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A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of the University of Richmond
in Candidacy
for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
in
History

August, 1986
Richmond, Virginia
Abstract

A Genealogy of the Will: A Comparison of the Works of Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche

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Degree: Master of Arts in History
University of Richmond, 1986

This study investigates the development of the notion of man's will upon which Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche based their theories. Although this topic had been virtually neglected in the great intellectual debates of the first to the eighteenth centuries, by the nineteenth century the question of man's will--its origin, function, and value--dominated such philosophical discussions. An exploration of the differences in the perception and role of the will in the works of these three men is attempted, from Kant's redefinition of the nature of will, to Schopenhauer's redirection of its position in philosophical matters, to Nietzsche's radical reinterpretation of the entire problem. An examination of these profoundly different interpretations and implications reveals that Kant's effort to emancipate the will from its causal connections to make room for moral responsibility was transformed by Nietzsche into an attempt to liberate mankind from his own moral and metaphysical misunderstandings.
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Acknowledgements

This manuscript could not have been completed without the help of two key people. First, I would like to thank Dr. Hugh West for his enduring encouragement, suggestions, and support. Secondly, I would like to thank Bridgette Clemons for her dedication and persistence in typing this manuscript.
Prologue
Curious as it may first appear, one of the vital intellectual issues of the past two centuries, the concept of man's will, had been virtually neglected in the great philosophical debates which had punctuated enlightened discourse from the first to the eighteenth centuries. During the nineteenth century, however, as a result of Kant's "revolution" in philosophy, the question of man's will--its origin, function, and value--became of paramount importance in philosophical matters. Not only Kant, but also Schopenhauer and Nietzsche made the will basic to their own theories, albeit with profoundly different interpretations and implications. This study will explore some of the differences in the perception and role of the will in the works of these three men.

Since Kant (1724-1804) is the chronological, as well as the theoretical, precursor to both Schopenhauer (1788-1860) and Nietzsche (1844-1900), his views will be examined first. But because Kant set the terms of this discussion by redefining the nature of will and its place in philosophical thought, it is necessary to survey some of the notions of will which were prevalent before him. There are problems inherent in this undertaking, the most annoying of which is the elusiveness of a definition of will itself. This is obviously crucial to any discussion of its "redefinition," but proves to be exceedingly difficult to pin down, partly because thinkers--even one as meticulous as Kant--have not subscribed to any single definition of will. An attempt, however, must be made even at the risk of over-simplifying the issue.

Throughout western thought, the will was often used as a blanket
term to include appetites, desires, or bodily needs. Although there were numerous variations in such definitions over a period of many centuries, they did have one element in common: they did not refer to man's will as a separate faculty, i.e., a separate capability or power of one's mind, as reason, for example, often was. But the definition of will which is central to understanding the revolutionary focus of Kant's enterprise at the end of the eighteenth century is precisely that of will as an autonomous faculty, which he first employs in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781), and which is later seized upon with such profoundly perverse consequences by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.

In this first critique, Kant describes our will as that which spontaneously initiates a new series in time. This definition of will as a source of action is further broadened in Kant's subsequent Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and in the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) to include will as the basis of all our moral actions.\(^2\) This is a direction which is novel and quite different from all prior definitions of will; however, it is a path followed by neither Schopenhauer nor Nietzsche.

That this notion of will as a separate faculty would have seemed strange to earlier philosophers is evident from a brief review of the definitions which predominated during the Classical, Hellenistic, and Christian eras. As Hannah Arendt notes in The Life of the Mind: Willing, "the faculty of the Will was unknown to Greek antiquity . . ."\(^3\) What she means by this is that the concept of will as a component of the mind, capable of initiating something altogether new in time, was
not one which was discussed by the greatest of these thinkers. She observes, in fact, that the term "free will," which presupposes the view that one might choose not to follow a particular course of action, is notably lacking in the language of Classical Greece. She finds, too, that this "neglect" of will as a faculty capable of acting contingently, which is common to most of the pre-Socratic philosophers, is in accordance with the temporal concepts of antiquity. These stressed the cyclical nature of life, in which nothing totally new ever occurred.

Even Aristotle, whose views differed in many ways from these, still did not have a concept of the will. Although he did develop the related notion of "proairesis"("before making a choice"), whereby one chooses between alternate objects or ways of conduct, Arendt contends that this is merely "liberum arbitrium"("free choice"), in which the goals of such choices are already given. Thus, while one may choose a certain means to an end--one may refrain from drinking in excess--one chooses this path because one knows that good health (the "given" goal) demands this abstinence. Since the ends are already determined, this faculty of choice is neither spontaneous, autonomous, nor the beginning of something entirely new, but is only the arbiter between reason and desires, neither of which will ever lead to action of its own accord.

After the first century A.D., with the growth of Christian doctrine of time to rival the cyclical and deterministic classical ones, a shift occurred in the definition of will which was to become crucial to Kant's enterprise. This shift had to do both with a changed view of temporality, and a new focus on will as something which functions within the
mind as a whole in conjunction with reason/desire/intellect.

The Christians developed, first of all, a concept of rectilinear time, which brought with it the idea of something new originating in time. This new beginning was Christ, who had come once to save man from his own sins. When Christ comes the second time, it will not be as part of an unending cycle of recurrent events, but as herald to the end of the world. Moreover, their idea of immortality, of future heavenly rewards or hellish punishments, as the Apostle Paul noted, was meaningless in a world governed by the laws of casuality. If all events were determined by antecedent events in time, then one could be neither commended nor reprimanded for his actions, and the ethical demands for Christians to lead a morally good life were empty. For only if the acts so judged were "free"—i.e., under the control of the agent who could choose to do or not to do them—would moral judgments of approbation and disapprobation become meaningful. Paul resolved, therefore, that we are "free" to do right or wrong, but our salvation is not determined by our will, but by God's mercy.

Paul's dilemma was this: How could one resolve the conflicting claims between God's power, which was omnipotent, and His judgment, which was equitable? If God is all-powerful, then He certainly has the power to make us act any way He wants us to. If that is the case, however, then God cannot judge our actions at all, for to do so would be to judge Himself. God has, therefore, chosen to limit His own power to give us the freedom to believe in Him or not, and to act accordingly. Since there is no chain of events that automatically leads us to faith,
we have "free will," at least to the extent of choosing to believe in God or not. Through the power of God's mercy, He judges us not on the basis of our acts alone, but also on the strength of our faith in Him.

Yet even Paul's commitment to "free will" (about which more will be said later) does not postulate an autonomous faculty. Paul proclaimed the will to be ultimately impotent because it automatically splits, producing its own counter-will (the "I will" and the "I will-not"), which hinders the will from ever successfully making a difference either in this world, or the next. We can neither will nor strive for our own salvation because such matters are governed solely by God's mercy, which is in turn based upon God's will, not man's. Thus, our future salvation is out of our control: it is precisely this element of control--of power to affect our own future--that truly distinguishes the Kantian concept of will from its predecessors.

The Stoic version of the will, which was flourishing contemporaneously with Pauline Christianity, was similarly impotent. It also was unable to actively alter one's present or future condition. Although Epictetus declared the will to be omnipotent, closer examination reveals that this was a curiously powerless form of power. Indeed, the will's first decision was to know "'the limits of the will to get and the will to avoid . . . and to dismiss those things that are beyond us . . .'"7 This leaves only the realm of interior psychological adjustment to external conditions in our control. In other words, it is one's internal, emotional response to events which is the crucial factor here, for Epictetus firmly believed that it was not pain or death which made us miser-
able, but the fear of pain or death; therefore, in order to lead a serene, tranquil life, we need only to fear fearfulness itself. Once we have learned to be "apathetic"—unaffected by either life or death—and to will ourselves to acceptance of our particular situation with tranquility, we will have achieved a life undisturbed by storms or obstacles.

Epictetus further advised those who wished to live well to "... 'let your will be that events should happen as they do.'" Not only is this a singularly unaggressive form of power, but it rests on the Stoic notion of "heimarmenē," the "doctrine of fate which holds that everything happens in harmony with the nature of the universe and that every particular thing, man or animal, plant or stone, has its task allotted to it by the whole and is justified by it." It is against just such notions of universal harmony and determinism, as well as individual impotence, that the Kantian conception of will stands in opposition. If, according to Webster in 1975, the will means "to control by the power of the will ... " then we have come a long way from the Stoics. The focus has shifted from the will as something which needs to be controlled (in the form of appetites, desires, or fears), to something which actively does the controlling, and is no longer subject to divine mercy or the harmony of nature.

Despite their numerous differences, all of these theories are at least in agreement on one very substantial notion: they all assume that the will is real. But in the seventeenth century, in the wake of the decline of Christian theological domination, there were some philoso-
phers who challenged even this fundamental assumption. Hobbes and Spin-
oza, for example, suggested that the will was not real, but an illusion. Central to this contention was their association of will with freedom, which Paul had made long before, and which plagued philosophers as di-
verse in attitude as Augustine, Kant, and Schopenhauer. As Spinoza ex-
plained, if one assumed that a stone could be sensible of its own mo-
tion, then any stone set in motion by an outside force "'would believe itself to be completely free and would think that it continued in mo-
tion solely because of its own wish.'"12 We are similarly deluded into believing ourselves to be free "'simply because [we] are conscious of [our] actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined.'"13 Thus, by the end of the seventeenth century, the will was often admitted to be a "subjectively felt faculty," perhaps inherent in the very structure of our consciousness, but nevertheless, it was not a "real" faculty. So when Kant turned to his task at the close of the eighteenth century, he had inherited notions of the will that con-
firmed either its impotence or its illusory nature. Against these posi-
tions, Kant's postulation of the will as the foundation of his philo-
osophical system stands in stark contrast.
Kant
Central to Kant's theory of the will is its association with reason. We must, therefore, look briefly at Kant's conception of the role of reason in our functioning. Although there is only one reason, Kant claims that it has two distinguishable functions. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant focusses on the use of "theoretical" reason, which deals with man's cognitive faculty. "Pure reason" is the means by which we investigate our capacity for knowing things a priori through understanding. The central issue of this critique is to ascertain how "synthetic a priori" judgments are possible. Before Kant, only analytic statements such as: "2 + 2 = 4"; or, "this chair is a piece of furniture," were considered to give a priori knowledge, because they alone contained their predicate within the concept of their subject. But as Kant discovered in his first "revolutionary" insight, even the laws of mathematics, the supposedly pure "analytic a priori" universally--true statements, were actually synthetic--that is, they went beyond their subject matter, and yet they were still a priori because they did not need any particular experience to amplify their concepts.

In his second critique, the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), Kant's objective is to prove that theoretical (pure) reason can have practical applications in the realm of moral decisions, i.e., it can and does affect the ways we act. This is of paramount importance if Kant is to succeed in his task of uniting the previously incompatible realms of objective and subjective knowledge. In this work Kant contends that an ethical system can be developed wholly a priori and can be applied to man, because reason, which provides only the universal
form, is not dependent upon the specific data of the particular situation. Although this may sound impossible at first, it is always necessary to keep in mind that Kant had shown in the first critique that, contrary to traditional theories, knowledge was not just passive conformity to an object. Instead, he had explained the phenomenal characteristics of objects in terms of the behavior of the knowing mind, whose structure makes it imperative that we use such ordering principles as space and time to aid our understanding. He had thus developed the notion of an active reason that was not condemned to purely passive contemplation, but one that actually helped to form the world which it examined. What this means is that we have "a priori" knowledge of only those aspects of objects which we ourselves have imposed on them.

What of the "reality" of those objects per se? In his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant makes a distinction between two realms of reality, the noumenal and the phenomenal. One of these realms is composed of "things in appearance" which are subject to the causal laws of nature. These are the facts (or objects) of everyday life, which are known to us through the world of sensory experience. These are externally determined by their causal relationships to each other, and are referred to as "phenomena." The other realm, which we can never "know" (because all the objects of our knowledge pertain to the sensory realm), but can only assume "behind the appearances," is that of the "noumena." These are the "things in themselves," the essences which are not determined by external contingencies, but instead establish their own laws. They are, therefore, free.

It is in this context that Kant develops his notion of the auton-
omous or "free" will. The will, according to Kant, is the capacity of a rational being for acting in accordance with the conception of laws. By this definition, Kant can show that pure reason can be practical in regard to the will, and that the will, in regard to morality, can be free. He attempts to validate our basic belief in our own freedom by disclosing that the phenomenal world, which is determined by the causal laws of nature, is only one aspect of the "real world" we can perceive. For there is another aspect to this world--that of the noumenal reality--which lies beyond the realm of appearances, and in which laws themselves are formulated. Since we are not solely a part of the natural world (determined by external laws), but participants who use our reason to intuit realms beyond any possible experience, and thereby attempt to understand the universal forms of laws, we are also part of the noumenal world (where such laws are made). Kant suggests that since "Neither obligation nor law can be derived from experience, for experience establishes no necessity . . ."\textsuperscript{14}, and since we, as thinking beings can imagine such object--less concepts as obligations and laws, they must be part of the noumenal reality--i.e., they exist outside of time or space, and are not constrained by the natural laws of causality. Further evidence for this dual character of reality is our possession of a priori knowledge, which puts us outside of the temporal order when it comes to knowing.

