so that a lion could be at the same moment also a goat, and not a goat. (112-13)

The floating figures with their “dusky edges” are in contact with other “strange things” and this flux-like characteristic of the figures endows them with the potential to form assemblages with other figures, and thus to become something “other” than themselves; to become deterritorialized. These are fluxes that are capable of connecting and communicating, capable of a Lawrencian sympathy (feeling with and not feeling for) and not of identification, capable of a touch that transforms and irrevocably alters:

[O]ne of the charms of the Etruscan paintings: they really have the sense of touch, the people and the creatures are all really in touch...Here, in this faded Etruscan painting, there is a quiet flow of touch that unites the man and the woman on the couch, the timid boy behind, the dog that lifts his nose, even the very garlands that hang from the wall. (78)

What Deleuze emphasizes about the becoming of the self as an encounter and not as identification helps to explain the “individuation without a subject” in Lawrence. It

also works to differentiate between the flux with its encounter zones and the accumulative quality of the rhizome that renders all the assemblages it encounters into the same massive whole.⁴ But in order to delve deeper into the Deleuzian perception of encounter, a brief introduction to becoming in Deleuze is needed. There is always an encounter and a passage in becoming which suspends the binary machine through which we acquire our self-definition as isolated subjects. Becoming is thinking beyond the category as Patty Sotirin indicates in her article “Becoming-Woman”: “Becoming explodes the ideas about what we are and what we can be beyond the categories that seem to contain us...Becoming moves beyond our need to know...beyond our determination to control life.. and beyond desire to consume or possess” (KC 99). Deleuze insists that becoming is “imperceptible“ and is clear of imitation or amalgamation. Becomings for him are phenomena of “double-capture, of non-parallel evolution, of nuptials between two reigns” (D 2). Deleuze picking up consciously or unconsciously on the Lawrencian “sympathy” thinks of becomings in literature as creative encounters where animal- becomings for example

do not consist in imitating the animal, in “playing” the animal, any more than Mozart’s music imitates birds, although it is imbued with a bird- becoming... It is rather an encounter between two reigns, a *short - circuit*, the picking up of a code where each is deterritorialized ...an encounter in which each pushes the other, draws it on to its line of flight in a combined deterritorialization. (D 44) (my emphasis)

⁴ A whole like grass or what seems to be its alternative in the Deleuzian text “weeds.”

This unique conception of encounter involves a “short circuit” of deterritorialization that suggests a temporary demarcation of the encounter zones which permits the movement of a current between the animal and the human for example, a current that can only be a current of desire; a desire of becoming, of involution and not evolution as Deleuze stresses (D 29).

The tension arises from the difficulty of thinking of a rhizomatic constantly overflowing expansion. In order for the current of desire to pass through assemblages, it requires the closing of at least a short circuit. It is this movement of desire between fluxes and not subjects which makes Lawrence’s collective selves more convincing and endowed with more potential to become real. Which is, incidentally, one of the meanings of flight for Deleuze himself: “to flee is to produce the real, to create life, to find a weapon” (D 49). The Lawrencian deconstruction of the subject is already at work in the depiction of characters that flow as flower-becoming (Lydia, Anna, Ursula), animal becoming (Will, Tom, Anton), and even a fascinating moon becoming (Ursula). These proper names that function as representations are not stable, fixed signifiers since they designate assemblages of sensations, of wills, and becomings.

Yet, in order for desire to circulate among these overflowing assemblages, there must be hypothetical presupposed points of encounter that signify deterritorializations and reterritorializations. Ursula and Anton’s dancing in Fred Brangwen’s wedding illustrates this flux of individuation: “It would be endless movement, it would continue forever. It was his will and her will locked in a trance of motion, two wills locked in a trance of motion, yet never fusing, never yielding one to the other. It was a glaucous,

intertwining, delicious flux and contest in flux. They were both absorbed into a profound silence into a deep, fluid underwater energy” (TR 316). What is illustrated in Lawrence’s fluxes is not a grass-like growth which eliminates even the slightest individuation. Rather Lawrence presents an individuation which does not refer to a coherent, finished identity. Lawrence’s insistence on sympathy as a “feeling with” and not a “feeling for,” which Chaudhuri glosses in his exploration of “difference” and otherness in Lawrence, further demonstrates that the Lawrencian conception of becoming is an encounter between fluxes that are indefinite and pluralistic yet not rhizomatic.

