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Edward VII and the Anglo-French Entente of 1904

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The Background of the Anglo-French Entente

After the end of the Napoleonic wars, the appearance of Europe was changed almost to that of the eighteenth century. France had been returned to her old borders, the multitude of little kingdoms in Italy and Germany had been reinstated, and Russia had taken back the portion of Poland that she had acquired in 1793. The general alliance of all European countries against a superior France was discontinued as soon as France had lost that position. It had been nothing more than one of the agreements that European countries made when they were under pressure. The enemy was only the enemy for the moment. The wars had not changed that time-honoured method of diplomacy.

Governments were accustomed to make their policies and alliances without much reference to public opinions. International relations were supposed to be above the comprehension of the masses. The public did not, however, take this as an indication that they should refrain from having or expressing opinions. The situation was simply that public opinion and government policy seldom agreed, since what was popularly agreeable and what was politically expedient were often two separate things. Even in Britain the public did not have great influence on foreign affairs. Events in France con-

ued to make the temper of the British press rise and fall,

depending on what was occurring in Paris. However, the British government was ready to make the settlement that best suited the circumstances. Therefore, in 1848, England and France came to a joint action in foreign affairs for the first time. That this action was based on mutual distrust rather than on brotherly love was not significant. What mattered most was that a precedent had been established that was to affect the relations of Britain and France for the rest of the nineteenth century.[1] Foreign relations between Britain and France were checkered but, until the end of the century, did not break into open and violent animosity. The ministries of both countries, on the contrary, sought for friendly relations as the rule. In 1848 France and Britain had come to an amicable arrangement regarding the advancing interests of Russia around the Black Sea.[2] All agreements of this sort were expected to flounder if some other factor changed the aspect of the situation. In the case of Britain and France, the problem was Greece, and in the heated debate that followed Britain's high-handed approach to a trifling situation, the Anglo-French alliance almost became a Franco-Russian one. Britain, along with France and Russia, were garentors of Greek independence. Palmerston's rough attitude in defending a claimant to British protection was taken as a threat. However, before the natural results of his mistake were explored by those two countries, Napoleon III staged his coup d'etat in Paris.

Britain had known Napoleon III from the time that he had spent in exile there, and knew him to be essentially

friendly to British interests. On the other hand, both Austria and Russia were unhappy to see a restoration of the Bonapartists. Russia in particular felt threatened, because one of France's major areas for expanding her interests was in Turkey.[3]

One of Napoleon III's primary objectives was agreement with Britain. Throughout the Second Empire he had discussions in Paris on current foreign policy, particularly the situation in Turkey before the Crimean war. Russia, feeling threatened as she did, eventually went to war with Turkey, and brought France and Britain into the conflict to protect their common interests in the Near East. In this instance, Napoleon was sucessful in creating the alliance. After the war, however, Britain became preoccupied with domestic reform and, irked by constant pressure from Napoleon to come to the French conferences, finally refused to participate altogether. Her attitude ended definitively the alliance of the war.

Napoleon never gave his attempts to gain a complete <u>entente</u> with Britain. In his final endeabor he initiated a policy for France that was to become a standard. Eventually, with the help of circumstances, this idea would lead to the result that he had worked so hard for.[4] When he went to war in 1870, he and his government were determined to prove that the cause of France was morally superior to that of Prussia. This idea did not help France at Sedan, but later, after the harshness of Prussian peace terms in annexing Alsace-Lorraine, it acquired a certain authority. The French did not hesitate

emind the world of their plight whenever it served their

purpose to generate a little moral indignation in their behalf.

After 1870, relations went back to normal between Britain and France; that is, since the beginning of the French Third Republic, a similarity of principles and institutions made a base for Britain and France to maintain their ordinary pleasant relations.[5] As long as France remained peaceful this situation would continue, for nothing suited Britain better than having a peaceful neighbor on the continent. Gambette and his colleagues were in favour of the friendly relations, since this gave them someone to call on if Prussia moved against France again. However, there was a new and forceful imperialism growing in France, whose ambitions aimed at colonial expansion. Africa was France's best chance, and it was here that France and Britain suddenly found themselves face to face in violent opposition.[6]

The imperialists in France were convinced that an agreement ment with Britain could only be a hinderance as far as colonial affairs were concerned. While they controlled the French government, France and Britain almost came to blows several times before the turn of the century. There was, however, heavy political unrest in France, since the imperialists favoured an alliance of convenience with Germany, to back her against Britain if she should have to make a stand on colonial affairs. The Germanophobes in France fought this settlement bitterly, unable and unwilling to forget that Prussia had done France so much harm in 1870.[7] They believed that eventually

they would again arrive at a settlement of all problems with Britain. However, French public opinion in general was alive with bad feeling for the British, especially after the affair at Fashoda. The mood in Britain was hardly different.