While this may seem implausible at first, Kant explains that "there is not the least contradiction between a thing in appearance (as belonging to the world of sense) being subject to certain laws of which it is independent as a thing or being in itself."\textsuperscript{15} But the only point of mediation between these 2 realms is that offered by the free will, a con-
cept which is not, in itself empirically knowable. Kant tries to define this interaction in the following way: "As will is a kind of causality of living beings so far as they are rational, freedom would be that property of this causality by which it can be effected independently of foreign causes determining it. . . ." Kant seems to be saying that freedom is here defined as the power to be a "cause" without being an "effect" of some previous cause, i.e., the power to initiate a new series of causal relationships, which necessarily implies a position outside of time, for otherwise it would become part of an infinite regress in these relationships. A few pages further, however, Kant admits that, "The subjective impossibility of explaining freedom of the will is the same as the impossibility of discovering and explaining an interest which man can take in moral laws."

Yet we do take such an interest, even if we cannot logically explain our reasons for it. Kant shows that we all have such interests; and furthermore, that we also have ordinary moral convictions of duty and obligation, which comprise our "moral a priori." In fact, our "obligatoriness constitutes the essence of morality;" and even if we cannot understand how a being in the world of appearances, such as we, can ever impinge upon, much less formulate a law for, something in the world of essences, we can still entertain the possibility of such an occurrence.

In what at first appears to be a surprising move, Kant broadens his concept of freedom of the will to include the ability to make laws, as well as to initiate a new series of causal events, which, of course, would not have occurred if the will had been different. Kant now estab-
lishes this legislative function of the will, and then equates his "free will" with a will under "moral law." Although this sounds contradictory, it is so only when one defines freedom in the negative sense, i.e., as "freedom from" something else. But this type of freedom is only of "limited liability," because it does not free man from the natural world, with its web of causal relationships. It is merely freedom in a "legal" sense. Only the rational will, which operates in the noumenal realm, can free us in the positive sense, since it alone is capable of providing a basis for determination independent of the world of sense. It thus is seen as "freedom to" do something. But what is this something?

Kant argues that the will and its actions, whatever they may be, are actually free only when they have been "determined by the totality of ends and requirements of their unity."\(^{19}\) That is, only the well-being of mankind as a whole can serve as the determinant of the rational will. It is not enough for us to will our own happiness as the guide to our moral behavior. For, although the desire for happiness may be universal, happiness itself is individual, and a world filled with individuals all striving for their own personal pleasures is a world of chaos and conflict. If we could, however, decide that: "I will act so that I can enjoy my life in my own way,"\(^ {20}\) all of our subsequent actions would be themselves determined by our own individual concept of "enjoy" at any particular moment. We would never be "free", even though we each had "freely chosen" to satisfy our own desires, because these desires would themselves imprison us within our own particularity.

This is why Kant insists that the will and its actions are "unfree"
when they have been determined by some individual object of desire, such as one's own particular happiness or well-being. For us to be freely willing moral agents, we must, therefore, act according to a rational principle, i.e., the moral law, and not from any inclination to an object in the sensuous realm. Kant repeatedly insists that for an action to be "morally good," it is not sufficient for it to conform to a moral law; rather, it must be done for the sake of that law. The reason for this is that anytime there is a specific content given to a law, it is necessarily limited in its application and its validity. So, if we merely "conform" to a moral law, we are not, by Kant's definition, following the formal, universal law legislated by reason, for Kant's law is based upon no particular content; therefore, it would be impossible to "conform" to it. As Kant explains, "The sole principle of morality consists in independence from all material of the law (i.e., a desired object) and in the accompanying of choice by the mere universal legis-lating form which a maxim must be capable of having. That independence, however, is freedom in the negative sense, while this intrinsic legislation of pure and thus practical reason is freedom in the positive sense. Therefore, the moral law expresses nothing else than the autonomy of the pure practical reason, i.e., freedom." 

It appears as though Kant has introduced yet another dualism here; now freedom itself has 2 different aspects, as do reason and reality. There is "negative freedom," which looses us from the laws of nature (from necessity), and there is also "positive freedom," whereby someone willing gives himself a law, and then submits to its jurisdiction, rather than submitting to an alien one. This positive freedom is actually
the source of the law that the free will follows when initiating a new series of events in time.\(^23\) Since it is this moral act of self-legislation (submitting to one's own law) which liberates us from the determination of causal relationships, freedom is now seen clearly as residing in the individual subject—not in the objective world of sensory experiences.

But this connection between law and free will also serves as a bridge between the two aspects of the world. For the laws of causality do operate in our everyday phenomenal realm; therefore, it follows that our free will itself can not be lawless, but must operate according to laws of a "peculiar kind,"\(^24\) one of which is self-legislation. Kant believes that nothing less than the dignity of humanity itself, its intrinsic worth, is based upon this capacity to formulate universal normative laws to which it is also subject.

Moral value, and our primary responsibility, are thus found to lie within "the principle of the will, irrespective of the ends which can be realized by such action. For the will stands, as it were, at the crossroads half-way between its a priori principle which is formal and its a posteriori incentive which is material."\(^25\) The moral will, therefore, signifies a relationship between our a priori reason and our a posteriori (known through experience) desires. For these are two distinguishable aspects of all acts of will: a want for something in the sensuous world, which is a dynamic incentive to our impulses; and a recognition of duty, which is a cognitive realization of what we "ought" to do. It is this distinction that separates acts of will from those of mere desire, in which the objects are the sole goals of our behavior. But
Kant maintains that acts of will are further guided by knowledge of the principle which relates such actions objectively. The fundamental difference that this makes is seen in the fact that although all animals have desire, only rational men possess will. It is solely through our reason that we become aware of ourselves, and consequently aware of the conflicting claims between our duty and our desires. As noted earlier, Kant claims that nature itself presents us with neither a sense of obligation or of duty, and it is only by using our powers of self-reflection that we are able to separate ourselves from the realm of nature, and participate in the noumenal realm by consciously and freely willing to do either "good" or "evil."

Man's only guides to such actions are found in Kant's notion of "imperatives," which are commands of reason that function as constraints upon a will which is not totally good, i.e., upon a human will. There are two kinds of imperatives, hypothetical and categorical. Hypothetical imperatives are those in which the action is good only as a means to something else; but a categorical imperative is one in which the action is good in and of itself—as an end, not as a means. There is, however, only one categorical imperative. It is: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." For it is through the necessity of an action performed from respect for this law that duty, which is the "condition" of a will which is good in itself, arises. Only those actions which are performed according to duty, not desire, have moral worth. Furthermore, this worth is determined by the universal form of the moral law, not by its particular content.
Yet it is just this emphasis on the form of the categorical imperative, rather than its content or context, which has led to numerous criticisms from other philosophers who either failed to grasp, or to agree with, Kant's attempt to find a via media between the chaotic anarchy of a free will subject to no laws, and the oppressive tyranny of one subject to laws imposed from without. Kant claims that the "free will must find its ground of determination in law, but independently of the material of the law."29 His categorical imperative achieves this precisely because it does not attain its validity through any "utilitarian accomplishment of predetermined ends", (in which case it would be merely a "means"); but rather, through the form of its universal legislation, it proves itself to be an end. Since this moral imperative is a law formulated by reason, and not by experience gained through the senses, it is "formal"; therefore, it is not determined by any of the causal laws of nature pertaining to the phenomenal realm. In other words, it is based on autonomy--or free will--and thus is not limited in its validity or applicability to any particular content or context.30 Furthermore, this form is not, as some detractors have suggested, empty of content, but by its very "universalizability" it prescribes a criterion by which any law can be evaluated.

Although this may sound as if it is contradictory, or at best confusing, it is consistent with Kant's other attempts to resolve such seemingly contradictory concepts as things-in-appearance and things-in-themselves, or free will and determinism. To Kant, such contradictions are apparent rather than real, and are the result of our application of the rules of one realm to the objects in another. As Kant had
warned, "Freedom . . . among all the ideas of speculative reason is the only one whose possibility we know a priori. We do not understand it, but we know it as the condition of the moral law which we do know."31 But if freedom can never be understood completely, because it is the object of something in the noumenal realm (i.e., moral will), not of something in the phenomenal realm (which human understanding determines), it can still be thought of as a possibility; and the fact that we fail to understand it does not in any way negate or limit its reality.

With his observation that "obedience to the law that one has himself prescribed is the only real freedom"32, because it is the only time that our actions are not determined by causal events in the phenomenal world, Kant feels he has discovered an essential connection between the apparently contradictory concepts of laws and freedom. He thus can offer a way to transcend the paradox of our position as self-conscious beings who are phenomenally determined in the world of appearances, but noumenally free in the world of essences, and this is but another of his "revolutionary" theories. In the final analysis, it would appear as if Kant had successfully accomplished his primary objectives. With his fundamental identification of practical reason with will, Kant was able to rescue our concept of free will from the causal determinism suggested by 18th century scientific and philosophic thought, and thereby to offer a way out of the apparent dualisms within his own system. In this way, Kant made good on his "revolutionary" attempt to liberate thought, through a self-critique of the limits of reason, from the traditional stalemate between the dogmatic claims of the rationalists and the skeptical attacks of the empiricists.
It should be apparent by now that Kant's concept of a free will is incredibly more complex than just a "source of action." It is also the source for all moral decisions and actions, the bridge between the noumenal and phenomenal realms, and the legislating agent which is both author of, and obedient to, its own laws. It is undeniably real, and the locus of power is firmly established in the individual--but this power is expressed only through the ethical demands of reason in the form of the categorical imperative.

The question arises, how such a previously neglected notion as the autonomous faculty of will could have developed into the foundation for a sophisticated philosophical system such as Kant's? How was it possible for the concept of will to rid itself of its illusory or subordinated position, which it had acquired by the end of the seventeenth century, and to become the focal point of philosophy--all within a span of approximately one hundred years? It seems reasonable to suggest that two developments within this period were crucial. First, "man" became the object of both scientific and philosophic investigations, a process encouraged by the factual advancement of scientific revolution and the theoretical insights of such early Enlightenment thinkers as Descartes, Locke, and Vico. By 1785, when Kant's *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* was published, the successful conclusion of the American Revolution proved that men and women could alter not only their own present, but their future as well. In such an intellectual climate, Kant's postulation of the will as the basis of both freedom and morality was not as unthinkable as it might have been even a few decades before.
Schopenhauer
Kant's "revolutionary" focus on the will as a basic component of his philosophical system stimulated further investigations and interpretations of the will throughout the 19th century, several of which finally departed in important respects from Kant's metaphysical conception of the will and his belief in its central moral function. One of the earliest of these is Schopenhauer's multivolume work, The World as Will and Idea (1818). As this title suggests, Schopenhauer also places the will at the center of his philosophical theories. But it is with a decided difference: for Schopenhauer not only distinguishes the will from any reason whatsoever, whether it be "pure" or "practical", but also asserts the essentially amoral nature of the will itself. Kant's view thus appears to have spawned its own antithesis in Schopenhauer.

Nevertheless, Schopenhauer's views are based upon the Kantian philosophy. He repeatedly refers to himself as "Kant's true successor". Schopenhauer explains how he could owe so much to Kant, and yet deviate so far from his views on the most crucial matters, in a lengthy critique in The World as Will and Idea. Here he credits Kant with perceiving the fundamental distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal realms, but then chides him for not attaining "to the knowledge that phenomena is the world as idea, and the thing in itself is the will."35 Schopenhauer thus accepts Kant's dualistic vision of reality, and believes that he has actually perfected the Kantian system by discovering the true nature of the noumenal realm. Although Kant had claimed that this knowledge was forever barred from man's understanding, Schopenhauer disagrees.

As Schopenhauer explains, Kant had seen that all natural laws, as well as the world itself, were conditioned by the form of the subject's
knowledge. That is, our knowledge of our world is always determined by the a priori forms (such as, space and time) which we have imposed on our experience, or in Schopenhauer's paraphrase of this Kantian insight, "the world is my idea"; however, this vision of the world as idea is merely its phenomenal appearance, not its noumenal essence. To discover this noumenal reality, Kant had used his reflective knowledge to posit the "other side of appearances". But this assumption of the noumenal was itself based upon an inference from the law of causality, which held that our sensations must have an external cause. Since the notions of causality, space, and time—the forms of the visible world which condition our very perception of it by our senses—are known to us a priori through intuition, it follows that such purely intuitive perceptions underlie our empirical perceptions.

Yet this is precisely the point at which Kant became "confused". For if these concepts are all known to us a priori, Schopenhauer claims, they are, consequently, functions of our intellect; therefore, they are of subjective origin, and sensation itself is purely subjective. Kant's "mistake" is that he failed to distinguish properly between perceptible knowledge (what we know by intuition or sensation) and abstract knowledge (what we know by reason or reflection). This failure led to Kant's "inextricable confusion" of intuitive and abstract knowledge, in which Kant further confused the idea of perception with that of abstract ideas and called it "experience." Schopenhauer cites several examples of this confusion in Kant's works: for example, in his Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics (sections 20-22), Kant claimed that perception and sensation belong only to our sensory experience, while judgment
(thinking) belonged solely to our understanding. But if we apply the law of causality entirely a priori (prior to our experience of changes experienced by our senses), this "law" is of as subjective an origin as our sensations are; therefore, it can not lead to any noumenal knowledge.\textsuperscript{39}

Schopenhauer rescues Kant's "true and important insight" as to the a priori nature of the causal law from Kant's "fallacious proofs" by claiming that "empirical perception is and remains merely our idea; it is the world as idea."\textsuperscript{40} From this realization, Schopenhauer argues that there is no real difference between experience and its object; therefore, the reality is the representation, and more specifically, the world is my representation. Only through our own self-conscious awareness, which "proclaims the will as the inner nature of our own phenomena",\textsuperscript{41} can we realize that the will is also the "inner essence" of the world itself. Schopenhauer contends that such intuitive insights into our own nature provide parallel insights into the nature of reality per se and allow us to perceive that the core of mankind and the core of the world is will.\textsuperscript{42}

But what is this generalized concept of the will, which is the metaphysical basis of all phenomena? Here again, Schopenhauer distances himself from Kant by defining the will as the ultimate principle of being--as "one almighty, indestructible, eternal"\textsuperscript{43} striving for "something". The will is the causeless craving which only expresses the will to live--to continue existing--but which has no specific goal. It is unrest, demand, an insatiable desire for existence that wells up as soon as it has been satisfied: it is the true expression of the world's (and
our) innermost being. Yet because this will is the noumenal reality, it exists outside of space and time, and only becomes the "world" as it becomes objectified in space and time according to the principle of individualization. In other words, as it becomes divided against itself, against its essential one-ness, and becomes objectified as "I" and "they," (as the world and its multiplicity of beings), it begins to strive against itself. This is a direct result of the fact that each particular individual now strives for himself.