Lawrence’s self as Chaudhuri indicates “undermines essence, and denies ‘knowability’: ‘This is what I believe:...that my known self will never be more than a little clearing in the forest.’ ‘That gods, strange gods, come forth from the forest into the clearing of my known self, and then go back.’ ‘That I must have the courage to let them come and go’Lawrence’s ‘gods’ and ‘souls’ are a network of differences rather than essences” (DHLAD 172-173). Lawrence’s “gods” recall Deleuze’s “demons” and their proximity to the line of flight; nevertheless the configurations of these demons are attained by their contrast to the gods who maintain, according to Deleuze “fixed attributes.” The contradiction between Deleuze’s and Lawrence’s visions of the gods/demons arouses more than a superficial suspicion, since although it is enough to invert the terms to reach the same conclusion, it is significant to consider the fact that for Lawrence “gods” do not seem to be ordinary or recognizable. Lawrence’s gods are foreign gods, “strange gods” that are never omniscient or omnipresent, but rather more like Deleuze’s leaping demons. Lawrence’s natural gods are the gods of unknowing and

of strangeness setting the “norms” of his understanding of the self and the other as inappropriated fluxes floating in their own becomings and still exhibiting difference and never amalgamating.

Rupert Birkin—Lawrence’s most autobiographical character, who appears in the sequel novel to *The Rainbow*, *Women in Love*—represents a further Lawrencian development of this constantly changing self. As the Contessa (Hermione’s friend) testifies, “He is not a man, he is a chameleon, a creature of change” (65). Similarly, Ursula’s unformed self in her girlhood remains puzzling to her when she becomes a woman, and though the emphasis on the plurality of the self is clearly articulated, what remains striking here is the fact that it is still a self, and it is the possibility of this self that allows her to experiment and be one with the infinite:

Was she herself an impersonal force, or conjunction of forces, like one of these? She looked at the unicellular shadow that lay within the field of light, under her microscope. It was alive ... What was its will? If it was a conjunction of forces, physical and chemical, what held these forces unified, and for what purpose were they unified?... What was its intention? To be itself. Was its purpose mechanical and limited to itself? It intended to be itself. But what self? Suddenly in her mind the world gleamed strangely, with an intense light, like the nucleus of the creature under the microscope.... She only knew that it was not limited mechanical energy, nor mere purpose of self-preservation, and self-assertion. It was a consummation, a being infinite. Self was oneness with the infinite. To be oneself was a supreme, gleaming triumph of infinity. (TR 439)

Moreover, Lawrence's depiction of the finished selves of Gudrun and Gerald displays his aversion from the finality of these frightfully perfected, "done with" selves that can desire only mechanically and are doomed to either cynicism (Gudrun) or destruction (Gerald). Rupert's contemplation of Gerald, the man not the "animal man," grasps this aspect of finality, predicting thus Gerald's destruction: "He seemed to see ...the man himself, complete, and as if fated, doomed, limited. This strange sense of finality in Gerald, as if he were limited to one form of existence, one knowledge, one activity, a sort of fatal halfness...it was the insistence on the limitation which so bored Birkin in Gerald" (199). Similar perception to Rupert's is manifested through Ursula's aversion to Gudrun's tendencies to always imagine people and things as finished paintings, or sculptures she crafts on the spot: "there started a revulsion from Gudrun. She finished life off so thoroughly, she made things so ugly and so final...This finality of Gudrun's, this dispatching of people and things in a sentence, it was all such a lie. Ursula began to revolt from her sister" (256). Gerald and Gudrun are defective halves incapable of becoming, incapable of realizing the possibility of maintaining a becoming self traversed by a desire other than the mechanical. The infinite, unpredicted self which is always in a state of flux and constantly becoming materializes as symbol, not to be interpreted. Lawrence voices this concern through Ursula and Rupert's revulsion at the human that encapsulates everything in final terms and functions: it is just "a lie" as Ursula indicates: "Gudrun is really impudent, insolent, making herself the measure of everything...Rupert is quite right, human beings are boring, painting the universe with their own image. The universe is non-human, thank God" (257). Again, Deleuze's body without organs seems to occupy

the Lawrencian literary plane. Resisting signification and subjectification, Deleuze's body without organs is infinite and very similar to Lawrence's symbolic that is sacred due to its immunity to interpretation. The self as symbolic to Lawrence is an infinite unknown, individualized; yet not subjective.

