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**BLINDSIDED BY CATHOLICISM: R. W. SETON-WATSON AND THE
SURPRISING STRENGTH BEHIND INTERWAR SLOVAK NATIONALISM**

by Marty Elizabeth Manor


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
Although many historians have studied the topic of nationalism—even interwar Czechoslovak nationalism—none has analyzed it as seen through the eyes of R. W. Seton-Watson, the foremost scholar on Central and Eastern Europe before, during, and after World War I. He possessed a unique relationship with the Slovak people, yet he underestimated the influence religiously-inspired nationalism had on the Slovak masses. This study proposes that it was diverging religious institutions, namely Protestantism and Catholicism, which determined the convictions of the Czech and Slovak intelligentsia and thus the direction of Slovak nationalism in interwar Czechoslovakia. Protestantism's Czechoslovakist national theory gave way to Catholicism's Slovakist theory. Seton-Watson recognized the role of the Protestant tradition, but he was blindsided by the degree of Catholicism's power over Slovak nationalism. The result of the shifting command of nationalist theories was the polarization of Czech and Slovak national identity, ending in the 1938 breakup of Czechoslovakia.

APPROVAL PAGE

I certify that I have read this thesis and find that, in scope and quality, it satisfies the requirements for degree of Master of Arts.



John D. Treadway, Thesis Advisor



John L. Gordon, Jr., Second Reader

**BLINDSIDED BY CATHOLICISM: R. W. SETON-WATSON AND THE
SURPRISING STRENGTH BEHIND INTERWAR SLOVAK NATIONALISM**

By

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B.S., University of Central Florida, 2000

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty

of the University of Richmond

in Candidacy

for the degree of

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in

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“If Nationality is to be the dominant factor in the future settlement of Europe, two other vital factors—economics and religion—must on no account be neglected, unless we are to court disaster.”¹ –R. W. Seton-Watson, 1919.

The rising heat of European nationalist sentiments ignited World War I. The end of the war in 1918 found numerous small nations scrambling for independence and recognition from the victorious Allies and Associated Powers. American President Woodrow Wilson, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, and Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando assembled for six months in Paris in 1919 to draw the map of the new world. Together their negotiations took away lands from the vanquished powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary and gave freedom to peoples who until that date did not exist as independent states. Reacting to the enormity of bloodshed in World War I, the Western powers aimed to create a world in which like ethnic peoples could form their own nation-states rather than being forced to assimilate into large empires. The hope was that this self-determination would allow various people groups to coexist peacefully with their neighbors, rather than allow nationalism to fuel another conflict such as occurred in the Great War. Wilson’s idea of self-determination for ethnic people groups gave the various peoples license to incorporate into nation-states for the first time in history. These “Succession States,”

¹ R. W. Seton-Watson, *Europe in the Melting Pot* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1919), 72.

largely located in Central and Eastern Europe, became known as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania.²

Also present at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 was a Scotsman who had made a name for himself as emissary from Great Britain to the oppressed Czech, Slovak, and Yugoslav peoples while they were under Austro-Hungarian dominion. Robert William Seton-Watson was one of the few delegates at the conference who truly understood and championed the rights of these heretofore overlooked groups. Although not yet widely renowned as an influential player on the global scene, Seton-Watson would soon be regarded as the foremost British scholar on Central and Eastern Europe before, during, and after World War I. His role would be monumental not only in founding Czechoslovakia but also in maintaining the peaceful cooperation between Czechs and Slovaks from 1918 to 1938.³

Seton-Watson and leading statesmen at the Paris Peace Conference witnessed the dramatic effects nationalism had on Europe in the Great War, and they aimed to understand its origins and components. Nationalism is a topic that has also been debated by historians for years. Even the seemingly narrow field of Czech and Slovak nationalism during interwar Czechoslovakia has been the subject of numerous studies. Central and East European historians have compared the differing ways in which Czechs and Slovaks perceive their national identities as well as comparing divergent Czech and Slovak political parties. One popular approach among historians in determining the

² Carol Skalnik Leff, *The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 21; Romania already existed as a loosely federated country before the war.

³ "R. Seton-Watson, British Historian," *New York Times*, 28 July 1951: p. 10.

origins of Czech and Slovak nationalism has been to examine leading Czech and Slovak figures in the interwar nationalist movement. What brought these figures to prominence? How did they acquire their nationalist convictions? How did they obtain followers? Much of the time religion has been found to be a significant factor contributing toward nationalist sentiments. In particular, the dramatic life of Slovak Catholic priest Andrej Hlinka has attracted many scholars to study his Slovak People's Party and its extreme Slovak nationalist stance which led, in part, to the 1938 division between the Czechs and Slovaks. Historian Miloš Trapl's book *Political Catholicism and the Czechoslovak People's Party in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1938* explores how Czech political Catholicism changed between World Wars I and II and the influence it had on political policy and the country's people.⁴ James Felak's work "*At the Price of the Republic*" *Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, 1929-1938* focuses on the Slovak side of politics, particularly the Slovak People's Party, and argues that Hlinka and his followers wanted to promote Slovak nationalism as distinct from Czech nationalism even "at the price of the Republic."⁵ Their goal was realized when Slovakia separated from the Czechs and became an independent nation (answerable to the Third Reich) from 1938-1945. In identifying the interwar Czech and Slovak intelligentsia, historians such as Owen Johnson have studied the effects of education on the intellectual class in forming divergent nationalist beliefs.⁶

⁴ Miloš Trapl, *Political Catholicism and the Czechoslovak People's Party in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1938* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

⁵ James R. Felak, "*At the Price of the Republic*" *Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, 1929-1938* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994).

⁶ Owen V. Johnson, *Slovakia 1918-1938: Education and the Making of a Nation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).

Bradley Abrams follows four distinct groups of Czech intelligentsia in his recent *The Struggle for the Soul of the Nation: Czech Culture and the Rise of Communism*.⁷ His book examines how the four groups' differing interpretations of post-1918 history and their alternate understandings of socialism led to the successful rise to power of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia after World War II.

This study takes a similar approach to Johnson's in determining the origins of Slovak nationalism, yet incorporates different source material. While Johnson argues that education influenced the Slovak intelligentsia and therefore nationalism, this thesis proposes that it was diverging religious institutions, namely Protestantism and Catholicism, which determined the convictions of the intelligentsia and thus the direction of Slovak nationalism in interwar Czechoslovakia. Although all of the above-mentioned historians' books reference the work of R. W. Seton-Watson, none has based his study primarily on Seton-Watson's writings. No in-depth analysis exists regarding Seton-Watson's perspective of the religious evolution of Slovak nationalism. Therefore, Seton-Watson's comprehensive paper collection including published books and articles as well as unpublished correspondence, documents, and notes will constitute the primary source materials consulted in this thesis.⁸ This study aims to prove that Seton-Watson recognized the role of the Protestant tradition in instilling a sense of nationalism within the Slovak intelligentsia, but he failed to predict the degree of Catholicism's power over

⁷ Bradley F. Abrams, *The Struggle for the Soul of the Nation: Czech Culture and the Rise of Communism* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004).

⁸ R. W. Seton-Watson Collection, School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES), University of London.

Slovak nationalism. He was blindsided by political Catholicism's influence on the Slovak masses. Protestantism's Czechoslovakist theory of nationalism gave way to Catholicism's Slovakist theory during the interwar period. The result of shifting nationalist theories was the polarization of Czech and Slovak national identity and political affiliation by 1938.

To determine the religious origins of Slovak nationalism, several questions will be addressed in the following pages: Who were the Slovak intelligentsia? How did they acquire their nationalist beliefs? Why did they align themselves under either the Protestant or Catholic faith? What impact did their religious membership have on their ideology? Why did the command of Slovak nationalism shift from the Protestants to the Catholics? Additionally, this thesis will explore Seton-Watson's evaluations of both Protestant and Catholic leaders, as well as the impact of his own background and religious convictions on his perception of the Slovak situation. Further inquiries will ask why Seton-Watson was blindsided regarding the power Catholicism holds over Slovak nationalism, and why he failed to predict the divergent directions the Slovaks and Czechs would take in 1938?

Such avid attention to an obscure area of history like the origins of Slovak nationalism leads one to question the significance of such a study. How does this study contribute toward a better understanding of the big picture of history? Perhaps an article from a September 2004, edition of the *New York Times* will shed light on the issue.⁹ The article's topic is Russia's scramble to cope with the deadly terrorist attack on September

⁹ Steven L. Myers, "Putin Gambles on Raw Power," *New York Times*, 19 Sept. 2004: sec. 4.

3, 2004, that killed over 300 primary school children in Beslan, Russia. Author Steven Lee Myers writes, “The principal threat posed by democracy in Russia today, he [Vladimir Putin] made clear . . . lies in simmering ethnic and religious tensions along the rim of Russia where ethnically non-Russian people live.” Myers continues, “what Russia has failed to do in more than 13 years of post-Soviet politics is develop a sense of national identity that might overcome those divisions.” He adds, “On the southern rim, religion has begun to challenge the nation as a source of identity.” Nationalism and its religious origins are just as relevant and powerful today as they were 80 years ago. In the twenty-first century the problem is no longer an intra-national dispute between two differing dogmas of Western Christianity but a battle between Eastern Islamic extremists and Western cultures. In Russia’s case the dispute involves neighboring yet disparate ethnic, lingual, and religious groups. Nevertheless, the same questions are being asked today that were addressed in Seton-Watson’s time: what are the origins of extreme Islamic nationalism, who are the leading figures, why are adjacent peoples so different, and what will be the global consequences? At stake are the safety of the world’s largest country and the security of the world. Identifying and understanding the answers to questions regarding the religious sentiment that fuels political drama is critical in today’s society.

CHAPTER 2

R. W. SETON-WATSON: THE SCOTTISH TRAVELER

Who would have guessed that a Scottish historian would develop a unique affinity for the Slovak people and come to play a monumental role in the establishment of Czechoslovakia? In order to appreciate R. W. Seton-Watson's perspective and influence on interwar Czechoslovakia, it is important to have an understanding of his background and evolution as a Central and East European scholar. Seton-Watson's Scottish heritage had given him empathy for small nations, formerly swallowed up by larger ones, who were now trying to survive on their own. His Presbyterian faith also influenced his religious outlook and the advice he offered concerning religious squabbles in Czechoslovakia. Born in 1879 to Scottish parents, Seton took his last name from both of theirs and spent most of his formative years at Ayton House in Abernethy, Perthshire, Scotland, where his mother's father also lived from 1891 to 1903. His grandfather was the one who instilled in him a pride in the Scotch Seton-Watson family history. Although his parents exercised two different Protestant faiths (his mother an ardent Episcopalian and his father a Reformed Presbyterian), the Presbyterian took hold, and Seton himself remained a practicing member of the Church of Scotland for life.¹⁰

¹⁰ Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe: R. W. Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981), 1-3; Jan Rychlík, Thomas D. Marzik, and Miroslav Bielik, eds., *R. W. Seton-Watson and His Relations with the Czechs and Slovaks: Documents, 1906-1951* (Prague: Ustav T. G. Masaryka, 1995-6), 2: 21.

His college years took him to New College, Oxford, where he graduated in 1902 with a degree in Modern History. Following his father's death in 1903, Seton-Watson received a sizeable inheritance and was able to devote himself to his passion of European history, spending significant amounts of time as a full-time graduate student. His first exposure to Central and Eastern Europe came during the winters of 1903-1905 when he enrolled at universities in Berlin, Paris, and Vienna. A fluent knowledge of German allowed him to read a majority of Austro-Hungarian documents regarding the Slavic minorities within their empire. Additionally, the fact that most of the Slavic figures he corresponded with could also speak and write in German enabled him to obtain an intimate knowledge of their situations.¹¹ Seton-Watson originally intended to study the history of the German Renaissance and Reformation but found himself enthralled with the current political questions in Europe. He thus shifted his attention in 1905 to writing a post-Congress of Vienna history of Austria-Hungary and began investigating the divergent races that comprised the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This investigation led him to Hungary, where he initially favored Magyar policy. After meeting with Slovak leadership, however, he quickly realized the destructive effects of forced Magyar assimilation on the Slovak people.¹² In a 1995 biographical sketch of his father, Christopher Seton-Watson wrote, "he developed from a conventional admirer of the liberal Hungary of Lajos Kossuth to a relentless critic of the current Hungarian

¹¹ Seton-Watson could also read Czech and Slovak, but spoke those languages primarily through a translator. Rychlík, Marzik, and Bielik, eds., *Seton-Watson and His Relations*, 2:21.

¹² The term "Magyar" refers to Hungary or anything Hungarian

administration.”¹³ The change of position from favoring to rejecting the Hungarian government shaped and characterized the remainder of his career as a Central and East European historian. His first book, entitled *The Future of Austria-Hungary*, drew criticism from the Hungarian government for its condemnation of Magyar oppression of Slovak and other ethnic minorities within its shared empire. Seton-Watson continued to expose the Hungarian subjugation of Slovaks in successive pieces of writing including his second book, *Racial Problems in Hungary*. It won him acclaim in Great Britain as an expert on Central European affairs and he was subsequently awarded a doctorate from Oxford University in 1910.¹⁴

After his marriage to May Stack in 1911, the Scotsman continued traveling within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, meeting with leading nationals from the Czech, Slovak, Yugoslav, and Romanian peoples and listening to their grievances against the policies originating in Vienna and Budapest.¹⁵ He forged a particularly strong friendship with a professor of philosophy at the Charles University in Prague, Tomáš G. Masaryk. Masaryk would later become the first president of Czechoslovakia. After the outbreak of World War I, Seton-Watson and Masaryk started a weekly academic journal of Central and East European political, economic, and social affairs titled *The New Europe*. Seton-Watson and Masaryk, along with other leading Central and East European political analysts, contributed frequently to the periodical, at times writing under pseudonyms to

¹³ Rychlík, Marzik, and Bielik, eds., *Seton-Watson and His Relations*, 2:21.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 21-2, 109-10.

¹⁵ Seton's wife May shared his Protestant beliefs as she herself came from a uniquely Protestant Irish family. Rychlík, Marzik, and Bielik, eds., *Seton-Watson and His Relations*, 2: 23.

protect their own identities since they were particularly wanted by the Austro-Hungarian government for inspiring notions of insurrection and treason. *The New Europe* ended its publication in 1920 when interest in Central and Eastern European affairs had waned and the journal was no longer making a profit. Undaunted, the pair again teamed up to launch what was to become the School of Slavonic Studies at King's College, London, where Seton-Watson assumed the Masaryk Chair of Central European History in 1922. Due to the wartime crisis and Seton-Watson's obvious expertise of Central and Eastern European affairs, the British government employed him in an official capacity as head of the Intelligence Bureau for Central and Eastern Europe during World War I. He maintained this position until the end of the conflict and remained an emissary of the British Foreign Office into the early years of the Czechoslovak Republic. After the Armistice, Seton-Watson traveled to the Paris Peace Conference with his companion Henry Wickham Steed, the foreign editor of *The Times of London*. Steed employed Seton-Watson as a temporary writer and thus enabled him to be present in Versailles as the Entente leaders re-defined existing nations and created new ones. The Scotsman had a thorough understanding of the principles of democracy and self-determination that his friend Czechoslovak President Masaryk intended to establish the new nation upon, and with his firsthand knowledge of the situation, Seton-Watson was able to be a knowledgeable contributor toward the creation of Czechoslovakia.¹⁶

Soon Seton-Watson would be recognized in the Western world not only as a journalist and observer of relations between the Czechs and Slovaks, but as an authority

¹⁶ Ibid., 2: 23-31; although it sounds phonetically correct in English to spell "Czechoslovak" as "Czechoslovakian," the Czech and Slovak people spell and pronounce it as "Czechoslovak."

on Central and East European politics in the early twentieth century. He would publish some thirteen books and numerous articles on various issues facing the Central European Succession States, not to mention his active speaking schedule throughout Britain. Always his goal was to educate his own country and other Western nations about the dynamic and significant peoples from a little-known part of the world. He aimed to correct pre-existing notions held among Westerners, such as British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, that the ethnicities of Central and Eastern Europe were “people of whom we know nothing.”¹⁷

The British historian became well-known not only in the Western world, however, but also to leading Central and East Europeans from all the Succession States. His personal paper collection housed in the University of London’s School of Slavonic and East European Studies, includes files of his personal correspondence with numerous national figures from both Britain and Central and Eastern Europe. The native Slovaks referred to him as “Scotus Viator” or the “Scottish Traveler,” the pen name he often used. The Slovaks even went so far as to erect a bust of Seton-Watson in 1937 in the town of Ružomberok on the thirtieth anniversary of his first visit to Slovakia. They sensed that he was not only their political ally but also their friend who, from his own background, empathized with their delicate political and religious relationship with the Czechs.

¹⁷ *New York Times*, “R. Seton-Watson, British Historian,” 10; Rychlík, Marzik, and Bielik, eds., *Seton-Watson and His Relations*, 2: 59-60; Thomas D. Marzik, “A Splendid Scottish-Slovak Friendship: R. W. Seton-Watson and Fedor Ruppeldt,” in *Scotland and the Slavs: Cultures in Contact 1500-2000*, ed. Mark Cornwall & Murray Frame (Russia: Oriental Research Partners, 2001), 103-25; R. W. Seton Watson, *A History of the Czechs and Slovaks* (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1943), 5, quoting Neville Chamberlain’s infamous assessment of the Czechoslovaks as he ceded away their country to appease Hitler in Munich, 1938.

Likewise, upon examination of Seton-Watson's writings, it becomes clear that he held a special affinity for the Slovak people.¹⁸

As stated above, the British historian's Scottish heritage and Presbyterian faith greatly influenced his global perspective and inclined him to relate particularly to the Slovak situation. His son Christopher would later write of his father:

Despite this English education he remained a Scot in spirit and outlook, and this goes far to explain his lasting interest in small nations. The Union of England and Scotland in 1707, within which two nations lived in harmony while retaining their separate identities, seemed to him the ideal model for other countries with national problems, such as Czechoslovakia.¹⁹

In a 2004 article on the "Scotus Viator," historian László Péter relates the early influences of Presbyterianism and Scottish heritage on Seton-Watson. "Above all, Seton-Watson was impressed with a strong sense of Scottish national identity. As R. R. Betts observed . . . 'His great interest in his Seton forebears kept alive his Scottish feeling, and perhaps made him the more sympathetic to the rights and sentiments of small nations.'" Péter summarizes, "religion, nationality, and liberal education, reinforcing each other, all predisposed Seton-Watson towards the defence of the underdog in national conflicts."²⁰ A contemporary of Seton-Watson, Professor W. J. Rose, also recognized the historian's campaigning on behalf of the underdog. Rose recalled that he was "a true Scot, . . . always and everywhere champion and apostle of the rights of the oppressed, of the

¹⁸ Seton-Watson Collection, SSEES, University of London; Marzik, "Scottish-Slovak Friendship," 104.

