Factors affecting the political stability of certain Latin American countries

Sue Fulghum

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FACTORS AFFECTING THE POLITICAL STABILITY
OF CERTAIN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

SUE FULGHUM, MASTER OF ARTS IN
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The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis that the factors that have produced political stability in Mexico have been largely absent from the political development experience of other Latin American countries that have experienced instability. Based on the literature on political development theory and on an historical survey of political development in Mexico, the factors of consensus, legitimacy and institutionalization are identified as having been primarily responsible for political stability. These factors have allowed the Mexican political system to respond successfully to the destabilizing pressures of modernization, economic development, social mobilization and urbanization, as well as the external pressures of economic dependence. From an analysis of political development in Argentina, Chile and Brazil, it is my conclusion that these countries have failed to develop a consensus, suffered repeated crises of legitimacy, and failed to develop political institutions to check the destabilizing forces of modernization, the military and external influences.
Factors Affecting the Political Stability of Certain Latin American Countries

by

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4/8/85
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OF CERTAIN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

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INTRODUCTION

Political instability in one form or another has always been of concern to social and political philosophers. "Theorists from ancient times onward have repeatedly returned to questions related to political instability in their discussions of the characteristics and conditions of the good society, their disputations over the right of revolution, and their endless reconsiderations of the nature of justice, equality, progress, and the scores of other abstract ideas."¹

During the last twenty years, however, the interest that scholars have shown in political stability has intensified. "Western social scientists have 'discovered' the third world where political upheaval is a prominent feature of the political landscape. At the same time many of the stable democracies have been rocked by massive political dissent."²

Why is political instability so common in third world countries? A partial answer would have to lie in the relative youth of most of these countries. In the 17th century a process of nation building began from which evolved the democracies of Europe and North America which, with a few exceptions, have enjoyed a relatively high degree of stability. For Great Britain this process occurred gradually over a period of 183 years from 1649 to 1832. The United States spent 89 years (1776 to 1865) building the institutions of a
stable government. Since 1945 about 138 new nations have been added to the third world, primarily in Asia and Africa. These nations in a very short period of time have had to create political institutions and processes that would be accepted as legitimate. They have had to do this while at the same time promoting industrial growth and modernization, meeting the demands of a more mobilized population and the diverse ethnic and economic interests within the country. It is little wonder that unprecedented political violence has resulted. Even in South America, where European colonialism ended in the 1820s, with few exceptions, the countries have failed to develop stable political institutions.

This political instability in Latin America has been of concern to the United States from the time of the Roosevelt Corollary to the present dilemma presented by the revolutionary movements in several Central American countries. The rapidly deteriorating political situation in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua as well as the extralegal seizures of power in some South American countries create a new sense of urgency for understanding the factors that promote development of a stable political system. A study of the political development of Mexico could contribute significantly to this understanding in several ways. First, Mexico is an example of a country that used revolution successfully as a means to political development. Perhaps similar patterns of development
could be adopted for other countries in the region. Unlike any other Latin American country, Mexico has enjoyed a relatively stable political environment for over half a century. It is of vital interest to the United States for economic and political reasons that Mexico maintain this stability by successfully responding to the new pressures that have been placed on the system by rapid economic growth and the current economic crisis. A study of how the political system has successfully met the challenges of the past could aid other countries in devising a plan of development that could lead to greater stability.

A careful examination of the development of the Mexican political system reveals a set of factors that have been primarily responsible for the stability that the country has enjoyed. It is the contention of this writer that these factors have been largely absent in the developmental experience of Latin American countries that have suffered varying degrees of political instability.

In support of this contention this paper will examine, within the context of political development theory, the development of political institutions and processes in Mexico, Argentina, Chile and Brazil. This examination will identify the causes of instability in Argentina, Chile and Brazil and offer tentative proposals for steps that might be taken to achieve a higher degree
of stability. Argentina and Brazil were chosen because their level of economic development and length of independence roughly approximate that of Mexico. Venezuela would have been a logical choice for inclusion in the study considering the criterion of level of economic development; however, in the interest of limiting the scope to manageable proportions, Chile was selected because it affords the opportunity to examine the role of foreign intervention as an external factor in political instability.

Chapter I of this paper is devoted to defining the terms "political stability" and "political development" and to a survey of the literature on theories related to political development. Chapter II contains a discussion of the political development of Mexico and the identification of those factors that have been responsible for the stability of the political system. Chapter III examines the development process of Argentina and identifies causes for the extraordinary level of system instability that the country has experienced. Chapter IV surveys the political history of Chile and identifies the factors that destabilized a polity that until 1973 had been considered a showcase of stable democratic development in Latin America. Chapter V examines the political system of Brazil with continued focus on identifying factors that have inhibited stable political development. A summary of the major findings of the research as well as conclusions concerning the future prospects for political
stability in the countries studied will be presented in Chapter VI.

Historical data presented in Appendix A supports the designation of Mexico as a stable polity and Argentina, Chile and Brazil as unstable ones.
ENDNOTES


2 Ibid.
I. DEFINITIONS AND THEORIES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Observation of the political development of western democracies led political scientists to theorize that political development which was generally understood as "stable democracy" was a direct result of economic development. This thinking was reflected in the massive foreign aid programs of the cold war era. However, concepts relative to western nations in political development theory proved inadequate in the 1960s in their application to emerging nations. The field of comparative politics was inundated with new studies and reexaminations of concepts related to political development often adding more to confusion than clarification.

The conceptualizations of political development that have contributed most to understanding its relationship to political stability are those of dichotomous typologies and institutionalization. In the first, political development is seen as continuous progress indicating movement from something to something else—the dichotomies of traditional and modern. This approach led to many theories attempting to clarify the impact of various aspects of modernization on political stability. Samuel Huntington conceptualized political development as movement toward institutionalization which, according to theory developed in his monumental work Political Order in Changing Societies, is the major factor in achieving political stability. These concepts
of modernization and institutionalization will be developed more fully as the theories that have emanated from them are discussed later in this chapter.

Political stability is usually discussed as a valued condition: the result of "good" political development. Instability is considered to result from a lack of political development. Claude Ake defines political stability as "the regularity of the flow of political exchanges." He continues by saying, "There is political stability to the extent that members of society restrict themselves to the behavior patterns that fall within the limits imposed by political role expectations." Ake cautions against confusing political stability with the absence of political change. Taking this into consideration, Ernest Duff and John McCamant write that "A stable political system can be defined as one which can manage change within the structure."

Leon Hurwitz, in an excellent review article, identifies five approaches to the study of political stability and concludes that the most effective is to study political stability as a multifaceted social attribute. This view sees political stability as "systemic stability" and is a synthesis or integration of the other approaches. It is in this context that theories concerning political stability will be reviewed and their application to Latin American political development examined.
The study of political development and political stability has been aided significantly by the development of theory. James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff describe theory as:

...an intellectual tool that helps us to orient our knowledge, to ask significant questions, and to guide the formulation of priorities in and the design of research; it enables us to relate knowledge in our field to that of other fields; and thus it enhances our ability to understand and explain reality in a satisfying way. 6

During the period from World War I to the mid 1940s, theorists tended to explain political stability in terms of "constitutional engineering." This was a reflection of the current popularity of "formalism" in the study of comparative politics which emphasized the legal institutions of government: constitutions, presidents, legislatures and judicial systems. These theories were discredited by the failure of "engineered democratic experiments" in new nations as well as old ones such as Weimar Germany. 7

The movement to behavioralism in political science research in the postwar years was in part a response to the changing political realities of the international system as a result of the emergence of the third world. Studies began to favor socio-economic and environmental explanations of political instability.

For Taketsugu Tsurutan the explanation of political stability lay in the existence of a consensual
society. "The most fundamental as well as general source of stability is the existence of consensus, viz., a tacit agreement engendered by a homogeneous political culture, between the government and the governed as well as among groups within the governed, concerning the broad goal of society within a given time context and the means to implement its attainment." Eric Nordlinger also emphasizes the importance of consensus when he argues that

The possibilities of a political system's developing in a nonviolent, nonauthoritarian and eventually democratic stable manner are maximized when a national identity emerges first, followed by institutionalization of the central government, and then by the emergence of mass parties and a mass electorate.

A concept closely related to consensus is legitimacy. Lipset says that, "Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for society." Douglas Bwy examined a number of theories of political stability and concluded, "It appears, therefore, that the causes of political instability are numerous and the relationship is indeed complex." He also turns to legitimacy for a better explanation.

Other writers have combined legitimacy with effectiveness in explaining stability. "Instability is brought about by a population that considers the political system to be illegitimate and/or ineffective,
and by political institutions which cannot meet the
demands and needs of the society and which lack the
capacity to adjust."¹²

Many political scientists have developed theories
purporting to explain the relationship between modernization
and political stability. Some writers contend that
there is a positive correlation between the two. Examples
of such viewpoints are Seymour Lipset's *Political Man*
and Gabriel Almond and James Coleman's *The Politics
of Developing Nations*. More recently, however, other
writers have expressed the view that modernization leads
instead to political instability. The literature on
this viewpoint is so large and the aspects of modernization
examined so numerous that it is difficult to discuss
it in any organized fashion.

The most comprehensive study to date connecting
modernization and political stability is Huntington's
*Political Order in Changing Societies*. He challenges
the "poverty theses" and the conclusion that social
and economic backwardness are responsible for instability.
"Wealthier nations tend to be more stable than those
less wealthy, but the poorest nations, those at the
bottom of the international economic ladder, tend to
be less prone to violence and instability than those
countries just above them."¹³ This observation led
him to his often quoted conclusion that "modernity breeds
stability and modernization breeds instability."
The two aspects of modernization that seem to have received the most attention from theorists are economic development and social mobilization. Economic development is viewed as a destabilizing factor in political development because of the tremendous and far reaching changes it brings to the social as well as economic structure of society and the additional pressures it places on the political system to satisfy needs. "The most important reason why economic development sometimes fails to produce political stability is that while the economy is making it possible for the political and economic systems to satisfy the demands of the population, it is also raising the level of expectations."\(^{14}\) According to Robert Clark, "Ideas about what people think they should achieve in politics begin to outreach the institutions available to help them achieve these objectives. The results are frustration, anger, aggression and a generally increased level of political instability."\(^{15}\)

Economic development and the growth of industry give rise to a new urban middle class. Their increased desire to have a share of the political power brings them into direct conflict with the rural oligarchy which has been the seat of power in traditional societies. This conflict during the early stages of modernization can inhibit national integration and at the worst lead to civil war.
Industrial development has always been accompanied by massive rural to urban migrations that have a great potential for political instability.\(^\text{16}\) Another problem of rapid urbanization results when the number of people migrating to the cities exceeds industrial capacity to provide employment. Shanty towns have grown up around most of the major cities of Latin America where the people live in grim poverty. "The poor provide the potential for extraordinary political instability."\(^\text{17}\)

A review of research produces inconclusive evidence of the linkage between income inequality and political instability. Conventional wisdom has held for a long time that the high level of income inequality in Latin America was a major cause of instability. Samuel Huntington alludes to this when he states, "In particular modernizing countries the impact of economic growth on income inequality may become quite noticeable. The twenty years before the revolution in Mexico witnessed a tremendous growth in income inequalities, particularly in land ownership."\(^\text{18}\) In addition Huntington contends that

Modernization affects economic inequality and thus political instability in two ways. First, wealth and income are normally more unevenly distributed in poor countries than in economically developed countries....Social mobilization, however, increases awareness of the inequality and presumably resentment of it....Hence social mobilization turns the traditional economic inequality into a stimulus to rebellion.\(^\text{19}\)
He does conclude, however, that the scarcity of data on wealth and income make it impossible to test the proposition that economic inequality leads to political instability.

The "social mobilization" to which Huntington referred is a term developed by Karl Deutsch to deal with the aspects of modernization that produce a more politically aware citizenry and increased demands on the political system. Some of the social mobilization indicators identified by Deutsch are: exposure to modern aspects of life, exposure to mass media, change of residence, urbanization, change from agricultural occupations, literacy and per capita income. This index of social mobilization has many implications for political development and stability. Social mobilization increases the number of meaningful political actors who must be accommodated within the political process. This in turn brings pressure for structural changes that will make the system more responsive. The size of the government sector in the economy increases with social mobilization, and a more sophisticated bureaucracy must be developed. Rapid social mobilization can be a positive influence for nationalism in homogeneous societies; however, it can be a disruptive factor in societies split by religious, linguistic and social diversity.

Huntington states that
The relationship between social mobilization and political instability seems reasonably direct. Urbanization, increases in literacy, education and media exposure all give rise to enhanced aspirations and expectations which, if unsatisfied, galvanize individuals and groups into politics. In the absence of strong and adaptable political institutions, such increases in participation mean instability and violence.²¹

An important part of Huntington's work in political development theory deals with developing the concept of "institutionalization." As modernization and social mobilization place pressures on the political system, stability can be maintained only if the political system is sufficiently institutionalized. The level of institutionalization, according to Huntington, can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of the organization and procedures of the political system.²² He contends that dissatisfaction, resentment and rebellion result when political institutions are inadequate to meet the demands of social mobilization. However, some critics of Huntington's theory point out that social mobilization can produce higher levels of support for the political system and actually be a stimulus for institution building.²³

All factors that have influenced political stability in Latin America do not fit neatly within the modernization-institutionalization framework. One such influence is the military and the role that it has played in Latin American politics. Traditional
analysts have tended to view the military as playing a very negative role in political development. The armed forces have often been held responsible for the instability in such countries as Argentina where coups have overthrown civilian governments with almost predictable regularity.

Revisionist analysts, however, view military intervention not as a cause of political instability but a symptom of it. Thompson sees the military coup as "a manifestation of political violence in a system lacking an acceptable political formula." Huntington also supports a less critical view of the role of the military. He has found that coups occurring in the early stages of development are generally what he terms as "modernizing coups." The military at this point is more liberal in its viewpoint and is assisting the middle class in broadening the base of political participation and weakening the control of the rural oligarchy. In later stages of development, however, Huntington found the military playing a more conservative role in maintaining system stability by exercising "veto coups." Coups of this type are designed to halt the process of expanding political participation that threatens to bring the lower classes to full political power.

The survey of political stability theory to this point has dealt only with factors that occur within
the political system. Some political scientists have turned to an examination of external factors and their linkage to political development in third world countries. "Too often it is assumed that national systems are completely autonomous political units and that phenomena such as political instability may be explained solely with reference to factors internal to the nation state." 26

Two areas that have been given attention are the impact that foreign military aid has on political development and of foreign investments on economic development. Some research has shown that military aid is a negative factor in political development because by keeping the military strong popular revolution and expansion of political participation are thwarted. "It can surely be said that much of the political instability in contemporary Latin America can be blamed on the United States' support of military dictatorships." 27

The impact of foreign investment and trade on economic, social and political development in third world countries is incorporated in dependency theory. Economists working on the Economic Commission on Latin America sponsored by the United Nations developed the concepts of dependency theory to explain the underdevelopment that exists in certain countries by focusing on the unequal terms of trade between those countries that export raw materials (periphery) and those that export
manufactured goods (center). Within this world systems approach the system of unequal exchanges allows the core regions to exploit the periphery through various mechanisms such as multinational corporations and international lending institutions.

Through a variety of propositions, dependency theory links dependent economic development to external manipulation, social development and political stability. "More broadly, Latin America's historical patterns of external linkages, some of which can be subsumed under the heading of dependency, could be treated as independent variables with pronounced effects on Latin American political structure and political behavior." Ayers also suggests that the greater a country's dependency the less capable it is of regulating the actors within the system, the more difficult it will be to establish legitimacy and stability in the decision-making process and the greater the inequality in distribution of power among groups in society. Ayers also contends that dependency inhibits political institutionalization and the unification and creation of a distinctive national culture.

According to dependency theory, the center is in a position to influence development in the periphery in a variety of ways. When the productive apparatus in the periphery is foreign owned it is conditioned
more to the needs of the center than to the development and expansion of the host country. In the world economic system the comparative advantage of the periphery is generally its cheap labor supply. Thus, a low standard of living becomes the basis of dependent development. The low wages paid to workers discourages the development of industry in the periphery that would be directed toward the production of goods for local mass consumption. Instead goods are produced for export or for consumption by the elite since they are too expensive to be purchased by the masses. "Because they are effectively barred from economic participation, to allow them political participation would be disruptive. Social and cultural exclusion follow from political and economic exclusion." 31

Multinational corporations are the primary vehicles by which the center carries out its economic control of the periphery. They have been held responsible for contributing to developmental discord in a variety of ways. First, the strategic decisions concerning development methods and technologies to be used are made in the center, not in the periphery. Secondly, multinationals do not take new technology to the periphery, thus denying that country of the "windfall profits" that result from new product development. In addition, multinationals attempt to cultivate similar consumer tastes in the periphery as exist in the center. "Reluctant
to invest in innovative activity that might produce a more locally appropriate technology, the multinational is anxious to market existing ideas regardless of appropriateness."32

Multinationals are also the source of much of the direct foreign investment that some writers contend can destabilize the political system of the periphery. Reliance on foreign loans can lead to heavy indebtedness. During periods of economic decline international lending institutions can impose austerity programs as a prerequisite for continued loans to service the existing debt. The government is forced to severely curtail social welfare programs for the poor. Also when foreign investors are used as the source of capital for industrialization, there are usually strings attached that are not in the best interest of the country as it attempts to move toward economic independence. 33

On the surface dependency theory seems to present a logical explanation for the continued underdevelopment of certain countries. However, upon closer examination many writers express problems with the general acceptability of dependency theory. Some charge that its definitions are not precise and cannot be easily operationalized. The theory is also criticized because it places an over-reliance on a monocausal explanation of the problem of underdevelopment and cannot be supported empirically. 34
Table 1

Factors Affecting Political Stability - Instability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors Promoting Stability</th>
<th>Factors Promoting Instability</th>
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<tr>
<td>Consensus</td>
<td>Modernization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Economic Development</td>
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<td>Institutionalization</td>
<td>Social Mobilization</td>
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<td>Foreign Interference</td>
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<td>Economic Dependency</td>
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</table>
To summarize the survey of theories related to political development just presented, it would seem that three general theories have been offered to explain political stability. First, there should be a basic consensus within society as to the goals and objectives of the government and the direction that it should take. Also, the government must be considered legitimate and effective in reaching these goals and objectives. And finally, stability is promoted by the institutionalization of the political actors and processes to the point that adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence are achieved.

Many of the theories that have been advanced to explain political instability deal with the phenomena of modernization and the attending developments of economic development, social mobilization and urbanization. Large, well trained and financed military forces are also held to be an internal factor promoting political instability.

A body of theory of more recent origin deals with the impact of factors external to the nation state on its stability. The dependent status of third world countries within the world economic order retards economic as well as political development. Political stability is also jeopardized by direct foreign interference in
domestic political affairs as well as major power manipulation of international lending institutions.