Assembling Lawrence

Infinity in the Lawrencian conceptual world is not a regression to a metaphysical traditional deity, it is rather the fluidity and the becoming of the flux as an assemblage constantly encountering another one, where both are ruptured with desire. Desire circulates in a body without organs only when the two assemblages are different, so that it is capable of deterritorializing and reterritorializing them both at the same time. It is not a binary that generates the movement of desire, it is the difference between assemblages that are themselves composed of differences. Once any of the two loses its distinctive alterity, its otherness without acquiring a new one, desire stops to pass between them. It is this necessity of difference that makes desire consummating and infinitely self-renewing when it is impersonal, when the two assemblages maintain their foreignness and their unknown selves.

Lawrence's depiction of the regeneration of desire in Anna and Will's relationship after Will's failed adventure with Jennie, the common girl, traces the subtle functioning of impersonal desire between the husband and the wife as strangers: "he was a strange man come home to her. Glancing at him, she knew she couldn't reduce him to

what he had been before. In an instant she gave it up...She liked this strange man come home to her...She was very glad to welcome a stranger. She had been bored by the old husband...She was another woman, under the instance of a strange man...It was as if he were a perfect stranger, as if she were infinitely and essentially strange to him” TR 232-34). The impersonality of desire liberates Anna and Will from their sedentary lines which reduce them to known, calculated social signifiers. It is an instant in Lawrence where Deleuze and Guattari’s fears of the body without organ’s degradation “under the pressure of physiologically based instinct and socially induced habit” materializes revealing the resistance of desire to any organization:

Instincts and habits bind perception and action to the recognition and accomplishment of pre-assigned objects and tasks in order to satisfy “needs” and “duties” as defined by social order. But desire is inimical to any and all organization of this kind: it seeks always to disorganize and free itself from instincts and habits so as to experiment with new modes of perception and action, new modes of existence (Holland 61).

The individuation seems to pertain an unmitigated debt to the self, to the fluidity of the flux that remains amorphous, yet with points of encounter. Ursula Brangwen’s life, which makes up almost the entire second half of *The Rainbow*, is traced in its multiple becomings and its plurality of wills and tendencies revealing always an element of consistency, not an essence, but rather a trace:

In every phase she was so different. Yet she was always Ursula Brangwen. But what did it mean, Ursula Brangwen? She did not know who she was. Only she was full of rejection, of refusal. Always, always spitting out of her mouth the ash

and the girt of disillusion, of falsity. She could only stiffen in rejection, in rejection. She seemed always negative in her action. That which she was, positively, was dark and unrevealed, it could not come forth. (TR 435)

What makes her a coherent though plural self is not her thoughts or feelings, not even the way she interprets the world and herself, rather it is the unknown about her, “the dark.” It remains as dark for her as it is for others who encounter her. Ursula’s desire, which seems to define her in the first awakening of love in her life, is not a designation of subjectivity but rather a discovery of an infinite self that is caught in its woman-becoming staging the passage beyond the sexual binary. Failing to attain gratification in her relationship with Anton, Ursula turns to Inger. In both relationships, the illusion of a consistent desire which forms and defines the self collapses instantly leaving Ursula every time as a new becoming, relentlessly seeking its major encounter, its line of flight. Captured in these attempts is the quest towards self-definition which starts as quest of finitude and an aspiration towards a “maximum self”: “it was begun now, this passion, and must go on, the passion of Ursula to know her maximum self, limited and so defined against him. She could limit and defend herself against him, the male, she could be her maximum self” (TR 301).

