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President Gerald Ford's impact on United States foreign policy from 1974 to 1991

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***PRESIDENT GERALD FORD'S IMPACT ON UNITED
STATES FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1974 TO 1991***

By

Robert David Clifton

Submitted for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in Political Science

University of Richmond

1998

Dr. John W. Outland

To illustrate President Ford's impact on United States' foreign policy, this thesis looks at his early life, his Congressional career and his brief tenure as Vice President. From there, it focuses on the differences between Ford and President Nixon. The paper looks at their personalities, decision-making styles, and their styles of leadership. Next, it analyzes the major international events that took place during Ford's years in the White House. These events include the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia, communist intervention in Angola and Ford's dealings with the Soviet Union and The Peoples' Republic of China. Finally, the paper examines three post-Ford Administrations and the impact that Gerald Ford had on them. The evidence supports the author's contention that Gerald Ford had a substantial impact on the foreign policy of the United States during and after his Presidency.

PRESIDENT GERALD FORD'S IMPACT ON UNITED STATES

FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1974 TO 1991

By

ROBERT DAVID CLIFTON

B.A., Rider University, 1991

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty

of the University of Richmond

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
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
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
I certify that I have read this thesis and find that, in scope and quality, it satisfies the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.



Professor John W. Outland, Thesis Advisor



Professor John Whelan



Professor Daniel J. Palazzolo

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Thanks Dad!

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Following the Persian Gulf War, TIME magazine ran a small article discussing the impact that former President Gerald R. Ford had on the United States' victory over Iraq. The article pointed out that both Presidents Carter and Reagan had made substantial contributions during their presidencies by implementing new weapon systems and by overall increasing military spending and strength.¹ However, Hugh Sidey, the article's author, stated that it was Ford's time in the Oval Office that had the most profound effect on the outcome of the war.²

This assumption by Sidey was not based upon any weapons system deployed under the Ford Administration or by any treaties signed by him; instead, it was formulated by the men that Ford had chosen to serve in his Administration. "Of the eight men in George Bush's war council, four were brought in directly or shoved along in their journey by Ford. Two others arrived at the fringes of power during Ford's brief tenure, and their talents were allowed full play in the meritocracy that Ford helped nurture."³ These men were George Bush, Brent Scowcroft, Dick Cheney, James Baker, Colin Powell and Robert Gates.⁴

After reading this article, I decided to take a closer look into the Ford Administration and to examine the impact of his presidency on United States Foreign Policy. I began with Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War by Richard Melanson. Melanson, however, does not distinguish between the Nixon and Ford Administrations. It is for this reason that I decided to focus on President Ford's contribution to United States Foreign Policy. My thesis is that Gerald Ford had a substantial impact on United States foreign policy during his brief

presidency and that impact was carried on to later administrations. First, I will look at Ford's life and early political career and show how this part of his life shaped his world view and affected his future decisions. Second, I will distinguish Ford from Richard Nixon, in terms of how they handled foreign policy issues and crises. Finally, I will look at Ford's impact on foreign policy in later administrations.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CHANGES IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

The American public has been divided over the issue of foreign policy since the birth of the nation. A. James Reichley states in his book, Conservatives in an Age of Change, that the division over foreign policy was the main cause of the development of the two party system in the United States. The Federalist Party, led by Alexander Hamilton, favored a pro-British policy in the war between Great Britain and France. Hamilton believed that a close relationship with England would enhance the economic condition of America. On the other side was the Republican Party led by Thomas Jefferson, who favored close ties with France. Jefferson's argument was that France was following the United States in an international movement toward freedom.⁵

In the 19th Century the United States entered into a period of isolation. As the U.S. turned away from the outside world, it devoted its energies to expanding its borders. The policy makers of the day chose to follow the advice of former President George Washington. In his Farewell Address, Washington stated, "Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world."⁶ This period was also marked by the beginning of the country's industrial revolution and the expansion of America's urban centers. These events further enhanced the United

States' isolationist policies because they consumed the nation's attention.⁷

On February 15, 1898, the United States was suddenly thrust back into direct involvement in world affairs. On that day the U.S. Battleship Maine exploded in Havana Harbor in Cuba. Many in the United States believed that Spain had sabotaged the ship. The cause of the blast was never determined; however, within months, the United States was at war with Spain.⁸ After the war with Spain, the United States assumed a more active role in world affairs. This activist role was short lived due to the horrors of the first World War and the rejection of the League of Nations. The United States once again withdrew from the world stage by the early 1920's. From the end of World War I until 1941 a war between the isolationists and the internationalists raged on.⁹ The conflict between the two parties ended with the start of World War II. The United States became a leader in world affairs that continues to this day.

With the conclusion of World War II and the creation of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and various other alliances, the United States found itself in every corner of the globe. America was forced to abandon its isolationist nature and emerge as a superpower. U.S. policy makers felt they would no longer stand by and allow aggression to stamp out the flames of freedom that were spreading across the globe. This new attitude in the United States would lead to confrontations with the world's other superpower, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. For the most part the confrontations were fought by proxies or by one or another verses a proxy, such as in Korea and Vietnam. However, in 1962 the United States and the Soviet Union faced off in the waters off Cuba when it was discovered that the Soviets had placed medium range nuclear missiles on the island nation. The United States blockaded the island and turned back the Soviet ships. The incident ended without a shot fired and with the missiles being removed.

By the early 1970's, President Richard Nixon realized that the United States no longer had the ability to "fight every battle, win every war, or draw every line to keep global peace."¹⁰ Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger ushered in a period of diplomacy with the Soviet Union known as detente. However, by the time of this new attitude towards the communists, the war in Vietnam had been lost. Staggering loss of life and declining support back home would force Nixon to withdraw from the Southeast Asian nation. Watergate would force an inexperienced leader to take the reins of U.S. foreign policy as thirty years of hegemony were coming to an end. This man was former Michigan Congressman Gerald R. Ford.

FORD'S EARLY YEARS - DEVELOPING A WORLD VIEW

Before looking at the Ford Presidency, I feel it is important to briefly look at the development of Gerald Ford's world view and at his time spent in the United State House of Representatives and as the Vice President of the United States.

Before World War Two, Gerald Ford, like most Americans, gave little thought to world affairs. Ford had taken the position of President George Washington, who, in his Farewell Address, stated that "Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none or a very remote relation."¹¹ However, Ford's four years in the Pacific as a Lt. Commander in the Navy reshaped his world view. By the end of the war, the United States had paid a high price for its unwillingness to become involved in the "primary interests" of other nations.