As A. J. P. Taylor so aptly noted, "Someone has said that nine English traditions out of ten date from the last third of the nineteenth century; and this is certainly true of foreign affairs."[8] From the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1821, friendship, not inmity, had been the rule between Britain and France. Yet, a contrary idea persists asserting that France since the time of the Hundred Years War was the avowed and declared enemy of Britain, that nothing could ever make them come together in peaceful agreement, and that the Anglo-French entente that finally came about after the turn of the century was a miracle. Actually, Britain and France were allies through most of that period. It was simply the colonial situation that so roused the presses of each country that papers insulted one another's leaders and customs. Not even the prestige of Victoria saved her name in the Paris papers. If a settlement could be found for the colonial situation, then the real barrier to an entente would be gone. This was the state of affairs between Britain and France when Edward VII became king of England in 1901.

Edward VII as He Was on Becoming King

The position of a monarch, in a country as subject to Parliamentary process as Britain, needs some examination. The position of Queen Victoria, in fact, was unique in British history and in the history of Europe By right of age and relation of some kind to every royal house in Europe, she was able to offer her foreign office an influence in continental courts never before held by any country. Her correspondence was voluminous and ranged over every subject. As the head of a great family she was able, as a benevolent but stern grandmother, to keep reins on anyone who seemed likely to become a source of trouble in the balance of Europe. For some time before her death, Victoria was the only person who could keep her grandson, William II of Germany, under any kind of control.[9] Yet, there were things that she could not do because of her inability to travel extensively.

The situation with Edward VII was entirely different. Whereas he could not offer the voluminous correspondence and the influence of age, he was exceedingly widely traveled, and knew every sovereign in Europe personally. He had, also, traveled in the Near East and the Orient, and knew many of these rulers. However, Edward's favourite place to visit was and had always been France. Since childhood Edward had preferred things French in contrast to his mother's preference

for things German.[10] He had friends among all walks of life in France, as he could not exactly have in Britain, especially among the actors and actresses of Paris. The affection that he held for the French was cordially returned by them and they were accustomed to seeing him incognito at the Hotel Bristol, strolling the boulivards and using the cafes. His popularity only faded during the Fashoda affair when he was violently and vilely attacked in the Paris press as the leading representative of England, next to the Queen.

Edward's attitude towards Germany, also, comes in this context. He was familiar with the country of his father and was hardly one to see a threat in everything that that country did. He did not regard the unification of the German states as anything but a good occurrence.[11] However, Edward had several reasons for disliking the situation in Germany. These reasons were mainly personal and yet they could not help but affect his feeling for Germany. In the first place, his wife, Alexandra of Denmark, had a violent hatred for Germany because it had taken two provinces from the southern boundary of her country in a war that Germany herself had provoked for that purpose. It was only natural that the Prince of Wales, as he then was, should try to maintain an impartial attitude and yet still be drawn on the side of his wife.

Secondly, the Bismarcks, father and son, were strongly opposed to the influence of the English house in German affairs, and consequently were the avowed enemies of the Prince and Princess of Wales. Edward's sister, the Empress Frederick,

had tried vainly, as the liberal English wife of an enlightened Crown Prince, to introduce the British method of representation and social reform to Germany. The Bismarcks had helped to block her ambitions and were suspicious of any of her family. Finally there was the relationship between Edward and his nephew the Emperor William.

William had been thoroughly trained by the Bismarcks and the tutors that they got for him to despise the policies of his father and mother, and had had a deep distrust of everything English instilled in him. As a result, William and his uncle were almost bound to clash often. William was inclined, because he envied Edward's position in the courts of Europe, to insult him and play down to him at every opportunity. This attitude on the part of his nephew more than once led to such anger from Edward that a formal apology had to be forced from William by his grandmother.[12] Relations between the two men were never, even at the best times, good, especially after Edward became king.*

After the affair at Fashoda caused such an uproar in France, Edward found himself no longer welcome there. He

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* After the death of the Emperor Frederick, Edward visited his sister in Germany, only to find that she was subjected to every humiliation by her son and by Bismarck, not even allowed a proper house or freedom of movement. Very angry over her treatment, Edward managed, by threatening to tell all England of her plight, to get her situation improved.[13]

went instead to take the waters at Baden and to contemplate the practicality of an alliance with Germany. During this period he considered this alignment of the countries in Europe for the one and only time and gave it his tentative support. Long before France had forgiven him, he had forgiven France and was again looking for ways to return their feelings for himself and Britain to their former warmth.