¹⁹ Christopher Seton-Watson quoted in Rychlík, Marzik, and Bielik, eds., *Seton-Watson and His Relations*, 2: 21.

²⁰ Péter László, "R. W. Seton-Watson's Changing Views on the National Question of the Habsburg Monarchy and the European Balance of Power," *Slavonic & East European Review* 82 (July 2004): 655-679.

unfortunate, of the under-dog.”²¹ But it was not merely others who recognized the historian’s particular attraction to small nations such as Slovakia.

Seton-Watson himself admitted as much. His 1923 letter to Catholic political leader Andrej Hlinka that appeared in the newspaper *Slovak* pledged, “. . . I shall always be ready in the future as in the past to defend the cause of the Slovaks, from whatever side it may be threatened”²² Additionally, in an effort to preserve the fragile unity of Czechoslovakia, Seton-Watson’s 1924 book *The New Slovakia* described the grievances the Slovaks held against their stronger Czech partners. As a third party observer Seton-Watson commented, “I am only too conscious of the delicate and embarrassing task which awaits the ‘candid friend.’ But to one qualification I can at least lay claim—namely, a lively sympathy for the Slovak nation and a keen desire for its success and happiness under the new regime.”²³ Thirteen years after the creation of the Czechoslovak Republic, he set out to show the world the positive changes that had been made in Slovakia since 1918 and even since the publication of *The New Slovakia*. He embarked on a 1931 anthology entitled, *Slovakia Then and Now*, with the following purpose stated in the Preface:

In 1927 the new provincial system of administration came into operation, and since then the consolidation of Slovakia has advanced by leaps and bounds As however this remarkable process is not merely little known abroad, but actually obscured by a deliberate propagandist campaign which aims at blackening the good fame of the new Republic, it occurred to me to make available to the foreign public a detailed survey of the true facts What

²¹ W. J. Rose quoted in Marzik, “Scottish-Slovak Friendship,” 106.

²² Rychlík, Marzik, and Bielik, eds., *Seton-Watson and His Relations*, 1: 344.

²³ R. W. Seton-Watson, *The New Slovakia* (Prague: F. Borovy, 1924), 11.

foreign opinion wishes to know, is not what the *Czechs* think of it, but what the *Slovaks themselves* think. Hence all the twenty-five contributors to this volume are Slovaks The cumulative effect will serve to show that the Slovaks themselves have had a much greater share in the reconstruction of their country than is often supposed.²⁴

Interestingly, Seton-Watson did not write similar books boasting progress for the other East European minorities with whom he labored.

The Scotsman often employed the comparison between his own country's relationship with England and Slovakia's relationship with the Czechs as a means of encouraging both peoples that cooperation was possible. He concluded in *The New Slovakia*:

England and Scotland have gradually devised a practical compromise between centralism and decentralization, such as offers many analogies to the problems now confronting the various Succession States. Our experience in this island has shown that side by side with unity in sovereignty and legislative powers, very great latitude and diversity can be allowed in most other directions: and that there is no inherent objection, no weakening of state authority, in the existence of two distinct administrations, or judicatures, or educational or land systems, within a single territorial unit.²⁵

But Seton-Watson realized that it was not only a political parallel that existed between the relationship of Scotland with England and Slovakia with the Czechs. A religious parallel also provided a model for cooperation. Just as the English and Scottish possessed differing national faiths, the Czechs and Slovaks respectively boasted Protestantism and Catholicism. What he failed to see was the degree to which Czechoslovak political distinctions were influenced by religion. He was especially shortsighted regarding the power that Catholicism exercised over the Slovaks.

²⁴ R. W. Seton-Watson, *Slovakia Then and Now* (Prague: Orbis Publishing Co., 1931), 1-2.

²⁵ Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 122.

Regarding religion, early in his career Seton-Watson betrayed the moderation that would later characterize his stance toward Czechoslovak Protestant and Catholic differences. With the royalties he received from the Czech version of his 1908 book *Racial Problems in Hungary*, the historian established a scholarship program aimed at inviting both Slovak Protestant and Catholic clerical students to attend the University of Edinburgh for a period. Unfortunately, the details coordinating Catholic students' study in Scotland never materialized, leaving only six Protestant Slovaks to accept the offer over a period of four years.²⁶ The scholarship program's aim was two-fold. The first goal was to expose promising young Slovak leaders to the working political and religious relationship between Scotland and England. Secondly, the plan intended to further the effort to educate Britain about little-known East European people such as the Slovaks. It should be noted that Seton-Watson did not establish a similar scholarship fund for any other Central or East European ethnicities, hinting again that he had a special place in his heart for the Slovaks.²⁷

The "Scottish Club" as Seton-Watson called the six scholarship students, later became very influential not only on the Slovak clerical scene, but also in political, literary, and educational spheres. Martin Rázus became a Lutheran pastor, a writer, and a politician, leading the Slovak National Party beginning in 1929. Rázus and fellow "Scottish Club" compatriot Vladimir Roy both became well-known poets, while Jozef Koren rose to administer the Teacher's Training School in Prešov, Slovakia. Fedor

²⁶ Ironically it was Seton-Watson's staunchly Catholic friend Anton Štefánek who located most of the students who participated in the program. Marzik, "Scottish-Slovak Friendship," 108.

²⁷ Marzik, "Scottish-Slovak Friendship," 103, 119.

Ruppeldt would later become known as “one of the outstanding Slovak intellectuals during the interwar period,” and of the six students it was he who maintained the closest contact with Seton-Watson throughout his career. He served as a Lutheran bishop and also as a deputy for the Agrarian Party from 1933-1935.²⁸

In his article, “A Splendid Scottish-Slovak Friendship: R. W. Seton-Watson and Fedor Ruppeldt,” historian Thomas D. Marzik examines the unique relationship that developed between the “Scotus Viator” and Fedor Ruppeldt. Their lifelong friendship exemplifies Seton-Watson’s personal investment in the lives of Slovaks and his desire for them to take home and apply what they learned during their stay in Scotland. Ruppeldt wrote many letters to his Scottish mentor before and after World War II, never ceasing to thank him for his interest in Slovakia and in the lives of the “Scottish Club” members. Their correspondence reveals not only Ruppeldt’s gratitude but also the unique relationship Seton-Watson had with the Slovaks. In two letters dated September 1917 and January 1911, respectively, Ruppeldt commented on his visit to the Seton-Watson home at Ayton and on the historian’s book *Racial Problems in Hungary*:

I dare say, you yourself can hardly imagine what does it mean for a man like me, son of a small unknown oppressed people, to come to [your] country.²⁹

Really, Sir, our people must be much, very much obliged to you for this brilliant book, for your whole work at all, which is a great, noble and, I dare say, a successful attempt to bring the truth about this ‘obscure corner of Europe’ to light Every page of your book shows me, that it is written not only with [the] head but also with the heart, - and that your whole work is done not only for the

²⁸ Rychlík, Marzik, and Bielik, eds., *Seton-Watson and His Relations*, 2: 33, 113-15; Marzik, “Scottish-Slovak Friendship,” 118.

²⁹ Fedor Ruppeldt to R. W. Seton-Watson, 16 Sept. 1917, Seton-Watson Collection, SSEES, University of London.

scientific interest of truth, but also for the noble purpose of helping our people to freedom and culture. The best proof of it is just our staying here in this country!³⁰

Seton-Watson would later remark that Ruppeldt seemed to grasp the concepts the Scotsman had intended him to take away from his time in Britain. Marzik quotes Seton-Watson, “the advantages to be gained from a contact between the Protestant Slovaks and the Scottish Churches’ had been realized by Ruppeldt ‘even more thoroughly than I had hoped.’”³¹ A letter written by the Slovak bishop confirms Seton-Watson’s observation:

In the political and ecclesiastical history and present situation of your nation and your Churches I could point out many things, what we Slovaks, or our Evangelical Church could learn from you. My studies of your Churches and their history have thrown in my mind a new light upon my own Church and its future.³²

Ruppeldt understood the parallel between Scotland and his native Slovakia and would later even advise Seton-Watson on his 1924 book *The New Slovakia* in which the author compared Slovakia to Scotland.³³ As a result of his time abroad, Ruppeldt wrote an article in the Slovak Lutheran journal *Cirkevné Listy* (*Church Letters*) in 1911. Marzik summarizes the contents, “He [Ruppeldt] specifically lauded the Scottish ‘presbyterian system’ which, he claimed, had become the ‘strong bastion of Protestantism and democracy [and of] spiritual independence of Scotland; it sustained its national Church and through it powerfully influenced the political-social education of the nation as

³⁰ Fedor Ruppeldt quoted in Marzik, “Scottish-Slovak Friendship,” 110-11.

³¹ Marzik, “Scottish-Slovak Friendship,” 117.

³² Ruppeldt to Seton-Watson, 16 Sept. 1917, Seton-Watson Collection, SSEES, University of London.

³³ Ruppeldt also officially translated *The New Slovakia* into Slovak. Marzik, “Scottish-Slovak Friendship,” 121.

well.””³⁴ The concepts that Ruppeldt and his five compatriots took away from their time in Scotland were not wasted upon their return to Slovakia.

Shortly after the Munich Agreement was signed in 1938, Ruppeldt wrote to his old friend and mentor but this time under a very different set of circumstances. Even as a bishop Ruppeldt was active in politics and especially in the Resistance effort against the Nazis. He wrote as early as 1917 of the necessarily dual roles of pastor and politician, “We Slovak ministers can not help taking part in the political struggling as the present unhappy political system inside and outside the Church is what most corrupts it.”³⁵ In his October 15, 1938, letter to “Scotus Viator” Ruppeldt sensed the coming Nazi oppression that would eventually lead to his own arrest by the Gestapo for his efforts with the Resistance. “Whatever happened and may yet happen, your noble friendship towards our people and, if I may take the liberty to mention it also towards *me personally*, is to me like a beam of light which is surrounding us all.”³⁶ Ruppeldt was subsequently imprisoned in 1940 and twice in 1944—in a concentration camp for Jews and in the Slovak prison at Ilava. But he survived to serve as bishop in Žilina, Slovakia, from 1947-1952.³⁷

As Ruppeldt’s letters testify, Seton-Watson held a unique place in his heart for the Slovak people. He aimed to bring the example of his own country’s peaceful coexistence

³⁴ Ibid., 113.

³⁵ Ruppeldt to Seton-Watson, 16 Sept. 1917, Seton-Watson Collection, SSEES, University of London.

³⁶ Fedor Ruppeldt quoted in Marzik, “Scottish-Slovak Friendship,” 123-4.

³⁷ Rychlík, Marzik, and Bielik, eds., *Seton-Watson and His Relations*, 2: 116; Ruppeldt to May Seton-Watson, 15 Feb. 1961, Seton-Watson Collection, SSEES, University of London.

with England to bear on the relationship between the Slovaks and the Czechs. The Slovak and Czech peoples were not as similar as was first presumed at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Their divergent histories and religious leanings would prove divisive in the early years of the Republic.

CHAPTER 3

CZECH AND SLOVAK: SURPRISINGLY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES

The parallel between the relationships of England and Scotland and the Czech lands and Slovakia proved an indispensable example for Seton-Watson as he advised the newly married Czechs and Slovaks in the Czechoslovak Republic. Although they appeared extremely similar, surprising differences lay beneath the surface. These differences lent themselves to the divergent forms of nationalism that stemmed from the Protestant and Catholic faiths. Thus it was religion that influenced the Czech and Slovak intelligentsia who in turn promoted differing nationalist theories.

Who were the prospective marriage partners in the proposed 1918 union of Czechoslovakia? Indeed, the Czech and Slovak peoples possessed several similarities indicating they were suitable for each other. First, both were Slavic peoples, oriented in ethnicity toward Russia and related to nearby Poles and Yugoslavs, but distinctively not to the Hungarians. Although they were Slavs, the Czechs and Slovaks further distinguished themselves in that neither was of the Orthodox faith. Since the fifteenth century the Czechs had been primarily Protestant and the Slovaks, Roman Catholic. They shared a common history to the extent that both were part of the “Great Moravian Empire” of the ninth century, and also to the extent that in the fifteenth century the Slovaks were occupied by Czech Hussites during the later Hussite Wars. Geographically, the Czechs and Slovaks shared adjacent lands separated only by the Carpathian Mountains. Perhaps most significantly, their languages were very similar, comparable in

kinship to Spanish and Portuguese. The languages are two branches of a common Slavic base dialect. Additionally, both languages used a Latin alphabet, unlike the other Slavs to the south and east who employed the Cyrillic alphabet. The Czechs and Slovaks appeared remarkably similar.³⁸

Appearances, however, can be deceiving. The surprisingly significant differences between the two groups included a thousand years of divergent histories as well as a religious doctrinal distinction that would prove divisive to a joint national consciousness. The Czechs and Slovaks initially shared the “Great Moravian Empire” in the ninth century including what the Czechs proudly refer to as the “historic lands” of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia.³⁹ But the ensuing Magyar invasion and conquest of their empire in 896 separated the two peoples’ historical experiences for the next thousand years. The Slovaks became subject to the Hungarians from the late ninth century until the end of the First World War. The unique geography of Bohemia and Moravia also contributed to the division between Czech and Slovak historical experiences. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck remarked in reference to the Carpathian Mountains, forests, and the Danube River bordering the Czech lands, “Bohemia is a fortress created by God Himself.”⁴⁰ The Carpathian Mountains supply one boundary of the fortress, splitting the adjacent lands of Bohemia and Moravia, and preventing easy access and communication from one area to

³⁸ Leff, *Czech and Slovak Republics*, 6; Margaret Macmillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2003), 241; Seton-Watson, *History*, 250, 253-4.

³⁹ Seton-Watson, *History*, 313; Ethnic Czechs have traditionally occupied Bohemia, while Moravia has been home to ethnic Slovaks, and Silesia to the Poles.

⁴⁰ Otto von Bismarck, quoted in R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Future of Bohemia* (London: Nisbet & Co. Ltd., 1915), 31.

the other. Conversely no barrier existed between the Slovak and Hungarian territories of Moravia, which allowed the Hungarians to easily monitor and influence their Slovak subjects. Even today the ethnic distinction between Slovak and Hungarian peoples in southern Slovakia is blurred. Many Slovaks living in the southeast part of Slovakia consider themselves ethnically Hungarian, speak both Slovak and Hungarian, and observe both cultures' traditions. But hard feelings can still be detected among Slovaks from the north of the country against the Hungarians due to a thousand years of oppression. Thus the year 896 marks the division of Czech and Slovak histories.⁴¹

The Czechs found themselves under German rule rather than Hungarian as their stronger neighbors to the west asserted political and religious control over Bohemia. The Czechs managed to enjoy a period of prosperity under their King Charles IV, and the period from 1346-1378 is known as the "Golden Age of Bohemia." During that time Prague became a crossroads for trade and cultural development for Central and Eastern Europe. Charles IV founded Charles University in 1348 in Prague as the first university of the German and Slavonic worlds and the school where Czech national hero Jan Hus became rector in 1403.⁴²

No history of Bohemia is complete without an account of the forward-thinking Jan Hus. His figure towers over Prague's *Stare Mesto* (Old Town) even today. Traditionally known for his rebellion against Papal authority, Hus lit the torch of the Protestant Reformation a full century before Luther lit the bonfire. As Bohemia strained

⁴¹ Seton-Watson, *History*, 250-51.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 15-35, 42; R. W. Seton-Watson, "Speech Delivered on Fifteenth Anniversary of the Czechoslovak Republic," 29 Oct. 1933, Seton-Watson Collection, SSEES, University of London.

against German control during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, German Papal hierarchy lorded their power over the minority Czech population. Hus came to prominence as a preacher at a time of widespread corruption among clerics of his own Slavic nationality, and it was this that he initially resisted. He exclaimed, “Woe on me, if I were silent! It is better for me to die than not to oppose such wickedness.”⁴³ The religious hierarchy was guilty of everything from buying and selling ecclesiastical appointments to concubinage. When the Papacy declared itself infallible, Hus objected. Further contradicting the existing structure, he declared Scripture—not the Papacy—to be the peoples’ sole religious authority. For his unorthodox stance, the heretical preacher drew standing-room-only crowds of students from nearby Charles University to his Bethlehem Chapel in Prague.⁴⁴

Nevertheless, what distinguishes Hus as a leading national figure in the history of Bohemia is not only his proto-Reformation religious beliefs, but also his effort to preserve and promote the Slavic language and culture. As Seton-Watson commented regarding Hus, “he did for the language and literature of his people all that Luther did for the German.”⁴⁵ Hus wanted the common Bohemian to be able to understand his objections, so he wrote in the basic literary language used in Prague. He also urged his audience to seek truth, promising that “truth will prevail,” and, “Let God be true and

⁴³ Seton-Watson, *History*, 33, quoting Jan Hus.

⁴⁴ Seton-Watson, *History*, 33; Seton-Watson, *Future of Bohemia*, 8.

⁴⁵ Seton-Watson, *History*, 53.

every man a liar.”⁴⁶ Obviously his intolerance of clerical authority was not popular with the Papacy who ordered him to be burned at the stake in 1415, a century before Luther pounded his Ninety Five Theses on the church door in Wittenberg in 1517.⁴⁷

The Hussites, inspired by their martyr, acquired more of a militant than a spiritual reputation as they conquered lands, including parts of Slovakia, in the name of Hus. But their tenure was brief, and soon the Slovaks were again suffering as a minority Slavic group under Hungarian subjugation.⁴⁸ The Hungarians encouraged German settlement in Magyar territory, however. The German colonists brought Reformation doctrine with them to their new colonies, and therefore Lutheran reformed theology was also introduced to the historically Catholic Slovaks. Although the reformed faith attracted a small but significant number of Slovak followers, the number of Slovak Catholics far exceeded the number of professing Slovak Protestants before World War I. Even as late as the year 1900, 68 percent of the Slovak population reported themselves Roman Catholic in the Hungarian census, while only 20 percent professed to be Protestant (Lutheran and Evangelical Reformed).⁴⁹

On the heels of the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation and ensuing Counter Reformation, came the famous Bohemian Battle of White Mountain in 1620. Protestant and Catholic forces met on November 8, 1620, in a skirmish which ended with the

⁴⁶ Abrams, *Struggle for the Soul*, 40, quoting Jan Hus; Seton-Watson, *History*, 54, quoting Jan Hus.