CONGRESS

Ford entered the 1948 Republican Primary for the Fifth Congressional District in Michigan against Bartel J. Jonkman, who had held the seat since 1940 and sat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Jonkman was a fervent isolationist and clashed

frequently with fellow Republican, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, also of Michigan, a leading internationalist and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Jonkman campaigned little against Ford and what campaigning he did was in the form of attacks against Vandenberg's internationalist philosophy on the floor of the House of Representatives.¹²

Jonkman felt he knew exactly what the voters of the Fifth District wanted in postwar Washington. They wanted, he believed, a congressman who would battle the Truman Administration at every level, who would help rid the federal government of New Deal - Square Deal influences - particularly the left wing, soft-on-Communism bureaucrats Jonkman perceived in the State Department. Moreover, Jonkman disliked Senator Vandenberg and was jealous of the attention and flattery that the nation's capital and Michigan were bestowing on the senior Republican. So Jonkman would try to cut "old Arthur" down to size by suggesting he had been duped by Roosevelt and Truman into supporting the United Nations and the Marshall Plan, and was therefore a traitor to the Republican Party, if not to the country.¹³

Ford, on the other hand, hit the campaign trail and promoted his belief that the United States must play a leading role in world affairs, and he praised the work of Vandenberg. In June 1948, when Ford announced his candidacy, he stated that "I [Ford] believe in aid to Europe, with emphasis on making certain that the common man in the countries we aid gets maximum benefits. That's the way to build democracy."¹⁴ Foreign policy would become the foundation of his candidacy. He campaigned energetically across the district throughout the summer and fall and continued to speak of the importance of European recovery. Ford went so far as to challenge Jonkman to a debate on the issue, but the incumbent congressman refused.¹⁵ Ford beat Jonkman, receiving 62 percent of the vote. In the November general election, Ford defeated Democratic candidate Fred Barr by carrying 60.5 percent of the vote.¹⁶

In 1951, Ford was appointed to the powerful Appropriations Committee. He was given former Michigan Congressman Albert Engel's seat on the Defense Subcommittee.¹⁷ At the same time, Ford was placed on the Subcommittee on General and Temporary Activities that had been created due to the Korean War.¹⁸ As was the Republican Party divided on the issue of foreign policy in Ford's home of Grand Rapids, so were the

Republicans in Congress in the 1950's. Naturally, Ford allied himself with Senator Vandenberg and the rest of the internationalists. The leader of the isolationists was Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, son of former President William Howard Taft. Taft believed in the concept of "Fortress America," and that hemispheric defense could protect America.¹⁹ In 1941, Taft opposed the Lend-Lease Act, a program designed to aid America's European allies, fearing that it would drag the United States into the war in Europe.²⁰ In early 1952, Taft had become the front-runner for the Republican Party's nomination for President that November. In response, Ford and 17 other internationalist House Republicans sent a letter to General Dwight David Eisenhower urging him to seek the Republican nomination for President. Eisenhower agreed, beat Taft for the nomination, and was elected President.²¹

The 1952 elections had given the Republicans in the House of Representatives the majority. Representative John Taber of New York became chairman of the Appropriations Committee and elevated Ford to the chairmanship of the Army panel on the Defense Subcommittee.²² In that same year Ford voted against the House Defense Spending Bill, which would limit military spending.²³ The vote echoed the sentiment that Ford had expressed in 1946 when he stated that, "The United States should never again allow [its] military to be anything but the best." He went on to say that along with a strong military, rebuilding Europe would halt the communist threat.²⁴

The central foreign policy issue of the 1960's was the war in Vietnam, on which Ford had been a hawk since his first trip there in 1952. Ford, who had become the House Minority Leader, became the point man for the House Republicans on this issue. As the war in Vietnam escalated, Ford sought to provide alternatives to President Johnson's proposals. From the start, Ford attacked Johnson's handling of the war. In his autobiography, Ford stated that Johnson was "guilty of shocking

mismanagement" of the Vietnam War.²⁵ Ford had stated the same sentiment against the French after the defeat at Dien Bien Phu. He charged that the French had been dragging their feet.²⁶ Johnson countered by accusing Ford of endangering the lives of U.S. servicemen in Vietnam. By 1967, Ford believed that the Republicans should no longer follow the President on Vietnam but that they should take an independent position. On August 8, 1967, Ford, in a speech to the House of Representatives, stated that he had "grave misgivings about the way the war in Vietnam is going." He condemned the President's failure to use America's superior naval and air power. Instead Johnson, Ford said, felt the answer was "more men, more men, more men." Ford believed that a Kennedy-type sea quarantine, "that was used in Cuba during the missile crisis in 1962, would have been more effective than the continued expansion of U.S. ground forces."²⁷

With Richard Nixon's victory in 1968, Ford had a President who was ideologically in tune with his beliefs on how foreign policy should be formulated and carried out. Ford applauded Nixon's selection of Harvard Professor Henry Kissinger as National Security Advisor. Ford called it "a master stroke."²⁸ Kissinger had invited Ford to speak several times at his graduate seminars at Harvard.

In 1969 Ford went from attacking administration policy to defending it. He supported Nixon and Kissinger's new plan for Vietnam called "Vietnamization." Nixon wanted to achieve "peace with honor," which meant a government in South Vietnam that was friendly to the United States. "Vietnamization" was a carrot and stick policy. First, the U.S. would begin to withdraw troops unilaterally, hoping that this would encourage peace talks. Secondly, more of the burden of the fighting would be placed on the South Vietnamese army who were supplied by the United States.²⁹

Ford's support for Nixon's foreign policy agenda led him overseas. On June

26, 1972, Ford traveled to China to further support a trip that Nixon had made in February of the same year. Nixon and the Chinese leadership felt that an increased flow of visitors to each nation would improve relations. In China, Ford met with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai. The two discussed a wide range of issues from the role of the United States military in Asia after Vietnam to the growing Soviet military.³⁰

In November 1973, Ford led the fight to sustain President Nixon's veto of the War Powers bill. Ford, a strong opponent of the bill, stated that, "We are not out of the woods yet. We may be a long way from being out of the woods. I am very concerned that the approval of this legislation over the President's veto could affect the President's capability to move forward from the cease-fire and achieve a permanent peace...."³¹ Ford's efforts, however, were not enough. The House voted to override Nixon's veto.