Concerning the French alliance, Edward had a long history of working for such an end. As far back as 1866 Edward had spoken in favour of the understanding with the French. During the following years, as age and ability gradually made a place for him in the trust of his mother's cabinets, he was to speak with the knowledge and backing of the foreign office. Many French ambassadors to Britain became his friends in the fashionable social world of London where the Prince of Wales' rule was undisputed. Edward would have private audiences with them on the possibility of the British and French coming to some kind of agreement.[14]

For a while after the overthrow of the Second Empire, with which he had naturally been in close sympathy, Edward stopped these informal talks. However, the French continued to send interesting and witty men to represent them in England, and Edward was soon back on his old footing with them.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century the first ambassador to really promote the Anglo-French <u>entente</u> as a definite end came to London. Needless to say, he and Edward got along well. This French ambassador was almost as important

to the entente as it was eventually set up, as the Cambon embassy, which tends always to overshadow the importance of this forerunner. Courcel has not yet been recognized as having the importance that he had. He was undoubtedly one of France's most able diplomats and a real architect of the future settlement between Britain and France. His trouble was that he was in advance of his time. Neither country was ready for what he was proposing, as they would be several years later when Cambon took the London job.[15]

When Courcel began his campaign for an alliance with Britain, his only real ally was the Prince of Wales, who agreed with him completely and did everything in his power to make certain that Courcel got some kind of hearing in the foreign office.

After he became king in January 1901, there was an interval of time before he could continue his visits to France. In the first place there was all the planning of the coronation to attend to. At the last moment Edward was struck with appendicitis and the entire ceremony had to be postponed for several months. Secondly, the situation with France, who was still angry and humiliated over the Fashoda affair and was sympathetic with the Boers in the unfortunate South African war, made the visit of the king extremely difficult. Even as Prince, virulent attacks in the French press had prevented him from going as he usually did to France in 1900. The position of the king would be all the more troublesome. Still, it was with France that Edward's natural sympathies

lay and he was determined to return to France and to do all that he could to improve the relations between his country and the French.

Edward expressed his determination to undertake this trip to his cabinet early in 1903. Here he ran into fresh difficulty. Lansdowne, who was now the Foreign Secretary, objected to such a journey on the grounds that there was no telling what the French might resort to if they found the king of the country which they so hated within their reach. It could only lead to a situation where Britain would be insulted to the point of making war with France, something that the government of Britain was determined to avoid if they could possibly do so.[16] The French government did not share the feelings of its public, however, and the president cordially invited the English king to stop in Paris on the return part of Edwars's first progress as king. Edward was delighted to accept.

Politics and Policies

When Edward VII became king, Salisbury was still Prime Minister. Throughout his tenure of office, both as Prime Minister and as Foreign Secretary, Salisbury had been on the side of an entente with France. However, he was, also, unwilling to give any leeway in the colonial situation, and so his negotiating powers with the French were negated by his stand. This was especially true regarding the problem of Egypt. Still he was unwilling to write off any discussion between the French and the British. Twice during various terms in office the idea of talks between the two countries had been begun, only to be stopped by some occurrence on the colonial scene. However, in 1902 Salisbury was forced to give up the foreign secretaryship, because of ill health, which he had held for some time consecutively with the prime ministership. Lansdowne, under his no longer too watchful eye, became the Foreign Secretary for the conservative government.[17]

Lansdowne, in 1902, was far more interested in an alliance with Germany than in one with France. As far as he was concerned the problems between the two countries precluded any chance of settlement. Besides, he thought that there were definite advantages to joining with Germany, who was at this time the fastest growing country economically. Friendly relations between these two powerful countries, Britain and

Germany, would have benefits for them both in the mater of trade and in the colonial world.[18] In this feeling Lansdowne had the backing of several members of the cabinet, among whom the one most to be reckoned with was Joseph Chamberlain.

