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EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR. AND THE MEXICO
CITY CONFERENCE OF 1945

BY
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A THESIS
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CHAPTER I

EDWARD STETTINIUS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE MEXICO CITY CONFERENCE

American leadership in the latter stages of World War II enhanced the prestige and position of the United States in international affairs. Unfortunately, while Washington attracted many new friends, certain old supporters were alienated. By the fall of 1944, strained relations with Latin America were of grave concern to Secretary Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. and his State Department colleagues. Political, economic, and social problems of common American interest raised by the war or foreseeable after the war were pressing for joint consideration.¹ The Pan American republics had not met since the Rio Conference of 1942. As time elapsed, such issues as the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, the status of the inter-American security system, the isolation of Argentina, and the development of economic transition programs had emerged as delicate points of Latin American interest. These unattended controversial matters bred resentment among the South American nations toward their northern neighbor. To maintain hemispheric solidarity and overcome Latin antagonism, a consultative meeting of the American republics was necessary. This urgent need to exchange views and reconcile differences eventually culminated in the Mexico City Conference of 1945.

1. Harley Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 398.

The talks at Chapultepec Castle are now overshadowed by other summit meetings such as Yalta and Potsdam. Nevertheless, the Mexico City Conference, an important episode in the diplomatic history of the United States and the Western Hemisphere, is worthy of further examination. An attempt is made herein to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the Chapultepec talks against the background of the contributions of the United States' chief delegate in Mexico City, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

LATIN AMERICAN RESENTMENT

To understand the origins of the Chapultepec Conference, one must study the causes of Latin American resentment toward the United States in late 1944. One highly debated theme within inter-American affairs arose from United States involvement in planning a world organization. The "Big Four" (the United States, Soviet Union, China, and Great Britain) met outside Washington, D. C., at Dumbarton Oaks beginning August 21, 1944 to formulate guidelines for an international peace-keeping body. The secrecy in which the conferees deliberated perturbed Latin Americans, concerned as they were over the preservation of the inter-American regional system.² When the discontent became too vocal, Cordell Hull, then Secretary of State, and Undersecretary Stettinius invited Latin American diplomats in Washington to private briefings.

2. John Lloyd Mechem, The United States and Inter-American Security, 1898-1960 (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1961), p. 255.

By October, 1944 the Dumbarton Oaks talks were completed. American spokesmen endeavored to play down the growing divergence of interests between the United States and the nations south of the border. However, the Latin American republics became increasingly apprehensive as it appeared that the United States was preparing to take a leading role in world affairs and cooperate with the great powers in allocating to themselves a dominant position in the proposed United Nations.³ At a Columbus Day reception for Latin American diplomats at the Blair House, Stettinius sought to assure the guests that the United States delegation to the conference had done everything possible to preserve the inter-American regional system. Referring to specific Dumbarton Oaks proposals regarding regional arrangements, Stettinius declared that the United Nations Security Council would encourage the settlement of local disputes through a regional system.⁴ At the same reception, President Roosevelt stated that, "within the framework of the world organization of the United Nations the inter-American system can and must play a strong and vital role."⁵

Despite assurances by Stettinius and Roosevelt, the other Pan American republics were not so sure that the proposals granted the regional system an acceptable status. They wanted an opportunity

3. Gordon Connell-Smith, The Inter-American System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 129.

4. Meham, The United States and Inter-American Security, p. 256.

5. David Green, The Containment of Latin America (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), p. 169.

to exchange ideas at a general inter-American discussion of the Dumbarton Oaks resolutions. They favored a meeting prior to the United Nations conference scheduled for April, 1945 in San Francisco.

Washington's southern neighbors objected to the provision that no enforcement actions could be taken by a regional agency without authorization by the Security Council. They saw in this the end of the inter-American system's autonomy.⁶ They also opposed having non-American powers represented on the Security Council ruling on hemispheric matters. Latin Americans criticized the unequal membership of the council. Five seats permanently assigned to the five principal powers implied direct dictation of world policy by first class powers only. Perhaps the most pronounced complaint of the Latin Americans was that just the "Big Four" had planned the United Nations structure. South American arguments against the Dumbarton Oaks proposals centered around two major points: 1) the great powers had been granted too much authority and would dominate the world organization, and 2) the inter-American system had not been given the important role it should enjoy.⁷

Deeply concerned with the proposed plan for a world organization, the southern republics desired a meeting of the minds with the United States. They hoped to revise the objectionable provisions produced at Dumbarton Oaks. An inter-American conference might also present the opportunity for Latin America to restrain

6. Mechem, The United States and Inter-American Security, p. 256.

7. Ibid., p. 257.

Washington's power and interventionist habits by building up a series of regional legal and political safeguards.⁸ From the United States standpoint, a hemispheric meeting would allow Roosevelt's administration to gather solid bloc support for the forthcoming United Nations conference. In addition, the State Department would be able to develop some kind of solidarity program to keep Latin American nationalists in line until such time as multilateral agreements could get moving again.

As long as Cordell Hull was Secretary of State, however, there could be no wartime inter-American conference. President Roosevelt was so preoccupied with the war effort that the State Department was given a free hand in regulating foreign affairs with Latin America. Hull firmly opposed a meeting of the hemispheric republics because he feared that Argentina would further disrupt inter-American unity.⁹ Other State Department officials such as Brechinridge Long shared Hull's distrust of Argentina. Buenos Aires resented the hegemony of the United States and had been the main obstacle to hemispheric unity against Axis aggression. World War II had upset Argentina's plan to make herself the leading power of South America. Fearing the European dictators, Latin America had drawn closer to her northern neighbor and thus isolated Argentina. During most of the war, Buenos Aires pursued a policy of neutrality. Her leaders expressed open admiration for fascism, particularly

8. Green, The Containment of Latin America, p. 167.

9. Ibid., p. 169.

for Franco's Spain, and allowed Nazi agents considerable freedom within their country.¹⁰ Latin America and the United States condemned Argentina for her failure to break relations with the Axis powers.

Secretary Hull had desired more extreme measures against Argentina such as economic sanctions. However, Great Britain was dependent upon Argentine beef and the United States could not afford to hinder her ally's food imports. While tension mounted between Washington and Buenos Aires, nationalistic army officers staged a coup in February, 1944. General Edelmiro J. Farrell headed the new Argentine regime which proceeded to become more fascist and more repressive than its predecessor. The United States retaliated by persuading the other Latin American republics not to recognize the Farrell government.¹¹ Later, Washington decided to freeze Argentine assets within the United States. In October, 1944 Buenos Aires requested a meeting of inter-American foreign ministers to examine its problems. Hull was not willing to discuss the Argentine case. He feared that Farrell might attempt to intensify Latin American discontent.

The Pan American republics were disturbed by Argentina's exclusion from hemispheric activities. Seeking to restore inter-American harmony, they supported Argentina's motion for a meeting to iron out differences. Not until the stubborn Hull was replaced by a more conciliatory Secretary was there a chance that the

10. Alexander DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy (New York: Scribner, 1963), p. 716.

11. Ibid., p. 717.

United States would alter its attitude toward an inter-American conference. When failing health forced Hull to retire from public service, a flexible man, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. became head of the State Department on November 27, 1944. He and his Assistant Secretary for Latin American affairs, Nelson A. Rockefeller, were eager to repair the damage done to hemispheric solidarity during the preceding year. They desired an equitable solution for the Argentine impasse. Thus, with a shift in leadership within the State Department, an attempt to cope with Argentine isolation became more conceivable.

Another critical issue which aggravated United States relations with Latin America involved economic matters. Considered a low priority area in the fight against fascism, Central and South America during World War II suffered from consumer shortages and the curtailment of development programs. Although a certain amount of industry had been stimulated by the war effort, the end of hostilities would mean not only the drastic reduction but possibly the eventual termination of the war-created demand for raw materials.¹² Latin Americans feared the economic consequences of peace. They were plagued by several vital questions. What will be done to overcome the massive unemployment created by the transition to peacetime production? How severely will raw material industries be reduced? Will the United States assist in substantially raising the standard of living in Latin America? For the

12. Mechem, The United States and Inter-American Security, p. 258.

southern republics, an inter-American conference to handle these postwar economic questions could not come too soon. Since the United States alone possessed the key to the solution of their problems, obviously a meeting must be convened to wheedle concessions from the "Colossus of the North."¹³

Developments outside the Western hemisphere magnified the growing problem of inter-American economic cooperation in the postwar period. During the final months of the war, the United States became increasingly aware of the treacherous ways of its Soviet ally. Washington felt that the best defense against Russian aggression in Western Europe would be through economic assistance programs. American policymakers began to formulate plans to channel large amounts of material and monetary aid to the devastated war zones. Witnessing a growing United States interest in European reconstruction, some Latin Americans feared that all prewar and wartime plans for postwar development projects within the hemisphere would once again be relegated to oblivion.¹⁴ The maintenance of Latin America as a low priority area and the continued fixation with European policy by the State Department could only serve to increase hemispheric resentment toward the United States. As early as December, 1943 George Messersmith, American Ambassador to Mexico warned: "we must not try hysterically to build up the economies of our enemies (Germany and Japan) after the war, but

13. Ibid.

14. Green, The Containment of Latin America, p. 170.

must do what we can to build up the economies of our friends, including the republics of this hemisphere."¹⁵

By the time Stettinius succeeded Hull in November, 1944, the bonds of the Good Neighbor Policy had been greatly weakened. The new Secretary had to overcome the burden of persistent Latin American resentment. Major policy questions associated with the Dumbarton Oaks proposals had to be clarified. The Argentine problem had to be settled for the sake of hemispheric solidarity. Economic programs to stimulate inter-American industry and agriculture required attention. Stettinius quickly perceived the urgency behind the Latin American cries for a hemispheric conference. Before he could act, however, Ezequiel Padilla, the Mexican Foreign Minister forced the State Department's hand. As Hull was preparing to step down, Padilla circulated among the Latin American republics a proposal to hold a hemispheric conference. Ambassador Messersmith cabled Washington warning that the United States would seriously jeopardize Padilla's position in Mexico and probably undercut one of its strongest Latin American supporters unless it backed his proposal.¹⁶ The Roosevelt administration thus decided in late November, 1944 to participate in an inter-American meeting and arrangements began in earnest for the Mexico City Conference of 1945.

15. Ibid., p. 164.

16. Ibid., p. 167.

STATE DEPARTMENT PLANNING FOR THE MEXICO CITY CONFERENCE

Although the Chapultepec talks became a concrete possibility in November, 1944, there were earlier events which foreshadowed the inter-American conference. The Latin American countries were deeply concerned about the relationship between their regional system and the proposed world security organization. The State Department therefore inaugurated an exchange of views with the other nineteen Pan American republics via a circular telegram on the problems of creating an international peace-keeping body. This diplomatic correspondence was issued on July 11, 1944.¹⁷

Later, after the Dumbarton Oaks conversations began, Latin American diplomats attended briefing sessions during the months of August and September. Stettinius's Blair House reception of October 12, 1944 began a series of meetings for the systematic but informal interchange of views on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. As soon as time had been allowed for comments from Latin American governments, another "Blair House Meeting" with chiefs of the missions was held on October 26. Thereafter similar meetings were held at the State Department.¹⁸

At a third meeting of Latin diplomats and American Foreign Service officers on November 9, a Committee of Coordination was appointed to summarize comments and suggestions made regarding

17. Motter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 309.

18. Ibid., p. 400.

the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Membership on this body consisted of the Ambassadors from Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Brazil and Norman Armour, Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs. After this conference, Stettinius, then Acting Secretary, publicly spoke of being encouraged by the support that the American republics were showing for the basic ideas embodied in the United Nations proposals.¹⁹ While in consultation with Senate leaders on November 24, Stettinius reiterated his belief in Latin American support for the world organization. He revealed that his first public statement had received the prior approval of the various chiefs of the missions in Washington.

By the end of November, various strategy sessions projected that a meeting of the hemispheric foreign ministers might convene about January 10, 1945 if practicable. The Senate had just approved Stettinius's appointment as Secretary of State. With a change in State Department leadership, the Padilla invitation to a consultative meeting was more readily acceptable. The nature of the desired meeting was clarified through a State Department memorandum. It was to be an inter-American conference to consider the problems arising from the present hostilities. Only those American republics which had participated in the war effort were to be invited.²⁰ This stipulation prevented Argentina's attendance and thus avoided the possibility of an embarrassing confrontation between Washington and Buenos Aires.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

Following the meeting of ambassadors on December 29, 1944, Secretary Stettinius noted that the diplomatic channels were functioning smoothly in preparing for an inter-American conference. Plans to hold such a meeting became more definite as the new year began. On January 13, 1945 Mexico City was announced as the location of the hemispheric talks. A few days later, February 21 was confirmed as the opening date of the conference. Informal exchanges with the ambassadors continued and even intensified. Five more meetings were held with Latin American diplomats on January 5, 26, 31 and February 5 and 9 to further analyze the United Nations plan.²¹

Under normal circumstances, the Governing Board of the Pan American Union would have formulated the agenda and completed arrangements for a hemispheric conference. Since Argentina was a member of the Union but was to be excluded from the Chapultepec talks, direct diplomatic negotiations were employed to organize the meeting. Based upon consultations with the invited governments, the host country, Mexico, submitted an agenda which closely resembled the United States proposed subjects for discussion. On January 18, President Roosevelt approved the topics to be covered at the Mexico City Conference. The main headings included

- 1) further cooperative measures for the prosecution of the war to complete victory,
- 2) problems of an international organization for peace and security,
- 3) social problems of the Americas, and

21. Ibid., p. 401.

4) other matters of general and immediate concern to the participating governments.²²

State Department preparations for the Chapultepec talks paralleled developments on the international level. On October 17, 1944 department staff experts organized an advisory group for the consultations with Latin American ambassadors. Background papers on inter-American problems were written and submitted to a Policy Committee. Rockefeller served as chairman of this body, which was composed of his assistants and the appropriate Foreign Service personnel from the Office of American Republic Affairs. These policy-makers met eighteen times from January 17 through February 7, 1945.²³

Two other working groups were created to lay the groundwork for American participation in Mexico City. One committee collected data on Latin American economic problems and reported its findings to Assistant Secretary William Clayton, who was responsible for the development of United States policy in this field. The other body dealt with political issues like the strengthening of the inter-American system and its relationship to the world organization. Membership in this latter group included men who would later make significant contributions for the American delegation at Chapultepec Castle. Technical Experts Arvra Warren, John M. Cabot, and Harley Notter met almost daily in the political committee.

22. Ibid., p. 402.

23. Ibid., p. 403.

Prior to the inter-American conference, the United States delegation met on February 13, 1945 for purposes of organization. The delegation was broadly representative of the various government agencies. Over one-third of its advisors and technical officers had actively participated in preparations for the conference.²⁴ Foreign Service personnel Oscar Cox and Leo Pasvolsky were joined by military men like Generals George V. Strong and Stanley D. Embick and Admiral Cecil Train on the delegation. Congress sent Senators Tom Connally (Democrat of Texas) and Warren Austin (Republican of Vermont) and Representatives Luther Johnson (Democrat of Texas) and Edith Nourse Rogers (Republican of Massachusetts) to Mexico City. To coordinate the activities of this diverse party, the recently-appointed Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., was selected as the United States' chief delegate to the Chapultepec talks. For the businessman-diplomat the Mexico City negotiations loomed as a critical test of his abilities. Stettinius had to overcome Latin American resentment toward certain Dumbarton Oaks provisions, the Argentine question, and Washington's postwar economic goals. How he conducted himself at the Chapultepec talks would be a big factor in determining the United States' success in restoring hemispheric solidarity.

24. Ibid., p. 405.

FROM GENERAL MOTORS TO CHAPULTEPEC: THE RISE OF

EDWARD STETTINIUS

Though the halls of Chapultepec Castle and the conference rooms of General Motors have little in common, they are both significant places in the career of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. The chief American delegate to the Mexico City Conference of 1945 was a man with impressive credentials. A clever administrator without much knowledge of foreign affairs, Stettinius through his managerial ability and business acumen had risen from a lowly stock clerk to the highest State Department office in a mere twenty years.

He was born in Chicago, October 22, 1900, the son of a partner in J. P. Morgan and Company. Stettinius attended the Pomfret School in Connecticut and later the University of Virginia from 1919 to 1924. An indifferent scholar, the future diplomat failed to meet the requirements for a college degree. This flaw in academics was minor in comparison to the many successes he achieved at that time. Stettinius's college days are characterized by an idealism which persisted throughout his life. Devoted to helping others, he became president of the campus Y. M. C. A. and later founded a Student Self-Help Bureau to find jobs for needy students. In addition, he taught Sunday school and did missionary work among the mountain people. In all his activities, Stettinius displayed a remarkable energy and organizational talent as well as a friendliness and warmth for which he was later noted.²⁵

25. Robert Walker, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, Volume XIV, edited by Samuel Flagg Bemis and R. H. Ferrell (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1967), p. 4.

The young university student's extracurricular activities brought him to the attention of Virginia alumnus John Lee Pratt, a vice-president of General Motors. The business executive convinced Stettinius to enter the field of industry rather than the ministry. In 1924, the son of a Morgan financier began his first job in the stock room of the Hyatt Roller Bearing Company. As a clerk in a division of General Motors, his wage scale was forty-four cents per hour. Within two years, Stettinius was promoted to special assistant to Pratt. This advancement enabled him to demonstrate his innovative abilities. He created one of industry's first group insurance programs, opened modern medical clinics within factories, and employed the new Madison Avenue advertising techniques. In record time, Edward Stettinius overcame the handicaps of wealth and a brilliant father to establish his own niche in the industrial history of the nation.²⁶ At the age of thirty-one, he became a vice-president of General Motors in charge of public and industrial relations.

