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***Creative Redemption and Complete Affirmation
in Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra***

Department of Philosophy

Spring 2004

Philosophy 395 Honors Thesis

Supervising Professor: Gary Shapiro

Philosophy Department – University of Richmond

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James H. Hall, Department Chair

Matthew Homan
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Creative Redemption and Complete Affirmation in Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*

Any reader engaged with Nietzsche's thought, as we are (or about to be), must consider his or her life in relation to one thought, Nietzsche's most abysmal thought, *the greatest weight*:

This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence – even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust! (GS aphorism 341)

Affirmation, to state it simply, is Yes-saying. The affirmation taught by Nietzsche, however, is far from simple. Nietzsche's affirmation is as total as the greatest weight is great, by definition, as we shall see. To define total, utter affirmation, the affirmation for which Nietzsche strives, we must be more specific and take into account, specifically, this most abysmal thought: the eternal recurrence. Something can be utterly affirmed in life only in relation to the eternal recurrence; only by affirming this thought, will we be able to completely affirm our respective lives; this means that only if we are able to affirm the past, the present, the future, and the *eternal* repetition of this cycle, will we be utterly affirming life, as Nietzsche would have us affirm it.

The cyclical nature of this temporal schema means that the past is the future, and the future is the past. Affirmation of the past is, thus, an integral part of affirming life as a whole, and hence, an essential facet of affirmation is the transforming of 'It was' into 'Thus I willed it', the redeeming of the past for its place in the future. As one who knows Nietzsche should not be surprised, a process of creation is involved in this mechanism ('It

was' into 'Thus I willed it') of affirming. Take the example of the Ugliest Man in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. The Ugliest Man can reflect on his ugliness, on his birth, his persecution, his pitiable state with shame, embarrassment, regret, hatred, even indifference, thinking: 'It was' and can never be changed; or, he can *create* a reason why he would want to live it again an infinity of times; he can convince himself that it is best that he is ugly, and in so doing place *himself* in control of the past. '*I willed it that way*', he will then say. In the section "On Redemption" of *Zarathustra* Nietzsche says, "All 'it was' is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful accident – until the creative will says to it, 'But thus I willed it.' Until the creative will says to it, 'But thus I will it; thus shall I will it.'" (Z 253). It is a creative will, because it is creating change, a change of perspective, *the creation of perspective*. It is, of course, impossible to will backwards, in the sense that one cannot change the past in terms of what actually happened; only 'Madness', according to Nietzsche, infers from this inability that "willing itself and all life were supposed to be – a punishment" (Z 252). We can say that 'Madness' here represents many of Nietzsche's predecessors, in particular, Schopenhauer. In *The World as Will and Idea*, Schopenhauer describes a person who understands that constant suffering is essential for life; with this understanding, "at the end of life, if a man is sincere and in full possession of his faculties, he will never wish to have it over again, but rather than this, he will much prefer absolute annihilation" (Schopenhauer 59)¹. Nietzsche's Yes-saying philosophy is the ultimate reversal of Schopenhauer's nihilistic, No-saying philosophy. Nietzsche writes to reverse this idea that life must be suffering (because we cannot will backwards) and should be negated. He writes to teach the idea that we *can* change the

¹ It is interesting to note, as Richard Schacht does, in his book, *Nietzsche*, that Nietzsche's familiar aphorism in *The Gay Science*, "The greatest weight" could be read as a response to Schopenhauer's thought.

past by changing our perspective of the past, by changing the *meaning* of the past, and in so doing enable ourselves to affirm the past, the present and ultimately, the eternal recurrence of any event, even painful ones². Nietzsche does, however, characterize the past as a *riddle*; it is a riddle until the creative will takes possession of it by saying ‘But thus I will it; thus shall I will it’; the riddle is how to impose the will onto something already past, and thus achieve its affirmation. The solution to this riddle, which is the central question of affirmation, will be the focus of this paper. I take Nietzsche’s claim that one can create a way to affirm everything in life to be one of the very hardest of Nietzsche’s claims to accept. After all, we can all easily recall experiences that we would not want to live through again. We are happy that they remain only as distant memories, and would think it odd, perhaps even sadistic, to be told that we should want to live them again, for eternity! Underneath the *prima facie* quixotry, however, these are ideas worthy of attention and warranting defense. We will not be attempting the explication and defense of some kind of panacea, but rather of a philosophy of value, mind and causality. In working through the main problem of affirming the past, we will have to deal with a smaller, but still significant problem that arises within it, the problem of deception. As we shall see, this problem constitutes a serious objection to the possibility of redeeming the past, but I will argue that this sub-problem is a problem for the individual and not, as some scholars have suggested, a problem for Nietzsche’s project. More generally, I will examine two solutions to the larger riddle: firstly, the forgetting of old and absolute values to clean the slate of the mind for the creation of new and original ones; and secondly, the entanglement of things, the notion that all ‘things’ are connected in such a

² I say ‘we’ here, but perhaps it would be more appropriate to say ‘those whom Nietzsche addresses’, i.e., the strong, because, as is important to note, the ‘greatest weight’ will not be borne by everyone.

way that any one 'thing' is connected to, and therefore contingent on, every 'thing' that precedes it. I will show how both attempts contribute to solving the riddle, but only by *making* the connections between things, as Nietzsche does in *Ecce Homo*, can everything be sufficiently affirmed to embrace and endure the greatest weight. At the end of this paper, we may still find Nietzsche's theory difficult to accept. It is my hope, however, that this essay will reveal the fertility of Nietzsche's thoughts on affirmation and, by outlining a solution to the riddle of imposing the will onto the past, show that complete affirmation is less impossible than one might initially think.