The French were ready to negotiate for some time before the British government finally got some united action on what they wanted to do. From the time that Theophile Delcasse came to the office of foreign affairs he decided that the thing that would most benefit France was an alliance with Britain. Germany was the real threat, even though for a long time the policy of Germany had been to back the desires of the French in everything that they wished, except the return of Alsace-Lorraine. Bismarck knew the value of keeping France and Britain at odds. However, in the eyes of France, Germany's growing economic and military might was directed priamrily at the French. Germany, not France, was to be the dominant power in Europe. Therefore, Delcasse had the resident ambassador of France in London, M. Paul Cambon, sound out the English again on their feelings.

The French cause had a few ardent supporters among the English even before there was a chance of getting public discussion of an entente. Salsibury, as noted, was agreeably inclined, while he was Foreign Minister, to have settlement talks with France. The impediment was France, and her problem was to decide whom she hated more: England, because of Fashoda, or Germany, because of Alsace-Lorraine.[19] With French Germanophobe feeling as strong as it was, only one

answer was possible in the end. Delcasse and the government of France would be willing to come to some settlement.

Delcasse had a new situation on his side in playing up to Britain, now. France had just recently concluded an entente with Fussia, and the scene of Europe was divided into two armed camps: the Triple Alliance against the new Dual Alliance. Britain, in return, had just finished settling an agreement with Japan, because she felt so left out of Europe. What France saw coming over the horizon was a war between Japan and Russia. As Russia's only ally, France would automatically expect the Russians to ask them to keep the defensive end of the agreement and help them (the Russians) against Japan. If France were to join Russia, then they might reasonably expect Japan to call for the aid of Britain, and France would find herself faced with war with the British Empire. Even with the help of the Russian fleet, which had been promised them if they needed it, Britain would win, almost certainly. To avoid war on these terms, it was imperative that France find some way of coming to a settlement with Britain.[20]

However, the problem of how to bring about this necessary measure still remained. The French Third Republic was a democracy of little stability. Governments had already set the precedent of rising and falling with alarming frequency. Any step that the government took would have to be supported by the French public or the government would fall before it could put its policy into action. At that time the French

public was indulging itself in a veritable orgy of mud-slinging, directed at Britain because of Fashoda and because the French took the side of the Boers. Delcasse allowed his feelings to be known in private conversations conducted both in Paris and in his name in London by the French ambassador. He explained that he was willing for the two countries to form an entente, but that with French public feelings as they were, chances of open success were minimal.[21]

The English government was in a better position at home to advocate an alliance with the French because the English public had suddenly been thrown into outrage by the outspoken opinions from the German Reischstag on the South African war. That war was not exactly popular at home, but no one who was not British had the right to insult a policy of the British Empire in such terms. The press hated Germany with a violent passion, and the full force of English sarcasm was turned by editors, even of the most reasonable papers, on the leaders of the German government.[22]

At this point, Lansdowne would have been ready to come to some type of pribate terms with the French whether public opinion in England had been agreeable or not. Lansdowne had reversed his stand in foreign affairs--nothing was more remarkable about Lansdowne's conduct of the foreign office in his early years there than his ability to shift his position--and had decided that the only way for Britain to be able to make a stand in the future on the continent was to have an alliance of some kind with France. The French ambassador in

London was notified from Delcasse to carry on informal talks with Lansdowne even though at the time there was no chance of these becoming the stated policy of either country.

Lansdowne's change of position had a reasonable basis for all its apparent suddeness. The specter of a continental coalition seemed about to lift its head against Britain. Germany was doing her best to lure France and her ally Russia into the Triple Alliance. If she succeeded there would be no one to side with Britain; her"splendid isolation" would be guarenteed, not because she wanted it but because she had no choice. Considering the colonial situation, where every European country with colonial ambitions found itself blocked by the British empire, the inevitable result of such an alliance would mean war against Britain by all the countries in it.[24]

M. Cambon had been instructed by Delcasse to bring up the touchy subject of colonial conflict and to try for some solution that would be agreeable to the English foreign ministry. Siam and Morocco were the topics and the French tentatively suggested that they were ready to find some settlement. As M. Cambon said, the English understood the feeling of having to back down from a position: it affacted the prestige of the country that had to do it. Therefore the settlement would have to be one that allowed the French to come out of the agreement with their pride and honour still in tact.

Lansdowne said that he understood the situation of France. He decided that the best way of overcoming the

colonial problem was to give up Morocco to the French. Cambon, for his part, agreed that England should be allowed the rights in Egypt. These agreements were secret, since neither the English people nor the French were prepared to accept a settlement between their two countries.[25] In other words, the agreement between the two countries was essentially settled, except for working out the details. The problem was still public acceptance, the bugbear to all international diplomacy.