⁴⁷ Seton-Watson, *History*, 51.

⁴⁸ Despite the fact that Slavic lands surround Hungary, the Magyar nationality and language are far-removed from the Slavic ethnicity and dialect.

⁴⁹ Seton-Watson, *Future of Bohemia*, 13; Seton-Watson, *History*, 252-5; Johnson, *Education*, 27.

Bohemian Protestants losing their kingdom to the Austrian Catholics. It was during this turbulent course of events when Elizabeth Stuart of England was married to the King of Bohemia and lived in Prague as the “Winter Queen.” Her contemporary and the other notable Bohemian figure from the seventeenth century was Jan Amos Comenius (Komenský). He is known in Czech history as the great educational reformer, but like Hus, Comenius was also a religious figure. He was the last Bishop of the Czech Brethren, the Protestant line of clergy who formed a Czech national church that endeavored to follow Hus’s example of pursuing Christian morals lived out in daily life. Hus and the Czech Brethren tradition strongly influenced Comenius’ educational philosophy. As Seton-Watson noted, Hus and Comenius did not hail from noble birth. They were recognized for their intellectual and religious beliefs and rose to become national figures in Czech history. Thus the pattern emerges of Czech intelligentsia rising from humble beginnings and allowing their religious beliefs to influence their political and educational reforms.⁵⁰ They became the fathers of Czech nationalism who inspired later Czech and Slovak intelligentsia to revive Czechoslovak nationalism in 1848.⁵¹

The overall Slovak historical experience from the year 896 until the end of World War I was completely separate from that of their Czech neighbors. While the Czechs suffered under German oppression, the Slovaks endured a thousand years of Hungarian

⁵⁰ “Intelligentsia” refers to the educated figures who led the Czech and Slovak political and cultural revival.

⁵¹ Seton-Watson, *History*, 111-12; Seton-Watson, “Czechoslovak Anniversary Speech,” 1933, Seton-Watson Collection, SSEES, University of London; Rychlík, Marzik, and Bielik, eds., *Seton Watson and His Relations*, 2:70; H. Gordon Skilling, *T.G. Masaryk: Against the Current, 1882-1914* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 99.

domination. The Hungarian Magyarization program of the 1840s essentially forced the assimilation of thousands of ethnic Slovaks into a Hungarian mold. The Slovak language was no longer permitted to be spoken in Slovak schools or colleges. Primary schools taught lessons in Hungarian only. Government affairs and public business could no longer be conducted in Slovak. Slovak inscriptions on railroad systems and in post offices were banned, the Slovak press was censored, and Slavic peoples were not allowed to assemble freely. The small class of Slovak intellectual elites was Magyarized, and anyone who held an official position had to profess allegiance to the policies of Budapest. Historian James Felak describes the Hungarian Apponyi Laws that required students in Slovak primary schools to “be fully proficient in the Hungarian language by the end of the fourth grade,” and mandated that “teachers refrain from participation in the national movements of non-Hungarian nationalities.”⁵² The Hungarians strove to erase any vestige of Slovak identity from the people.⁵³

Magyar manipulation even extended into the religious sphere. The Hungarian regime recognized the sway local parish clergy held in the lives of the masses of Slovak villagers. The clergy could easily and effectively either spread Hungarian assimilation or promote Slovak nationalism. Therefore the Magyar authority successfully persuaded many of the Catholic clergy and some of the reformed Calvinist clergy in Slovakia to promote pro-Magyar sentiment from the pulpit and in daily interactions with parishioners. Local priests generally sided with the Hungarian authorities while

⁵² Felak, “*At the Price*,” 12.

⁵³ Seton-Watson, *Future of Bohemia*, 26; Seton-Watson, *History*, 284.

numerous Slovak peasants were left to silently disagree. Seton-Watson referred to the Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinist churches of pre-war Slovakia as “powerful instruments of assimilation.”⁵⁴ In *The New Slovakia* he stated, “Under the Magyar regime their [Catholic priests’] influence among the masses had been almost unchallenged, and this the state had respected, in return for their active support of Magyarisation.”⁵⁵ He even labeled the Hungarian-influenced priests as “tools” in the following statement: “It is true that the Catholic hierarchy of Hungary was even more a tool of Budapest than the Bohemian hierarchy ever was of Vienna, and eagerly lent itself to designs of national assimilation.”⁵⁶ Hungarian persuasion permeated the national level of the Slovak Catholic clergy as well as the local level. Seton-Watson noted that “Under Hungary the Catholic Bishops had been the chief exponents of Magyarisation”⁵⁷ Future Czechoslovak Prime and Foreign Minister, Protestant Milan Hodža presented a similar assessment of Slovak Catholic clergy under Hungarian rule, “The Catholic hierarchy placed itself at the disposal of Magyarising tendencies, which under its encouragement penetrated far and wide among the clergy.”⁵⁸ The “Scotus Viator” continued his 1931 commentary by stating that the “Magyarone” or Hungarian-influenced clergy were particularly vehement in their efforts to persuade Slovak church goers toward the end of the nineteenth century because Slovak assimilation was progressing at such a rapid pace.

⁵⁴ Seton-Watson, ed., *Slovakia Then and Now*, 25.

⁵⁵ Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 70.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁵⁷ Seton-Watson, ed., *Slovakia Then and Now*, 35-6.

⁵⁸ Milan Hodža quoted in *ibid.*, 87.

He reflected that if the Central Powers had been victorious in the First World War, within one generation the Slovak character would have been completely absorbed into a Hungarian identity.⁵⁹

The irony is that under Hungarian rule, Slovak Catholicism was a tool used by the Magyar government to assimilate the Slovak peoples; yet, after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War I, Catholicism became the primary institution promoting Slovak autonomy via the Catholic-led Slovak People's Party. Johnson notes, "The Catholic clergy would later be identified with the interwar Slovak nationalist movement, but in prewar Slovakia the clergy was for the most part devotedly Hungarian."⁶⁰ Exceptions existed, however, since not every Catholic priest propagated Magyar doctrine. Although Slovak Catholicism's values changed from representing pro-Magyar nationalism to advocating pro-Slovak autonomy, a majority of the directors of the Slovak People's Party (such as leader Andrej Hlinka) had been consistently anti-Magyar.⁶¹

Magyarization's intrusion into all areas of life caused many Slovaks to revert to their historically Catholic faith, despite the fact that many local priests were well known for their "Magyarone" association. The Slovaks were widely recognized to be a naturally devout people. Seton-Watson observed in his introductory chapter to his 1931 anthology *Slovakia Then and Now*, "it is quite true that the Slovaks, Catholic majority and

⁵⁹ Seton-Watson, ed., *Slovakia Then and Now*, 25, 35-6, 87; Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 70.

⁶⁰ Johnson, *Education*, 27.

⁶¹ Seton-Watson, ed., *Slovakia Then and Now*, 18.

Protestant minority alike, have always been extremely devout by nature, and indeed it may well be that their repressed national feelings found vent in devotion to the church.”⁶²

Catholic priest and Slovak nationalist leader Andrej Hlinka agreed with Seton-Watson regarding the significant role religion played in the makeup of the Slovak people. He concluded in his contributing chapter to Seton-Watson’s 1931 collection:

In Hungary the Slovak was known for his law-abiding, modest and devout qualities, as well as for the emotional depths of his nature. He was profoundly influenced by religion: and this was only natural, for he had no worldly goods and religion was his mainstay . . . when everything had deserted him, he was not deserted by his religious instinct. . . . In this respect he compared favourably with other civilized nations. But for his faith he would have become a slave, and he therefore founded all his future on religion.⁶³

One thousand years of Slovak isolation from their Slavic brethren as well as greater Europe provided a stark contrast to the Czechs’ noteworthy historical figures and accomplishments. The differences between the Czech and Slovak historical experiences played a large part in the difficulties they faced during the early years of the Czechoslovak Republic. Seton-Watson repeatedly referred to the disadvantage that the Slovaks suffered at the hand of the Hungarians via their policy of Magyarization. The following quote denoted his assessment of the differing histories of the two peoples:

During the last half century in particular, while Bohemia was increasingly open to all the currents of world-thought, Slovakia lay under the nightmare of Magyarisation, With every decade the Czech has been led farther into the currents of speculative enquiry, alike in the field of politics and social order, of theology and philosophy; while the Slovak saw little of the outer world, and saw that little only as it had appeared to his father before him.⁶⁴

⁶² Ibid., 35.

⁶³ Andrej Hlinka quoted in Seton-Watson, ed., *Slovakia Then and Now*, 168.

⁶⁴ Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 32.

Johnson echoes Seton-Watson's evaluation, "Whether Lutheran or Catholic, the Slovak was far more religious than his Czech brethren and had a far narrower world view."⁶⁵

The Czechs, following in the footsteps of the forward-thinking Jan Hus, managed to expose themselves to progressive thought despite German suppression. The Slovaks, having no national leader to imitate, reverted to their historical Catholic faith.

Given that the Czechs were subjected by German and Austrian rulers who were closely connected with the Catholic papal hierarchy (the same hierarchy that Hus opposed), many Bohemians strongly disliked Catholicism or what became known as the "Austro-Catholic" policy.⁶⁶ The resulting backlash against Rome, coupled with the fact that many Czechs also wanted to distance themselves from the militant Protestant Hussites, caused a majority of Bohemians to be only nominally religious or even atheistic. The Czechs became more entrenched in their pro-Hus, anti-German, anti-papal ways, while the majority of Slovaks continued to devote themselves more fully to Catholicism. Political scientist Carol Skalnik Leff agrees, "Slovak Catholicism was more vigilant and self-conscious than was the Czech."⁶⁷ Consequently, the two nationalities began to judge each other.

The Slovaks disliked the Czechs for being secular, atheistic, and modern, while the Czechs viewed the Slovaks as ignorant, backward villagers. Political differences

⁶⁵ Johnson, *Education*, 58.

⁶⁶ Pavel Marek, "Emancipation of Czech Political Catholicism, 1890-1914," *East European Quarterly* 37 (March, 2003): 15.

⁶⁷ Carol Skalnik Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 21.

began to stem from religious and national differences. It became logical to associate particular nationalist policies with either the progressive, pro-Hus, and even Protestant Czechs or the Catholic Slovaks. Protestants (Czech and Slovak) typically advocated union between Czechs and Slovaks, or “Czechoslovakism,” as the only viable means of opposing the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Catholics (Slovak only), on the other hand, typically embraced the idea of an independent Slovakia or “Slovakism.” When comparing Slovak Protestants to Catholics apart from the Czechs, the Slovak Protestants aligned themselves with the Czech position of Czechoslovakism, while the Slovak Catholics remained Slovakists.⁶⁸

This conceptualization was facilitated when national Czech and Slovak figures began to distinguish themselves as representatives of either the Czechoslovakists or the Slovakists. Spiritual leaders took on political roles, thus becoming political leaders as well. Oftentimes these leaders did not hail from an elite status, but rose from humble, common origins. Bradley Abrams notes a pertinent 1973 quotation by Antonin Liehm, “modern Czech political consciousness emerged as an attempt to revive the national language and culture. Those who took over this task—writers, linguists, scholars—assumed the role of the aristocracy; they became the spiritual elite of a subjugated nation, and eventually transformed themselves into a political elite.”⁶⁹ Forty years earlier the

⁶⁸ Johnson, *Education*, 58; Seton-Watson, ed., *Slovakia Then and Now*, 35; Petr Příhoda, “Mutual Perceptions in Czech-Slovak Relationships,” in Jiří Musil, *The End of Czechoslovakia* (London: Central European University Press 1995), 131; Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, *Making New Europe*, 83.

⁶⁹ Antonin Liehm quoted in Abrams, *Struggle for the Soul*, 41.

“Scotus Viator” had recognized the same phenomenon within Czech history regarding

Hus:

[the Bohemians are] the first example in modern European history, of an entire nation choosing for its acknowledged leader a scholar and thinker, of no birth and without social advantages, and under the inspiration of his teaching holding all Europe at bay. Henceforward the real heroes of Czech history have been intellectual and spiritual rather than materialist—thinkers not warriors.⁷⁰

The emerging intelligentsia who would lead the Czechs and Slovaks in the 1848 cultural revolution against the Dual Monarchy rose from humble beginnings. As Seton-Watson noted in 1933, Czech and Slovak nationalism originated as a bottom-up movement rather than a top-down phenomenon. “Except for a few enlightened individuals among the Bohemian nobility of those days, the motive force came not from above but from below,” and again, “The movement is still from below, the true leaders or makers are still intellectuals.”⁷¹ This pattern of nationally-influential intellectuals rising from modest backgrounds repeatedly surfaced in the examples of Hus, Comenius, and Masaryk.

Particularly after 1918, the religious institutions of Protestantism and Catholicism provided a common denominator or basic starting point from which Czechs and Slovaks could identify themselves. Protestantism carried the banner of Czechoslovak unity while Catholicism boasted hopes of an independent Slovakia. Regardless of their Protestant or Catholic affiliation, most Czechs already perceived themselves as lining up with the Hus-like, progressive thinking, Czechoslovakist, Protestants; whereas most Slovaks aligned themselves with the traditional, Slovakist Catholics. Owen Johnson’s book, *Slovakia*

⁷⁰ Seton-Watson, “Czechoslovak Anniversary Speech,” 1933, Seton-Watson Collection, SSEES, University of London.

⁷¹ Ibid.

1918-1938: Education and the Making of a Nation, proposes that it was education which first influenced the Czech and Slovak intelligentsia, resulting in two nationalist positions—Czechoslovakism and Slovakism. Alternately, this thesis purports that it was religious institutions (Protestantism and Catholicism) that originally influenced the intelligentsia resulting in Czechoslovakism and Slovakism. Nevertheless, the Slovak Protestant educational system of the nineteenth century had a remarkable impact on future Slovak national figures.⁷²

Despite the oppressive Hungarian policy in the 1800s that forced Slovak school children to speak and learn in the Hungarian language, the Slovak Protestants were able to successfully educate their children apart from Magyar control. Johnson's book describes in detail the superior quality of education provided by the Protestant schools in comparison to the Magyarized schools where the majority of Slovak children were taught. Seton-Watson recognized the same and noted in 1924, "It is well known that the Slovak intelligentsia has been very largely recruited from the children of Protestant pastors"⁷³ The following statistic evidences Seton-Watson's claim. Before World War I, 112 out of 178 Slovak writers were priests, and two-thirds of these priests were Lutheran. The remaining one-third was Catholic.⁷⁴ If writers are an accurate reflection of the intelligentsia, then it is true that the influential thinkers of the nineteenth century were largely Protestants. Only Protestants and Catholic priests had access to quality

⁷² Seton-Watson, ed., *Slovakia Then and Now*, 18-19.

⁷³ Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 38.

⁷⁴ Johnson, *Education*, 323; Johnson does state (323) that these figures are "tentative compilations" reported by Slovak sociologist and public official Anton Štefánek (1877-1964).

education in Slovakia during Magyarization. Although the Slovak Protestants were only a minority population amidst a vast majority of Catholics, the nineteenth century would prove that a disproportionate number of Slovak national figures were professing Protestants educated in Protestant schools during the Hungarian regime. Seton-Watson and Leff both reference a small but unified number of Slovak Protestant families who made Protestant learning available for their children and grandchildren. Leff examines the Protestant versus Catholic composition of interwar Czechoslovakia's political elite and notes, "This grass-roots differentiation intensified at the upper reaches of the political hierarchy. The outnumbered Protestants were a tightly knit group, 'the twenty families,' and no commentator deals with the Slovak political scene without noting their predominance in politics and administration; . . ." ⁷⁵ Likewise, in 1943 Seton-Watson referenced, "a small group of four hundred to five hundred families—among whom the children of the Lutheran clergy played a disproportionate part . . ." ⁷⁶ He was referring to the Protestants who had exercised resistance to Hungarian domination by providing alternate education for their children. The Lutheran Lyceum in Bratislava, Slovakia, was one such institution that produced notable Slovak Protestants such as Ludovít Štúr, Michal Hodža, and Jozef Hurban. This establishment, founded in 1803, became a center for Evangelical Protestant thought and education that distinctively promoted Slav nationalism. A few additional examples of prominent Slovak Protestant family dynasties include 1848 nationalist leader Michal Hodža (1811-1870) and his nephew Milan Hodža

⁷⁵ Leff, *National Conflict*, 190.

⁷⁶ Seton-Watson, *History*, 284.