Moving on to the industrial giant, United States Steel, Stettinius became a member of its board of directors and chairman of its finance committee in 1934. Again, his talents permitted him to rise quickly within the company hierarchy. At the age of thirty-seven, Stettinius was appointed chairman of the board of directors with an annual salary of one hundred thousand dollars. In his rapid ascent to the pinnacle of success in the business world, the so-called "wonder boy" never lost those qualities of

26. Ibid., p. 5.

compassion and warmth which were to stand him in good stead in later years.²⁷

Although associated with traditionally conservative big business interests, Stettinius held liberal social and political views. Willing to experiment and innovate in a time of economic disorder, he shared in the optimism of Roosevelt's New Deal. Washington called on his services for the first time in 1932, when he was invited to serve on the Industrial Advisory Board. As a liaison officer with the National Recovery Administration, Stettinius impressed many with his loyalty, sincerity, and boundless energy. Noted for his ability to harmonize and reconcile conflicting interests, he was appointed to a number of troublesome administrative posts within the federal government. In 1939, Stettinius decided to devote his full time and effort to public service. At that time, he became chairman of the War Resources Board.²⁸ The following year, President Roosevelt asked him to serve on the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense in charge of industrial materials. As the possibility of American involvement in World War II increased, Stettinius was selected as Director of Priorities of the Office of Production Management in January, 1941. Eight months later, he took over the administration of the Lend-Lease program. As coordinator of this military assistance project, the former businessman made his first contacts in the field of foreign affairs. Convinced of the value of Lend-Lease, he took time out

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., p. 7.

in the spring and summer of 1943 to write Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory. In this work, he explained the necessity for the program's continuation possibly even after the Axis defeat.²⁹

By September, 1943, another federal agency was in desperate need of bureaucratic innovation. The State Department was operating in a haphazard and confused manner. The diplomatic corp was hampered by a bad press, low morale, and an inability to cope with increasing responsibilities. Various functions overlapped different offices and day-to-day decisions were often made with little regard for over-all policy. The Department was further handicapped by inadequate methods and hence lacked the machinery for a sound public relations program.³⁰ The situation became intolerable as a result of the personality clashes between Secretary Hull and his chief assistant, Sumner Welles. At the urging of advisors James F. Byrnes and Harry Hopkins, President Roosevelt appointed Edward Stettinius to the post of Undersecretary of State on September 25, 1943.³¹

The administrative troubleshooter approached his new job determined to introduce efficiency, flexibility, and optimism to the State Department. Hull welcomed Stettinius's program of reorganization, but considered him basically a bureaucratic harmonizer. The new Undersecretary attempted to improve the channels of communication with other executive offices and the Congress. He also

29. Ibid.

30. Walter Johnson, An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century, edited by Norman A. Graebner (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1961), p. 212.

31. Walker, The American Secretaries of State, p. 8.

initiated a public relations campaign to restore the Department's prestige and clarify its role in the war effort. Stettinius created new offices and bodies with specific responsibilities to release his assistant secretaries from excessive paperwork. Consequently, the Committee on Postwar problems and the four geographic directorships were established. Some of the old Foreign Service officers were critical of the new ways. The New York Times remarked, however, "that the Undersecretary brought a breath of fresh air to somewhat musty corridors."³²

Stettinius was at his best in coping with problems of management and organization. His role in the State Department took on new significance when failing health forced Cordell Hull to step down in late 1944. The Undersecretary was not the most likely candidate to succeed Hull as the architect of American diplomacy. He was not experienced in the subtleties and complexities of international relations. But President Roosevelt intended to dictate American foreign policy through direct negotiations with Churchill and Stalin. While the chief executive would make the high-level decisions, he needed a loyal assistant to oversee the smooth operation of the State Department's administrative machinery. Thus, Stettinius was promoted to Secretary of State on November 27, 1944. Readily assenting to Roosevelt's determination to be the formulator of policy, he saw his own responsibilities to consist of re-inforcing the Department, implementing decisions, and serving as a two way messenger between the Department and the President.³³

32. Johnson, An Uncertain Tradition, p. 212.

33. Ibid., p. 215.

The selection of Stettinius as a "caretaker" Secretary was acceptable to both Roosevelt and his White House advisors. Unlike many public servants, he was not associated with party politics and had no intention of usurping Presidential power. Without formal training in world affairs, Stettinius did a commendable job in keeping the chief executive well-informed on policy issues. He also advanced Hull's earlier efforts to obtain bipartisan support for the world security organization. Consistent with his "goodwill to all attitude," the United Nations dream eventually became his greatest goal. All other interests were subordinated to making the international peace-keeping body a reality.³⁴

During his tenure as Secretary, Stettinius greatly utilized the informal, personal approach in carrying out his duties. Sidestepping the rigidity of diplomatic protocol, he made his office more accessible to both his own subordinates and foreign diplomats. Undersecretary Joseph Grew was always informed of the latest developments in foreign policy. It will be noted later that throughout the Mexico City Conference, Stettinius daily cabled Grew to seek advice and to relay progress reports. The Secretary's quick smile and easygoing ways also helped to partially alleviate the resentment of Latin American ambassadors at briefing sessions on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. As an expert in public relations, Stettinius sought to improve the image of the State Department through informal talks with leaders of national opinion-forming groups. Congressional figures and fellow cabinet members were

34. Walker, The American Secretaries of State, p. 82.

also cultivated to maintain a friendly basis for cooperation.

"Big Ed" as he was nicknamed, revitalized the State Department through his personal charm and inexhaustible energy. He and his "new team" of Assistant Secretaries, Nelson Rockefeller, William Clayton, and Archibald MacLeish, conscientiously fulfilled the dictates of the White House. Being a managerial wizard rather than an experienced diplomat, the Mexico City Conference of 1945 represented a unique challenge for Stettinius. Miles away from the friendly confines of Washington, he would have to make on-the-spot decisions of great significance. His goal would be to restore the Good Neighbor Policy to its past preeminence. Equipped only with a personal zeal for work, persistent idealism, and complete loyalty to President Roosevelt and the idea of a world organization, Edward Stettinius thus prepared for the Chapultepec talks.

CHAPTER II

DAYS OF ORGANIZATION AND POLICY STATEMENTS

FEBRUARY 20, 1945

The Inter-American Conference On The Problems Of Peace And War did not begin in a very auspicious way for Edward Stettinius. He arrived a day early on February 20, 1945 to become acquainted with and help organize the operations of the American delegation. A few hours prior to the completion of his journey from Yalta to Mexico, the Secretary paid a visit to the ruling Junta of Guatemala. Filled with aspirations of restoring hemispheric solidarity, Stettinius encountered resentment in Guatemala City. He discussed political issues with strong men Marshall Javier Aranka, Senor Guillermo Torriello, and Captain Jacobo Arbanz who revealed their displeasure over American recognition of the new regime in El Salvador.¹ They believed that the United States had let them down in accepting the change in Salvadorean leadership. Fortunately, Stettinius was at the Crimean conference at the time of recognition and could not be blamed for this diplomatic move. After his short conversation with the Junta, the Secretary made a brief statement expressing his respects to the rulers of Guatemala and regret for the brevity of his visit.² He also cabled Joseph Grew

1. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Calendar Notes, February 20, 1945, p. 3, Box 285, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. Papers, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. Herein cited as Stettinius Papers.

2. Ibid., p. 4.

in Washington, requesting him to obtain British and Russian consent to deliver the invitations for the world organization conference. He wanted this approval no later than the opening day of the Chapultepec talks.³ This was an early indication of Stettinius's preoccupation with the United Nations plan throughout the Mexico City sessions.

The chief American delegate flew into the Mexican capital about 1:45 in the afternoon. Another uncomfortable scene developed when Stettinius issued a statement to reporters at the airport. A typographical error in the text had substituted the word "own" for "friend." Consequently, the Secretary read the passage: "The United States looks upon Mexico as a good neighbor, a strong upholder of democratic traditions in this hemisphere and a country we are proud to call our own."⁴ Realizing the mistake, he gasped but went on with the speech. Although of no real significance, the minor slip denoted the extreme intensity of coverage given to every item at the press conference.⁵ A Foreign Service officer immediately corrected the error, but the verbal remark had already been overheard. James Reston of the New York Times and Time Magazine later published the textual mix-up.⁶

3. Ibid., p. 5.

4. James Reston, "Secretary's Error Puts Error in Stettinius' Mouth," New York Times, February 21, 1945, p. 2.

5. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 20, 1945, p. 6, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

6. Reston, New York Times, February 21, 1945, p. 2.

Recovering from his shakey start, Stettinius was impressed by the cordiality of the correspondents and the great public interest in his arrival. From the airport, the Secretary was taken to the Hotel Geneve, where he would reside for the duration of the conference. This suburban lodging housed Stettinius, his chief advisors, and a secretarial staff. Much of the speech writing and processing of documents was to occur at the Geneve. The central offices of the American delegation were in another hotel, the Edificio Imperial. The conference itself was to be held at Chapultepec Castle, on a hill two hundred feet above the capital city. This ancient fortress was strongly linked to Mexico's heritage. It had been an Aztec palace, a military school, Maximilian's royal residence, and most recently a national museum.⁷ Stettinius later wrote that its history and natural beauty lent extraordinary dignity and a feeling of perspective to the talks.⁸

The Secretary held his first strategy session in the Geneve at 4:00 P.M. In attendance were Rockefeller, Messersmith, Special Assistants Leo Pasvolsky and Robert Lynch and Technical Expert Hayden Raynor. Stettinius read the latest draft of his opening speech. Reactions to it were enthusiastic and only a few minor changes were suggested. Afterwards, the size of the American delegation was discussed. There were four congressional advisors and

7. Arthur Preston Whitaker, Inter-American Affairs, 1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), p. 3.

8. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 20, 1945, pp. 8-9, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

over one hundred State Department personnel in the group. Included in the delegation were twenty-nine advisors four Special Assistants to the Secretary, twenty-two Technical officers, twenty translators, press and administrative aides, and twenty-four stenographic and clerical people.⁹ Surprised at the composition of the United States party, Stettinius became critical of the number of people brought to Mexico City. Differences were reconciled when Rockefeller gave a vigorous defense for the size of the group.

Of several decisions made at this meeting, the most important dealt with access to information. The Secretary insisted that not only plenary sessions but also major committee meetings be open to the press. With his high regard for public relations, he announced that daily conferences with American correspondents would be held if possible. It was also decided that the American delegation would assemble every day at 9:00 A.M. at the Edificio Imperial for briefing sessions.¹⁰

Stettinius's first opportunity to exercise his personal approach to diplomacy came in the early evening when he visited Mexican Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla. They discussed the close relationship between the United States and Mexico. Padilla, like most Latin Americans, was concerned about economic problems. He stated that the youth today have a tendency toward communism. The best way to combat it he felt was not by force, but by in-

9. Ibid., p. 10.

10. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

creased education, economic activity, and an improved standard of living.¹¹ The Mexican Foreign Minister also reported that the Argentine situation was in hand. This delicate matter would be brought up at the end of the Chapultepec talks. Stettinius noted that on his arrival, he had found the Buenos Aires question boiling. He was convinced that decisive action should be taken promptly to maintain the initiative. If Argentina met certain conditions, the unity of the Americas could be insured. The Secretary believed that normal relations with Buenos Aires could be restored if she 1) declared war on Germany and Japan, 2) adhered to inter-American defense measures, and 3) gave public notice of troop dispersions concentrated adjacent to the Brazilian and Chilean borders.¹² The conversation between Stettinius and the strongly pro-American Foreign Minister lasted almost half an hour. The whole spirit of the meeting was one of sincerity, cordiality, and complete agreement.¹³

With his first day in Mexico City drawing to a close, the United States' chief delegate met informally with correspondents at the American Embassy. He recounted off-the-record his experiences at the Yalta Conference. Afterwards, he attended a reception for the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Venezuela, Cuba,

11. Report on 6:00 P.M. Ezequiel Padilla-Stettinius Conversation, February 20, 1945, p. 2, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

12. Argentine Affairs Report, February 20, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

13. Padilla-Stettinius Conversation, February 20, 1945, p. 3, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

Chile, Peru, Mexico, and Columbia at the Reforma Hotel. Outside of the embarrassment in Guatemala City and the typographical mistake at the airport, the day's activities had come off smoothly. As expected, Latin America was concerned about the Argentine question and economic problems. This was confirmed at Stettinius's meeting with Padilla. Though delicate issues were involved, first impressions depicted the Secretary as a whirlwind of optimism, hoping to make the Mexico City Conference as successful as the Crimean talks.¹⁴

FEBRUARY 21, 1945

The Argentine issue dominated the opening of the Mexico City Conference on February 21, 1945. There were both public and private expressions of interest in the Buenos Aires controversy. Stettinius, like the other delegates, was exposed to the tension created by Argentina's alienation. Journal entries reveal that throughout the day, from his attendance at the preliminary session until his evening composition of telegrams, the Secretary's thoughts were directed to the Argentine question.¹⁵

The morning session of the conference steering committee provided the first opportunity to debate the matter of hemispheric solidarity. The chief delegates assembled at 11:00 to organize subordinate committees and approve the agenda. Foreign Minister Acosta of Costa Rica nominated Ezequiel Padilla for the presidency

14. Reston, "Stettinius Lands For Mexico Talks," New York Times, February 21, 1945, p. 11.

15. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 21, 1945, pp. 1-8, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

of the Chapultepec talks. Stettinius in his first official act at the conference seconded the motion. Padilla was unanimously chosen president and proceeded to establish six study groups which would research and submit resolutions to the conference. Because of his great interest in the proposed United Nations, the American Secretary was selected to chair the committee on the world security organization. Other groups dealt with further military efforts to win the war, the strengthening of the inter-American system, economic and social problems of the transition period, and postwar economic and social issues.¹⁶

With the committees appointed, the next matter of business was to formalize the agenda. Not unexpectedly, the Cuban delegate proposed that the Argentine issue be given preferential treatment by the conference. Paraguayan Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Celso R. Velasquez, suggested that Argentina be discussed first rather than last on the agenda.¹⁷ Padilla replied that the nations of the hemisphere had agreed otherwise in replying to the Mexico City invitations. This question was not scheduled to be reviewed until the end of the proceedings. The conference president proposed that the delegates adhere to that agreement and debate the issue later with the "greatest amplitude and with absolute frankness."¹⁸ This reasoning prevailed and the Velasquez motion was

16. Conference Steering Committee Report, February 21, 1945, p. 1, Box 235, Stettinius Papers.

17. James Reston, "Dispute is Put Off Absence is Deplored," New York Times, February 22, 1945, p. 1.

18. Ibid., p. 11.

defeated. Thus, the awkward problem of Buenos Aires' isolation was not solved but merely postponed. An unknown quantity at this point was the United States' willingness to discuss the issue. Though the Argentine question was temporarily shelved, certain resolutions were later related to it. In fact, fear of the Farrell-Peron clique forced the Uruguayan delegate to conclude the preliminary session with a unique proposal. He suggested the promulgation of a mutual guarantee of territorial and political unity within the Western hemisphere.¹⁹

Following the steering committee meeting, Secretary Stettinius visited Mexican President Avila Camacho. In this attempt to further cultivate personal contacts, the American delegate had a friendly talk with Mexico's chief executive. Camacho stressed the importance of success at the Chapultepec Conference and asked how he could help achieve this. The Mexican president later remarked that he and Stettinius had "clicked" at once.²⁰ In two days, the Secretary's personal approach had reaped rewards. The Mexican leadership, specifically Camacho and Padilla, were quite eager to cooperate with the United States.

Throughout the afternoon, various festivities celebrated the opening of the Mexico City Conference. That evening, the first plenary session was convened at Chapultepec Castle. Several speeches reaching a high oratorical level were made. Stettinius

19. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 21, 1945, p. 3, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

20. Ibid.

gauged the value of each message by how quickly the photographers stampeded over to the rostrum.²¹ The Secretary did not plan to address a plenary session until the following day. As part of the audience, he was content to take notes on the gathering.

The keynote address was given by President Camacho. The speech reflected Latin American concern for the pressing problems which had stimulated southern resentment toward the United States. Camacho pointed out how important the "spiritual" help of even the weaker nations had been to the war effort and the need now to discuss their postwar problems. He remarked that democracy was the best protection against the further infiltration of totalitarian propaganda. For this reason, it was necessary that democratic processes be protected and intensified within the American republics. The Mexican president tied politics and economics together by emphasizing that democracy can only survive when economic and social conditions are sound. "We must create a world in which a minimum standard of living is guaranteed and where there will be economic cooperation between countries."²² In a subtle fashion, Camacho was appealing to the United States to assist in the elimination of economic distresses within the hemisphere. Stettinius observed that the Mexican leader's most controversial comments related to the United Nations and the Argentine issues. In a low-key manner, Camacho expressed his belief that if the peace should be based solely on the wishes of the powerful nations, the war would have been

21. Ibid., p. 4.

22. Ibid.

fought in vain.²³ He upheld the right of the Americas to help in the shaping of the international security program. However, the "Big Three" dictates at Yalta and Dumbarton Oaks had conflicted with this hemispheric right. Enthusiastic applause was evoked by the Mexican chief executive's remarks on the world organization and Argentina. In reference to the controversy with Buenos Aires, he deplored the absence of Farrell's country but still held a cordial place for it in "his thought and in his affection."²⁴ At the expense of United States prestige, Latin America sought reconciliation with Argentina.

After reviewing the day's activities, Stettinius spent the latter part of the evening working on diplomatic correspondence. He read dispatches and forwarded reports to Grew in Washington. A cable from Argentina informed the Secretary that Buenos Aires would probably not declare war on Germany. Civilian and military circles were pressuring the Farrell-Peron regime not to move against the Axis powers.²⁵ This news must have come as a blow to Stettinius. To restore relations with Argentina, he wanted demonstrations of good faith such as her involvement in the war and not unimplemented declarations. Luckily, Padilla had succeeded in postponing the Buenos Aires question until the end of the conference, giving the Secretary time to cultivate the inter-American delegations and

23. Report on Avila Camacho Speech, February 21, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

24. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 21, 1945, p. 4, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

25. Ibid., p. 5.

hopefully come to some common understanding.

Besides the unfavorable Argentine news, Stettinius received a negative report on the planning of the San Francisco Conference. Despite the efforts of the State Department, France had not yet expressed agreement with the Dumbarton Oaks proposals completed at the Crimean talks. France and Nationalist China had not participated in the final revision of the proposals. But the United States, Soviet Union, and Great Britain had invited them to help sponsor the world organization conference in April. While China had accepted these terms immediately, de Gaulle's Provisional Government had not committed itself yet. Stettinius wired Grew that he was in a delicate position. He had been elected chairman of the United Nations committee and was thus responsible for studying the possible integration of the regional system into the proposed world organization. Latin Americans realized that the Security Council would be the vital cog within the United Nations machinery. They were anxious to know its voting procedures and operations. This information could not be released, according to a Yalta agreement, until the invitations to the San Francisco Conference had been delivered. A vicious circle had developed whereby no invitations could be issued until the sponsors had been determined. The longer France dawdled over the question of sponsorship, the more difficult became the Secretary's position. A reluctant France would only help to widen the credibility gap between the world organization and Latin America. Stettinius cabled Washington:

From the standpoint of frank and fair dealing, I should be able to discuss all angles of the world security proposals at the earliest possible moment. I still hope that between this evening and the following night, when I deliver my address, that Ambassador Caffery will be able to explain in Paris the fact that twenty republics are meeting to discuss the world organization and that the French delay is most embarrassing to the United States. We ardently hope for prompt consent 26

Unfortunately, the problem of French sponsorship had just begun.

February 21, like the preceding day, was a time of organization and preparation for both Edward Stettinius and the Mexico City Conference. Although the Secretary had established some personal contacts, he had also encountered some traces of resentment. The delicate problems related to the United Nations, Argentina, and postwar economic policies had quickly emerged. Greatly interested in a smooth transition to peace, Latin America was anxious to know the United States' postwar policy. Thus, the southern republics looked forward to Stettinius's pronouncements of February 22.

FEBRUARY 22, 1945

By the second day of the Chapultepec talks, the delegations were ready to tackle the problems of transitional planning. With the opening formalities completed, a pattern of committee meetings and plenary sessions was established. At this point, Secretary Stettinius emerged as a key spokesman for postwar cooperation and the Good Neighbor Policy. On February 22, 1945, he was the center of attention in Mexico City. His introductory speech on Washington's

hemispheric policy highlighted these early conference proceedings.