At this moment the setermination of the king to visit France, while it might have the unhappy results that several cabinet members thought, might,on the other hand, improve the situation between Britain and France to where the discussions could be made public. Edward himself thought that this might be the result and was anxious to try out his abilities. Therefore, on the return leg of his journey around the Iberian penisula and Italy, Edward stopped in Paris.[26]

There was little enough enthusiasm shown him as he gob off of the train in Paris. President Loubet was the only one there who seemed glad to see the king. (Loubet was the one who had so cordially invited the king to stop in Paris, so that Delcasse's Entente might have a chance.) The Parisians observed the king's progress through the city with sullen faces or with cries of "Vive Fashoda!" Edward took no notice of the frigidity in the air and responded to what salutes were offered him. When one of his aides spoke seriously to him as they were going into the embassy

and said that the French did not like them, Edward replied, truthfully enough, "Why should they?" He meant that they had no reason to -- yet.[27]

That night Edward went to the opera, where the atmosphere was scarcely less chilly than it had been that morning. There are too many conflicting reports on what Edward actually said or did during the intermission, when he paid such warm attention to a notable Frenchwoman, for anything to be set down as fact. Whatever the circumstances, the news that the English king could be so gallant and sympathetic, and spoke such excellent Franch, raced all over Paris by morning. The Parisians began to remember who this king was: not someone of whom they had never heard who came to them as the Russian Emperor had, with unsmiling countenance and conscious superiority of his titles and power, who insulted their democracy with his looks, but someone whom they knew well. It was that same prince who had always visited and loved France, a boulivardier like themselves, who loved and understood them. The frigidity of the day before was almost melted by the time he drove out the next day.[28]

Both the Parisians and the English in Paris were eager to hear what the king had in mind when he rose to address them, and through them the whole of their countries.

> It is scarcely necessary to tell you with what sincere pleasure I find myself once more in Paris, to which, as you know, I have pais very frequent visits with ever increasing pleasure, and for which I feel an attachment fortified by so many happy and ineffacable memories. The days of hostility between the two countries are, I am certain, happily at an end. There

> may have been misunderstandings and causes of dissension in the past, but that is all happily over and forgotten. The friendship of the two countries is my constant preoccupation, and I count on you all who enjoy French hospitality in their magnificent city to aid me to reach this goal. 29

This mention of friendship between the two countries, which Edward put so carefully in a prominent place in his speech, was supposed to mean more than the king could openly speak of, but the undertones were strong enough to come through. Edward was firmly backing the entente, and was asking the French whom he had just won to his side to support him and their leaders willingly. His speech affected the position of both countries in the world.

By the time Edward left Paris the French were literally at his feet. "Vive notre roi!" Most people who were witnesses to the change were amazed. The English were probably more amazed than any. All the countries of Europe knew their king better than they whom he ruled did.[30]

The Discussions Between Lansdowne and Cambon

With the certainty that their agreements would be accepted in both their countries, Lansdowne and Cambon were able to go on with their talks. Though the main issues had been mentioned and agreed to there were still the details to be worked out and the minor items needed to be inserted in their proper places.

The foreign secretary of Britain, in discussing the matter, had come to several conclusions. In letters exchanged between Lansdowne and Cromer, the British consul-general in Egypt, certain points were decided on. They agreed that France should have the rights in Morocco, provided that Britain would get the rights in Egypt, that the sea coast of Morocco would be neutralized, and that British trade would not be put under any special restrictions. If all these points were acknowledged by the French, then there would be no problem.[32]

The French had some points in mind also. They wanted the director-general of Antiquities in Egypt to remain a Frenchman, and they wanted the French schools that had been established in Egypt to remain in French hands and not to be at a disadvantage in the English governed province.

Both of these problems were settled in the discussions. In addition, they agreed that Spain, because of her proximity to Morocco, should receive special assurances of good will

from the two countries and should get the same benefits that France was going to allow Britain to have. No fortifications would be built along the coast opposit Gibraltar and Spain would be allowed to have as a sphere of influence any territory that the sultan of Morocco was supposed to control outside of Melilla. These last agreements were under the secret settlement part of the entente as it was written. The problems that France and Britain had had in other parts of their colonies, for example in Newfoundland, were not specifically mentioned in the agreement that Lansdowne and Cambon signed, but they were discussed and settled.[33]

The Aftermath

To anyone casually examining the results of the discussions and the treaty, it would seem that Britain got the best of the bargain. She got something that already existed and which she in fact already controlled: the province of Egypt, which was well set up, ready for them to govern, and in which trade was already established. France got a chaotic country without any government could control it, anyone could guess at the time.