(1878-1944), who would become Czechoslovakia's Foreign Minister and Prime Minister in the 1930s; Milan R. Štefánik (1880-1919), first Czechoslovak Minister of War and the Slovak member of the Czechoslovak triumvirate including President T. G. Masaryk and Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš. Štefánik's father was a Lutheran pastor. Additionally, cousins Samuel (1888-1975) and Stefan Osuský (1889-1973) cannot be overlooked. Samuel was a Lutheran bishop who greatly influenced Lutheran theological education, while Stefan was the famous American-educated lawyer who was a leading pre-1918 advocate in the United States for the creation of the Czechoslovak State. The pattern of Slovak Protestant families boasting educated and nationally-prominent members was evident throughout the nineteenth century.⁷⁷

It is no wonder that Protestants were the primary Slovak intelligentsia leading up to the 1918 establishment of the Republic. The Slovak Protestants had a system of high-quality education in place for their children, schools where the peculiarly Protestant type of nationalism could be instilled. As a result, the Slovak intelligentsia who emerged on the national scene both before and after the creation of Czechoslovakia almost uniformly advocated Czechoslovakism. Conversely, Slovak Catholics had no alternative to Magyarized schools directed by Magyarized priests. The Hungarian-influenced priests' goal was to assimilate young generations of Slovak students into the Hungarian way of speaking and thinking. The few Slovak Catholic priests who were not of the Hungarian persuasion could not reproduce generations of free-thinking Slovak Catholics because

⁷⁷ Rychlík, Marzik, and Bielik, eds., *Seton Watson and His Relations*, 2: 83, 106-7, 124-5; Seton-Watson, ed., *Slovakia Then and Now*, 26.

they were bound not to marry. The Protestant faith, however, did not bind its clergy to celibacy, so a great number of Protestant families produced dynasties of well-educated Slovaks who supported the design for Czech and Slovak unity proposed by the Czechoslovakists.⁷⁸

As a result of the teaching they received from Protestant schools, the Czech and Slovak Protestants led Bohemia's national revival in the early nineteenth century. The seeds of Czech nationalism that Jan Hus and Jan Amos Comenius planted centuries earlier at last began to flourish as three notable figures began to promote and preserve the Slavic heritage, emphasizing literature and language. Two of the three leaders were Slovaks Jan Kollár and Pavol Šafárik. The third was a Czech named František Palacky. Kollár pastored the Slovak Lutheran Church in Budapest and wrote an epic poem in 1824 named *Slávy Dcera (Daughter of Slava)*, which greatly contributed to Slavic solidarity. Two years later Prague professor P. J. Šafárik, the son of a Slovak Lutheran pastor, published his seminal work *History of the Slavic Language and Literature in All Dialects*. Palacky is the most famous of the three for his work as a great historian. Palacky was educated at the Lutheran Lyceum in Bratislava where Reformation dogma made an impression on him as well. His mid-nineteenth-century masterpiece *History of Bohemia* follows Czech and German racial tension as well as the religious tension between Protestantism and Catholicism. Seton-Watson noted of the Czech historian, "what Palacky did for the Czechs was little short of a revolution. He brought them back to life, gave them courage and belief in a forgotten or despised past, and proved to them that

⁷⁸ Johnson, *Education*, 28; Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 38.

they had achievements in the moral and intellectual sphere of which any nation might be proud”⁷⁹ These three men would inspire the next generation of Czech and Slovak nationalists to insist on recognition of their Slavic minorities within the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary.⁸⁰

The rising generation of Slovak nationalists were also educated at the Lutheran Lyceum in Bratislava. Three figures came to the forefront once again—Slovaks Ludovít Štúr, Michal Hodža, and Jozef Hurban. Each of these men was talented in multiple ways. Štúr was a writer, publisher, teacher at a Lutheran high school, and member of the Hungarian diet, but most notably a linguist. He would become the father of the revised Slovak literary language. His colleagues Hodža and Hurban were both Lutheran pastors but were also gifted writers and linguists. It became apparent to the three that the Slovaks needed their own literary language separate from the Biblical Czech dialect which had been the Slovak literary language for centuries. The reasoning behind their joint decision in 1843 was the urgent need for the Slovak nation to assert its autonomy against the oppressive Magyarization policy. As Hugh Seton-Watson would later observe in his work *Language and National Consciousness*:

For these pioneers of national consciousness the language was far the most important issue. . . . It was defence of this language, and insistence on its use for public and private business in Slovakia first against the Hungarians in the last years of the Habsburg Monarchy, and then against the Czechs in the first Czechoslovak Republic, which formed the basis of modern Slovak nationalism.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Seton-Watson, *History*, 177.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 175-7; Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, *Historical Dictionary of Slovakia* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1999), xxxv-vi.

⁸¹ Hugh Seton-Watson, *Language and National Consciousness* (London: Oxford University Press, 1981), 8.

Therefore Štúr, Hodža, and Hurban led a campaign to revise the Slovak language as a means of building a movement for Slovak autonomy against the Hungarians.⁸²

The three Slovak nationalists looked to the Slovak dialect of central Slovakia as the model for the new literary language. Central Slovakia and the town of Martin had become a bastion of Slovak Protestantism and nationalism whereas Trnava, to the west, was the center of Slovak Catholicism. Additionally, according to the 1910 Hungarian census, north central Slovakia was the only part of the country considered “almost purely Slovak.” Western and Eastern portions of the country were “predominantly Slovak,” but in the southern regions bordering Hungary, Slovaks were a minority population.⁸³ Understandably, the central town of Martin was to be the site of the Slovak cultural institution *Matica Slovenská* in 1863 which became “the centre of the Slovak intellectual and national revival.”⁸⁴ But the year 1867 would bring an intensified Magyarization that shut down several Protestant high schools in Martin as well as *Matica Slovenská* eight years later. Nevertheless, future Slovak nationalist leaders would return to Martin at the end of World War I as the base of their political operations. The revised Slovak language based on the dialect from central Slovakia was perceived by the Czechoslovakist Jan Kollár and several others as a deliberate attempt to distance the Slovaks from the idea of Czecho-Slovak solidarity, but most Slovak scholars applauded the campaign. Just as the

⁸² Felak, “*At the Price*,” 6-7; Rychlík, Marzik, and Bielik, eds., *Seton Watson and His Relations*, 2: 83-5; Johnson, *Education*, 29.

⁸³ Johnson, *Education*, 22.

⁸⁴ Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, *Making of New Europe*, 45.

Protestant faith they espoused was built upon Reformation principles that challenged the establishment, these three Protestant Slovak leaders confronted the Austro-Hungarian monarchy with their unorthodox demands. Štúr, Hodža, and Hurban would be elected as Slovak delegates to the Slavic Congress in Prague in 1848, shortly before revolution erupted.⁸⁵

The three Slovak delegates at the Slavic Congress were joined by fellow Slovak Šafárik and the Czech Palacky in the motion to transfer Slovakia from Hungary into a “Czechoslav federal unit” with Bohemia and greater Moravia.⁸⁶ The group also demanded that the three million Slovaks living in Hungary “shall be acknowledged as a nation, with their own Diet, schools, university and equality of rights with the Magyars.”⁸⁷ Needless to say, the Hungarians did not respond positively to this measure and proceeded to take up arms against the dissidents during the years 1848 to 1849. The Slovaks aided the Austrian Hapsburgs in conquering the Hungarians but unfortunately the Russians also stepped in to aid the Hapsburgs in quelling the Slovak revolutionaries. The Czechs and Slovaks formally came under subjection to the Dual Monarchy in 1867 and would remain so until the end of the First World War. But the Slovak nationalists had taken unprecedented steps to assert their nationality. Their efforts combined with the

⁸⁵ Kirschbaum, *Historical Dictionary*, xxxvii; Seton-Watson, Hugh and Christopher, *Making New Europe*, 44-5.

⁸⁶ Seton-Watson, *History*, 262.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 262-4. The number of Slovaks within the Austro-Hungarian Empire was a subject of contention. Slovak author Thomas Čapek accused the 1850 and 1900 Hungarian census accounts of being “notoriously unreliable and partial to the dominant race....” In 1906 he estimated the actual number of Slovaks under Hungarian rule at 3 million. Thomas Čapek, *The Slovaks of Hungary: Slavs and Panslavism* (New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1906), 145-6.

1863 establishment of the Slovak Cultural Institute *Matica Slovenská* in central Slovakia would prove to be catalysts in the formation of important Slovak political parties.⁸⁸

Aging nationalist leaders Štúr, Hodža, and Hurban advocated Slovak autonomy from the Magyars in hopes that Slovakia could someday become free from Hungarian domination. Their followers formed the Slovak National Party (*Slovenská Národná Strana* or SNS) in 1871, headquartered in the town of Martin. The SNS members took a passive approach believing that change would come by lobbying the Hungarian government. In the late nineteenth century, a new group of younger Slovaks (again primarily Protestants) grew impatient with the SNS passivity theory and began listening to a philosophy professor from Prague named Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk. Masaryk was Czech and argued that the only feasible way forward for Slovaks was to be in union with the Czechs. He believed that together the Czechs and Slovaks could resist and perhaps even overcome the Germans and Hungarians. Masaryk became the primary Czechoslovakist philosopher circulating ideas of what the proposed country of Czechoslovakia should look like and what the new “Czechoslovak” citizen should look like. His ideas became so influential that he was eventually elected the first president of the Republic serving from 1918 to 1935. Masaryk was another example of a member of the intelligentsia whose nationalist principles were impacted by religion, and in his case by a religious conversion from Catholicism to Protestantism.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Ibid., 262-3; Kirschbaum, *Historical Dictionary*, xxxviii.

⁸⁹ Johnson, *Education*, 43-4; Kirschbaum, *Historical Dictionary*, xxxviii; Rychlík, Marzik, and Bielik, eds., *Seton Watson and His Relations*, 2:100.

He was born in 1850 in the Czech lands to a Catholic family, his father a Slovak and his mother a Czech. Nevertheless, at the age of twenty he left the Catholic Church (if only inwardly) when the Church declared papal infallibility in 1870. His American wife, Charlotte Garrigue Masaryk, influenced his beliefs further with her Protestant Unitarian faith. Masaryk admired the Protestant value of allowing religion to impact one's life on a daily basis, and he formally became a member of Bohemia's Evangelical Church in 1880. But the philosopher's Protestantism was of an unorthodox nature. He was decidedly against attending church on a regular basis and declared himself in 1907 "a dead member of the Church."⁹⁰ Yet Jan Kozák, fellow instructor with Masaryk at the Charles University in Prague, described his posthumous colleague by stating, "at the bottom of his personality there was a certain, essentially Christian attitude toward man."⁹¹ Religion had a profound impact on Masaryk's philosophy of "humanitarian democracy."⁹²

Seton-Watson, the longtime friend, correspondent, and political ally of Masaryk, summarized the Czechoslovak president's three philosophical tenets in a speech delivered on the fifteenth anniversary of the Republic. The Scottish historian drew a connection between Masaryk's three philosophical precepts and the influence that the historical Protestant tradition had on his "humanitarian democracy." The first of Masaryk's tenets was the ethical or religious. Seton-Watson quoted two well-known Masaryk sayings,

⁹⁰ T. G. Masaryk quoted in Skilling, *Masaryk*, 95.

⁹¹ Jan Kozák to Seton-Watson, 30 Dec. 1937, Seton-Watson Collection, SSEES, University of London; Kozák was a scholar of Masaryk's philosophy and life. In a February 1938 letter to Seton-Watson, Kozák reported to have delivered over forty lectures on Masaryk since the previous September. Kozák also authored the article on Masaryk in the 1929-30 edition of *The Slavonic Review*.

⁹² Skilling, *Masaryk*, 94-5; Kozák to Seton-Watson 17 Feb. 1938, Seton-Watson Collection, SSEES, University of London.

“Jesus, not Caesar, that is the meaning of History,” and, “The religious question is really the only one I know.”⁹³ The religious element of Masaryk’s philosophy required a non-materialist or non-Communist interpretation of history and related to his second philosophical tenet—the historical. Masaryk believed that the ideas of Hus, Comenius, and Palacky should be implemented in modern society. He directly linked his religious and historical precepts into a theory of Czech nationalism. Historian H. Gordon Skilling notes in his biography of Masaryk:

In his study of Palacky, however, he declared that the religious idea was the leading idea of Czech history, and the ‘main content’ of Czech development from the times of Charles IV until the end of the eighteenth century, and that ‘our so-called revival [obrozeni]’ was ‘a natural and logical continuation’ linked with the idea and the ideals of our Reformation.⁹⁴

Indeed, Masaryk firmly believed in “the power of truth and the force of ideas,” just as Hus had declared 450 years earlier.⁹⁵ His political philosophy wove Czech religious history into a modern day Czech nationalism since he believed religion had been the driving force impacting Hus’s Reformation ideas as well as the 1848 national revivalists. The third tenet to his “humanitarian democracy” emphasized the practical as he desired moral and political theory to be daily practiced in the lives of Czechoslovaks. Masaryk certainly represented a typical member of the Czech and Slovak intelligentsia, rising from modest circumstances to become a thinker affected by religion, who created a powerful wave of nationalism.

⁹³ T. G. Masaryk quoted in Seton-Watson, “Czechoslovak Anniversary Speech,” 1933, Seton-Watson Collection, SSEES, University of London.

⁹⁴ Skilling, *Masaryk*, 98-9.

⁹⁵ T. G. Masaryk quoted in J. B. Kozák, “Masaryk as Philosopher,” *The Slavonic Review* 8 (1929-30): 483.

As the influential new Czechoslovakist philosopher at the turn of the century, Masaryk had many followers. Notable among them were Czechoslovakist leader and medical student Vavro Šrobár and his colleague, attorney Pavol Blaho. They established the journal *Hlas (Voice)* in 1898 as a vehicle for promoting the notion of Slovak and Czech unity. The monthly publication of *Hlas* encouraged other Czechoslovakists like Milan Hodža (nephew of Slovakist Michal Hodža) to produce additional liberal periodicals such as *Slovenský Denník (Slovak Daily)* and *Slovenský Týždenník (Slovak Weekly)*. The *Hlas* journal attracted a following, including particularly Protestant doctors and lawyers, and soon a political group known as the *Hlasists* was established. In contrast to the SNS, the *Hlasists* were not a formal political party vying for seats in the Hungarian parliament. They chose rather to effect change themselves at the local level.⁹⁶

Although the Protestants were the first group to carry the banner of Slovak and Czecho-Slovak nationalism, Andrej Hlinka, the Catholic priest who would become notoriously associated with Slovak nationalism, had not yet arrived on the scene. He was a priest from the Slovak village of Černova where a violent eruption known as the Černova Massacre took place in 1907. The Černova Massacre brought about much the same galvanization of public opinion in Slovakia as the Boston Massacre did in pre-Revolutionary America.

The setting for the dramatic 1907 massacre could not have been more ideal for attracting the attention of Slovakia's numerous peasant population. Nestled in north-

⁹⁶ Johnson, *Education*, 39-40, 43-4; Rychlík, Marzik, and Bielik, eds., *Seton Watson and His Relations*, 2:83. Interestingly, despite Magyarization restrictions, the Hungarian government allowed liberal Slovak publications to exist provided there were parallel publications targeting a Slovak readership that were produced by the Hungarian authorities. Johnson, *Education*, 40.

central Slovakia, this town would not have been exempt from Magyarization policy. The Slovak language was not allowed to be spoken in Černova's schools, grocery, at the train station, or in the post office. All official written and spoken communication was in Hungarian. Černova, like all other Slovak villages at the time, was largely rural and agricultural. The 1910 Hungarian census for Slovakia reported that 2,261,485 Slovaks lived in rural areas, while only 663,766 Slovaks lived in urban areas. Only 12,121 Slovaks lived in Ružomberok, the town closest to Černova.⁹⁷ Villagers drew their water from wells and lived off the produce grown on small plots of land. A significant number of the village would have been practicing Catholics, observing not only the Sabbath, but also the regular practices of prayer and confession. The same census findings confirm that 70 percent of Slovaks were Roman Catholic in 1910, while 19 percent were Protestant.⁹⁸

The doctor and Czechoslovakist who established the *Hlas* journal, Vavro Šrobár, was running for a seat in the Hungarian parliament in 1906 representing his hometown of Ružomberok. Šrobár narrowly lost the election, but a significant factor in his receiving the sizeable percentage of votes that he did gain was due to help from Ružomberok's Catholic priest, Andrej Hlinka. Hlinka petitioned his parishioners on behalf of Šrobár and his nationalist ideology. The Magyar authorities responded to the election results by retaliating against Hlinka for aiding the liberal-minded candidate, and stripped him of his parish in Ružomberok. At the ensuing trial where Hlinka and Šrobár were both accused

⁹⁷ Johnson, *Education*, 21, 26; Johnson does note (19) that the Hungarian censuses are not completely reliable but are useful for gaining an understanding of general demography of the Slovak population.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 27.

of “incitement,” Hlinka received a sentence of two years in prison and Šrobár, one year. The priest’s final address to his parishioners before commencing his imprisonment excited the Magyar authority enough to add an additional eighteen months to his prison sentence. The actions taken by the Magyar officials inflamed the Catholic Slovaks in Hlinka’s birthplace, the adjacent village of Černova. What really enraged the villagers, however, was when the new church in Černova, which Hlinka had raised money to build, was deliberately given to a priest well known for his pro-Magyar sentiments.⁹⁹

On October 27, 1907, a large crowd of Slovak peasants from Černova peaceably assembled in the village to demonstrate against their new church being assigned by Hungarian authorities to a notoriously pro-Magyar priest. Suddenly, the group of Hungarian soldiers who were overseeing the demonstration opened fire on the demonstrators, killing twelve men and three women and wounding up to sixty other villagers. As if the villagers had not already suffered enough injustice, the following year when the incident was taken to court, fifty nine of those who survived the incident were issued a total of thirty-six years imprisonment by the Magyar judiciary. The Černova Massacre proved to be a uniting force solidifying Slovak Catholic peasants throughout Moravia against Hungarian tyranny, with their living martyr Father Hlinka as leader. Hlinka garnered enough support in the aftermath of the Černova incident to form a political party known as the Slovak People’s Party (*Slovenská L’udova Strana* or SLS) in 1913. He represented the Catholic majority of Slovaks, who to this point had no collective political voice against Magyar oppression. The deaths of the Černova

⁹⁹ Seton-Watson, *History*, 278-9.

Massacre victims brought together the support needed to launch Hlinka's Slovak People's Party from obscurity into prominence.¹⁰⁰

On the global scene, the assassination of Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand in 1914 plunged all of Europe into world conflict. Austria-Hungary aligned with the Germans to form the bulk of the Central Powers, aiming to absorb even more territory and ethnicities into their German empire. Naturally, Czech and Slovak men and boys were drafted to fight for the Dual Monarchy against the Entente Powers. The irony of the situation was that as Slavs, the Czechs and Slovaks were forced to fight for the ethnic Germans and against their own Slavic kinsmen, the Russians. But the clever Czechs and Slovaks devised a plan. On the battlefield where Austro-Hungarian trenches were dug opposite Russian trenches, the Czech and Slovak soldiers would wait until midnight and then sing the pan-Slavic song "Hej Slovani." This song was to signal the Russian troops in the opposite trenches to hold their fire because a group of Czech and Slovak soldiers were about to defect across the "No Man's Land" strip of battlefield to the Russian side. In this way, numerous Czech and Slovak soldiers defected to the Entente side, were embraced by their fellow Slavs, and were employed to fight against the powers that had so cruelly subjected them for centuries.¹⁰¹

The situation changed, however, with the Bolshevik Revolution in the fall of 1917. The Communist Bolsheviks landed in power and quickly pulled Russia out of the Great War by signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Exiled future Czechoslovak President

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.; Kirschbaum, *Historical Dictionary*, xxxviii.

¹⁰¹ Seton-Watson, *History*, 287; Seton-Watson, *Future of Bohemia*, 22-5.