We turn now to a discussion of political development in Mexico and application of the theories presented in explaining the political stability of that country.
ENDNOTES


3 Ibid.


11 Ibid.


17 Duff and McCamant, p. 1128.

18 Huntington, p. 58.

19 Ibid., p. 57.

20 Deutsch, p. 506

21 Huntington, p. 47.

22 Ibid., p. 12.


27 Burnett and Johnson, p. 512.


30 Ibid.

32 Ibid., p. 37.


34 Ayres, p. 46.
II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN MEXICO

Mexico was set on the course of developing its own political traditions with the revolt against Spanish rule in 1810. An uprising led by Father Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla on September 16 spread throughout Mexico in a series of wars that lasted for eleven years. Spain conceded defeat in 1821 and left the revolutionary leadership at the threshold of political power for which they were sadly unprepared. As one historian has asked,

How does one create a nation out of a newly independent state when the political atmosphere is pervaded by acrimony and mistrust? The question obsessed hundreds of Latin American leaders in early nineteenth century once parental authority had been successfully challenged. Iturbide [Augustine de Iturbide was a leader of the revolutionary movement and Emperor of Mexico from 1822 to 1823.] did not have all the answers, but he felt that he had one reliable formula. Identify the head of government with the state, subsume the two into one, and by some miraculous metamorphosis a nation will emerge. But the crucial element in the process, he believed, was to identify a dynamic, resourceful, self-assured, and charismatic leader.

From 1821 to 1860 over fifty different governments ruled Mexico, most gaining their position through military coup. General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, of Revolutionary War fame, was president on eleven separate occasions from 1835 to 1855.

A brief period of imposed stability occurred when France occupied Mexico in 1863 and Napoleon III
installed Ferdinando Maxmillian of Hapsburg and his wife Marie Charlotte Amelie Leopoldine as monarchs. Imperial rule ended with Maxmillian before the firing squad, and instability ensued until Profirio Diaz seized power by military force and controlled Mexican politics for the next third of a century.

Diaz was responsible for taking the first steps toward modernization by encouraging foreign investment and development of Mexico's natural resources. He found many willing investors in the United States and awarded them contracts and concessions that were often not in the best interest of long term growth towards independence for the Mexican economy. It has been estimated that by the end of the period known as the Profiriato foreigners owned over one-fourth of the country's total land area and accounted for two-thirds of Mexico's total investments outside of those in agriculture and handicrafts.

Modernization was accomplished at the expense of the peasants whose relative position steadily worsened during the Profiriato. As land became concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy families, the peasants were forced from their private and communal lands (ejidos) and into the thinly disguised servitude of the hacendados. This was accomplished mainly through the land act of 1883 that encouraged purchase of public lands. Any
land to which no clear title existed was considered public land. The peasants had for years farmed the land handed down to them from generation to generation with no thought to registering ownership. They were in no financial position to purchase the land that had been traditionally theirs; therefore, they had no choice but to leave the land and seek the only employment available. This was quite often working for the hacendado who purchased their land. The small pay that they received was usually in the form of credit that could be redeemed only at the hacienda-operated store.  

Diaz also alienated himself from the Mexican people by his flagrant manipulation of the constitutional provision prohibiting reelection. The constitution was conveniently amended at the end of each term of office to allow him to remain in power. Thus, suspicion of foreign influence, exploitation and interference, the unequal distribution of land and the violation of the principle of no reelection formed the ideological base for the Revolution of 1910. These factors were the impetus for several constitutional provisions that set the guidelines within which the president may exercise the powers of his office even today.

Hence, the events that contribute most to understanding the current political culture of Mexico
began with the revolt against the Diaz regime led by the wealthy, liberal hacendado Francisco Madero, in the state of Coahuila. His desires for reform, however, were more philosophical than material. After a year of bloodshed throughout Mexico, Madero emerged as president in the election of 1911. Unwilling to implement the reforms that had formed the basis for the Revolution, Madero almost immediately found himself the target of a counter-revolution led by his former cohorts, Victoriano Huerta and Emiliano Zapata.

Madero was forced to resign his office on February 19, 1913. On this day Mexico was served by three presidents in rapid succession. Order began to emerge from chaos with the implementation of the Constitution of 1917 and the election of presidents of the Iturbide model who identified strongly with the principles of the Revolution. Also, the impact of the emergence of a one-party system on the stability of government cannot be overemphasized.

Plutarco Elias Calles, president of Mexico from 1924 to 1928, formed the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) in 1929 as a widely based political party that would give future presidents a permanent coalition with which to govern, thus providing the key to government stability. President Lazaro Cardenas, seeing the need
for a more broadly based party to meet the economic challenges that were facing the government in 1938, reorganized the party. Now known as the Partido Revolucionario Mexicano (PRM), the official party included the four sectors of society: agrarian, popular, military and labor. Reflecting the decline in importance of the military, Manuel Avila Comancho (1940-46) reorganized the party during his presidency, dropping the military as a separate sector and renaming the party the Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI).

Thus, it could be argued that the three major factors contributing to the political stability of Mexico have been the Revolution, for its role in building a national consensus and providing the ideological basis on which the government bases its legitimacy; the emergence of a strong presidency; and the one-party political system. The role that has been played by these three factors in institutionalization and in responding to the pressures of social mobilization and economic development brought on by modernization will be discussed in the pages that follow.

During the past century revolution has been a key factor in the political development of many countries. Some have used revolution to bring about a reordering of the political structure, increased participation,
and a redistribution of power that promotes development on an egalitarian basis. In other countries unsuccessful revolutions had led instead to military dictatorships or a return to the traditional forms of authority.

Samuel Huntington has written that "A full scale revolution involves the destruction of the old political institutions and patterns of legitimacy, the mobilization of new groups into politics, the redefining of the political community, the acceptance of new political values and new concepts of political legitimacy, the conquest of power by a new, more dynamic political elite, and the creation of new and stronger political institutions." The Revolution of 1910 produced these types of changes in Mexico. During the dictatorship of Profirio Diaz the political system could be described as "uninstitutionalized, personal and oligarchial rule, lacking autonomy, complexity, coherence, and adaptability." This type of system could not cope with the increased demands produced by the rapid economic development. "The political system that emerged out of the revolution furnished Mexico with political stability unprecedented in Latin America and the political framework necessary for a new period of economic growth in the 1940s and 1950s." The revolution has also had the residual benefit of making other contributions to political stability.
It produced a set of egalitarian and nationalistic ideals and aspirations that have provided the basis for the legitimacy for the government and for the Mexican political consensus. The slogans of the revolution, the mystique and the ideology created a wider base of political support and loyalty.

From the Revolution emerged an institutionalized political system that concentrated power in the presidency but limited tenure to one six-year term. The system of presidential recruitment, while it might seem undemocratic, has produced a period of orderly political transition that is remarkably free of the disorder that characterized the political systems of the past. Mexico has solved the problem of charismatic, personalistic presidential leadership that causes many developing countries to be plagued with instability. The office of the presidency has become institutionalized, and the people identify more with the position than the person who may be holding the position at any particular time. Vincent Padgett points out that, "It is the office which commands the respect, clothes the leader with dignity and endows him with charismatic qualities." 8

The Constitution in Chapter III, Article 83, states that "The President shall assume the duties of office on the first of December for a term of six years."
A citizen who has held the office of president of the Republic, by popular election or by appointment as ad interim, provisional or substitute president can in no case and for no reason again hold that office."

This rule has contributed greatly to the stability of the Mexican political system. If a president could hold power indefinitely, even though subject to periodic elections, other presidential hopefuls would certainly be more likely to resort to illegal means of removing him from office. "With each president limited to a single term, ambitious politicians can look forward to several opportunities of possible presidential election, until the point is reached where they are too old to be selected but also too old to protest effectively against their being passed over."9

A third aspect of presidential politics that has contributed to the orderly succession of presidents and thus to the stability of the system is the method of selecting the presidential nominees. It is generally acknowledged that the incumbent president holds the key to the selection of the PRI's candidate. That is not to imply that the decision is entirely unilateral. It would be unthinkable, however, for a candidate to be nominated who was unacceptable to the incumbent president. Indeed, the entire electoral process anxiously awaits
the nod from the president. Generally, the selection is a cooperative effort: "...he selects his own successor with the cooperation of a small clique of powerful men, including the living ex-presidents and his choice is legitimized by an election that cannot be lost."\(^{10}\)

The role of the PRI in promoting political stability stems primarily from its broad base of support and its ability to successfully balance the demands of the competing sectors under its umbrella. Thus, since the PRI is the only avenue for interest aggregation and articulation, it means that all competition takes place within the party structure and among the various sectors of the party. When new centers of power emerge that could potentially form an effective challenge to the government, the PRI has been successful in co-opting them into the broadly based structure. The PRI makes every effort to form interest associations with these groups that have previously remained unorganized. Martin Needler sees the single party as a strength of the political system because it "removes the possibility of illegal opposition by disgruntled elements deliberately excluded from positions of power and influence."\(^{11}\)

The Role of the Military

The role of the military in the institutional framework of government has been the subject of much
debate by political development scholars. Some feel that the military somehow operates outside of the formal governmental structure; others, more correctly it seems, view it as one of the institutions of government.

The military has played a prominent role in the governments of most Latin American countries, and that role does not seem to be diminishing. The armed forces have in one way or another been connected to the political instability of countries either as a cause of it or as a reaction to it.

In Mexico, the relationship of the military to the government is unlike that in any other Latin American country. During the period of 1920 to 1940 there was a conscious effort on the part of Mexico's presidents to reduce the political role of the military and thus the threat of military coups. This reduction in power was accomplished by rotating zone commanders to prevent them from building up a personal following and splitting the command of Mexico City among the Presidential Guard, the secretary of national defense and the zone commander. Older officers were purged or encouraged to retire and the younger ones were professionalized. The president controlled the rank and assignment system for all ranks of colonel and above. He also had control over the budget and the procurement of equipment.12
In effect, the military was reorganized and made subordinate to civilian authority.

The military in Mexico is considered to be less professional than its counterpart in other Latin American countries and to serve as more of an internal police force than as a defense against foreign aggression. "The Mexican army is reputed to be one of the best 'tamed' and least political in Latin America.... Military coups have become virtually impracticable."13

Thus, it would seem that the military in Mexico is not in a position to challenge presidential authority and moreover, that it actually functions as a support for the president. The fortunes of the military ebb and flow with the fortunes of the government. The military has been called on to suppress guerilla activity, restore order in student riots and labor disturbances, maintain peace during elections and provide services of a socioeconomic and humanitarian nature. "Through a long history of rural civic action, the army has engaged in health education, provided applied medicine from dentistry to minor surgery, undertaken school and road construction and repairs, dispensed food supplies and clothing as well as tools and utensils, and has also carried out reforestation programs."14 Also, the zone commanders serve as an intelligence source for the president on the activities
of state governors and as a line of communication for peasants who have gotten nowhere with state officials. "If discontented peasants feel that the state government or other civilian officials have blocked their petitions from reaching presidential attention, peasant leaders have sometimes protested to the zone commander or sought his help in getting the president's attention." 15

The supportive role of the military is perhaps best summed up by David Ronfeldt.

... the endurance of the established Mexican political system has probably depended significantly --and will continue to depend--upon the army's performance of its residual political roles. Because of the army's impact on conflict management, through political communication and enforcement, it remains important for party-government stability and for elite integration within the revolutionary family. 16

**Pressures Generated by Modernization**

By the 1940s, Mexico had developed political institutions and structure sufficiently stable to accommodate rapid economic growth. The Second World War and the Korean War created a demand for Mexican exports. With the industrial output of the United States directed towards the manufacture of war materials, Mexican industry could also fill the vacuum created by the absence of goods imported from the United States. 17 Between 1940 and 1975, the GNP rose at the rate of 6 percent a year. Even considering the high population growth rate during
this period, the per capita output increased at the rate of 3 percent a year. In the 1958-1970 period, the aggregate growth rates were among the highest in the world.\textsuperscript{18}

The development of industry in Mexico has followed several phases. The period of 1880-1930 was characterized as a primary product export phase. The mining of silver, gold, copper and lead was controlled by foreign capital of which United States capital constituted 60 percent. The period of 1930-1955 was a period of horizontal import-substitution industrialization (ISI). Government policy promoted the development of local manufacturing of consumer goods when the Great Depression made export-oriented growth untenable.

The end of the Korean War brought an end to the economic boom that Mexico had enjoyed. Demand for exports fell and the country faced a severe recession that resulted in a 50 percent devaluation of the peso. It was at this point that the policy-making elites made the decision to shift to the vertical ISI phase of economic development. The object was to broaden domestic production and build up the local manufacture of capital and intermediate goods and thereby slow the drain on the country's balance of payments.

John Bailey has identified several pressures on a political system that can be associated with industrialization
They are: a decline in agricultural production; rapid urbanization; foreign penetration of certain areas of the economy; increasingly skewed income distribution; growth of capital intensive as opposed to labor intensive industry; adverse balance of payments and growing foreign debt.\textsuperscript{19}

Huntington and others have argued that nations that have highly institutionalized systems are better prepared to manage the pressures brought on by socio-economic modernization. Attention will be focused on certain pressures with which the Mexican political system has had to cope as a result of modernization; urbanization; socio-economic dualism and demands for increased political participation.

Urbanization

The period of rapid urbanization in Mexico roughly parallels the period of rapid economic growth. From 1950 to 1960, the rural population increased 1.6 percent per year while the urban population growth rate was 6.1 percent. The proportion of the population living in cities of over 10,000 rose from 12 percent in 1900 to 38 percent in 1960. Currently, over 70 percent of the population is classified as urban. Research has indicated that urbanization promotes instability. Wayne Cornelius used data presented in Almond and Verba's
study Civil Culture to analyze the effect of urbanization in relation to three themes or clusters of propositions about the relationship between urbanization and political stability in Mexico. The first theme concerned urbanization as a contributor to economic frustration among the migrant population as a result of inadequate pre-migration preparation, restrictions on upward mobility and increased awareness of the condition of relative deprivation. A second cluster of propositions would indicate that political instability would result from urbanization because migrants experience difficulty adjusting socially and psychologically to the urban environment. This adjustment difficulty stems from the absence of a support system provided by the large family units, the difference in the norms of behavior between rural and urban areas and the frustration that results from the time lag between giving up old traditions and acquiring new ones. A third proposition holds that urbanization, increased awareness of government and politics and mobilization of radical opposition forces go hand in hand. 20

Based on the data available from various urban studies, Cornelius found that urbanization had not contributed significantly to political instability for several reasons. The material deprivation in the city may not have been as severe a perceived by previous researchers. During
the 1940-1960 period, those without access to public sanitation increased by only 18.9 percent while the urban population grew by 177.1 percent. For the majority of the migrants, then, the move to the city could have represented an improvement in conditions. Data in *Civil Culture* also indicated that the migrants were relatively satisfied with conditions. Of those who had lived in the city for 2 years or less, 41 percent indicated that they had definite plans for remaining. This feeling was expressed by 80 percent of those who had lived in the city at least 4 years. Cornelius also found that the nuclear family was not necessarily destroyed by the move to the city. The size of the family of the migrant was at least as large as the average size of the family in the native village. Other findings indicate that similar patterns of political awareness existed between the long time city residents and the migrants, the majority of the migrants had had some preparation for obtaining jobs prior to migration and that migrants expressed a high degree of support for the political system. Eighty-five percent of all migrants believed that the ideals and goals of the revolution had been realized or that the people in the government were still working on them. Only 10 percent believed that the government's policies would endanger the national welfare.  

Cornelius found from his own studies of the migrant poor conducted in the early 1970s that those
who had been born and raised in the rural areas had slightly more authoritarian tendencies than the city-born respondents. This would seem to dispute the proposition that urban migrants constitute a threat to regime stability. The research also indicated that there is a degree of support, especially among the urban poor, for the position of the president as the chief authority figure charged with guaranteeing law and order. In 1968 President Diaz Ordaz was responsible for the death of unarmed student demonstrators and by-standers in Mexico City. Fifty-nine percent of the low income adults in the city approved of the president's use of repressive measures to restore order.

Thus, it would seem that continued support for the mystique of the Mexican Revolution and a strong presidency have ameliorated some of the destabilizing effects of urbanization that have operated in other Latin American countries.

Socio-economic Dualism

Income inequality is only one aspect of the dualism that exists in Mexican society. This dualism could undermine the support for the egalitarian ideology of the Revolution. Income statistics show that dualism exists to a great extent in the rural-urban quality of life. In 1963 the major metropolitan areas of Mexico
City, Guadalajara and Monterrey with 16 percent of the population received 34 percent of the income. Only 25 percent of the income went to the 45 percent of the population who lived on farms or in villages of under 2,500. The income of the urban workers on the average was four times greater than that of their counterparts in the rural population.

The urban-rural dualism is also reflected in nutritional standards, unemployment and education. A 1973 study shows that the majority of the 55 percent of the Mexican population who are malnourished live in rural areas. Of the 40 percent of the population that was unemployed or underemployed in 1970, over two-thirds were workers from the rural areas. In relation to education, an Eleven-Year Plan (1950-1970) was adopted by Lopez Mateos. It was successful in increasing the number of students that attended school but did not address the problems of rural education. By 1970, 54 percent of the urban children remained in school to complete their elementary education. Only 9 percent of the rural school children remained in school long enough to receive even this level of literacy.