The Problem of Deception

Nietzsche says that only a "creative will" can redeem the past, and it does so by changing one's perspective of it. This 'creative' 'change of perspective' has troubled some recent scholars who think that this act of creating a perspective is potentially an act of self-deception and hence, a problem for Nietzsche's project of redeeming the past. Let us use again the example of the Ugliest Man, one of Zarathustra's disciples, to understand this concern. Confronted by the demon, 'the greatest weight' in his 'loneliest loneliness', the Ugliest Man might decide to embrace the demon's proposition that his life will be lived the same way over and over again for eternity. As we have said above, to fully affirm the demon's proposition it is necessary to affirm everything in one's life, because everything in one's life will be repeated. Faced with the task of then actually affirming everything, including the history of persecution ensuing from his ugliness, the Ugliest Man might be inclined to *convince* himself that it was all for the best. And he may very well be convinced and *believe* it was all for the best. Certainly, this attitude is what Nietzsche is trying to develop in people. ("My formula for greatness in a human being is *amor fati*:

that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity” (EH 714.) However, if the Ugliest Man must distort the facts of his life, let us say, to meet the demands of complete affirmation, then he is deceiving himself. In this instance, the Ugliest Man is not affirming his life as he has lived and experienced it (or, at least, his memory of how he lived and experienced it); rather, he is affirming some parts of his life, and some parts of his own ideality.

Alexander Nehamas, in his well known book, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, goes even further than saying that creation of a change of perspective is ‘potentially’ deception: “Unless, by a stroke of unbelievable luck, we have never done anything we regret, or, by means of self-deception, we can convince ourselves we have not, the affirmation Nietzsche envisages seems to be impossible” (Nehamas 159). If the level of deception becomes too great, then there may be a conflict with truth, where truth refers to what one remembers having experienced.

A particularly serious problem for this project is created by self-deception, which may convince us that we are approaching this relationship to life and to the world when in fact we are not. I might be willing, for example, to repeat my life only because I do not let myself see it for what it is, because I do not allow myself to see in the proper light, or to see at all, large and objectionable parts of it. This is a grave difficulty because Nietzsche allows great freedom in determining what does and what does not in fact constitute part of a life (Nehamas 163).

David Farrell Krell echoes Nehamas’ concern in the following excerpt from *Infectious Nietzsche*:

...if I am to ‘redeem’ the past by willing it as *my* will, *my* deed, for all eternity, such willing amounts to no more than a forced enthusiasm – not the exuberant anamnesis of recurrence as Pierre Klossowski portrays it, but a metaphysical comfort when the thought intoxicates me, and a metaphysical depressant when the fiction evaporates (Krell 75).

“Forced enthusiasm”, “metaphysical comfort”, “self-deception” – how can we resolve these concerns that creating a change of perspective involves self-deception?

One may well ask at this point: how can self-deception even be a problem for Nietzsche's philosophy, given that he allows the creation of perspective? Isn't it permissible that one deceives oneself, so long as the deception provides for affirmation? The idea that self-deception is not a problem from Nietzsche's point of view, that Nietzsche's philosophy provides for self-deception is what concerns Nehamas and Krell. After all, according to Nehamas, "Nietzsche allows great freedom in determining what does and what does not constitute a life" (Nehamas 163). The fact is, however, that Nietzsche is *not* vague on this point. He makes it clear that self-deception *cannot* lead to complete affirmation. Although self-deception may be a problem for an individual confronted by the demon's proposition of the eternal recurrence, it is not a problem for Nietzsche's project, as Nehamas suggests it is (Nehamas 163). Indeed, it is only a problem for the individual *because* Nietzsche makes it clear that self-deception is not an acceptable means of completely affirming one's past. We shall now view the reasons why self-deception is not a problem for Nietzsche's project.

Nietzsche's whole project is concerned with teaching people how to affirm *this* world, the very same world that the majority of Nietzsche's predecessors have renounced in favor of either a better world or nothing. In the chapter "On the Afterworldly" Nietzsche writes, "this I teach men: no longer to bury one's head in the sand of heavenly things, but to bear it freely, an earthly head, which creates a meaning for the earth" (Z 144). The phrase "bury one's head" already has a ring of hiding from what one experiences, of deceiving oneself, of fantasizing about a better, more heavenly world; and to 'bear one's head freely' already implies a frank disposition, an honesty about one's experience. He says further on in the chapter, "Many sick people have always been

among the poetizers and God-cravers; furiously they hate the lover of knowledge and that youngest among the virtues, which is called ‘honesty’” (Z 145). Here, Nietzsche employs the very word, ‘honesty’ and calls it a virtue. To be sure, Nietzsche’s is a perspectivist philosophy, where each person’s account of the world is contingent upon his or her perspective. One might be tempted to say (as many have in fact said) that if everything is *just* perspective, then nothing can be true. This view is pointless, on Nietzsche’s conception; for Nietzsche, there is no ‘*just*’; ‘*just*’ cannot be a qualification of ‘perspective’; a person’s particular perspective is what is true for that person, rather than truth being something beyond the powers of individual perception. If a person is embellishing or ignoring parts of his or her perspective, then he or she cannot be completely affirming the earth.

Moreover, it is not enough simply to *will* a past event; that is, one may feel “the greatest weight’s” weight in that one may feel one *has* to affirm an unpleasant event in order to be able to affirm life as a whole. One may also therefore reluctantly affirm something, neither embellishing it nor ignoring it, but believing that one must. Once again, this low-grade sort of affirmation is undoubtedly not what Nietzsche is striving for. Nietzsche writes, describing the child of the three metamorphoses, “For the game of creation, my brothers, a sacred ‘Yes’ is needed: the spirit now wills his own will, and he who had been lost to the world now conquers his own world” (Z 139). One must affirm affirmation itself, and then affirm that second affirmation itself, and so on *ad infinitum*, what Morgan might call “raising affirmation to ecstasy” (Morgan 304). One must adopt an attitude of affirmation whereby the question is hardly raised. Of course, the question cannot be completely suppressed else one might be in danger of being like Zarathustra’s

ass (the higher men's idol in the ass festival of the fourth part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*), saying yes to everything. In his book, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Gilles Deleuze describes the ass's affirmation as a "false affirmation" because "The ass does not know how to say no; but first and foremost he does not know how to say no to nihilism itself. He gathers all its products, he carries them into the desert and there christens them: the real as such" (Deleuze 182). In one respect, the ass' affirmation is the opposite of reluctant affirmation, because the ass does not reluctantly affirm, the ass readily affirms...too readily. In another respect, both the ass' affirmation and reluctant affirmation are two sides of the same coin – neither exercises discretion of affirmation. The ass will affirm nihilism, and so will the reluctant affirmer, if he thinks he has to (of course, he does not, and we will see why below). There exists a line to be walked between an attitude of affirmation (which could become the ass' attitude) and an attitude of skepticism regarding something's worthiness of affirmation, for not everything is worthy. That is to say, on the one hand, if one is (too) readily affirming, then one might slip into affirming nihilism (for instance). On the other hand, if one is too cautious in one's affirming, then one will hardly have space/time to affirm *ad infinitum*. Notwithstanding this line, which we will return to later, the problem of deception is answered relatively simply: although Nietzsche leaves room for creation (of perspective), we must create ways of affirming *this* world, and we must *want* to affirm *this* world (affirmation of affirmation), and for our purposes, we must want to affirm the past of this world; or, in other words, to respond to Nehamas, self-deception is an issue the individual must reconcile (by resisting the temptation to deceive him- or herself, and understanding

that such deception will not lead to the affirmation of *this* world that Nietzsche is proposing); it is not a flaw in Nietzsche's project.