T. G. Masaryk despised Communist ideology but wanted to keep the Czechoslovak troops who had defected to the Russian side out of Russian domestic political disputes. He met with the Bolsheviks in power and arranged for the safe transport of the Czechoslovak Legions home via Vladivostok and the United States, but the Bolsheviks went back on their word. Thus began the Czechoslovak Legions' fight to resist the Bolshevik Red Army during the Russian Civil War. The Czechoslovak Legions became world famous for their skilled fighting abilities and their successful resistance efforts against the Bolshevik Red Army.¹⁰²

As an Entente war victory appeared certain, various nationalities began to petition for the formation of new countries forged on the basis of self-determination. Among them were the Czechs and the Slovaks who mobilized toward the establishment of a future joint state. Several agreements made immediately prior to the founding of the Czechoslovak Republic would become monumental. The first was what became known as the Pittsburgh Pact. Exiled Czechoslovakist T. G. Masaryk traveled to Great Britain and the United States during the First World War to gather support from the Entente Powers for the creation of a Czechoslovak state after the war. Masaryk organized the meeting in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania on May 30, 1918, because he realized the importance of support from Czechs and Slovaks who had already emigrated to America.

¹⁰² Ibid. The Czechoslovak Legions were formed in March 1917, after the Bolsheviks signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Although they shared the same Slavic ethnicity, most Czechs and Slovaks vehemently despised the Bolsheviks. The Legions fought the Bolshevik Reds all the way across Siberia, seizing control of key stations along the Trans-Siberian Railway. Their exploits became a major fascination in British and American newspapers. They were awarded for their service upon arrival in Europe after taking a ship from Vladivostok across the Pacific and eventually to the European continent. Rychlík, Marzik, and Bielik, eds., *Seton Watson and His Relations*, 2:29.

He would need their endorsement to sell the idea of an independent Czechoslovakia to the Entente and also to Czechs and Slovaks back home. As he would state in a 1919 letter, “it was easier to win the war than to organize Eastern Europe—but this is the task of the peace and has been the aim of the War.”¹⁰³ The “Pittsburgh Czecho-Slovak Agreement” itemized essentials of the proposed cooperative government, the most notable being the following: “Slovakia shall have her own administrative system, her own diet and her own courts.”¹⁰⁴ Slovaks would point to this phrase repeatedly during the early years of the republic when they felt their promised autonomy was being infringed upon.¹⁰⁵

Following the Pittsburgh Pact, Czech and Slovak political leaders met separately to agree amongst themselves upon Czech and Slovak cooperation in a proposed joint state. The Czechs met in Prague on October 28, 1918, while the Slovaks met two days later in Martin, Slovakia.¹⁰⁶ The Slovak agreement became known as “The Martin Declaration” and was signed by all leading Slovak intelligentsia as members of the Slovak National Council. Signers of the Declaration included leading Slovak Protestants Milan Hodža, Fedor Ruppeldt, and Samuel Zoch, and leading Slovak Catholics Andrej

¹⁰³ Masaryk to Robert Lansing, 16 March 1919, Thomas Masaryk Papers, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh.

¹⁰⁴ “Czecho-Slovak Agreement of Pittsburgh,” in *The Birth of Czechoslovakia*, ed. Cestmir Jesina (Washington: Czechoslovak National Council of America, 1968), 35.

¹⁰⁵ Rychlík, Marzik, and Bielik, eds., *Seton-Watson and His Relations*, 1: 26; Felak, “*At the Price*,” 15.

¹⁰⁶ Amazingly, the Slovaks had no knowledge that two days prior to the Martin Declaration the Czechs had come to an identical conclusion regarding the formation of a joint Republic. Felak, “*At the Price*,” 15. The Slovaks hyphenated the name of the proposed country as the “Czecho-Slovak Nation” emphasizing their expected degree of independence from the Czechs. Jesina, *Birth of Czechoslovakia*, 107.

Hlinka, Ferdinand Juriga, and Karol Medvecký. The fact that Catholics such as Hlinka agreed to the Martin Declaration became significant when shortly thereafter they repudiated the Declaration's terms due to what they considered to be an unfair allocation of official positions within the new Republic. Just weeks after the Slovak National Council's meeting in Martin, the Armistice was signed on November 11, 1918, and the joint nation of Czechoslovakia with its elected President T. G. Masaryk had only to be formalized at the Paris Peace Conference of 1918-1919.¹⁰⁷

This examination of the distinct Czech and Slovak historical experiences has shown how the two peoples emerged into the early twentieth century in different positions. The Czechs, following in the footsteps of the forward-thinking Jan Hus, managed to expose themselves to progressive thought despite German suppression. But the Slovaks, having no national leader to imitate during the majority of their domination by the Hungarians, reverted to their historical Catholic faith. The Czech and Slovak figures who led the national revival against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in 1848 were impacted by Czech religious history and the Protestant tradition. Thus it was religion that influenced the intelligentsia who espoused Czechoslovakism and provided the catalyst for the creation of a Czechoslovak Republic. But the Czechoslovakist brand of nationalism would not prevail in Slovakia throughout the duration of the interwar Republic. A shift would transfer the command of nationalism from the hands of the Slovak Protestants to the hands of the Slovak Catholics.

¹⁰⁷ Rychlík, Marzik, and Bielík, eds., *Seton-Watson and His Relations*, 2: 84, 89, 101, 135.

CHAPTER 4

SHIFTING THEORIES OF NATIONALISM

Seton-Watson was well aware of the Protestant influence on Czech history and its implications for the proposed Czechoslovak state. A Scotch Presbyterian himself, he agreed with the democratic principles Masaryk and his fellow Czechoslovakists gleaned from the long tradition of Czech Protestant heroes. In his speech delivered on the fifteenth anniversary of the Czechoslovak Republic, Seton-Watson recollected for the British audience the lineage of three particular Czech religious figures. Beginning with Hus, followed by Comenius, and concluding with Masaryk, the historian traced the influence the Protestant faith had on each man's political and nationalist beliefs. He summarized, "the Czechoslovak Republic is the logical outcome of a long process of historical evolution. . . ." ¹⁰⁸ Acknowledging that Czechoslovakism was the primary nationalist thought espoused by Czech and Slovak intelligentsia since the fifteenth century, the "Scotus Viator" assumed that this brand of nationalism would continue to prevail in the newly-created Czechoslovak State. What he failed to recognize was the growing power of persuasion that the pro-Slovakist form of nationalism had amongst Slovak Catholics. Soon popular support of Catholic Slovakism would eclipse Protestant-espoused Czechoslovakism within Slovakia.

¹⁰⁸ Seton-Watson, "Czechoslovak Anniversary Speech," 1933, Seton-Watson Collection, SSEES, University of London.

At the turn of the century, three political organizations dominated the Slovak electoral spectrum. The oldest was the Slovak National Party (*Slovenská Národná Strana* or SNS), formed in 1871 by followers of the 1848 national revival leaders Ludovít Štúr, Michal Hodža, and Jozef Hurban. It was headquartered in central Slovakia in the historically Protestant town of Martin, and its membership reflected a heavy Protestant influence. Johnson's examination of the 1913 SNS membership records reveals that out of the 200 Lutheran priests in Slovakia, ninety five were SNS members, while out of 675 Slovak Catholic priests in 1913, only twenty six pledged allegiance to the SNS. Approximately 50 percent of Lutheran clergy in Slovakia were affiliated with the pro-Czechoslovakist party, but only a fraction of Catholic clergy joined the SNS.¹⁰⁹ These statistics evidence the strong Protestant affiliation with Czechoslovakist groups and the lack of Catholic association with such. The SNS emphasized education and social programs, but took a passive approach toward promoting their agenda. They believed change would come by lobbying the Hungarian government, and perhaps for this reason their popular support was fading. The second group, the *Hlasists*, were seen as the sons or the more progressive outgrowth of the SNS. Named after the influential journal *Hlas*, authored by Vavro Šrobár and Pavol Blaho, they distinctly chose not to form an official political party. Czech philosopher T. G. Masaryk's unorthodox religious and social thought impacted their ideals but disturbed the traditionally conservative SNS and the Slovak Catholic clergy. The *Hlasists* were concerned with education and social programs as well, but took a more active role in trying to effect change at the local level. They

¹⁰⁹ Johnson, *Education*, 27.

targeted the Slovak peasant population and emphasized social issues more than religious ones. They also promoted a high level of cooperation with the Czechs. Additionally, the *Hlasists* promoted economic reform—an issue the SNS ignored. But the political party that would eventually exceed in popularity both the SNS and the *Hlasists* was the Slovak People's Party (*Slovenská Ľudová Strana* or SLS). In comparison to the SNS, which identified more with Lutheran Slovaks, the People's Party's target constituency was the Slovak Catholic peasants—a group that had to that point remained unsolicited. The violent Černova Massacre in 1907 attracted the visibility and support the Slovak People's Party needed to launch them from obscurity into the limelight.¹¹⁰

Seton-Watson's 1931 anthology *Slovakia Then and Now* claimed that the Černova Massacre was “the first incident to arouse general attention in Europe to the Slovak movement.”¹¹¹ When armed Hungarian soldiers committed the blatantly brutal act of opening fire on a crowd of peacefully demonstrating Slovaks in the Slovak village of Černova, they subjected themselves to international scrutiny. In the aftermath of the October 27, 1907, event that left fifteen dead and sixty wounded, the Slovak Catholic masses united behind Father Andrej Hlinka. Hlinka was born in Černova in 1864 and was elected priest for the neighboring town of Ružomberok in 1905. Ironically it was Hlinka's support of leading *Hlasist* Vavro Šrobár in his campaign for election to the Hungarian parliament in 1906 that caused the Hungarian authorities to charge Hlinka

¹¹⁰ Johnson, *Education*, 44-5; Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, *Making of New Europe*, 45-6, 83.

¹¹¹ Seton-Watson, ed., *Slovakia Then and Now*, 167.

with “incitement,” landing him in prison for over two years.¹¹² When he emerged from his internment, he joined forces with fellow Slovak Catholic priest Ferdinand Juriga and businessman František Skyčák to organize the Slovak People’s Party as the party representing the majority of the Slovak people—the Catholic peasants.¹¹³ Again, according to the 1910 census, 663,766 Slovaks lived in urban areas, whereas almost four times that number still lived in rural areas. The same record shows almost 70 percent of Slovaks identified themselves as Roman Catholics while roughly 19 percent were Protestant, 7 percent Greek Catholic, and 5 percent Jewish. The Slovak People’s Party became the political representatives for the Catholic majority of rural Slovaks.¹¹⁴

Seton-Watson respected Hlinka’s efforts to champion the rights of the Slovak minority within the Austro-Hungarian Empire before World War I.¹¹⁵ His estimation of Hlinka changed, however, when one incident turned Hlinka from a reasonable advocate

¹¹² Hlinka and Šrobár were both sentenced to prison by the Magyars after the 1905 election. What began as a friendship between the two turned into a longstanding disagreement when Hlinka was not given a chief ecclesiastical appointment in the 1918 Republic while Šrobár was elected to the chief post of Minister for Slovakia. They remained at odds throughout their political careers. Seton-Watson, *History*, 278, 323; Seton-Watson, ed., *Slovakia Then and Now*, 167.

¹¹³ The official date for the establishment of the Slovak People’s Party is debated among historians. Owen Johnson traces the party back to 1905, Stanislav Kirschbaum records in his *Historical Dictionary of Slovakia* that the SLS was founded in 1913, and Seton-Watson points to 1920. Johnson, *Education*, 44; Kirschbaum, *Historical Dictionary*, xxxviii; Seton-Watson, ed., *Slovakia Then and Now*, 167.

¹¹⁴ Seton-Watson, ed., *Slovakia Then and Now*, 175; Seton-Watson, *History*, 278; Kirschbaum, *Historical Dictionary*, xxxviii; Rychlík, Marzik, and Bielik, eds., *Seton-Watson and His Relations*, 2: 120; Johnson, *Education*, 21, 27.

¹¹⁵ The Scotsman even chose to place Hlinka’s picture opposite to the title page of his 1908 book, *Racial Problems in Hungary*, in which he aroused British popular interest toward the plight of the oppressed Slovaks. He fondly recalled Hlinka’s early days in a published letter to Hlinka, “When 14 years ago you were the victim of Magyar oppression, it was to me a great pleasure to defend your cause and with it the cause of the Slovak nation: and I have never regretted my deliberate selection of your portrait for the frontispiece of my book as the symbol of a courageous struggle for liberty.” Rychlík, Marzik, and Bielik, eds., *Seton-Watson and His Relations*, 1: 343.

for the Slovak Catholic majority into an emotional extremist. It occurred shortly after the creation of the Czechoslovak Republic. Hlinka attended the meeting in Martin, Slovakia, of Slovak Protestant and Catholic intelligentsia on October 30, 1918, where “The Martin Declaration” was signed by all present, including Hlinka.¹¹⁶ The declaration was an agreement by leading Slovak figures to bond with the Czechs in the joint Czechoslovak State to be created at the conclusion of the war. The problem arose when the Slovak leaders present at the Martin Declaration intentionally overlooked Hlinka for the newly-established role of chief religious ecumenical leader for Slovakia. Seton-Watson saw this oversight as a mistake for which the Slovak leadership was responsible (including Hlinka’s adversary Vavro Šrobár): “Hlinka’s selection, . . . would have been a fitting recognition of past services as a champion of national feeling among the Slovak priesthood,”¹¹⁷ Anti-Catholic sentiment in Prague from both Protestant Slovak officials as well as Czech officials also contributed to Hlinka’s rejection for the position of chief administrator of Slovak ecclesiastical affairs.¹¹⁸ Seton-Watson took Hlinka’s defense to this point but no further, “Up to this point the blame seems to me to lie almost

¹¹⁶ Hlinka later referred to the Martin Declaration as “our sinful and reckless Martin Declaration.” Andrej Hlinka, “Hlinka Vlastizradca?” *Čecha*, 12 Oct. 1919.

¹¹⁷ Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 42.

¹¹⁸ Seton-Watson later commented on Hlinka’s rejection for national office as well as the intentional omission of other educated Catholics to official positions within the new state: “In my opinion a grave initial blunder was committed in not admitting the Clerical Slovaks to a full share in the responsibilities of government. Had this been done, many subsequent sources of friction might have been avoided.” Seton-Watson, “Czech and Slovak,” 1922, Seton-Watson Collection, SSEES, University of London.

exclusively with Hlinka's opponents: henceforth it lies more and more upon his own shoulders."¹¹⁹

Burned by his opponents, Hlinka lashed out at what he saw as a lack of Slovak sovereignty within the proposed joint nation. Rather than expressing his concerns before the provisional government in Prague, he sought a passport from Polish authorities and took his case to the world leaders at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. There he addressed leading global statesmen on behalf of a Slovakia that he believed to be in dire distress, on the brink of being entirely assimilated by domineering Czechs. He pleaded for complete Slovak autonomy from the Czechs and for the creation of two separate nations, but his requests were denied. In response he poured himself into the Slovak People's Party, dedicated to fight for the promised Slovak sovereignty within the Czechoslovak administration. It was this incident at the Paris Peace Conference that caused Seton-Watson's assessment of Hlinka to turn from positive to negative. His radical conduct also did not make a good impression on Western and Czech government leaders or the Czech people themselves. But his virulent claims did not wane after his appearance at Versailles. In an October 1919 publication of his People's Party newspaper *Čecha*, Hlinka wrote an article in response to his critics (including Šrobár) who called him a traitor. He wrote, "And I am throwing the accusation of treason against me back to the one who invented it. I am the defender of my nation, namely the tortured Slovak nation."¹²⁰ Seton-Watson believed Hlinka had severely exacerbated religious

¹¹⁹ Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 42.

¹²⁰ Andrej Hlinka, "Hlinka Vlastizradca?" *Čecha*, 12 Oct. 1919; the same article included his personal attack on Šrobár, whom Hlinka despised for rising to a prominent political position because he

quarrels between the Czechs and Slovaks. He stated, "The controversy which has so long centred round the person of Father Hlinka, has done more than any other single factor to poison the atmosphere and to delay consolidation."¹²¹ Indeed, Hlinka's nationalist extremism only aggravated religious and political tensions between the two nations.¹²²

But what exactly was Hlinka's ardent Slovak nationalism founded upon? His article in Seton-Watson's 1931 anthology revealed that he closely associated religion (specifically Catholicism) as the sustaining force during the suffering the Slovaks endured under Magyarization as well as with Slovak nationalism.

Religion and our Catholicism taught us to suffer, to work and to bear hardships under the old regime. Religion and religious societies maintained the Slovak in idealism and hope for better days. Religion taught the 15 martyrs of Černova to lay down their lives on the 27th October, 1907. Religion taught us pride and self-confidence when the gates of jails and penitentiaries were opened to us. Religion gave us the doctrine: "Fear not those who kill the body, for the soul they cannot harm." Our Catholicism taught us openness and national pride: . . .¹²³

How could Seton-Watson have overlooked the connection that Hlinka clearly drew between Slovak Catholicism and Slovak nationalism? The Scottish historian recognized the emotional fervor behind Hlinka's appeals, but he was blindsided by the degree of power Catholicism held over a majority of the Slovak people. In Slovakia, unlike in the Czech lands, Catholicism fed nationalism. Hlinka created the perception that to be a true, patriotic Slovak was to be a Catholic who was a pro-autonomy Slovak nationalist. As a

agreed to support the Czechoslovakist theory of a joint Czech and Slovak nation, "Who is the traitor now? The one who sits comfortably in an office and gets a good salary? The one who got rid of the name Slovak and exchanged it for Czechoslovak because of power?"

¹²¹ Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 40.

¹²² Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 40-4; Seton-Watson., *History*, 333.