Increased Demands for Political Participation

In a sense the pressures created by urbanization and socio-economic dualism have contributed to their
source of tension which is a greater demand for political participation. Demonstrations against the government have been relatively rare in Mexico when compared to other Latin American countries. This is understandable when one considers that the government, itself, is a revolutionary one based, at least ideologically, on egalitarian principles. Also, the office of the president has commanded such respect that the president has almost never been criticized even in the press. To the masses, the president has served almost as a father figure. The one-party system also has escaped serious attack because the PRI has had such a broad base and the leadership has been responsive to the demands of the citizens. 25

During the late 1960s and 1970s, however, severe strains developed in the Mexican political system. In 1968, just prior to the holding of the Olympic Games in Mexico City, approximately 4,000 people gathered in the Plaza of the Three Cultures to hear speeches. The subject of the speeches was a criticism of the government for spending millions of dollars to stage the Olympics while millions of Mexicans lived in grinding poverty. The rally ended in what has been dramatically described as a "massacre," with reports of the number of casualties ranging from 50 to 500 students. A 1971 incident involved
the use of a paramilitary group known as Los Halcones (The Falcons) on a group of students who were protesting the continued incarceration of some of the demonstrators from the 1968 incident. The ensuing "scandal was so open that President Echevarria had to ask for the resignation of several high-ranking officials including cabinet ministers and the Mayor of the Federal District." 26

The base of dissent broadened in the six years following the riots in the Plaza of the Three Cultures. "A wave of alienation swept the country involving not only the younger generation but also the adult middle class, intellectuals, and trade unionists. And by 1976, even the traditionally docile peasantry was resorting to violence and political acts of guerilla warfare." 27

These expressions of dissatisfaction were accompanied by an economic crisis that brought about galloping inflation, the devaluation of the peso and the transfer of capital to foreign investments. To deal with these emergencies, President Echeverria undertook certain reforms and offered concessions that actually intensified the problems that faced his successor, Jose Lopez Portillo. He announced a policy of "shared development" and attempted to rebuild popular support through costly wage, price, housing and investment programs. To meet the demands of the poor, Compania Nacional de Subsistencias Populares (CONASUPO)
was formed. This was a food distribution system in which the government purchased staple-goods and made them available at lower prices to low-income families through shopping centers and mobile vending stores.28

These programs required an enormous outlay of public funds, increased the national deficit and the foreign debt. By 1975, federal expenditures had increased from 3.2 billion in 1970 to over 12 billion, the deficit rose from $500 million to $3.3 billion, and the balance of payments deficit rose from $1 billion to over $3.5 billion.29 When Portillo took office in December of 1976 the country had an external debt of over $20 billion and an inflation rate of 30 percent.

Portillo's program for restoring legitimacy to the system contained three parts: general amnesty for political offenses; administrative reform and a program of political reform known as reforma politica. The purpose of the latter part of the program was "to co-opt the principal opposition forces into the system and to reopen the channels of political participation."30 The new election law of 1977 increased the size of the Chamber of Deputies to 400. Three hundred of the members would be elected from single member districts throughout the country. The remaining 100 seats were guaranteed to opposition parties on a proportional basis. The
elections of July 1, 1979, were the first held under the new law. The PRI won 296 of the single-member seats. The strongest opposition party, National Action Party (NAP), won 3 of the single-member district seats and 39 of the proportional seats. The remaining 61 seats were distributed among eight other parties. 31

External Factors Affecting Stability

Perhaps the most difficult problems with which Mexican presidents have had to deal are those related to industrial development and the penetration of the economic system by foreign investments. Presidents have constantly had to shift from economic policies that favor national independence to those that encourage foreign investment when the flow of direct foreign investments began to diminish. Their dilemma has been an exercise in balancing the Revolutionary ideology of independence from foreign economic and political domination with the hard realities of developing an economic policy for a country heavily dependent upon foreign trade, capital and technology.

Mexico has been able to build a diversified, sophisticated and intermediately complete industrial economy in large measure on the basis of direct foreign investment. 32 This investment has been responsible for the fact that Mexico no longer resembles the model
of a "peripheral" country. It is too industrialized, its exports are too diversified, Mexican industries supply the country with too large a share of finished goods that are consumed domestically, and additionally Mexico is an unusually strong country politically with a sophisticated administrative structure that is capable of defending local interests.

On the other hand, however, Mexico has many problems to overcome before it can move from its dependent development or semi-peripheral status to that of a developed country. Economic development must focus on raising the GNP, equalizing income, reducing dependence on foreign investment and developing technology rather than being dependent upon foreign sources.¹²

Mexico's economic development has not been achieved without some political costs in the form of loss of independence and frustration of public welfare objectives. As was indicated previously, the foreign manipulation of the availability of investment capital can influence a president's domestic policy options. In December of 1958, shortly after taking office, Lopez Mateos announced that he intended "to govern on the extreme left of the Constitution."³⁴ Within days over $250 million in capital from the private sector left the country for investment in the United States. The
president was forced to abandon his policy. Again in 1960-1961, Mateos advocated changes that would limit the role of direct foreign investment. Foreign capital again fled the country. Devaluation of the peso and sluggish economic growth resulted.

Direct foreign investments dropped during the administration of Luis Echeverria (1970-1976) as a result of his policy of favoring the interest of the local bourgeoisie. In 1973 a "Mexicanization" law was passed which required that at least 51 percent of certain industries be owned by Mexicans. Mexicanization had the effect of a two-edged sword. The reduction in foreign investments forced Echeverria to turn to international lending institutions for investment capital, thus increasing the country's foreign debt. Lopez Portillo, who followed Echeverria in office, had to shift his economic policy to restore investor confidence and end the serious recession brought on by the policies of Echeverria. Gereffi sums up the dilemma faced by the presidents as follows: "From Cardenas in the 1930s to the initial years of Lopez Mateos' regime to the Echeverria period, the flow of DFI to Mexico declined immediately whenever a president sounded too nationalistic or too concerned with the problems of labor or the poor."^35

The suggestion of dependency theorists that direct foreign investment through multinational corporations
can divert government attention from social welfare programs would, at least in the case of Mexico, seem to be confirmed by Gereffi's statement. Other dependency propositions state that multinational corporations actually drain the periphery of capital, that major sources of capital are domestic rather than foreign, that multinational corporations create unemployment by using capital intensive rather than labor intensive technology and that they contribute to increasing income inequality. These positions would seem to be supported by evidence so far as the Mexican economy is concerned.

Statistics show that in the 1940-1960 period foreign investors took more capital out of Mexico than they invested. The trend has continued. "In this decade alone, foreign investors, on new direct investments of $886 million, made an income of almost $1.7 billion, of which they reinvested less than 20 percent in Mexico. This 'suction pump' effect of foreign investment taking capital out of Mexico, combined with increased foreign credits, declining conditions of trade, periodic flight of capital and accumulated underdevelopment, has led to Mexico's progressive indebtedness, economic dependence and what Gonzalez Casanova has correctly termed 'decapitalization.'" A problem that parallels that of decapitalization is the use of domestic capital by MNCs to finance their
investments. Dependency theorists suggest that the multinationals are less risky creditors than local firms and are, therefore, unable to secure loans that might otherwise go to domestic capital investors. Cockcroft indicates that this is the case in Mexico. "United States corporations finance 70 percent of their investments with Mexican capital, make their profit on cheap Mexican labor, sell their goods for exorbitant prices directly in Mexico or abroad through the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) or the Central American Common Market, and remit the bulk of their profits to the United States."37

Foreign subsidiaries account for a dominant share of the economic output in Mexico. During the period of the 1960s and 1970s, multinationals produced 67 percent of the output in the chemical industry, 63 percent of the electrical machinery and 84 percent of the output in the rubber industry. It has been argued that since MNCs have the tendency to be capital intensive, they do little to create jobs and actually create unemployment. In Mexico, MNCs have been found to be about 2.5 times as capital intensive as local firms.38

Muller contends that even though multinationals contribute to unemployment, the role they play in income maldistribution is more critical. "In Mexico in the
early 1960s the ratio of individual income of the richest 20 percent to the individual income of the poorest 20 percent was 10 to 1. By the middle of the 1960s the ratio had increased to 17 to 1.\textsuperscript{39} The situation of income inequality was even greater in the Mexico City area where most of the MNCs are located. There the richest 30 percent receive 62.5 percent of the income while the poorest 20 percent have 1.3 percent of the income on which to live.\textsuperscript{40}

The Current Economic Crisis

The economic crisis that Mexico is currently weathering is the most serious test of the stability of the political system in recent decades. In the wake of the discovery of huge oil reserves, the Portillo administration launched an ambitious plan for rapid development. The plan called for heavy borrowing to finance the development of oil resources, industrial growth and expanded services for the poor, thus committing future income from oil exports to repay the loans. When the oil glut developed in 1981-1982 and income dropped, the government was faced with the need to borrow additional money just to pay the interest on the estimated 80 billion dollar foreign debt.

The severe financial crisis and the exposing of widespread corruption in the Portillo administration
put the new president, Miguel de la Madrid, in an unenviable position when he took over the office in December of 1982. The annual gross domestic product which had grown at the rate of 8 percent from 1979 to 1981 fell to no growth at all in 1982. In 1983, during the height of the crisis, growth actually declined about 3.5 percent. Unemployment or underemployment was estimated to be about 50 percent of the work force. The real income of those that were employed fell by 16 percent and Mexicans' buying power has dropped by 50 percent since 1982.41

The austerity measures imposed by the president and indirectly by international lending institutions as a precondition for further loans were severe. "Medicine prescribed was as strong as it has proved effective: drastic cuts in public spending and wages bravely held well under the inflation rate. In no other country in modern times, not even post-Weimar Germany, has so radical a program been instituted with such success."42

De la Madrid halved the budget deficit which in 1982 was 18 percent of the gross national product. The inflation rate of 100 percent in 1982 had been reduced to about 75 percent by January of 1984 and was expected to be reduced to 50 percent by the end of the year. Imports were cut in half and the government had a healthy surplus of $12 billion at the beginning of 1984.
Observers have expressed amazement that the crisis, although not solved, has been reduced to manageable proportions. Even greater amazement has been expressed that President da la Madrid has accomplished this with so little cost to his political standing. "For the most part, Mexicans have accepted their new leader's message for lower expectations. The country's most powerful unions have been unusually docile. They agreed to a moderate 15 percent increase in minimum wage earlier this year and seem willing to settle for 25 to 30 percent increase in January."43

Conclusions

For many years students of Mexican politics have questioned the saliency of the Revolutionary ideology, the dominance of the president and the one-party system as factors in continued political stability. About 20 years ago, Raymond Vernon predicted the break-up of the ruling party over economic circumstances that closely parallel those of the present time.44 Martin Needler, writing in 1961, stated, "with all its advantages--by comparison with what went before in Mexico, with what would probably have occurred in Mexico without it, with what has taken place elsewhere in Latin America--the one-party system, admirably suited though it has been to the politics of this transitional period in Mexican life, is most likely itself a transitional form."45
Neither break-up nor transition have occurred. The PRI still continues to have massive support perhaps out of fear of a return to political instability or because of the traditional respect for authority. While it is true that Mexico is currently facing the worst economic crisis since before World War II, there is little reason to believe that a change in the party system would solve the problems. The major theme of opposition is corruption within the PRI and this can be temporarily silenced by a change in leadership. The current president has pledged to wage a vigorous campaign against corruption as one of the major objectives of his administration. 46

The Revolution itself has come under attack by writers who contend that the Mexican people no longer believe that the Revolution has accomplished its goals. Those that take this position point to political favoritism, graft and corruption, the 37 percent illiteracy rate, the highly unequal distribution of wealth and the poor health and nutritional standards that give Mexico a higher crude death rate than Bolivia and Peru. 47

On the other hand, the accomplishments of the Revolution seem to be impressive. Totalitarianism has been avoided, the land power structure has been broken and extensive agrarian reform has been achieved,
and perhaps most importantly, order and stability in government have been maintained. It would seem that the goals of the Revolution are still the goals of the Mexican people and there is no evidence that the unifying effect of the Revolution has diminished. The people accept the fact that a great deal has been accomplished and that there is still a long way to go.

There is also little evidence that the power of the president as a force in maintaining political stability has diminished. It is true, however, that the president increasingly finds himself performing a balancing act between the interest groups affiliated with the PRI. He is caught in the paradox of possessing great power, but at the same time in order to retain this power he must act with moderation and maintain a balance between the competing interest of the PRI coalition.

As the government activities expand to meet the needs of an industrially developing nation, the president is finding his power usurped by a growing bureaucracy. Vernon sees the president acting as a virtual rubber stamp for the bureaucracy. Although these factors may limit the president's ability to act decisively, they do not damage the institutionalized nature of the presidency.
Robert Monson has stated that "Instability is brought about by a population that considers the political system to be illegitimate and/or ineffective, and by political institutions which cannot meet the needs and demands of the society and which lack the capacity to adjust." From the evidence presented, it would seem that the Mexican political system does indeed have the capacity to adjust, that its legitimacy has not been seriously questioned and that it has shown a responsiveness to the needs and demands of society. The factors that have produced stability in the past should continue to do so in the future, even in the face of the current economic crisis.
ENDNOTES

1 This quote and the historical sketch which follows are from Michael C. Meyer and William Sherman, *The Course of Mexican History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 299.


3 Meyer, p. 416.


5 Ibid., p. 316.

6 Ibid., p. 317.


9 Huntington, p. 321.


13 Ibid., p. 294.

14 Ibid., p. 293.

15 Ibid., p. 295.

16 Ibid., p. 306.

18 David Felix, "Income Inequality in Mexico," Current History 72(March 1977): 112.


21 Ibid., p. 850.


23 Felix, p. 112.

24 Ibid., p. 113.


28 Johnson, p. 119.

29 Fagan, pp. 692-693.

30 Leich, p. 362.

31 Ibid., p. 363.

32 Gereffi, p. 54.

33 Ibid., p. 31.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid., p. 54.

37 Ibid., p. 278.


40 Ibid.


46 "We are in an Emergency," Time 120(December 20, 1982): 30.


48 Vernon, p. 146.

III. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN ARGENTINA

Argentina was as ill prepared for the task of nation-building as was Mexico when separation from Spain was achieved. The independence movement began when the city council of Buenos Aires removed the Spanish viceroy and took control of the area in 1810. A declaration of independence, however, was not issued until six years later. Already conflict had developed between those who had commercial interests in Buenos Aires and controlled the flow of goods through the Rio de la Plata estuary and the caudillos who controlled the provinces of the interior. The focal point of this conflict was what form the new government should take. The caudillos supported a federal government thinking that this form would afford them the best opportunity to maintain autonomy over their provinces. The portenos (residents of Buenos Aires), on the other hand, wanted a unitary system to protect their economic interest and provide at least semblance of national unity to curb the power of the caudillos.

A constitution, written in 1819, was to have united the country under a federal form of government, but Buenos Aires refused to participate and followed an independent course for seven years. Another constitution was written in 1926 which created the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata under a unitary form of government.
Bernardino Rivadavia was chosen to serve as president, but this time the caudillos rebelled and once again national unity was not achieved. Juan Manuel Rosas, one of the strongest provincial caudillos, and his private army restored order after the fall of Rivadavia. In 1835 he began a period of dictatorial rule that lasted until he was overthrown by Justo Jose de Urquiza, the caudillo from Entre Rios.

Urquiza called a constitutional convention in 1852. The document approved at that meeting was patterned largely after the United States Constitution and has remained in force ever since with the exception of a brief period from 1949 to 1955 during the presidency of Juan Peron.

The new constitution, however, did not bring stability, and civil war broke out again in 1858 and 1861. For Argentina order began to emerge from chaos when Bartolome Mitre was elected president, and Buenos Aires rejoined the Union, "and the next several decades were characterized by peace and stability and by rapid economic and political development.\(^1\)

The government that produced this development was tightly controlled by the traditional oligarchy; the political bosses, importers and wealthy cattlemen from both Buenos Aires and the interior. For the most part these were good and able men who obeyed the constitution
which provided for a degree of democracy. The citizens of Argentina enjoyed some civil and political rights but were largely excluded from meaningful participation in the political process. "Governmental machinery revolved around the person of the president. In the provinces, legislatures were usually subservient to governors, who in turn were almost personal agents of the president."  

The oligarchs of this first conservative era (1862-1916) made significant progress toward modernization. First, and perhaps most importantly, they unified the country under a federal system. The conflict between Buenos Aires and the interior ended. The Indians were forced from the pampas and the region was turned over to the production of cattle and grain on a massive scale.

The oligarchy realized that Argentina needed to develop industry as well as agriculture. To this end they encouraged foreign investment to develop a network of railroads and telegraph lines and promoted immigration to meet the increased demand for labor. Success in the latter endeavor was immediate and has had a far reaching impact on Argentina's development. The 1914 census showed that 30 percent of the population was foreign-born. For the city of Buenos Aires, immigrants comprised more than 50 percent of the population. 3 Most of the newcomers eventually settled in the urban centers of the country and created a growing urban middle-class
of small manufacturers and merchants. "By 1914 immigrants were in a majority among homeowners in Buenos Aires and as owners of small industries and commercial firms." These immigrants did not place many demands on the political system, nor did they agitate for political participation. For the most part they showed little interest in politics, having brought with them a low level of political culture. Nevertheless, because of their numbers and concentration in urban centers, they did have an impact on the system. "Argentine immigration posed a unique threat to political development through overnight creation of urbanization."5

These changes, industrialization and immigration, encouraged by the modernizing conservatives were major factors contributing to their fall from power in 1916. "Argentina's ruling oligarchy found that the coercion of the 19th century did not work. The primary exporting economy had developed a complex, pluralist society in the urban centers whose interests, aspirations, and class affiliations sometimes conflicted with those of the ruling oligarchy."6

However, the conservative's control of government was not challenged until 1890 when the Radical Civic Union (UCR) party was formed under the leadership of the popular and charismatic politician, Hipolito Yrigoyen. The Radical's platform called for expanded suffrage, an end to corruption and greater representation of urban
interests. In an effort to curb the tensions generated by the opposition party, the conservatives sought a compromise that would satisfy the demands of the middle class, but still not compromise the power of the landed aristocracy.

**Liberalizing the System**

Such a compromise was achieved by Roque Saenz Pena, an upper-class reformer, who was elected president in 1910. He sponsored an electoral reform bill which opened up the political system to include active participation by a larger segment of the middle class. The secret ballot was introduced, honest voter registration was held, voting became compulsory and suffrage was extended to all males over the age of 18. As might be expected, voter participation increased dramatically from 190,000 in 1910 to 640,000 in 1912 and 1.46 million in 1928. These reforms allowed for a more competitive two party system and paved the way for Yrigoyen's election to the presidency in 1916.

The Saenz Pena law also established the "incomplete list" system of electing congressmen and presidential electors. A voter was required to cast a vote for two-thirds of the candidates on the ballot for each office. Those candidates with the most votes were elected regardless of party. "This law did not favor strong party discipline and allowed many parties to gain congressional representation."
Many optimistic political observers at the time felt that the election of Yrigoyen and the change of governmental control from the Conservatives to the Radicals was a positive step toward political development and political modernization. Without revolution or civil war, the political system had responded to demands for change and the base of political participation had expanded.

But history has not validated their optimism. Argentina was indeed at a critical junction in its political development, a position similar to that of Mexico after the Revolution. However, instead of moving on to develop political institutions and procedures, Argentina began a process of political decay. The Radicals should bear a great deal of the responsibility for pointing Argentina in that direction. "The Yrigoyen administration was an orgy of spoils politics for the benefit of the Radical faithful who had worked and waited so long for their chance to participate in the public bounty, and many less educated Radicals took the places of more educated Conservatives." The Radicals did not have a program to accomplish the "national renovation" that had been their slogan for the past several decades. "Yrigoyen led not a movement of ideas, but a personal following, and his Radicals wanted chiefly to use power for their material benefit."
Marcelo Alvear succeeded Yrigoyen as president and served from 1922 to 1928. Some Radicals felt, however, that Alvear was only a puppet manipulated by Yrigoyen from behind the scenes. This disregard for the institutional integrity of the presidency on the part of the former president led to a split of the Radical party into two factions, the personalistas (supporters of Yrigoyen) and the anti-personalistas. Yrigoyen was elected to the presidency again in 1928 and served until he was overthrown by a military coup d'état in 1930.