There might still be some confusion, at this point, surrounding the juxtaposition of possibilities of creating ways of affirming the past, and Nietzsche's requirement that we are honest and truthful in our interpretations of our earthly experiences. To attempt to help alleviate this confusion, we will regard the past (and the present as well for that matter) as analogous to a text to be read. As with any text as complicated as a biography (which is what the 'text' of our pasts amounts to), the 'text' of the past can be read in different ways. But, there is a difference between, on the one hand, creating different meanings in a text, i.e., creating different readings, and on the other hand, substituting parts of a text for different text or ignoring passages. This is not to say that one cannot ignore certain events, denying their importance, or question the accuracy of the text presented by one's own memory at any given time; after all, scholars do this sort of thing all the time when analyzing texts. One is constrained, however, by demands of earthly justification if one is to be true to the earth, and true to one's experience of the earth. That is, reading the text of the past certainly does not allow for expurgation or censorship of any kind; it does not allow for suppressing or deleting parts of the text that are too visceral, melancholic, or *earthy*³. Such evasive and suppressive dealing with the text of the past is neither creative nor affirmative on Nietzsche's conception – it is negative, nihilistic; by censoring the earth, one denies the earth, one negates it. Nietzsche's task is to teach us to read the text of the past in the most affirmative way possible, and the most affirmative way possible means remaining true to the earth, and hence to our experiences and memory of it. This does, however, raise the question: What constitutes being true to

³ By 'earthy', here, we mean, '*this-worldly*'.

the earth, and what constitutes not being true to the earth? Does a lobotomy constitute deception? Do anti-depressants constitute deception? Let us look at the example of Jake Barnes in Hemingway's *The Sun Also Rises* as a marginal case. Jake is an American expatriate living in Paris, who was rendered impotent by a World War I injury. He is in love with Lady Brett Ashley, whom he first met when she dressed his war wound in the hospital. She loves him as well, but cannot be with him because of his impotence. The novel focuses on Jake's handling of his situation, and provides a good example of a marginal case because he both faces and suppresses the reality of his situation. On the one hand, he tells his friend Robert Cohn, after a proposal to get away to South America, "Listen, Robert, going to another country doesn't make any difference. I've tried all that. You can't get away from yourself by moving from one place to another. There's nothing to that" (Hemingway 11). Although, from his comment, it is clear that he has, in the past, tried to forget about his impotence by moving around, he realizes, here, that it does not work. He realizes that he must attempt to reconcile his problems by facing them, which amounts, in Nietzsche's terms, to bearing freely his earthly head. On the other hand, however, Jake attempts to drown his sorrows in alcohol by drinking throughout the day. Drinking on a regular basis in order to silence painful thoughts and memories would seem to be an example of being dishonest with one's perspective of the world, because one is denigrating the clarity of one's perspective. It is important that it is a *denigration* here and not merely a *change*, because one would not say that taking anti-depressants, for instance, amounts to burying one's head in the sand, even though anti-depressants effect a *change* in perspective. Presumably, the motive in that instance would be to *normalize* one's perspective, which is to say, achieve normal serotonin levels, etc., in order to have

what society deems the best perspective of things. One might easily object to this particular example, but it will not be further developed; the point of honesty with respect to the earth, to the reality of one's experience, I think, is clear, notwithstanding the debatable nature of particular examples. The idea of an 'honest' perspective does, however, seem to be in conflict with Nietzsche's perspectivism and raises the question: why should a drunken perspective be any less honest than a sober one, if all perspectives are equally true?

Firstly, I think (thankfully) that it is possible to drink alcohol while still maintaining an honest perspective of one's memories and experiences. The reason that Robert Cohn's drinking results in a dishonest perspective is due to the motivation behind it. He did not drink to enrich his life with different types of experiences; rather he drank in order to forget about his situation and his past experiences, so he could not possibly be working to redeem, and thus affirm, his past. Moreover, only if he were to be perpetually drunk would he have any chance of actually forgetting about his past, but this solution will not work even if honesty were not required. As human beings we exist in bodies that need to be managed in certain ways if we are to continue to exist. Daily consumption of copious amounts of alcohol works sufficiently against the wellbeing of our body to suggest a dismissal of the requirements of living on this earth, and hence a denial of the earth as a medium of existence.

We still might want to challenge the idea that we need to be honest to have a completely affirming view of our past and our lives. Why could a Christian or an alcoholic not have a completely affirmative perspective? Alcohol exists in the world; beliefs exist in the world. Why can't alcohol or Christian beliefs be a part of one's

earthly experiences? I think the point to stress in response to these questions is that we are necessarily tied to the earth in a certain way. We simply are constituted in a certain way in a certain place, namely, the earth. Perhaps, we might want to concede that it is possible that one has a completely affirmative view of one's past while at the same time being Christian. There seems to be no reason to deny this possibility. I think the important point is that given our constitution as necessarily earthly beings, we will have a more difficult time affirming our life if we try to ignore the fact that we are rational, embodied beings, with sensitive livers. Hence, when Nietzsche speaks of an honest perspective with respect to the earth, he is not saying that there is something intrinsically good about honesty (which would conflict with his rejection of universal values); rather he is making the pragmatic point that we must respect the way we are constituted, the way we work, which is as earthly beings, if we are to achieve complete affirmation.