Prior to delivering his policy message, Stettinius spent the early part of the day mapping out strategy with his aides. He attended the 9:00 A.M. briefing of the United States delegation at the Edificio Imperial. These daily gatherings proved to be of great value. They provided a clearinghouse for ideas and an informal means to cope with troublesome points.²⁷ Throughout the conference, the Secretary attended these morning sessions when his schedule permitted. Ordinarily, they were presided over by his chief alternate, Nelson Rockefeller. Stettinius had long been regarded as a good manager of men rather than as a substantial formulator of American policy.²⁸ He had a tendency to transfer important responsibilities to capable aides. Such a case would be Rockefeller's supervision of the daily delegation meetings. The chief alternate received oral committee reports and decided which ones should be relayed to the Secretary.

The United States delegation gathering of February 22 revealed Stettinius's high regard for public relations. In attendance were representatives of American labor, agriculture, and business as well as the usual Foreign Service officers.²⁹ These individuals

27. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 22, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

28. Walter Johnson, An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century, ed. by Norman G. Graebner (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1961), p. 221.

29. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 22, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

not regularly employed by the State Department were primarily economic advisors. They symbolized the Secretary's attempt to widen public participation in American diplomacy. At this first meeting, the method of delivery for Stettinius's afternoon speech was discussed. It was decided that the Secretary would pause at the end of each major passage to permit a Spanish translation.³⁰

After the delegation meeting, Stettinius began to prepare for his role as chairman of Commission II on the world organization. Knowing that Latin American involvement in the United Nations would be a touchy matter, he had formed an advisory body on world security. This group included Leo Pasvolsky, General Strong, Congressman Johnson, Hayden Raynor, and later Senator Tom Connally. At a 10:00 A.M. meeting, they reviewed Latin American attitudes toward the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. These advisors realized that the United States was bound by a gentleman's agreement not to negotiate the United Nations resolutions with other states until the San Francisco Conference. However, Venezuela and Ecuador were already organizing a campaign to compose a conference resolution criticizing the proposals.³¹ Stettinius's advisory group had to disassociate the United States from any movement of this nature. But there were other threats to the American position on the world organization. The Chilean delegation wanted the membership of the Security Council increased from eleven to fifteen with the four additional seats going to Latin

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., p. 3.

American nations. Others desired a hemispheric lobby which might force concessions from countries of other regions.³² These ideas were intolerable to the Secretary. The situation was so delicate that the American delegation could not even afford to initiate its own resolution on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Such a move would become the focus for all those wishing to express opposition to the United Nations.³³ Foreign Minister Padilla's conception of a world organization resolution appealed to Stettinius. In other words, he sought a proposal which would be 1) an expression of the desire for a general international organization and 2) an endorsement of the Dumbarton Oaks resolutions as a basis for drafting the organization's charter.³⁴

Following a reception given by President Camacho at the National Palace, the Secretary assembled the American steering committee. This group included his world security advisors plus William Clayton, Adolf Berle, and other Foreign Service officers. They functioned throughout the conference as Stettinius's chief consultative body. It will be noted later that many of the crucial decisions made by the Secretary originated in this council. The steering committee met at this time to analyze resolutions to be introduced by the United States. All proposals were due for submission on or before Saturday

32. James Reston, "End of Censorship In Americas Urged," New York Times, February 23, 1945, p. 14.

33. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 22, 1945, p. 3, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

34. Ibid., p. 4.

night February 24. In view of the fact that Clayton, the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs had just arrived, the committee decided to ask for an extension of time until Monday for certain economic resolutions.³⁵ With the Mexico City Conference in just its second day, nineteen proposals had already been introduced. Seven of these motions alone related to the United Nations plan. One of the first resolutions that Stettinius's people planned to draft dealt with the abandonment of censorship regulations. The American delegation desired a freedom of information clause which would result in all hemispheric countries providing correspondents with the right to gather information freely wherever they chose. In addition, the press would be allowed to transmit that information abroad without control by official sources. The Secretary wanted the Latin American countries to do what they could to assure these two freedoms in the hemisphere and to secure the same advantages elsewhere in the world.³⁶

With the day's strategy sessions behind him, Stettinius prepared for his first major test at the Chapultepec talks. His policy statement at the 4:30 P.M. plenary session would probably set the mood for the rest of the conference. Since the United States was the largest and most powerful hemispheric republic, her postwar goals would directly affect Latin America. Major economic and social advances in South America could only be achieved with

35. Telegram, Stettinius to Joseph Grew, February 22, 1945, p. 2, Box 287, Stettinius Papers.

36. Reston, New York Times, February 23, 1945; p. 14.

Washington's cooperation. Therefore, what development programs the inter-American nations hoped to obtain at the Mexico City Conference depended upon the concessions the United States was willing to make. As Washington's chief spokesman, Stettinius had to reassure the southern countries of United States friendship and cooperation throughout the transition and postwar periods.

Prior to Stettinius's address, Foreign Minister Padilla opened the plenary session with a brilliant extemporaneous speech. Setting forth the objectives which he hoped the Chapultepec Conference to achieve, he then stressed the need to preserve the unity born of war. The strongest part of his message and that which evoked the most whole-hearted response from the delegates described the dignity of the common man and the masses in the Americas to feel they had a stake in the preservation of hemispheric solidarity.³⁷ The Mexican diplomat's cry for economic liberty so that "every man will be able to feed his family and educate his children" was loudly applauded by the assembly.³⁸ "It was vital for Latin America to do more than just produce raw materials and live in a state of semi-colonialism. The goal", he said "of an economic program in this hemisphere should be that of stable employment in trades and industries which satisfy the demand of masses for goods."³⁹ United

37. John E. Lockwood, Plenary Session Report, February 22, 1945, p. 2, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

38. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 22, 1945, p. 5, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

39. Lockwood, Plenary Session Report, February 22, 1945, p. 2, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

States capital would be required to substantially raise the standard of living and the purchasing power of the southern republics. Padilla warned of the ever-present ideological threat to underdeveloped regions. He argued that people turned desperate by hunger would be attracted to communism or fascism. Hence, democracy must fulfill its promise of steady work, fair wages, and a decent home.⁴⁰ Thus, playing upon Washington's increasing fear of Soviet subversion, the conference president appealed for United States support in modernizing Latin America.

After Padilla's fine oratory, Secretary Stettinius addressed the chamber. He spoke in what was later noted as an even-toned and serious manner.⁴¹ The Secretary, anxious to remove any Latin American doubts about Washington's desire to aid its southern neighbors, stated:

The United States Government looks upon this conference in Mexico City as a meeting of decisive importance. Our unity has been strengthened by our wartime collaboration. Now it is our task to advance this unity still further, both for the war and in our political, economic, and social collaboration in the tasks of peace. I wish to reaffirm to the representatives of all Governments assembled here that the United States Government regards the Good Neighbor Policy and the further development of inter-American cooperation as indispensable to the building after victory, of a peaceful and democratic world order. I wish also to reaffirm the belief of the United States that this democratic order must be built by all nations, large and small, acting together as sovereign equals.⁴²

40. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 22, 1945, p. 5, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

41. Ibid., p. 6.

42. Stettinius, Plenary Session Speech, February 22, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

This passage was warmly received by the Latin American delegates. Stettinius was obviously also trying to soften their resentment toward the proposed United Nations. The southern republics had been angered by their exclusion from the Dumbarton Oaks talks. Now the Secretary was calling for the world community, not just the "Big Three," to participate in the creation of the world peace.

Stettinius continued by stating his purpose to reveal the United States' objectives at Mexico City and in overall foreign policy. Washington's immediate goal was to bring about the earliest possible defeat of the Axis powers. Besides deposing the dictators, the Secretary felt that their ideologies must be eradicated. Warning against possible Nazi and Fascist infiltration, Stettinius announced that:

The people of the United States are confident that the American Republics will join in whatever cooperative measures may be necessary to stamp out utterly every vestige of Nazi influence in this hemisphere. That must be our unalterable purpose⁴³

Turning to the world security question, Stettinius examined the relationship between the international organization and the inter-American regional system. He declared that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals would create a peace-keeping body to prevent aggression and remove the causes of wars. Totally committed to the concept of a United Nations, he stressed the value of the forthcoming San Francisco Conference. This April, 1945 meeting would utilize the Dumbarton Oaks proposals to prevent the future use of

43. Ibid., p. 4.

lawless power politics. The Secretary also acknowledged that the inter-American system should play an important role in the postwar period. He reminded the delegates too of the value in integrating it within the framework of the United Nations. Consequently, the stronger we can make the inter-American system in its own sphere of activity, the stronger the world organization will be and vice versa.⁴⁴

The last section of Stettinius's message concentrated on the economic worries of Latin America. His reference to the necessity of raising the standard of living of the masses was particularly appreciated and timely, since it hit the same keynote as the preceding Padilla speech.⁴⁵ He depicted the United States as willing to contribute its vast economic, industrial, and technical resources to the improvement of conditions within the hemispheric republics. Washington would propose and support measures for closer cooperation in public health, nutrition and food supply, labor, education, science, and transportation. The Secretary remarked that as his country helped to soften the economic dislocations of the transition period, collaboration in economic and financial measures would achieve the "rising standard of living we all seek."⁴⁶

In concluding his address, Stettinius spoke of the possible historical significance of this inter-American conference. A realization of the objectives he just set forth might place the

44. Ibid., p. 6.

45. Lockwood, Plenary Session Report, February 22, 1945, p. 3, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

46. Stettinius, Plenary Session Speech, February 22, 1945, p. 7, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

Chapultepec talks among the "great historic milestones on the road to lasting peace."⁴⁷ The Secretary cabled Grew that night, requesting his reaction to the speech. He believed that the delegates appreciated this outline of major points of United States policy and the choice of the Mexico City Conference as the forum for as important a declaration by this Government.⁴⁸ Although there were then twenty points marked by applause, Stettinius observed that the names of Stalin and Churchill had not been well received. No concrete assistance programs were revealed in the American policy statement, nor was Argentina covered. Washington's chief spokesman was not willing to compromise on the Buenos Aires situation. Camille M. Cianfarra of the New York Times noted that crystal-clear proof of all-out collaboration in keeping with democratic principles would be needed before Argentina would be accepted into the community of American nations.⁴⁹ The Secretary's address however did show that Washington was receptive to Latin American pleas for aid. Speaking after Stettinius, at the plenary session Cuervo Rubio of Cuba praised the "solid political, humanistic message" of the United States delegate.⁵⁰ This positive comment reflected the general sentiment of the hemispheric representatives.

47. Ibid., p. 9.

48. Telegram, Stettinius to Grew, February 22, 1945, p. 3, Box 287, Stettinius Papers.

49. Camille M. Cianfarra, "U. S. Promises Help for the Americas," New York Times, February 23, 1945, p. 14.

50. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 22, 1945, p. 7, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

During the early evening, the Secretary's first major conference speech was again in the limelight. At 8:30 P.M., he participated in a radio broadcast over the Blue Network. This took the form of a dialogue between the announcer, Ed Tomlinson and Stettinius. They opened the program by reviewing the initial proceedings of the Chapultepec talks. The Secretary then outlined again the aims of his afternoon address. Tomlinson asked questions about Yalta, which Stettinius tried to associate with the Mexico City Conference and the inter-American system. The final broadcast remarks dealt with the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and attempts to raise the world standard of living.⁵¹

Thus, the second day of the Chapultepec talks featured important speech-making. Foreign Minister Padilla had voiced the Latin American desire for economic liberty. The southern republics looked to the United States for support in their struggle for technical and industrial independence. Edward Stettinius had identified himself and the United States with their cause. His plenary session address had advocated peace, international security arrangements, and postwar cooperation in hemispheric problems. The American Secretary had reassured Latin America of Washington's dedication to the Good Neighbor Policy. With the military, economic and social discussions yet to begin, Stettinius wired President Roosevelt: "The conference is off to a good start."⁵²

51. Ibid., p. 8.

52. Ibid.

CHAPTER III

A CLOSE-UP ON PUBLIC RELATIONS AND THE WORLD ORGANIZATION

FEBRUARY 23, 1945

As the five conference commissions developed committee organizations, Secretary Stettinius prepared the agenda of his world organization group and held his first Chapultepec press conference. Prior to these activities, however, the chief American delegate began the day on the telephone with Washington. Joseph Grew called him to review the French sponsorship issue and his opening conference message. They agreed to issue the invitations to the San Francisco Conference on Tuesday, February 27 with or without France. The Acting Secretary also congratulated Stettinius on his great job the day before with the plenary session. Grew considered it "one of the finest, most forceful, important statements that had come out in the war."¹ He informed his boss that American newspapers had given the message considerable prominence and space. The New York Times had carried a front page story on it and had devoted three and one half columns to excerpts. The Washington Post regarded the speech as the "first review of American foreign policy since the Yalta Conference."² The Philadelphia Inquirer used superlatives to describe it. An Inquirer editorial labeled it a masterful address and stated: "Mr. Stettinius said the right things in the right places and in a tone of helpfulness and reas-

1. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 23, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

2. Ibid., p. 6.

surance without bombast."³ Like the southern republics, the American press had welcomed Stettinius's remarks.

At the daily 9:00 A.M. meeting of the delegation, the Secretary discussed the status of American resolutions. Up to this point, only two United States proposals had been submitted at the conference. One dealt with the removal of censorship barriers and the other with the strengthening of the inter-American regional system. After Stettinius asked for committee progress reports, Harley Notter read the text of a possible resolution on Dumbarton Oaks. The drafting of resolutions was being conducted smoothly except in the economic field. Latin American anxiety over industrial and technical matters dictated a slow, cautious approach to economic proposals. Rockefeller informed the delegation that American resolutions in this area might not meet the Saturday submission deadline.⁴

Eager to get his own commission off the ground, the Secretary convened the world organization committee at noon. This body had the delicate task of relating the inter-American system to the proposed United Nations. Stettinius opened the meeting expressing confidence that the deliberations about to occur would prove as invaluable to the world of the future as had the results of the Dumbarton Oaks talks.⁵ At this particular gathering, the delegates had to elect officers and establish guidelines for discussing rele-

3. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 26, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

4. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 23, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

5. Ibid., p. 2.

vant issues. The Secretary invited nominations for the positions of vice-chairman and committee reporter. Ambassador Guillermo Belt of Cuba and Foreign Minister Para-Perez of Venezuela were elected respectively to these posts. Intense interest in the regional system's relationship to the world organization was reflected by the committee's immediate consideration of five resolutions relating to integration. To avoid unnecessary debate, Stettinius proposed a sub-committee to analyze the resolutions and report its findings to the full commission. Para-Perez was selected to head the sub-committee. This smaller body compiled all the Latin American opinions on the United Nations and eventually produced the commission's position paper on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.⁶ In order for the Venezuelan Foreign Minister's group to summarize the world organization recommendations, it was important to know how far the United States would go in permitting suggestions. Stettinius assigned several top aides, especially Leo Pasvolksy, to protect American interests at these sub-committee meetings. Other American delegates assigned to Commission II included John Cabot, Hayden Raynor, Harley Notter, Senator Tom Connally, and Congressman Luther Johnson.⁷

While the Secretary's world organization group met, other committees were in session. Commission I on the war effort debated the question of jurisdiction. Unsure whether its interests covered just the war or also the transition period, it decided to seek the

6. Developments of February 23, 1945, p. 2, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

7. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 23, 1945, p. 3, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

advice of the conference steering committee. Within Commission III on the strengthening of the inter-American system, several unique proposals were presented. The Uruguayan delegation supported a hemispheric security pact. Columbia also sought some kind of Pan American non-aggression treaty. Reversing the ancient doctrine that the United States should be kept from intervening in any disputes below the Rio Grande, the Columbian resolution asked for a general guarantee of all American boundaries against any aggressor within or without the hemisphere.⁸ This meant that Washington and its southern neighbors would consider any attempt against the territorial integrity, sovereignty, or political independence of an American state as an act of aggression against itself.⁹ Columbia's unprecedented request was destined to play a major role at the Mexico City Conference. Unlike the inter-American study group, the economic committees did not produce any dramatic proposals. Commission IV met briefly and discussed what subjects would be proper for the Chapultepec talks to consider and what topics should be held over for the June technical conference in Washington.¹⁰ In the Commission V meeting, Peruvian Foreign Minister Gallagher suggested that raw materials contracts with the United States be extended or renegotiated.¹¹

8. James Reston, "Hemispheric Peace Sought At Parley," New York Times, February 24, 1945, p. 1.

9. Ibid., p. 7.

10. Telegram, Stettinius to Joseph Grew, February 23, 1945, p. 3, Box 287, Stettinius Papers.

11. Developments of February 23, 1945, p. 2, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

At 1:30 P.M. at the Edificio Imperial, Stettinius held his first press conference. He called the meeting to become acquainted with representatives of the Mexican press and to review the activities of the American delegation.¹² Always realizing the value of good public relations, the Secretary hoped to establish friendly contacts among local journalists. He noted that the opening days of the conference had brought satisfaction and encouragement to all people. Commenting on Mexican leadership, he stated:

In the splendid addresses of President Avila Camacho and Dr. Padilla we have heard new and inspiring expressions of the ideals of friendship and cooperation that have been the tradition of the American Republics, and which we now seek to translate into greater welfare for all people.¹³

After this introduction, he shifted to the central issues he wished to discuss. Reiterating one of the themes of his plenary session address, Stettinius stressed the value of the regional system in creating world peace. He observed that:

Neither victory nor peace can be won without the full support of the American republics and the effective and continuing collaboration among ourselves and the rest of the world. That sacred obligation we must repeat and recognize here in Mexico City¹⁴

The Secretary, in emphasizing the new world's potential to improve the status of mankind, also acknowledged the importance of a United

12. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 23, 1945, p. 3, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

13. Stettinius, Press Conference Statement, February 23, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

14. Ibid., p. 2.

Nations. As a strong advocate of the international peace-keeping body, he sought regional integration and declared:

The United States Government believes that the stronger we can make the Inter-American system in its own sphere of activities, the stronger the world organization will be¹⁵

He revealed to reporters that the American delegation's first two Chapultepec resolutions had been drafted with the purpose of strengthening the inter-American arrangement. The first proposal sought the free exchange of and access to information through the abandonment of censorship. "If we are to have enlightened public opinion," Stettinius remarked, "information on current events and trends of thought should be readily available to the public."¹⁶ According to Latin-American circles, this resolution was not expected to meet opposition even though the majority of the southern republics had strict military and political censorship.¹⁷ The Secretary and his staff had overlooked one flaw in their proposal. They had weakened the draft by not calling for the immediate abandonment of censorship. As a result, those rulers who utilized censorship to strengthen their autocratic governments could get around the freedom of information concept.