This will is not only egoistic, but—a radical departure from Kant—is opposed to the welfare of anyone other than ourselves, and is, therefore, heedless of moral considerations altogether. Furthermore, we ourselves, as manifestations of this will, are imbued with an overpowering a priori desire for life: "We ourselves are the will to live, and therefore we must live, well or ill." Hence, our primary focus and only direction, which is given to us a priori and grounded in noumenal reality, is to exist, to continue being, and moral laws or categorical imperatives have no foundation in such a primeval force as Schopenhauer's will.

Even the world itself, as it manifests this all-encompassing, blindly demanding will, seems far removed from the Kantian realm, where order, reason, and morality prevail. Instead, Schopenhauer's world is one in which chaos reigns over meaningless struggle and strife, and our only source of satisfaction and stability—our self-conscious awareness of ourselves as individual beings—is itself an illusion. For as, Schopenhauer notes, "at bottom, it is the will that is spoken of whenever 'I' appears in a judgment." Since there is no ultimate distinction between "my" will and "your" will, (both are merely manifestations
of the primordial will), the world is nothing more than the site of distressing conflict and deception, and the "I" of my awareness is no more than the "mouthpiece" of the will to live, which "gnaws at itself forever."47

As dismally depressing as this seems, the fact that I do have self-conscious awareness provides my only pathway of escape from the misery and insatiable wants of this world. Although the will, "as noumena, constitutes the inner, true, and indestructible nature of man; in itself, however, it is unconscious. For consciousness is conditioned by the intellect, and the intellect is a mere accident of our being . . ."48 It is only the knowing intellect, which is itself "passive" and a "servant of the will,"49 which can become aware of the nature of the world as will, and can penetrate the illusions of individuation to perceive the noumenal reality of the will. Or, as Schopenhauer puts it, "The will is the substance of man, the intellect the accident; the will is the matter, the intellect is the form; the will is the warmth, the intellect is the light."50 In direct opposition to the traditional theories, Schopenhauer cites further evidence of the will's power over the intellect: "The intellect is really like the reflective surface of the water, but the water itself is like the will, whose disturbance, therefore, at once destroys the clearness of that mirror and the distinctness of its images."51 And, while the intellect may become tired, because knowing is always accompanied by effort, the will is never tired, because willing is our very nature, and thus requires neither effort nor practice.52 The will's dominance requires that, at times, the "intellect must do violence to its own nature, which aims at the truth, for it compels its self, contrary to its own laws, to regard as true things
which are neither true nor probable, . . . in order to appease . . . for a while the restlessness and unmanageability of the will."  

After thus "proving" the ultimate impotence of the intellect in relation to the will, Schopenhauer surprisingly asserts that this very same intellect may function "free" from the will. It does this through self-awareness, by which "knowledge breaks free from the service of the will, by subjectively ceasing to be merely individual, and thus becoming the pure will-less subject of knowledge . . ."  

Once the intellect has, through contemplation, perceived the one-ness of the will behind the veil of multiplicity, it can quiet and stifle the will—temporarily. In fact, this "whole knowledge of the nature of the world, the mirror of the will, which has grown up through the comprehension of Ideas, becomes a quieter of the will; and thus free, the will suppresses itself."  

This contemplation is facilitated by both aesthetic and philosophic speculations, but is itself always subject to the tension between the temporary supremacy of our intellect, and the eternal supremacy of the will.  

Although it is not altogether clear how the intellect can ever gain supremacy over the will, one can infer, from Schopenhauer's contention that the will, when "freed" by intellectual contemplation, "suppresses itself", that his theory allows for some form of freedom for the will. But this he specifically does not do when speaking of the will in the phenomenal realm—which is the only realm in which we can sensibly speak of having "free will". Schopenhauer agrees with Kant that while freedom is commonly defined in a negative way, as the absence of restraints, when freedom manifests power, it becomes positive. Schopenhauer differ-
entiatates among three different types of freedom—physical, intellectual, and moral. Physical freedom is expressed by the notion that everything moves or acts only as a result of its own will; intellectual freedom presupposes that we have voluntary control over our own thoughts; and the concept of moral freedom assumes that "I am free when I can do what I will." Although these distinctions are not quite clear, Schopenhauer focusses on the last assumption. He discovers that the notion of moral freedom raises the question whether I am free to will my own volitions. This is the crucial issue to Schopenhauer, who sees the real question here to be: "does the will retain the freedom to will or not to will?"58

Essential to this question is the distinction between wishing and willing. Schopenhauer explains that one "can wish two opposing actions, but will only one of them. Only the act reveals to his self-consciousness which of the two he wills."59 What is truly at issue here is the grounds of each act of willing. If, as Schopenhauer contends, man's will is his authentic self, the true "core of his being", then it constitutes the ground of his being, and is something beyond which he cannot go. In other words, man "is as he wills, and wills as he is . . . Therefore, to ask him whether he could also will differently than he does is to ask whether he could also be other than himself; and that he does not know."60 Although Schopenhauer agrees with the subjectively-felt fact that we all self-consciously believe that we can do what we will, he further explains: "'You can do what you will, but in any given moment of your life you can will only one definite thing, and absolutely nothing other than that one thing.'"61 We thus have only a "relative and comparative freedom" which is dependent upon our capability of thought. This gives us a greater number of choices than animals
have, because we are free of the immediate compulsion of perception that forces them to act, but is not what we usually mean by "freedom", i.e., acting without restraints. We are, however, always subject to our "natural delusion" that posits our firmly held, self-conscious conviction that we have freedom over our own will. In a passage that is reminiscent of Spinoza's parable of the stone's certainty of its own freedom of motion, Schopenhauer describes the water's similar conviction:

'I can make high waves (yes! in the sea during a storm); I can rush down hill (yes! in the river bed); I can plunge down foaming and gushing (yes! in the waterfall); I can rise freely as a stream of water into the air (yes! in the fountain), . . . but I am doing none of these things now, and am voluntarily remaining quiet and clear water in the reflecting pond.'

Nevertheless, Schopenhauer's belief in the illusory aspect of the "freedom" of our will is fundamentally opposed to Spinoza's view. For Schopenhauer never doubts the reality of the will itself, which is Spinoza's contention, but only the illusion as to its freedom in the phenomenal realm. Schopenhauer attempts to explain away this confusing aspect of the will by positing the origin of our belief in our own free will as the result of our perception of the noumenal reality of the will itself. The will "reveals itself to every one directly as the in-itself of his own phenomenal being. And it is also this immediate knowledge of one's own will out of which in human consciousness the concept of freedom springs; for certainly the will as world-creating, as noumena, is free from the principle of sufficient reason and therewith from all necessity, thus is completely independent, free, and indeed almighty." 63

Although our own will, as it participates in this phenomenal world, is subject to the causal laws of nature, (from which Kant had liberated it), it is "free" only so far as it manifests the noumenal will--the
driving force of our being—behind it. But we have no power or control over this will in the long run, only the temporary respite from its external striving which is offered by intellectual contemplation of artistic works or philosophical principles. As Schopenhauer further explains, our notion that "I can will this" carries along with it an additional clause, "if I did not prefer the other." "But this addition annihilates that ability to will." 64

Perhaps Schopenhauer's greatest distance from Kant is obvious here. Unlike Kant, Schopenhauer sees man as an objectification of the primordial will—which means that man is an object, not a subject; therefore, like all other objects of experience, man is a phenomenon in space and time, and thereby subject to the causal laws of nature. "If freedom of the will were presupposed, every human action would be an inexplicable miracle—an effect without a cause." 65 This is impossible, of course, in the phenomenal realm which operates under the laws of causality, where Schopenhauer defines "cause" itself as the "antecedent change which makes the following one necessary." 66

From the preceding, it would seem as though Schopenhauer had abandoned any pretense of a philosophy which could deal with moral matters. By denying both the transcendent God of traditional thought, as well as the Kantian free will, Schopenhauer at first appears to eliminate all possibility of ethical choice from his interpretation of the world. He claims that "no system of ethics is possible which moulds and improves the will itself. For all teaching only affects knowledge, and knowledge never determines the will itself..." 67 But this is not the whole picture, since Schopenhauer does believe in ethical responsibility for
the content of one's actions. "From what we do we know what we are."68 It is from this assertion that we achieve consciousness of the responsibility and moral demands of life. "In a word, man does at all times only what he wills, and yet he does this necessarily. But this is due to the fact that he already is what he wills."69 Even though we all subjectively believe that we do only what we will, this merely means that our actions are the pure expressions of our own being. For Schopenhauer firmly contends, as noted before, that it is the will that is spoken of whenever "I" appears in a judgment.70

Although this view may seem to have the cards unfairly stacked against the individual who wishes to do "good", this is precisely Schopenhauer's point. Because he claims that, "everyone knows his will only in its successive acts, and not as a whole, in and for itself; therefore, no one knows his character a priori, but only learns it through experience and always incompletely."71 By denying us the complete picture of what/who we are at any given moment, we may be led to reflect upon our own individuation and perceive its illusory nature. If so, we may come to the realization that our ego is identical with that of others, and that the barriers separating us from others are unreal. Through such contemplation, we would learn that the principle of individuation is valid only in the phenomenal world of appearances, and that the true nature of each of us is identical. We would then have compassion (sometimes translated as "pity") for others, for we would see and feel the suffering of others as if it were our own—which it is. It is this compassion which is the basis of Schopenhauer's morality.72

Schopenhauer's distance from Kant is thus immense. Not only is his universe one in which chaos and the meaningless struggle to survive
Constitute noumenal reality, but his foundation for morality, in which one's ever-changing emotions determine one's compassion—or the lack thereof, is irrational; hence, it is the polar opposite of Kant's "pure practical reason". Yet there remains a line of continuity with Kant's views, and even with those of Plato, in Schopenhauer's philosophy. He sees himself as their successor because they insisted, as he does, upon a disparity between what we perceive, (phenomena) and what is "really real" (noumena). Furthermore, the content of even our faulty perceptions is dependent upon our own intellectual apparatus (Plato's parable of The Cave). Thus, Kant's all-important insight that both objects in space and time, as well as space and time per se, are conditioned by the perceiving subject—and constitute our "spectacles"—is of primary significance for Schopenhauer, too. If, as some thinkers suggest, the motive power behind all philosophy is the need to find something eternal behind all change; and if, as Classical philosophers claimed, the more lasting and real something was, the greater its perfection, then Schopenhauer achieved his own "transvaluation of values" by positing the ever-striving will as the core of the noumenal reality. For the "essence" of all appearances is now seen to be an ever-changing, insatiable appetite for existence, which "wells up" as soon as it is satisfied, and constantly seeks new paths of exploitation. In other words, all that is truly "eternal" is eternal change and process—but with no meaning, "pattern", or "Plan" behind it. In place of the "heavenly reward" for morally "good" behavior on earth offered by Christian theologians, or the "eternal advancement of mankind" offered by Kant, Schopenhauer posits only the ephemeral feeling of compassion—and the realization that
both the suffering, and its amelioration, in others is our own. Thus, in Schopenhauer's moral system, to alleviate suffering in another is suddenly a crucial element in alleviating it in ourselves—and this seems to be a perfect instance of "enlightened self-interest".

As one recent admirer of Schopenhauer explains: "To stand up for the temporal against merciless eternity is morality in Schopenhauer's sense. 74 By postulating blind will as the eternal force—the only reality, Schopenhauer "unmasks the treachery of the old metaphysics by showing that no need is ever compensated for in any Beyond." 75 For Schopenhauer believes that all distinctions of morality are nothing more than the creations of men, and simply reflect our own feelings and desires within a particular context, at a particular time. 76 In Schopenhauer's view, one does not want something because it is "good", but defines it as "good" because he wants it, a point on which Nietzsche concurs. In such a vision, a categorical imperative becomes an impossibility, and Kant's attempt to provide a universal form for morality becomes an absurdity. For if what is "good" is whatever an individual desires at any moment, it can have no universal applicability. The whole idea of a categorical imperative is, in fact, a logical impossibility to Schopenhauer, since all imperatives are due to some condition in the phenomenal realm; therefore, an "unconditioned imperative" is a contradiction in terms, 77 and any attempt to impose a moral law on basically irrational beings is of little use.