On the surface, the fourteen years of Radical government seemed to be a period of substantial progress. The country had achieved high levels of economic development, literacy, urbanization and social mobilization.

The greatest success story in Latin America prior to 1930 was Argentina. In the 1920s, Argentina was roughly at the same economic level as Canada and Australia and not far behind the United States. With a high degree of urbanization, a largely European population with many recent immigrants and a record for steady progress toward liberal democratic institutions, Argentina looked to the future with utmost confidence. Having near complete literacy and an excellent press, the Argentines were among the most cultivated of people, leading the world (Sweden and the United States following) in the number of school teachers per 1,000 population.

During this period of growth and expansion, the Radicals reaped the benefits of a primary exporting economy during a period of general prosperity, but failed to address any of the needs of structural changes in
government and society that developed along with modernization. In addition to ignoring institution-building in government, the Radicals had no programs for land reform, aid for the rural poor and made no effort to reduce income inequality between Buenos Aires and the interior or to improve working conditions for urban laborers.

The End of the Democratic Experiment

The depression brought an end to the prosperity of the Radical era and an end to their popularity. "People looked beneath the surface and discovered that the Radicals had not contributed significantly to extending political participation to the middle class that it was supposed to represent." The military coup of 1930 was a response to this disillusionment with the Radicals, to the economic crisis created by the disappearance of foreign markets and credit, to the widespread corruption in Yrigoyen's administration and to his alleged senility and inability to govern.

In retrospect, the coup seems to have been another pivotal point in Argentina's political development. The coup "... has baffled many observers because it contradicts some cherished precepts in contemporary social science. Whereas most theorists envision democratic government at the culmination of political development, Argentina passed through a democratic period then moved on to dictatorial forms." The coup seems to have
established a pattern of "institutionalized" instability. Only in 1922 and 1928 have democratically elected presidents completed their term of office. Military coups have removed civilian governments in 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966 and 1973. In the words of Marvin Goldwert, "Until 1930, Argentina was one of the great hopes for stable democracy in Latin America.... But the revolution of 1930 unleashed the scourges of modern militarism and chronic instability in the land."\(^{15}\)

General Jose Uriburu led the coup of 1930 and headed the government until Augustin Justo successfully challenged his authority and had himself elected president in 1932. Justo favored the economic interest of the conservative rural elite and in response to their pressure signed the Roco-Runciman Pact with Great Britain. In effect this agreement gave British investors control of public utilities and transportation as well as the meat packing industry. In return for this, Argentina received a pledge that in the midst of the depression Great Britain would not reduce its purchases of Argentine beef. Not only did the agreement clearly favor the cattle producers over the industrialists and middle sectors of the economy, but it also was a serious blow to those who favored a nationalistic economic policy since it greatly increased Argentina's economic dependency on Great Britain.
Roberto M. Ortiz, a reformist conservative, was elected president in 1938. He reinstated free elections, but was able to accomplish little more because of ill health which forced his resignation after only two years in office. Ramon Castillo, his reactionary vice president, proceeded to undo the progress that had been made in reestablishing a more open political system and was overthrown by the military in 1943.

The officers who supported the coup were motivated by two rather different factors. One group simply wanted to continue the political reforms of the Ortiz period but the other group was responding to a more complicated set of external circumstances.

Argentina had thus far been able to avoid alignment with either the Axis or Allied powers in the World War. A group of officers, however, favored supporting the Axis alliance because they saw an Axis victory as a way for Argentina to break free from its economic dependency on Great Britain. They were concerned that if the conservatives continued in power after the 1944 elections they would force an alliance with the Allies in order to protect their economic interests.

Also, at this time another change was taking place in Argentina which would have a far reaching impact on the country's political development. During the 1930s and the 1940s there was a wave of migration to
the cities of truly incredible proportions. During the period from 1936 to 1947, the number of Argentines born in the provinces and who moved to metropolitan Buenos Aires was equivalent to about 40 percent of the population increase. "These great masses transported rapidly to the cities and changed from rural peons, craftsmen, or laboring personnel into industrial workers, acquired a political significance without at the same time finding institutional channels necessary for their integration into the normal functioning of the democracy." 116 Political parties could have been channels for integration; however, as Peter Snow writes, "The structures, the programs, and the leaders of the existing political parties were not able (nor willing perhaps) to offer anything of value to the working class." 117 The inability of any group to effectively incorporate this element into its midst left unattended a large element for potential instability.

The Rise of Peron

It was the urban working class that one of the leaders of the 1943 coup, Juan Domingo Peron, mobilized not as a political party or even as participants in normalized political processes but instead as a mob to further his own personal political ambitions. Peron served as under secretary of war in the military government but used his position as head of the Department of Labor
and Social Welfare to organize the urban working class. He won their allegiance by securing significant wage increases and benefits. He was instrumental in organizing new trade unions and in expanding others that supported his political ambitions. By October of 1945, Peron had sufficiently expanded and consolidated his political support to the point that he posed a threat to the stability of the military government.

Because of this threat he was arrested on October 9th. A massive demonstration of hundreds of thousands of workers in front of the Casa Rosada (presidential residence) convinced General Edelmio Farrel to release Peron on October 17th. The following February he was elected president of Argentina and for the next decade determined Argentina's future with government that was increasingly authoritarian. "His government was a highly personal one lacking a true revolutionary faith for transforming the nation.... Peron divided the country into Peronist and anti-Peronist. Neither was strong enough to destroy the other, nor humble enough to live with the other. This situation literally ruined the country."18

As president, Peron continued to do a great deal for the working class, both materially and psychologically. He modernized the social security system and increased the number of workers covered by its benefits. Wwages
and fringe benefits were increased at a rate much higher than the workers' productivity indicated would be wise to avoid inflationary pressures.

Peron's economic policies, as well as his social programs for the workers, had disastrous effects on the economy. He followed a form of state capitalism in which "private property was subordinated along with individual rights to strict government control." Industrial expansion was to be financed through a scheme by which the government would purchase agricultural products for low prices and resell them on the world market at substantially higher prices. Production fell drastically. In response to pressures for a more nationalistic economic policy, Peron purchased the foreign share of ownership in the railrods, telephone companies and in petroleum production. This move proved to be counter productive from an economic standpoint. Not only did the purchases use up precious foreign exchange, but also the enterprises were soon operating at a loss and needed government subsidies to keep them operating.

As Peron's economic problems became more complex because of inflation, costly social programs, decreased production and dwindling foreign exchange, his rule became more repressive. He took over the upper-class newspapers and increased press censorship. Opposition members in congress were effectively silenced by a new
law "which made it a crime for anyone to attack the leaders of government or their policies."\(^{20}\) Peron's increasing paranoia is evident in the 1953 Edict of Economic Safety. This law "made it a crime to cast doubt on the government's policies, or to spread rumors, or to fail to denounce anyone who did."\(^{21}\) As another act of spitefulness against the upper-class, Peron had a prestigious jockey club in Buenos Aires burned.

Peron's fatal mistake, however, was his attack on the Catholic Church. The first clash came in the field of education. Peron outlawed religious instruction and dictated the *justicialismo*, an attempt to deify Peron and the state, be made a required course in all schools. He also closed the Catholic newspapers, arrested priests, forbade religious processions and, as the ultimate insult to the Church, legalized divorce and prostitution.

In addition to losing support of the Church, Peron alienated other groups that had supported him in the 1946 election. In the early years of consolidating power he had won the grudging support of the military by significantly increasing military expenditures. Officers had received huge pay increases and in many instances were paid higher salaries than officers of comparable rank in the United States. Also, during the period from 1943 to 1949 appropriations for military procurements increased 1000 percent.\(^{22}\) However, by
1953 the economic condition of the country was so weak that Peron could no longer afford to buy the support of the military and its budget was greatly reduced.

Peron was also forced to abandon his nationalistic economic policies that had won support for him in the past. Foreign investment was encouraged and a contract was signed that gave Standard Oil of California control over the petroleum industry.

After several unsuccessful coup attempts, the army joined the navy in calling for Peron's resignation on September 16, 1955. Three days later Peron retired to a Paraguayan gunboat anchored in the harbor and left behind a sad state of affairs in Argentina. The economy was in shambles; public confidence in government was destroyed; legitimate governmental institutions and processes had been weakened; and the working class, aware of its potential political strength, had become accustomed to operating outside of the official governmental structure.

The demise of Juan Peron did not mean an end to Peronism. He continued to direct his following from exile in various other Latin American countries and later from Madrid. The presidents who served during the period from 1955 until the return of Peron in 1973 had little time to devote to the affairs of state after dealing with what had become known as the "Peronist
problem." The Peronists frustrated economic recovery and political development by their unwillingness to accept austerity measures and by staging crippling strikes and turning to terrorism as a means of achieving their demands.

**Instability Ensues**

General Eduardo Lonardi became president immediately after the coup but was replaced after only 50 days because his methods of dealing with the Peronist agitators were not considered harsh enough. Pedro Aramburu dissolved the Peronist Party and outlawed any political activity on its behalf. These actions, however, did not weaken the Peronist movement. In fact, the repression served as a rallying point for the Peronists to challenge the legitimacy of the military government. In the elections of 1957 and 1960, the Peronists resorted to casting blank ballots which amounted to a higher percent of the total vote cast than those for any political party.  

In 1958 the government was returned to civilian control and Dr. Arturo Frondizi was elected president. His credibility was questioned because many people felt that he had struck a deal with the Peronists. In exchange for electoral support Frondizi was thought to have agreed to remove some of the restrictions on labor's political activities. Nevertheless, his years in office were a balancing act between the demands of the right wing
army officers, the demands of a worsening economy and the constant agitation of the labor movement for higher wages and political participation.

In the face of eroding political support, Frondizi legalized the Peronist party in time for them to participate in the 1962 congressional elections. This act resulted in a sweeping victory for the Peronists and the arrest of Frondizi in a military coup just nine days after the election.

Jose Maria Guido, president of the senate, served as acting president for 18 months until Arturo Illia was elected. Unable to deal effectively with growing economic problems and labor unrest, Illia was replaced by General Juan Carlos Ongania in a military coup on June 28, 1966. He had no greater success than his predecessor in dealing with the nation's economic problems or in stemming the rising tide of terrorist activity that had resulted in the assassination of former president Aramburu and the kidnapping of numerous diplomats and foreign businessmen. Ongania was forced to resign by the military leaders and General Alejandro Lanusse, the army commander-in-chief, took over in 1970. "In order to resolve the institutional crisis and bring all sectors of the country into the decision-making process, the Lanusse government has proposed a Gran Acuerdo Nacional (Grand National Agreement, GAN). Lanusse
envisioned this agreement as an avenue for dialogue among the major political forces to arrive at a meeting of the minds to create a stable political environment for the country." The GAN was met with skepticism by the major parties. "Already frustrated and alienated, these groups tended to have a defeatist attitude toward programs intended to create national unity or accord among diverse, recalcitrant sectors." 

Lanusse promised to return the government to civilian hands and hold elections in 1973 in which Peronists who had been allowed to return to Argentina, would be able to participate but in which Peron himself would not be allowed to be a candidate. Hector Campora, generally considered to be a stand-in for Peron, won the election but served only a brief period before he and his vice president resigned to pave the way for new elections in which Juan Peron would be a candidate.

Writing at the time, David Rock stated that "Peronism has been rehabilitated to the point where Peron himself is widely regarded among groups formerly most bitterly opposed to him as Argentina's de Gaulle, a focus of hope for an escape from the past and for a new era of stability and development." 

Peron, however, did not provide the stabilizing force that the country needed. He died of natural causes after a year in office and was succeeded by his wife
and vice president, Isabel Peron. Unable to restore order and under constant attack from waring factions of the Peronist movement on the left and from the military on the right, Isabel Peron was removed to the surprise of almost no one by the military on March 24, 1976. The military retained power until 1983 and in the years immediately following the coup seemed to be making some progress toward economic and political recovery. By 1979 the economy was growing at the rate of 7.3 percent a year and substantial amounts of capital were flowing back into the country and terrorist activity seemed to have been brought under control. The accomplishments, however, were greatly overshadowed by the repressive measures that were secretly used to deal with the terrorist problem. It has been estimated that the military and civilian paramilitary forces killed from 15,000 to 20,000 people. Of these about 80 percent were under the age of 30. To add to the military's problems public confidence in the economy declined in 1981 after many businesses declared bankruptcy. Capital fled the country and the value of the peso which had been 2000 to the dollar in 1980 fell to 24,000. Perhaps in an attempt to divert the people's attention from these mounting domestic problems, President Leopoldo Galtieri announced a surprise attack on the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands on April 2, 1982. This
military action was met initially with widespread support from the Argentine people. Argentina had always maintained that the islands are a part of its national territory acquired from Spain at the time of independence. However, the British had occupied the islands since 1833 and this occupation had been considered an insult to Argentina's national honor.

The military venture resulted in humiliating defeat for the government as well as the Argentine people. Galtieri was forced to resign and his replacement, Reymaldo Bignone, made the decision to turn the reigns of government back to civilians.

Elections were held in 1983 and Raul Alfonsin of the revived Radical Civic Union Party won with 52 percent of the vote. The most surprising outcome of the election was the relatively poor support shown for the Peronist candidate who polled only about 40 percent of the vote. If, as the election results would seem to indicate, Peronism as a political force in Argentina is waning, it offers great hope that Argentina might at last be able to overcome the paralysis that has virtually stopped political development.

This survey of the political history of Argentina demonstrates the tragedy that can result when a country's political development fails to keep pace with the demands of economic development and modernization. The situation
is perhaps more tragic because in the early decades of the twentieth century Argentina's future seemed so bright. Even today Argentina does not have to deal with many of the staggering problems that face developing countries. Argentina has a relatively homogeneous population and has always had one of the highest literacy rates in Latin America. Although there are disparities in income, they are not significantly different from those found in the United States, Italy or West Germany. Argentina is not plagued with the problems that accompany rapid population growth. The current population growth rate is 1.3 percent and has been steadily declining for the past 50 years.

The reversal of development in Argentina is dramatically illustrated by David Rock.

Argentina is today to many observers a pale shadow of what she was in the past. Until at least the First World War she was generally regarded as being capable of repeating in Latin America the phenomenal expansion of the United States. Now she is more frequently seen as just another bankrupt and stagnant, weak and exploited corner of South America, compelled to exist in the future as she now has done for so long in the past, in a maelstrom of disorganization and decay.

**Consensus and Legitimacy**

The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a closer examination of the aspects of Argentina's political history that have contributed most to this disorganization and decay.
Many students of Argentine politics, both native and foreign, contend that the roots of instability can be found in the absence of a consensus or a sense of community in Argentine society. Domingo Sarmiento, the first statesman to rule Argentina after the legal unification of the nation in 1861, noted at that time that "The public good is a meaningless word--there is no public." Lars Schoultz argues in his book, The Populist Challenge, that political instability has its roots in a largely unresolved conflict between two opposing views of the appropriate social structure for Argentina. The conflict is most often expressed in the opposing economic policies of liberalism and national populism. "Liberals advocate an economic system open and responsive to international influences, while national populists argue for policies that favor native entrepreneurs and a relatively high level of economic autonomy." Schoultz argues that a consensus must be established before Argentina can extricate itself from the paralysis that affects its political system. "As it has for the past four decades, Argentina lacks a basic consensus on the type of society Argentines should attempt to construct. Absent this agreement, the nation has lurched uncertainly through most of the twentieth century, and it will undoubtedly continue to do so until it reaches a consensus on goals that are both economically feasible
and politically acceptable to a broad segment of the Argentine people."  

Another ingredient held to be essential in political development is legitimacy. According to theory, for a government to be legitimate, it must be considered the most appropriate for meeting the goals of society, must follow established norms of political behavior and must have the capacity to deal effectively with change. Generally speaking, the legitimacy of every government since the Radicals came to power in 1916 has been questioned by some politically significant group in Argentine society.

The first crisis of legitimacy occurred in Yrigoyen's second administration and was one of the major reasons for the coup of 1930. "All traditional rules of Argentina's political game had been seriously violated, particularly after 1928. The Radicals' steady accretion of votes destroyed any balance of power. Intense partisan struggle replaced fluid party allegiances. ... Understandably, in view of their expectations, conservatives came to see democracy as dysfunctional and therefore illegitimate."  

In a sense the military has perpetuated the legitimacy problem each time that it has stepped in to impose a solution to a crisis rather than allowing the problems to be dealt with by the institutions of
government that would normally be responsible for conflict resolution. Some political scientists arguing in defense of the military state that the military has been the only institution in Argentina with the capacity to deal with conflict.

However, another and perhaps more accurate view is that the incessant, internecine discord among various factions of the armed forces made them a very ineffective force for conflict resolution. "The armed forces' inability to agree among themselves on how to use their decisive power has been a major source of the instability that has characterized Argentine political life most of the time since 1930."  

The Failure of the Institutionalization

In addition to lacking consensus and legitimacy, Argentina also has failed to develop political institutions or processes that are strong enough to deal with the demands of a complex economic and social system. This lack of institutionalization is most evident in the presidency and in the functioning of political parties.

The office of the president as a center of institutional authority has never developed in the Argentine political system. Executive power has rested more with the man holding the office than the authority of the position itself. There have been no presidents who,
when it counted, put the interest of the nation above their own personal political ambitions.

Hipolito Yrigoyen, the first of the democratically elected presidents, was in a position much like that of George Washington and Lazaro Cardinas when they assumed the presidency of their respective countries. His administration could have established certain norms and procedures that would have led to the institutionalization of the presidency as a focal point for stability. He chose instead to follow the old style of caudillo politics.

Years later, Juan Peron had the opportunity to restore institutional integrity to the presidency. However, he chose not to be the leader of the Argentine people, but rather to be the idol of the working class and to manipulate them to free himself from the constitutional limitations of the presidency and to assume near dictatorial powers.

A traditional role of political parties in the political process has been interest aggregation and articulation. Parties serve as institutionalized channels through which citizens can press their demands on the government. Theoretically, in a system that functions well the political parties are either sufficient in number or broad in scope to articulate the demands of all politically active groups in society. It is
in this respect that Argentine parties have repeatedly
failed to fulfill their institutional role.