Having said that one must remain true to the earth for complete affirmation, there is evidence elsewhere in Nietzsche's writings to the contrary. For instance, in the 1886 preface to *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche seems to suggest that deception is at least a part of life, if not something to strive for. He talks, here, of his solitude and isolation produced as a result of his unusual degree of suspicion of the world, and his subsequent need to escape his loneliness by seeking shelter "in some piece of admiration or enmity or scientificity or frivolity or stupidity; and...where I could not find what I *needed*, I had artificially to enforce, falsify and invent a suitable fiction for myself" (HAH 5).

Further on, he says,

What do *you* know, what *could* you know, of how much cunning in self-preservation, how much reason and higher safeguarding, is contained in such self-deception – or of how much falsity I shall *require* if I am to continue to permit myself the luxury of *my* truthfulness?...Enough, I am still living; and life is, after all, not a product of morality: it *wants* deception, it *lives* on deception (HAH 6).

What we said above seemed to indicate that “my truthfulness” could not be dependent on self-deception, because one’s truth is one’s honest perspective of the world. This quote, however, is saying just the opposite. How are we to reconcile this contradiction? To begin, let us announce one important difference between the two faces of the contradiction: the evidence we used above to support the claim that self-deception cannot be an element of a completely affirming worldview was taken from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, whereas we have just seen contrary evidence from the autobiographical preface of *Human, All Too Human: Zarathustra vs. Nietzsche...Zarathustra vs. Human*. That is to say, we have evidence presented by Nietzsche from the mouth of Zarathustra on the one hand, and evidence presented by Nietzsche directly from his own mouth on the other. The question, therefore, becomes, What is the difference between Nietzsche and Zarathustra? In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche describes Zarathustra as “younger, ‘heavier with future,’ and stronger than I” (GM 532). That Nietzsche himself *needs* self-deception in order to remain sane, joyful, affirmative, does not mean that he would not like to overcome this need. Nietzsche’s self-deception is, as he admits, only necessary in times of solitude, when he is feeling isolated and lonely – or, in other words – when he is feeling weak. That Nietzsche is not perfect by the standards set by his own ideals is not a particularly powerful argument against those ideals. Nietzsche’s ideals are, after all, those of the future, those of the overman, not easily attainable by any means, and Nietzsche does not hide this fact. We should not be surprised if Zarathustra comes a great deal closer to attaining Nietzsche’s ideals than does Nietzsche himself, for Zarathustra is a figment of Nietzsche’s imagination, a projection into the future. This is not to say that even Zarathustra is flawless. “At one time Zarathustra too cast his

delusion beyond man, like all the afterworldly. The work of a suffering and tortured god, the world then seemed to me. A dream the world then seemed to me, and the fiction of a god” (Z 142). However, as Nietzsche said in the *Genealogy*, Zarathustra is stronger than he; by the time *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is taking place, Zarathustra has overcome himself and carried his own ashes to the mountains where he has invented a brighter flame for himself (Z 143). Thus, although Zarathustra is not perfect by Nietzsche’s standards, he is closer to their full attainment than is Nietzsche himself. It would be slightly oversimplistic, however, to say that it is for only this reason that we find a discrepancy in the respective words of Nietzsche and Zarathustra concerning self-deception. Moreover, we should certainly not be satisfied with simply dismissing Nietzsche’s 1886 preface as merely being a symptom of temporary weakness. To complicate matters, it is difficult to say that Nietzsche even aims at perfection at all, for this would mean that there is *one* set of values that Nietzsche thinks are the best, a position that would not be far from love of *absolute* values, which Nietzsche clearly condemns. A more nuanced reading of the discrepancy would take account of Nietzsche’s frequent playfulness and frivolity. For example, it is certainly possible that Nietzsche deceived himself, fully aware that such deception was contradictory to some of his writings, in which case, it would not really have constituted deception, rather it would have amounted to playful self-mockery.

Although, the contradiction between what is said in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and the 1886 preface of *Human, All Too Human* has not been completely resolved, it seems clear that Nietzsche’s comments from the 1886 preface do not present a serious challenge to his more serious idea of remaining true to the earth. Satisfied with this conclusion, we

will return to the analogy of the past as text, and turn now to the affirmative reading of this text, beginning with what we will call a preparatory measure – forgetting.

Forgetting

“On the Three Metamorphoses” is the first of Zarathustra’s speeches in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. It describes three metamorphoses of the spirit: “how the spirit becomes a camel; and the camel, a lion; and the lion, finally, a child” (Z 137). In order to achieve the third metamorphosis of the spirit, to become a child, in spirit, the lion must learn to forget. “The child is innocence and forgetting” (Z 139). By introducing the concept of forgetting, Nietzsche prepares a clean slate for reading the text of the past. That is, the text is best read free from the constraints of old, absolute values; that is, it is best read free from the constraints of, for example, the platonic and Christian values that have continued to be passed down, inherited, and readopted for centuries. Reading of the text should be based purely on the phenomena one has experienced, or in other words, the truth of one’s experience, where truth is not relative to some kind of ‘objective’ (disembodied) truth valued for its own sake, but rather incorporated knowledge based on the survival and interests of the person on earth. If, for example, one were to read the text through Plato-tinted spectacles, where the world one experiences is characterized as false, a mere matrix of examples, one would extract very different meanings from someone who read the text through the eyes of a child. In “On the Three Metamorphoses” the child forgets about the ‘Thou shalt’ and the thousand years old values of the dragon, which is something the lion is not able to do. Robert Gooding-Williams says in his book, *Zarathustra’s Dionysian Modernism*, “Unlike the camel and the lion, for example, [the child] does not define himself with reference to the belief that

it is good to be the one and only God. The child's forgetting may seem, then, to sustain and reinforce the lion's nay-saying antipathy to Christianity by extending that antipathy to the very value of being God" (Gooding-Williams 43). Forgetting enables a person to look at his or her past and draw meaning unhindered by the expectations of old, absolute values, which cannot possibly be as affirming as possible because they are old and absolute. The nature of the world, according to Nietzsche, is to change. "Heraclitus will remain eternally right with his assertion that being is an empty fiction" (TI 481.) Any attempt to impose universal, absolute values upon the world, therefore, negates its very nature⁴. Only by forgetting such absolutes can someone create new values (*re-value*) and draw new meanings. Deleuze says,

To affirm is not to take responsibility for, to take on the burden of what is, but to release, to set free what lives. To affirm is to unburden: not to load life with the weight of higher values, but to create new values which are those of life, which make life light and active (Deleuze 185).