Stettinius next outlined the American recommendations to strengthen the regional system's administrative machinery. Washington was attempting to buttress the Good Neighbor Policy. A

15. Ibid., p. 2.

16. Ibid., p. 2.

17. Camille M. Cianfarra, "Stettinius Urges Unfettered Press," New York Times, February 24, 1945, p. 1.

possible secondary motive of these proposals might have been to allay Latin fears that the United States was becoming too preoccupied with the world security organization. The American draft suggested that hemispheric conferences be held at regular intervals of four years to consider broad problems of common interest and that meetings of foreign ministers be convened annually to resolve major problems of more immediate concern. It also sought to broaden the functions of the Pan American Union and create an economic and social council under the auspices of the Union's Governing Board. Finally, Stettinius's program called for the establishment of an inter-American educational and cultural commission and further efforts to more effectively correlate the numerous existing inter-American agencies.¹⁸

After completing his formal statement, the Secretary held a short question and answer period. On two pressing issues, Argentina and postwar economic planning, he refused to comment, feeling any discussion of these matters premature. Mexican reporters questioned him about the United Nations and Security Council procedures. He replied that as soon as negotiations with France and China were completed, invitations would be issued and operations clarified. The Secretary also revealed that he did not anticipate any serious obstacles in attempting to coordinate the goals of the inter-American system with those of the world organization.¹⁹ Hoping to

18. Stettinius, Press Conference Statement, February 23, 1945, p. 4, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

19. Ibid., p. 6.

speaking with local reporters the following week, he ended the press conference around 3:00 P.M.²⁰

Throughout the latter part of the afternoon, Stettinius had a few appointments with magazine correspondents. He also completed arrangements to reside at a country estate near Cuernavaca for the weekend. The 5:30 plenary session was his last conference meeting of the week. Although not as dramatic a meeting for him as the preceding day, the Secretary still made a significant contribution to the session. He presented a message of greeting from President Roosevelt. The American chief executive declared that:

The assembling of the Conference of American Republics on the Problems of War and Peace move me to send cordial salutations to you and my felicitations to the Government and people of Mexico as hosts to this significant meeting. Will you please communicate to the delegates my greetings and confident anticipation of notable accomplishment.

Since the days of their independence, the American Republics have tirelessly explored every pathway to human freedom, justice and international well-being and today the common men of all peace-loving nations look to them and you for light on the arduous road to world peace, security, and a higher level of economic life.²¹

Another noteworthy item at the session was a Peruvian delegate's appeal for the establishment of an international court of justice in association with the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. A representative from Honduras also cited the need for United States mechanical

20. Ibid., p. 5.

21. Telegram, Franklin D. Roosevelt to Stettinius, February 23, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

equipment and instruction in scientific methods of agriculture, mining, commerce, and transportation.²²

Stettinius's day concluded with the reappearance of two nagging issues. From Argentina came word that Juan Peron might succeed Farrell and that the Columbian delegation to the Mexico City Conference had been asked to play "Godfather" to Argentine attempts at rehabilitation.²³ The question of French sponsorship also still persisted. The Secretary received a telegram from President Roosevelt regarding the United Nations conference. The chief executive left to Stettinius the final decision on delivery of the San Francisco invitations; but he acknowledged that March 1 was his preference.²⁴ The Secretary still had to hear from the French Provisional Government and so this matter could not be settled yet.

Although the Buenos Aires and French sponsorship problems were unresolved, the chairman of the American delegation had had a pretty successful day. His world organization committee was now functioning. The United States had submitted two resolutions which suggested Washington's strong interest in the plight of Latin America. Finally, Stettinius had established good rapport with the local press. In reviewing the day's activities, he cabled Joseph Grew:

I feel that the work of the committees got under way with dispatch. The committees have now been set up, procedures defined, and I believe that the atmosphere is good.²⁵

22. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 23, 1945, p. 4, Box 265, Stettinius Papers.

23. Ibid., p. 5.

24. Ibid., p. 6.

25. Telegram, Stettinius to Grew, February 23, 1945, p. 6, Box 267, Stettinius Papers.

CHAPTER IV

THE CARETAKER SECRETARY AND FRENCH SPONSORSHIP

FEBRUARY 24, 1945

Relaxing at Cuernavaca for the weekend, Stettinius left his capable assistant Nelson Rockefeller in charge of the American delegation. The Secretary's papers do not reveal his reasons for withdrawing from the center of conference activities, but again key aides directed Washington's policy rather than he. Although it was true that few negotiations and no plenary sessions were scheduled during these two days, Stettinius, the staunch advocate of the United Nations, did miss a meeting of his own Commission II on the world organization. His only official activities on Saturday centered around his participation in an evening radio broadcast; on Sunday, he concentrated on solving the French sponsorship problem.

On Saturday, the American delegation studied the Columbian proposal for a non-aggression pact. The goals of this resolution included the consideration of any attempt against the territorial integrity, sovereignty, or political independence of an American state as an act of aggression against oneself. Another provision called for consultation with each nation and agreement on measures deemed necessary to deal with any case of aggression or with any state planning aggressive action. A third clause recommended the following measures be taken against an aggressor: the recall of diplomatic representatives, severance of consular and diplomatic relations, economic sanctions, and the use of military forces to

repel aggression.¹ General Embick read a statement from the joint chiefs of staff approving the Columbian pact since it would constitute a regional agreement that could be built into the world security system.² He went on to point out that the world organization might or might not succeed and if it did not, the solidarity of the Americas was essential to the defense of the United States.³ After listening to the military aspects of this non-aggression treaty, Pasvolsky remarked that its relationship to the world organization from economic and political points of view was more complicated. Rockefeller suggested that Embick study this matter further and discuss it with the Secretary early the following week. At this point the State Department personnel decided to seek Uruguayan support of the Columbian proposal because resolutions from both these countries were quite similar. A key question arose in reference to the security pacts - whether the United States could take immediate action in the event of Argentine aggression against a neighbor. Pasvolsky noted that paragraph five of the Moscow Declaration made it mandatory that the United States consult with the signatory powers before taking military action. But General Embick interpreted this passage as relating to only the present war.⁴ The issue was temporarily shelved after both Embick

1. James Reston, "Hemispheric Peace Sought At Parley," New York Times, February 24, 1945, p. 7.

2. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 24, 1945, p. 4, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

3. John E. Lockwood, American Delegation Meeting Notes, February 24, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

4. Ibid.

and Pasvolsky agreed that the Columbian security pact might require the ratification of the Senate.⁵

Turning to other war measures, the American diplomats agreed to support the creation of a permanent inter-American Defense Board. This Mexican proposal sought to build the machinery for unified military action against aggression from inside or outside the hemisphere. A body composed of representatives from the various general staffs would draft joint defense plans. Before the American delegation adjourned, Rockefeller reviewed the activities of the conference. He observed that the press had treated the sessions favorably. He reported, however, that certain Argentines were attempting to destroy the solidarity created by the Chapultepec talks but were making no headway.⁶

Only Commission I on the war effort and Commission II on the world organization met on Saturday. The former convened only briefly to set up its sub-committees. The latter assembled to receive the progress report from Para-Perez's study group on Latin American attitudes toward the United Nations. The Foreign Minister of Venezuela suggested that his group compile a minimum rather than a maximum statement of views concerning the Dumbarton Oaks proposals from each country and produce one large summary. Dr. Salaya of Cuba supported this motion. He indicated that a series of speeches reflecting various opinions on the world organization would waste

5. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 24, 1945, p. 4, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

6. Ibid., p. 5.

the commission's time.⁷ Thus, in the absence of Stettinius, the commission decided to allow a study group to do most of the drafting of the United Nations resolution.

While the American delegation and the two commissions were in session in Mexico City, the Secretary rested at Cuernavaca, awaiting his 8:00 P.M. address on the NBC radio network. This speech was indicative of Stettinius's desire to restore the prestige of the State Department. Originating in Washington, D. C., the broadcast was the first in a series of six weekly programs on the creation of a world peace.⁸ Dean Acheson and Archibald MacLeish were to participate in the broadcast from the United States capitol. The top American diplomats were attempting through these programs to clarify to the public their role in terminating the hostilities and stabilizing the postwar world.

The final text of Stettinius's message represented several attempts by Foreign Service personnel to obtain a consensus on the matter. Technical Expert Wilder Foote composed the first draft. This was cabled to Washington on Thursday evening with Stettinius's request that Assistant Secretary MacLeish try his hand at preparing something different.⁹ When no new draft had been received by Friday afternoon, Stettinius's staff got Washington on the phone and had the MacLeish text dictated to them. Hayden Raynor discussed

7. Harley Notter, Commission II Report, February 24, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

8. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 24, 1945, p. 2, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

9. Ibid., p. 1.

this new draft with Pasvolsky, Green Hackworth (the delegation's legal advisor) and Michael McDermott (the press secretary). They all agreed that MacLeish's work did not contain enough substance and what substance it did contain was inaccurate.¹⁰ It was also inappropriate with its very literary style.¹¹

Under the leadership of Pasvolsky, this small group of advisors wrote their own version of the speech. They presented it to the Secretary prior to his departure for Cuernavaca. He read it aloud to those who happened to be in the hotel room (Raynor, Foote, Major Tyson, and Robert Lynch). They all felt that this new draft was an improvement over the MacLeish text, but one or two comments indicated that it dragged.¹² Foote, however, liked the speech from Washington and hoped it would be utilized with the inaccuracies corrected. Stettinius finally decided to have Pasvolsky and his group revise their draft that Friday evening, telephone it to Washington, and deliver it to Cuernavaca on Saturday morning.¹³

Pasvolsky, Raynor, and McDermott worked on the speech until 1:00 A.M. After completing their editorial project, Raynor forwarded the latest composition to Washington. At 6:45 A.M., MacLeish telephoned from the State Department highly excited, telling Raynor that the new version was "perfectly dreadful."¹⁴ Trying to calm

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

the Assistant Secretary, Raynor explained that the speech was basically on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and that he was obligated to allow the world security advisors to revise the Washington text as they so desired. The Technical Expert eventually agreed to present both drafts to Stettinius, with an explanation of MacLeish's views.¹⁵

At breakfast Raynor and McDermott reviewed the situation and decided to go back to the MacLeish address, working to use as much of it as possible, correcting the inaccuracies.¹⁶ They collaborated with Hackworth and Technical Expert Harry Frantz to produce a fourth version of the Saturday night speech. This final combined form was sent to Cuernavaca around 1:30 P.M.¹⁷ After three days of writing and editing, the Secretary's Dumbarton Oaks talk was ready to be given.

Unknown to Stettinius as he spoke over NBC radio, a breakdown in broadcasting facilities permitted his voice to be heard only west of the Mississippi. Archibald MacLeish, reacting quickly in Washington, read the revised draft to the other half of the United States. The Secretary opened the program by noting that it was appropriate to initiate a series of broadcasts on the building of the peace from Mexico City. He observed that:

Delegates from the American Republics are assembled in this beautiful city of Mexico to strengthen fraternal ties developed through many

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

decades and to improve the inter-American system of relations. They are engaged in the serious business of considering how their friendship and unity of purpose may best contribute to a world for peace, security, and a better way of life.¹⁸

Stettinius went on to stress the hardiness and determination of the new world. Americans were accustomed to unprecedented work and would not listen to the counsels of despair. They had tamed a wild land and:

fostered a spirit of neighborliness, which is indispensable to a new society of mankind. We have good reason, therefore, for approaching the greatest labor of human history (a world peace enforced by the United Nations) with such high hopes, with such unshakeable determination. We have not listened in the past and we will not listen in the future to voices of frustration and defeat which tell us we cannot do what we perceive we must do.¹⁹

As the Secretary revealed the will of the Western hemisphere to build a new peace, he also reviewed the efforts of the "Big Three" to create a world security organization. He acknowledged the value of the upcoming San Francisco Conference in building the machinery for an international body. To offset any resentment that lesser powers might hold toward the "Big Three" for their planning the United Nations by themselves, Stettinius played up the equality of nations. He remarked that:

The sovereign equality of nations large and small is a basic principle underlying the (Dumbarton Oaks) proposals. Those proposals not only embrace the sovereign equality of nations, but they also in-

18. Stettinius, Radio Speech, February 24, 1945, pp. 1-2, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

19. Ibid., p. 2.

tend that the power of all nations shall be used in the interests of world peace, security, and freedom.²⁰

While appeasing the smaller nations, the Secretary continued to skirt the issue of voting procedures in the Security Council. He hinted that these procedures recognized the two essential elements of unity of action and equality of sovereignty. Yet five days after his arrival, the French sponsorship problem still prevented him from revealing all the operations of the council.

Stettinius closed his address by restating the purpose of the broadcast series. He hoped the programs stimulated the American people to study, discuss, and reflect on the proposals to create the United Nations. All the facts must be placed before the country in accordance with the democratic methods of freedom of thought, speech, and action. The Secretary tied the people's right to know to his censorship resolution. In his final statement, he declared that:

Here in Mexico City, we have sought to support that democratic method by offering a resolution which declares the right of people to have free access to information. In this way, and only in this way, will truth, the enemy of tyranny, assert itself for the freedom and security of mankind.²¹

Stettinius's radio speech indirectly referred to one of the most persistent problems he encountered during his first week in Mexico City, the French sponsorship question. Latin American delegates at the Chapultepec talks were anxious to know the operations

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 3.

of the Security Council. Without a French commitment on sponsorship, the Secretary could not reveal this information. He was bound by a Yalta agreement not to divulge any data relating to the council until sponsorship had been established and invitations issued.

Just before delivering his address on NBC radio, Stettinius had reason to believe that the sponsorship problem was almost resolved. That Saturday morning, Joseph Grew had telephoned Hayden Raynor in Mexico City. The Acting Secretary relayed a telephone conversation between Assistant Secretary James Dunn and the American Ambassador to Paris, Jefferson Caffery. Dunn was informed that France would accept the invitation to attend and also to sponsor the San Francisco Conference. However, de Gaulle's government wished to make a reservation to be allowed to present amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals for consideration in San Francisco.²² Grew felt this was a strange request because every country had the right to submit amendments. In the interest of good relations, he and Dunn believed the United States should accept the reservation, but before doing so, notify the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China.²³ After his conversation with Grew, Raynor phoned Cuernavaca to acquaint Stettinius with the most recent developments in the sponsorship matter. The Secretary approved of the State Department responses. But Leo Pasvolsky, his top United Nations advisor,

22. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 24, 1945, p. 3, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

23. Ibid.

was not comfortable with the reservation. He felt that the psychological effect would be to open up the San Francisco Conference to too many additional suggestions and make the creation of the world organization more difficult.²⁴

FEBRUARY 25, 1945

On Sunday, the twenty-fifth, hopes for French sponsorship changed abruptly. Around noon, Dunn phoned Pasvolsky to report that written confirmation had been received from Paris. But the situation was not the same as depicted in the earlier conversation with Caffery. Apparently the French wanted their amendments placed on the table at San Francisco on an equal basis with the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.²⁵ The "Big Three" had outlined the world security organization gradually through a series of talks and strategy sessions. Now de Gaulle's regime felt it could simply create its own conception of the United Nations. Grew and Dunn recommended that the reservation not be accepted on these terms. Pasvolsky forwarded this news to Cuernavaca and Stettinius approved of Washington's suggestions.²⁶

The State Department cabled the latest developments on French sponsorship to Moscow, London, and Chungking. Washington also informed its allies about its refusal of the reservation. Since further negotiations with Paris would greatly delay the issuance

24. Hayden Raynor, French Sponsorship Report, February 26, 1945, p. 2, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

of the San Francisco invitations, the Secretary reluctantly decided to send them out by March 1.²⁷

With the French problem still bothering him, Stettinius asked Raynor late in the afternoon to see if he could devise some formula by which to reduce the consultation period with Paris. The chief American delegate even suggested sending a personal note to de Gaulle.²⁸ The Technical Expert arranged a 6:30 P.M. meeting in Mexico City with Pasvolksy, McDermott, and Nottar to study the whole problem.²⁹

This strategy session produced no formula for a quick solution to the sponsorship dilemma. The Secretary's advisors, however, did support his idea of a private cable to Paris. Stettinius drafted a note but never sent it. The potential correspondence stated that:

I personally would deeply welcome the acceptance by the French of sponsorship since this, my dear General, would be a shining demonstration of the re-assumption by France of her place as a great power and of her disposition to act in full cooperation with the other great powers in carrying out the high responsibilities which repose in nations of that rank and influence.³⁰

Around midnight, Grew wired the Secretary from Washington. He reviewed the State Department's responses to the day's events.³¹ As it stood, the San Francisco invitations would be issued on March 1. Hopefully, the position would be explained fully and

27. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 25, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., p. 2.

30. Draft of Telegram, Stettinius to Charles de Gaulle, February 25, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

31. Telegram, Stettinius to Joseph Grew, February 25, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

sympathetically by the American government. With the possibility of French sponsorship now almost completely destroyed, Stettinius was confronted by a new problem — how to prevent other nations from imitating Paris' example. Thus, his first weekend in Mexico City ended on an unhappy note.

These two days, the twenty-fourth and the twenty-fifth, reflected the Secretary's ability as a caretaker diplomat. Withdrawn from the focal point of foreign affairs, he had permitted his aides to coordinate American policy. Indeed he had made the final decision on many issues, but the ideas and suggestions for policy responses had not originated with him but with his staff. In Mexico City, Rockefeller had directed the American delegation and its support of the Columbian non-aggression pact. MacLeish had been instrumental in drafting the radio address. Grew and Dunn had recommended the refusal of the French reservation. Raynor, Pasvolsky, and McDermott had made vital contributions to several policy issues, from the NBC program to the San Francisco invitations. Edward Stettinius, the capable manager of men, had employed his advisors well.

FEBRUARY 26, 1945

Upon his return from Cuernavaca on Monday morning February 26, the French sponsorship problem still plagued the Secretary. After meeting his wife's plane at the Mexico City airport, he went to the Hotel Geneve and telephoned James Dunn at the State Department. They reviewed the controversy with the Provisional Government in Paris. Dunn advised against sending a personal note to de Gaulle

and emphasized the seriousness of the situation. Stettinius too was fearful of the implications arising from French omission as a sponsor. He speculated about how many countries would be disposed to follow the Parisian model. The Assistant Secretary believed that France had taken the position of not wanting to support the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Consequently, he noted: "that makes our decision clear-cut, that there is no possibility we can accept her as a sponsor on this basis."³² Before ending the conversation, the chief American diplomat suggested that a final alternative might exist. They could ask Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, to intervene and expedite the whole matter. This last idea was temporarily shelved.³³

After his phone call, Stettinius sent a cable to Joseph Crew outlining the procedures for making a simultaneous announcement of the San Francisco invitations. At noon on March 1, Crew was to publicize that the United States government was transmitting invitations to the United Nations conference on behalf of the sponsoring powers. At the same time, the Secretary would issue a statement from Mexico City, commenting on the Security Council voting powers agreed to at Yalta. This interpretative remark from the Chapultepec talks was to be considered as just a news release from a diplomat on an official mission.³⁴

32. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 26, 1945, p. 4, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

33. Ibid.

34. Raynor, French Sponsorship Report, February 26, 1945, p. 3, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

Later Stettinius learned of British attempts to resolve the sponsorship problem. A message sent by American Ambassador James Winant from London described a meeting between Sir Alex Cadogan and French officials. In answer to the French insistence on amendments to the proposals, Cadogan had explained that the text as it stood afforded an ample opportunity for submitting further recommendations during the forthcoming conference.³⁵ Georges Bidault of the Provisional Government stated, however, that a triple invitation had been received in Paris. The three sections included a request 1) to participate in the conference, 2) to join in the sponsorship of the conference, and 3) to partake in preliminary consultations to establish a trusteeship system. The first point was satisfactory to the French; but as for the second, Bidault remarked that the "Big Three" had formulated the Dumbarton Oaks plan without mentioning or accepting Paris' desire for amendments.³⁶ Therefore, the de Gaulle regime could not accept sponsorship of the San Francisco Conference.