Passing through disillusion with a “sense of deadness” resulting from her contact with Inger (TR 342), she attains a realization and an infatuation with infinity. She arrives at the same conclusion after her experimentation with the mechanical world, in what seems to suggest in the later chapters of the novel her becoming-man and her rejection of a man’s world at the same time. It is at St Philip where she learns how to “put the

personal self away, become an instrument, an abstraction, working upon a certain material, the class, to achieve a set purpose of making them know so much each day... Now...she had another self, another responsibility”(TR 382, 388). Ursula shoulders her way in a man's world, which though radically different from the stifling heat of breeding in her parents' house in Coosthay apparently, functions mechanically too, rendering all elements as tools for production. Resentment against children's production and against her mother's absorption into the motherly mechanical trance push Ursula to the discovery of another type of mechanical trance to which she learns to adjust, and becomes even fascinated with sometimes:

The class-teaching itself at last became almost mechanical. It was a strain on her, an exhausting wearying strain, always unnatural. But there was a certain amount of pleasure in the sheer oblivion of teaching... when the work had become like habit to her, and her individual soul was left out, had its growth elsewhere, then she could be almost happy...When she was well enough and not tired, then she did not hate teaching. She enjoyed getting into the swing of work of morning, putting forth all her strength, making the thing go.... She was struggling between two worlds, her world of young summer and flowers, and this other world of work. And the glimmer of her own sunlight was between her and her class. (TR 405-06)

Ursula's reluctant involvement in the mechanical world and the conflicting two modes of existence which she embodies bring back Lawrence and Deleuze to the same plateau again, where the schizophrenic desire of decoding fostered by capitalism tries "to recode

as best as it can, so as to prevent the capitalist social life from becoming completely meaningless (decoded): the nuclear family, state schooling, job training and consumer training...all serve this purpose” (Holland 58). The body without organs that is identified as the site of decoding and recoding in Deleuze’s work with Guattari is illustrated in Ursula’s contradicting status as more “independent” and free, and at the same time more dependent and chained to the mechanical world with “the big want.” Attempting to escape the recoding of desire in the nuclear family through becoming a school mistress, Ursula is more deeply drowned into the process of recoding, and the free decoding practiced by her “other” hidden self is ruptured by the desire for a material gratification, by the need to travel, to meet big people, and own beautifully compiled books.

[I]n coming out and earning her own living she had made a strong, cruel move towards freeing herself. But having more freedom she only became more profoundly aware of the big want. She wanted so many things... it was difficult. There were so many things, so much to meet and surpass. And one never knew where one was going. (TR 404)

What Lawrence might designate as the freedom of the body without organs is a continuous search for *gratification*, a term which is used by Deleuze and Guattari to indicate the fixation of desire, and consequently its deterioration. But here again, is gratification possible outside Lawrencian short circuits? Does Ursula Brangwen’s attempt to escape from one sphere to the other seem to signify a resistance to gratification? Or is it rather a relentless quest for it? Is this apparent contradiction between Deleuze’s figuration of desire and Lawrence’s experimentation with it a terminology problem? Or

does the literary plane adherence to a would-be reality, make the illusion of gratification necessary to pursue the movements of assemblages in a narrative form?

Deleuze's emphatic articulation of desire's opposition to determination finds its echo in the Lawrencian plane. Yet it is always the illusion of a possible gratification which triggers the narrative and draws its characters' escapades, thus illustrating the Deleuzian designation of desire's constant movement where "the BWO [body without organs] stages the struggle of desire to escape determination - whether instinctual, habitual or social; it thus designates the human potential for freedom" (Holland 58). At the same time, Lawrence contradicts the Deleuzian treatment of gratification and repression alike as types of fixation which "both shut down desire (whether by blockage or evacuation), instead of giving desire free reign to fully invest the BWO and explore its plane of consistency" (Holland 59). Ursula seeks what seems in *The Rainbow* an impossible gratification which always shifts her as a flux on molar and molecular lines, carrying her in short circuits of desire on lines of flight. The disillusion in the final phase of her life in *The Rainbow* motivates her to desire a new flight, which she pursues later in *Women in Love*.

The rainbow becomes the *symbolic*, resisting and defying interpretation since it combines all colours distinct, though floating in an assemblage. It is a Lawrencian symbol par excellence since it is an assemblage, an individuation without a subject, and it is an *arch*: "the arch bended and strengthened itself till it arched indomitable, making great architecture of light and colour and space of heaven" (TR 493).