¹²³ Seton-Watson, ed., *Slovakia Then and Now*, 173-4.

result of an effectively communicated message, the Slovak People's Party rose from nonexistence before 1913, to receiving the third largest number of Slovak votes in the 1920 election, to receiving the most Slovak votes out of eight parties in the 1925, 1929, and 1935 elections.¹²⁴

Religiously-inspired Slovak nationalism shifted its leadership and its orientation during the interwar Czechoslovak Republic. It shifted from the hands of the Slovak Protestants to the hands of the Slovak Catholics. The Protestants espoused Czechoslovakism while the Catholics espoused Slovakism. Why did this transfer take place? When did it take place? How did it take place? The shift from Protestant Czechoslovakism to Catholic Slovakism occurred as a result of Slovak grievances which became evident in the early years of the Republic and culminated in the 1920s. The Slovaks objected to, among other things, administrative decisions made concurrent with the establishment of Czechoslovakia. The fact that a majority of Czechoslovakia's first governing officials were Czech and not Slovak, not to mention that the few Slovaks who did hold official positions were of the Protestant faith, caused many Slovaks to be outraged. The Slovak Catholic majority felt underrepresented in national proceedings by the Slovak Protestant officials. As the years went on it was not only the administrative but also the religious and economic problems that contributed to Slovak discontent. By the early 1920s the Slovaks felt that their lives had not been bettered by what they considered to be a transition from Hungarian to Czech authority. They were angry and gradually began to look for alternatives to the Protestant pro-Czechoslovakist doctrine

¹²⁴ Johnson, *Education*, 64-5.

that was being propagated by Prague. Andrej Hlinka's Slovak People's Party program for an autonomous Slovakia increasingly sounded attractive to many Slovaks.

Six years after Czechoslovakia had been established it became evident that the honeymoon was over. In 1924 Seton-Watson wrote *The New Slovakia* in response to numerous objections Slovaks were voicing regarding their Czech counterparts. He referred to the objections as "the Slovak problem."¹²⁵ Despite the fact that some of the accusations against the Czechs were unfounded, Seton-Watson recognized those that were valid. In an effort to preserve the unity of the fledgling nation, he addressed in his 1924 book what he summarized as Slovakia's three main grievances—the administrative, the religious, and the economic. He also identified the fact that the two peoples held what he called "diametrically opposed theories of government."¹²⁶ The Czechs favored a centralist government while the Slovaks wanted a decentralized administration. In his book, the Scotsman acted as a "candid friend" who brought his own country's relationship with England to bear in the disputes that faced Slovakia and the Czechs.¹²⁷ Seton-Watson recognized that the Slovaks felt so emphatically that they had been violated by the Czechs that the new country was in danger of splitting apart. Above all, he wanted to preserve the country's fragile unity and wrote *The New Slovakia* in an effort to mediate between the two perspectives and prescribe viable solutions.

In order to understand the Slovak grievances that began to surface during the 1920s, it is first necessary to review the administrative configuration of the new country.

¹²⁵ Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 116.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 11.

After both the Czechs and the Slovaks agreed to join forces in a unified State, the National Assembly met on November 14, 1918, to declare Masaryk as the formerly elected president. His first cabinet consisted of Czechs Karel Kramář as Prime Minister and Edvard Beneš as Foreign Minister, with Slovak Milan R. Štefánik as the first Minister of Defense. Masaryk, Beneš, and Štefánik were a powerful triumvirate that had contributed indisputable service toward the formation of the proposed Czechoslovak nation during the war. In a way the three national leaders proportionately represented both the Czech and Slovak dimensions of the country. Beneš was Czech, Štefánik a Slovak (son of a Lutheran pastor), and Masaryk the son of a Slovak father and a Czech mother. The appointment of each to his respective position within the new country was welcomed by Czech and Slovak alike. After 1920 positions within the president's cabinet were awarded according to election results—the title of prime minister being given to a member of the party that had won the most seats in parliament. Physician Vavro Šrobár, “the most powerful man in Slovak politics until 1920,” filled the position of the highest-ranking Slovak as the “Minister for Slovakia.”¹²⁸ He had been co-founder of the Czechoslovakist journal *Hlas* and, along with Hlinka, was sent to prison after an unsuccessful attempt to gain a seat in the Hungarian parliamentary election in 1906 representing the town of Ružomberok. Although clearly a Czechoslovakist, he had only a nominal religious affiliation to the Catholic church which made him a more neutral choice for the top Slovak position.¹²⁹

¹²⁸ Johnson, *Education*, 66.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 59-60, 63, 66-7; Seton-Watson, ed., *Slovakia Then and Now*, 26, 29.

The country's most important legislative body, the "Revolutionary National Assembly," was formed in 1918. The first National Assembly's Czech seats were distributed according to the Czech lands' most recent election before the war, but the Slovak seats were assigned much more arbitrarily since Slovaks had been unsuccessful in gaining many seats in the Hungarian Diet. Leading Slovak politician Vavro Šrobár had the authority to appoint members for the original forty Slovak seats. Naturally, the Czechoslovakist assigned Lutherans to fill almost three-quarters of the Slovak seats. Johnson remarks of Šrobár's selection, "The minimal Slovak representation in the Hungarian Diet made it impossible for Šrobár to use the sort of 'key' employed by Švehla [leading Czech] in allocating seats in the new Assembly. He chose people he could trust, which meant a large majority of those supporting the Czechoslovak idea."¹³⁰ Eventually the unicameral National Assembly changed to a bicameral legislature that allotted seats among the eight interwar Czech and Slovak political parties based on a system of proportional representation. Šrobár governed Slovak affairs from the regional Slovak capital of Bratislava over thirteen "Referents" who each administered a specific area of Slovak affairs.¹³¹

The original structure of the Czechoslovak government allowed Slovakia to be treated as its own entity within a larger nation. This decentralized organization soon evolved into a more centralized configuration, however. Several factors contributed

¹³⁰ Johnson, *Education*, 66-7.

¹³¹ The Referent departments included Interior, Agriculture, Finance, Trade, Railways and Posts, Justice, Militia, Education, Catholic Affairs, Protestant Affairs, Social Welfare, Food, and Public Works. Seton-Watson, ed., *Slovakia Then and Now*, 30; Johnson, *Education*, 59-63, 66-7.

toward the change from a decentralized to a centralized government including a lack of qualified Slovaks to fill official posts, Hungary's threat to reclaim Slovakia, and Prague's distrust of Slovak capabilities. Observe Johnson's following reflections:

It quickly became clear in many areas that the passivity, resistance, or departure of the former Hungarian office-holders, combined with the apparent lack of qualified Slovaks, made it necessary to call on Czech administrators, judges, teachers, and various other employees. This action could not help but strengthen centralist tendencies. In no other way, however, would it have been possible to get the state moving and to eliminate from influence persons who would have preferred that the Czechoslovak Republic collapse.¹³²

The young government of Prague was highly skeptical about the political activities of most Slovak politicians, . . .¹³³

Even one of the members of the Ministry for the Administration of Slovakia, Anton Štefánek, remarked that he and others (including Šrobár) "felt instinctively that we must set briskly to work before the jurists and bureaucrats [from Prague] could come along with their paragraphs and instructions and schedules and clip our wings and put an end to our power."¹³⁴ The movement toward a centralized country upset those Slovaks who wanted Slovaks, not Czechs to administer their nation.

The internal government structure of Czechoslovakia reflected an obvious imbalance between the Czech and Slovak partners evidenced by the fact that Czechs held a disproportionate number of administrative positions from the top level in Prague all the way down to the local level. Additionally, of the Slovaks who did hold positions in the Czechoslovak government, a majority were Protestants. These imbalances caused an

¹³² Johnson, *Education*, 269.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 69.

¹³⁴ Anton Štefánek quoted in Johnson, *Education*, 326.

outcry among Slovaks who argued that there was no proportionate Slovak representation in the joint Czechoslovak State, nor was there an accurate religious reflection of the Slovak Catholic majority at the higher levels of government. Seton-Watson addressed these issues in his 1924 book *The New Slovakia* when he stated that in 1918 the number of “educated and nationally conscious Slovaks” was estimated at 750 to 1,000 persons out of approximately 13 million.¹³⁵ Only 750 to 1,000 Slovaks were considered intellectually capable of administering official positions at the time of the formation of the Republic. The incredibly small number of Slovak intelligentsia in 1918 was an indicator of the different Czech and Slovak historical experiences. The Czechs had been able to educate themselves despite German domination, whereas a majority of Slovaks’ cultural and intellectual growth was stunted by the harsh policy of Magyarization. As Seton-Watson summarized:

Meanwhile the Slovaks, . . . had their backs against the wall. The entire upper class was Magyarized, the hierarchy worked openly for the Government, the great majority of the Catholic, and a considerable section of the Protestant, clergy were more or less ‘Magyarone,’ all official posts, high and low, were closed to nationally conscious Slovaks. Education was in Magyar hands. Save among a small group of four hundred to five hundred families—among whom the children of the Lutheran clergy played a disproportionate part—resistance was weakening; the end seemed in sight.¹³⁶

¹³⁵ Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 13-14. He stood by this figure in years to come, restating in his 1931 book, “I gave this estimate in my book ‘The New Slovakia’ in 1924, after repeatedly testing the views of representative leaders, and have not found it seriously challenged by any one.” *Slovakia Then and Now*, 30. Other historians concur with Seton-Watson’s figure, but Johnson states in *Education* (2), “Even the oft-mentioned figure of 750-1000 nationally conscious Slovak intelligentsia given as characterizing the state of Slovakia in 1918 is now questioned by Czechoslovak historians.” Jiřina Ruzkova, dir., *Czech Demographic Handbook* (Prague: Czech Statistical Office, 1998), 15.

¹³⁶ Seton-Watson, *History*, 284.

Magyarization accounts for the fact that fewer Slovaks than Czechs were capable of filling national positions in the new Republic, but of the 750 to 1,000 Slovak intelligentsia who were able to administer official positions, a majority were professing members of the Protestant faith. The reason for the top-heavy Protestant representation stems from the nineteenth-century Protestant school system that produced students who were better-educated and had not been influenced by Magyarization in school. The Protestant students constituted a majority of the Slovak intelligentsia by 1918 and were considered capable of administering top positions in the new State.¹³⁷

Therefore it became necessary for the Czechoslovak government to call for qualified Czechs to temporarily move to Slovakia to fill official posts at the regional and local levels due to a lack of educated and qualified Slovaks. The problem arose when the Czechs filled not only the higher, more demanding positions, but also the lower ones that could have been staffed by Slovaks. Unemployment became a Slovak dilemma which only grew when the Czechs refused to leave their jobs in Slovakia. The Slovaks felt discriminated against and accused their neighbors of violating the Pittsburgh Pact and negating the promised degree of autonomy they were to have received in the joint Republic. Consider the following objections raised by Slovak People's Party Senator Ján Mudroň reflecting Slovak discontent with Vavro Šrobár's alleged Czechoslovakist agenda:

After the occupation of Slovakia Dr. Vavro Šrobár, a pre-revolutionary Czechoslovak, arrived with his whole pre-revolutionary Czechoslovak body of retainers, comprising about 30 or 40 members, as Plenipotentiary Minister of the Revolutionary Government of Prague, and began his work which both for the

¹³⁷ Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 38.

Slovak people and for the Czechoslovak Republic proved to be pernicious and of ill-repute. This work was carried out in the interests of the unification and assimilation of an independent Slovakia. The first thing he did was to abolish the activity of the Slovak National Council, and to become an unrestricted ruler, the dictator of Slovakia.

There is no doubt that only and exclusively the Slovak National Council had the right to appoint deputies for the revolutionary National Assembly. The National Council, however, was dissolved by Dr. Šrobár, and he usurped its rights, himself arbitrarily nominating the members. So it came about that in the revolutionary National Council many areas in Slovakia were not represented at all.¹³⁸

Senator Mudroň's accusations were partly true. At the initial outset of the Czechoslovak government in Prague, Šrobár was given authority to appoint members of the National Assembly, but subsequent elections determined the composition of the legislature.¹³⁹

Perhaps the problem that aroused the most deep-seated bitterness among Slovaks against the Czechs was the religious issue, which Seton-Watson addressed second in *The New Slovakia*. As previously stated, the difference in religious perspectives dated back to the year 1415 when Czech national hero John Hus was burned at the stake for his heretical, anti "Papal Infallibility" beliefs. He fought the German papal hierarchy which was oppressing his fellow countrymen and thus turned the posture of Bohemia against Rome for the next 500 years. The Hussites, inspired by their martyr, took on more of a militant than a spiritual reputation as they conquered lands, including parts of Slovakia, in the name of Hus. Many Bohemians, especially the educated class, adopted an agnostic or atheistic attitude toward religion perhaps in an effort to distance themselves from the

¹³⁸ Ján Mudroň, "Hlinka and Scotus Viator. Further Views," 2-4, [ca. 1923], Seton-Watson Collection, SSEES, University of London.

¹³⁹ Seton-Watson, ed., *Slovakia Then and Now*, 26-7, 30; Seton-Watson, *History*, 323; Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 14-15, 18, 20-21; Johnson, *Education*, 63, 66-7.

militant Hussites. Consequently, under Austro-Hungarian rule, a majority of Czechs associated Catholicism with their Austrian dictators, which engendered even more vengeance against the Catholic Church. The Czech grudge against Catholicism did not make relations with pro-Catholic Slovakia any easier. As Seton-Watson accurately commented, “The Slovak has always been extremely devout by nature”¹⁴⁰ Unlike the Czechs, however, a majority of the Slovak people’s devotion was ardently committed to the Church of Rome. Yet religious differences existed within Slovakia. Although a vast majority of Slovaks professed Catholicism, a small but significant minority was Protestant. In addition to accusing Slovak Protestants of disproportionately representing the Slovak Catholic masses in the new Czechoslovak administration, Slovak Catholics felt threatened by Bohemia’s radical ecclesiastical policy. Furthermore, the leftover Magyarone priests’ efforts to bring Slovakia back under Hungarian control did not help the troubled religious environment within the early years of the new Republic.¹⁴¹

Seton-Watson began his discourse on the religious element of “the Slovak problem” by addressing the issue of the majority of Slovak Catholics feeling underrepresented in governmental position by their Protestant rivals. His 1924 book spoke of “the growing tendency among the more extreme Clericals [Catholic] to denounce the Slovak Protestants as such, and to resent the undoubted fact that they have a share in public affairs out of all proportion to their numerical strength.”¹⁴² He continued

¹⁴⁰ Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 34.

¹⁴¹ Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 32-50; Seton-Watson, *Future of Bohemia*, 8, 32-3.

¹⁴² Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 38.

his effort to cut to the heart of the Czech and Slovak religious differences by calling down what he saw as Czech religious extremism. Although he unhesitatingly affiliated himself with the Scotch Presbyterian Church and on more than one occasion identified himself as “an ardent and convinced admirer of Hus,” Seton-Watson was very much a religious moderate.¹⁴³ Perhaps he perceived himself as a religious progressive like his friend Masaryk. Above all, he wanted to preserve unity within fragile Czechoslovakia. He assessed, “...I know enough of Slovak Lutheranism to realize what is not always understood in Bohemia—that even the Protestants of Slovakia are still quite unripe for the very advanced and ‘unorthodox’ religious views of most Czechs and [the Slovak Protestants] are even inclined to resent their [the Czechs] intrusion.”¹⁴⁴ He added, “in the first ebullition of revolutionary feeling, there should be many all too vocal representatives of such extreme views among the Czechs who came to Slovakia, . . . and in the first few years there was a constant friction and a whole series of petty incidents.”¹⁴⁵ Slovak Protestant and future Czechoslovak Prime Minister Milan Hodža echoed the Scottish historian in his 1931 article, “In the period immediately following the War the dominant tendency in Prague had been in favour of an extremely radical ecclesiastical policy, but in the end the milder Slovak current prevailed.”¹⁴⁶ Protestants Seton-Watson and Hodža

¹⁴³ Seton-Watson, *Future of Bohemia*, 9; Seton-Watson, “Czech and Slovak,” 1922, Seton-Watson Collection, SSEES, University of London.

¹⁴⁴ Seton-Watson, “Czech and Slovak,” 1922, Seton-Watson Collection, SSEES, University of London.

¹⁴⁵ Seton-Watson, ed., *Slovakia Then and Now*, 35.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 88.

recognized the post-war wave of Czech Protestantism as too strong for the Slovak Protestants, let alone Catholics, to absorb.

Yet an internal religious threat festered within Slovakia as well. Among the Slovak Catholic priests who had adopted Magyar policies before 1918, some wanted to see Slovakia return under Hungarian authority. They sought to incite religious bitterness among the Slovaks against the Czechs in hopes that the Slovaks would voluntarily submit themselves to Hungarian rule. Evidence of this phenomenon includes Seton-Watson's remark, ". . . Slovak resentment was fanned by the clergy and skilfully exploited by those 'Magyarone' elements who still secretly hoped for a Hungarian restoration."¹⁴⁷ Seton-Watson considered the meddling of the Magyarone priests as a serious threat to the unity of the new country. Nevertheless, the vast majority of Slovaks would never consider returning to Hungarian domination. The religious grievances the Slovaks held against their Czech counterparts aided the shift in Slovak popular opinion from Czechoslovakism to Slovakism. Slovaks increasingly wanted to be completely independent of the Czechs. As most Slovaks saw it, if an independent Slovakia existed there would be an adequate number of Slovak Catholic administrative officials and the Slovak people would be free from Bohemian religious extremism.

When Seton-Watson addressed the economic element of the "Slovak problem," he optimistically stated that Czechoslovakia's finances were relatively strong compared to that of other Succession States, and he was right. Johnson corroborates Seton-Watson's assessment in his description of Slovakia's economic problems during the

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 35.

interwar period. He concludes, “the economic configuration of her [Czechoslovakia’s] society was more developed than any other East European country except Hungary.”¹⁴⁸ The Slovak people, however, still palpably felt the economic pains that resulted from the postwar European crisis and particularly from what they perceived as Czech monopolization of the industrial situation within the new State. A severe economic recession hit the entire continent of Europe after the First World War, especially during the early 1920s. Slovak workers felt the sting of unemployment as over 25 percent were jobless from 1921 to 1923. The Slovak economy continued to plummet until it reached its lowest point in 1933 when one-third of Slovak laborers were unemployed. Slowly the nation began to climb out of the crisis yet, as Johnson notes, many Slovaks still lived in rural areas where economic growth was not readily experienced. The “rural religious outlook” and the “clutching to the past” that he mentions aided the interwar rise of the political party that represented the Slovak Catholic peasants—the Slovak People’s Party. The SLS would capitalize on the economic grievances Slovaks held against the Czechs as a way of building political and nationalist momentum.¹⁴⁹

Some of Slovakia’s economic difficulties were due to irrefutable facts based on geography and history. Besides the fact that Bohemia was much more industrialized than Slovakia, Seton-Watson noted that Bohemia had more natural resources such as coal and minerals than did its neighbors to the east. Johnson adds that the raw materials which the Slovak factories under Hungarian rule had converted into finished products primarily

¹⁴⁸ Johnson, *Education*, 75.