In actuality, France got the best of the deal, for two reasons. First, Morocco proved to be a largely underdeveloped dountry that had great potential. She became a valuable area for trade; her wealth had been hidden, not nonexistant. Secondly, Delcasse knew what he was doing when he settled the entente with the British as he did. The French, as it worked out, had paid their end of the bargain: England had full sway in Egypt. However, they had taken the promise of the British for things to come. The British could not fail to support the French in Morocco without seriously damaging their good name. Delcasse almost certainly knew that Germany would hardly let such influence grow in Africa without challenging it on behalf of their growing empire there. The British would be forced to help the French against the Germans, who could be counted

on to start the rouble. It would not only aid the French in Africa but would strengthen the ties of the entente.[35] The British were not looking for such long term effects. It was the apparent that they appreciated, not the fact, and they thought that they had gotten the best end of the agreement. The settlement bill passed with great popularity in the House of Commons.

In the final analysis, the praise for the entente rests with four people. Delcasse is the first, because he held to his idea of an agreement with Britain through all the instability of a government of the Third Republic and was successful in the end. Cambon is the second, because he sat down and went through the settlement point by point during all the long months of negotiations. Lansdowne is the third, because in the end, when once he had been converted to the idea of an alliance with France, he supported it whole-heartedly and to the best interests of Britain as he saw them.

However, the man who most influenced the successful outcome of the negotiations that had been carried on between Britain and France was Edward. Without his popularity and h his charm the Anglo-French Entente would not have been possible. It was he who removed the barriers that would have prevented the French government from agreeing to the entente and getting it through the Chambers in their assembly. He showed them Englishmen who had the best interests of both countries in mind, not for the benefit of empire but in their common good.

APPENDIX

good their rights to the succession, without any risk of serious interference on our part, Morocco will, to all intents and purposes, become before long a French province.

The question, therefore, to my mind is this: have we any objection to Morocco becoming a French province? Personally, I see none, provided always (1) that we get an adequate *quid pro quo* in Egypt and elsewhere; and (2) that the French comply with your three conditions as regards Morocco. These, if I understand rightly, are (1) the seaboard is to be neutralised; (2) a proper regard is to be shown to Spanish interests and susceptibilities; and (3) a guarantee is to be obtained that British trade and enterprise will not be placed at any legal disadvantage in Morocco.

. . . . . .

[Declaration between the United Kingdom and France respecting Egypt and Morocco. Signed at London, April 8, 1904.]

Article I.

His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Egypt.

The Government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other manner, and that they give their assent to the draft Khedivial Decree annexed to the present Arrangement, containing the guarantees considered necessary for the protection of the interests of the Egyptian bondholders, on the condition that, after its promulgation, it cannot be modified in any way without the consent of the Powers Signatory of the Convention of London of 1885.

It is agreed that the post of Director-General of Antiquities in Egypt shall continue, as in the past, to be entrusted to a French *savant*.

The French schools in Egypt shall continue to enjoy the same liberty as in the past.

Article II.

The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco.

His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognise that it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require.

They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which Great Britain, in virtue of Treaties, Conventions, and usage, enjoys in

Morocco, including the right of coasting trade between the ports of Morocco, enjoyed by British vessels since 1901.

Article III.

His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, will respect the rights which France, in virtue of Treaties, Conventions, and usage, enjoys in Egypt, including the right of coasting trade between Egyptian ports accorded to French vessels.

Article IV.

The two Governments, being equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that they will not, in those countries, countenance any inequality either in the imposition of customs duties or other taxes, or of railway transport charges.

The trade of both nations with Morocco and with Egypt shall enjoy the same treatment in transit through the French and British possessions in Africa. An Agreement between the two Governments shall settle the conditions of such transit and shall determine the points of entry.

This mutual engagement shall be binding for a period of thirty years. Unless this stipulation is expressly denounced at least one year in advance, the period shall be extended for five years at a time.

Nevertheless, the Government of the French Republic reserve to themselves in Morocco, and His Britannic Majesty's Government reserve to themselves in Egypt, the right to see that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, &c., are only granted on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public interest.

Article V.