THE VICE PRESIDENCY

On December 6, 1973, Congressman Gerald Ford was sworn in as the 40th Vice President of the United States. Ford replaced Spiro T. Agnew who had resigned on October 10th of the same year.³² Ford became the first Vice President chosen under the Articles of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.³³ Nixon stated that he had chosen Ford because, "Ford was qualified to be President...his views on both domestic and foreign policy were very close to mine."³⁴

As Vice President, Ford continued to be a "dyed-in-the-wool internationalist in foreign affairs."³⁵ He fully supported Nixon's initiatives to open relations with the communist powers of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Detente was a departure from the ideology that both Nixon and Ford had professed in their quarter century of public service. However, they both believed that it was a

necessary policy to undertake. In April of 1973, while still in the House of Representatives, Ford stated that detente may lead to "a lesser [military] burden for everybody."³⁶ Growing out of detente was the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviets. Not only would Ford support SALT as the Vice President, but as President, he would continue to work for arms reduction with SALT II.

During Ford's tenure as the Vice President, domestic affairs as well as foreign affairs suffered. Because the Watergate scandal continued to grow, less and less work was being done. Kissinger expressed his concern to Ford that Watergate, "would impede his ability to achieve his foreign policy goals." He went on to say that the scandal undermined the efforts to improve relations with the Soviets and Chinese.³⁷

On August 7, 1974, Ford would meet with Nixon for the last time as his Vice President. Nixon told Ford of his resignation and how it would be carried out. He then went on to discuss the problems that the nation faced overseas.

He mentioned the need to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as his hope that I [Ford] could reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the strategic arms limitations. Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviets' top man, was bright and tough, Nixon said, but he could be flexible. He hoped I [Ford] would continue a strong policy in South Vietnam and Cambodia, and he emphasized the role Kissinger could play. "Henry is a genius," Nixon said, "but you don't have to accept everything he recommends. He can be invaluable, and he'll be very loyal, but you can't let him have a free hand."³⁸

After the meeting, Ford called Secretary of State Kissinger and asked him to stay on and Kissinger agreed. On August 10, 1974, President Nixon resigned and Ford was sworn in as the 38th President of the United States.

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
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CHAPTER 2

FORD & NIXON: A COMPARISON

There are many factors that are involved with the decision-making process in the area of foreign policy. One of the more important factors is that of the individual characteristics of the decision-maker. These characteristics include personality, beliefs, and psychological traits that define the types of people and the types of behavior they exhibit.¹ "All those aspects of a decision-maker -- his values, talents, and prior experiences -- that distinguish his foreign policy choices or behavior from those of every other decision-maker."² Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, in American Foreign Policy, state that this personal variable is not the only variable that affects decision-making, but that it is an important factor and may explain some decisions.

The figure below, created by Kegley and Wittkopf, seeks to illustrate the factors that lead to foreign policy decisions. Ford and Nixon dealt with many of the same external and societal sources and the same type of governmental sources. From an



individual standpoint, both of them fought in World War II and were fierce, cold warriors during their days in Congress. However, the differences lie in the way they dealt with those external, societal, and governmental sources. In the wake of Watergate and the pardon of President Nixon, I contend that President Ford had to deal with a more hostile environment on all fronts. It would be his personality that would help to rebuild U.S. credibility around the world.

An example of personality traits influencing decision-making is that of Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Due to his Presbyterian upbringing, Secretary Dulles had moralistic religious values. This upbringing is one of the factors explaining why he refused to shake hands with Chou En-Lai, the leader of communist China. To Dulles, Chou was seen, "...as a symbol of atheistic doctrine so abhorrent to his own values that he chose not to be associated with the symbol."³

Another example would be that of President Kennedy's tough stance towards the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis. "Kennedy had been, by his own confession, humiliated and out bargained by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in their 1961 summit meeting in Vienna." Kegley and Wittkopf believe that it may be this fact that pushed Kennedy into a position where he could show that he was tough and composed under pressure."⁴

This theory that political leaders' personal characteristics are an important factor in the decision-making process is a popular one. Kegley and Wittkopf state this is the case "because democratic theory leads us to expect that individuals elected to high office will be able to either sustain or change public policy in accordance with popular preferences."⁵ They also warn that the public should be wary of ascribing too much importance to the impact of individuals. Individuals may matter, and in some instances do matter, but the mechanisms through which individuals

influence foreign policy outcomes are likely to be much more subtle than popular impressions would have us believe."⁶

For the purposes of this paper, it is important to look closely at personality. As stated above, Ford and Nixon shared many of the same "sources." They also had the same "mechanism" for conducting foreign policy -- Henry Kissinger. Personal factors are the most striking difference between the two men.

Richard Melanson, in his book, Reconstructing Consensus, never distinguished between the Ford and Nixon Administrations. He saw Ford as a caretaker of the Nixon Presidency, not as a unique and distinct President. Melanson is correct in stating that the two men were very similar from a philosophical standpoint. As stated before, they were both anti-communist, cold warriors and both believed that the United States should and must play a central role in world affairs. However, their personalities, styles, and beliefs about how to run government were very much in contrast.

PERSONALITY

President Nixon

To look at the personality of Richard Nixon, I researched one of Nixon's closest advisors, Dr. Henry Kissinger. Kissinger served as National Security Advisor to the President from 1969 to 1974 and as Secretary of State from 1973 to 1974. He served as President Ford's Secretary of State until 1977.

Richard Nixon could best be described as an introvert. Kissinger wrote of how painfully shy Nixon was towards others. "Meeting with new people filled him with a sense of vague dread, especially if they were in a position to rebuff or contradict him"⁷ Before meeting people, Kissinger wrote, Nixon would most likely be in another room "settling his nerves" and also reviewing his notes that he would write on a yellow legal pad. However, Nixon would never bring the pad into the room, instead he

would memorize the key points. He would operate in this fashion even when dealing with foreign leaders, learning the main points and was "too proud" to even use a memorandum explaining the issue.⁸

In Kissinger's mind, Nixon's weaknesses, "a fear of being rebuffed and an antipathy to personal negotiations," were in some instances strengths. Many United States foreign policy failures, Kissinger points out, were carried out by Presidents, "who fancied themselves as negotiators." When a President makes a mistake in negotiations, there are "no escape routes left for diplomacy. Concessions are irrevocable without dishonor."⁹

Not only did Nixon hate meeting new people or engaging in direct negotiations, but also he hated to give orders to his subordinates, especially those who might disagree with him. Kissinger saw this not only as a weakness in the administration's ability to function, but also as one of the main factors that caused the Watergate scandal. Kissinger wrote that