The concept of 'unburdening' presented by Deleuze sounds very much like the idea of forgetting, in that both terms imply a release from something, a release from, as Deleuze says here, 'higher values', or absolute values. However, there is a sense in which the concept of 'forgetting' goes beyond the concept of 'unburdening'. The camel's transformation into the lion is the removing from his (the camel's) back of burdensome old values. The lion does not bear the weight of old values; he attempts to fight his "last master", the great dragon for control of them. Although, the old values are no longer on the lion's back, they still exist, the lion wants control of them – he has not yet forgotten

⁴ One might wonder at this point if affirmation itself is an old and absolute value. Much of Nietzsche's philosophy is a response to Christianity and Platonism and their renunciation and negation of *this* world. Hence, relative to two thousand years, at least, of the domination of Christian values in the Western world, it would be hard to say that Nietzsche is not proposing something new. Of course, if Western society suddenly latches on to Nietzsche's ideas, then in another two thousand years, it will be high time that they are changed as well, but this does not seem to be very likely any time soon, at least given the present status quo in the United States.

them. Only the child can forget about the old values. When something is forgotten, it ceases to exist for the mind that forgot it. Hence, the important distinction between unburdening and forgetting: unburdening implies a release of weight, but only forgetting entails annihilation of weight; unburdening does not necessarily go that far⁵. To annihilate old values provides the greatest amount of space conceivable for creation of new values. The lion must transform into a child, because, although he has removed the burden from his back, he has not forgotten about it, and hence has not rid the world of the burden, and provided maximal space for creation. To affirm involves unburdening, as Deleuze says; unburdening is the first step – the next is forgetting. We shall now return to the text of *Zarathustra* to view a specific example of how forgetting works as a basis for affirmation.

The Ass Festival

During the ass festival in *The Awakening*, the higher men revere the Yes-saying ass; they praise the manner in which it bears their burden: never saying No, always saying Yes. They call it their god. Zarathustra sees their festival and reacts initially with anger. “They have all become pious again, they are praying, they are mad!” (Z 424) and he asks some of the higher men how they could worship as god an ass; and each, in his turn, defends their festival. In their festival, they return to revering the eternal and the divine, as in Christianity; they begin to adore again the promise of the otherworldly, as Christians worship the promise of the kingdom of heaven. After hearing their responses, which mostly refer to there finally being something on earth to adore, that is, the symbol in the ass of the eternal bliss of heaven, a place that can bear any burden and still say yes,

⁵ We say “not necessarily” because although forgetting (in the sense we are interested in) is unburdening, unburdening does not entail forgetting. It is possible that Deleuze uses ‘unburdening’ in the same way we are using ‘forgetting’, but the potential distinction is an important one to draw.

that accepts all who embrace it, Zarathustra calls the higher men children: “How all your hearts wriggled with pleasure and malice that at last you had become again as little children, that is, pious; that at last you did again what children do, namely, prayed, folded your hands, and said, ‘Dear God!’” (Z 428). Zarathustra’s initial anger at the childishness of the higher men represents his initial reading of their actions. He first sees in their adoration of the ass not the childishness of the child of the third metamorphosis, but the childishness of the children of God. That is, he sees them as helpless, dependent, supplicant children, kneeling at the foot of an idol, begging to suckle its nipple. The childishness of the higher men, however, is multifarious, and after some reflection, Zarathustra gives their adoration of the ass a second reading. This reading recognizes the second way in which the higher men became children again: by returning to loving God and old values the higher men *forgot* what Zarathustra taught them. On this second reading, the higher men display the childishness of the third metamorphosis. After Zarathustra realizes this second reading, he begins to appreciate their gaiety and their invention, creation of the ass festival, notwithstanding its content. “Do not forget this night and this ass festival, you higher men. *This* you invented when you were with me and I take that for a good sign: such things are invented only by convalescents” (ibid). Here Zarathustra implores the higher men to ‘not forget’ the ass festival precisely because it was their creation. Forgetting is only helpful if old, absolute values are forgotten, and not if new, original ones are forgotten. Zarathustra goes on to tell them, however, that when they have another ass festival to do it “in remembrance of *me*” (Z 429). The higher men forgot Zarathustra’s teaching during the ass festival, but *remembered* the old values of Christianity. The higher men were right to forget

something, and that is one reason why Zarathustra was able to call them children, but what they created affirmed the affirmation of the ass, and so although it was a step in the right direction, their affirmation was still the low-grade affirmation of the ass.

Zarathustra wants them rather, to *forget* Christianity, as the child in *On the Three Metamorphoses* does, and instead of *remembering* Christianity to *remember* him. By remembering Zarathustra and not Christianity, the higher men will have ass festivals that affirm affirmation and creation, rather than affirming old values and negation.

This contrast needs some further explanation, because although the ass' affirmation of negation diminishes the quality of the ass' affirmation, in general, there is a sense in which negation can be affirmed. To quote Deleuze again: "The ass does not know how to say no; but first and foremost he does not know how to say no to nihilism itself" (Deleuze 182). One might think that a philosophy that is as affirmative as possible would have to provide for, or even require, the affirmation of nihilism; how can a philosophy be completely affirmative if some things must be negated? It is true that to be as fully affirmative as possible one has to be able to affirm nihilism. However, this affirmation of nihilism must affirm nihilism *as part of a whole*. When faced with the question, do you wish you could escape this world, for a better world?, the only answer which affirms *this* world is No. The problem with the ass is that he does not know how to say No. He can only say Yes. Hence, although he might affirm this world in some circumstances, he would renounce it in others, simply by always saying Yes. It is necessary to discriminate, to have and develop a taste for what, *per se*, is worth affirmation and what is not. Zarathustra says, "I honor the recalcitrant choosy tongues and stomachs, which have learned to say 'I' and 'yes' and 'no'. But to chew and digest

everything – that is truly the swine’s manner. Always to bray Yea-Yuh – that only the ass has learned, and whoever is of his spirit” (Z 306). For a completely affirmative stance, nihilism *per se* must be negated; but nihilism as part of the world as a whole must be affirmed; that there exist nihilists must be affirmed, but without subscribing to nihilism *per se*. By affirming Christianity, an earth-renouncing system of thought, the higher men affirmed the renunciation of the earth; that was their mistake, their expression of poor taste, and why Zarathustra asks them to *forget* Christian values and instead to remember *him*, and his philosophy *of the earth*.