As we indicated previously, the Radicals remained
a narrowly based party and failed to incorporate the
middle class as a group into its ranks. The Radical
Party was more of a "great people" party than a "great
idea" party and revolved too much around the personalist
leadership of Yrigoyen.37

Peter Snow addresses this problem in his discussion
of Argentine political parties and their response to
urban migration that occurred in the 1930s and 1940s.
"Unfortunately, the nation's political institutions
were not equipped to handle large, new groups of political
participants. The structure, the programs and the leaders
of existing parties were not able (nor willing, perhaps)
to offer anything of value to the working class."38
Even when Peron organized the workers into what from
time to time was referred to as the Peronist Party,
it was not a party in the traditional sense. The party
"functioned primarily as a vehicle for mobilizing the
working class support for the regime; it did not, in
fact, participate in the governing of Argentina."39
Duff and McCanant also point out the failure of parties
to meet their interest aggregation responsibilities.
"...no party has been able to integrate the major sectors
of the country and today the Peronist labor groups remain
as much out of the system as they did before Peron organized them."

Snow has identified the major defects of the party system as a lack of national parties, the failure of the party system to legitimate the government, inability to incorporate the Peronist movement into the party structure and the inability to meet the crisis of increased participation. In summarizing the contribution of political parties, he says, "Historically, parties have played a major role in the political development of the nation, yet at the same time they must assume a major share of the blame for the chronic instability that has plagued the nation since 1930."

The Role of the Military

A fourth influence that must share responsibility for political instability in Argentina is the military. The pervasiveness of its involvement in politics is evident from the preceding discussion of Argentina's political history, but to more accurately assess the impact of its involvement on political instability, it is helpful to look at its development as an institution, to identify the political roles that it has played and to examine the factors that motivated the military to replace constitutional governments.

The considerable influence that the military has had on the course of Argentine politics is a direct
result of the process of professionalization that began during the first Conservative era from 1862 to 1916 and the process of politicization that began in the 1890s. Bartolome Mitre nationalized the war ministry as a first step in transforming the military into a professional force. Sarmiento continued the process by creating the Colegio Militar in 1869 and the Escuela Naval in 1872. During the presidency of Roca a war college for senior officers was established, and in 1901 compulsory military training was mandated with a system of promotions based on merit. By the first decades of the twentieth century, Argentina had well educated and highly trained officers primarily from the middle class who considered service in the armed forces as a professional career.

The process of politicization has had a greater impact on the military and on political development of Argentina. Paul Lewis has identified three periods in the increasing involvement of the armed forces in politics. The first involvement was on a rather limited scale in the 1890s when the Radicals tried to enlist the support of the army officers in revolts against the Conservatives in 1893 and 1905. When the Radicals came to power in 1916, Yrigoyen continued to politicize the armed forces by restoring rank to those who had lost it as a result of their support of the revolts.
in 1893 and 1905. The president caused greater dissension in the ranks by using his power to grant promotions as rewards to those officers who were supportive of his regime. During this phase of politicization political parties sought to use the force of the military as a catalyst to bring about political change but gave no consideration to sharing power with the military.

In the 1940s the military began to assume a more overt political role. They took the initiative in the 1943 coup without civilian backing.

The third phase of politicization began in 1966 when the military took firm control of the government and asserted its right to rule alone, abolishing political parties and greatly demobilizing political participation.

While operating in its political role, the military has served in many capacities. Initially, the military operated as a pressure group in the first Radical era and as a partner in government with Peron and the labor movement. During the Frondizi administration the military increased its influence in politics by demanding that its leaders be allowed to exercise veto power over major policy decisions of the administration. However, the most drastic step taken by the military in exercising its political power has been to overthrow constitutional governments and establish military governments. Acting in this capacity the military has caused the
greatest harm to the political system. The reasons for these extra-legal seizures of power are important in an assessment of the military's responsibility for the lack of political stability.

While it is often assumed that the armed forces seize control of governments "to retain the status quo and to prevent any meaningful reform," the causes for intervention identified by Snow in the case of Argentina would seem to contradict this position.

Instead, it appears that the major causes of Argentina's 'revolutions' have been: 1. the meddling of civilian governments in the internal affairs of the military; 2. popular dissatisfaction with civilian administrations; 3. a desire to change the very nature of the political system; and 4. in recent years, a deep-seated anti-Peronist attitude on the part of the leaders of the armed forces.

In attempting to assess the responsibility of the military for the political instability, it is important to note that at no time did the armed forces overthrow a healthy, well functioning democratic government. Their action has been in response to an actual or perceived crisis. However, their "quick fix" approach to dealing with institutional and economic crises has prevented a process of incremental change that would have led to the development of stable institutions and an established political process. Because of its overt political role, the military has been an effective roadblock to the
legitimation of government and the process of institutionalization that has been its stated objectives when taking over after deposing civilian governments.

External Factors

The impact on political stability of factors external to the national system of Argentina has been varied, subtle and difficult to measure. An analysis of political history, however, reveals three groups of pressures from external sources that have affected the stability of domestic politics: 1) Pressures resulting from economic dependence on Great Britain until after World War II; 2) Pressures from the United States and other Latin American countries to join the Allied forces in World War II; 3) Pressures from the United States and certain international organizations to follow certain norms in observing human rights.

The pattern of economic development chosen by the modernizing Conservatives in the nineteenth century produced a reasonably good standard of living for most people in Argentina but greatly limited the political maneuverability of succeeding administrations. "Argentina's status before the Second World War as a dependent primary producer linked to overseas trade was the most vital factor impinging upon her social and political development." Argentina flourished so long as the world economy was healthy and her primary trading partner, Great Britain,
continued to purchase large quantities of grain and beef. But because Argentina's development strategy centered around the export of raw materials and the importation of consumer and capital goods, the economic well being of the nation was at the mercy of the international market.

An example of the impact that the dependent state of Argentina's economy had on administrative decisions occurred during the Agustin Justo administration discussed earlier in this paper. In negotiating the Roco-Runciman Pact, Justo was forced to favor certain sectors of the economy. The increased dependency on Great Britain served as a rallying point for political opponents. Until after World War II succeeding administrations were constantly shifting back and forth between policies that favored foreign investment and those that limited it.

Since World War II it would seem that Argentina has lessened its dependency on Great Britain and has been somewhat immune to economic penetration by the United States, primarily because of its geographical distance. In the 1960s only 2 percent of the government's income was from customs revenues, and by the late 1970s only 6 percent of investment capital came from foreign sources. "...Argentina's complex international economic relations cannot be characterized as consisting of a one-sided dependence."
Thus, it would seem that Argentina is not as vulnerable as Mexico to economic manipulation for several reasons. At the present time Argentina has a foreign debt of about 43 billion dollars compared to Mexico's 83 billion. Although Argentina has experienced some difficulty in making interest payments and in repaying the principal, the government has resisted demands of the International Monetary Fund to impose austerity programs to reduce government spending. "Instead, Argentina wants to 'grow' its way out of the crisis. Government planners say that unlike Mexico and Brazil, which have had to swallow bitter austerity medicine as part of their agreements with their creditors, Argentina's economy is basically healthy--despite its fevered inflation. It traditionally exports more than it imports. The Alfonsin team insists that it can cut the budget deficit and bring down inflation without contracting the economy. With economic management and political order, it argues, the economy will grow and the debt will be paid. The implication is that otherwise Alfonsin will never last and the banks can kiss their $43 billion goodbye."49

Argentina's political stability was threatened by the not so subtle pressures of the United States for Argentina to declare war on the Axis powers in World War II. Public opinion in Argentina was divided. Certain segments of the military were supportive of the fascist
government in Italy and some, such as Juan Peron, had received military training in Italy and Germany. Others supported the Axis powers for economic reasons as indicated previously. They hoped that the defeat of Great Britain would release Argentina from Britain's economic control. Still other groups in Argentina favored joining with the Allied powers as an expression of hemispheric solidarity. The issue of the position Argentina should take in World War II was a contributing factor to the military coup that occurred June 4, 1943, and external pressures played a role in that decision as discussed by Michael Francis. "It is necessary to discuss the internal nature of the forces that produced the coup because in this instance, even more than in most such cases, international events became intermeshed with domestic political considerations until the two were no longer separable. This is not to imply that the events of June 4 were caused by pressures outside Argentina. They were shaped by international forces but certainly not caused by them."50

A third and more recent instance in which external pressures placed stains on the stability of the military government came during the Carter presidency. Reports of repressive measures used by the military to combat terrorism in the late 1970s prompted the Carter administration to stop arms shipments to Argentina and to reduce military aid from $34 million to less than
$1 million. The impact of this action on the government of Argentina has received mixed reviews. Some feel that it was a contributing factor to the fall of the military government. Emilio Mignone, the head of Argentina's leading human rights group, has been quoted as saying, "Carter's policy had enormous influence. It saved lives and helped create the conditions for the restoration of democracy." Other writers contend that the measures taken by Carter were not particularly successful in bringing about a change in policy because arms and aid were readily available elsewhere.

Thus, it would appear from this limited but fairly representative survey of external influences on domestic politics that external factors have not played a major role in the political instability of Argentina. Indeed, foreign interference sometimes produces results that are very different from those desired, as is indicated by Joseph Tulchin in the case of the United States.

The United States government persistently pressured the Argentine government first to cooperate more enthusiastically in the war effort and, after 1945, to conform more closely to the accepted norms of democratic behavior. Repeatedly, this pressure had the unintended effect of undermining the political factions most sympathetic to the United States and strengthening the faction that was most nationalistic, more antiliberal, and less friendly to the United States. In other words, United States interference in Argentine domestic affairs then had the effect, and has had the
effect over and over again, of pushing the government further to the right and further toward xenophobic nationalism and away from reasonable interaction with the United States.

Summary

Argentina's political instability has resulted primarily from the inability of its political institutions to respond to the growing pressures of economic development, rapid political mobilization and urbanization. Two factors have been primarily responsible for weakness of Argentina's political institutions. The first of these factors is the military. Its role in politics has been much more destabilizing than in any other country in this study. Repeated intervention has interrupted the evolutionary process of institutional development. Another factor has been the prevalence of personalism in Argentine politics. Peronism in particular injected an element of personalism that led to a polarization of political forces that had the effect of retarding political development for decades.
ENDNOTES


2 Peter Snow, "Argentina" in Burnett and Johnson, p. 397.

3 Lewis, p. 17.


6 Rock, Ibid.

7 Snow, p. 11.

8 Lewis, p. 139.


11 Ibid., p. 12.


13 Snow in Burnett and Johnson, p. 397.


17 Snow, p. 12.

18 Lee, p. 566.
19 Lewis, p. 25.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Snow, p. 28.
25 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
31 Rock, Argentina in the Twentieth Century, p. 1.
32 Huntington, p. 64.
33 Schoultz, p. 13.
34 Ibid.
35 Linz and Stepan, p. 67.
37 Johnson in Barager, p. 137.
38 Snow, p. 12.
39 Ibid., p. 13.
40 Duff and McCanant, p. 1137.
41 Snow, p. 40.
42 Ibid., p. 17.
43 Ibid., p. 43.
44 Ibid., p. 62.
45 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
51 Wynia, p. 95.
IV. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHILE

Chile offers an interesting contrast to both Mexico and Argentina in its political development. Whereas Mexico developed a stable political system only after almost a century of political upheaval and a civil war that took millions of lives and Argentina has yet to experience stability, Chile's history has seen only minor eruptions of political discontent. In 1973, however, the tradition of stability was broken, and today Chile's prospects for a stable future are even more dismal than Argentina's.

Following a brief survey of Chile's political history, this chapter will focus on the foundations of Chile's political stability and those factors which brought it to such a violent end in 1973. Special attention will be given to the Frei and Allende administrations and to the role of the United States government and international agencies in bringing an end to Chilean democracy.

Chile emerged from its war of independence free from Spanish control but with the colonial social structure essentially intact. Quite naturally the military, flush with the prestige of the successful revolution and having the organizational structure already in place, took a dominant role in organizing
the government. Bernard O'Higgins, a distinguished war hero, headed the legally constituted but autocratic government from 1817-1823. He sensed the need to bring about certain reforms in the social structure as a prerequisite to creating a true republic. However, his efforts to achieve reform were met with strong opposition. He resigned the presidency rather than allow the confrontation to lead the country into civil war.

His resignation precipitated the formation of two groups that would eventually evolve into Chile's first political parties.

One favored a real republic, free and democratic, and the liberalization of social institutions accordingly, regardless of the lack of traditions in political habits; the other demanded a strong centralized government, as opposed to the federalization advocated by its opponents, and aspired, in general, to a system which would not break completely with traditions, one which in short would not be different from the one maintained under Spanish control.

Perhaps O'Higgins' magnanimous gesture of resignation saved Chile from a civil war such as Mexico experienced in its revolution of 1910, but it allowed Chile to postpone coming to terms with an important ingredient for political stability— that of reaching a consensus on the basic goals of society and the direction that the government should take.

The problem of forming a consensus became rather moot with the inauguration of the Autocratic
Republic (1830-1871). In 1830 after several years of political upheaval, Diego Portales created a governing institution based upon the "authority of the Executive and impersonality, and regularity of procedures, and legitimacy."²

The three presidents that followed Portales' prescription brought stability and order to Chile. In this respect, Chile was unique among the former Spanish colonies. Failure to break with colonial social institutions made Chile the most politically stable country in Latin America, but at the same time it was the most socially backward.

The power that the presidents of the Autocratic Republic enjoyed was somewhat weakened during the Liberal Republic (1871-1890). Presidents during this period found the support of political parties in congress a necessity for effective government. Presidential power was almost totally extinguished by a civil war that erupted in 1891. The confrontation pitted the president, Jose' Manuel Balmaceda, and certain members of the Chilean aristocracy against the congress and its supporters over the question of whether a presidential or parliamentary system of government should prevail. The defeat of Balmaceda ushered in the Parliamentary Regime (1891-1925) during which time presidential
authority all but disappeared and political parties increased in power and number.

This period of time also saw many changes in economic and social development. The failure of the political parties to respond to these changes led to the collapse of the oligarchy in 1920. According to Gill,

Change had come swiftly--an industrial revolution and social upheaval hand-in-hand--the machine, the proletariat, the metropolis, and the intellectual middle class appeared almost simultaneously on the scene. While these changes were in the making, parties remained alien to the social revolution. They were imposing structures without substance, too absorbed in political machinations and petty rivalries to grasp the significance of the transformation.

Not only did the parties fail to address themselves to societal and economic needs during the parliamentary period, but they also failed to address the need for institution building in government.

Government in Chile reached a very low point during the period of parliamentary rule. Ministerial instability could be expected to increase with the implementation of a parliamentary system; however, it reached truly epidemic proportions. In the 55 years prior to 1886, 31 cabinets had headed Chilean government. In the 33 years of parliamentary rule, there were 121 different cabinets composed of over 530 ministers.
Contrary to previous norms of electoral behavior, vote-buying became an accepted practice during the parliamentary period. After 1891, public office was open only to those who could afford to spend the considerable sums of money which were necessary for getting elected to office. Gil suggests that

For the sake of prestige, seats in Congress were bought by wealthy aristocrats in the same way that their ancestors had purchased titles of nobility. Civic spirit and patriotism seemed lost, and the masses submitted to the congressional oligarchy with the same resignation with which they had accepted presidential absolutism after 1830, apparently indifferent to the neglect of the national interest and to administrative inefficiency and political corruption.

By the 1920 presidential election, however, Chilean society could no longer be described as consisting of the ruling elite at the top making all of the decisions and the submissive masses waiting patiently on the political fringe. Public opinion had been stimulated by economic growth and trade union activities. New segments of the society were demanding fundamental changes in government and a redistribution of power. The problem of developing a consensus on the direction of Chilean political development that was postponed with the resignation of O'Higgins surfaced again as a major issue in 1920. "The campaign...developed chiefly as a struggle between partisans for stability in the prevailing order and those who favored profound
social and political change—a 'new system', as Arturo Alessandri, their candidate, called it."6

Alessandri won by a slim margin and the Tribunal of Honor, the body that selected presidents in the event that no candidate received a majority, presented him with the presidency. Once in office, however, translating the public will as demonstrated by his election into public policy was no easy task. His proposals for social security, direct election of the president, separation of church and state, administrative decentralization and abolition of the parliamentary system met with firm opposition in the Senate. This opposition produced an impasse that was due in part to poor economic conditions as well as a recalcitrant congress and continued even after the congressional elections of 1924 gave Alessandri a majority in both houses.

An unusual series of events occurred late in 1924 that overshadowed in importance the passage of Alessandri's reforms. The scenario started with congress voting itself a pay increase in violation of the constitution instead of dealing with the urgently needed proposals. The military in its first intervention in politics in over a century intimidated congress into approving within a short period of time all of
the social legislation over which it had been languishing for years. Alessandri, realizing that legitimacy of his government had been abridged by the actions of the military, left the country the same day.

A military junta was formed which dissolved congress and ruled for five months until it was replaced by a clique within the armed forces. This group recalled Alessandri, who, now free from an obstructionist congress, ruled by decree to enact the social and economic reforms that he had championed in his 1920 campaign.

Perhaps the major accomplishment of Alessandri's brief period in office was constitutional reform. Although the constitution contained some provisions that would lead to greater stability—a strong executive to replace the parliamentary system—it contained three provisions in particular that had great potential for institutionalized instability. The first of these provisions established a system of proportional representation in congress which led to a proliferation of political parties. The large numbers of parties represented in congress, as well as their competitiveness, has often caused immobility in legislative action at times when a crisis called for swift and decisive action. Such an impasse occurred during the administrations of Eduardo Frei (1964-1970) and Salvador Allende (1970-
and was one of the contributing factors to the breakdown in Chilean democracy.

A second provision of the constitution with potential for instability was the power of congress to choose presidents when no candidate received a majority of the popular vote. With the large number of fairly competitive parties, this happened frequently. In fact the election of 1964 is the only one in which a president ever won an absolute majority.

The third feature of the new constitution which contributed to instability was a separation of the dates for presidential and congressional elections. This meant that swings in public opinion could put into office presidents and legislators who were hostile to each other's programs.

The first decade under the new constitution was probably the most politically unstable period in Chile's history. Emiliano Figuera Larrain was elected president in 1925 but was ousted by Carlos Ibanez who set up a dictatorship that lasted for four years. Unable to quell civil disturbances or reverse the sharp economic depression, Ibanez resigned in July of 1931. During the next fifteen months, Chile experienced nine different governments, two general strikes and a naval revolt. The most unique of the
nine governments was the short-lived Chilean Socialist Republic formed by Colonel Marmaduke Grove. The election of 1932 marked the beginning of the much heralded period of stability in Chile which set it apart from other countries in South America. The reasons for this stability have been discussed by many scholars interested in Chilean political development.

Coups d'etat and military rule, common in other Latin American countries, have been almost completely absent in Chile since the 1930's. From that date Chilean elites have been able to fashion a viable set of institutions which permitted the vast majority of Chilean presidents to serve out their terms and make way for their duly elected successors.... That process was facilitated by the fact that Chilean elite did not divide sharply along social and economic lines. Both the traditional landed elites and new mining and commercial interests shared a similar stake in Chile's export economy.