¹⁴⁹ Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 78-9; Johnson, *Education*, 72-8.

came from other parts of the Hungarian Empire, now inaccessible to Slovak factories. Additionally, due to the strong Magyarization effect, Slovak industrial conditions and employee work ethic had not developed to the more advanced stages evidenced in the Czech lands. For example, Slovakia's working class still suffered under overcrowded urban housing conditions, long hours, and underdeveloped union associations. Because Austria (which oversaw Czech industry) was more Westernized than Hungary, Czech workers had been better trained and better motivated. The result was, as Seton-Watson observed, "The industrial workmen of Bohemia, having lived in the freer atmosphere of Austria, are on the one hand better organized and disciplined than those of Slovakia . . . and on the other hand, they are more efficient and work harder."¹⁵⁰

Among the objections the Slovaks raised, was an inequality of competition which increased Slovak unemployment. Struggling Slovak firms whose products were taxed higher than Czech products could not compete with the lower priced goods produced by Czech firms. Additionally, Czechs and Germans chose to import cheap labor from outside the country, overlooking Slovak workers who needed jobs. The Slovak banking situation also seemed to be manipulated by the Czechs. During the postwar economic depression, the Czechs managed to gain control of numerous Slovak banks. The Czech-operated banks gave preference to Bohemian industries' requests for capital rather than to tenuous Slovak industries. This fact combined with the loss of Slovakia's former chief subsidizer (the Hungarian Empire) left Slovak factories without capital and noticeably weaker than their Czech counterparts. Johnson summarizes Slovak education reformer

¹⁵⁰ Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 83, 85; Johnson, *Education*, 73.

Anton Štefánek's claim that in 1935 "only five percent of the ownership [of Slovak industry] was in Slovak hands and 60 percent belonged to Jews and Hungarians. The remainder was presumably Czech."¹⁵¹ These perceived threats to Slovak competition led to genuine widespread beliefs that the Czechs meant to intentionally exploit Slovakia as a colony and thereby cripple its economic liberty. The accumulation of administrative, religious, and economic complaints from the Slovak quarter evidenced that the Slovaks were dissatisfied with the outworkings of the concept of Czechoslovakism and were primed to demand Slovak autonomy.¹⁵²

The inflammatory 1922 document known as the "Žilina Memorandum" is perhaps the most virulent example of the seriousness of the administrative and economic grievances the Slovaks held against the Czechs. Authored by Andrej Hlinka and his Slovak People's Party, the document spoke from an extremist position, yet that position was quickly gaining popular support in Slovakia. Similar to his plea for Slovak autonomy at Versailles, Hlinka intended to attract global attention through the strong language he employed in the document. Its title read "A Country Doomed to Death, A Nation in Her Last Agonies Implores the Civilized World for Help." The following excerpts demonstrate the degree of Hlinka's extremism but also the weighty charges against the Czechs:

the rulers in Prague were skilful in managing affairs of Slovakia so that Slovaks were bamboozled out of the freedom promised to them. . . . These occurrences . . . are concealed from the view of the world. . . . This is the cause why she [the

¹⁵¹ Johnson, *Education*, 75.

¹⁵² Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 83-6, 96; Johnson, *Education*, 73, 75.

world] remains unaware of the deadly struggle carried on in the very heart of Europe by three millions of Slovaks in order to escape extinction.

When the Czech “brothers” came into Slovakia they brought along with them ten thousands of officials and schoolmasters, and before long all posts were filled up with them. . . . even to-day the offices and schools of Slovakia are nearly exclusively occupied by these people.

To-day there exists not one independent Slovakian bank in the whole of Slovakia.

... The centralists of Prague . . . invented the “Czechoslovak” nation and therewith made disappear the independent Slovak Nation.

. . . Slovaks and Czechs are bearers of two utterly separate national individualities. . . . The Slovak is as well an independent branch of the great slavic tree as are the Bulgarians and the Poles, the Czechs and the Croatians. And as there does not exist any “Bulgaroservian” or “Polishukrainian” Nation, so the “Czechoslovak” Nation means also only an error of ideas, a nonsense. . . . This denomination is only a trick of the Czechs which helps them to avoid the acknowledgement of the separate Slovak interests, to enable them to establish Czechs throughout the Slovak country, and to cynically hide the process of our being molten away.¹⁵³

Hlinka was a radical, yet one who knew how to use words to persuade the masses.

Nevertheless, it is important to remember that Hlinka signed the Martin Declaration of October 1918, in which leading Slovak intelligentsia (both Protestant and Catholic) agreed to join the Slovak nation with the Czech lands in a united Czechoslovak country.

Note Seton-Watson’s recollection: “On May 4th 1908 he made the following declaration before the Magyar Court at Bratislava: ‘It will remain an eternal truth that we Slovaks are one stock, one culture, one nation with the Czechs.’”¹⁵⁴ It was shortly after this declaration that Hlinka was spurned by Šrobár and the leading Slovak officials when he

¹⁵³ Andrej Hlinka, “The Žilina Memorandum,” 3 Aug. 1922 in Rychlík, Marzik, and Bielik, eds., *Seton-Watson and His Relations*, 1: 319.

¹⁵⁴ Seton-Watson, “The Problem of Autonomy in Slovakia,” [ca. 1923], Seton-Watson Collection, SSEES, University of London. This article’s author is unlisted yet the writing is very typical of Seton-Watson’s style and views and is included in the Seton-Watson Collection.

was overlooked for the position as chief ecclesiastical Slovak figure. He then took his case for Slovak autonomy to the Paris Peace Conference and devoted himself to the cause of complete Slovak independence from the Czechs.

Although Hlinka's arguments in the Žilina Memorandum were exaggerated, they nonetheless resonated with a majority of the Slovak people who felt repressed by Czech administrative, religious, and economic policies in the new State. According to the Pittsburgh Pact, the joint country was supposed to provide a larger degree of Slovak sovereignty than was realized in the early years of the Republic. Slovaks felt that the Czechs assumed the head while they remained the tail. The Czech and Slovak Protestant nationalist theory of Czechoslovakism was slowly giving way to Hlinka's theory of Slovakism. Hlinka represented their traditional Catholic faith and hailed from the same peasant circumstances that they did. Plus he was the hero who championed the rights of the Slovak minority in the face of Hungarian oppression after the Černova Massacre. Disillusioned with failed Czechoslovakist promises, many Slovaks turned to Hlinka's notion of Slovak autonomy. The nature and orientation of Slovak nationalism shifted in the 1920s from Protestant Czechoslovakism to Catholic Slovakism. Yet Seton-Watson did not anticipate this transfer of Slovak nationalist theories. Instead he was more preoccupied with the polarizing personality of Andrej Hlinka than he was concerned with the mounting force of Catholicism which fueled Hlinka's dynamic character.

CHAPTER 5

SETON-WATSON AND HLINKA: MISSED CONCEPTIONS

Slovak public opinion shifted in the 1920s from the days before the Republic when the Protestant pro-Czechoslovakists dominated the nationalist debate to the situation in the early years of the interwar period when Catholic pro-Slovak autonomists were gaining the upper hand. The swing from Czechoslovakism to Slovakism occurred because the benefits of the joint Czech and Slovak country that the Protestants promised were not materializing fast enough to quell the Slovak masses' complaints. They saw glaring administrative, religious, and economic problems plaguing the Slovaks but not the Czechs. Slovaks argued that the Czechs assumed the head (of the Republic) while they remained the tail. The presence of mounting discontent with the Czechoslovak government conveniently played into the hands of the Slovak People's Party (*Slovenská Ľudová Strana* or SLS). They were the most outspoken critics of the administration, advocating complete Slovak independence from the Czechs. Consequently, their party platform dominated the Slovak political scene and paved the way for the breakup of Czechoslovakia in 1938.

The remarkable rise of the Slovak People's Party is worthy of examination since its power caught Seton-Watson by surprise and led to consequences he did not foresee. The party was first formed by Slovaks in 1913 while under the Hungarian regime, but it had little influence or ability to function freely since all Slovak political parties were

censored by the Hungarian government. After World War I and the creation of Czechoslovakia, Hlinka “resuscitated” the party and particularly poured all of his energies into its Slovak autonomist platform after he was deliberately passed over by Šrobár and the Slovak intelligentsia for the position as chief ecclesiastical officer in Czechoslovakia.¹⁵⁵ He thus became the official leader of the SLS, and in his honor the party was renamed the Hlinka Slovak People’s Party (*Hlinková Slovenská L’udova Strana* or HSLS) in 1925.¹⁵⁶ In 1918 the SLS was hardly detectable on the Czechoslovak political radar, registering only 2,115 members. That figure was to jump dramatically, however, over the next twelve years. The SLS rose to 11,983 members in 1920, 17,958 in 1925, and 22,467 in 1930.¹⁵⁷ As Kirschbaum notes, by 1925 the SLS had claimed the largest number of parliamentary seats in Slovakia’s multi-party legislature.¹⁵⁸ Johnson adds that from 1925 to 1938 the SLS garnered an average of 30 percent of Slovak votes, making it the “leading vote getter” among Slovak political parties.¹⁵⁹ Thus the Slovak autonomist party rose from obscurity to prominence during the short time between 1920 and 1938.

¹⁵⁵ Rychlík, Marzik, Bielik, eds., *Seton-Watson and His Relations*, 2: 83; Hlinka’s party joined with the Czechs in the Czechoslovak People’s Party (*Československá Strana Lidová*) for a brief stint from 1918 to 1921, but their coalition was short lived due to differences between the parties’ leaders and conflicting party agendas. Trapl, *Political Catholicism*, 57-8.

¹⁵⁶ Although the Slovak People’s Party (SLS) was renamed the Hlinka Slovak People’s Party (HSLS) in 1925, it will be referred to as the SLS for the remainder of this thesis.

¹⁵⁷ Felak, “*At the Price*,” 30.

¹⁵⁸ Kirschbaum, *Historical Dictionary of Slovakia*, xli.

¹⁵⁹ Johnson, *Education*, 70.

The growth of the SLS's popularity can be attributed to several factors. First, the charisma of its leader Father Andrej Hlinka attracted many followers. He was born in the Slovak town of Ružomberok and experienced the humble circumstances with which many of his supporters could identify. His imprisonment following the 1907 Černova Massacre brought him fame as a patriotic Slovak hero who challenged Hungarian authority. Nevertheless, Hlinka also possessed great skill as a persuasive orator and writer. Employing repetition to build his arguments, audiences became convinced of the veracity of his message. He was an emotional dramatist who empathized with the pain Slovaks endured at the hands of the Czechs and articulated their plight to the world. Felak notes that Hlinka "wrote speeches and articles that resembled sermons, regularly using scriptural or other religious references when commenting on the political situation."¹⁶⁰ His method suited the audience he was trying to reach, which consisted of the Slovak Catholic masses. Felak states of Hlinka's constituents, "Slovaks who were nationally active before 1918 joined with former Magyarones, priests with lay people, moderates with radicals, intellectuals with peasants, to form a union of Slovak nationalists held together by a desire for autonomy, a profession of the Catholic faith, and the charismatic personality of Andrej Hlinka."¹⁶¹ Hlinka's unique ability to persuade the Slovak people directly impacted the electoral success of the SLS.

The second factor contributing to the popularity of Hlinka's party was the influence of local Catholic priests across Slovakia. Although some were guilty of

¹⁶⁰ Felak, "*At the Price*," 38.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 37.

acceding to the Magyarone position under the Hungarian Empire, others never abandoned loyalty to their Slovak nationality. These clergy risked imprisonment and worse to maintain the Slovak language in the traditional mass. Observe Seton-Watson's mention of one such priest: "... Bishop Fischer Colbrie on the other hand earned the disapproval of Budapest by refusing to ignore the existence of the Slovak language in his relations with his diocese."¹⁶² Regardless of their posture toward the Hungarians before the creation of the Republic, during interwar Czechoslovakia the local parish priests provided an alternative to far-away Prague for thousands of Slovak Catholics. Discontent with Prague's centralist policies, many Slovaks looked to their local priests as a substitute intellectual elite for the Protestant Czechoslovakists who sided with the Czechs. At a time when it was important for Slovaks to distinguish themselves from the Czechs, Catholicism represented what it meant to be Slovak, and the local priests personified the Catholic faith to the masses.

The third factor that caused many to join the SLS was the Slovak problem. The accumulation of administrative, religious, and economic inequalities the Slovaks saw in the Czechoslovak government prompted many voters to cast their ballots for Hlinka's party. The SLS and its Slovakist position stood in direct opposition to the Czechoslovakists and their failed promises for the new country. Hlinka and his party demanded autonomy from the Czechs even "at the price of the Republic," and constituents from across Slovakia responded to that claim.¹⁶³ Felak emphasizes the

¹⁶² Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 34.

¹⁶³ Andrej Hlinka quoted in Felak, "*At the Price*," xiii.

impact of the Slovak grievances during the interwar period: "Though the Slovak question did not cause, or necessitate, the Republic's demise, it certainly facilitated it, as well as helping to determine the shape that the demise would take."¹⁶⁴ Slovaks were increasingly looking for a substitute for the Czechoslovakism that dominated the first years of Czechoslovakia, and the Slovak People's Party seized upon their discontent.

What did Seton-Watson have to say about Hlinka and the ascension of the Slovak People's Party? Did he foresee the speed of its growth or the ramifications of its ascendancy by 1938? One thing is certain, Seton-Watson did not mince words when it came to evaluating Andrej Hlinka. Observe his comments on Hlinka's Žilina

Memorandum:

It is not merely that it habitually employs phrases about Slovakia such as would only be true of the worst tyrannies in history ("a country doomed to death, a nation in her last agonies," . . . "a real reign of terror," . . .). It is full of such obvious perversions of fact, as, that the Czechs have forced 50,000 Slovaks to emigrate, that the word Czechoslovak was invented in order to rob the Slovaks of their position as a national minority But the whole tone of the memorandum is one of sweeping generalization, which covers almost every subject, yet rarely condescends to concrete facts¹⁶⁵

It should be noted that although the objections Hlinka's memorandum raised were not completely accurate, Seton-Watson saw a valid grain of truth underlying them.

Objections regarding the administrative, religious, and economic sectors coming from all corners of Slovakia (including much more reliable sources than Hlinka) caused Seton-Watson to write *The New Slovakia* in 1924 in an effort to preserve the Republic.

Nevertheless, he feared that a polarizing figure such as Hlinka could cause the majority

¹⁶⁴ Felak, "At the Price," 215.

¹⁶⁵ Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 46.

of Slovaks to follow Hlinka's autonomist platform and demand separation from the Czechs.

If there was anything Seton-Watson did not want, it was a breakup of the Czechoslovak Republic. It was the leading illustration among the Succession States that the post-World War I promises of democracy and self-determination could be realized. As he stated in 1924, "The ultimate aim must be to achieve a higher unity between Czech and Slovak" ¹⁶⁶ Therefore, Seton-Watson believed in sacrificing anything for the sake of the Republic. This position stood in direct opposition to Hlinka's autonomist aims. James Felak's book "*At the Price of the Republic: Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, 1929-1938*" argues that Hlinka was much more inclined to champion the rights of his Slovak minority nationality group within the joint Czechoslovak State than to preserve the unity of the whole. Felak quotes Hlinka's own words that Slovak autonomy was the preeminent issue, even "at the price of the Czechoslovak Republic."¹⁶⁷ Needless to say, the two men did not see eye to eye. Historian László Péter successfully argues Seton-Watson's contrary opinion. Péter notes that if there was a choice to be made between the interests of a particular nationality group within one of the new Succession States and the preservation of the State as a whole, Seton-Watson was on the side of preserving unity within the new State. Observe the following excerpts from Péter's article on Seton-Watson:

For a liberal like Seton-Watson the central question was how, . . . stability and international peace could be preserved.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 129.

¹⁶⁷ Andrej Hlinka quoted in Felak, "*At the Price*," xiii.

The principle of nationality had to be subordinated to the requirements of the balance of power. In sum, the attitudes of the man who had championed the smaller nations altered radically, and it seems that, . . . Seton-Watson's adjustments in opinion were dependent upon his changing perception of what was required to maintain the European order.¹⁶⁸

Péter's argument is consistent with Seton-Watson's perspective in his 1931 anthology

Slovakia Then and Now:

As in 1923, there is once more here and there in Slovakia a tendency to consider only what can be seen from the village church tower: but these twelve years have done much to widen this parochial outlook, and to bring home to the Slovak masses the extent to which their fate is bound up with that of a much larger unit, and even of Europe as a whole.¹⁶⁹

Here Seton-Watson not only expressed hope that the Slovaks would recognize themselves as part of a larger whole, but he also censured what he considered to be a Slovak tendency to rely solely on the church's opinion on all matters, even those pertaining to politics. The abovementioned quote hints at Seton-Watson's view on the proper relationship between religion and politics in a republic and also betrays the reason he was ultimately blindsided by the strength of Catholicism.

Seton-Watson believed that within a republic such as Czechoslovakia the church (Catholic or Protestant) and its clergy should be removed from politics. He wrote in *The New Slovakia*, "Hence the true role of the church in all countries, is not to plunge recklessly into party politics . . . but far rather to provide . . . a practical proof that Christianity is a vitalising force, without which the state is doomed to languish and

¹⁶⁸ Péter, "Seton-Watson's Changing Views," *Slavonic and East European Review*, 657, 677.

¹⁶⁹ Seton-Watson, ed., *Slovakia Then and Now*, 51.

decay.”¹⁷⁰ The church’s place was to be confined to the religious sphere. It should not have any influence in politics. Seton-Watson resented Hlinka for his religiously-influenced politics: “In these Laodicean days there is less room for a fanatic who places the Church above all else.”¹⁷¹ He saw in the person of Andrej Hlinka a charismatic leader who manipulated religion for political purposes. Thus it was Hlinka himself that Seton-Watson determined to be the primary danger threatening the unity of Czechoslovakia. He failed, however, to recognize the substance behind Hlinka’s rhetoric that drove the autonomist agenda.