The Ugliest Man

We turn now to the passage concerning the Ugliest Man (entitled, “The Ugliest Man”), whose condition and development as Zarathustra’s student offers another look at how forgetting acts as a preparatory measure for reading the past. When Zarathustra first encounters the Ugliest Man, he is sitting in the valley of Snakes’ Death, the place where “ugly fat green snakes” (Z 375) come to die. Just as the snake is the wisest animal in *Zarathustra*, one can consider the Ugliest Man the wisest of the higher men⁶. The Ugliest Man is the murderer of God because God was able to see his ugliness and pity him for it, yet he sits in the valley of Snakes’ Death, where nothing but dwelling and pondering can be done, (where even Zarathustra descends into a “black reminiscence” in which “much that was grave weighed on his mind” (ibid)) waiting for his own obliteration. Although Zarathustra calls him a great self-lover, Zarathustra also states: “None have I found yet who despised himself more deeply” (Z 379). The Ugliest Man’s case thus recalls one of the problems with affirmation raised above: that one may be able

⁶ It is necessary to note that although the Ugliest Man may have been the wisest of the higher men, Zarathustra nevertheless concludes at the end of *Zarathustra* that none of the higher men are his “proper companions” (Z 437).

to easily affirm some things in life, but only with difficulty and/or deception be able to affirm others. He is clearly able to affirm, for example, his intelligence, his defiance of God etc. (“ah, how great must this self-love be!” says Zarathustra (ibid)). However, he is not able to affirm his physical condition and the mob’s ensuing pity, which is why he is also a great despiser of himself. His development as a student of Zarathustra will enable him to forget about other, older values, the values of the mob, and impose his own new ones. (One can, of course, look at certain physical characteristics as values, albeit more superficial ones; there will be old, absolute standards of physical appearance in the same way as there are old, absolute standards of truth; these physical standards can be revised just like truth standards.) This development is apparent after the ass festival, which the Ugliest Man in fact starts. Zarathustra says to him: “You seem changed to me, your eyes are glowing, the cloak of the sublime lies over your ugliness” (Z 427). We might infer that he has managed to hide his ugliness by forgetting about old standards of ugliness, and transformed himself, in his own eyes, into a sublime person just by revising values. This, however, is not clear. Even if there are old standards of physical beauty and potentially new standards, it is possible that standards of beauty are genetically engrained to a degree at which standards are not pragmatically replaceable. And even if one wanted to push the question of whether standards of physical beauty work in this way, it is almost indubitable that standards of health, for example, do. Nonetheless, the Ugliest Man becomes able, by way of the ass festival, to affirm his past, his present and the eternal recurrence of everything that has ever happened to him. In *The Drunken Song*, a little while after the ass festival, the Ugliest Man says:

For the sake of this day, *I* am for the first time satisfied that I have lived my whole life.
And that I attest so much is still not enough for me. Living on earth is worth while: one

day, one festival with Zarathustra, taught me to love the earth. 'Was *that* life?' I want to say to death. 'Well then! Once more!' (Z 429)

How, then, does the ugliest man go from sitting in the Valley of Snakes' Death, to affirming the eternal recurrence? There are a number of possibilities. On the one hand, as we stated above, perhaps the Ugliest Man was able to forget about old standards of beauty and create new standards of his own by which he was now beautiful. This reading seems rather implausible given the probability that standards of beauty are, to a significant extent, genetically determined. Moreover, and more importantly, this reading says nothing about the ass festival itself, which seems to provide the impetus for his change of perspective. On the other hand, the Ugliest Man could have been so enthralled by the gaiety and joy of the ass festival that he forgot, not about standards of beauty, but about his physical constitution itself. It is certainly not implausible that the ass festival distracted the Ugliest Man from dwelling on his physical state and the grievance it causes. This type of forgetting, however, is tantamount to the self-deception that, above, we said ignores the earth as it is and, therefore, cannot produce affirmation of it. This reading, although plausible, does not give the Ugliest Man much credit, and more importantly does not comport comfortably with his post-festival speech. The Ugliest Man says, *for the sake of this day* he is able to affirm *all* of his existence. He is able to give a reason for his affirmation, but his reason cannot be that he forgot about his ugliness, because by the time he started making a speech about affirming all of life, including his past, he would have had to remember his ugliness. Rather, it seems, the Ugliest Man is fully aware of his ugliness, but is able to affirm the world anyway. The third reading, therefore, is that the ugliest man recognizes that only by way of his past did he get to 'this day', which is so wonderful, that he is able to affirm the entire path to it.

He seems to understand Nietzsche's idea that things are connected, and not just things, but everything.

Have you ever said Yes to a single joy? O my friends, then you said Yes too to *all* woe. All things are entangled, ensnared, enamored; if ever you wanted one thing twice, if ever you said, 'You please me, happiness! Abide, moment!' then you wanted *all* back. All anew, all eternally, all entangled, ensnared, enamored – oh, then you *loved* the world (Z 435).

The Ugliest Man said Yes to a single joy; he said Yes to “one day, one festival with Zarathustra”, and from this concluded that “Living on earth is worthwhile”. This seems a rather large jump to make. It doesn't seem to follow that if you ever wanted one thing twice, then you wanted *everything* again, eternally. Why then does Zarathustra say just this in his drunken song? There are two possible answers to this question; one concerns the nature of joy, and the other concerns the nature of ‘things’. Let us begin with the first. In the verse, strophe, section of the drunken song following the one just quoted above, Zarathustra says,

All joy wants the eternity of all things, wants honey, wants lees, wants drunken midnight, wants tombs, wants tomb-tears' comfort, wants gilded evening glow.
What does joy not want? It is thirstier, more cordial, hungrier, more terrible, more secret than all woe; it wants *itself*, it bites into *itself*, the ring's will strives in it; it wants love, it wants hatred, it is *overrich*, gives, throws away, begs that one might take it, thanks the taker, it would like to be hated; so rich is joy that it thirsts for woe, for hell, for hatred, for disgrace, for the cripple, for *world* – this world, oh, you know it! (Z 435).