Lawrence's insistence on the impersonal desire is further illustrated by Rupert

Birkin's rejection of Ursula's obsession with love as an expression of personal desire, a subjective one. For Rupert, this love amounts to the same as the relentless deadening consciousness of Hermione. Imposing subjectivity on desire is a limitation and a strain for the unpredicted passage of desire. A limitation that restricts desire to an already prescribed types of sexuality (husband/wife- an Oedipal nucleus), a mode which does not signify the ultimate and only desire for Lawrence, as he illustrates through Rupert's theorizing and inclinations:

On the whole he hated sex, it was such a limitation...He wanted so much to be free, not under any compulsion of any need for unification, or tortured by unsatisfied desire. Desire and aspiration should find their object without all this torture, as now, in a world of plenty of water, simple thirst is inconsiderable, satisfied almost unconsciously. And he wanted to be with Ursula as free as with himself, single and clear...yet balanced...the mingling of love was becoming madly abhorrent to him. (191)

Obviously, Rupert's desire is not to be categorized as a sexual desire, and it is not a desire for the mechanic either. In its indefiniteness and vagueness, Rupert's desire suggests a more abstract and more general sense of desire which directs the fluxes towards encounters, yet leaves them always different and never reduces them to oneness, staging thus the "individuation without a subject." What Rupert is seeking is not love or union, it is the attempt to be in contact with the other without losing his "dusky edges" of encounter. What his "star equilibrium" illustrates is this ability of being in contact, forming assemblages, circuits of desire without being diffused and without being

transformed into a rhizome: “there were depths of passion when one became impersonal and indifferent, unemotional whereas Ursula was still at the emotional level -always so abominably personal... ‘We love each other,’ she said in delight. ‘More than that,’ he answered...She had had lovers, she had known passion. But this was neither love nor passion” (296,305).

But to what extent does the Deleuzian adherence to attach the self to the movement of desire apply to the Lawrencian flux? Was Lawrence anticipating a body without organs functioning as a “difference-engine” as Holland indicates in his analysis of desire in Deleuze’s work? And is it possible to think of a perpetually liberating desire in Lawrence’s fictional world that aspires to become real? To answer these questions, a return to the rupture of invigorating impersonal desire between Anna and Will might be helpful to trace how the liberation of an impersonal desire alters, not only the way they relate to each other but furthermore, what they become. It also provides us with a chance to examine the impact of this impersonal desire which begins as a process of self-blossoming on two different, unpredicted selves. How does an impersonal desire develop in same couple with time, and how does it develop, or degrade each one of them? And does the Deleuzian understanding of desire as “opposed to gratification as it is to repression” flow smoothly with the Lawrencian quest of an infinite self maintaining its zones of encounter, and with sexuality as a reoccurring possibility of flight?

Will and Anna, each seems to have pushed the impersonal desire to the extreme without leaving their ordinary, social selves intact. Careless, and oblivious of the “habit,” responsive only to their instinctive, sensual encounter, they end up performing a

mechanical process of breeding illustrating what Deleuze in his work with Guattari designated as the danger confronting desire: "Desire can overproliferate like a cancer, or it can break loose and plunge into the void" (Holland 60). They end up seeking an escape, a new space that is capable of accommodating a new passage of the impersonal desire. Their short circuit has exhausted their possibilities and their becoming selves:

Brangwen had kept his carelessness about his circumstances...Living with Anna Brangwen, his mind was always suffused through with physical heat, he moved instinct to instinct, groping, always groping on. When it was suggested him that he might apply for one of the posts as hand-work instructor ...it was as if a space had been given to him, into which he could be removed from his hot, dusky enclosure...Now he might escape. (TR 416)

As for Anna, despite the gratification of birth- giving, which has always filled her with a sense of infinity and becoming, she too acknowledges the mechanical production of children in which she is caught and is willing to break with now: "she began to come awake from her sleep of motherhood, her energy moved more outwards. The din of growing lives roused her from her apathy. She too must have her hand in making life. She was quite ready to move, taking all her brood. It would be better if she transplanted them" (TR 416). What seems to be illustrated in the chronological alternation of desire here is a confirmation of the Deleuzian, or shall we say also the *Lawrencian*, understanding of desire as an opposing force to all organization and to all the configurations of molar sedentary lines, which in this case are not merely social but rather sensually mechanical: "they were neither of them quite personal, quite defined as individuals, so much they

were pervaded by the physical heat of breeding and rearing their young” (TR 352).