Thus, while Kant's ethical system is one of imperative reason, with an abstract a priori basis, Schopenhauer's is one of compassionate feeling, based on actual experience. 78 Where Kant scorns an empirical basis
for ethics in either feelings or inclinations, and instead locates it in the noumenal character of rational beings who are autonomous members of the moral order, Schopenhauer shifts the focus and maintains that morality, to have any real significance, must be rooted in real human experiences. Although this appears to be a reasonable request, the practical consequences of Schopenhauer's system show only the insignificance of the human condition altogether. His ethical theory, which is based on sympathy, compassion, or "pity" with the condition of others who are trapped, as we are, in a world of illusion--whose only "purpose" is to manifest the purposeless force of the noumenal will--leads to, at best, self-effacement at the prospect of such a pessimistic world view. At worst, it seems to lead to a desire for self-obliteration and the eventual extinction of all life. For Schopenhauer appears to be saying that the annihilation of individuality is desirable, if only temporarily possible; and since this individuality is only an objectification of the metaphysical will, the annihilation of this noumenal will is also desirable--although permanently impossible. While this derogation of reason as a mere tool which the will employs to achieve its own temporary satisfaction and security may have helped topple reason from its unequalled elevation at the hands of Enlightenment thinkers, it did so at the expense of providing any "reason" why this nothingness--this annihilation of the will and its manifestations--was preferable to anything else, no matter how illusory.

In any case, one must wonder how such a pessimistic philosophy could develop from its purportedly Kantian roots in little more than a decade after Kant's death. How did Plato's "ideas" become, in Schopenhauer's system, "incurably gluttonous", and serve only as nourishment
for the will? Some twentieth century thinkers have surmised that Schopenhauer's theories grew out his "hatred for the indecent optimism of the contemporary demagogy of progress," while others have seen his own "passionate temperament" and bitter personal experiences as "conspiring to suggest to Schopenhauer the primacy and ultimacy of the will." Certainly Kant's philosophical "revolution", as well as the course of the French Revolution, illuminated the limits of reason in ways previously unknown, while Rousseau's emphasis on the power of our emotions, and Napoleon's rise to political power and predominance within Europe illustrated the dynamic, forceful nature of change. But, unfortunately, within the first decade and a half of the new century, Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo and the reactionary character of the Congress of Vienna in 1815 seemed to exemplify Voltaire's dictum: "The more things change, the more they remain the same." It may be that these political events paved the way for Schopenhauer's pessimistic vision, or at least enabled him to perceive the illusory nature of much of the phenomenal realm. This, coupled with his "imperfect understanding" of Indian philosophy, perhaps facilitated Schopenhauer's postulation of will as the only reality. Whatever factors, or combinations thereof, were responsible for the formation of his thought, Schopenhauer left a philosophical legacy which was itself later transformed by the works of Nietzsche into a vision of exhilarating possibilities.
Nietzsche
Nietzsche's philosophical views, as they were articulated in the latter half of the 19th century, are both a continuation and a rejection of those of Kant and Schopenhauer. It is their works which provide Nietzsche with certain insights and vocabulary, as well as with enemies to overcome. Yet this fundamental similarity of interest is easily obscured by Nietzsche's radically different style, methodology, and conclusions, and by his later repudiation of much of Schopenhauer's teaching. For Nietzsche uses the thought of Kant and Schopenhauer as a springboard to take off on a purportedly new direction for thought, thereby giving the will a new appearance as well. It is, therefore, necessary to begin with a brief overview of Nietzsche's project as a whole.

Central to Nietzsche's new course in philosophical inquiry is his claim that it is our language which is responsible for many of the muddled metaphysical systems which are perennially springing up in the quest for "truth" and "reality". Nietzsche sees the problem as two-fold. First, he contends that our minds are dominated by the grammatical structure of our language. We impose the subject/predicate relationship, whereby every predicate requires a subject, onto the structure of the world at large; therefore, we demand that every action requires an agent. The consequences of this projection of our own inability to comprehend the world in any other terms are profound. It is this subject/predicate relationship which is actually the basis for the distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal realms. Nevertheless, this distinction is one that rests on erroneous reasoning, and is therefore, rejected by Nietzsche. Instead, he suggests that: "Once we understand that the subject is an invention, the opposition between Ding an Sich [Subject-in-itself]..."
and appearance becomes untenable—so that the concept of appearance collapses.\textsuperscript{84} Perhaps Nietzsche's refusal to accept the Kantian distinction between noumena and phenomena is responsible for his denial of all such dualistic interpretations of the world as equally false and irrelevant. As he explains, "there is no 'being' behind the doing, acting, and becoming; the 'doer' has simply been added to the deed by the imagination—the doing is everything."\textsuperscript{85}

The second stumbling block is our necessity of thinking in words, which we use as though they were actually explanations of things, and from which we are thereby able to derive "knowledge". But Nietzsche denies that this is, in fact, the case. He believes that the roots of this problem lie in the prehistoric past, and originated because the "sculptor of language was not so modest as to believe that he was only giving things designations, he conceived rather that with words he was expressing supreme knowledge of things."\textsuperscript{86} Nietzsche rejects this assumption, and claims: "'Thingness' was first created by us".\textsuperscript{87} This means that the fundamental relationship of all "things" is that of "being-an-object-for-an-interpreting-subject,"\textsuperscript{88} and our interpretations are of paramount importance in determining what we "know."

Moreover, Nietzsche contends that knowledge "is not to 'know' but to schematize—to impose upon chaos as much regularity and form as suffices for our practical requirements."\textsuperscript{89} The very fact that we do conceptualize and impose our own language-based schema on our world, which is otherwise senseless and formless, is not only necessary; it is also an example of our will to power—our human need to order and structure our universe, and thus preserve our sense of dignity and importance.
And we are not distinct from what we interpret or do. We are will to power, for our interpretation of this world is a mode of imposition, a means by which we exert our power over our world, and attempt to become master over it. The world is, therefore, something that we make and re-make, and has no meaning or structure other than what we give it. Hence, Nietzsche's assertion: "Against positivism, which halts at phenomena--'There are only facts'--I would say: No, facts are precisely what there are not, only interpretations." Obviously, Nietzsche's emphasis on interpretation as one mode of the will to power suggests a very different view of will from those of Kant and Schopenhauer.

Furthermore, among these interpretations, or perspectives, which we have created, are the "laws" of science and mathematics, including the canons of logical argument and deduction. Nietzsche maintains that logic itself is nothing more than a scheme to make our world comprehensible to us, and really "rests on presuppositions with which nothing in the actual world corresponds." But logic and science, although fictitious and erroneous, nevertheless are necessary for the preservation and enhancement of mankind. And language, for all its limitations, is similarly essential, for without it: "we cease to think when we refuse to do so under the constraint of language . . . Rational thought is interpretation according to a scheme we can not jettison."

Nietzsche, therefore, resigns himself to the use of a faulty tool, language--because that is the only instrument available--to communicate his philosophical insights. At the same time, since he perceives that language necessarily simplifies and thus distorts what it interprets, Nietzsche attempts to limit its potential for falsification by utiliz-
ing the stylistic devices of aphorisms and "thought experiments" to disclose his views. This is in direct opposition to the systematic studies of the "essence" of reality undertaken by Kant and Schopenhauer, which are "suspicious" to Nietzsche because they assume the veracity of linguistic and logical constructs. He even goes so far as to suggest that, "The will to a system is a lack of integrity." 95

Yet Nietzsche's approach is more than merely a reflection of this anti-systematic bias. Aphorisms and thought experiments are especially well-suited to conveying various perspectives and interpretations, and easily enable Nietzsche to adopt and discard notions freely. Perhaps of equal benefit is their discontinuous nature, which Nietzsche finds helpful in his attempts to disturb, and hopefully awaken, the thought processes of his intellectually "lazy" audience. 96 This is, obviously, a very different project from those of Kant and Schopenhauer, and thus necessitates a different methodology. Nietzsche explains this new direction to philosophical inquiry, and the dangers inherent in such pursuits, in his preface to Daybreak (1887): "In this book you will discover a 'subterranean man' at work, one who tunnels and mines and undermines." 97 This is not only an apt description of Nietzsche's method of seeking out the psychological and sociological origins of beliefs and systems (as opposed to their "essences"); but also illustrates the corrosive impact of his views on those of traditional philosophic thought. 98

Before proceeding with an examination of Nietzsche's notion of the will, however, it may be helpful to outline a few of the individual debts--and later differences--which Nietzsche's thought owed to Kant and Schopenhauer. Initially, Kant's influence on Nietzsche appears to be
more difficult to discern than Schopenhauer's. Yet Kant's attempt to provide a "metaphysics of experience" was to have a pronounced effect on Nietzsche's own work. 99 Central to this were Kant's critique and limitation of reason, and his focus on the will. Kant's disclosure that traditional metaphysical speculations (which aimed at establishing the existence of God, immortality of the soul, etc.) were unattainable because they were beyond all human experience and knowledge, however, contained a hidden element of "implicit agnosticism" which was not lost on Nietzsche. 100 Additionally, Kant's Copernican Revolution in philosophy held that the noumenal realm was forever outside of our possible knowledge, which was itself dependent on what we, as human beings, actually are and do with our sensory information. Nietzsche accepts both of these Kantian notions: that we make a subjective contribution to experience, and therefore to knowledge; and that we can never know the noumenal (or "true") world. Although Nietzsche adapts these concepts to accommodate his own theories, nevertheless, it is these Kantian insights which underlie his own insistence upon the interpretive and perspectival nature of "truth", art, science, and mathematics.

But Nietzsche's overall reaction to the Kantian view that our knowledge is unable to transcend the limits of our own senses and experiences is profoundly different from Kant's. Instead of Kant's faint-hearted attempt to limit reason and thereby make room for "faith", Nietzsche decides to limit his own investigations to the phenomenal realm, the apparent world, which is the only one that we can ever "know". Nietzsche realizes that this choice requires the courage to acknowledge that there is no eternal realm to which we may ever aspire. Yet he sees his direc-
tion as preferable to Kant's deplorable contention that reason only knows that it can never hope to comprehend the noumenal realm. Nietzsche finds Kant's claim to be both a continuation of the traditional "perversion of philosophy," and a form of sadistic pleasure in which "reason in its self-contempt and self-mockery decrees that the realm of truth does indeed exist, but that reason is debarred from it."\(^1\) Nietzsche decides that Kant's entire notion of the noumenal realm is fatally flawed and hopelessly confused.

Nietzsche sees Kant's two mistakes to be his concepts of causality and noumena. Nietzsche claims that "there is no such thing as a sense of causality, as Kant thinks. The supposed instinct for causality is only fear of the unfamiliar, and the attempt to discover something familiar in it--is a search, not for causes, but for the familiar."\(^2\) We have merely combined our feelings of freedom, will, responsibility, and intention to perform certain acts into a single concept of "cause," and then proceeded to "explain" events whenever any condition was detected in which that event was already contained. "In fact, we invent all causes after the schema of the effects--the latter is known to us."\(^3\) What gives us our firm belief in causality, however, is not just our habit of seeing one event following another (as Hume suggested), "but our inability to interpret events other than as events caused by our own intentions."\(^4\) It is, therefore, this inability that induces us to posit will and intention as the only effective forces, and then allows us to interpret every event as a "deed," each of which presupposes a causal link with its "doer."

As to Kant's noumenal confusions, Nietzsche criticizes these along
the same lines that Schopenhauer had previously examined. Since Kant held that the principle of causality did not apply between the realms of noumena and phenomena, he could not infer the existence of noumena by such a principle. Because noumena are not the direct objects of perception or intuition (in opposition to Schopenhauer's notion of will), they are "empty" concepts, i.e., they are concepts without precepts. In addition, Nietzsche argues that nothing can exist independently of other things, and something that does exist in such a manner (a "thing-in-itself") is a thing without properties or, in other words, "no-thing." Thus, Kant's whole notion of a "thing-in-itself" is just as perverse to Nietzsche as a "sense-in-itself" or a "meaning-in-itself." Nietzsche argues: "There are no 'facts-in-themselves', for a sense must always be projected into them before they can be facts."106

So far, Nietzsche's critiques of Kant's mistaken ideas of causality and noumena have been supported by his theory that language itself distorts and falsifies what it attempts to explain. But there is an additional element in his rejection of Kant's dualism. Nietzsche perceives that the notion of an inaccessible real or true world acts to degrade and impoverish this world. Since Nietzsche views the world as a totality, he investigates the roots of this dualistic theory, and determines that concepts such as: "This apparent, phenomenal world is not the 'real world!'" are actually based on "Contempt, and hatred for all that perishes, changes, varies ..." He further explores the "psychology of metaphysics" to find where such a "valuation of that which remains constant" originates. Nietzsche concludes:

This world is apparent, consequently, there is a true world;
this world is conditioned, consequently there is an unconditioned world... this world is one of becoming, therefore, there is a world of being—all false conclusions (because of the blind trust in reason: if A exists, then the opposite concept B must also exist)(somewhere). It is suffering that inspires these conclusions: fundamentally, they are desires that such a world should exist: similarly, to imagine another more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the resentment of metaphysics against actuality is here creative.