The nature of joy is to be so profound as to want itself again and again, and not only itself, but all things. It is almost childish...and fittingly so. One can think of a child in a state of ecstasy similar to Zarathustra's during his “Drunken Song” laughing interminably at the sight of a clown or a funny face or a ball shouting “Again, Again”, or if the child could speak the language of Nietzsche: “*Da Capo! Da Capo!*” This is the joy of the child, the joy of the overman, a symptom of a will to power so strong and affirmative that it is overcome by a given moment, an ass festival, for example, to the point where all

woe, in that moment, seems like child's play. This answer may indeed be accurate in some cases, and perhaps in the particular case of the Ugliest Man described above. However, what about more sober moments? After all, this sort of affirmation is not far from the enthrallment in the moment we said was the second possible explanation for the ugliest man's change of perspective, which we said was tantamount to forgetting the true nature of one's experiences, as a whole, and hence self-deception. Although, to reiterate, this answer to the question of going from one moment of joy to the affirmation of everything is valid in certain circumstances, i.e., ecstasy, it does not explain going from affirming one moment to affirming all moments in the generally sober, daily unfolding of life. Perhaps, then, this step from one moment to all moments cannot be made outside of a state of ecstasy. Before we jump to this conclusion, however, let us examine the second potential answer to the question of how Zarathustra jumps from loving one 'thing' to loving *everything* concerning the nature of 'things'.

Entanglement

Zarathustra says, in the passage quoted above, "All things are entangled, ensnared, enamored". What exactly does it mean for everything to be entangled, ensnared, enamored? Section 557 of *The Will to Power* says,

The properties of a thing are effects on other 'things':
if one removes other 'things,' then a thing has no other properties,
i.e., there is no thing without other things,
i.e., there is no 'thing-in-itself.'

Nehamas calls this section of *The Will to Power*, "the metaphysical foundation" of Nietzsche's view that "All things are entangled" (Nehamas2 257). The idea that "there is no 'thing-in-itself'" means that it would not even be possible to say Yes to a single joy without implicitly saying Yes too to all woe, for, whether one is conscious of it or not,

according to Nietzsche, any one 'thing' (e.g. the joy ensuing from an ass festival) that one experiences is dependent upon all the other 'things' that one has previously experienced (including, of course, all the woe one has previously experienced). Thus, when Nietzsche says that all things are entangled, ensnared, enamored, he means that everything is connected in some way. Let us look again at the example of the ass festival. The ass festival is connected to something antecedent to it, let us say, the ugliest man's encounter with Zarathustra, and the encounter with Zarathustra is, in its turn, connected to something antecedent to it, and so on. Somewhere further down this list of connected events, or 'things,' will be a time of woe, suffering, haplessness, a trip, a mistake, from which every posterior event or 'thing' will stem, and on which, every posterior event or 'thing' will depend, to some extent. Consequently, to affirm some present 'thing,' at the top of the list of a chain of interconnected 'things,' is to implicitly affirm every 'thing' that preceded it, including 'things' that might be regrettable independent of everything else. (It is for this reason that it is possible, (and indeed necessary for a fully affirmative position) to affirm nihilism without being a nihilist.) The Ugliest Man's affirmation of the world, however, was not merely implicit in his affirmation of the ass festival. The Ugliest Man *announced* his affirmation of his whole life. "For the sake of this day, *I* am for the first time satisfied that I have lived my whole life". There are two possible reasons that the first 'I' of this statement is emphasized. The most obvious and important reason for the italicization is that he is the *ugliest* man alive, yet, despite his superlative ugliness, *he* is still able to affirm his entire existence. The secondary, subtler interpretation is that the 'I' is in italics because there is *a subject in recognition* of the connection between the joy of the ass festival and all the experiences that preceded it, as

opposed to a lack of subjective recognition, leaving just the *implicit* connection due to the entanglement of things. That is to say, by italicizing the ugliest man's 'I', Nietzsche is drawing a distinction between, on the one hand, affirming a present event without recognizing that all antecedent events are necessarily connected to it, and thereby only *implicitly* affirming all antecedent events, (for the connection between events is independent of one's recognition of it, on Nietzsche's conception of the connection between events) and on the other hand, affirming a present event *in recognition of* the fact that one is also affirming all connected antecedent events. The Uglyest Man's affirmative statement and this second interpretation of the italicization of the 'I' raise an important question: Is recognition of the entanglement of things necessary for complete affirmation, or is the fact that there is an implicit affirmation of all things, whether a subject recognizes it or not, sufficient? To answer this question we must more fully develop the relationship between affirmation and the eternal recurrence.

Affirmation and Eternal Recurrence

We said above that Nietzsche's affirmation is as total as the greatest weight of the eternal recurrence is great, by definition. The reason for this inherent equality of degree is that the idea of the eternal recurrence, the greatest weight, was designed, by Nietzsche, to *require* total affirmation; only the total affirmation of a Dionysian spirit will be able to *endure* the idea of the eternal recurrence. Nietzsche calls it his "great cultivating idea" (WTP fragment 1053); it is an invitation to rise to the daunting challenge of saying Yes to everything, because, for Nietzsche, to say Yes to life is beautiful, Dionysus is beautiful, the overman is beautiful. Not everyone will rise to this challenge: "the races that cannot bear it stand condemned; those who find it the greatest benefit are chosen to rule" (ibid).

It is the greatest benefit because it produces the greatest affirmation, the greatest engagement and joy in life. It is a *personal* invitation, “the question in each and every thing, ‘Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?’” (GS aphorism 341) Do you desire your life again, exactly as you have lived it once more and innumerable times more? This is the question one must be able to say Yes to, in order to be utterly affirmative of life, in order to meet Nietzsche’s standards of beauty and greatness. To be able to say Yes to this question, it is necessary to redeem the past for its place in the future; it is necessary to affirm every moment of suffering, every time of woe. If one is ignorant of the reasons why *all* of one’s past is worth affirming infinitely, then one cannot answer the question honestly and with conviction. The question demands an answer, and one must be prepared to submit one. And, as we have seen, the Yea-Yuh of the ass will not do. For this reason, it is necessary not only to recognize that one’s particular past is the reason for one’s present, but also to make the connections between one’s present and one’s past. That is, one must understand why a period of suffering led to a period of joy, how one’s pain fathered one’s pleasure. In his autobiographical book, *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche makes those connections between past pains and present joys and presents them to the reader, examples of which we will now view⁷.