He [Nixon] rarely disciplined anybody; he would never face down a Cabinet member. When he met with insubordination, he sought to accomplish his objectives without the offender being aware of it. This might achieve the goal; it did little for discipline or cohesion. As often as not, it revealed to outsiders a disunity that they might seek to exploit. Over time, it led to a fragmented Administration in which under pressure almost everyone looked out for themselves. In the sense of isolation this produced in Nixon and the lack of cohesion among his team lie one of the root causes of Watergate.¹⁰

The late House Speaker Tip O'Neill in his book, Man of the House, wrote that Nixon was "a brilliant guy." However, "he [Nixon] had a quirk in his personality that made him suspicious of everybody -- including members of his own Cabinet."¹¹

In contrast, Ford, as President remained the same person according to O'Neill. O'Neill writes that during meetings with Nixon "it was all business." With Ford "the atmosphere was much more congenial and relaxed."¹²

President Ford

In Leadership in the Modern Presidency, Roger Porter describes Ford as a patient man, whose actions were deliberative and measured.¹³ Ford, like Nixon, did not like confrontations. However, he did not avoid them, especially when an unpleasant situation arose that needed immediate attention. This is best illustrated with Ford's pardon of Nixon. It was political suicide for Ford. He did it, despite the negative public opinion, because, as he stated, "I can't run this office while this business [Watergate] drags on day after day. There are a lot more important things to be spending time on."¹⁴

Another controversy that Ford attacked straight on was the issue of draft evaders and deserters. There were 50,000 people in this group. Ford developed a plan where these people could earn amnesty. He unveiled his plan at the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention. Ford moved quickly to heal the wounds, caused by Watergate and Vietnam, no matter how damaging it was to his political future.¹⁵

Ford was seen as a regular guy and was liked by members of both political parties. It was this fact that made his confirmation hearings for the Vice Presidency run so smoothly. Ford brought this image to the Presidency and "accessibility and openness would be the hallmarks of his administration."¹⁶

This "openness" would be a complete and total departure from Nixon and his "Imperial Presidency," where Nixon was isolated and inaccessible to many in Congress and even his own Administration.

DECISION-MAKING STYLE

President Nixon

President Nixon would make decisions based on the opinions of a few close associates or on a memorandum given to him. He would make his final decision alone;

often he would come to a decision with no expert opinion at all. Kissinger described his style as "a definite instruction, followed by maddening ambiguity and procrastination, which masked the search for an indirect means of solution, capped by a sudden decision."¹⁷

President Ford

Ford, on the other hand, consulted many different sources: friends, advisors, family members, Cabinet officials and members of Congress from both sides of the aisle. However, like Nixon, Ford made the final decision.

Ford placed a great deal of weight on the opinions and advice of "experts." On labor issues he consulted with AFL-CIO President George Meany. He met with the Reverend Jesse Jackson, Vernon Jordan and members of the Black Congressional Caucus to discuss issues facing African-Americans. In discussions on the Equal Rights Amendment, he sought the opinions of Congresswomen. On issues involving the states, he met with governors, county officials and mayors.¹⁸

WHITE HOUSE ORGANIZATION & DEPARTMENTAL RELATIONS

President Nixon

Kissinger described the Nixon White House as a "paradox of a President strong in his decisions but inconclusive in his leadership."¹⁹ As for his style of government, Nixon "was prepared to make decisions without illusions. Once convinced, he went ruthlessly and courageously to the heart of the matter; but each controversial decision drove him deeper and deeper into his all-enveloping solitude."²⁰ Nixon's unwillingness to inspire his underlings and his self-imposed isolation created a fractured White House. Strong-willed subordinates disregarded the President's orders. "The Cabinet was tempted to exaggerate its autonomy," because the President

kept ideas to himself. Nixon attacked the bureaucracy for not supporting him, but many times the President did not make it clear in which direction he wanted them to act. In Kissinger's words, it "all became a vicious circle in which the President withdrew even more into his isolation and pulled the central decisions increasingly into the White House, in turn heightening the resentments and defiant mood of his appointees."²¹ Melanson, in Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since Vietnam, stated that the Nixon administration achieved its goals through centralized power in the White House.²² Ford, in contrast, strove to create a decentralized open administration. The White House, of course, made decisions; however, they were not always formulated there.

President Ford

Ford wanted to create a new environment for department and Executive Branch relationships. He had seen first hand during his tenure as Vice President the lack of communication between the President and his department heads.

In the Nixon years, the Cabinet departments and agencies had lost power and influence to such White House appendages as the Domestic Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Council on International Economic Policy. That tended to destroy one of the foundations of our form of government. A Watergate was made possible by a strong Chief of Staff and ambitious White House aides who were more powerful than members of the Cabinet but who had little or no practical political experience or judgment. I [Ford] wanted to reverse the trend and restore authority to my Cabinet. White House aides with authority are necessary, but I [Ford] didn't think they had the right to browbeat the department and agencies. Nor did they have the right to make policy decisions. I decided to give my Cabinet members a lot more control.²³

Nixon used his Chief of Staff, H. R. Haldeman, as a communication link between himself and the Cabinet. Haldeman would be used for face-to-face confrontations and also controlled access to the President.²⁴ It was this control and Haldeman's criminal behavior during the Watergate Affair that made President Ford wary of having a Chief of Staff. Ford wanted to create a "spokes-of-the-wheel"

Administration; this concept was illustrated by the President's personal control of the Executive Branch. There was no one between Ford and his Secretaries. This concept was short lived since it was not practical. Someone had to do the job of the Chief of Staff, such as "overseeing the scheduling of the President's time and the flow of paper to him, and chairing the morning White House senior staff meeting."²⁵ Alexander Haig, who replaced Haldeman, remained in the position until Ford replaced him with Donald Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld was referred to as the White House Coordinator and was later replaced by Richard Cheney. Cheney would later serve as a member of Congress and as Secretary of Defense under President Bush.

Even with a Chief of Staff (White House Coordinator), Ford was still able to create an open Administration. In Ford's White House nine officials had unrestricted access to the President. Four of the nine dealt with policy areas, i.e., management and budget, economic affairs, domestic affairs and national security, the latter being headed by Henry Kissinger. Kissinger, at the time, served as both Secretary of State and National Security Advisor. In November 1975, Ford replaced Kissinger as National Security Advisor with Air Force General Brent Scowcroft. Scowcroft had served as Kissinger's deputy from January 1973 to 1975. Scowcroft would later serve as President Bush's National Security Advisor.