Against this Kantian "resentment" of reality, Nietzsche turns to Schopenhauer, who at least accepts the necessity of suffering. Nietzsche, an admitted "disciple" of Schopenhauer for a time, admits in Ecce Homo (1888) that, "It was atheism that had drawn me to Schopenhauer." But this is only one of a number of factors involved in Nietzsche's early enthusiasm for Schopenhauer's thought. Some of these are the more subtle elements of influence which Nietzsche discusses in his essay "Schopenhauer as Educator" (1874). Here Nietzsche cites "his [Schopenhauer's] honesty, his joy, and his consistency," and also praises Schopenhauer's persistence in upholding the truth of his "unacceptable" philosophy. "He was absolutely alone, with no single friend of his own kind to comfort him; and between one and none there lies an infinity—as ever between something and nothing." The analogies with Nietzsche's own "acceptance" (or lack thereof) in philosophical circles, and of his solitary lifestyle are striking, and Nietzsche undoubtedly felt some affinity with this man he described as his "deliverer." Even Nietzsche's outrage over the attempts of his contemporaries to "adapt" Schopenhauer's thought to their "enervated" age is, in light of Nietzsche's own subsequent use/abuse, prescient as well as poignant. In a passage which might have described Nietzsche's later fate, he reveals that "the new danger has gradually arisen of regarding him [Schopenhauer] as an
odd kind of pungent herb, of taking him in grains, as a sort of meta-
physical pepper."\textsuperscript{113}

But the significance of Schopenhauer's impact on Nietzsche's own
thought lies in the vision of a universe without purpose or ultimate
meaning, dominated by human suffering and frustration, and itself merely
the expression of a blind will. Such a world, which can only be glimpsed
through the subjective perception that we are this will, is not a ration-
al structure created by some divine or law-abiding intellect. Further-
more, this view proves that the human intellect, (the "servant" of the
will) can not be an "autonomous entity."\textsuperscript{114} With this insight, Schopen-
hauer not only questioned Kant's emphasis on reason and will as autono-
ous faculties, but negated Hegel's claim that the real was rational,
and the rational was real. Nietzsche was forever indebted to Schopen-
hauer for this illumination of the irrational will as the only reality,
with all of its atheistic implications, and for the subordination of the
intellect to the will.

Ironically, it is in reference to Schopenhauer's own most highly
valued belief that Nietzsche failed to acquiesce. Schopenhauer took
great pride in having attained the "one true insight" that had eluded
Kant--the knowledge that the noumenal reality was the will. Although a
detailed exposition of Nietzsche's version of will is to be found in a
later section, suffice it to say that Schopenhauer's metaphysical "will
to live" is similar in word only to Nietzsche's physiological complex of
drives which, because it enters consciousness as one sensation, is des-
ignated by the single word "will."\textsuperscript{115} Against Schopenhauer's claim that
only the will is really known to us, Nietzsche asserts the complexity of
the very notion of will: "Willing seems to me to be above all something complicated, something that is a unit only as a word ..." \[116\]

As Nietzsche explains: "Schopenhauer's basic misunderstanding of the will (as if craving, instinct, drive were the essence of will) is typical ... for will is precisely that which treats cravings as their master and appoints to them their way and measure." \[117\] The source of this misunderstanding is Schopenhauer's belief in the noumenal/phenomenal dualism; therefore, he falls into the same basic error as Kant. Because of this, however, Schopenhauer has committed yet another error when he suggests that "the only way to the 'true', to knowledge, lies in getting free from affects, from will ..." \[118\] This leads Schopenhauer to preach the renunciation of will and the denial of life itself—unpardonable sins in Nietzsche's eyes. The consequences of Schopenhauer's chaotic, irrational, meaningless reality are anathema to Nietzsche. \[119\] For Schopenhauer aims at an ascetic suppression of all desires through the compassionate contemplation of the suffering of all life forms. When Nietzsche finally realizes that Schopenhauer's "joy" is one of resignation, rather than his own one of creative affirmation, he breaks with the bulk of Schopenhauer's thought. Hereafter, Nietzsche refers to Schopenhauer's teachings in such uncomplimentary terms as "lunatic interpretations"; or in incensed passages where Nietzsche rails against the absurdity of: "The 'denial of life' as an aim of life, an aim of evolution! Existence as a great stupidity!" \[120\]

Nietzsche thus accepts Kant's notion that we determine the world, and Schopenhauer's contention that the will is central to that determination. But the world in which the will acts is strictly phenomenal, and
our interpretation of it is just another instance of will to power--of
the release of life's essential fundamental energies. To Nietzsche, there
is nothing more fundamental in man or nature than this will to power,
which transforms its environment in order to survive. 121 It is only drive
that is basic to all living beings, and Nietzsche takes care to differ-
entiate it from Schopenhauer's "will to survive." Nietzsche detects the
cardinal instinct of all beings to lie in their discharge of strength--
their will to power--not in their own self-preservation; consequently,
"self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent re-
sults." 122 In Nietzsche's version, something does not struggle to sur-
vive, as Schopenhauer and Darwin might say, but survives to struggle.
For the will to power is not merely a drive among others (like self-pres-
ervation, sex, or hunger), but a generic trait of all creatures, of
which the other drives are but modes.

Nietzsche tries to reconcile his notion of will to power as a prin-
ciple of life with his notion that will is something that is a unit only
as a word. Nietzsche claims that will to power is distinguished from
desiring, demanding, and striving by the "affect of command." 123 He
further discusses this problem in his notes written in 1887-1888: "Is
the 'will to power' a kind of 'will' or identical with the concept of
'will'? Is it the same thing as desiring? or commanding? . . ." 124
Nietzsche then responds to these questions, and to the suggestion that
will to power is still Schopenhauer's noumenal will, in the following
ways: the "will" so described does not exist at all; such a "psycholog-
ical description" of will is an "unjustified generalization"; and the
character of the will is eliminated by subtracting its goal--its "whith-
er"--from its content. Nietzsche argues that this is precisely what Schopenhauer did in his system, with the final result that "will" became nothing more than an empty word.125

Yet this answer is surely insufficient to the task of explaining the confusion between will to power as a kind of metaphysical principle, or as a phenomenological observation. Nietzsche appears to use will in the first sense when he exclaims: "This world is will to power--and nothing beside! And you yourself are also this will to power--and nothing beside!"126 And he employs it in the second sense when he suggests that will "is only a simplifying conception of the understanding, as is 'matter'."127 It is with this latter understanding in mind that Nietzsche frequently reminds us: "There is no such thing as 'will', but only a willed something: one must not remove the aim from the total condition--as epistemologists do..."128

It appears as though Nietzsche's use of "will" depends upon his topical concern of the moment. When he reveals that, "The inner world is full of spooks . . . the will is one of these"129, he is arguing against the existence of all "faculties", including the will in its Kantian garb. He offers, instead, an empirical explanation of our behavior. Nietzsche finds that since we usually behave in reasonably predictable ways, we get habits of expectation. Repeated successful predictions give us a sense of power, and we then explain our behavior by believing that it is our will which is causing our actions. But, in light of his other views on the mistaken concept of causality, Nietzsche concludes that this is illusory. For our human "reality" is nothing more than a "bundle of passions and drives," many of which we are either unconscious of, or wrong
about, and nothing else is "real" except our drives. 130 What Nietzsche means by such statements is that the will does not "exist" in any noumenal sense, just as Soul, Reason, Spirit, Truth, or Thinking do not exist separately from the human animal who uses such concepts to help in his interpretation of the world. 131 These are all "fictions", but they derive their psychological utility from their ability to protect our "egos" from vanishing in the multiplicity of change. 132 In this sense, it seems reasonable for Nietzsche to include "will" in his list of "tremendous blunders," for he sees that it is will which is always invoked whenever there are "effects" to be explained. 133

But no matter how useful will may be as a psychological hypothesis to explain human behavior, it has other functions of equal importance to Nietzsche's overall philosophical project. When he uses will to power in a metaphysical sense (as the basis for us and our world), the will becomes a unifying monistic principle available for use in his constant battle against the life-denying prospects of dualistic interpretations. 135 When he employs it in Zarathustra as the "will to overcome oneself," will to power serves as the means by which we can transform ourselves, and our world, for the better. And when Nietzsche says: "To impose upon becoming the character of being--that is the supreme will to power," 136 he is using it in yet another sense--that of interpretation. As he reveals: "It is a measure of the degree of strength of will to what extent one can do without meaning in things, to what extent one can endure to live in a meaningless world because one organizes a small portion of it oneself." 137 And this, I think, is the best way of making sense of Nietzsche's contradictory statements. 138
If, contrary to John Locke's belief, it is not our minds which are tabula rasa, but our very world, then Nietzsche's attempt to interpret this world—to impose a structure and meaning on the otherwise "blank senselessness of reality"—becomes an admirable one. To will means to will "something" (as opposed to Schopenhauer's view); our world, therefore, awaits our creation for its very value and significance. But this demands an extraordinary effort on our part, as Nietzsche admits: "I assess man by the quantum of power and the abundance of his will ... I assess the power of a will by how much resistance, pain, torture it endures and knows how to turn to its advantage ..." 139 This latter suggestion, that we must know how to turn our suffering to our "advantage", is crucial. Suffering per se is not admirable to Nietzsche (more on this later) as it was to Schopenhauer, but overcoming our necessary suffering is. And one way to do this is to impose our will—our interpretation—on our world. What Nietzsche ultimately offers us is an interpretation of our attempts to interpret the world. Of course, if everything is an interpretation (not "the" interpretation), then Nietzsche's own "thought experiment", suggesting the will to power as the basis of all interpretation, is likewise "only an interpretation." This is not, however, an objection. For Nietzsche remarks: "Supposing that this also is only interpretation ... well, so much the better." 140

Nietzsche, nevertheless, is not content with offering only interpretations and perspectives on our human plight. He still seeks to uncover the "original" motives behind such doctrines as the will. Nietzsche discovers that our habit of tracing everything back to a "will, an intention, a responsible act" actually was invented for the sake of pun-
ishment.

It was the social utility of punishment that guaranteed this concept its dignity, its power, its truth. The originators of this psychology—the psychology of will—are to be sought in the classes that administer penal law, and the priests—they wanted to create for themselves a right to take revenge—wanted to create a right for God to take revenge. To this end, man was seen as 'free'; to this end, every action had to be conceived of as willed, the origin of every action as conscious.141

While such a bald assertion initially appears to be patently false, Nietzsche unearths the heretofore hidden connection between our alleged "free will" and punishment. He finds that the entire theory of responsibility (which assumes free will for our acts) depends upon the false presupposition that one is responsible only for what one has willed. When Nietzsche develops this theory more fully he observes: "there must be a principle in man, a 'free will', as first cause; for if man is not a first cause as will, then he is irresponsible—therefore, he has no business before the moral tribunal . . . In summa: so that man may respect himself, he must be capable of doing evil."142

Nietzsche thus tackles this persistent problem of the freedom of the will which has troubled thinkers since the time of Paul, but he does so with a typical twist. Instead of the traditional focus on our ability to choose between good and evil, (which assumes that the greater benefit accrues to those who choose the "good"), Nietzsche focusses on the effects of our ability to do "evil". And these effects have to do more with the sociological consequences of such actions, than with the ethical issues supposedly involved. By locating the origin of this theory of free will in the motivation for revenge of those who wielded social/political power, Nietzsche sets the stage for his contention that the
will to power erases all distinctions between good and evil. The whole system of punishments and rewards is no more than the attempt, by those in power, to maintain and solidify their control over others, and is simply the manifestation of their own will to power. Those unlucky enough to be punished are merely used as the means by which others are warned against performing similar acts. They are not punished because they "deserve" it, but because it serves the interests of those in power.

Unlike his philosophical predecessors, whose primary concern with the freedom of the will purportedly was derived from their interest in the normative consequences attending such theories, Nietzsche's concern is with the psychological sources of these concepts: this gives him a different angle from which to attack the prevailing notions. From this perspective, he discovers that this doctrine of free will, (which he describes as a "hundred-times refuted theory", or as an "erroneous article of faith" inherited from our primordial ancestors), actually serves several different psychological needs. Again, depending upon his particular topic of consideration, Nietzsche ascertains that our feeling of free will originated in our sense of pride, power, and strength; or, alternatively, in our need to justify cruelty and give meaning to the suffering of ourselves and others.

Although Nietzsche understands the motives behind such impulses, he believes that they rest on a basic misunderstanding of our real psychological processes and requirements—which he explains in terms of our will to power. He perceives that, at one time, there were benefits to be gained for all of us from the priestly and ascetic interpretations of
our suffering, for: "The meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering itself, was the curse which hitherto lay spread out over mankind . . ."\(^{148}\)

And Nietzsche believes that any meaning was (and still is) preferable to no meaning at all. Yet Nietzsche argues that there are many "meanings" to be offered, and that the one suggested by the fallacious notion of free will is the "foulest of all theologians' artifices, aimed at making mankind responsible in their sense, that is, dependent upon them."\(^{149}\)

It is a "lie" which even the priests know to be a lie, but one which they have found useful in preserving their power over others.\(^ {150}\)

But Nietzsche's real antipathy to this doctrine lies in its fundamental connection with Christian morality, which he seeks to re-evaluate because of its insidious, life-negating consequences. In fact, Nietzsche sees the entire history of moral valuations as the "history of an error, the error of responsibility, which is based upon the error of the freedom of the will".\(^ {151}\)

To understand how an error of such magnitude arose, (the results of which are, to Nietzsche, still adversely affecting our comprehension of our world and ourselves, and thus are supremely important to his own project) it is necessary to digress and look first at Nietzsche's examination of the morals of the ancient and the Christian worlds. The great disparity between these valuations convinces Nietzsche that there is no single morality, but only different moralities. This conclusion results in his denial of the existence of any "essential good", and illustrates Nietzsche's contention that moral values are phenomena, i.e., made for and by us in our everyday world—which is the only one there is. But there is an element in common which both the ancient and Christian moral-
ities share: the concept of "obedience to a command". "To be moral, virtuous, ethical means to obey a long-established law or tradition. Whether one obeys gladly or reluctantly is immaterial: it is enough that one obeys." Nietzsche thus reveals that it is the act of obeying a command, rather than the nature of that command--its content--which has been of primary importance in moral matters. He also claims that, "To become moral is not in itself moral", since we may do so for a variety of reasons--from despair, or self-interest, or vanity, or "slavish obedience". And these insights seem to place Nietzsche closer to Kant than we might initially expect. For both are insisting on the primacy of the form of the command (Kant's categorical imperative) in moral valuations; and on the importance of obeying such a command for its own sake.