Ecce Homo

⁷ A short disclaimer: we said above that Nietzsche suffered, at times, from loneliness, and as a consequence resorted to deceiving himself by pretending that like minds, ‘free spirits’ existed. As we said, Nietzsche was not perfect (with respect to his ideas), and his comment in *Ecce Homo*, “Suffering from solitude is also an objection – I have suffered only from ‘multitudes’” (EH 714) proves this point only further. Our purpose however, is hardly to investigate how well Nietzsche’s life mirrors his philosophy. After all, he also says in *Ecce Homo*, “I am one thing, my writings are another matter” (EH 715). The examples, taken from *Ecce Homo*, that follow, therefore, are not to show that Nietzsche made the necessary connections to live a completely affirmative life. Rather, they simply provide good illustrations of the concept of connecting in question.

Nietzsche did not always enjoy the best of health (in the strictly physiological sense of health), and he recounts several periods of malady in *Ecce Homo*. What is significant in each recounting of poor health is the connection he makes between it and later periods of great health. Speaking of the winter during which he composed *The Dawn*, Nietzsche says,

The perfect brightness and cheerfulness, even exuberance of the spirit, reflected in this work, is compatible in my case not only with the most profound physiological weakness, but even with an excess of pain. In the midst of the torments that go with an uninterrupted three-day migraine, accompanied by laborious vomiting of phlegm, I possessed a dialectician's clarity *par excellence* and thought through with very cold blood matters for which under healthier circumstances I am not mountain-climber, not subtle, not *cold* enough. (EH 679)

Further on in *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche says, "Only my sickness brought me to reason" (EH 698). In connecting periods of sickness, and even pain, with periods of vigor, production, and joy, Nietzsche makes these difficult periods part of a whole he is capable of affirming, *as a whole*. The painful times are affirmed in their connection to joyful times, and in this way are redeemed for their place in the future. And were the demon to steal after Nietzsche in his loneliest loneliness and tell him that his life will be lived, innumerable times more, exactly as he has lived it, Nietzsche would be able to greet the demon's proposition with open arms, declaring "You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine" (GS 274), because Nietzsche is well acquainted with the text of his life, and how each part fits in an entangled, ensnared, enamored, wonderful whole.

Creative Redemption

Our final task is now at hand: to say where creation fits in to this picture of redeeming the past, (in particular, if, as we have said, one must remain true to one's perspective, and true to the earth), for Nietzsche says that all 'it was' is a fragment, a riddle, until a

creative will redeems all 'it was' and declares, 'But thus I willed it; thus shall I will it'.

What about this 'will' is *creative*?

Firstly, one must *create a reading* of the text of one's own life, (which would be to turn reading into an *art*, as Nietzsche suggests we do in his preface of *On The Genealogy of Morals*). There are many different interpretations one can give, *make*, to the text of one's life, but not all interpretations are affirmative, and few are *completely affirmative*. We have presented three essential components of a completely affirmative reading of life's text: honesty; forgetting; and *making* the connections between the events or 'things' that comprise the entangled whole of one's life. Although the first two components may require effort, and the development of a certain kind of disposition towards one's experiences, it is the latter component that involves the creation of an interpretation, a reading. One must, as Nietzsche did in *Ecce Homo*, connect the parts of one's life that are not affirmable *in themselves*, to the parts of one's life that are, to the joyful, productive, vigorous parts, in order that the painful, strenuous parts may be affirmed as parts of a generally magnificent whole.

The second, and greater creation in this picture of redeeming the past, however, is Nietzsche's creation of the idea of the eternal recurrence, which drives the entire mechanism of transforming 'It was' into 'Thus I willed it', a weight designed either to inspire utter affirmation of life, or crush its negation. If we look at Nietzsche's philosophy of affirmation as, in part, a response to the nihilism and negation of his predecessors, then the eternal recurrence is the weapon with which he replies as such. We called it an aesthetic or ethical truth because it serves as the cornerstone for what Nietzsche finds beautiful and valuable in the world, namely, affirmation of life. When

we say that it is a truth, however, we do not go any further than ascribing this truth to Nietzsche himself, and anyone who chooses to accept it as their own. This is to say, if the eternal recurrence does not work as a conduit of complete affirmation for a particular person, then he or she is invited to create another idea to produce affirmation. I think we can agree that cultivating the ability to affirm life is something valuable. How one does this is dependent on one's particular perspective. After all, Zarathustra advises his disciples as follows:

One repays a teacher badly if one always remains nothing but a pupil. And why do you not want to pluck at my wreath?
You revere me; but what if you reverence tumbles one day? Beware lest a statue slay you.
You say you believe in Zarathustra? But what matters Zarathustra? You are my believers – but what matter all believers? You had not yet sought yourselves: and you found me. Thus do all believers; therefore all faith amounts to so little.
Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and only when you have all denied me will I return to you. (Z 190).

Perhaps, then, we can reformulate the essential components of a completely affirmative reading of life's text thus: honesty, with regard to one's experience of the earth; forgetting, of old and absolute values; *making* the connections between the events or 'things' that comprise the entangled whole of one's life, that is, creating an affirmative reading of the text of one's life; and lastly, if Nietzsche's thought of the eternal recurrence does not drive successfully the redemption of the past, and the complete affirmation of one's life, then one will just have to create a new thought for oneself.

In part, though, this final 'if' is what concerns Nehemas. According to him, the attempt to think about one's life with reference to its eternal recurrence will not produce complete affirmation, but rather either rejection of the abysmal thought or self-deception. Given that Nietzsche's theory does not allow for self-deception in the way we have described it (and in the way Nehemas conceives of it), must we conclude, with Nehemas,

that complete affirmation is simply too hard for the average mortal? Is it beyond us to develop an honest perspective of our past and still to want it all back? Although it might seem that complete affirmation could be possible only for the luckiest and most extraordinary of humans, I see no reason to think that it is not possible for many people. I think that through mental discipline a completely affirming perspective of life could be cultivated. Whether it ever has been or ever will be are questions I will leave open. I think the methods of nurturing such a perspective that we have examined throughout the course of this paper are straightforward enough not only to justify leaving these questions very much open, but also to warrant their employment as means to creating ever more affirming perspectives.

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