Instead, Seton-Watson perceived religion as a minor factor in Slovak politics. His 1921 confidential memorandum to Czech Prime Minister Jan Černý reveals his shortsightedness. Seton-Watson’s purpose in writing the memorandum was to recommend that the Czechoslovak government facilitate the removal of Hlinka from politics by allowing him to take an official clerical post as Bishop. Seton-Watson believed that if Hlinka was occupied with religious duties he would be less influential on the political scene and present less of a danger to the unity of the Republic. As one of the most outspoken advocates for the creation of the new state in 1918, Seton-Watson did not want any single person to jeopardize Czechoslovak relations. But his line of reasoning indicates his belief that religion was not a factor in politics. Note the following excerpts from the secret memorandum:

¹⁷⁰ Seton-Watson, *New Slovakia*, 50.

¹⁷¹ Seton-Watson, ed., *Slovakia Then and Now*, 43.

It seems to me that if Hlinka were to be named bishop, then the main risk would be carried by the church, not the state; and if I were the government, I would quietly burden the church with this risk!

That his train of thought belongs more to the Middle Ages than to the twentieth century is really another reason to transfer his activities from the worldly to the spiritual realm. His mentality and the mentality of a large part of his people coincide, and that would only be done away with through educating a new generation, not through Hlinka's neutralization.

...Hlinka thrown back into political orbit, would further contribute to the uneasiness of the spirit, and at the same time, the cloudiness of Czech-Slovak relationships.

In a word, I would gladly hail his removal from politics....¹⁷²

In the words of Hlinka, Seton-Watson advocated the unity of the Republic "at the price of the Church." His recommendation to sluff Hlinka onto the responsibility of the church acknowledges that he considered the church to be outdated, not a factor in politics. Religion, according to Seton-Watson, should have no influence in the political affairs of a republic; therefore moving Hlinka from the secular to the religious realm would prevent his political meddling. Additionally, removing the dangerously popular personality of Hlinka would avoid further polarization of the Slovaks from the Czechs. Seton-Watson minimized the power of religion behind Hlinka's Catholic movement, yet the rising popularity of the Slovak People's Party among the Slovak masses ultimately led to what he feared most—the breakup of Czechoslovakia.

Hlinka, however, saw what Seton-Watson missed. Unlike the Czechs, the vast majority of Slovaks were extremely devout, practicing Roman Catholics. They followed Hlinka in droves not only for his reputation as the hero of Černova, his persuasive

¹⁷² Memorandum, Seton-Watson to Jan Černý, 14 June 1921, Seton-Watson Collection, SSEES, University of London.

speaking ability, or his humble background. They followed him because of the substance that fueled his message. Hlinka tapped into the tremendous power that Catholicism held over the everyday lives, culture, traditions, and history of the Slovak people. It was for Catholicism that the fifteen victims of Černova died, it was Catholicism that distinguished the Slovaks from the increasingly agnostic Czechs who were now taking advantage of them, it was the local parish priests who represented Catholicism in the village, preaching a different nationalism than was propagated by far-away Prague. Hlinka was able to convince the Slovak masses that the only true, patriotic Slovaks were those who were Catholics and Slovakists who demanded complete autonomy from the Czechs. He drew a connection between religion and nationalism and communicated that message effectively. Observe his language in the following 1931 article:

Religion and our Catholicism taught us to suffer, to work and to bear hardships under the old regime. Religion and religious societies maintained the Slovak in idealism and hope for better days. Religion taught the 15 martyrs of Černova to lay down their lives on the 27th October, 1907. Religion taught us pride and self-confidence when the gates of jails and penitentiaries were opened to us. Religion gave us the doctrine: "Fear not those who kill the body, for the soul they cannot harm." Our Catholicism taught us openness and national pride . . .

What strengthened our Republic after the year 1925? Strong religious conviction. Religion teaches us to respect law and State. With the help of religion we overcome the most powerful enemies. Our 325,856 electors were guided by the idea of religion and autonomy.

...it is in the best interest of States to foster religion and support those who proclaim it, because the basis of States is morality. And the basis of this is religion.¹⁷³

¹⁷³ Andrej Hlinka quoted in Seton-Watson, ed., *Slovakia Then and Now*, 173-4.

Hlinka recognized Catholicism as a force that united the Slovak people. He built upon this common foundation and allowed religious dogma to stimulate a political platform. Ultimately, he linked Catholicism with Slovak autonomy and made loyalty to any other platform seem anti-Slovak. Hlinka's rhetoric and electoral support are further proof that the origins of Slovak nationalism were religious.

The events of 1938 saw the radical manifestation of the power of Hlinka's movement that not even Seton-Watson predicted. Czech and Slovak national identities and political affiliations had become so polarized that they actually agreed to divide the country they had created together only twenty years earlier. In Munich on September 30, 1938, Britain, France, and Italy ceded Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland to Germany in an effort to appease Hitler.¹⁷⁴ Feeling abandoned by the Western nations and faced with mounting pressure from the Nazis, the Czechoslovak government considered a proposal it had rejected numerous times during the interwar period—Slovakia's demand for complete autonomy. Prague was willing to do whatever necessary to maintain some joint relationship between the Czechs and Slovaks to present a united front against German encroachment. By this time the SLS dominated the political scene in Slovakia and capitalized on the dire straits brought on by the Munich decision, pressuring the other pro-government parties into voting for Slovak autonomy. On October 6 parties from across the political spectrum in Slovakia agreed upon a demand for Slovak autonomy from the Czechs, drafting the Žilina Manifesto. The next day the Czechoslovak

¹⁷⁴ The Sudetenland refers to the area of Bohemia that contained a larger German than Czech population.

government in Prague granted their request giving Slovakia additional sovereignty within the renamed Czecho-Slovakia. The Slovaks were led by Premier Jozef Tiso who succeeded Hlinka after his death on August 16, 1938. Tiso was also a Catholic priest and had been a high-ranking figure in the People's Party, leading the more moderate element of the SLS in contrast to Karol Sidor's radical SLS group. As with Hus and Comenius, Tiso was a spiritual leader who became an influential political leader.¹⁷⁵ On March 13, 1939, he traveled to Berlin to discuss with Hitler possible independence of Slovakia from the Czechs. The following day the issue was brought before the Slovak Assembly which voted unanimously in favor of the first Slovak Republic. Tiso was elected Slovakia's president in October 1939, and remained in office until 1945.¹⁷⁶

The People's Party goal of achieving Slovak autonomy ultimately resulted in the Slovak decision to cooperate with the Nazis in exchange for independence from the Czechs. Slovakia became a puppet state of the Third Reich. Seton-Watson, the man who presumed that the dominant Czechoslovakist ideology of 1918 would carry the Republic into a future of harmony between the two peoples, never predicted that the extremist Catholic Slovakist People's Party would be in a position to dictate Slovak politics by 1938, forcing the other parties to back their Žilina Manifesto. Perhaps this was because during his early visits to the Czech lands and Slovakia he met mostly Protestant Czechs and Slovaks who agreed with the Czechoslovakist position rather than meeting Catholics who were of the Slovakist persuasion. He assumed all Czechs and Slovaks thought the

¹⁷⁵ Abrams, *Struggle for the Soul*, 41.

¹⁷⁶ Kirschbaum, *Historical Dictionary of Slovakia*, xliii-xlv; Felak, "At the Price," 178, 201, 206-08; Rychlík, Marzik, and Bielik, eds., *Seton-Watson and His Relations*, 2: 128.

same way as the Protestants whom he initially met and believed the two peoples would continue to cooperate towards the idea of creating a joint identity. And he certainly did not foresee that the leader of independent Slovakia would be a Nazi collaborator. The united Czechoslovakia he so desperately worked to preserve, shattered. Slovakia possessed the autonomy and independence Hlinka's party had long sought after, but it came not only "at the price of the Republic," but at the price of an alliance with Hitler, a decision the nation would later deeply regret.

Seton-Watson was blindsided by the power of the Catholic religion that fueled the popularity of the Slovak People's Party. He understood that nineteenth-century Protestant education created a commitment to the Czechoslovakist brand of nationalism within Czech and Slovak intellectual leaders. He also understood that a majority of Slovaks were practicing Catholics yet were educated under the Magyar regime, causing them to maintain a Slovakist position. Seton-Watson witnessed the shift from Protestant led Czechoslovakism to Catholic led Slovakism, and he recognized the administrative, religious, and economic grievances that arose from the Slovak quarter in the 1920s. What he did not see was the degree of power Catholicism held over Slovak nationalism. As evidenced by his 1921 letter to Czech Prime Minister Jan Černý, Seton-Watson did not think religion could significantly influence politics. He overlooked the extent of Catholicism's influence on the Slovak masses' everyday lives and nationalist allegiance.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Although many historians have studied the topic of nationalism—even interwar Czechoslovak nationalism—none has viewed it primarily through the eyes of R. W. Seton-Watson, the foremost scholar on Central and Eastern Europe before, during, and after World War I. He possessed a unique relationship with the Slovak people, empathizing with their underdog position in the Czech and Slovak relationship. Seton-Watson often recalled his Scottish heritage in his advice to the Czechs and Slovaks, offering the example of Scotland and England’s relationship as a model for the newly created Czechoslovakia. His affinity for the Slovaks was unparalleled and evidenced by the scholarship fund he established which allowed six Slovak students to attend the university in his native Scotland. Seton-Watson’s life long correspondence with one of the students, Fedor Ruppeldt, is an example of the personal attention he devoted to Slovaks and their cause.

This study employs the collection of R. W. Seton-Watson’s writings held in the Slavonic School of East European Studies at the University of London in an effort to determine Seton-Watson’s perspective on Slovak nationalism and its religious overtones. Specifically, this thesis proposes that it was diverging religious institutions, namely Protestantism and Catholicism, which determined the convictions of the Slovak intelligentsia and thus the direction of Slovak nationalism in interwar Czechoslovakia.

Protestantism's Czechoslovakist theory of nationalism gave way to Catholicism's Slovakist theory. Seton-Watson recognized the role of the Protestant tradition in instilling a sense of nationalism within the Slovak intelligentsia, but he failed to predict the degree of Catholicism's power over Slovak nationalism. The result of Catholic Slovakism's ascendancy was a polarization of Czech and Slovak national identity and political affiliation by 1938.

At first glance it appears that the Czechs and Slovaks are almost identical peoples, but further study reveals significant differences of history, religion, and politics. While the Czech struggle was historically against the Germanic peoples to their south and west, the Slovaks strained against the Hungarians for a thousand years. History drew a distinct dividing line between the Holy Roman Empire which included Bohemia, and Slovakia which was perceived as being under Hungarian control. The dividing line remained until the end of World War I when the Czech and Slovak peoples were allowed to form a united state based on the right of self-determination. The only problem with this new partnership was the fact that radically divergent historical experiences separated their religious and political affiliations. Czech heritage boasted the dynasty of pre-Reformation hero Jan Hus who championed not only religious reform but also defended Slavism in the face of German domination. Hus was the first in a long line of Czech Protestant religious figures who were also political leaders. Bohemian educational reformer Jan Amos Comenius followed in Hus's footsteps as the last Bishop of the Czech Brethren. His educational philosophy was extremely innovative and is still practiced today. Hus and Comenius also represented the pattern of Czech intelligentsia who rose

from humble beginnings and allowed their religious beliefs to influence their political reforms. In contrast to the Czechs, the Slovaks maintained a devoutly Catholic faith under Hungarian suppression. They had few religious and intellectual heroes to imitate, and as a result their intellectual culture was not as cultivated as the Czech's. The nineteenth-century Czech and Slovak intelligentsia who managed to lead the Czecho-Slovak revival were directly impacted by religion, which in turn determined the nationalist theories they espoused. The Protestants advocated Czechoslovakism, the existence of a joint Czech and Slovak identity, that they hoped would evolve into a united country; yet the Catholics promoted Slovakism, the belief that the Slovak identity was distinct from the Czech and entitled them to their own nation.

Education played a large role in the nineteenth-century cultivation of Protestant Czechoslovakism. Although Protestantism was generally associated with the Czechs and Catholicism with the Slovaks, a small but significant number of Slovaks were Protestant. They formed the backbone of the Slovak intelligentsia who emerged before and during the Czech and Slovak national revival that culminated in 1848. Because Protestantism did not bind its clergy to celibacy as Catholicism did, a great number of Protestant ministers' families produced dynasties of well-educated Slovaks who supported the design for Czech and Slovak unity proposed by Czechoslovakism. Slovaks such as Kollár, Šafárik, Štúr, Hodža, and Hurban were all influenced by Protestant values they gained from their Protestant parents, at the Lutheran Lyceum in Bratislava, or in their own training as Protestant clergy. The first Czechoslovak President T. G. Masaryk was also a member of the Czechoslovakist intelligentsia impacted by religion. He was born a

Catholic but converted to Protestantism as a young adult, incorporating its values into his philosophy of humanitarian democracy. Masaryk followed the long tradition of nineteenth-century Czech and Slovak national figures who drew their Czechoslovakist nationalism from the Protestant faith.

The end of World War I saw the realization of the Czechoslovakist dream—the creation of a Czechoslovak State. The Czechs in Prague and the Slovaks in Martin, Slovakia, reiterated the Pittsburgh Pact signed by Czechs and Slovaks in America. The Pittsburgh Pact and the Martin Declaration became critical documents in the 1920s as the Slovaks evaluated the degree of sovereignty they were given in the Czechoslovak Republic. Not all Slovaks agreed with the principle of Czechoslovakism, especially when the honeymoon phase of their relationship with the Czechs ended and the administrative and economic problems began. Father Andrej Hlinka, leader of the Slovak People's Party (SLS), became the spokesman for these disgruntled Slovaks, using their discontent for political ends. The SLS's chief aim was Slovak autonomy from the Czechs. Hlinka was famous for his imprisonment by the Hungarians in 1907 for his role in the Černova Massacre, the event that galvanized Slovak public opinion in favor of supporting Catholicism as a distinctive element of the Slovak identity. Statistics show that in the early twentieth century most Slovaks remained devoutly Catholic since by 1921, 77 percent of Slovaks were registered Catholics.¹⁷⁷ Hlinka capitalized on his reputation as the hero of Černova and the mounting Slovak grievances during the early

¹⁷⁷ Felak, "At the Price," 22.

years of the Republic to attract a significant following to his religiously-inspired People's Party.

Slowly the tide was beginning to turn from the Protestant notion of a united Czech and Slovak people and nation to the Catholic notion of Slovak autonomy from the Czechs. The Slovak Catholic masses perceived the imbalance in the number of Protestants who held official positions in the new state and in the number of Czechs who took over Slovak administrative positions. Slovak Catholics felt they were not proportionately represented in Prague or at the regional Slovak level, and they resented Czechs such as Masaryk for their progressive, unorthodox religious ideas that were corrupting the state. Economic inequalities further embittered the Slovaks against the Czechs. Czech firms held a competitive advantage because they could sell their products cheaper than the Slovak firms' prices. As a result of the Slovak businesses' precarious financial status, Czech banks hesitated to loan them money. The accumulation of administrative, religious, and economic complaints from the Slovak quarter was the catalyst prompting the 1920s shift in Slovak popular opinion from Czechoslovakism to Slovakism. Many Slovaks believed the promises the Protestant Czechoslovakists made in 1918 never materialized and that the Czechs were intentionally suppressing the Slovaks. Hlinka and his Slovak People's Party's demands for Slovak autonomy began to resonate with the Slovak masses.

After witnessing the shift from Czechoslovakism to Slovakism, Seton-Watson was alarmed by the severity of the Slovak grievances against the Czechs that threatened the unity of the country. He referred to the administrative, religious, and economic

complaints as “the Slovak problem” and wrote his 1924 book *The New Slovakia* in an effort to propose solutions to preserve the fragile Republic in danger of breaking apart. While Seton-Watson was prepared to sacrifice anything to save Czechoslovakia, Hlinka was ready and waiting to sacrifice the Republic to gain Slovak autonomy. That the two men did not see eye to eye is clearly reflected in Seton-Watson’s evaluations of Andrej Hlinka. Seton-Watson saw Hlinka as a dangerous charismatic personality who could persuade Slovaks with his message of Slovak autonomy. He was critical not only of Hlinka’s emotional extremism but of his being a representative of the church who was meddling in politics. The Scotsman believed that the church should be separate from the state. He issued a confidential memorandum in 1921 to Czechoslovakia’s Prime Minister Jan Černý advising that Hlinka be granted the position of Bishop in order to transfer the burden of Hlinka from the political sphere to the religious. Seton-Watson believed if Hlinka was preoccupied as Bishop he would not be able to impact politics, and thus wrongly concluded that the church had no influence in Slovak politics. He was blindsided by the power Catholicism held over Slovak nationalism.

Hlinka, however, recognized what Seton-Watson overlooked. He understood that the power that fueled the growing popularity of his Slovak People’s Party came from its strong religious essence. It was Catholicism with its integral role in Slovaks’ everyday lives, culture, traditions, and history that was the substance behind the political message of autonomy. The more the Slovaks became disgruntled with administrative and economic inequalities, the more they wanted to separate themselves from the Czechs, and one way to do that was to revert to their distinctly Catholic faith that espoused Slovakism.

Catholicism was a tangible reality for the Slovak masses for several reasons. First, the Černova victims had given their lives for their Catholic faith. Second, the local parish priests represented Catholicism in the village, preaching a different nationalism than was propagated by far-away Prague. Third, Catholicism was the antithesis of the religiously progressive agnosticism the Czechs espoused. Hlinka tapped into the force that united and defined the Slovak people separate and apart from the Czechs—Catholicism. He shrouded himself in its religious garb and successfully manipulated the faith for political ends. Hlinka’s Slovakist message met with resounding approval from the Slovak Catholics. It is no wonder the People’s Party won the most votes of any Slovak political party from 1925 to 1938.¹⁷⁸

Conversely, Seton-Watson failed to perceive the growing strength of Slovak Catholic nationalism. He was blindsided by the power of religion behind the People’s Party rhetoric and did not foresee the dramatic polarization of Czech and Slovak political opinion that divided by 1938. He missed the fact that by 1938 the People’s Party would dominate the Slovak political scene so completely that it could successfully demand autonomy from Prague. He also never guessed that the popular vote in Slovakia would elect a Catholic priest who would openly collaborate with a Nazi dictator in exchange for Slovak independence from the Czechs. Seton-Watson should have heeded his own warning written in 1919: “If Nationality is to be the dominant factor in the future

¹⁷⁸ Johnson, *Education*, 70.

settlement of Europe, two other vital factors—economics and religion—must on no account be neglected, unless we are to court disaster.”¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁹ Seton-Watson, *Europe in the Melting Pot*, 72.

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