His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they will use their influence in order that the French officials now in the Egyptian service may not be placed under conditions less advantageous than those applying to the British officials in the same service.

The Government of the French Republic, for their part, would make no objection to the application of analogous conditions to British officials now in the Moorish service.

Article VI.

In order to insure the free passage of the Suez Canal, His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they adhere to the stipulations of the Treaty of the 29th October, 1888, and that they agree to their being put in force. The free passage of the Canal being thus guaranteed, the execution of the last sentence of paragraph 1 as well as of paragraph 2 of Article VIII of that Treaty will remain in abeyance.

Article VII.

In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the River Sebou.

This condition does not, however, apply to the places at present in the occupation of Spain on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean.

Article VIII.

The two Governments, inspired by their feeling of sincere friendship for Spain, take into special consideration the interests which that country derives from her geographical position and from her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean. In regard to these interests the French Government will come to an understanding with the Spanish Government.

The agreement which may be come to on the subject between France and Spain shall be communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

Article IX.

The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco.

In witness whereof his Excellency the Ambassador of the French Republic at the Court of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, duly authorized for that purpose, have signed the present Declaration and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at London, in duplicate, the 8th day of April, 1904.

(Signatures of Lord Lansdowne and M. Paul Cambon follow.)

Secret Article I.

In the event of either Government finding themselves constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify their policy in respect to Egypt and Morocco, the engagements which they have undertaken towards each other by Articles IV, VI and VII of the Declaration of to-day's date would remain intact.

Secret Article II.

His Britannic Majesty's Government have no present intention of proposing to the Powers any changes in the system of the Capitulations, or in the judicial organisation of Egypt.

In the event of their considering it desirable to introduce in Egypt reforms tending to assimilate the Egyptian legislative system to that in force in other civilised countries, the Government of the French Republic will not refuse to entertain any such proposals, on the understanding that His Britannic Majesty's Government will agree to entertain the suggestions that the Government of the French Republic may have to make to them with a view of introducing similar reforms in Morocco.

Secret Article III.

The two Governments agree that a certain extent of Moorish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta and other *Présides* should, whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of influence of Spain, and that the administration of the coast from Melilla as far as, but not including, the heights on the right bank of the Sebou shall be intrusted to Spain.

Nevertheless, Spain would previously have to give her formal assent to the provisions of Articles IV and VII of the Declaration of to-day's date, and undertake to carry them out.

She would also have to undertake not to alienate the whole or a part of the territories placed under her authority or in her sphere of influence.

Secret Article IV.

If Spain, when invited to assent to the provisions of the preceding article, should think proper to decline, the Arrangement between France and Great Britain, as embodied in the Declaration of today's date, would be none the less applicable.

Secret Article V.

Should the consent of the other Powers to the draft Decree mentioned in Article I of the Declaration of to-day's date not be obtained, the Government of the French Republic will not oppose the repayment at par of the Guaranteed, Privileged and Unified Debts after the 15th July, 1910.

Done at London, in duplicate, the 8th day of April, 1904.

(Signatures of Lord Lansdowne and M. Paul Cambon follow.)

FOOTNOTES

1. Kenneth Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 1830-1902, (Oxford, 1970), 64; A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1914, (London, 1957), 21.

2. Bourne, 65-66; Taylor, 34-35.

3. Bourne, 74; Taylor, 63.

4. Taylor, 141 & 199.

5. Ibid., 283.

6. Ernest Lavisse, L'Evolution de la 3e Republique 1875-1914, (Histoire de France Contemporaine, VIII), (France, 1921), 196; Taylor, 285-286; John B. Wolf, France 1814-1919: The Rise of a Liberal Democratic Society, (New York, reprint 1968), 468-470.

7. Pierre de Coubertin, The Evolution of France Under the Third Republic, (New York, 1897), 81.

8. Taylor, 284.

9. R. W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914, (Cambridge, 1938), 566-588.

10. Sidney Lee, Edward VII: From Birth to Accession, (New York, 1925), Vol. 1, 36.

11. Reginald B. Brett, The Influence of King Edward and Essays on Other Subjects, (London, 1915), 53.

12. Lee, Vol. 1, 484, Vol. 2, 132; Andre Maurois, Histoire de France, (Np., Nd.), 278.

13. Lee, Vol. 1, 643.

14. Ibid., 335.

15. J. A. S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, the Close of the Nineteenth Century, (London, reprint 1970), 108.

16. Lee, Vol. 2, 221; Philip Magnus, Edward VII, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1967), 382; Lord Newton, Lord Lansdowne: a Biography, (London,1929), 275.