Between his conversation with Dunn and the arrival of the Winant dispatch, Stettinius attended a 10:30 A.M. session of the conference steering committee. This meeting was highlighted by talk of breaking off relations with Spain. Dr. Padilla was critical of the pressure exerted by certain groups to pass a conference resolution isolating Franco's regime. He stated that the Mexico

35. Telegram, Stettinius to Joseph Grew, February 26, 1945, p. 2, Box 235, Stettinius Papers.

36. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 26, 1945, p. 5, Box 235, Stettinius Papers.

City Conference should not deal with matters which do not involve the continent.³⁷ An Uruguayan delegate arose and announced his support of a proposal welcoming the establishment of a democratic system in Spain. He declared that Spanish affairs were of interest to the American republics because of their origins and Madrid's proximity to the war zone.³⁸ A representative from Peru challenged this argument. He supported Padilla's case against a Spanish resolution and remarked that the Chapultepec talks did not have the right to dictate a nation's political philosophy. The Uruguayan delegate replied that after the experience of this war, it would not be possible to permit the existence of a Nazi or Fascist government anywhere. For this reason, he wanted a statement issued by the conference stressing the desirability of a democracy in Spain.³⁹ As the meeting progressed, diplomats from Honduras, Peru, Panama, and other Latin American states voiced their support of Padilla's position. Against this stiff opposition, the Uruguayan representative requested his suggestion be withdrawn from consideration. The Secretary did not reveal his position on the Spanish resolution, as he abstained from the debate.

In the early afternoon, the American steering committee assembled at the Reforma Hotel to brief Stettinius on the importance of hemispheric solidarity and the Columbian non-aggression pact.

37. Ibid.

38. Telegram, Stettinius to Grew, February 26, 1945, p. 3, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

39. Conference Steering Committee Notes, February 26, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

General Embick, Dr. Pasvolsky, and Judge Hackworth emphasized the necessity of inter-American cooperation from political, economic, and military points of view.⁴⁰ A discussion ensued as to how to make the Columbian security proposal immediately applicable without being hampered by congressional debate and ratification. Adolf Berle, the American Ambassador to Brazil, was asked by the Secretary to aid Pasvolsky and Hackworth in resolving this matter. Nelson Rockefeller then reviewed the status of conference resolutions. He observed that seventy-four proposals had already been submitted. The United States itself was planning to introduce ten resolutions on various topics from censorship to economics. Rockefeller also announced that Assistant Secretary Clayton would be ready to issue the next day a statement of principles underlying inter-American economic relations.⁴¹ Like Stettinius's first plenary session address, Latin American interest in this speech was mounting. Long after the Farrell regime passed away and the Argentine problem was forgotten, and years after the debate over voting procedures in the Security Council was resolved or shelved, the southern republics feared that their poverty would remain.⁴² They hoped that the upcoming Clayton message would reassure them of Washington's economic cooperation and financial support.

Throughout the day, the conference committees resumed their work after the weekend break. The Secretary's Commission II on

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., p. 2.

42. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 26, 1945, p. 2, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

the world organization however did not plan to meet until March 1, the day the San Francisco invitations were to be issued. This postponement of commission hearings gave Para-Perez's sub-committee time to collect and summarize Latin American views on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.⁴³ The delay also gave Stettinius the opportunity to study developments within other study groups. Harley Notter, John Lockwood, Joseph Johnson, and Dudley Bonsal were among the many Foreign Service personnel who provided the Secretary with progress reports from other committees. For example, the chief American delegate was informed by Lockwood that Commission I on the war effort was working on several resolutions. Among proposals that had been drafted were the United States recommendation on eliminating the remaining sources of subversive influence within the hemisphere. Also under consideration was a resolution to place armaments production directly under the control of each national government. In Commission III, discussion centered around Washington's suggestions for strengthening the inter-American system. Senor Nieto del Rio of Chile felt that the American idea to hold annual meetings of the foreign ministers was too cumbersome, expensive, and unnecessary.⁴⁴ Other delegates like Garcia Salazar of Peru agreed with this. Another recommendation to buttress the regional arrangement, expanding the political functions of the Pan American Governing Board, was also criticized. These negative attitudes

43. James Reston, "Latin American Needs Dominate Conference," New York Times, February 25, 1945, p.

44. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 26, 1945, p. 3, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

though, dealt with only minor provisions of the Commission III resolutions.

Like the weekend activities, the twenty-sixth found Stettinius concentrating much of his time and energy on the French sponsorship issue. Devoted to the United Nations cause, he wanted the San Francisco Conference to successfully establish the machinery for preserving world peace. Within the Chapultepec sessions, the proceedings were moving along smoothly. The American resolutions had not really been hindered. The Secretary had a cordial relationship with the press. His first conference speech and radio broadcast had been well-received. But the Mexico City Conference was now at a critical juncture. Postwar economic planning had been delayed as long as possible. Latin Americans were anxious to hear of concrete technical aid and development programs from the United States. The Stettinius plenary session address had been partially reassuring, but now the hemispheric delegates wanted to hear economic expert William Clayton's statement of specific projects.

CHAPTER V
ECONOMIC ISSUES, DUMBARTON OAKS PROPOSALS AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESOLUTIONS

FEBRUARY 27, 1945

By the middle of the second week, proceedings at the Chapultepec talks were in high-gear. The drafting and refining of resolutions filled the time span between the Clayton address and the issuance of the San Francisco invitations. Like the other delegates, Stettinius responded to the conference's fast pace by adhering to a full schedule. Pressure on him mounted as the day to discuss the Security Council voting procedures approached. New issues joined the unresolved French sponsorship problem to increase the Secretary's burden. He had to mold resolutions to fit American foreign policy. Proposals like the hemispheric security pact had to be adjusted in order to make it immediately applicable to the United States. He also had to coordinate the activities of the American delegation, keep Washington informed, and attend various press conferences and plenary sessions.

Although Stettinius directed most of his attention on the twenty-seventh to events surrounding the economic speech of William Clayton, the recurring headache of French sponsorship demanded his interest in the morning. During an early telephone conversation with James Dunn, the Secretary decided to contact Anthony Eden about possible British intervention in the sponsorship affair. When reached in London, Eden was surprised to hear of the de Gaulle government's refusal to back the San Francisco invitations. He

sympathized with Stettinius's delicate task of regulating the curiosity of eighteen Latin American foreign ministers. Eden promised to take the matter up immediately and do everything in his power to obtain a favorable decision.¹ To give London a chance to negotiate with the French, Stettinius sent out a circular telegram in the afternoon, ordering the chiefs of missions to delay releasing the invitations. In the meantime, he received a cable from Grew which suggested the rationale behind Paris' position. The Acting Secretary agreed with a New York Times article that de Gaulle could not accept sponsorship because he felt that 1) amendments were necessary to make the Dumbarton Oaks proposals compatible with a Soviet-French alliance and 2) the prior approval of the Security Council for regional arrangements was an objectionable provision.² Replying to the Washington dispatch, Stettinius stated that: "from the standpoint of frankness and harmony it is most important to the great cause toward which we are working for the invitations to be issued on March 1."³ Although willing to let the British make one last attempt to gain French sponsorship, the Secretary was determined to publish the invitations within two days.

Preoccupied with planning the San Francisco talks, Stettinius missed most of the daily delegation briefing and the conference steering committee meeting. Rockefeller as his chief alternate

1. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 27, 1945, p. 4, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

2. French Sponsorship Report, February 27, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

3. Ibid., p. 2.

presided for him at both gatherings. In an optimistic manner, Rockefeller told the United States diplomats at the Reforma Hotel that the work of the conference pointed to auspicious results for the governments and peoples of the countries involved.⁴ He also reminded the delegation that William Clayton's policy statement would be delivered at 11:30 A.M. before a joint session of the economic commissions (IV and V). Professor William Benton of the University of Chicago suggested that the presence of a large press corps be utilized to clarify any confusion derived from the Clayton speech. Adolf Berle and others proposed that American representatives from business, labor, and agriculture be present at the two scheduled press conferences (at 1:00 P.M. and 3:30 P.M.) to properly interpret the key economic message. Thus, Stettinius's afternoon meetings with reporters would take on further value. Turning to the subject of resolutions, Rockefeller declared that they should be confined to issues associated with inter-American action.⁵ Matters of world concern should be submitted to the San Francisco Conference. Observers assigned to the five committees reported that the drafting of resolutions was progressing for the most part at a satisfactory rate. Only in Commission III were deliberations at an awkward stage. A strong Mexican proposal calling for the creation of a roving political body within the regional system had been introduced to this study group. The United States opposed this

4. John E. Lockwood, Delegation Meeting Report, February 27, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

5. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 27, 1945, p. 2, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

motion. It wanted to strengthen the present Pan American Union rather than weaken it with this overlapping recommendation.⁶ As the delegation meeting ended, it was decided to continue the practice of daily briefings for consultative purposes.⁷

From this gathering of the American diplomats Rockefeller proceeded to the 10:30 A.M. conference steering committee session at Chapultepec Castle. Stettinius was engaged at that moment in a telephone conversation with Anthony Eden over the French sponsorship issue and could not attend. Two unusual recommendations were debated at this meeting. The first one was a Cuban proposal for the conference to recognize the traditional boundaries of Poland. An Uruguayan delegate contested this suggestion on the grounds that the subject matter was of no concern to this hemisphere. Others agreed that the Polish resolution was outside the scope of the conference. Thus, it was withdrawn from consideration. The diplomats then discussed the Chilean proposal to invite Canada to become part of the Pan American Union. Led by Rockefeller, the representatives from Honduras, Uruguay and other countries also questioned the propriety of this recommendation. The Assistant Secretary declared that such an invitation would be an embarrassment to Canada, the United States, and Great Britain because of the Pan American Union's regulations excluding nations which form

6. Lockwood, Delegation Meeting Report, February 27, 1945, p. 2, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

7. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 27, 1945, p. 2, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

part of a kingdom.⁸ The Chilean delegate argued that his proposal was derived from the belief that the Canadian government would welcome an invitation to membership. He indicated willingness however to submit the resolution to whatever modifications might make it acceptable.⁹

As the conference steering committee ended its morning session, Stettinius completed his exchanges with London. With the sponsorship problem now temporarily in the hands of Anthony Eden, the Secretary was able to attend the joint meeting of the economic commissions, where around noon Clayton began his policy address. He noted that over the past four and one-half years the United States had purchased five billion dollars worth of goods from the American republics. "These transactions had been abnormal in size and character; they had been entered into with the purpose of defeating a powerful and ruthless enemy, intent upon the destruction of our liberty and yours."¹⁰ The Assistant Secretary observed that Latin America's first concern now dealt with the sudden termination of procurement contracts and the resulting shock to their postwar markets. He assured the delegates that American policy would seek an orderly, gradual withdrawal from wartime commodity demands.

We will continue as in the past to give appropriate notice of the curtailment or termination of procurement contracts. We will confer freely with

8. John E. Lockwood, Conference Steering Committee Report, February 27, 1945, p. 3, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

9. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 27, 1945, p. 3, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

10. William Clayton, Economic Policy Statement, February 27, 1945, p. 3, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

you in reference to such reductions and the necessary adjustments which they will involve. We will consider and cooperate with you in measures designed to effect these adjustments with the least possible shock to your economies ¹¹

Clayton felt that the southern republics' second major interest was related to the dollar balances they had accumulated in the United States during the present hostilities. He warned them against draining off these balances at the first opportunity through the purchase of luxury goods abroad. The Assistant Secretary declared that it was in the best interest of the hemisphere that a substantial portion of these dollars be utilized for the sound development of Latin American industrial, agricultural, and mineral resources.¹² Consequently, the inter-American standard of living would be raised and continental production increased.¹³

When Clayton got down to the prospects of Washington's supplying its southern neighbors with the needed goods to stimulate their economies, he was not too optimistic. With reference to the availability in the United States of tools, machinery, and equipment which were required to implement their postwar policy of economic modernization, he told the diplomats that this was a difficult problem.¹⁴ The Assistant Secretary defended his nation's wartime record on this score by pointing out that even United States

11. Ibid., p. 5.

12. Ibid., p. 9.

13. Ibid.

14. David Green, The Containment of Latin America (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), p. 173.

industries had managed without vital replacements. During the transition period, the hemisphere would be hard-pressed to obtain capital goods, but Washington would endeavor to satisfy this crucial need.¹⁵

Attempting to remove any pessimistic feelings, Clayton revealed that Congress had increased the capital accounts of the Export-Import Bank in order to make larger loans for Latin American development projects.¹⁶ He also endeavored to allay fears that Europe would receive the bulk of Washington's foreign aid and thus hinder the economic advances of Central and South America. He pointed out that a rehabilitated war zone would provide the southern republics with a market for their goods.¹⁷

The Assistant Secretary summed up his views by stating that the United States was definitely committed to a postwar policy which sought a substantial expansion in the world economy.¹⁸ It recognized the interdependence of nations in matters of economics and proclaimed that labor standards and social conditions could be improved only through the removal of trade barriers and the adherence to an "Economic Charter of the Americas."¹⁹ This American statement of principle would seek such objectives as equality of

15. Ibid., p. 174.

16. Clayton, Economic Policy Statement, February 27, 1945, p. 7, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

17. Green, The Containment of Latin America, p. 175.

18. Clayton, Economic Policy Statement, February 27, 1945, p. 14, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

19. Ibid.

access to raw materials, elimination of the excesses of economic nationalism, and promotion of private enterprise.²⁰

Stettinius, sitting in the audience, felt that the economic address made an excellent impression. He noted that while the first reactions of Latin American representatives indicated disappointment that Clayton had not made more substantial commitments, a more considered view crystallized and the moderation and balance of his statement were worth far more than rhetorical bombast.²¹ It soon became clear to less biased observers that the United States approach at the Mexico City Conference was to stress advice rather than assistance and recommendations rather than commitments. Some of the advice and some of the recommendations were intended to mollify Latin American resentment over past problems by implying future American commitments.²² The only concrete program outlined by Clayton had dealt with the Export-Import Bank. The Assistant Secretary had really given little comfort to the delegates by his general assurances of United States cooperation in the transition period. Unfortunately, Stettinius did not perceive completely the superficiality of the Clayton address. Without clarifying such pronouncements as the desire to remove trade barriers, the delegates could interpret certain passages with the wrong connotation. They could depict a

20. John Mechem, The United States and Inter-American Security (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1967), p. 266.

21. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 27, 1945, p. 7, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

22. Green, The Containment of Latin America, p. 174.

dichotomy between the economically "colonial" Latin America and the economically mature United States, in which the older, more efficient industries of the North took advantage of the South's newly-developed resources.²³

After listening to Clayton's policy statement, Stettinius spent much of the afternoon reviewing it with journalists. He held two press conferences. At the 1:00 P.M. briefing, American representatives of labor and industry expressed their endorsement of the message. Because of a luncheon date, the Secretary cut this session short, but asked reporters to reconvene at 3:30 P.M. at the Edificio Imperial. This later gathering was highlighted by a discussion of American assistance during the postwar adjustment period, progress towards strengthening the inter-American system, and measures to insulate the hemisphere against Axis infiltration.²⁴

Stettinius opened the second press conference with the observation that a spirit of fine and excellent cooperation permeated the Chapultepec talks. This friendly environment he noted, had been aided by Clayton's statement of postwar assistance. This speech represented a mature conclusion as to the practical methods of advancing the development of the American republics for the benefit of everyone.²⁵

23. Whitaker, Inter-American Affairs, 1945, p. 13.

24. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 27, 1945, p. 8, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

25. Stettinius, Press Conference Statement, February 27, 1945, p. 2, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

Following his comments on the economic address, the Secretary stressed the importance of a strong regional arrangement to achieve the complete elimination of Nazism from the hemisphere.²⁶

Before fielding questions from the journalists, Stettinius introduced Clayton. In reference to economic solutions for post-war problems, the Assistant Secretary stated that:

I don't think that I have anything much to add to what I said this morning. A very prominent gentleman from one other American republic said to me just a few minutes ago: "That was a very nice speech you made. Now the question is to turn it into facts." I don't anticipate any difficulty in that direction. We have tried to understate rather than over promise I don't believe we will have any difficulties in turning into facts and deeds things we promise down here I have been tremendously impressed by this conference. I think it will turn out to be a very useful and constructive one, and I am very optimistic regarding relations between the United States and the rest of the hemisphere²⁷

At the conclusion of Clayton's optimistic remarks, the Secretary proceeded to answer questions from the press. Some reporters touched on the delicate issues of Argentina and French sponsorship. The chief American delegate refused to comment on the status of the Farrell regime in relation to the Mexico City Conference.²⁸ He also withheld his opinion on releasing invitations to the San Francisco Conference. Stettinius did reveal that his Commission II was in the process of summarizing Latin American views toward the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.²⁹

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

28. Ibid., p. 6.

29. Ibid., p. 7.

The press conference ended in a unique fashion. The Secretary had always sought to improve the public's impression of the State Department. To restore prestige to his agency, he felt that the American people should understand, and at times, participate in the operations of the Department. For this reason, he had brought representatives from labor, industry, and agriculture to Mexico City to serve as advisors. Stettinius now introduced these individuals to the press and allowed them to issue statements. Union leader George Meany declared that: "this conference represents to American labor an opportunity to give expression to some of its real ideals and hopes. Now from a practical point of view we see the conference as a step in the direction of a permanent peace."³⁰ Meany also stated that he was in complete agreement with the wording of the Economic Charter of the Americas and the rest of Clayton's speech. Eric Johnston of the American Chamber of Commerce voiced his approval of his delegation's economic program and proclaimed that: "as one of the greatest creditor nations of the world, the United States was responsible in no small measure for the economic balance of the world and particularly Latin America."³¹ Other non-diplomats who spoke at this time included David McDonald of the CIO, James Patton of the National Farmer's Union, and Alfred Goss from the National Grange.³²

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., p. 8.

32. Ibid., pp. 8-12.

While Stettinius was holding his briefings with the press, other American delegates were developing conference resolutions at afternoon committee hearings. The deadline for all but the economic proposals had been Monday, February 26. With the last economic recommendations introduced on the twenty-seventh via the Clayton address, the Chapultepec talks now had to act on a total of one hundred and fifty-five resolutions. Of this number, eleven had originated with the American delegation. The United States was concerned about such topics as strengthening the inter-American system, free access to information, cooperation in health and sanitation, surrender of war criminals, and the Economic Charter of the Americas.³³

Commission I met as Clayton was giving his policy statement and after a full discussion approved two resolutions entitled "The Establishment of a Permanent Military Organization" and "The Control of Armaments."³⁴ Stettinius's world organization group continued to postpone its hearings because the summarization of Dumbarton Oaks views had yet to be completed.