Yet these similarities do not obscure the profound differences between their views. Kant's pronouncements carry an implicit (and sometimes explicit) "ought" in their content. That is, the categorical imperative ought to be followed for its own sake, regardless of any specific content. Nietzsche's remarks, however, do not carry a similar burden, since he is making observations instead of exhortations. He is not interested, at least at this point, in suggesting what we "should" be doing, but rather in revealing the psychological origins of what we are doing. Of even greater significance is Nietzsche's claim that morality is merely another one of the various constructs which we impose upon certain phenomena. And here he irrevocably parts company from Kant. To Nietzsche, moral values are simply matters of opinion, i.e., interpretations. As such, they lack the noumenal reality and respectability with
which Kant clothes them, for they are nothing more than the "sign-lang-

uage of the feelings". 154

But if "morality is nothing other (therefore no more!) than obedi-

tence to customs", 155 why is Nietzsche so opposed to the Christian and,
because of his similar intent, the Kantian "interpretations" and tradi-
tional "customs"? It seems, at first, unfair for Nietzsche to single
these out as the objects of his venomous re-evaluation of values, especi-
ally in light of his own insistence on the importance of interpretations
and perspectives. Nietzsche explains his position in the following ways.
On the one hand, he reminds us that, "Actions are never what they appear
to us to be! We have expended so much labor on learning that external
things are not as they appear to us to be"; 156 yet we have refused to
apply similar reasoning to our "inner world", and perceive that it is
the motivations behind our moral actions which are "essentially un-
known". 157 We thus act as if we had gained a profound insight into the
"real" world, and succumb to the delusion that there is only one, abso-
lute, "true" moral world order. Yet this is as mistaken a notion as was
primitive man's attempt to assign gender to all things: "In the same
way man has ascribed to all that exists a connection with morality and
laid an ethical significance on the world's back. One day this will
have as much value, and no more, as the belief in the masculinity or
femininity of the sun has today." 158

What both the Christian and Kantian systems fail to perceive is
that we are biological beings, powered by drives which are themselves
transformed by moral judgments. The very same drive can be viewed as
either cowardly or humble, because a drive has "neither this moral char-
acter at all, nor even a definite attendant sensation of pleasure or displeasure: it acquires all this . . . only when it enters into relations with drives already baptized good or evil . . . "159 For example, Nietzsche reveals that the early Greeks saw "envy" as good, and "hope" as "deceitful and blind," while the Christians regarded them exactly opposite.160 Nietzsche emphasizes the mistaken nature of most notions of morality when he discloses that even the drive to distinction is not what it appears to be. It is actually a form of "refined cruelty", in which our own will to power seeks to awaken feelings of envy and impotence in others in the face of our greater virtue and perfection. And even our "holiest" saints are not exempt from these motives: "The chastity of the nun: with what punitive eyes it looks into the faces of women who live otherwise! how much joy in revenge there is in these eyes!"161

Not only is Christian morality mistaken in what it venerates, but it is inconsistent and irrational, since it condemns that which it presupposes--our "life forces." But, what is even more repulsive to Nietzsche, Christianity is "hostile to life" itself because it sees normal human behavior as "sinful." Furthermore, it is self-righteously ignorant of its own motivations. While Christianity claims that egoism and will to power are evil, it actually represents the egoism and will to power of the slavish and weak. Although Christianity admits that cruelty is evil, its own virtues are achieved by self-cruelty and torture. And when it denounces our human passions and instincts, Christianity fails to perceive that its own denunciation is a product of these very same forces.162 Christianity thus takes as "absolute truth" what is psycho-
logically and empirically false. Even worse, this adoption of "absolute" standards results in the relegation of all different standards to the realm of "lies," where any other claims to "truth" are negated. Yet Christianity's very refusal to recognize that "all of life is based on semblance, art, deception, points of view, and the necessity of perspective and error" encourages Nietzsche to develop his own project--the transvaluation of values. This is of the ultimate importance, because "we need to choose between doing away with our venerations--or with ourselves!"

As the first step in this transvaluation of values, Nietzsche argues that it is our will to power, the aggressive dynamic of life itself, which is the real foundation of morals, as it is of all else. In opposition to Kant's examination of our a priori moral foundations, Nietzsche claims that moral values are formed a posteriori, since they develop out of the contingencies of individual responses to constantly changing situations. What is naturally "good" is whatever enables man to realize his needs. For, "All truly noble morality grows out of triumphant self-affirmation . . ." As evidence for this surprising contention, Nietzsche cites the evidence gained from his own exploration into the origin of such words as "good" and "bad". He suggests, on the basis of his discoveries, that the words for "good" all initially meant "noble" or "aristocratic" in the "social sense", i.e., as a social group; and that the words for "bad" originally meant "plebian", or one of a low social order. He uses the German term "schlecht" (bad) as an example, and finds that it is "etymologically identical" with the word "schlicht" (plain, simple). But unfortunately, this original morality, which
was based upon the natural strength and will to power of the "nobles" (a term that supports his identification of "good" with "aristocratic"), has been overthrown.

There has been a "slave revolt" in morals, whereby the rancor and resentment of weaker men have become creative and given birth to the values which are dominant in Western civilizations today. The will to power of the impotent has disguised itself by hiding behind such notions as "spirituality" or "compassion", and then used these concepts as a means of triumphing over the strong. Nietzsche proclaims that the powerless have embraced these ideals solely because they offer the weak an indirect way of attaining power over others. Nietzsche further reveals that such ideals as compassion or pity are really the most agreeable feelings of power known to those who are without any prospects of greater conquests. Yet this will to power of the weak is essentially of a different kind of will from that of the strong, for it is an impotent form of power that actually disparages the concept of power per se, and offers nothing positive to replace the toppled paragon of strength. But, what is even a greater sign of debasement and degeneracy, the weak arouse the feelings of pity in others with the fundamental objective of hurting them, of causing others to share in their own suffering through the very act of comprehending such misery. The weak thereby exhibit their own power over the strong.¹⁶⁸

Nietzsche thus unmasks not only the psychological perversity behind such Christian "virtues" as compassion and suffering, but also illuminates the intrinsic absurdity of Schopenhauer's morality, which was based precisely on these notions. "To expect that strength will not
manifest itself as strength, as the desire to overcome, to appropriate, to have enemies, obstacles, and triumphs, is every bit as absurd as to expect that weakness will manifest itself as strength. Nietzsche blames both the curious inability of the strong to see through the devious machinations of the weak, and the dualistic interpretation of the world reinforced by Kant, for the fact that this disastrous subversion of values reigns supreme in contemporary Christian societies. Nietzsche explains that once the existence of noumenal reality has been postulated and accepted, the concept of "strength" becomes absolutized into a neutral entity-in-itself which has the option either to manifest or to contain itself. As a result of this metaphysical "sleight of hand", it appears as though it is within the discretion of the strong to act as though they were weak—for the "birds of prey" to become the "lambs". Nietzsche contends that it is in this manner that the strong are called to account for experiencing their natural aggression upon the weak. For it is with this appearance of "free choice" in such matters that the weak are able to triumph over the strong—the slaves over the masters.

Furthermore, these slaves, with the "wily vengefulness of the impotent", successfully transform their inherent weakness into a meritorious deed—into "kindness". And this is what constitutes their "greatest trick", whereby those who are unable to avenge themselves are said to be unwilling to do so; therefore, they become not only the "good" but the "just" as well.

Nietzsche, however, asserts that it is only the powerful who are capable of either justice or injustice, and that the rhetoric of toleration, with which the weak try to obscure the reality of their ethical
transvaluation, is intended to veil their own vindictive will to rule—their natural will to power. Moreover, it is senseless to speak of justice or injustice, right or wrong per se. For there are no absolute, universal standards of good or evil, there are only varying interpretations and valuations, in which the very same acts (lying, cheating, killing, exploiting), depending upon the specific situation, may be socially condoned or condemned.\textsuperscript{171}

But this perversion of values is, to Nietzsche, more than merely a case of the weak masquerading as the strong, or the ambiguous nature of the concepts of good and evil as they apply to changing conditions. It is, rather, an essentially dangerous inversion of the moral realm, in which the strong and noble were conquered by deceit and resentment, and were fatally transformed into those who saw themselves as the weak had labelled them—as the cruel, the evil, and the damned. For the impotent have, "with frightening consistency, dared to invert the aristocratic value equations good/noble/powerful/beautiful/happy/favored-of-the-gods and maintain, with the furious hatred of the underprivileged and impotent, that 'only the poor, the powerless are good; only the suffering, sick, and ugly, truly blessed'.\textsuperscript{172}

Christianity, as the heir to this tradition of control based upon hatred and indirect manipulation, has actually succeeded in imposing artificial limits on man's will; and prevented him from becoming what he actually is—the creator, who actively and directly shapes both his world and his values. Nietzsche thus reveals that the traditionally "good" man really represents "not merely a retrogression but even a danger, a temptation, a narcotic drug enabling the present to live at the
expense of the future." Although this may appear to be a more comfortable and less dangerous course than its alternative, it is, in the long run, the greatest danger to man as a species insofar as it prevents him from reaching his highest potential.

Nietzsche believes that only through self-awareness can we even hope to see that our natural inclinations to exert our own will to power are not "bad"—that they are, in fact, removed from such mundane considerations as "good" and "evil". But first, Nietzsche sees that it is necessary to free us from these false values: to give us final say over our own lives and future. And this essential emancipation from the fetters of traditional "degenerate" morality can only be accomplished by going "beyond good and evil". For, "To recognize untruth as a condition of life—that certainly means resisting the accustomed valued feelings in a dangerous way; and a philosophy that risks this would by that token alone place itself beyond good and evil."  

This is one of Nietzsche's greatest projects: to create new values, new standards, and new "truths" based on what we consciously know to be human (not divine or "real") interpretations, perspectives, and errors—for these are the only "truths" we will ever have. To do this, we will have to build upon "lies" and errors, which are inescapable parts of our world. But this is really what we have been doing all along, although unknowingly, because when we are faced with new facts or events, "We construct a new picture... with the aid of all the old experiences which we have had..." What Nietzsche wants is for us to begin doing this consciously, and to realize that just because something is traditionally valued does not mean that it is, therefore, "true", but
only that it is an old "lie", which has forgotten its origins and seeks to intimidate us into accepting it at face value. Yet we can no longer safely take refuge in these old outworn values, for they are "unhealthy" and antagonistic to our future development; and they deny the validity of the will to power as the basis of morality. Neither can we seek comfort in the "truths" of our senses, since they also lie: "What is new finds our senses ... hostile and reluctant ... All this means: basically and from time immemorial we are--accustomed to lying ... one is much more of an artist than one knows." 176

These pronouncements have an emotionally and intellectually jarring impact on us, as does Nietzsche's contention that he is "immoral" in the sense that it means "denying that moral judgments are founded on truths ... Therefore, I deny morality in the same way as I deny alchemy, i.e., I deny its hypotheses ..." 177 And this is Nietzsche's intention, for he hopes to thereby awaken us from our philosophically and theologically induced stupor, and alert us to the perils of this complacent course. As he warned us, it is dangerous to tunnel into the foundations of morality. But some of our knee-jerk aversion to these proclamations might be avoided if we remember Nietzsche's admonition that all language, concepts, constructs, as well as sensory data, "lie" in that they simplify and thus distort what they seek to communicate. Furthermore, Nietzsche cites an error in reasoning as the basis for the notion of "antitheses", by which things are categorized as: moral/immoral, good/evil, or real/apparent. Nietzsche argues that there are "no opposites" except in the exaggerations of metaphysical interpretations. 178

And this is yet another reason for his dislike of the dualisms propound-
ed by Kant, Schopenhauer, and the Christian perspectives. Since Nietzsche's own assertion, that we desire always to augment our power, is itself neutral with respect to approval or disapproval, he provides us with an interpretation that ignores such easy antitheses.

But more to the point, Nietzsche sees that, "The frightful energies--those which are called evil--are the cyclopean architects and road-makers of humanity." 179 He argues that our "good" qualities (in the conventional sense of being "humane") actually have evolved from our earlier "evil" (in the sense of brutish and cruel) qualities because they cannot have come from anywhere else. 180 Although Nietzsche, too, desires what is good and civilized, he perceives that these goals cannot be achieved without the preceding work of what we would call evil. In other words, "envy", "violence", "greed", and "hatred" all belong to the "favoring" circumstances which result in "great" men and "increases in virtue". 181 They have, therefore, their own "value", as does "bad conscience". And Nietzsche approves of "bad conscience" because he perceives it to be nothing more than a "temporary illness", similar to pregnancy, which is actually "full of future".