17. Raymond James Sonthe, European Diplomatic History, 1871-1932, (New York, 1933), 79; Grenville, 232-233.

18. Ibid., 79.

19. Denis W. Brogan, France Under the Republic; the Development of Modern France, 1870-1939, (New York, Nd.), 326.

20. Seton-Watson, 510; Wolf, 480-481.

21. Lee, Vol. 2, 221; Newton, 267; Sonthe, 61.

22. Grenville, 429; Sonthe, 81.

23. Ibid., 434.

24. Sonthe, 81.

25. Newton, 267; Sonthe, 91-92; Jonathan F. Scott and Alexander Baltzly, ed., Readings in European History since 1814, (New York, 1941), 480-481.

26. Lee, Vol. 2, 238-254, 336-345; Magnus, 380-390; Newton, 278-293; Scott and Bartzly, 478.

27. Ibid., Vol. 2, 238-254 & 336-345; Magnus, 380-390; Newton, 278-293; Scott and Bartzly, 478.

28. Ibid., Vol. 2, 238-254 & 336-345; Magnus, 380-390; Newton, 278-293; Scott and Vartzly, 478.

29. Ibid., Vol. 2, 238-254 & 336-345; Magnus, 380-390; Newton, 278-293; Scott and Bartzly, 478.

30. Ibid., Vol. 2, 238-254 & 336-345; Magnus, 380-390; Newton, 278-293; Scott and Bartzly, 478;

31. Ibid., Vol. 2, 238-254 & 336-345; Magnus, 380-390; Newton, 278-293; Scott and Bartzly, 478.

32. Scott and Bartzly, 481.

33. Lee, Vol. 2, 247; Scott and Bartzly, 41.

34. Taylor, 415.

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Brett, Reginald Balliol, Viscount Esher. The Influenee of King Edward and Essays on Other Subjects. London: John A. Murray, Albemarle Street W., 1915.

Eckhadstein, Baron von. Ten Yeears at the Court of St. James's. N.p. N. d.

Edward VII. Correspondence. from secondary sources: Phillip Magnus, Sir Sidney Lee. see secondary bibliography. If I had not been able to use the secondary sources, the letters would have been impossible to find, since they have not yet been edited and printed.

Gery, Sir Edward, Viscount of Falloden. Twenty-five Years, 1892-916. New York: Frederick Stokes and Company, 1925, I. This book was not really of any factual help even though Grey lived and worked during this period, because he was out of office and consequently out of the secret meetings. However, it was a reflection of those who did not know, but were guessing, st what was occurring.

Les Origines diplomatique de le Guerre de 1870-1871, tome X. Paris: N.p., 1915.

Scott, Jonathan F. and Bartzly, Alexander, ed. Readings in European History since 1814. New York: F.S.Crofts and Company,1941. Chapter XII, sec. 3, 461-465. Chapter XIII, sec.2, 475-484.

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Temperly, Harold W.V. and Penson, Lillian M., ed. Foundations of Britiah Foreign Policy From Pitt(1792) to Salisbury (1902). Cambridge: University Press, 1938. Of all the primary sources, this one and the Scott were the most useful.

Secondary

Bainville, Jacques. Histoire de France. Paris: Coulommiers, Le Livre de Poche, 1964. 439-468.

Brogan, Denis W. France under the Republic; the Development of Modern France, 1870-1939. New York: Harper and Brothers, N. d.

Chastenet, Jacques. La Republique Triomphante, 1895-1906. (Histoire de la Troisieme Republique) Paris: Librarie Hachette, 1955. 138-159, 309-352. This is the only thorough history of the Third Republic that has been done by a Frenchman. It is a neglected period in history, though historians are beginning to go into it now more.

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Grenville, John Ashley S. Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, Close of the Nineteenth Century. London: The Athelone Press, University of London, 1964, Reprint, 1970. Grenville is better at the problems of the foreign office under Salisbury, than Kennedy, but then he is not trying at the same time to write a life of Salisbury too.

Kennedy, A.L. Salisbury, 1830-1903. New York: Kraus Reprint Company, 1971.

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Trevelyan, G.M. Grey of Falloden: Life and Letters of Sir Edward Grey, Afterwards Viscount Grey of Falloden. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1937. One can Only regret that Trevelyen does not write more on everything. His style is the most sympathetic and lovely and his command of prose the most enviable of all the historians that I read.

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