Four of the other five individuals with direct access dealt with functions within the White House. The ninth person was the White House Coordinator.²⁶

CONCLUSION

Even though Nixon and Ford held similar beliefs in the area of foreign policy, their personalities, decision-making and organizational styles were different. Taken together, these factors create a clear picture of how each man functioned in office. Nixon isolated by his own will, made decisions alone from

within the Oval Office. Administration officials acted on their own, causing a lack of clarity, which led to a poorly run Administration and to scandals.

The Ford Administration reflected the personality of the man. He opened up the Oval Office and gave access to those who needed it. He dealt with Administration officials directly and disciplined them when necessary, thus avoiding embarrassing scandals. His decisions were made based on information and opinions from a variety of sources.

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CHAPTER 3

PRESIDENT FORD'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1974 TO 1991

President Gerald Ford has been described as a "Conservative Internationalist" in the area of foreign policy. Conservative Internationalism is a combination of nationalist goals and internationalist strategies.¹

Like Hamilton, Theodore Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and Nixon, Ford believed that the national interest of the United States could best be served through active participation in international affairs. The objectives of such participation, however, were limited to the nation's clear economic and security interests, rather than aimed at any Wilsonian program for remaking the world in the image of American democracy.²

Ford was opposed to the United States creating social policies for other nations; instead he favored providing nations the assistance as they moved towards their own society.³ One example would be that of the Marshall Plan, which gave war torn nations of Europe the resources to rebuild themselves.

Foreign affairs would dominate Ford's Presidency as it did Nixon's. The late House Speaker Tip O'Neill wrote, "Jerry Ford, my dear old friend, became enamored with foreign policy as soon as he moved into the White House."⁴ Ford entered the Presidency as America's longest war was rapidly coming to an end. Vietnam divided America and worried our allies about the United States' ability to defend them against the communist threat. America also faced a world that appeared to be safer and more dangerous all at once. This duality was created first by the open dialogue between America and the Soviet Union, and with the improving relations with China. Simultaneously, continuing conflicts in Vietnam, Cambodia and the Middle East and new ones in Africa and Central America pushed the United States and the communist world closer to confrontation.

Ford entered the White House with many years of public service, but without a great deal of practical experience in the area of foreign policy in relation to his predecessor. He spent fourteen years on the Defense Committee and served as Chairman of the Army Panel. He traveled abroad often, including a trip to China and a private meeting with Chinese leader Chou En-lai. As House Minority Leader, Ford led the fight against President Johnson's handling of the war in Vietnam and supported Nixon's policies during the conflict, such as the "Vietnamization" of the conflict. Under this policy, the United States would begin to withdraw troops unilaterally, hoping that this act would aid with the peace talks. Secondly, the burden of fighting would begin to be placed on the backs of the South Vietnamese army who were being supplied by the United States.⁵ Nixon and Ford held a great many of the same beliefs in terms of foreign policy and, as a result, Nixon's foreign policy architect, Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, was retained by Ford.

Ford's national security and foreign policy team remained the same as it was under President Nixon until November of 1975. In that month, Ford fired Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and replaced him with White House Coordinator Donald Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld was one of the "Young Turks" from Ford's days in the House of Representatives. He also appointed Lt. General Brent Scowcroft as the President's National Security Advisor.⁶ Replacing Kissinger with Scowcroft, lessened some of Kissinger's power, but allowed him to focus solely on his role as Secretary of State. Finally, the President fired CIA Director William Colby and replaced him with former Congressman George Bush.⁷

SOUTHEAST ASIA: VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA

Vietnam was the first foreign policy crisis that the Ford Administration faced when it came into the White House. Vietnam created problems for the new

President both at home and abroad. Ford had to deal with the division that had taken place in the country: draft evaders, veterans and the economy. Ford also faced a democratically controlled Congress and a public angry with the pardon of Nixon.

Abroad Ford desperately fought to keep the floundering government in South Vietnam and Cambodia afloat. Between January 28 and April 10, 1975, Ford requested \$1.24 billion in emergency military aid for South Vietnam.⁸ The emergency appropriations were denied by Congress. Senator Jacob Javits of New York summed up Congress's attitude towards the situation in Vietnam when he told Ford, "I will give you large sums of money for the evacuation, but not one nickel for military aid,"⁹ For fiscal year 1975, Ford had requested \$1.4 billion in military aid for Vietnam and Cambodia. However, Congress passed a bill that would give only \$1 billion in aid and of that only \$700 million was appropriated.¹⁰

U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS UNDER PRESIDENT FORD

Early in Ford's presidency he was able to demonstrate his resolve in preventing Soviet expansionism. In Angola, a southwest African nation that had been a Portuguese colony for over 400 years, Ford faced a situation similar to what President Truman confronted in Vietnam; they both faced the spread of communism in a former European colony, and the conclusion of the conflicts would be left to their successors. Truman saw Vietnam in the light of events in Europe, crises in Berlin, Greece and Czechoslovakia. The separation between East and West continued to widen.¹¹ Ford saw Angola as a continuation of communist expansion that had swept across Southeast Asia. Angola, like most of Africa, was having growing pains in the years just before as well as after their independence. These growing pains took the

form of bloody conflict that would once again draw the United States into a confrontational position with the Soviet Union and Cuba, a conflict that would weaken the gains of detente.

Angola, like Vietnam, would be a long-fought political battle, stretching over a series of administrations. It, however, would not draw America into a foreign war. During the Ford Administration, Congress, still weary of the lessons learned in Vietnam, moved quickly to prevent another bloody conflict. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment of the National Assistance Act of 1974 required that:

No funds be expended by or on behalf of the CIA for operations abroad, other than activities designed to obtain necessary intelligence, unless two conditions were met: (A) the President must make a finding that such an operation is important to the national security of the United States; and (B) the President must report in a timely fashion a description of such operations and its scope to Congressional committees.¹²

American involvement in Angola would be short-lived. With the CIA prevented by Congress from supplying factions friendly to the United States, Ford was forced to use an intermediary, France, to supply the FNLA, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola.¹³ Through France, also backed by the People's Republic of China, the FNLA received \$25 million dollars worth of weapons. The West's support was token at best, compared to the \$100 million worth of Soviet weapons and the six thousand Cuban troops that had been sent to the region to support the MPLA, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Angola.¹⁴ Even China had sent more aid to the FNLA than had the United States. Small or not, on December 19th the Senate voted to prohibit further American aid to the FNLA. The House passed the Clark Amendment, which prohibited American military involvement in Angola.¹⁵ With the United States unable to aid the FNLA, the French backed out, unwilling to act alone against the Soviet Union.