In addition to a common interest shared by the political elites, Chile's stability also rested on a spirit of compromise between the government and opposition parties. "Not only did the Chileans enjoy greater political stability than most Latin American countries after 1932, but they did so using an unusually sophisticated multi-party system. It was a system, however, that was controlled effectively by upper-class and middle-sector parties, which tolerated working-class opposition only so long as their interests were not threatened. When the working-class parties did get
out of line, they were outlawed, as was the communist party in 1947 and 1958."\textsuperscript{10}

James Petras also attributes Chile's political stability to compromise and accommodation. "Chronic economic problems of slow growth and a rigid social system have been managed through a delicate system of political transactions involving established parties and interest groups. This arrangement created the conditions for Chilean political stability."\textsuperscript{11}

Two problems are rather immediately evident from the preceding discussion of stability. First, Chile's political stability was not derived from the functioning of institutions but from a tacit agreement between the government and opposition that bargaining and compromise were necessary for them to maintain their control. Secondly, a large segment of the population, the urban working class and the peasantry, were excluded from the bargaining process. This fragile stability lasted as long as the electorate remained small and the lower classes were not mobilized.

But this situation was not to last long. The period of industrial expansion from 1940 to 1953 produced a 40 percent rise in national income. The benefits were unevenly distributed to the different groups in Chilean society which led to a gradual process
of greater economic, social and political polarization. During this period, the real income for proprietors and the self-employed rose over 60 percent, for the white collar workers an estimated 46 percent, but the real wages of manual workers rose only 7 percent. 12

Before moving on to a discussion of the Frei and Allende administrations and the end to Chilean political stability, it is helpful to summarize the status of Chile's political development in relation to those factors identified as having been responsible for stability in Mexico. First, Chile still lacked a basic consensus on the most appropriate political system for the country. The legitimacy of the system had not to this point been seriously questioned because of the low level of political participation by the only groups that would question it. By the early 1960s, Chile was ranked first in democratic stability among the Latin American countries but was ranked fourteenth in electoral participation. A voter turnout of 17.9 percent in the presidential election of 1958 represented the high point in participation to that time. 13

Also, in contrasting political development in Chile and Mexico, Chile had developed an institutionalized process with a strong executive, but unlike Mexico
it also had an equally powerful legislature. Indeed, the Chilean legislature has been characterized as one of the strongest in the world.\textsuperscript{14} What this meant in practical terms was that the institutional framework contributed more to legislative immobilization and incremental political change. This system worked well so long as the demands on the system were not forceful or in urgent need of resolution.

The political party structure in Chile was also very different from that in Mexico. The multiplicity of competitive parties did not provide the legitimizing and stabilizing function for the system as the PRI has done in Mexico. Burnett addresses the problem that the multi-party system caused for Chile.

Indeed, by the 1960's six major parties vied for control of the government and offered the Chilean voters numerous doctrinal alternatives. But if the contemporary party system now provided an openness and dynamism unparalleled in the history of the republic, the very plethora of partisan camps--and the societal cleavages they mirrored--also introduced immobilist features into the decision-making process that created uncertainty about the viability of government in its existing form and about the social and economic directions the nation would pursue.\textsuperscript{15}

The election of Eduardo Frei in 1964 did indeed forecast new directions for Chile. The Christian Democrat's program for a "revolution in liberty" called for electoral reforms, expanding suffrage to illiterates, limiting campaign expenditures, and measures to combat
"conflict of interest" in public administration.

To eliminate some of the problems of immobility in the legislative process, Christian Democrats wanted to simplify the legislature, strengthen the power of the executive by allowing the president to submit bills to a national referendum when congress failed to act on them. In the economic field Frei advocated an increase in the state's control over the economy, including the Chileanization of the copper industry. For the masses who had so long been ignored by government programs, the Christian Democrats proposed the construction of 60,000 houses annually for six years, agrarian reform to include the expropriation of large, inefficient land holdings as well a the unionization of peasants.

These measures which were introduced within the first few months of taking office were bottled up in congress by forces of the far right and the far left. Frei was forced to withdraw them in the hope that the March 1965 congressional elections would give him the necessary votes to proceed with the reforms that the country so badly needed. The elections gave the Christian Democrats 42.3 percent of the vote and for the first time in many years a single party held a majority of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
From its position of strength, the Christian Democrats began to assault many of the institutional obstacles to swift legislative action.

On major issues, such as agrarian reform and copper nationalization, compromises were struck with opposing forces. However, on much of the day-to-day running of the government, with the support of the majority in the Chamber, the government was able to undermine significantly the politics of clientelism.... Arguing against the incrementalism which had impeded reform, government technocrats sought to institute more "rational" planning schemes which would dispense with the "distortions" of the political process. Opposition parties and legislators were progressively excluded from many of the particularistic deals of the past. Congress lost some of its earlier importance as an arena of accommodation.

The Frei administration also encouraged social mobilization as a means of gaining support for its programs.

For the first time in our history the peasantry formed unions, cooperatives increased, and the number of workers in industrial labor unions doubled. Thanks to the work of the National Office of People's Development, a whole system of grass roots organizations came into being, including neighborhood associations and centers for mothers.

This period of hyper mobilization encouraged by Christian Democrats resulted in significant increases in electoral mobilization. The electorate expanded from 1.25 million or 16 percent of the population in 1960 to 2.84 million or 28.3 percent in 1971.

On the surface, the Christian Democratic party seemed to be making great progress in bringing reforms
in Chile. However, on closer examination, it would seem that they were rather unwittingly destroying the fragile underpinnings of the system that had produced the stability of the past. The *partido unico* or "single party" strategy of government to avoid the bargaining and clientism destroyed the institutional base upon which most scholars felt the stability of the system rested. Their strategy also intensified the polarization of the right and left as well as their efforts to prevent the center Christian Democrats from building a permanent majority. The parties of the right, the Conservatives and Liberals, formed a coalition party, the National Party. The left, on the other hand, started a rigorous organizing campaign among the rural peasants as well as the urban working class. The Christian Democrats found their electoral base seriously eroded when the election of 1970 approached.

A great deal of political maneuvering by forces both inside and outside of Chile accompanied the election of Salvador Allende, the first Marxist ever chosen in a democratic election. Allende was the candidate of the *Unidad Popular* (UP) or Popular Unity, a coalition of parties which included socialists and communists. Yet, he was obstructed in his efforts to bring socialism to Chile by a variety of forces: the institutional
inadequacies of the Chilean political system, unwise choices in implementing the socialist program and the overt and covert opposition of the United States.

Allende had been a prominent figure in Chilean politics for many years and a candidate for the presidency in the three previous elections. In 1952 he was last in a four way race polling only 32,000 votes of the more than a million cast. By 1958, he had increased his support tremendously, receiving 356,493 votes to Jorge Alessandri's 389,909. Allende would almost assuredly have won that election had Antonio Zambrano, a defrocked priest from a small village near Santiago, not entered the race as an independent. He polled 41,304 votes which it is reasonable to expect would have gone to Allende giving him a plurality, and considering congress's strong adherence to selecting the candidate with a plurality, Allende, not Alessandri would have been president.

In 1964 Allende came in second again behind Eduardo Frei who had received over 3 million dollars from the Central Intelligence Agency and substantial sums from Christian Democratic parties in Europe and from private businesses. Valenzuela writes that

The CIA also undertook to support the Frei effort by mounting a massive propaganda campaign. The campaign, referred to in Chile as a "campaign of terror," sought to depict the Allende candidacy
as one that would institute a repressive and bloody regime in which, among other things, children would be taken away from their mothers. There is little doubt that the vituperative propaganda contributed to the sharp rise in conflict and mistrust in Chilean politics.18

Allende was able to overcome his political opposition in 1970 and won a plurality of the votes. There were several unsuccessful plots to encourage congress to break with tradition and appoint Jorge Alessandri. Alessandri had even pledged to resign if appointed to pave the way for new elections in which Eduardo Frei would have been an eligible candidate. This move would afford the center another opportunity to consolidate support and win a majority.

During Allende's first year in office, important steps were taken along the "Chilean road to socialism." More industries were added to the public sectors, wages were increased for urban and farm workers, public housing provided shelter for significantly greater numbers of poor Chileans and social security programs were expanded to cover more workers. The economic situation looked promising. The 1971 gross geographical product increased 8 percent, industrial production was up 12 percent and overall consumption was up 13 percent. Inflation which had always been a problem for the Chilean economy was held to 22 percent and the unemployment rate was down 50 percent.19
But these conditions were to be short lived, and the remaining two years of Allende's administration could be described as politically and economically chaotic. The most serious political problems centered around congress's refusal to approve constitutional legislation sanctioning the government's program of expropriation and nationalization which was essential to Allende's program. Matters reached an impasse when congress approved an amendment which would have subjected each act of expropriation or nationalization to congressional approval on an individual basis. Allende vetoed the amendment and contended that a two-thirds vote of congress was necessary to override the veto. At this point both congress and the president focused their attention on the March elections in hopes that the results would be conclusive enough to break the impasse in their favor. The opposition hoped to gain enough seats to impeach Allende while Allende himself hoped that a significant gain of seats in congress for the UP would serve as a plebiscite on his program.

In the area of economics, the promising picture of 1971 reversed itself in 1972. The increased wages had created a demand for goods far beyond Chile's capacity to produce. It became necessary to import
huge quantities of food and other consumer goods. The program of nationalization brought domestic as well as foreign investment to a standstill and the government had to play a greater role in capital formation. Foreign reserves were quickly used up and the foreign debt rose to over 4 billion dollars and represented at that time the largest per capita debt of any country except Israel. Food shortages began to appear in 1971 and inflation rose to 163 percent in 1973 and to 508 percent in 1973.

The economy was destabilized not only by Allende's policies that were inflationary but also by strikes and an "economic blockade" carried out by the United States. The most disruptive strike was conducted by the truckers in October of 1972. The strike was initiated by independent owners in a remote southern province. It was joined by merchants, professionals, industrialists, white-collar workers, anti-Marxist peasants as well as the National and Christian Democratic parties. To one degree or another all of the parties involved participated in the strike in order to discredit Allende's government. Some wanted to shut down the economy in order to win concessions from the government while others wanted nothing short of the overthrow of Allende.
The strike failed primarily because of popular mobilization and the support of the government by the military. The effects of the strike were weakened when workers began to take over and operate many of the factories that had been closed by the owners. Volunteer drivers using over 1,000 requisitioned trucks kept goods moving. The strike did succeed, however, in further polarizing society along class lines. The working classes supported the government while the upper and middle classes became an increasingly violent opposition.

Because of these unsettled conditions in his country, Allende was forced more and more to turn to neutral forces for support of the government. One such neutral force was the military. The strike pressured Allende into making some changes in his cabinet. He brought three high-ranking officers of the army into prominent positions. The most influential was Carlos Prats, a strong supporter of constitutionalism, who became Minister of the Interior. Within four days, the truckers' strike was settled.

Scholars of Chilean politics and history are divided on the role that the military has played in Chilean society. Some writers contend that the military has always had an important political role. The fact
that there had been no coups d'état for the past 42 years resulted more from the condition that the civilian governments did not threaten the position of the military than from its non-political nature.  

Burnett sees the lack of military involvement in politics as the result of "a long-honored arrangement whereby the military is assured a given percentage of the budget and goes about its own way." Frederick contends that the military in Chile has been rather limited in its ability to influence political affairs unlike its counterpart in other Latin American countries because the civilian governments have functioned well and in accordance with the constitution. The civilian governments also used several techniques to check military ambitions. They kept the military contented with generous supplies of equipment and agreed to their demands as long as they were not excessive. The government supported anti-military press campaigns from time to time and gave unofficial sponsorship to a civilian militia.  

But regardless of the tradition of non-intervention in politics, the armed forces became increasingly divided on the issue as the economic and political situation worsened for the Allende administration. The decision to bring Prats into the government contributed
to the dissention within the military. It intensified the latent generational, service and political divisions within the military institutions. It tended to polarize the elements that abhorred the Popular Unity government and were becoming increasingly committed to its overthrow and the "constitutionalists" who approved of no action in violation of the constitution.26

The "bosses strike" of October 1972 brought more military officers into the government to fill positions in the bureaucracy as well as the cabinet. "Thus by September 1973, the Allende government was virtually a captive of the armed forces, which were or had been involved at all levels in the country's crisis as managers of enterprises, as bureaucrats in the national administration and as political leaders in the emergency zones and in the cabinet."27

The anti-Allende forces gained the upper hand and the fate of Allende's government was sealed when Carlos Prats was forced to resign and was replaced by General Augusto Pinochet who assumed the positions of Commander-in-Chief and Minister of the Interior.

The right-wing of the military had plotted a coup when Allende was elected. A small group conspired to kidnap General Rene Schneider, the Army Commander-in-Chief and blame it on the left. The plot failed, however,
when General Schneider was accidentally killed and the right was discredited. The coup that ended Chile's socialist experiment came on September 11, 1973. While the coup was not unexpected, its violent nature was. Allende was killed in the intense bombardment of the presidential palace and hundreds of lives were lost in sporadic fighting throughout the capital city.

The role of the United States and multi-national corporations in the affairs of Chile during the Allende administration afford the opportunity to examine the variety of ways in which a "center" country can influence the stability of a "peripheral" one. The United States government perceived that a successful Marxist government in Chile would not only be detrimental to United States commercial interest in that country but also a political embarrassment. Having failed to prevent Allende's election, various efforts were made to promote his downfall.

Chile's economy was very vulnerable to manipulation by the United States. The country imported about 30 percent of its food, machinery and machine parts. Many of the parts could only be obtained in the United States. Copper was the country's basic export and the health of the Chilean economy depended heavily on the world price for this commodity.28
By unanimous vote, the Chamber of Deputies, in which the Popular Unity government held a minority of the seats, supported the nationalization of the Anaconda and Kennecott copper mines in June of 1971. The government proposed to deduct from the compensation profits in excess of the 12 percent that was considered to be a fair return on an investment. Independent accountants found that the profits made by the American companies were excessive to the point that the companies actually owed the Chilean government money. There is some evidence to support the contention that the profits were excessive. "The rich copper reserves of Chile, in just sixty years, had produced for U. S. copper corporations...the equivalent of over half of Chile's total assets accumulated over the previous 400 years." The profits of Anaconda and Kennecott exceeded the total book value of the companies by $774 million.

In retaliation for the nationalization, the United States government, under pressure from the companies involved, initiated steps to economically destabilize the country. The United States vetoed Chile's application for loans from the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) and multi-national lending institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-American. The
Eximbank also suspended guarantees and insurance programs for commercial banks and exporters who in turn were forced to cut almost all short-term credits to Chile. This action resulted in a reduction of credits from $300 million in 1970 to $30 million in 1973. This "credit blockade" forced Chile to use up its foreign reserves.

According to Collins, the impact of the "blockade" was devastating. By 1972 Chile's total imports had declined but most significantly imports from the United States fell from 40 percent to about 15 percent. The lack of spare parts caused particular problems. "By early 1972, 30 percent of the privately owned microbuses and 21 percent of the taxicabs and 33 percent of state owned buses were immobilized because of the lack of parts."^{31}

Paul Sigmund does not feel that the cut off of credit was a significant factor in the mounting economic chaos in Chile. He emphasizes that loans were available from Canada and western Europe as well as from other Latin American countries and the Soviet Union. "In fact, on August 30, 1973, Allende had more short-term credits available to him ($574 million) than at the time of his election ($310 million)."^{32} If this was indeed the case, it is unclear why imports
fell so drastically, serious food shortages developed, and the country was forced to draw on its foreign reserves.

In addition to pursuing a plan of economic destabilization, the United States through the Central Intelligence Agency supported activities to accelerate the economic crisis and encourage domestic opposition to Allende's government. CIA Director, William Colby, testified before the House Armed Services Subcommittee that the agency had been authorized to spend $8 million to finance the truckers strike and other activities designed to destabilize the Allende government. Considering inflation and the black market value of the dollar, the impact of the money spent by the CIA was comparable to $40 to $50 million. 33

Colby also testified that the Forty Committee of the National Security Council headed by Henry Kissinger authorized the CIA to spend covertly $400,000 in efforts to prevent Allende's election and later to spend $350,000 to bribe Chilean congressmen to vote for Alessandri. Officials of the State Department conceded that the money had been authorized but contend that the latter funds were never spent. 34

During subsequent questioning, Colby also revealed that the CIA had successfully infiltrated
all of the major political parties, the purpose being to encourage resistance to Allende's efforts to reach compromises with them on the issues that were immobilizing his government. Testimony also disclosed that the multi-national corporation ITT had offered the CIA one million dollars in 1970 to prevent Allende's election and later submitted a comprehensive plan to bring about economic chaos in Chile.

The CIA also engaged in activities designed to affect public opinion in the United States toward the Chilean government. Robert Clark refers to the Chilean situation in discussing the use of press reports to manipulate public opinion on foreign policy. "For example, prior to the fall of the government of Marxist Salvador Allende, the CIA sent a number of foreign reporters to Chile to bring back unfavorable material on the Allende regime to affect the opinion of influential political and business leaders in the United States." To what extent did these actions by the United States contribute to the collapse of constitutional government in Chile? While it is expected that opinions would differ, Frederick Nunn offers what would seem to be a rather naive evaluation.

It would be incorrect, however, to assume that economic sanctions, cutbacks in aid, grants and loans, and the expenditure of millions for harassment of the Chilean government caused that government's
demise. Such measures perpetuated certain difficulties and problems, but did not directly cause them. The golpe of September 11, 1973, was more a result of internal problems than external forces brought to bear through intrigue.

It would seem more logical to conclude that the external forces exacerbated the internal problems to the point that it was impossible for the traditional bargaining procedures to solve them.

Another area of possible influence by the United States in Chilean affairs was the military. Throughout the Allende period, the United States maintained close relations with the military and in fact military aid was the only kind of aid that the United States gave to Chile from 1970 to 1973. In the final analysis it was the armed forces decision to break with tradition that led to the overthrow of the government. The United States military personnel in Chile were in an excellent position to influence that decision. Given the vigor with which the United States pursued economic destabilization, it is hardly logical to think that the United States would have refrained from using the situation to its advantage.

The military with its promises to restore economic and political order was met initially with widespread acceptance by the Chilean people. The economic situation improved as aid, imported goods,
and loans were again flowing into Chile. But as the years passed, it became painfully obvious to Chileans that money and power had corrupted the military. Promises to return the government to civilians were broken, congress was dissolved, brutal and repressive measures were taken against those of the far left, political parties were outlawed, and even the leaders of the centrist Christian Democratic party were exiled.