The most interesting developments occurred within Commission III. This body supposedly assembled to observe the Dominican Republic's independence day. After the appropriate speeches, Luis Anderson of Costa Rica suddenly brought up the subject of Columbia's proposal for a mutual guarantee of territorial sovereignty. Because

33. Telegram, Stettinius to Joseph Grew, February 27, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

34. John E. Lockwood, Commission I Report, February 27, 1945, p. 3, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

of the importance of this resolution, he wanted it labeled "Declaration of Chapultepec" and approved by acclamation of the committee.³⁵

This created an embarrassing situation for the American members of the group, as the resolution contained certain provisions which they were not prepared to accept. Among the objectionable clauses was the obligation to intervene militarily to prevent aggression in cases where a majority of the American republics voted for such a measure.³⁶

Senator Warren Austin opposed Anderson's motion for the United States by pointing out that in the absence of an English text, more time was needed to study the recommendation. He also mentioned the desirability of awaiting Senator Tom Connally's arrival the next day. Commission III agreed to delay its decision on the question of acclamation until 11:00 A.M. the next day.³⁷

Stettinius's people on the inter-American study group met twice on the twenty-seventh after the commission hearing to plot strategy. In the early afternoon, Austin told his colleagues that the Anderson motion had come as a "bombshell" to him.³⁸ He pointed out that the proposed non-aggression pact required congressional approval, which could not be obtained before the next committee session. Dr. Pasvolsky suggested asking Roosevelt to utilize his special presidential war powers to make the "Declaration of Chapultepec" immediately

35. John E. Lockwood, Commission III Report, February 27, 1945, pp. 3-4, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

36. Ibid., p. 4.

37. Ibid.

38. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 27, 1945, p. 3, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

applicable to the United States.³⁹ Once hostilities were concluded, there would be plenty of time for Congress to draft a permanent treaty. After arriving at this solution, the meeting ended.

In the early evening, Rockefeller, Austin, and Technical Expert Dudley Bonsal met with the sub-committee of Commission III. With the security pact question hopefully resolved, they turned to another troublesome issue. Mexico had introduced a resolution to substitute the Governing Board of the Pan American Union with an ambulatory council consisting of ad hoc representatives meeting every six months in a different capital. Rockefeller urged them to move forward and not backwards as the case would be if the present set-up were scrapped.⁴⁰ A compromise was reached after some minor revisions were made in the membership of the Governing Board. The delegates agreed to rotate the office of chairman and have the board composed of diplomats other than the inter-American Ambassadors to Washington. Mexico found these measures satisfactory and withdrew her resolution. Stettinius later noted that: "there was a tendency to propose the creation of a variety of new agencies rather than to consolidate or build upon the existing bodies."⁴¹

February 27 ended with many matters still in flux. Depending upon Eden's efforts, French sponsorship might still be achieved.

39. Ibid., p. 4.

40. Dudley Bonsal, Committee III Subcommittee 2 Report, February 27, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

41. Telegram, Stettinius to Grew, February 27, 1945, p. 2, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

The full effect of the Clayton address had yet to be gauged. Now that the American economic policy statement had been issued, Commissions IV and V could finally take on a full load of work. Stettinius's world organization group had yet to finish its task of summarization. The "Declaration of Chapultepec" also had to be completed. Thus, the Secretary and his delegation still faced a heavy schedule of conference activities.

FEBRUARY 28, 1945

Wednesday, February 28 marked a full week of Mexico City sessions. Within this time span Edward Stettinius successfully filled the role of manager of men. He and his staff had manipulated the conference agenda in accordance with the goals of American foreign policy. The Clayton address had partially reassured the Latin Americans of postwar United States cooperation and yet left the door open for American aid in the reconstruction of Europe. The hemispheric security pact was in the process of becoming conditionally applicable to the United States. And the Pan American Union was being strengthened rather than torn apart. The only difficulty the Secretary had encountered was the matter of French sponsorship. He spent much of the twenty-eighth negotiating over the San Francisco invitations and analyzing press reaction to the conference. He also welcomed the initial appearance of Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at Chapultepec. And finally, Stettinius witnessed the first dissension within Commission II over the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

Washington's chief spokesman began the day by presiding over the 9:00 A.M. delegation meeting. He received the usual commission briefings and reviewed the previous day's activities. Senator Austin noted in his report that each nation associated with the hemispheric non-aggression treaty was bound by constitutional limitations.⁴² He remarked that the United States as well as the other republics would endeavor to overcome legal obstacles to join the pact. By invoking such measures as the presidential war powers he and Pasvolsky were making the Columbian proposal applicable to the United States for the duration of the conflict with the Axis powers. Rockefeller commented that the "Declaration of Chapultepec" reflected a fear of aggression by neighboring countries from Argentina, Peru, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti.⁴³ Following all these remarks, Ambassador George Messersmith warned the delegation against resolutions designed to form regional blocs as these were usually authored by those not friendly to Washington.⁴⁴

Throughout the morning, Stettinius examined studies of press and public reaction toward the Chapultepec talks. He also scheduled short interviews with correspondents Reston and Lara of the New York Times and Elliston of the Washington Post. On the home front, American interest in Latin America was greater than at any time since July, 1944. Commentators tended to view the conference

42. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 28, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

43. Ibid.

44. Green Hackworth, Delegation Meeting Report, February 28, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

as a "dress rehearsal" for San Francisco and pointed out that a success in Mexico City would strengthen the American position at the upcoming United Nations meeting.⁴⁵ The Argentine question and economic problems received most of the emphasis in various periodicals. In reference to the controversy with Buenos Aires, the Associated Press, Christian Science Monitor, Business Week, Walter Lippmann, and Charles Pergler were among those skeptical of any conciliatory moves by that nation.⁴⁶ Former diplomat Sumner Welles was among those in the minority, who favored recognition of the Farrell-Peron regime.⁴⁷

The other focal point of interest, the Economic Charter, received a mixed reception. The Baltimore Sun and Gabriel Heatter enthusiastically praised it, while the New York Journal of Commerce and Raymond Swing criticized it because of an absence of more concrete suggestions for the implementation of freer trade within the hemisphere.⁴⁸ Many leading newspapers including the Washington Post, the Philadelphia Inquirer, and the Nation agreed with William Clayton's statement that the United States would help soften the shock of economic dislocation within the hemisphere during the postwar period. On other subjects such as the inclusion of representatives from Congress, labor, and business within the United States delegation,

45. Survey of American Press Reaction, February 28, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

the press voiced its approval.⁴⁹ Stettinius must have been satisfied when he read these studies. The American people were closely following his actions and were for the most part supporting his hard line toward Argentina and his promises of economic assistance to Latin America.

In the early afternoon, the latest chapter in the French sponsorship story began with a phone call from Joseph Grew in Washington. The Secretary discussed with his second-in-command the absolute necessity of maintaining friendly relations with Latin America in light of the delicate situation with France.⁵⁰ After a few other remarks to Grew, he got James Dunn on the phone for a strategy session. He told Dunn that if France should make a final decision not to sponsor the San Francisco Conference, he wanted the news relayed to him immediately. Thus, a special meeting of the Latin American Foreign Ministers could be convened to interpret the situation properly before false rumors threatened hemispheric solidarity. To Stettinius's amazement, the Assistant Secretary revealed that British diplomat Sir Alex Cadogan had successfully persuaded the French to accept sponsorship.⁵¹ The acceptance, however, was conditional, based upon the placing of Paris amendments on the same footing as the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.⁵²

49. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, February 28, 1945, p. 7, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

50. Ibid., p. 2.

51. Ibid., p. 3.

52. Ibid., p. 4.

The Secretary phoned Padilla to inform him that the de Gaulle government had "fallen into line" and would back the United Nations conference. He remarked to the Mexican Foreign Minister that there would be no trouble and that:

We can all go hand-in-hand, but I can't promise to make the announcements tomorrow (March 1), because we have to work out the form of the invitations both in London and Moscow. However, I feel sure everything will be ready by Friday or Saturday (March 2 or 3) at the latest 53

Relieved to hear of French cooperation, Stettinius was in a happy mood until he received a second call from Washington. Presidential advisor Jonathan Daniels notified him at 4:00 P.M. that Roosevelt wanted to announce the Security Council voting procedures in an address to Congress the next day. The chief American delegate's credibility in Mexico City would be destroyed if this occurred. All along, he had promised the Latin American Foreign Ministers that they would be informed of these voting procedures the first moment the San Francisco invitations were made public.⁵⁴ The Secretary depicted this touchy situation to Daniels and added that consultations with London and Moscow were not completed yet. In concluding the conversation, he told the White House aide that he preferred to be guided by Grew and Dunn in the final decision on the congressional address, for they were closer to the situation.⁵⁵

In the early evening, Stettinius again talked to Dunn at the State Department. Describing how Daniels had pressured him, he revealed that the ultimate answer would come from him and Grew.

53. Ibid., p. 3.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid., p. 4.

Dunn noted that the United States was obligated not to discuss the voting procedures until the invitations were issued.⁵⁶ Since the issuance had not occurred yet, Roosevelt could not outline the functions of the Security Council to Congress without breaking an international agreement. Therefore, the Assistant Secretary promised his boss that he would oppose any premature announcement of the procedures, including Roosevelt's speech.⁵⁷ For the moment, it appeared the invitations could be released without embarrassment.

While Stettinius was attempting to keep on top of the sponsorship controversy, his world organization study group was voicing opposition toward the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Commission II Secretary Para-Perez had assembled his sub-committee at 11:00 A.M. to examine the slowly accumulated commentaries on the United Nations plan. At this gathering, Mr. Gutierrez of Cuba acknowledged his responsibility for a resolution condemning the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. After the meeting, he told Technical Expert John Cabot that the proposals were contrary to inter-American juridical concepts, failed to refer to international law, and lacked a preamble.⁵⁸ For these reasons, the Cuban senate would never accept the provisions.

By the time the sub-committee reconvened at 4:30 P.M., Gutierrez had radically changed his thinking on the United Nations.

56. Transcript, James Dunn - Stettinius, Telephone Conversation, February 28, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

57. Ibid.

58. Harley Notter, Commission II Report, February 28, 1945, p. 2, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

In a contradictory manner, he was still critical of certain "poorly chosen principles" which allowed for a power gap between the General Assembly and the Security Council and gave the whole organization a totalitarian character.⁵⁹ Yet, he also stated that the Dumbarton Oaks program was a good basis for creating an international peace-keeping body.⁶⁰ At this second meeting, delegate Cordova of Mexico also introduced a resolution, which in effect recommended to the San Francisco Conference the common views of Latin America regarding the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Gutierrez and other committee members supported this resolution as a means to communicate their disapproval of certain provisions. Cordova labeled it a preamble for the presentation of ideas, which would protect the liberty of action of all the American republics.⁶¹ Stettinius's representative at this session, Dr. Pasvolsky, remarked that the delegates should study the resolution further and make no final decision on it until after the submission of Para-Perez's report.⁶² It appeared that the American representative was advocating postponement in order to give his delegation enough time to study this new development. Thus, the concept of a United Nations was fast becoming a tremendous thorn in the side of the Secretary and the State Department. Already beset by the sponsorship problem, Stettinius now faced dissension within his own commission. He

59. Ibid., p. 1.

60. Ibid., p. 2.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

somehow had to disassociate his people from any proposal criticizing a program they had helped create. The Mexican recommendation could only work to alienate the United States from the other co-authors of the Dumbarton Oaks provisions, the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

Fortunately, the other commissions were not encountering the difficulties experienced by the world organization group. The war effort committee was studying ways to eliminate Fascist subversion within the hemisphere. Commission III on the inter-American system was revising the Pan American Governing Board and the non-aggression pact in line with Washington's policies. It also created an Inter-American Economic and Social Council to help solve transitional problems. The economic bodies were also busy incorporating Clayton's principles into their resolutions. They were in the process of drafting a proposal to lower trade barriers with few exceptions.

Outside of the verbal opposition in Commission II, activities were proceeding without incident. At 5:30, Stettinius went to Buena Vista railroad station to welcome Senator Tom Connally. The Texas Democrat was an expert in Latin American relations. The Secretary hoped his timely arrival would strengthen the American delegation in its efforts to overcome criticisms aimed at the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Now that the French sponsorship issue was temporarily settled, these criticisms were the only key issue.

MARCH 1, 1945

Since the conference was not encountering any major difficulties, the Secretary may have assumed that his presence in the capital was not absolutely necessary. His papers do not suggest any other reason for his withdrawal to Cuernavaca for a luncheon date on March 1. After attending a morning session of the United States steering committee, he departed at 12:30 P.M. for a reception at the Cuernavaca residence of Senor Serrano, the Mexican Economics Minister. With this exit, Rockefeller, Pasvolsky, and other top aides once again directed American foreign policy in Mexico City. They coordinated Washington's interests in the commission hearings and participated in the revision of certain resolutions.

The American delegation began the day with a 9:00 A.M. briefing on the activities of the world organization committee. Pasvolsky reported that the compilation of views on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals was almost completed. So far, only Haiti had expressed full agreement with the provisions.

Despite Cuban criticisms, it appeared that all the republics were willing to use the Dumbarton Oaks program as a basis for the creation of an international body.⁶³ After these introductory remarks, Pasvolsky outlined three complex issues within Commission II, which threatened Washington's postwar objectives.

The first matter of great concern was the Mexican resolution advocating alterations in the United Nations plan. The hemispheric

63. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, March 1, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

powers unanimously wanted to attain universality of membership and changes in purposes and principles in order to include references to international law and respect for treaties. They also sought greater power for the General Assembly and guaranteed Latin American representation on the Security Council. The southern republics desired, too, greater scope for the international court, the right to settle inter-American disputes through the regional system, and the establishment of a committee for cultural cooperation.⁶⁴ Since these modifications were contrary to the "Big Three" conception of an international body, the United States had to separate itself from the Mexican resolution. The State Department could not approach the San Francisco Conference condemning its own beliefs in a United Nations.

Another problem tied to Commission II dealt with the American proposal supporting the Dumbarton Oaks program. According to a secret agreement, Mexico was supposed to introduce this recommendation without revealing American authorship. At the time of submission (February 28), a Mexican delegate announced the move "on the behalf of the United States." Since this action violated the prior arrangement, the proposal was withdrawn and not immediately reintroduced due to differences within the Mexican delegation. The United States diplomats had to reach an understanding with their Mexican counterparts before this subject could be brought up again. Ambassador George Messersmith felt confident, however, that at the

64. Ibid.

right moment Padilla would come through with an acceptable resolution.⁶⁵

A third complex issue facing the world organization group was regional integration. Brazil had drafted a proposal recognizing inter-American supremacy over the United Nations in hemispheric matters. Unfortunately, this resolution had received widespread support from the Latin delegates. American observers believed the recommendation would promote regionalistic rather than international attitudes toward world problems. Since the United States favored one unified community of nations and not several local alliances, this resolution would require some revision too. Thus, the three issues involving Latin American alterations, the Mexican submission controversy, and the Brazilian proposal revealed that Washington definitely had to reconcile differences within Commission II.⁶⁶

After Pasvolsky's lengthy report, the American delegates dispersed to carry out their committee duties. At 10:00 A.M., Stettinius made his first and only appearance of the day at a conference function. He attended the United States steering committee meeting and received the Commission II briefing he had missed an hour earlier. His advisors, particularly Senators Austin and Connally, went over in detail the proposed non-aggression pact. Latin American countries had developed a great enthusiasm for this resolution because it would check the aggressive tendencies of Argentina and also sym-

65. Ibid., p. 2.

66. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

bolize their solidarity.⁶⁷ Considering the proposal one of the keystones of the conference, they had entitled it the "Declaration of Chapultepec." The Secretary noted that as matters stood, the non-aggression pact was divided into measures to be effective during the present hostilities and measures to be determined by a treaty for the postwar period. Turning to the French sponsorship issue, he expressed confidence in the existing situation.⁶⁸ Now that the de Gaulle regime was backing the San Francisco Conference, it would not be long before the invitations and voting procedures could be publicized. At 10:30 A.M., Stettinius and his staff gathered around a radio to listen to Roosevelt's congressional speech. Although reception was poor, they heard no premature presidential announcement on the operations of the Security Council.⁶⁹ Grew and Dunn had successfully prevented the chief executive from breaking the Yalta agreement on simultaneous publication.

With his departure for Cuernavaca, the Secretary's role in the Chapultepec talks diminished temporarily. The major developments of March 1 took place not in the plenary sessions of the foreign ministers, but rather in the committee meetings of the lower-echelon diplomats.