Furthermore, it was this "bad conscience" that made of man something other than a "beast"--something that could be "overcome." As Nietzsche proclaims in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883): "Man is something that shall be overcome." 182 But this was not originally possible, for it was only when man suffered from such evils--from himself as the architect of these evils--that he became a "promise" to be something more, and altered the earth itself in order to fulfill his own needs. And this is yet another reason why we must go beyond the simple antitheses of good
and evil, real and apparent, or true and false, and develop our own scale of values—but consciously this time, and with concern for the very human consequences involved. Moreover, we must take care to see that our "bad" passions are cultivated into "good" ones, instead of being rooted out, as all previous moralities have sought to do. 183

Or, to use Nietzsche's term, these evil drives must be "sublimated". This means that they must be transformed into something else. Since we possess the same basic drives as do the beasts, the only way that these can be converted into something distinctively human is by such sublimation of our own will to power. 184 And the personification of such a sublimation is Nietzsche's "superman". Essentially, this concept of the superman represents Nietzsche's greatest project of all, because it shows the means by which we, as individuals, can actively transform ourselves, and therefore our world, into something that is better. That is, into something that is both beyond our present simplistic interpretation of our passions and drives as "good/evil"; and beyond humanity itself as it now exists. In fact, Nietzsche reminds us that "What is greatest in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal." 185

Although this notion is in direction opposition to Kant's contention that man is, and should always be treated as, an "end" and not as a "means", to Nietzsche, this is precisely man's value. It is not that the fundamental nature of will to power has been changed, but that its objects have been. For Nietzsche's superman is one who has successfully organized the chaos of his own passions and become creative: he has not succumbed to despair and nihilism in the face of life's terrors, but instead has become master over his own fears and affirmed life without
resentment. He has thereby channeled his destructive will to power, which sweeps away all previous moral distinctions, into the positive construction and creation of new values and new interpretations. The superman thus illustrates the acme of will to power, which is embodied in his own self-control, and faces life without fear of himself, others, or his own mortality. And this is Nietzsche's most important achievement, for it enables him to transcend the "modern nihilism" which he sees as ultimately destructive of all values, and of all life. As Nietzsche proclaims: "Not 'humanity', but superman is the goal!" 186

One of the consequences of this notion is Nietzsche's adamant assertion that some of our interpretations—our "myths"—are better than others, (just as a strong will is better than a weak one), for they facilitate our own self-overcoming. 187 This also helps to explain Nietzsche's impassioned intolerance of those who prove themselves to be so impotent that they are unable to use their will to create. But Nietzsche's impatience on this issue is equally indebted to his deep-seated animosity to the Kantian and Christian claims that this apparent world is not the "real" one. Fundamentally, these two concepts are intertwined, for they both betray a fatal failure of nerve: "The belief which holds that the world, which ought to be, is real, is a belief of the unproductive, of those who will not create a world as it ought to be. They imagine that it is there, and they seek ways and means to attain it." 188 And in so doing, they divert their attention, energy, and will from those problems which they actually could overcome, and prevent themselves from ever becoming "superman."

The intrinsic dissimilarity between Nietzsche's views and those of
Kant and Schopenhauer is hereby revealed. Neither Kant nor Schopenhauer permit us to have final control—and thus power over—the creation of our world or ourselves, and this is Nietzsche's ultimate aim. Nietzsche, writing at the end of the 19th century, is able to look back over the previous developments in politics, philosophy, and psychology, and see that these have been insufficient in providing us with the means to attain our individual potential. What is needed is a new interpretation which will enable us to wrest control from the steadily increasing power of the state, which Nietzsche sees as epitomized by Bismarck's "bombastic nationalism", and that of society, which Nietzsche perceives as emasculating us by encouraging our submission to the "herd ideals" of weakness. Nietzsche fears that if we do not become conscious of our personal will to power—of our individual ability to alter our world and thereby make a substantial difference—that we will succumb to the nihilism which is robbing us of our will to create. And he believes that this nihilism is the greatest danger of all, and is, furthermore, a part of the legacy left by the philosophical investigations of Kant and Schopenhauer. For Kant's limitation of reason shows that we can never know any "real" world, although we believe that it exists; and Schopenhauer's illumination of the irrational will, operating in a purposeless universe, as the basis of this "reality" demonstrates that we are ultimately impotent. It appears that Nietzsche's description of a nihilist can thus be interpreted as a resounding condemnation of both Schopenhauer and Kant, for, "A nihilist is one who judges of the world as it is that it ought not to be, and of the world as it ought to be that it does not exist."
Conclusion
In reviewing the development of the concept of will, from its earliest appearance as appetites or desires, to its modern transformation into the will to power, one curious fact emerges which has not yet been addressed. Why have the greatest proponents of the will—from Kant, who first liberates the will to use it as the foundation of all morality, to Nietzsche, who celebrates it as the means by which we may alter our present, and thereby our future—all been German philosophers? It has been suggested that this focus on the will—on human control over certain attitudes or events—may have resulted from the chaotic suffering produced by the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) in the Germanies. This was an anarchic experience which the rest of Europe, at least in terms of the extent and duration of constant hostilities, was able to avoid. But this breakdown of political, social and moral order and security left a lasting imprint on the Germanies. And while a modicum of internal control was achieved under the Confederation of German states in the early 19th century, the actual state of affairs was one which was characterized by inefficiency and inertia. Thus, it has been hypothesized that the German fascination with will per se, and specifically with a "strong will," may have grown out of a deep-seated historical desire for actually accomplishing something, for following through on an intended ideal. In this analysis, the "Prussian efficiency" embodied by Bismarck in his war against Austria (1866), and his eventual unification of the German states under the Empire (1871), illustrate the practical appeal of such a focus on will. But this suggestion, although intriguing, does not seem to do justice to the diverse insights and aims of Kant, Schopenhauer, or Nietzsche.
Kant, who admits that a "free will could be a monstrous thing" if it were not autonomous, i.e., subject to its own moral laws, nevertheless maintains that this "still remains a useful and proper idea for the purposes of a rational faith." For it is to the task of devising an adequate and accurate guide to the ethical decision-making process that Kant sets his own "pure practical reason"--his own will. Even Nietzsche would agree that Kant is successful in this endeavor, at least to the extent that Kant systematically illuminates the boundaries beyond which reason fails to be an "adequate guide" to one's moral actions. But it is within the psychological realm, with its irrational, insinc-

tual components, that Kant's attempt ultimately founders.

Schopenhauer perceives that there is a fundamental flaw in Kant's theory, and therefore examines what Kant had avoided--the emotional, ir-

rational nature of man and his universe. Schopenhauer thus posits his own version of the "noumenal will", which is instinctual, irrational, and purposeless, as the basis for his new system. Yet Schopenhauer's view has its own "flaws", central to which is his admission that the only escape from the meaningless misery of his vision lies through the intellec-
tual suppression of the all-powerful will. But Schopenhauer never explains how our intellect, which he often describes as a sighted lame man who is carried by a blind man (the will), can ever attain supremacy, no matter how fleeting, over the incessant striving of the will. For how can an intellect affirm or deny the will, when the will itself seems to lie in the noumenal realm, outside of the phenomenal world of this intellect? By what mechanism can this intellect, raised as the "servant" of the will, attain its independence and actually become "will-less"?
It would appear to require some sort of transcendental quality to accomplish the heroic feat, but Schopenhauer has not granted it any. 194

Even Kant's theories, "bloodlessly rational" though they may be, are more helpful to Nietzsche's project of human liberation than Schopenhauer's. For Kant calls not only for freedom from external constraints, but for the fulfillment of ourselves through the freedom of our own self-determination. This is the meaning of Kant's insistence upon the autonomy of our moral will, whereby the moral life (one that is lived under the self-imposed law of the categorical imperative) is equivalent to freedom—and this is a radical sense of "self-determination". Yet Nietzsche, who would approve of the concept of self-determination, would go further and inquire, as Zarathustra did, "Free for what?" And Nietzsche would then inquire: "Can you give yourself your own evil and your own good and hang your own will over yourself as a law? Can you be your own judge and avenger of your law?" 195 If so, you could enter into the ranks of the potential supermen—the creators of a more humane world.

But Kant could not, for it would be blasphemy for one who had tried to "make room for faith", to do so. And Schopenhauer would not, for he believes that, for men to live is merely to be what they already are, and there is no chance of heroic self-transcendence possible in this view. Yet Nietzsche, also, would have trouble following the path suggested by Zarathustra. For he sees too clearly the dangers involved, and asks instead: "today—is greatness possible?" 196 If it is possible, Nietzsche believes that: "He shall be greatest who can be loneliest, the most concealed, the most deviant, the human being beyond good and
evil, the master of his virtues, he that is overrich in will." But Nietzsche already fears that some of his own thoughts are on the verge of becoming accepted: "You have already taken off your novelty, and some of you are ready, I fear, to become truths: they already look so immortal, so pathetically decent, so dull!" And once they become "truths", they will become as fixed, and canonical, and stale, and binding as those which preceded them. Yet even this perception does not daunt Nietzsche for long, or convince him of the impossibility of transforming ourselves and our world, for he believes that even this "'Truth' is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations . . ."
1 In the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant refers to his "Copernican Revolution" in philosophy whereby he attempted to show how synthetic a priori judgments were possible. As Lewis White Beck has suggested, Kant made yet another "revolution" in moral philosophy, which Beck refers to as Kant's Rousseauistic Revolution. This occurred in his Critique of Practical Reason, where Kant stated that obedience to a law one gives oneself is equivalent to freedom. L.W. Beck, Studies in the Philosophy of Kant (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965) p. 223.


4 It should be noted that Arendt does not discuss the doctrine of indeterminism set forth by the Atomists Epicurus (approximately 342-270 B.C.) and Lucretius (approximately 96 B.C.-55 A.D.). Although I am no student of antiquity, it seems difficult to reconcile Arendt's thesis that prior to Pauline Christian doctrines, the will was not seen as a spontaneous "spring of action", with the following from Lucretius:

If every motion is always linked on, and the new always arises from the old in order determined ... whence comes this free will for living things all over the earth, whence, I ask, is it wrested from fate, this will whereby we move forward where pleasure leads each one of us, and swerve likewise in our motions neither at determined times nor in a determined direction of place, but just where our mind has carried us? For without doubt it is his own will which gives to each one a start for this movement and from the will the motions pass flooding through the limbs ... .

Quoted in W.T. Jones, in The Classical Mind: A history of Western Philosophy (2nd ed., New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969), pps. 98-99. Of course, I do not know what words were translated as "free will", but it certainly seems as if the passage were referring to "spontaneous springs of action." Since the author of The Classical Mind went so far as to describe Lucretius as an "unoriginal thinker" who "did not contribute anything to the evolution of the theory, but was content to translate into Latin ... the views of Epicurus ... " (p. 75), it seems as though Pauline Christianity was not the only, or the first, theory to discuss free will as a source of action. Granted, the mechanism by which Epicurus sought to explain his "free will"--the notion of the infamous "swerve"--is patently implausible and was probably not a convincing argument at any time.

5 Arendt, Willing, p. 16.

6 Ibid, p. 62, and also in Jones, Classical Mind, p. 258.

7 Epictetus, quoted in Arendt, Willing, p. 78.
Arendt does discuss both Augustine, whom she describes as the "first philosopher of the will", and Duns Scotus, who alone among the Scholastics, asserted the primacy of the will over the intellect. She uses them to highlight the differences between their thought and that of traditional Western philosophical and theological arguments. But neither of them is essential to this study, since Augustine saw will as only one-third of the faculties of the mind, of which intellect, memory, and will all mutually functioned within the "mind as a whole"; and Scotus failed to follow up many of his insights, which were "easily overlooked because they are presented in the manner of the schoolmen, and easily lost in the intricacies of Scotian argumentations." (p. 134). Yet Arendt also describes Kant as "irrelevant" to the history of "willing", because his will is "pure practical reason", and not a special mental capability distinct from thinking. She sees Kant's will, ironically, as not meeting her criterion of "a spring of action." (pps. 149-150).

Quoted in Arendt, Willing, p. 23.


Ibid, p. 73.

Ibid, p. 90.


24 Kant, Foundations, pps. 73-74.


26 Beck, Commentary, p. 91.

27 Only the "divine" will could be completely good, in which case it would require no constraints.

28 Kant, Foundations, p. 44.

29 Kant, Critique, p. 140.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., p. 119.


33 Arendt discusses this focal shift in Willing, pps. 150-155, in a manner that is similar to, although not identical with, mine.

34 Arendt suggests that the French Revolution (1789) was responsible for this change, although the chronology of these events is off by at least four years, at a minimum.


37 Schopenhauer, World, II, pp. 29-34. The Kantian "spectacles", therefore, through which we, as perceiving subjects, condition objects in space and time, are themselves conditioned by the intellectual apparatus of the perceiving subject; thus, no "objects" without "subjects".

38 Ibid., p. 35.

39 Ibid., p. 118.

40 Ibid., p. 31.

41 Ibid.

42 Schopenhauer, Essay, p. 21.
43 Ibid, p. viii.


46 Ibid., p. 334.


49 Ibid., I, p. 422.

50 Ibid., II, p. 412.

51 Ibid., p. 430.

52 Ibid., pps. 418-424.

53 Ibid., p. 431.

54 Ibid., I, p. 230.

55 Ibid., p. 367.

56 Schopenhauer claims that once the curiosity of the intellect has been aroused and finally reveals the "evil" of the will, the intellect turns away and frees itself. Ibid., p. 422.

57 Schopenhauer also reasons that, since "every existence presupposes an essence", there is a logical fallacy involved in the notion of freedom of the will. Essay, p. 59. He explains this difficulty thus: "Freedom of the will . . . means an existence without an essence, which means a self-contradiction." Ibid., p. 60.