The only avenue left for Ford was diplomacy. Ford instructed Secretary Kissinger, while on a trip to Moscow, to get the Soviets to reduce their involvement

in the Angolan civil war. Ford personally spoke with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin about the Soviet and Cuban intervention. Neither Kissinger nor Ford made any headway with the Soviets. This was not surprising since the administration had no Congressional support to prevent further Soviet involvement, and Moscow realized that fact.

In early 1976, Ford made a final appeal to the House of Representatives, which was debating a measure that would allow the President to continue support for the FNLA. Ford stated to the House leadership that,

Resistance to Soviet expansion by military means must be a fundamental element of U.S. foreign policy. There must be no question in Angola or elsewhere in the world of American resolve in this regard. The failure of the U.S. to take a stand would inevitably lead our friends and supporters to conclusions about our steadfastness. It could lead to further Soviet miscalculations [and] it would make Cuba the mercenaries of upheavals everywhere.¹⁶

Even though the House leadership supported Ford's position, Congress feared another Vietnam and voted down the measure. After the vote, Ford stated that, "Congress had lost its nerve, and as a result, we were bound to see further Cuban involvement in Africa."¹⁷

Angola, like Vietnam, had an adverse effect on detente. Like Nixon, Ford was committed to it; he saw detente "as a means for defusing tensions between the superpowers." Unlike Nixon, Ford opposed cuts in the military budget. Nixon believed that cuts were "politically inevitable."¹⁸ Ford, for fiscal year 1976, proposed a \$8.7 billion or a 10 percent increase in military spending.¹⁹ Ford defended the increase by saying he "recognized that the nation's security required that the decline in defense spending be reversed." Reichley points out that Ford, in order to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining military superiority, was prepared to cut popular domestic programs and, if necessary, to risk provoking the Soviet leaders."²⁰ Reichley also points out that for Ford, "detente was never much more than a strategic

move in the continuing struggle to thwart Soviet ambitions for world domination."²¹

Angola is important in the history of the United States foreign policy because it is an example of where the United States Congress played a central role in the decision-making process. With the War Powers Act, the National Assistance Act of 1974 and the Clark Amendment, the President was no longer simply able to make decisions within his inner circle of advisors. Now Congress would have to be informed of the President's plans and debate them and approve or deny them. The loss of life and the abuses by the Executive Branch during Vietnam were the catalysts for this new attitude in Congress.

POST-FORD ADMINISTRATIONS

All presidents contribute to their successors in the area of foreign policy with an unfinished treaty, a military action or an individual or group that serve in later administrations. The same can be said of President Ford. Ford continued the work that Nixon had started on the strategic arms limitation talks. Talks on weapons reductions continue to this day between the United States and the former Soviet Union.

The Carter Administration (1977-1981)

During the 1976 presidential election, both Republican Conservatives and Democratic Liberals attacked Ford for his policies abroad. Presidential hopeful Ronald Reagan led the conservative movement against the SALT II Agreement when he accused Ford of "trafficking with the communists."²² Liberals, like the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, criticized Ford for not taking "up the defense of international human rights."²³ On both issues, however, Ford made progress in Vladivostok, in 1974, Ford reached agreement with Brezhnev on

the number of missiles each nation would be allowed without giving in to Soviet demands to stop the development of the B-1 bomber and the Trident submarine. In the area of human rights, Ford's National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, stated that, "Through quiet diplomacy, [Ford did] achieve progress against specific human rights violations in the Soviet Union, South Korea and Syria.²⁴ Even though these were successes, politics created the image that the events were failures.

President Ford left a strong foundation on which the Carter Administration could build. Three areas of particular importance were the strategic arms limitation talks, the Panama Canal Treaty and the Camp David Accords.

SALT II

After the Vladivostok Conference in 1974, the SALT II negotiations stalled with problems over weapons systems and their capabilities. For example, should the Soviet Union's Backfire Bomber be considered a strategic weapon, even though it would be unable to leave the U.S.S.R., hit its targets in the U.S., and return to Russia without refueling? These technical questions would be left to President Carter. Ford was able to set a framework on which the negotiations could continue. He and Soviet leader Brezhnev agreed upon the number of intercontinental missiles (ICBMs) each nation would be allowed to deploy, 2,400, and the number of multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), at 1,320.²⁵ Carter was able to reach agreement on SALT II and the treaty was signed in 1979. However, the treaty ran into problems in January 1980 after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Carter stated that, "It [the Soviet invasion] raises grave questions about Soviet intentions and destroys any chance of getting the SALT Treaty through the Senate."²⁶

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY

Like the SALT II Treaty, Ford's negotiations to give control of the Panama Canal to the Panamanian Government drew heavy fire from Governor Ronald Reagan. Reagan called the move paying "blackmail" to a dictator. He went on to say that, "When it comes to the Panama Canal, we built it, we paid for it, it's ours and we should tell Torrijos and Company that we are going to keep it!"²⁷ Ford, however, was just continuing talks that had begun under President Johnson.

President Carter received a great deal of support for his decision to give control of the canal to Panama, and in 1977 the Panama Canal Treaties were signed. The treaties returned sovereignty of the Canal Zone to Panama by 1999. They also stated that the United States had the right to use and defend the waterway.²⁸

CAMP DAVID ACCORDS

President Ford had made significant progress in the peace process between Israel and Egypt. The key issue was the Sinai, and, in March 1975, an agreement was reached. First, the Israeli army would pull back thirty-five miles from the eastern bank of the Suez Canal; second, the dividing line between Israeli and Egyptian forces would be the mountains of the Sinai desert; third, Israel would return the Abu Rudeis oil fields in the Gulf of Suez; finally, the Israelis would allow the Egyptians to use the road that linked the oil fields to the rest of Egypt.²⁹ The stumbling block was where to draw the line between the two armies in the Sinai. What was finally agreed upon was a buffer zone between the two, with 100 to 150 U.S. civilian technicians to patrol it. The Americans would not police the area, only monitor the movement of the armies. On September 1, 1975, an agreement was reached by both sides.³⁰

Even with the efforts of the Ford Administration, a state of war existed

between Israel and Egypt. In September of 1978, President Carter hosted Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel at Camp David in Maryland.³¹ After thirteen days of talks, Sadat and Begin agreed "not to resort to the threat or use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations."³² The two also agreed upon full recognition of one another and the abolishment of economic boycotts between the two nations.