Yet, it is desire which motivates the couple again. Aspiring to fulfillment after the subsuming exhaustive sensual experimentation stopped being rewarding, Will and Anna need to be exposed to other fluxes and need to participate in other encounters that might promise a new flight. Lawrence’s fictional world is programmed to maintain the infinite openness of possibilities, yet we must recall that the literary work is an experimentation with the real and a creation of reality. Desire, like the self, is rebellious against fixation and stability; yet unlike the Deleuzian conception of it, is maintained within in a conceivable program that doesn’t deny gratification as an ever renewing spell. In the Lawrencian world, the body without organs accommodates a desire which seeks its gratification, and the self which fluctuates and becomes with every encounter with other assemblages, is not to be regarded as a subject which is eternally revolving around its secretive stagnation, but as a plurality which is individuated though not rhizomatic. And since desire circulates in an unpredicted circuit pushing the self to encounter other fluxes producing lines of flight and initiating myriads of becomings, we might be able to perceive it as catalyst that prevents fluxes from congealing and agglomerating.

To conclude, Deleuze’s adaptation and establishment of Lawrence’s concepts in the plane of immanence of philosophy provides a chance to rethink Lawrence and Deleuze together. Deleuze, a careful reader of Lawrence, gathers lines of flight, becomings, and fluxes from Lawrence’s never “finished” literary becoming, resurrecting the dead Lawrence from his postmodern death and becoming himself *other* than a philosopher. In his Lawrencian becoming, Deleuze does not imitate Lawrence, rather he

encounters him. Paying homage to Lawrence by bringing him back to the literary plane in a conversational mode that negotiates the Lawrencian concepts and demands a rereading of Lawrence, Deleuze liberates the novelist from the romantic stigma and acknowledges his “foreignness” and his riches. Lawrence’s strange individuated fluxes punctuate the Deleuzian *Dialogues* in their own way, and revise the sweeping rhizome in its threatening expansion. An arched Lawrencian desire illuminates the Deleuzian short circuits and though circulating into unpredicted realms, it manages to “crosscut the chaos,” and to declare a human desire that aspires to gratification with the movement of a rupture always becoming: a line of flight.

Works Cited

- Bogue, Roland, *Deleuze on Literature*, New York, Routledge: 2003.
- Chaudhuri, Amit, *D.H. Lawrence and ‘Difference’*, Oxford, Clarendon Press: 2003.
- Deleuze, Gilles, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, translated by Daniel W. Smith and Michael a. Greco, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press: 1993.
- Deleuze, Gilles, *Key Concepts*, edited by Charles J. Stivale, Montreal & Kingston. Ithaca, McGill-Queen’s University Press: 2005.
- Deleuze, Gilles, and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues II*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, New York Columbia University press: 2002.
- Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, *Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi, Minnesota, University of Minnesota Press: 2005.
- Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?*, New York, Columbia University Press: 1994.
- Ingersoll, Earl G., *D.H. Lawrence, Desire, and Narrative*, Gainesville, University Press of Florida: 2001.

Khalifa, Jean ed., *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze*, New York, Continuum: 1999.

Lawrence, D.H., *Etruscan Places*, New York, The Viking Press: 1932.

Lawrence, D.H., *Mornings in Mexico and Etruscan Places*, Harmondsworth, Penguin: 1977.

Lawrence, D.H., *The Rainbow*, New York, Oxford University Press: 1997.

Lawrence, D.H., *Women In Love*, Pennsylvania, Penguin Books: 1976.

A Fulbright Scholar from Lattakia, Syria, Saffana Manoun is an MA candidate in English Literature at the University of Richmond, where she is exploring the complex relationship between literature and philosophy. Saffana had graduated from Tishreen University in 2002 with a B.A in English literature and completed a post graduate diploma in English Literary Studies in 2003. She also taught English for non-specialist students and previously worked with a Mediterranean organization, Mediterranean Corporation, as an interpreter and a coordinator. Saffana plans to pursue her Ph.D. degree in Unstable Identities next year at Autonoma University in Madrid, Spain. Her passion for Arabic poetry and world literature has inspired Saffana in her study of literary theory, giving her a unique perspective and understanding of English literature.