The war effort group was progressing with just a minimum of problems. It had already drafted and approved resolutions related

67. Ibid., p. 3.

68. Green Hackworth, Conference Steering Committee Meeting, March 1, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

69. Ibid.

to further military cooperation, the elimination of subversive activities, and the seizure of war criminals. These proposals all aimed to stamp out Fascist influence within the Western hemisphere. In fundamentals, Commission I had made no departure from the United States point of view.⁷⁰

Ironically, the study group with all the major problems did not even convene on the first. Commission II supposedly postponed its meeting because Chairman Stettinius was preoccupied by a luncheon date at Cuernavaca with the Mexican Economics Minister, Senor Serrano. In reality, the Secretary was in no position to assemble his commission and release the San Francisco invitations. He still had to await the conclusion of consultations with the Soviet Union. With the world organization group in an unsettled state, Stettinius's remarkable optimism surfaced. He wired Grew that: "on the whole confidence is felt that the work of this committee will result in a satisfactory conclusion."⁷¹ Since no meeting was scheduled until March 2, when Para-Perez was to issue his preliminary report on Dumbarton Oaks, Pasvolsky decided to call on Padilla. The conference president informed him that the Mexican submission controversy was a "mistake" of some sort and that the desirable resolution would emerge eventually.⁷²

70. Telegram I, Stettinius to Joseph Grew, March 1, 1945, p. 1, Box 287, Stettinius Papers.

71. Ibid., p. 3.

72. Harley Notter, Commission II Report, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

Commission III commenced in the morning of March 1 a paragraph by paragraph examination of the revised United States resolution on strengthening the inter-American system. Compromises had been made along lines which would preserve the Pan American Union and Washington as the seat of the Union. Among the principle changes was the prohibition against hemispheric ambassadors to Washington serving on the Union's Governing Board. A number of Latin American republics had opposed this change due to the added expense of maintaining an extra ambassador and the possibility of dissension among equals. Theorizing that too many diplomats were under the thumb of Washington, Mexico had supported this prohibition.⁷³ Another revision limited the Director General of the Union to a term of ten years without re-election. A third provision directed the Pan American Union in collaboration with the Inter-American Juridical Committee to compose a "Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and State." This charter was to be submitted at the 1946 hemispheric conference in Bogota, Columbia. Consideration of Commission III's most important resolution, the regional non-aggression pact, was deferred until March 2, in order to give Senator Connally time to crystallize his views. So far, the proceedings and compromises of Commission III were regarded as satisfactory to Stettinius and the American delegation.⁷⁴

73. Telegram I, Stettinius to Grew, March 1, 1945, p. 3, Box 287, Stettinius Papers.

74. Telegram II, Stettinius to Joseph Grew, March 1, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

In the economic field, there had been a tendency until February 28 to mark time waiting for Clayton's address. But finally, Commissions IV and V began to negotiate problems and draft resolutions. Sub-committee meetings were characterized on the one hand by Latin American desires for a United States commitment to continue purchases and on the other by the United States' unwillingness to go beyond Clayton's statement.⁷⁵ One case where the question of commitment arose revolved around coffee prices. The southern republics sought postwar price increases for coffee products. Evading the question, American diplomats just referred to the need for equitable prices for both the consumer and producer. In general, there seemed to be no disposition to force issues over American opposition.⁷⁶ The Latin Americans wished to stay in line with Washington on the freedom of international trade principle. They still wanted to insert individual specialized reservations to protect hemispheric balances of foreign exchange and infant industries.⁷⁷

In comparison with economic questions, there was greater unanimity over social resolutions. A proposal calling for inter-American cooperation on problems of health and sanitation had already been drafted. American delegate Katherine Lenroot was highly influential in commission attempts to resolve social problems. In one case, when Mexico introduced a resolution recommending

75. Telegram I, Stettinius to Grew, March 1, 1945, pp. 5-6, Box 287, Stettinius Papers.

76. Ibid., p. 6.

77. Telegram II, Stettinius to Grew, March 1, 1945, p. 4, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

that minimum salaries be tied to price fluctuations, Miss Lenroot led the opposition against this unjust proposal. She finally succeeded in revising the resolution to favor a constant rise in real wages.⁷⁸

With Stettinius out-of-town and most of the American diplomats in committee sessions, the French sponsor issue re-emerged. In the late afternoon, Hayden Raynor received a phone call from James Dunn in Washington. Dunn informed him that the Soviet Union would not accept the changes in the San Francisco invitations demanded by the de Gaulle regime. Word had been relayed by the English that Moscow refused to permit any alterations in the Crimean agreements. He suggested to Raynor that Ambassador Caffery be notified of the situation and instructed to present an ultimatum to the French. The Technical Expert agreed that Paris should decide by Friday, March 2 either to accept the original text or drop out of sponsorship.⁷⁹ Throughout the evening, Raynor attempted to contact Stettinius at Cuernavaca. He finally reached him at 8:30 A.M. the following day. The chief American delegate approved the Dunn proposal to obtain a final answer from France.⁸⁰ Once again, the sponsorship issue presented a messy situation.

With the exception of the sponsorship question, activities throughout the middle of the conference's second week had come off

78. Green Hackworth, Commission IV Report, March 1, 1945, p. 2, Box 235, Stettinius Papers.

79. Hayden Raynor, Developments of March 1, 1945, p. 1, Box 235, Stettinius Papers.

80. Ibid.

smoothly. Although uncomfortable scenes had developed around other issues, Stettinius and his colleagues were optimistic that various obstacles would soon disappear. Incidents like the Cuban criticism of the Dumbarton Oaks program and the Mexican submission controversy were minor in comparison to the sponsorship struggle. While the Secretary successfully shaped conference resolutions in keeping with Washington's foreign policy, he could make little headway with the stubborn de Gaulle regime.

CHAPTER VI

TROUBLESOME ISSUES AND CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

MARCH 2, 1945

As the second weekend of the conference approached, Edward Stettinius concentrated on eliminating issues which hampered negotiations at Chapultepec. The French sponsorship controversy was his main concern. Paris had to commit itself before he could release the San Francisco invitations. Further delays in publication could only have a negative effect on United States - Latin American relations. The Secretary also had to iron out differences within Commissions II and III. He had to overcome hemispheric opposition to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, particularly the principle of regional integration.

His schedule from March 2 to March 4 reflected his preference to work behind the scene in resolving matters. Over this time span, Stettinius did not participate in the more rigid, structured meetings of the conference steering committee and the American delegation. He felt more comfortable discussing policy issues within the informal setting of a luncheon or reception.

Throughout the morning of the second, the Secretary was once more wrapped up in the sponsorship affair. Hayden Raynor called Cuernavaca at 8:30 A.M. to inform him of Moscow's rejection of the French reservations. Shocked by the news, he gave the Technical Expert his approval to present Paris with an ultimatum.¹

1. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, March 2, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

When Raynor contacted Washington at 11:00 to relay Stettinius's instructions, he learned of further developments in the controversy. The State Department had received word from the British of Paris' refusal to accept the Soviet decision as final. The French had ordered their ambassador in Moscow to raise the issue there. James Dunn told Raynor that London had asked for a twenty-four hour postponement of all American diplomatic responses in order to give the French one last chance to reconcile differences.²

This matter was referred to Stettinius on his return at noon to Mexico City. He discussed the British request with Messersmith, Rockefeller, Pasvolsky and Technical Expert Avra Warren. They all agreed that a postponement would involve considerable risk, but the only alternative was French withdrawal and that would be disastrous. The chief American delegate and his aides arranged a forty-eight hour delay but made a firm commitment to announce the invitations no later than 10:00 Monday morning, March 5. The Secretary felt this schedule must be final and unalterable.³ He instructed Raynor to have Dunn notify both the French and British of the postponement devised with great difficulty as a courtesy to Secretary Eden. Stettinius also tried to contact Padilla about the situation and seek his advice. Unfortunately, he could not reach the Mexican Foreign Minister before leaving for a social gathering at which he was guest speaker.⁴

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

With the sponsorship issue still on his mind, the Secretary attended a reception, in Rockefeller's and his honor, given by the American community in Mexico City. At this party, he made a brief good will address emphasizing that American policy aimed to encourage a system of diplomacy broadly representative of a composite of United States interests and opinions. He praised the cordiality of American citizens in Mexico. Their amiable ways had helped to advance a spirit of harmony at the Chapultepec talks. Stettinius hoped that in the future Americans abroad would accept a new responsibility. He remarked:

I look to this community and to the groups of United States citizens resident in other American republics, for their friendly interest and co-operation in realizing many of the aims of our Inter-American program⁵

Reviewing the activities of the conference, he declared that the resolutions on public health, education, and nutrition were designed to bring the common people of the hemisphere closer together. The masses were a significant factor, since international relations were no longer confined to the relatively narrow policy interests and contacts of government officials. The chief American delegate declared:

Diplomacy becomes more truly representative of the interests and welfare of peoples. It becomes an international vehicle for social and economic welfare, enabling nations to share responsibilities for common progress and security. Now the broad representation of public sentiment becomes indispensable to diplomacy in the evolution of post-war international relations.

At the Inter-American conference now in progress here, you have doubtlessly observed an attempt by the

5. Stettinius, American Community Speech, March 2, 1945, p. 2, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

United States government to make its diplomacy broadly representative. Our delegation embraces representatives of commerce, labor, agriculture, industry and social welfare and the press. It really represents a composite of national interests and opinions⁶

Staying at the reception only long enough to deliver his address, the Secretary then hurried off to a 2:00 P.M. luncheon date at the Reforma Hotel. Under the guise of a social gathering, he had invited Foreign Ministers Alberto Lleras Camargo of Columbia, Jacobo Varela of Uruguay, Hildebrando Accioly of Brazil, and Luis Anderson of Costa Rica to dine with his top aides. Utilizing the personal approach, Stettinius hoped to transform the dinner into a strategy session on the wording of the Act of Chapultepec.⁷ The United States delegation disapproved of certain passages in part three of the Act. This section dealt with the relationship of the regional system to non-hemispheric organizations. Foreign Minister Camargo made some suggestions as possible substitutes, none of which were acceptable to the Secretary or Senator Connally. The Columbian diplomat felt that it should clearly be understood that the maintenance of peace on the American continent was to be solely the responsibility of the American states. He argued that otherwise Great Britain and particularly the Soviet Union might intervene in the political affairs of the Americas to the detriment of the inter-American system.⁸ Both Stettinius and Connally in-

6. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

7. Luncheon Report, March 2, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

8. Ibid.

sisted that they could not enter into a regional agreement at this time which did not harmonize with the United Nations plan. Camargo replied that: "if the United States is willing to allow European states to intervene in the settlement of political problems in this hemisphere, it would appear that the Monroe Doctrine is being abandoned."⁹

Connally emphatically denied this charge. Senator Austin finally ironed out differences by proposing that a compromise paragraph be inserted into the Act. The new section would acknowledge that the regional arrangement was to be consistent with the purposes and principles of the general international organization upon its creation.¹⁰ He drafted such a passage and it was immediately accepted by all present.

Following the delicate situation at the Reforma, the Secretary held an interview with Mr. Akin of Time magazine at 4:15 P.M. and then retired at 5:00 P.M. to his Cuernavaca residence. He spent the evening reading daily committee reports and composing a long telegram to Joseph Grew. Some unusual observations were included in the cable to Washington. Stettinius noted that some American journalists had been raising questions about delegation disagreements over economic matters. In fact, no such disagreements existed as complete unanimity linked the various government agencies and representatives of labor, industry and agriculture. He speculated

9. Ibid.

10. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, March 2, 1945, p. 3, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

that the reporters imagined that there were difficulties because they had been barred from economic sub-committee hearings on extremely sensitive topics.¹¹

The Secretary related another strange episode involving the Mexican press. Individual business groups within the capital favored local protection for industry over free international trade. To voice their opposition to the Economic Charter and its principle of free trade, they had taken out full page advertisements in the local newspapers. Analyzing this situation, labor advisors to the American delegation could find no proletariat angle for the advertisements. Stettinius reported his colleagues' belief that the action represented nationalistic feeling plus local politics, namely opposition to Padilla.¹² Further discussion of the incident was postponed until George Meany had time to conduct an investigation.

Most of the telegram to Grew highlighted the progress of the commissions. The Secretary felt that issues were coming to focus as the tension mounted. He revealed that: "today and tomorrow should bring forth the essential debate."¹³ Events indicated that the conference might be able to conclude its work by Tuesday, March 7. The war effort committee for instance, had almost finished its tasks. Resolutions to create a permanent inter-American

11. Telegram, Stettinius to Joseph Grew, March 2, 1945, p. 7, Box 287, Stettinius Papers.

12. Ibid., p. 6.

13. Ibid., p. 1.

Defense Board, eliminate the remaining centers of subversion, and prevent the immigration of Fascist undesirables had already been submitted and approved.¹⁴

Stettinius's dispatch pointed out however, that Commission II was bogged down by circumstances beyond its control. The world organization group could not draft a final proposal until the terms of the San Francisco invitations were publicized. He informed Grew that certain representatives within his commission were exercising individual prerogatives rather than those of their respective delegations. There were disturbing signs that Padilla did not have full control of his people. The Cubans also were not functioning as a unit.¹⁵ Consequently, the Guitierrez criticisms and Mexican submission controversy had occurred.

The telegram revealed that within the economic commissions discussion centered around the continuance of wartime purchases during the transition period, the export of capital goods, and the elimination of wartime controls.¹⁶ These groups were also working on transportation and subsidy recommendations. Another interest of Commissions IV and V was the hemispheric funds and property of the Axis powers. American delegate Oscar Cox had made a strong statement on the importance of returning looted property to its rightful owners and stopping the flight of Fascist capital to Latin America.¹⁷

14. Ibid., p. 2.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., p. 3.

17. Ibid., p. 4.

Considering the length of Stettinius's telegram (seven pages), it was unusual that no comment was made on the French sponsorship affair. Perhaps because of Paris' previous lack of cooperation, he was resigned to the fact that there would be no fifth sponsor of the San Francisco Conference. The weekend would at least give him an opportunity to rest before the Monday morning publication of the invitations.

MARCH 3, 1945

Stettinius relaxed at Cuernavaca on the third and pursued a very light schedule. Apart from reading a few commission reports and arranging the post-conference trip to Cuba, his time was devoted to social functions. He had lunch with Padilla and Camacho in the early afternoon and later returned to Mexico City for a dinner given by the chiefs of delegations in their honor.

During the day, the Secretary received a cable from Spruille Braden, the American Ambassador in Havana. This wire advised the chief American delegate against stopping off in Cuba after the Chapultepec talks. Braden believed that a Stettinius visit to Havana would be misinterpreted and over-emphasized.¹⁸ He suggested that Rockefeller make the good will trip in his place. The Secretary immediately relayed the Braden cable to Washington for Joseph Grew to examine. He also contacted Rockefeller and Avra Warren for their analysis of the wire. They agreed that a decision

18. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, March 3, 1945, p. 3, Box 235, Stettinius Papers.

should come from the State Department, where the Cuban situation could be studied in greater depth. Although Stettinius would await word from Grew, he felt at this point that any non-compliance with Havana's official invitation would create a misunderstanding.¹⁹

While the Secretary contemplated his trip to Cuba and socialized, the American delegation also moved at a slower pace. Foreign Service personnel had few conference duties or sub-committee hearings on Saturday. The usual delegation briefing was held at 9:00 A.M. with Rockefeller, Pasvolsky and economic advisor Wayne Taylor reviewing the progress of different committees. Rockefeller observed that the inter-American study group had reconciled its differences and almost completed the Declaration of Chapultepec. Outside of a Bolivian diplomat's criticisms, the Declaration had been received with marked enthusiasm. The Bolivian representative had voted for it but still believed the document to be incomplete as it failed to acknowledge his landlocked country's need for Pacific seaports.²⁰ Pasvolsky informed the gathering that fifteen nations had submitted commentaries on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. He speculated that Para-Perez's Commission II sub-committee might be able to summarize the various views by March 5. Wayne Taylor reported that differences of opinion within Commission IV centered around the cotton subsidy program, moderate

19. Ibid.

20. Telegram, Stettinius to Joseph Grew, March 3, 1945, p. 2, Box 287, Stettinius Papers.

protection for new industries, and the development of markets for synthetics.²¹

In general, the discussions revealed that the Mexico City Conference had very little unfinished business. There were some major matters though to clear up. The world organization group had yet to draft a final resolution on the Dumbarton Oaks program or hear Stettinius's statement on Security Council operations. The inter-American commission still had to mold miscellaneous proposals into the "Declaration of Mexico." This Declaration set forth some twenty principles including the rights of man, the sovereignty of states, the juridical equality of states, and the repudiation of territorial conquest. Mexican diplomats attached great importance to this resolution and hoped for its speedy submission and approval.²² Finally, the Economic Charter of the Americas had to be shaped to fit both the United States and Latin American objectives in the transition period. Therefore, such issues as wartime controls and purchases had to be resolved.

MARCH 4, 1945

The fourth was a day of rest for the delegates to the Mexico City Conference. No delegation, commission, or plenary meetings were convened. Like his colleagues, Stettinius took the day off, preparing for the publication of the San Francisco invitations on Monday.²³

21. Ibid., p. 3.

22. Ibid.

23. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, March 4, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

While the Secretary rested, State Department official Byington called Mexico City to verify the text of the simultaneous San Francisco announcements. As previously agreed, Grew would release the bids to the United Nations conference at noon on March 5 in Washington. The Secretary would do the same in Mexico City. Both would reveal that the United States was co-sponsoring the meeting with Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China. Byington suggested in his telephone conversation that there be no elaboration of the French sponsorship affair. The Department would merely state that while the French Provisional Government had acknowledged its willingness to participate in the San Francisco Conference, conditions had been placed upon its sponsorship which were unacceptable to the other major powers.²⁴

Stettinius received this last-minute proposal without comment. He must have looked forward to the Monday morning session of his Commission II. In less than twenty-four hours, the pressure to issue the invitations and reveal Security Council operations would be gone. His brief speech to the world organization would satisfy the curiosity of many Latin American diplomats.

MARCH 5, 1945

Stettinius's overwhelming interests on Monday were naturally directed to his Commission II speech on the San Francisco invitations. Both he and his fellow delegates were anxious to have the invitations released. For the Secretary, the issuance would relieve

24. Ibid., p. 3.

him of a heavy burden. The nagging problem of French sponsorship would be permanently removed. For Latin American diplomats, the publication would hopefully quell their fears that the Security Council was not merely a rubber stamp for the foreign policies of the "Big Three."

The chief American delegate returned from Cuernavaca an hour before the Commission II session to make the final preparations for his speech. Promptly at 10:00 A.M., he arrived at the long-awaited world organization meeting in the salon of Chapultepec Castle. Stettinius's "Calendar Notes" give a candid description of the scene. As he entered the long, narrow room filled with delegates and newsmen, the Secretary was caught up in the importance of the gathering. He observed that the setting was appropriate for his historical announcement with the walls lined with portraits of Mexican statesmen.²⁵

Labeling it the "most significant occasion of his formal participation" at the conference, Stettinius delivered his address standing at the end of a long horseshoe table. The meeting was marked by warm geniality as he began his speech emphatically and persuasively.²⁶ The Secretary followed the Byington formula and prefaced his message with off-the-record comments on the French sponsorship issue. Without elaboration, he simply stated that

25. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, March 5, 1945, p. 2, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

26. Ibid.

Paris' conditions for sponsorship were unacceptable to the four other major powers.²⁷

Stettinius reviewed the steps taken to establish an international peace-keeping body. The allies had pledged by signing the Moscow Declaration of 1943 to create a general security organization. At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, they had drawn up a vast program for postwar cooperation. "In Mexico City," he noted, "our task has been to exchange views and to clarify our thoughts on essential features of the world organization of the future and on the relationship to it of our inter-American system, and thus to prepare ourselves more fully for the work to be undertaken at San Francisco."²⁸

The Secretary then issued the invitations to the United Nations conference and moved on to the most critical section of his address, the Security Council voting procedures. He revealed that each member of the Council would have just one vote. Procedural matters of this body would be decided by the affirmative vote of seven members. All other business would be approved by a majority vote of seven including the concurring ballots of the permanent members.²⁹ The Secretary stressed that any nation appointed to the Security Council, whether temporarily or permanently, could not participate

27. Stettinius, Commission II Speech, March 5, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., p. 2.

in council decision-making on an international dispute to which it was a party. "This meant," he remarked, "that no nation in the world will be denied the right to have a fair hearing of its case in the Security Council, and that the equal, democratic rights of all nations will be respected."³⁰

More than half of Stettinius's twelve-minute speech was devoted to an explanation of voting procedures. He defended the rights of the major powers to dictate council operations. The "Big Three" were nations which possessed in sufficient degree the industrial and military strength to prevent future international conflicts. Although the first class states had designed the general security organization, he declared that the responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of a peaceful world order was the obligation of all nations. Concluding on a note of high emotion, the Secretary stated:

We have the opportunity. We have the will. May God grant us the vision and the strength to sustain us. It is my faith that together we will build this world of freedom and security - a world at peace at last.³¹

Both Padilla and Ambassador Belt of Cuba rose to generously congratulate Stettinius for his remarks. The Mexican Foreign Minister said the speech would warm the hearts of all men of good will. He praised the Secretary for his splendid work in building a better world and appealed to his colleagues to "take to that meeting (the

30. Ibid., p. 3.

31. Ibid.

San Francisco Conference) the high purpose of establishing justice for which men are dying, that it may be given lasting reality."³²

After these felicitations, Para-Perez presented his long report on the Dumbarton Oaks program, together with a draft resolution. This commission recommendation conceded that the purpose of the Western hemispheric republics was to cooperate with one another and with all nations loving peace in setting up a general world organization based upon the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The Cuban delegates, though they had previously opposed the proposals, now moved for the adoption of the resolution. They believed that the recommendation would not only make clear the determination of the American states to strive for the establishment of an effective international body but also place on record certain criticisms which they had to offer with respect to the Dumbarton Oaks program.³³

A Peruvian representative pointed out, however, that the resolution lacked a specific provision regarding the relationship between the inter-American arrangement and the world organization. He sought an amendment stipulating that the regional system would act only in accordance with the principles of the proposed United Nations. An Uruguayan diplomat, voicing similar sentiments, stated that there should be no exclusion of the world organization from jurisdiction over American matters.³⁴ In opposition to this line

32. Telegram, Stettinius to Joseph Grew, March 5, 1945, p. 2, Box 287, Stettinius Papers.

33. Harley Notter, Commission II Report, March 5, 1945, p. 1, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

34. Ibid.

of thought, a Brazilian delegate argued that the international body should intervene in hemispheric affairs only when the regional system broke down. To reconcile divergent views, it was agreed that Para-Perez would consult with the delegates and work out a formula of compromise.³⁵

Following this debate, Stettinius placed the resolution before the Commission and it was unanimously approved by acclamation. Before adjourning the meeting, the Secretary thanked Para-Perez for his report and also expressed his hope that the members of Commission II would work together again in San Francisco. Finally, he announced:

Gentlemen, our work is done; I am sure we all agree that the results achieved in this Commission will stand out as a truly historic contribution to the greatest cause in the world. We are all going on to the next step immensely fortified in our determination to achieve the creation of a world organization and in our faith that the United Nations shall succeed in this supreme endeavor.³⁶

Having instilled a feeling of cordiality and a belief that a real service was being rendered, Stettinius successfully achieved his goal for the world organization group.³⁷ At times, Latin American delegates had criticized the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and even suggested a list of revisions in the form of a Mexican

35. Ibid., p. 2.

36. Stettinius, Commission II Report, March 5, 1945, p. 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

37. Notter, Commission II Report, March 5, 1945, p. 2, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

resolution. In the end, however, the Secretary was able to persuade them to accept the proposals at least as a basis for discussion at the San Francisco Conference. Thus, the Western hemispheric states could approach the United Nations talks as a unified group desirous of peace.