The Reagan Administration (1981-1989)

President Ford's legacy to the Reagan Administration may have been only political ammunition for the Republican nomination in the 1976 presidential campaign. Reagan, then Governor of California, attacked Ford on his efforts to push forward with arms limitation, detente and the return of the Panama Canal. Reagan said that Ford, along with Nixon, had made the United States the "number two military power" in the world.³³

ANGOLA

One area on which Reagan built on Ford's efforts was in Angola. Unlike Ford, Reagan dealt with a Congress more willing to act to prevent communist expansion in Africa. Fearful of another Vietnam, Congress resisted Ford's efforts to halt Soviet and Cuban backed forces in Angola. However, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the continued spread of Cuban intervention in Central America and other parts of Africa, Congress repealed the Clark Amendment which had prohibited the United States from supporting anti-communist forces in Angola.³⁴ The Reagan Administration picked up where the Ford Administration had left off: the U.S., along with South Africa, began to supply anti-communist forces; U.S. diplomatic efforts led to the Soviets withdrawing Cuban troops and military support.³⁵

The Bush Administration (1989-1993)

President Ford had the most unique effect on the Bush Administration. Ford's legacy came to light during the Persian Gulf War. "Of the eight men in George Bush's war council, four were brought in directly or shoved along in their journey by Ford."³⁶

George Bush

George Bush first served under Gerald Ford in 1967 during Ford's tenure as House Minority Leader and Bush was a first term Congressman from Texas. Ford saw Bush as a "bright star," and went to Texas to campaign for him.³⁷

Bush would only serve two terms in the House after losing a 1970 bid for a seat in the U.S. Senate. Bush would not be out of public service long. In 1971, President Nixon appointed Bush U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and in 1973 Bush left that post and became Chairman of the Republican National Committee.

When Ford became President in 1974, Bush's "bright star" began to rise again. In 1975, Ford made Chairman Bush the head of the American Liaison Office in Peking (Beijing), the People's Republic of China.³⁸ In China, Bush carried the same fear that Ford and Kissinger had, which was that a close relationship between the Soviet Union and China would be dangerous for U.S. interests in Asia. Bush stated, "Nixon's visit to China was in the self-interest of the United States, and was undertaken with the attitude that what's best for us is best for you, especially as regarded the U.S.S.R. If Russia and China had worked together in concert totally, there would have been pressure on Korea and Japan right away."³⁹ In China, Bush's main contact in the Chinese government was Vice Premier Deng Xiao-ping.⁴⁰ The two men would meet again when they became the leaders of their respective nations.

In November 1975, President Ford cleaned house and fired Secretary of Defense

James R. Schlesinger and CIA Director William E. Colby. Ford looked to Bush as a replacement for Colby, and in December Bush accepted the appointment. In January 1976, George Bush was confirmed as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. As Director, Bush entered a CIA that was under attack for its past abuses. Bush had gained a reputation for being able to handle the tough jobs.⁴¹ Ford stated, "The CIA directorship, I thought, would be the right spot for George. He was an able administrator, and in other posts he had held -- member of Congress, Ambassador to the United Nations and Chairman of the Republican National Committee -- he had succeeded splendidly."⁴² Hank Knoche, a career CIA officer and Bush's Deputy Director stated, "We were anxious to have our house put in order. And we wanted a new definition, new guidelines, new policies, new procedures to adjust to. What he brought to us were those things."⁴³ With Ford's defeat, Bush was replaced as director in January 1977.

Bush would return to public service four years later as Vice President under Ronald Reagan, and, in 1988, Bush was elected President. In four years in the White House, Bush appointed three members of the Ford team, two to cabinet positions and one as National Security Advisor. These three men would play a crucial role in the outcome of the Persian Gulf War.

Richard B. (Dick) Cheney

Dick Cheney entered the political arena in 1968, when he served as an assistant to U.S. Representative William A. Steiger of Wisconsin.⁴⁴ Cheney only served a year with Steiger. In 1969, he joined the Nixon Administration, working for the Office of Economic Opportunity. In 1970, Cheney moved to the position of Deputy to the White House Presidential Coordinator, Donald Rumsfeld.⁴⁵ In 1973, Cheney left public service to become vice president of an investment advisory firm.

Cheney returned to the White House in August 1974, to again serve under Donald Rumsfeld, as Deputy to the White House Chief of Staff.⁴⁶ In November 1975, Cheney was caught up in the wide sweeping cabinet changes. Rumsfeld replaced Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and Cheney, at 34 years of age, became Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President. Ford stated that, "I knew that I could ask Cheney to step into Rumsfeld's shoes and that the White House would function just as efficiently."⁴⁷ He would serve in this position until the end of the Ford Presidency.

Between 1979 and 1989, Cheney served as the only member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Wyoming. He was elected House Minority Whip in 1988. Cheney served on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and on the House Select Committee to investigate covert arms deals with Iran.⁴⁸

In 1989, after President Bush's failure to have Senator John Tower of Texas confirmed as Defense Secretary, Cheney was named to fill that slot. It was his job to direct Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm.

Brent Scowcroft

Major General Brent Scowcroft graduated from West Point Military Academy in 1947, and, in 1948, he graduated from flight school. In 1953, he returned to West Point as an assistant professor of Russian History. Between 1957 and 1968, Scowcroft served in an array of administrative duties, ranging from Assistant Air Attache in the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, to head the Political Science Department at the U.S. Air Force Academy.⁴⁹

General Scowcroft served in the Johnson Administration when he was assigned to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in July of 1968. In 1970, he was named Special Assistant to the Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁵⁰

Between February 1972 and November 1975, General Scowcroft served various positions in the Nixon White House, including Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security. In November 1975, President Ford appointed him National Security Advisor, replacing Henry Kissinger.

General Scowcroft served as a member of the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control from 1978 to 1981. In 1983 he was appointed Chairman of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, and, in 1985, was appointed to the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management.⁵¹

Between 1986 and 1987, General Scowcroft served as a member of the President's Special Review Board, also known as the Tower Commission, which investigated the Iran-Contra Affair.⁵²

Twelve years after the end of the Ford Administration, Scowcroft returned as National Security Advisor to the President. He would serve in this position until the end of the Bush Administration.