59 Ibid., p. 17.

60 Ibid., pps. 21-22.

61 Ibid., p. 24.

62 Ibid., p. 43.

63 Schopenhauer, World, II, p. 119.
64 Schopenhauer, Essay, p. 94.
65 Ibid., p. 47.
66 Ibid.
68 Schopenhauer, Essay, p. 98.
69 Ibid. Nietzsche, and the "existential philosophers", will invert this order and proclaim: "existence precedes essence".
71 Ibid., p. 407.
74 Ibid., p. 32.
75 Ibid.
79 Wayne Sheeks, "Schopenhauer's Solution of the Intellect--Will Problem", in Fox's Schopenhauer: His Philosophical Achievement, pps. 74-75.
80 Mann, Essays, p. 329.
81 Ibid., p. 400.
82 Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy (New York: Pocket Books, 1971) p. 346. In his article on Schopenhauer, Durant also cited Rousseau's denunciation of reason, as well as Napoleon's demise and exile, as possible contributors to Schopenhauer's pessimism.
83 McGill, Schopenhauer, p. 144.
84 Friedrich Nietzsche, Unpublished Notes, #540-541, quoted in Arthur


88 Ibid.

89 Ibid., #515.

90 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, trans. by Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), #34. Nietzsche suggests that we have certain concepts, and not others, because these have enabled us to survive and develop. Just as these concepts have evolved over time, however, they will continue to do so only until others, which will have more utility, supersede them.

91 Nietzsche, *Human*, #11. This applies equally to the "law of contradiction" in logic, which is also of subjective origin and therefore without necessity. "We are incapable of affirming and denying one and the same thing: this is a subjective law drawn from experience, it does not express any 'necessity' but only an incapacity . . ." Nietzsche, Will, #516.

92 Nietzsche, Will, #511.

93 Ibid., #522.

94 Nietzsche readily admits that: "The falseness of a judgment is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgment . . . for . . . without a continual falsification of the world . . . mankind can not live--that to renounce false judgments would be to renounce life, would be to deny life." *Beyond*, #4. It is not falsification that Nietzsche objects to, but our unawareness of it, and our own consequent self-deception re veracity.


97 Ibid. Hollingdale further suggests that Nietzsche's urge to in-
vestigate the "origins" was prompted by his own need to justify his own opinions—which conflicted with nearly all others; therefore, Nietzsche sought the "origin of opinions." R.J. Hollingdale, *Nietzsche*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973) p. 62.

There are, however, drawbacks to this aphoristic approach, the most annoying of which is the difficulty of determining just what Nietzsche's "real" position is on any subject, and then locating it. Unlike Kant's *Critiques* or Schopenhauer's basic three-volume work, Nietzsche's theories are scattered throughout all of his numerous writings, both published and "unpublished".


Wilcox sees this as Kant's "crucial importance" to Nietzsche's development.


Nietzsche, *Will*; #551.

Ibid.

Ibid., #550.

Ibid., #553.

Ibid., #556.

Ibid., #585.

Ibid., #579. Nietzsche also finds the "priestly class" responsible for the origin of this dualistic concept. *Genealogy*, III, 12.


Ibid., p. 122. Nietzsche also favorably compares the solitary stance of Schopenhauer to Kant's position: "But in Kant we have the usual submissive professor, without any nobility in his relations with the state ..." Ibid., p. 187

Ibid., p. 108.
113 Ibid., p. 179.
114 Hollingdale, Nietzsche, p. 53.
115 Ibid.
116 Nietzsche, Beyond, #19.
117 Nietzsche, Will, #84.
118 Ibid., #612. Hollingdale further reveals that Nietzsche rejects Schopenhauer's claim to know the "unknowable noumenal realm" because even such an idea as "noumenal reality" is part of the phenomenal world; therefore, it also can not be used to gain access to the noumenal realm. Nietzsche, p. 56.

119 My position is that the "real difference" between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche is profound and substantial. For an opposite view, which sees their differences in terms of tone and temperament only, see Frederick Copleston's essay, "Schopenhauer and Nietzsche", pps. 215-225, in Fox's Schopenhauer. I think this view ignores Nietzsche's own comments on their relationship, which are replete in his later writings, and are along the lines of his remark in Nietzsche Contra Wagner that, since both Schopenhauer and Wagner "deny and revile life", they are his "antipodes."

120 Nietzsche, Will, #612.
121 Nietzsche, Beyond, #230.
122 Ibid., #13.

123 Nietzsche, Will, #353. Nietzsche emphatically rules out will to power as only consisting in power to dominate others. In fact, this willful domination "is even a proof of the absence of a secure sense of power..." Human, #588. Nietzsche's will to power is best understood as power over oneself.

124 Nietzsche, Will, #671.
125 Ibid., #692.
126 Ibid., 1067.
127 Ibid., #671.
128 Ibid., #668 and also #671, and in Beyond, #19.
129 Nietzsche, Twilight, p. 5.
130 Hollingdale, Nietzsche, p. 112.
131 Danto, Nietzsche, p. 150.
132 Nietzsche, Will, #480.
133 Ibid., #488.
134 Ibid., #529.
136 Nietzsche, Will, #617.
137 Ibid., #585.
138 As previously noted, Nietzsche sees the logical "law" of non-contradiction as merely another of the "fictions" which we impose upon the world. Thus, he is not afraid of contradicting his own views, for they are all "interpretations", and it is the act of interpreting which is of supreme importance.
139 Nietzsche, Will, #206.
140 Nietzsche, Beyond, #22.
141 Nietzsche, Will, #765.
142 Ibid., #228.
143 Nietzsche, Beyond, #18.
144 Nietzsche argues similarly to Schopenhauer on this issue of punishment and reward, for he says that one "cannot act otherwise than he did." Human, #105. There is, therefore, no point in saying that one "ought" to be different from what one is, or in suggesting that one change oneself, for that would require that everything would be changed. Twilight, V, 6.
146 Nietzsche, Daybreak, #128; see also Beyond #19 and #21. Nietzsche also attributes such feelings to: weakness (Daybreak, #125): the desire to judge and punish (Twilight, #VI,7); and to ressentiment, (Ecce, I, 6).
147 Ibid., II,7.
148 Ibid., #28.
Nietzsche, The Antichrist. The Portable Nietzsche, ed. by Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Viking Press, 1968), #38. Unfortunately, Nietzsche never fully defined what he means by "free will", or why he sees it as an "error", other than that it is "self-contradictory" (causa sui) in Beyond, #21. Furthermore, his notion of the sublimation of will to power in the "superman" seems, at the least inconsistent, as does his wish for liberation from our false values of traditional morality which alone can "make the will free once more and restore to the earth its aim, and to man his hope ..." Genealogy, p. 230.

Nietzsche, Human, #39.

Ibid., #96.

Nietzsche, Daybreak, #97.

Ibid., #3 Preface. Nietzsche sees Kant's "enthusiastic intention" of making firm the ground for morality doomed because Kant was the "son of his century", and thus "had been bitten by the moral tarantula Rousseau, he too harbored in the depths of his soul the idea of that moral fanaticism ..."

Ibid., #9. Nietzsche makes a sharp distinction between the Christian (and in this sense also the Socratic) emphasis on obedience and self-control. In answer to the question, "who is the most moral man?", Nietzsche responds: "First, it is he who obeys the law most frequently... Then, he who obeys it even in the most difficult cases." And for this, self-overcoming is demanded, "not on account of the useful consequences it may have for the individual, but so that the hegemony of customs, and traditions shall be made evident in despite of the private desires and advantages of the individual: the individual is to sacrifice himself..." This is, of course, what Christ did, and Nietzsche respects him for it. But this makes Nietzsche all the more furious at his Christian followers who, as Socrates also did, advocated a morality of self-control as a means to personal advantage. Nietzsche further asserts that the virtuous Romans saw these Christians, who thought first of their own salvation, as "evil," while the Romans themselves sought virtue which would put the entire community in favor with the gods.

Nietzsche, Daybreak, #116.

Ibid.

Ibid., #3.

Ibid., #58.

Ibid.

Ibid., #30.
161 Nietzsche, Gay, #357, and Genealogy, III, 27.


163 Nietzsche, Gay, #346.

164 Ibid.

165 Nietzsche, Genealogy, p. 170.

166 Ibid., I, 4. An equivalent example in English would be that of "villain" and "villain". Nietzsche also finds that in earlier times, "evil" signified: "free, incalculable, unforeseen . . . " Daybreak, #9.

167 Nietzsche, Genealogy, I, 4.

168 Nietzsche, Human, #50.

169 Nietzsche, Genealogy, p. 178.

170 This is further reason for Nietzsche to detest the notion of "free will", for it enables the weak to mask their manipulation of the strong, and hide behind their vaunted "virtues".

171 Nietzsche, Genealogy, p. 208.

172 Ibid., p. 167.

173 Ibid., p. 155.

174 Nietzsche, Beyond, #4.

175 Nietzsche, Gay, #114.

176 Nietzsche, Beyond, #192.

177 Nietzsche, Daybreak, #103.

178 Nietzsche, Human, #246.

179 Ibid.

180 Nietzsche, Will, #384.

181 Nietzsche, Gay, #19.

183 Nietzsche, Will, #384.
184 Ibid., #385.
185 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue 4.
186 Nietzsche, Will, #1001.
187 Nietzsche, Beyond, #36.
188 Quoted in Danto, Nietzsche, p. 228.
189 Nietzsche, Will, #585 A.
190 Hollingdale, Nietzsche, pps. 18-19. The following analysis is Hollingdale's.
192 Ibid., p. 83.
193 Schopenhauer, World, I, p. 421.
194 Wayne Sheeks, "Schopenhauer's Solution to the Intellect-Will Problem", in Michael Fox's Schopenhauer: His Philosophical Achievement, pps. 69-71. Schopenhauer appears to compound this difficulty by asserting that the "will itself is without knowledge, and the understanding which is given to it is without will." World, II, p. 420.
196 Nietzsche, Beyond, #212.
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid., #296.
199 Nietzsche, Will, #517.


Jones, W.T. The Classical Mind: A History of Western Philosophy. 2nd


—— *Friedrich Nietzsche: The Complete Works.* The first complete


Curriculum Vita

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Educational Background

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<th>Degree</th>
<th>Major</th>
<th>Dates of Attendance</th>
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<td>Ohio University, Athens, Ohio</td>
<td>LD/BD certificate</td>
<td>Learning/Behavior Disabilities</td>
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<td>University of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia</td>
<td>M.A.</td>
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<td>9/1982-6/1983</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio</td>
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<td>9/1983-8/1985</td>
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*Course work and General Examinations completed
Dissertation remains to be completed

Work Experience

Title: Teaching Assistant
Employer: History Department, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
Duties: Led discussions, prepared and presented lectures, conducted study sessions, and assisted in preparation of examinations for undergraduate courses in Western History and Civilization #111 and #112. *Responsible for evaluating and grading all quizzes, papers, and exams in these courses.
Title: Fellowship Recipient
Employer: Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
Duties: Completed necessary courses required for Ph.D. candidates.

Title: Graduate Assistant in History
Employer: History Department, University of Richmond, Virginia.
Duties: Supported research duties of assigned faculty members; delivered lectures on requested topics for undergraduate history courses; and led discussions on required class readings in undergraduate history classes.

Dates: 9/1979-6/1982
Title: Learning/Behavior Disabilities Tutor, Secondary Level
Employer: Upper Arlington City Schools, Ohio.
Duties: Developed Individual Educational Plans (I.E.P.'s), and provided individualized instruction in all academic subjects for students with learning/behavior disorders at the senior high level.

Dates: 1/1979-6/1979
Title: Mathematics Teacher, Secondary Level
Employer: Richmond City Schools, Virginia.
Duties: Taught Algebra I, Geometry, Remedial Math 12, and General Math 9 to high school students in a regular classroom setting.

Title: Learning/Behavior Disabilities Tutor, Secondary Level
Employer: Zanesville City Schools, Ohio.
Duties: Developed Individual Educational Plans (I.E.P.'s) and provided individualized instruction in all academic subjects for students at the junior high level with learning/behavior disorders. Compiled case studies; administered academic and modality assessments; and implemented all requisite remediation in specific deficit areas for these designated students.

Dates: 1973-1977
Title: Research Assistant
Employer: Dr. Joseph Dubbert, New Concord, Ohio.

Title: Assistant to History Department
Employer: Muskingum College, New Concord, Ohio.
Duties: Provided necessary support to assigned faculty members in the History Department.
Title: Astrophysics Laboratory Assistant  
Employer: Aero-Space Research Laboratories, Wright Patterson A.F.B., Ohio.  
Duties: Made tracings from oscillograph recordings on light intensity reflected from early satellites--Echo I and II, etc. This work was later incorporated into a book published by Aero-Space Research Laboratories, 1968.

Awards and Honors

1966: Recipient of National Federation of Women's Clubs Award for Outstanding High School Senior. Dayton, Ohio.  
1966: Received full scholarship to Muskingum College, New Concord, Ohio.  
1974: Graduated Magnacum Laude in the Honors Program at Muskingum College, with Distinction in the Department of Philosophy and Religion, and in the Department of History.  
1982: Awarded Graduate Assistantship in the Department of History, University of Richmond, Virginia.  
1983: Recipient of Albright Award for Outstanding Graduate Student in the Humanities. University of Richmond, Virginia.  
1983-1984: Awarded University Fellowship for Ph.D. program in the History Department, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.  
1984-1985: Awarded Teaching Assistantship in History, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.

Honorary Affiliations

1965: National Honor Society  
1967: Phi Sigma Tau, National Philosophy Honorary.  
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Presentations

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9/1984-8/1985: Representative for Graduate Student Affairs Council, (G.S.A.C.) for the History Department, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.

1/1985-6/1985: Member of Graduate Student Recommendation Committee, for History Departmental Chairman Search Committee, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.