Pinochet as leader of the junta has assumed dictatorial power and has taken steps to preserve his position. In 1980, a constitution designed to provide a measure of institutionalization for the ad hoc military regime was approved in a plebiscite. The constitution designated Pinochet as president for eight years and would allow the junta to reappoint him for an additional eight years. 39

In the wake of a severe crisis in the Chilean economy and resentment over continued military rule, Chileans have resorted to mass demonstrations. The Pinochet government has responded with mass arrests and detentions. The situation is described by a university student in Santiago in a letter to the author

In Chile we are passing the worst moment of our history. We always had a democratic tradition, 150 years of democracy.... Now we are suffering an external government, we have known what means repression, there are no liberty of opinion and information, a security police that arrest people
and you never know about them anymore, while on the otherside there are many bombs, and people death [people's death the] product of communist terrorism... Well, but we have faith that truth, justice and moderation will come back to our country.

Summary

But truth, justice and especially moderation might be a long time in coming to Chilean politics. It is not reasonable to expect Pinochet and the military to relinquish power in the face of growing leftist terrorism and increasingly bold and open opposition from the middle class. At the same time, it is not likely that these groups will give up their agitation for return to civilian rule.

This situation leads one to ponder what forces in Chile's political development were most responsible for the current crisis and what steps might be taken to hasten the return of a more stable political environment. It would seem that the rapid social mobilization of urban workers and peasants initiated by Frei and continued by Allende placed strains on the political system to which it did not have the capacity or perhaps time to adjust. The rise of these new politically relevant groups challenged the old consensus upon which the stability of Chile had rested. The increasing rapid polarization prevented the formation of a revised consensus. This increased mobilization was also accompanied
by rising expectations for greater economic benefits. The steps taken by Allende to meet these expectations destabilized the economy almost to the point of collapse. Finally, the interference of the United States in the internal political affairs of Chile must share some of the responsibility for the current crisis. The programs of economic and political destabilization carried out by the United States provided just the force that was needed to topple an already fragile and shaky structure.

If truth, justice and moderation are to return to Chilean politics, it is clear that there must first be a return to democratic government. This is not to imply that democracy and free elections will automatically produce stability. However, given the political tradition of Chile prior to 1973 and its experience with military dictatorship since that time, the legitimacy of any future government will have to be based on civilian, democratic rule. The new government will have to promote the formation of a political consensus that recognizes the need for the economic as well as political integration of all sectors of society. Institutions of government will have to be created and political processes developed that are dedicated to achieving this integration.
Endnotes


3 Gil, p. 57.

4 Ibid., p. 50.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., p. 51.

7 Ibid., p. 61.


14 Valenzuela, p. 17.

16 Valenzuela, p. 17.


18 Valenzuela, p. 36.

19 Michael Fleet, "Chile's Democratic Road to Socialism," *Western Political Quarterly* 26 (December 1973): 768.


22 Ibid.


24 Burnett, "Chile" in Burnett and Johnson, p. 348.


26 Valenzuela, p. 82.


29 Goldberg, p. 107.

30 Collins, p. 179.

31 Ibid., p. 185.


34 Ibid., p. 296.
35 Tad Szulc, "The View from Langley" in The End of Chilean Democracy, p. 158.
36 Ibid., p. 159.
38 Nunn, pp. 296-297.
V. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN BRAZIL

The colonial experience and independence movement in Brazil were significantly different from those of the Spanish colonies. The country was left in what would seem to have been a much more favorable position for stable political development. Feelings of nationalism had developed early when the Brazilian forces were able to remove Dutch invaders in the 17th century. Nationalism was further stimulated when the King of Portugal, Don Joao, fled to Brazil to escape capture by Napoleon I in 1808. When Napoleon was defeated and Portugal again became independent, Don Joao reluctantly returned to the Portuguese throne in 1821. He left his son Dom Pedro to serve as regent in Brazil and gave him instructions that if an independence movement should start he should become a leader of that movement rather than risk losing all authority by opposing it.

The Empire

The opportunity to follow this advice was very short in coming. In 1822 the Portuguese Cortez demanded that Dom Pedro also return to Portugal. This he refused to do and on September 7, 1822, he declared Brazilian independence and was crowned emperor several months later. There was very little opposition to this move by the Portuguese in Brazil, thus Brazil was able to
accomplish in 15 months what the rest of Latin America achieved in bloody civil wars after 15 years.¹  

Thus, Brazil started independence under rather auspicious circumstances. "The presence of the Portuguese royal family meant that the transition would be peaceful and that the government of the independent state would represent continuity and stability instead of anarchy and civil war."² Perhaps the most important aspect of the peaceful transition was the fact that the military had played no role in independence and, thus, was not in a position to influence the new government as was the case in Chile and Argentina. It was not until after the Paraguayan war (1865-1870) that the Brazilian military began to have political ambitions.

Pedro I drafted a constitution that provided for an elected lower house of the legislature but left a great deal of power for the emperor in the form of poder moderador (moderating power). Discontent grew over the emperor's use of his extensive power and he was faced with rebellion in several of the provinces. His suppression of these uprisings served only to widen the conflict and he was faced to abdicate in April of 1831 in favor of his son Dom Pedro II. Being only five years old at the time of his father's abdication, Dom Pedro II did not assume power until 1841 at the age of fifteen.
Dom Pedro II ruled for 48 years with the assistance of disciplined, elite oriented, conservative and liberal parties which continually broadened their base of support to include the developing middle class. The emperor, profiting from his father's mistakes, used his "moderating power" with much more restraint and allowed the parliamentary system to function without interference. The country enjoyed stability primarily because of the economic prosperity resulting from the export of sugar, cotton and rubber. Internal trade was stimulated by the construction of railroads and telegraph lines.

Ironically, it was the success that Dom Pedro II had in bringing about social and economic changes that led to the legitimacy of the empire being questioned. Increased political participation led to the rise of republicanism in the 1880s. The movement was particularly successful among the younger generation of university educated sons of planters, merchants and professional men. The movement was also supported by the Brazilian positivists who held important positions on the faculties of the leading colleges, especially military colleges.

Support for the monarchy was also eroded by a development that had its roots in the Paraguayan war. During this war, the military had suffered heavy casualties as a result of poor equipment and the lack of adequate training.
The officers blamed the monarchy for this condition and saw increased political involvement as the only way to protect their interests. Frustration was also growing within the officer corps over the slowness of promotions. These frustrations eventually vented themselves in a military coup and the announcement proclaiming the Republic on November 15, 1889. Dom Pedro II and his family quietly left for exile in Portugal.

**The First Republic and the Growth of Regionalism**

The creation of the First Republic (1889-1930) and the adoption of the constitution which provided for a federal system of twenty states and a directly elected president appeared at first to be an important step toward political development and integration; however, this did not prove to be the case. The centrifugal forces of regionalism threatened to fractionalize the country. Stability was maintained only at the price of recognizing the legitimacy of the entrenched oligarchial regimes in each state. The authority of the federal government was greatly compromised. The more economically prosperous states of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais controlled a disproportional share of the political power. The presidency, which was the most coveted prize, was virtually rotated between these two powerful states except on those occasions when Rio Grande do Sul could tip the
balance of power in favor of an alliance of small states. The system could not be expected to run smoothly, for as Paul Lewis indicates, "Where men might feel a greater sense of identification as minerios (Minas Gerais), paulistas (Sao Paulo), gauchos (Rio Grande do Sul), or cariocas (Rio de Janeiro), rather than Brazilians, the system is inherently unstable." 4

During the First Republic regionalism was encouraged also by the tremendous size of the country and the lack of roads and railroads to integrate the country. Regionalism remained a factor in Brazilian political instability until the election of Janio Quadros in 1960. In his bid for the presidency, he won a plurality of the vote in every one of the major states, a situation that has rarely happened in Brazilian elections.

Regionalism also played a large part in bringing the First Republic to an end. The fragile balance of power that had been maintained by alternating the presidency between candidates from Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais fell apart in 1930 when the powerful states could not agree on a candidate and they were challenged by a coalition of smaller ones. When the official candidate Julio Prestes was declared the winner, charges of election fraud sparked a rebellion. The army, exercising its "moderating powers," nullified the election and called
Getuleo Vargas, the opposition candidate from Rio Grande do Sul, to the presidency.

The Vargas Era (1930-1945)

The 15 years of Vargas' rule left Brazil vastly different from what it had been in 1930. Many of his programs were designed to promote economic growth and industrialization as well as to strengthen the country's political institutions and processes. In terms of lasting results, he was far more successful with the former than the latter.

Almost immediately after taking office, Vargas set about strengthening the central government and breaking the state government's hold on political power that had retarded political development. He reduced the size of the state militias and replaced the governors in all of the states except Minas Gerais with men who reported directly to him. This move greatly weakened the state political machines and reduced some of the destabilizing effects of regionalism. 5

Vargas' efforts to create more viable political institutions centered around his desire to create a strong presidency. Presidential power was increased greatly during the Vargas era but little was done to institutionalize or depersonalize the office. The power that Vargas exercised was more a result of the force
of his personality and political ambitions. During the first years of his administration, he governed without a legislature and during the period of the Estado Novo, congress was again recessed and Vargas created a virtual dictatorship.

Vargas used a great deal of political maneuvering to remain in power beyond the constitutional limits. After three years in office, he called a Constituent Assembly to write a new Constitution. One of the Assembly's most important acts was to elect Vargas as the first president with a four-year term. Before his term expired in 1938, Vargas, with the support of the military, proclaimed yet another constitution that created the Estado Novo with himself as dictator. From this position, it was a rather simple matter for Vargas to appoint himself to another four-year term. In 1943, Vargas explained that the emergency of war time precluded the holding of elections, and he remained in power until he was ousted by the military in October 1945.

Gutelo Vargas' most lasting contribution was in industrial development. The world economic crises of 1930 provided the stimulus for Brazil to begin import substitution industrial development. He encouraged the growth of domestic industry through a program of tariffs and subsidies that even included the investing
of government capital in constructing the Volta Redonda steel mill.

The efforts of his policies can be shown by comparative statistics: during his rule the number of factories doubled, as did the number of workers engaged in industry, the output of hydroelectric power also doubled; the value of production quintupled; and the amount of capital investment rose by 1,000 percent.

The Estado Novo provided the centralized structure necessary for Vargas and his aides to work toward reorganization and economic development. The federal government assumed an prominent role in the economy, organizing and strengthening marketing cartels for coffee, cocoa, sugar, and tea, and creating new state enterprises, such as the National Motor Factory which produced trucks and airplane engines. Important changes were made in the bureaucracy. The old partonage-ridden system was replaced by one based on merit. Perhaps the most important area to receive Vargas' attention was the promulgation of laws regulating the activities of labor unions. One union was permitted to organize in each plant on a local basis. No statewide or nationwide unions were allowed. The labor ministry had control of union finances and election, thus in effect, tying unions to the government and greatly limiting their potential for organizing strikes and protests in opposition to government economic policy as was the case so frequently in Argentina.
In evaluating the contribution of Vargas' administration to the development of Brazil, it would seem that there was very little achievement in the area of political development. His flagrant manipulation of presidential succession, his personalist approach to politics and his low regard for the Legislative Assembly as an institution of government did little to develop an institutionalized political system that could provide continuity in Brazilian politics. By contrast, his contributions in the area of economic development were significant and ongoing even though at the time the effects were not felt outside of the few urban centers.

Ironically, it was certain aspects of Vargas' economic policy that caused the polarization that--combined with other factors--resulted in military intervention and the end of his dictatorship. After the allied victory was assured in World War II, Vargas took a bold step by issuing a tough anti-monopoly decree that greatly restricted the role of foreign firms in the economy of Brazil. This was actually a sign of Vargas' shift to the left in response to a populist movement that had begun in Brazil in 1943. As further evidence of this shift, Vargas released leftist political prisoners and reduced police control of leftist political activities. These shifts in economic and political policy drew the
ire of the United States government as well as many
groups in Brazil who believed that foreign capital was
essential for the growth of the economy. As the year
progressed, the polarization of the anti-Vargas forces--
liberal constitutionalists; a large number of military
officers; and most state political bosses and those
that supported Vargas' policies; populists; some union
leaders, socialist and communist--increased. The confrontation
reached a climax in October and Vargas accepted the
military's action of declaring him deposed.

The Second Republic (1945-1964)

Vargas was replaced by General Eurico Dudra, a
close associate of Vargas in planning the Estado Novo.
However, instead of continuing the programs to promote
industrial development, Dudra dropped them and returned
to the exporting of coffee as Brazil's chief source
of revenue. This again placed the Brazilian economy
at the mercy of the world demand for coffee.

In political matters Dudra moved to check the shift
to the left that had begun several years earlier. The
Communist Party had been legalized in 1946 and immediately
began to show amazing strength in the unions of the
major industrial centers. The government moved quickly
to remove the leadership of hundreds of unions and to
replace it with men more favorably inclined to follow
government economic policy.
Vargas' exit from politics was short lived. Within two months, he was elected to serve in the senate from the state of Rio Grande do Sul. From this position, he began to organize for a political comeback and was elected to the presidency in 1950 with a plurality of 48.7 percent of the vote.

Economic policy was given top priority in Vargas' third presidency, but problems on the domestic as well as international fronts combined to frustrate his efforts. The rate of inflation nearly doubled from 1951 to 1952 and a deficit appeared in Brazil's balance of foreign trade. In addition to these domestic problems, Vargas was faced with the possible cutoff of loan commitments for infrastructural development that had been negotiated with the United States. Dwight Eisenhower, taking office in 1952, was reluctant to continue the aid commitments of the Truman administration.

These economic problems put Vargas in the untenable position of being able to please neither the right nor the left. Amid the rising tide of discontent over financial scandals that implicated Vargas' son, Vargas' fate was sealed when a plot to assassinate Carlos Lacerda, a journalist that led the anti-Vargas forces, was traced to the palace security chief. Lacerda was only slightly wounded in the attempt on his life but an air force
officer serving as his bodyguard was killed. Senior officers of the military demanded the president's resignation. This time Vargas chose to commit suicide rather than accede to their demands.

Juscelino Kubitschek was elected president in 1955 and set about mending the tears in the national fabric left by Vargas' administration and dramatic exit. He placated the military with new weapons and chose as minister of war a general who had a great deal of prestige among the officers. To divert the nation's attention from its problems Kubitschek played to a wave of nationalism with his "Target Program" for economic development that promised "fifty years of progress in five," and his ambitions to realize a longstanding Brazilian dream of building a new capital city in the interior of the country.8

Brazilia, the new capital in the interior, was completed on time but at the cost of mortgaging Brazil's economic future to foreign creditors. The task of repaying the loans fell to the new president Janio Quadros who was elected in 1960. He immediately imposed a tough stabilization program which was met with a great deal of opposition. When congress refused to grant him additional powers with which to deal with the economic problems, he resigned after only seven months in office.
His resignation created a crisis of sorts. Confidence in the political system was shaken and the country divided over the succession of Quadros' vice president, Joao Goulart. In the end the forces favoring constitutionalism prevailed when a compromise was reached that would allow Goulart to assume the presidency if congress would create a parliamentary system to reduce presidential power.

"Goulart's presidency was ill-starred from the beginning. The odds were against him on almost every count, but he made them worse by his inexperience, weakness and indecision."

An agreement was negotiated with the International Monetary Fund to deal with inflation and the balance of payments deficit. It called for a reduction in the government deficit, tough wage controls and a reduction in credit. The implementation of these measures alienated the very groups to which Goulart looked for his political support. For this reason he abandoned them after only a few months.

Goulart was faced with other problems as well. From the time of his accession to the presidency certain elements within the military with the tacit support of United States government officials in Brazil had been quietly developing plans for his overthrow. These elements became convinced in early 1964 that Goulart was planning to seize control of the government with
the support of the workers and leftist political elements including the socialists and communists. To prevent this, a military coup was carried out on March 31. The support that Goulart had tried to raise never materialized and he went into exile. The military broke with tradition and took control of the government thus bringing an end to the Second Republic.

The period from 1945 to 1964 was a period of democratic rule but one in which little progress was made in developing political institutions that would provide stability for the political system. One of the areas in which this was most evident was the political party system. Beginning in 1945, fourteen parties were legally registered, but only three were organized on a national basis. Two were formed by Vargas. The Partido Social Democratico (PSD) was made up of a variety of groups including political bosses, bureaucrats and industrialists and the Partido Trabalhista Brasilerio (PTB) was composed principally of urban workers. The anti-Vargas forces were united in the Uniao Democratica Nacional although each of the groups also formed their own parties on a regional basis.

These parties "were often described as non-ideological, personalistic, and opportunistic--in short, not to be regarded as modern political parties." Richard Nyrop goes further in his criticism of the ineffectiveness of the party system in Brazil.
Neither ideological nor representative of constituent interest, these parties functioned to channel local political mechanism, headed by paternalistic bosses, into the national electoral arena. Personalism pervaded the party machinery: delivering votes brought patronage in the form of government jobs, federal development projects, and cash to local bosses.

In summary, the party system as it developed during the democratic era did not function in such a manner as to provide legitimacy for the system or to serve the usual functions of interest aggregation and articulation.

Another area of Brazil's development that has contributed to instability is social mobilization. Mobilization in Brazil has been rather slow and has involved three major groups. The first group to be mobilized was the urban middle class that grew up after World War I. The middle class was organized into three interest groups. The first, the Brazilian Rural Confederation, represented large and medium sized landowners. The other two were the National Confederation of Commerce and the National Confederation of Industry. "The three groups were semi-public bodies. They were set up originally during the Estado Novo as employer syndicates to organize class support for the regime, and they have continued to be more or less under state control since then...."12

The second stage of mobilization in Brazil included the urban working class. The major vehicle for mobilization was the labor union and, as has been pointed out previously,
these organizations also came under the control of the government when the socialist and communist organizers became too successful.

The third group to be mobilized were the peasants during Goulart's administration. The rise of the Peasant Leagues in the northeast has been traced, in part, to the revival of the sugar industry in the 1950s. Instead of modernizing production methods, sugar growing was expanded to the plots of land that the peasants had been allowed to use for subsistence farming. Under the new system, the peasants were paid a wage for growing sugar on the small plots. The wages were of course kept low in order to maximize profits for the landowner. This resulted in a decrease in the standard of living of the peasants and an increase in the number of organizations such as the Peasant Leagues that represented the interest of the rural workers.

The effect that mobilization had on political development is well stated by Ronald Schneider. After World War II, "Brazil's evolution toward a civic polity floundered on the incapacity of its institutions to adapt to expansion of participation by the urban working class and the political awakening of the peasantry." In recent years, Brazil has experienced electoral mobilization as well as social mobilization. The major
factor affecting electoral mobility has been increases in the literacy rate. Literacy has always been a requirement for voting in Brazil, and as recently as 1950 about 50 percent of Brazil's population was illiterate. Due largely to the literacy programs instituted by the military government, the literacy rate now stands at about 75 percent. Electoral mobilization has been felt more strongly in the urban centers. "The growth of the urban electorate has proved an effective challenge to the control of the electoral system by parties of the oligarchy."  