James A. Baker III

James Baker joined the Ford Administration in 1975 as a deputy to the Secretary of Commerce. President Ford appointed Baker to head his 1976 election campaign. Baker also served as George Bush's campaign manager in the 1980 presidential campaign and had been a key figure in Bush accepting the Vice Presidential nomination. During the Reagan Administration, Baker served as Chief of Staff and as Treasury Secretary.

Between January 1989 and the fall of 1992, Baker served as George Bush's Secretary of State. He served as Chief of Staff until the end of the Bush Administration. During the Persian Gulf War, Baker's role would be critical because

it was his job to negotiate with Iraqi officials, such as Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. Baker would also be the point man for the United States in building a coalition against Iraq.

Conclusion

The focus of this chapter has dealt with President Ford's participation in foreign policy issues and the foundation he created for future administrations. During Ford's time in office, relations with the communist world dominated America's interests, i.e., the war in South East Asia, communist expansionism in Africa and Latin America, detente and arms control. When Ford took the Oath of Office on August 8, 1974, the United States was nearing the end of its longest and most costly foreign war and was losing it. The Soviet Union's military strength was increasing and its influence with post-colonial nations was on the rise. At home, both Republicans and Democrats criticized the Nixon Administration for its handling of the war in Vietnam. Presidential hopeful Ronald Reagan attacked Nixon and Ford for their dealings with the Soviet Union and the general state of the U.S. military.

However, Gerald Ford had taken steps to save the governments of South Vietnam and Cambodia and worked for increased military spending. He used detente as a means of achieving the U.S. strategic goals, and he strove for a lasting peace in the Middle East. Presidents Carter, Reagan and Bush all carried on work that had begun during the Ford Administration. Carter completed a peace accord between Israel and Egypt, Reagan saw the removal of Cuban troops from Angola, and Bush relied on the experience he was given during the Ford Presidency as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Bush also benefited from the expertise of Dick Cheney, Brent Scowcroft and James Baker who had all risen to the highest levels of government in the Ford Administration.

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CONCLUSION

President Gerald R. Ford, in terms of foreign policy, was not an innovator and did not give America a vision or goal of what he wanted to achieve. He came to power quickly, not through a long campaign where visions and goals are formulated and polished. Ford was thrust into office and forced to rely on the policies that had been in place for five years; dramatic change would have been impossible. "Presidents since Roosevelt have pursued essentially similar foreign policy objectives on the major issues that face this nation abroad.... To some extent a president is a prisoner of historical forces that will demand his attention."¹ This statement by James A. Califano, an advisor to Presidents Johnson and Carter, is very true; all presidents sought to curtail the Soviet Union's expansionist desires. President Ford was no different, he responded to aggression with force, but he also pursued the policy of detente as a means of achieving the foreign policy goals of the United States.

The following quote is from Robert Hartmann, who was a long-time aide to Ford in both the House of Representatives and in the White House. It sums up Ford's 835-days as President of the United States.

For the first time since Eisenhower and Kennedy, the country was at peace. Ford had finally closed the book on the Vietnam War and moved to heal the domestic divisions it had wrought. No Americans were in combat; but the President had made it clear the United States was not abandoning its peacekeeping responsibilities in Asia, Europe and the Middle East. He had won the respect of world leaders and started to rebuild the nation's strategic deterrents as an essential element of any arms agreement with the Soviet Union. In foreign affairs, where he had been perceived as least experienced, Ford had demonstrated his grasp of Presidential duty more forcefully than at home.²

In my introduction I stated that my thesis was "that Gerald Ford had a substantial impact on United States foreign policy during his brief presidency and that impact was carried on to later administrations." I feel that the last three chapters support my thesis. However, many scholars would disagree that Ford had

a significant impact on U.S. foreign policy. Many feel that Ford was at best an average president who left little behind from his time in office or was basically a caretaker for Richard Nixon.

According to James Reichley, "Ford never conceptualized his foreign policy goals or strategies in the systematic way Nixon had attempted."³ He goes on to state that Ford's personality had a great deal to do with his actions; "He [Ford] proceeded on the basis of tenaciously held values and beliefs, adapting as best he could to changing domestic and international conditions."⁴

In several polls conducted after Ford left office, he never ranked higher than an "average" rating from scholars.⁵ The polls point out that Ford lacked "an heroic stature and an absence of dominant leadership,"⁶ In his defense, scholars point out that Ford's presidency "restored the integrity to the Executive Branch, revived the national spirit in the aftermath of Watergate and Vietnam, and maintained a strong national defense.

Even though many scholars see the Ford Presidency as "average," those who served with him have a completely different attitude. Even though he had criticized Ford during the 1976 presidential elections, Daniel Partick Moynihan stated that, "In a moment of great crisis he [Ford] helped heal our country, and left it intact.... He was a man of enormous integrity, and everyone knew it. And when the country needed someone like him, he was there."⁸

Ford should be remembered for ascending to the presidency at a time when the nation was floundering socially, economically, and in the international arena. Ford was a crucial link in the continuation of U.S. foreign policy. He rebuilt and reasserted America's power after scandal and protest at home and defeat overseas and left his successors a strong foundation on which to build.

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4. Ibid, 339.
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7. Ibid.
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ROBERT DAVID CLIFTON

Robert David Clifton was born on December 31st, 1968, in Red Bank, New Jersey, and was raised in Matawan. He attended schools in the Matawan-Aberdeen Regional School District until 1983. He graduated from St. John Vianney High School in 1987. Rob graduated in 1991 from Rider College with a Bachelor Degree in Political Science and an Associates Degree in History. At Rider, Rob was a member of the 1989 and 1990 Model United Nations teams, a member of Phi Alpha Theta (the International Honor Society for History), served as Vice President of the Residence Hall Association and interned with the New Jersey State Public Defender's Office. He attended the University of Richmond in the 1991-92 academic year and interned with Virginia State Senator Robert L. Calhoun. He has also attended the School for Government Services at Rutgers University.

In 1993, Rob joined the office of Assemblyman Michael J. Arnone as a legislative aide. He also managed the Assemblyman's 1995 re-election campaign. In April of 1996, Rob joined the New Jersey State Department of Labor as an assistant to the Deputy Commissioner. In August 1996, he was appointed Director of the Office of Employer Outreach Seminars.

Rob was appointed Mayor of the Borough of Matawan, in Monmouth County, New Jersey, on December 3, 1996, and elected Mayor in November 1997. Before taking over as mayor, he had served on the Borough's Planning Board and the Board of Health. He also served as the Borough's Republican Party Chairman and campaign manager for three years.

Rob and his wife Tracy have been married since November 16th, 1996.