Brazil's development provides an excellent example in support of the theory that when mobilization exceeds the capacity of the political institutions to process the demands on it, instability results. "Not only in the 1961-1964 crisis but in those that preceded and even during the 1920s, a major factor in Brazil's political instability was the gap between the rate of social change and mobilization of new groups into politics on the one hand and the very slow development of political organizations and institutions on the other."

Military Rule (1964-1985)

The military has had a long tradition of involvement in the political affairs of Brazil. That institution inherited the "moderating power" originally held by the emperor and has made liberal use of it with respect
to preserving the legitimacy of government. Between 1930 and 1961, the army intervened as arbitrators in political conflicts on five different occasions. Only in 1964 did it remain in power.

The post-1964 military regime has been unique in that it has been neither a short-lived transition nor a period of personalist rule. Rather, the armed forces have ruled as an institution, faithfully adhering to hierarchical principles of discipline, promotions and retirement in order to preserve the institutional integrity of the officer corps.

Five generals have headed Brazil's government since the 1964 coup. Although they have differed somewhat in personality and style, they have followed policies that were intended to alleviate some of the most unstable features of Brazil's political system and gradually return the country to civilian control.

Upon taking office the military moved to purge the congress, eventually removing over 100 federal legislators who posed the greatest threat to military rule. Thousands of former political leaders were sent into exile. The first priority of the military was to solve the country's economic problems. To do that they needed peace and there could be no peace without authority. To this end Castelo Bronco, the first military president, announced Institutional Act No. 2 in October of 1965, which provided for the elimination of all existing political parties, an increase in presidential power, and the extension
of his term of office to March 1967. Two official parties were created: the National Renovating Alliance (ARENA) which was the government's party and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) which represented the opposition.

ARENA was quite naturally electorally successful for many years, considering that in some elections as many as 6 million blank ballots were cast and another 10 million Brazilians did not bother to vote. By 1978, however, it appeared that ARENA was about to lose its majority in congress. In response the president, General Ernesto Geisel, dismissed congress and in 1979 issued the Law of Party Reform which was designed to split the MDB while preventing the proliferation of small parties.

Thus having established authority, the military could pursue its economic goals without being concerned with the political consequences of its harsh stabilization measures. However, in the late 1960s Brazil experienced a rise in urban terrorism as did other countries at that time. The military responded with repression but not to the extent that it was used in Argentina or Chile. Repression was primarily a reflection of the military's priorities. "The turn to stricter political controls after December 1968 reflected the military's continuing disillusionment with seemingly inept and corrupt civilian
politicians, and its firm belief that economic growth, made possible by foreign confidence in Brazil's stability, must be given precedence over social justice."21

The military has made gradual but steady progress toward turning the government back to democratically elected bodies. "After 1978 congress again became a stabilizing influence in providing political support and legitimacy to President Figueiredo's efforts at abertura."22 By 1980 the plan of abertura or "opening up of the political system" had gathered speed. Over 5,000 political exiles were granted amnesty and allowed to return to the country. Also, "For the first time, labor leaders were successfully disseminating protest literature among the unemployed--a tactic made possible by the relative success of the past 1964 campaign--to increase literacy among the lower classes."23 As further evidence of abertura, by 1981 opposition parties held a majority of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies for the first time since 1965. Additionally, the bureaucracy was no longer suppressed and began to serve "as a most important channel for the exercise of influence by interest groups, owing to the weakness of such institutions as congress and political parties that perform such functions in other countries."24

As might be expected, the prudence of abertura and its chances for success have not been enthusiastically
accepted by all segments of society. The only open opposition to the plan came from the right-wing of the military. However, because of the policies of forced retirement at age 65 or after two years without promotion, President Joao Baptista Figueiredo has been able to effectively eliminate this opposition. Other threats to the success of the return to civilian rule are the poor state of the Brazilian economy and its lack of democratic traditions. Currently, Brazil has the largest foreign debt of any nation; its population is growing at an annual rate of 2.7 percent; and over 1.6 million new jobs must be created each year.25

Since plans for abertura were first announced, the people's immodest demands for an immediate return to civilian government have on several occasions cast doubt on the success of the plan. In 1981 over 100,000 teachers struck throughout Brazil to force the immediate replacement of the military. More recently, in April of 1984, a crowd of 1 million demonstrated in Rio de Janeiro in favor of direct election of the civilian president rather than election by the electoral college.26

Some writers have even expressed skepticism about the sincerity of the military in allowing a truly open political system. "It is hence the purpose of abertura to engineer adequate safety valves and a sense of participation
without real surrender of authority.... It should get away from dictatorship without opening the doors to anarchy, seeking legitimation with minimal sacrifice of power."²⁷

The true test of abertura will come when the newly elected civilian president, Tancredo Neves, takes office in March of 1985. During his campaign, he has offered several proposals that, if enacted, should facilitate the transition to civilian rule without disruption. His proposals would strengthen legislative power, reduce the power of the federal presidency and respect the authority of local and regional officials with the federal system. He has also been careful to praise the armed forces as the pillar of the republic," realizing their pivotal role in the success of the new government. Pang and Jarnagin conclude that "So long as the next president succeeds in convincing the military that he will not deliver the government to the radical left, his rule should be stable."²⁸

External Influences

After World War II, the United States replaced Great Britain as the foreign power that most influenced Brazil's political and economic life. While direct interference in Brazilian politics did not reach the same level that it later did in Chile, the United States
was not wholly innocent in trying to exert its influence when events there were perceived as a threat to United States interests.

Although there were certain accusations leveled at the United States stemming from the suicide note left by Gutelo Vargas, the most concerted effort of the United States involved the ousting of President Goulart. In the early 1960s, the United States government became concerned over the leftist tendencies of the Goulart administration and feared the creation of a Cuban-style communist dictatorship in Brazil. Actually almost from the time Goulart took office, the United States Ambassador had been in contact with the military officers who were secretly planning Goulart's overthrow. "The conspirators had indicated that a coup was being planned and that if it was to succeed they were going to need economic cooperation and assistance from the United States in getting the government and the economic policy moving again."29 The United States made no binding commitment but indicated that such a request under those circumstances would be favorably received.

While keeping covert contact with the military conspirators on the surface, the United States continued cordial relations with the Goulart government. But As the more established avenues of diplomatic relations
failed to achieve the desired cooperative spirit in Brazil, U.S. diplomats made efforts to influence the internal workings of the Brazilian political system. Officials at the State Department told Ambassador Campos that through Robert Kennedy's visit they hoped to affect Goulart's cabinet choices.30

The United States Embassy proceeded to contribute funds in support of certain candidates in the 1962 election and additional money was made available to the military. "The large military assistance program was considered important in generating a pro-U.S. posture by that group, which was, in turn, considered critical in the 'strategy for restraining the left-wing excesses of the Goulart government.'"31

When the coup became eminent it was felt that direct military support from the United States would be resented by the Brazilian people. However, plans under the code name of "Brother Sam" were developed whereby the United States would provide petroleum supplies that would be crucial to the success of the military if civil war broke out. In addition to the petroleum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized that certain quantities of arms and ammunition marked "Brother Sam" be readied for air lift to Brazil.32 As reported earlier, these preparations were unnecessary since there was only minimal opposition to the coup which fizzled after a few days.
Foreign influences on Brazil's economic development have been those typically associated with third world countries. Initially as a primary producer Brazil's economic position was affected by the demand for its products on the world market. As industrial development occurred, the country became dependent upon foreign technology and investment capital. But Brazil has developed more industrial self-sufficiency than most peripheral countries and has in recent decades lessened its dependency on trade with the United States. Brazil has increased its circle of major trading partners to include Japan, West Germany and the Eastern Bloc countries. The current foreign debt crisis is Brazil's most serious problem. The austerity measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund as a precondition for debt restructuring have caused frustration and hardship especially among the working class population. These frustrations coming at the same time as abertura could place too heavy a demand on Brazil's weak institutional capacity and threaten the success of new democracy.

Summary

Given the relative stability of Brazil in the 19th and early 20th centuries, it is disappointing that Brazil has experienced the same political instability that other Latin American countries have experienced. Brazil's
instability can be traced to a continuing lack of a political consensus and legitimacy of government. These deficiencies have become increasingly acute as the size of the electorate has increased and the society has become more mobilized. Perhaps the major cause of instability has been the underdevelopment of Brazil's political institutions and processes. The inadequacy of these institutions and processes also has been accentuated by the expansion of the electorate and the growth of the public sector of the economy.

External factors have not been a major cause of instability in Brazil. Although there has been foreign meddling in Brazil's internal politics, and foreign governments and lending institutions have from time to time tried to dictate the pattern of economic development, they are greatly overshadowed by internal factors as the major cause of political instability.
ENDNOTES


5 Skidmore and Smith, p. 166.

6 Lewis, pp. 48-49.

7 Skidmore and Smith, p. 170.

8 Ibid., p. 178.

9 Ibid., p. 179.

10 Ibid., p. 172.


12 Lewis, p. 220.

13 Lewis, p. 225.


16 Schneider, p. 9.


18 Nyrop, p. 248.

19 Fiechter, ibid.
20 Nyrop, p. 266.


22 Nyrop, p. 236.


24 Nyrop, p. 251.


29 Phyllis R. Parker, Brazil and the Quiet Intervention (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1979), p. 68.


31 Ibid., p. 102.

32 Ibid., p. 76.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this paper has been to examine the factors that have affected political stability in Latin America. A survey of political development literature revealed two sets of theories, one attempting to explain political stability, and the other instability. These theories, when applied to Mexico, seemed to be supported by the case history of that country's political development. An examination of the other countries in the study revealed that the factors for stability have been largely absent from their political development experience.

This concluding chapter will attempt to present a comparative analysis of the factors for stability and instability as they have operated in the countries surveyed, and also to offer some observations as to steps that might be taken to achieve greater political stability.

The political consensus that was achieved in Mexico after the Revolution has not developed in Argentina, Chile or Brazil for any appreciable length of time. Argentina was approaching a consensus with the incorporation of the new urban middle class into the political process as a result of the Saenz Pena reforms. However, the consensus broke down when the urban working class emerged as a potent political force and realized that their
needs and demands were not being addressed by the existing political system. A political consensus was developed in Chile in the 1930s and was an important factor in the stability that the country enjoyed for several decades. In the 1960s and early 1970s, however, the consensus disappeared as the country became increasingly divided, especially during the Allende administration. In Brazil a consensus was easily achieved and maintained so long as the politically active population was small and the rest of the people were politically disinterested. In contrast to the past, however, political mobilization has increased at a rapid rate in recent years. Achieving a consensus on the goals and directions of the government must be a major objective of the new administration if stability is to be achieved.

At the present time, Argentina and Brazil seem on the verge of developing a political consensus. A major test of the civilian governments will be to maintain the consensus by addressing the needs of all of the groups in their respective societies. Unfortunately, however, the development of a political consensus does not appear to be imminent in Chile. Opposition to Pinochet is spreading and the county is becoming increasingly divided. The middle class which had backed General Pinochet is withdrawing its support but at the same time not condoning the terrorist activities of the left.
The lack of legitimacy as well as consensus has contributed to political instability in Argentina, Chile and Brazil. The major cause of illegitimacy has been the repeated military interventions and ineffectiveness of civilian governments. Legitimacy has been achieved with the return to civilian rule in Argentina and Brazil, but it can be maintained only so long as the governments are effective in dealing with the staggering economic problems and in balancing the demands of the conservative and liberal elements. For both Argentina and Brazil, stability will also depend upon how successful the civilian governments are in reducing the political role of the military. In Argentina this might be somewhat easier to achieve. The military government was greatly discredited by its stunning defeat in the war with Great Britain and in the widespread violations of human rights. The members of the junta have been arrested and are to stand trial. Raul Alfonsin has taken steps to permanently reduce the role of the military. He wants to establish a chain of command that begins with the president, the minister of defense, the joint chiefs of staff and then to the heads of the branches of the armed forces. For Brazil, the problem of permanently subordinating the military to civilian authority may be more difficult. Although there has been widespread popular support for
a return to civilian rule, the military in Brazil has not suffered the loss of prestige that the Argentine military suffered.

In Chile, the legitimacy of Pinochet's government is seriously questioned as he resorts more and more to repression to maintain control. There appears to be no easy solution to Chile's dilemma. Given the long tradition of democracy in Chile, it is unlikely the military government will be considered legitimate, and it appears that the military is not about to return the government peacefully to civilians as was the case in Argentina and Brazil.

Perhaps the weakness of political institutions in Argentina, Chile and Brazil has been the major factor contributing to instability. The lack of institutionalization has resulted from the prevalence of personalism, oligarchic control of the political process in order to perpetuate class interest, and the often overpowering political presence of the military. Personalism seems to be on the decline in Argentina and Brazil. Alfonsin and Tancredo Neves were not major political figures or heads of political organizations before their elections. They seem to have been chosen on the basis of the people's confidence in their ability to address the current problems that their countries face. This could be an important
step toward institutionalization of the office of the president.

Institutionalization in Argentina, Brazil and Chile will also require some modification of the role of the legislature and of political parties in the political process. In Argentina and Brazil, the legislature must become a functioning institution whose powers are not overshadowed by the executive. For the political party system to become a more effective institution, the number of parties must be reduced and their base of support broadened. This could, perhaps, be achieved by creating single member districts.

Based on the developmental histories of the countries in this study, external factors have not contributed significantly to political instability. While the dependent status of these countries in the world economic system has from time to time caused economic problems as is currently the situation because of huge foreign debts, its impact is overshadowed by domestic factors. The intervention of the United States in Chilean politics in the Frei and Allende administrations was destabilizing but constitutes a rather isolated incident. External factors should play even less of a role in the future as countries reduce their dependence on one "center" country by diversifying their markets as Brazil has done in recent years.
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Appendix A

HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

Mexico

1911 Profirio Diaz resigned as result of revolution led by Francisco Madero; Madero became president
1913 Madero forced out of office by Victoriano Huerta
1914 Huerta forced to resign
1917 Constitution written and Venustiano Carranza elected president
1920 Carranza forced out of office Obregon, Alvaro taken in
1924 Plutarco Elias Calles elected president
1928 Emilio Portex Gil (interim)
1930 Pascual Ortiz Rubino
1934 Abelardo L. Rodriguez (interim)
1934 Lazaro Cardinas elected president
1940 Manuel Avila Comancho elected president
1946 Miguel Aleman Valdes elected president
1952 Aldolfo Ruiz Cortines elected president
1958 Adolfo Lopez Mateos elected president
1964 Gustavo Dias Ordaz elected president
1970 Luis Echeverria elected president
1976 Jose Lopez Portillo elected president
1982 Miguel de la Madrid elected president

Argentina

1916 Hipolito Yrigoyen elected president
1922 Marcelo Alvear elected president
1928 Yrigoyen elected to a second term
1930 Yrigoyen overthrown by military coup; General Jose Uriburu assumes the presidency
1932 General Agustin P. Justo challenges authority of Uriburu and is elected president
1938 Roberto M. Ortiz elected president
1940 Ill health forces Ortiz's resignation and Ramon Castello becomes president
1943 Castello removed by military coup and General Edelmio Farrel assumes the presidency
1946 Juan Domingo Peron elected president
1955 Peron removed by military coup and General Eduardo Lonardi assumes the presidency from September until November when General Pedro Aramburu takes over the presidency
1958 Dr. Arturo Frondizi elected president
1962 Frondizi is removed and General Jose Maria Guido serves as acting president for 18 months
1963 Dr. Arturo Illia elected president
1966 Illia is removed by military coup and General Juan Carlos Onganea becomes president
1970 Onganea forced to resign and Robert M. Levingston serves as figure head president
1971 General Alijuandro Lanusse replaces Levingston as president
1973 Hector Campora elected and serves as president from May until July
1973 Juan Domingo Peron elected president
1974 Peron dies and his vice president and wife Isabel Peron assumes the presidency.
1976 Senora Peron is removed by military coup and General Jorge Videla assumes the presidency as leader of the three man junta
1981 Roberto Viola assumes the presidency and serves until he is replaced by Leopoldo Galtieri
1982 Galtieri is forced to resign and General Cristno Nicolides serves as interim president
1982 Reynaldo Bignone is appointed and elections are held
1983 Raul Alfonsin elected by the people to serve a 6 year term

Chile
1817 Independence from Spain
1830 Autocratic republic under President Diego Portales
1871 Liberal republic created by coalition of parties
1891 Parliamentary republic organized to reduce strong executive power; move to congress
1921 Arturo Alessandri elected president; liberal reform
1924 Military closes congress; Alessandri installed as president with decree power
1927 Colonel Carles Ibanez seizes power and becomes dictator
1931 Colonel Marmaduke Grove creates socialist republic of Chile that lasts six months
1932 Rep. gov. restored and Arturo Alessandri elected president
1952 Carlos Ibanez elected president (populist)
1958 Conservative liberal candidate Jorge Alessandri elected president
1964 Dr. Eduardo Frei elected president
1970 Salvador Allende elected president
1973 Military coup ended 41 years of uninterrupted constitutional governors; General Augusto Pinochet became president and supreme ruler

Brazil
1930 Washington Luis removed by military coup and Getuleo Vargas installed as president
1934 Vargas' presidency extended 4 years by new constitution
1945 Vargas overthrown by the military
1950 Getuleo Vargas elected president
1954 Vargas commits suicide
1955 Juscelino Kubitschek elected president
1960 Janio Quadros elected president
1961 Quadros resigns and is replaced by vice president Joao Goulart; military imposes parliamentary system
1963 National plebiscite restores presidential system
1964 Goulart overthrown by military coup; Marshall Humberto Castelo Branco elected by the congress
1967 Marshal Arturo Costa e Silva selected president
1969 Costa e Silva resigns for health reasons and General Emilio Garr Cestau Medici assumes the presidency
1974 General Ernesto Geisel selected as president
1979 General Joao Baptista Figueiredo selected president
1984 Tancredo Neves elected president
Vita

Sue Fulghum was born near Luray, Virginia, and attended elementary and secondary schools in Page County. After graduating from Radford College with a Bachelor of Science degree in Home Economics, she began her teaching career in Clarke County. In 1972, she received a Master of Arts in Education degree from Madison College and moved to Chesterfield County, where she is currently a member of the Social Studies faculty at Loyd C. Bird High School.

Educational travel has included trips to Peru, Japan, Thailand, Hong Kong, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Greece, as well as several to western Europe and Mexico.