With his commission duties completed, Stettinius turned to another conference problem — the Argentine issue. He invited diplomats from Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Haiti, and El Salvador to a 2:00 P.M. luncheon to consider their relationships with the Buenos Aires government. This meeting accomplished very little. But its significance lies in that it marked the Secretary's first attempt in Mexico City to cope with the alienation of Argentina.³⁸

At 4:30 P.M., the chief American delegate assembled his top aides for an important strategy session. Connally, Austin, Messersmith, Rockefeller, and others met with Stettinius to draw up plans for bringing the Chapultepec talks to a successful conclusion.³⁹ Several topics were discussed, ranging from the propriety of submitting a resolution of thanks to Dr. Padilla for his fine chairmanship to the possibility of drafting a formula for the eventual return of Argentina to the hemispheric fold. The Secretary also brought up the subject of his post-conference trip to Cuba. Ambassador Messersmith noted that American problems in Cuba were rooted in the sugar purchasing policies. Unfortunately,

38. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, March 5, 1945, p. 6, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

39. Ibid., p. 7.

over the past three years, the State Department had been unable to exercise a stabilizing influence. Nevertheless, he believed that a stop made strictly on a courtesy basis would be appropriate.⁴⁰ Rockefeller supported this view. Since Ambassador Braden had already expressed his disapproval of such a visit, and Grew had yet to submit a judgment, a final decision was postponed.

Following the dialogue on the Havana trip, Assistant Secretary Clayton briefed the gathering on the development of the economic resolutions. He observed that Chile and Brazil had introduced proposals calling on the United States to close down war plants in competition with the basic resources of Latin America. This recommendation was directed exclusively at American rubber and nitrate factories.⁴¹ Clayton revealed that while Brazil had been influenced to withdraw its resolution on rubber production, Chile had refused to cooperate. Stettinius stated at this point that neither proposal was within the proper scope of the Mexico City Conference. The nitrate question was a private matter between the United States and Chile. He suggested that a letter be sent to the Santiago regime arranging for consultations at a later date.⁴²

Before ending the meeting, the Secretary commented on leaks to the press concerning the business of the delegation steering committee. James Reston and other correspondents had published

40. Delegation Steering Committee Report, March 5, 1945, p. 1, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

41. Ibid., p. 2.

42. Ibid.

unfavorable stories about internal disputes. Stettinius declared that "they would have to do better in San Francisco," implying perhaps, that unfounded rumors would have to be eliminated at the United Nations conference.

Since his talk with the delegation steering committee dragged on, the chief American diplomat missed most of the 5:00 P.M. plenary session. In the early evening, he met briefly with Rockefeller and then retired to answer his correspondence. Writing to Grew, he related that the Act of Chapultepec was a meeting of the minds, where all the American republics signing the document had guaranteed the security and integrity of not just one or two nations but the whole Western hemisphere. "It was a real step forward toward the success of the San Francisco Conference."⁴³

The Secretary also informed his assistant in Washington that Commission III had adopted the "Declaration of Mexico." This resolution by the host country embraced seventeen broad social precepts and principles of international law. He noted that the "Declaration" had aroused little debate. "Evidently, the delegates seem to feel it was a contribution to Mexican prestige and did not examine it closely"⁴⁴

Overall Stettinius exhibited an optimistic mood in his dispatches of March 5. The conference proceedings continued to meet the objectives of American foreign policy. The Latin American

43. Ibid.

44. Telegram, Stettinius to Joseph Grew, March 5, 1945, p. 4, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

republics had finally agreed to accept the Dumbarton Oaks proposals as a basis for discussion in San Francisco. A regional security pact had been drafted to become the keystone of hemispheric defenses. Economic and social resolutions foreshadowed closer cooperation between Washington and its southern neighbors during the transition period. With all these positive accomplishments, one critical issue still had to be resolved. The Secretary observed that "the outstanding theme of press and delegate interest was the Argentine situation, but it had not yet reached the stage of public discussion."⁴⁵ This lack of publicity would be remedied very soon.

45. Ibid., p. 5.

CHAPTER VII

OVERCOMING FINAL OBSTACLES: ARGENTINE ISOLATION AND THE END OF THE CONFERENCE

MARCH 6, 1945

With the conference near completion, Stettinius's duties at Chapultepec were greatly reduced. His only remaining major responsibility was to oversee the final processing of resolutions. Most of the commissions had submitted their recommendations to the conference as a whole. The status of these proposals had yet to be determined by the plenary sessions. Thus on March 6, the Secretary spent considerable time studying resolutions in preparation for the day's plenary meeting. Plagued by the Argentine issue, he also scheduled a luncheon with Latin American diplomats to discuss further relations with the Farrell regime.

Throughout the morning, Stettinius reviewed commission reports written by his aides. Adolf Berle's paper informed him that Commission I proposals were based upon the principle that the American republics constituted an integrated defense zone.¹ Therefore, the war effort committee suggested that a permanent hemispheric planning board be created for military affairs. The committee also sought government control of the production and distribution of armaments. This did not mean the nationalization of the munitions industry but rather government regulation of it. Other resolutions

1. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, March 6, 1945, p. 1, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

dealt with protecting the hemisphere from Axis subversion and war criminals. Berle cited two difficulties that his commission encountered. The first controversy centered around the criteria to distinguish political exiles from war criminals. A method had to be instituted whereby the distinction could be made without eliminating the right of asylum. The second problem was defining subversive action so as not to interfere with revolutionary activities which sometimes occurred within an American republic. This issue was debated without the intention of frustrating the possibilities of political change.²

In the Commission II report, Pasvolsky summarized only the key proceedings. This body had considered fifteen recommendations, five of which had been submitted to the full committee and three approved.³ Stettinius's world organization group had passed proposals 1) accepting the Dumbarton Oaks program as a basis for discussion in San Francisco, 2) reaffirming the Atlantic Charter, and 3) acknowledging the right of women to participate in international conferences.⁴

As the Secretary analyzed the resolutions of Commission III, he noted three of broad public and international interest.⁵ The

2. Telegram, Stettinius to Joseph Grew, March 6, 1945, p. 3, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

3. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, March 6, 1945, p. 1, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

4. Ibid.

5. Telegram, Stettinius to Grew, March 6, 1945, p. 1, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

The recommendation for freedom of access of information had been adopted unanimously by the committee with few minor changes. This action had been favorably received by American journalists and radio commentators. The Haitian proposal against racial discrimination had been passed too. It reaffirmed the principle that all men are entitled to equal rights and opportunities. A third resolution paid homage to the Dominion of Canada for her contributions to the war effort. It also recognized that relations between the American republics and Canada were becoming closer daily.⁶

The Commission IV paper presented to Stettinius by Technical Expert August Maffry covered a wide variety of resolutions. Proposals of commercial interest dealt with the Economic Charter of the Americas, inter-American transportation systems, and hemispheric development programs. Other measures sought to prevent unemployment and increase the sale and distribution of primary products. In reference to social matters, Maffry revealed that his committee had produced suggestions for inter-American cooperation in the case of European war orphans, a charter for women and children, and a Declaration of Social Principles of the Americas.⁷

The progress of Commission V was outlined by advisor Wayne Taylor. He observed that his group had approved eight programs geared to economic cooperation in the prosecution of the war.

6. Ibid., p. 2.

7. August Maffry, Commission IV Report, March 6, 1945, p. 1, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

Of great interest to the delegates was a war-time price control resolution. It recommended the continuous revision and review of controls, keeping in mind that price ceilings should be appropriately related to the costs of production and transportation, and that the prices of raw and manufactured materials should have a fair relationship.⁸ Another proposal desired to make capital equipment available to the underdeveloped southern republics on a fair and equitable basis. Tied to this suggestion was the concept of an economic advisory committee. This proposed research body would compile data on economic problems from each hemispheric power and hopefully produce concrete solutions. Having a strong interest in enemy financial and commercial holdings, Commission V passed three other resolutions. With respect to Axis acts of dispossession, no transfers made during the period of enemy occupation would be recognized. A declaration on gold policies would bind signatory nations to refuse to purchase gold having an enemy taint. And finally, neutral nations were called upon to demobilize Axis assets.⁹

Along with the five commission reports that the Secretary perused, he read a survey of press reaction to the San Francisco invitations. A majority of the top American newspapers welcomed the Security Council voting procedures. The operations of the Council were labeled "constructive and reasonable" by the New York Times and characterized as an "ingenious formula" by the New York

8. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, March 6, 1945, p. 1, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

9. Ibid., p. 3.

Herald Tribune.¹⁰ Of the few opponents to voting procedures radio commentators Earl Godwin and Walter Kiernan were the most bitter. "Another victory for Stalin," declared Godwin, "and a swell way to bat small nations around and let any one of the big nations act the bully." Kiernan described the invitations as "Russia getting her way."¹¹ France's failure to sponsor the San Francisco Conference received only a moderate amount of comment — mostly to the effect that Paris missed an opportunity to increase its prestige.¹²

After spending the first half of the day reading conference proposals, Stettinius held a 2:00 P.M. luncheon with Latin American diplomats. He discussed the Argentine situation with the Foreign Ministers of Bolivia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and the Paraguayan Ambassador to Washington. Unanimity existed among all delegations that the only alternative was to pass a resolution at the conclusion of the talks expressing regret at Argentina's absence but indicating hope that in the interest of continental unity she would adhere to the Act of Chapultepec and other conference provisions as well as qualify for United Nations membership.¹³ In accordance with conference plans, Dr. Padilla was to bring this resolution to the attention of the Buenos Aires government through the machinery of the Pan American Union. The diplomatic language of the proposal would seek to make clear that Argentina had to bind

10. Survey of Press Coverage of the Issuance of the San Francisco Invitations, March 5, 1945, p. 1, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

11. Ibid., p. 2.

12. Ibid., p. 1.

13. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, March 6, 1945, p. 3, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

herself to Mexico City and United Nations decisions in order to join the American and world security systems. At the same time, the draft would attempt to avoid any suggestion of an ultimatum. The conference recommendation would thus obligate the Farrell regime to take explicit action against Axis agents, war criminals, financial and commercial concerns on one hand and abandon its aggressive tendencies on the other.¹⁴ Latin American support for a resolution of this nature would appeal to the Secretary. This proposal would reflect hemispheric solidarity without pitting the United States against Argentina as individual adversaries.

Following the luncheon, Stettinius attended the 5:00 P.M. plenary session at Chapultepec Castle. At this meeting, more than twenty resolutions were given final approval by the conference as a whole. Among the recommendations passed were those concerning a permanent inter-American Defense Board, strengthening the regional system, and the Declaration of Mexico. With this session, conference business for March 6 ended.¹⁵ In the early evening, Secretary and Mrs. Stettinius hosted a black tie dinner for the heads of delegations at the American Embassy.¹⁶

Stettinius reviewed the day's activities in a cable sent to Joseph Grew later on that night. He noted that:

14. James Reston, "Conferees Soften Tone On Argentina," New York Times, March 7, 1945, p. 9.

15. Telegram, Stettinius to Grew, March 6, 1945, p. 4, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

16. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, March 6, 1945, p. 5, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

Everyone feels that noteworthy progress has been made toward cooperation of the American republics with the world organization and no negative criticism has been voiced beyond some indications of disappointment that France is not among the nations sponsoring the San Francisco Conference. The resolution regarding Argentina is in draft form but is unlikely to be presented till the meeting of the Steering Committee on Thursday.¹⁷

The Secretary also revealed that while the Chapultepec talks were proceeding smoothly, there would be an extension of the conference.¹⁸

The delegations would not depart before Thursday evening because of difficulties in the coordinating committee. Over one hundred and fifty resolutions had to be edited, typed, and translated before a conference adjournment.

MARCH 7, 1945

Much like the preceding day, Stettinius spent his time on March 7 in strategy talks debating the Argentine issue and in a plenary session legislating resolutions. At this point, most delegations favored the proposed statement of regret as the best means to handle Argentine isolation. American diplomats, however, wanted to make sure that the document would not place the hemispheric republics in an embarrassing situation at a later date. Therefore, when the Secretary was not at plenary sessions formalizing recommendations or attending to last-minute conference business, he and his aides were examining relations with Buenos Aires.

17. Ibid.

18. Telegram, Stettinius to Grew, March 6, 1945, p. 4, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

At both the 9:00 A.M. delegation meeting and the 9:45 A.M. steering committee conference, State Department officials studied the pros and cons of the Argentine resolution. Unable to attend these gatherings because of his brief courtesy call on President Camacho, Stettinius sent Hayden Raynor in his place. A mood of uncertainty existed at the first meeting. The question arose whether or not Argentina should be allowed to join the United Nations unless she declared war, in as much as some other Latin American nations had only declared a state of belligerency.¹⁹ Both William Clayton and Michael McDermott felt that public opinion at home would not be satisfied unless the Farrell regime initiated hostilities against the Axis powers. They considered a war declaration absolutely necessary for Argentina's return to the "family of nations."²⁰ Rockefeller pointed out, however, that according to the conference proposal, the Buenos Aires government need only abide by the United Nations' Pact and the Mexico City decisions to be welcomed back into the hemispheric fold. This resolution did not specify that Argentina declare war, although there was such an implication. Rockefeller urged his colleagues not to push Farrell's regime into the present conflict. Warning against writing something into the resolution that was not expressed there, he perceived that outside pressure might create such a reaction in Argentina that its people would refuse to satisfy the

19. Ibid.

20. Hayden Raynor, Delegation Meeting Report, March 7, 1945, p. 1, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

terms of the proposal.²¹ Senator Austin did not accept this line of thinking. He believed that the American delegation should publicly stress the need for an Argentine war declaration. Though such comments would be popular, Rockefeller felt that they would do a disservice to American foreign policy.²²

Immediately after this debate, a rump session of the steering committee convened. Following further polemics, this gathering agreed that the Argentine resolution should indicate that the Mexico City conference viewed the Farrell regime as an integral part of the Americas. Consequently, Argentina should place herself in a position to concur with the work of the Chapultepec talks and strive to become a signatory to the United Nations Declaration.²³

Having found unanimity only in the belief that the Buenos Aires government belonged within the hemispheric bloc, Stettinius's top aides assembled once more at 11:30 A.M. to brief him on their earlier discussions. Before examining the Argentine controversy, the Secretary commented on the value of keeping congressional leaders informed on conference proceedings. Senator Austin and Representative Johnson replied that the delegation had kept them abreast of diplomatic matters. Moving on to the Buenos Aires question, the debate resumed when Austin again stated that Argentina

21. Ibid., p. 2.

22. Ibid.

23. Hayden Raynor, Delegation Steering Committee Report, March 7, 1945, p. 2, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

must definitely declare war to be reinstated. Accepting this view, Stettinius stated that:

We should not even open the door a crack until she Argentina had declared war and that was the attitude all delegates would take when they went home.²⁴

Although there were conflicting opinions within the steering committee on the war declaration matter as evidenced by the Austin and Rockefeller positions, the group still supported the proposed Argentine resolution. In other words, Stettinius and other American delegates may have privately desired Argentina's entrance into the war, but publicly they supported her adherence to the Mexico City resolutions and the United Nations Declaration for re-admission. The Secretary noted later on that the Argentine resolution was "the product of the draftsmanship of many delegates and seemed to have complete and enthusiastic acceptance."²⁵ Thinking perhaps of differences within his own delegation he also observed that, lacking consensus, some individuals might oppose the resolution when it came up for final approval.²⁶

To inform the newspapers and the general public of the American delegation's activities and views concerning the Argentine resolution, Stettinius scheduled a 1:00 P.M. press conference. Surprisingly, he made a few introductory remarks and then departed for

24. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, March 7, 1945, p. 1, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

25. Telegram, Stettinius to Joseph Crew, March 7, 1945, p. 2, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

26. Ibid.

an "urgent appointment." Revealing his gratification with the progress of the conference, the Secretary just hinted that hemispheric solidarity was within sight and excused himself.²⁷

Rockefeller conducted the rest of the conference and outlined off-the-record American responses to the Argentine resolution. He mentioned that Stettinius had held a series of luncheon meetings with Latin American diplomats to exchange views on the Buenos Aires question. Considering these sessions "inspirational," the Assistant Secretary remarked that they were characterized by tremendous unanimity, frankness, and directness.²⁸ He stated too that the Washington delegation had continuously encountered a unique problem at the conference. Argentine representatives had worked behind the scenes with diplomats from every hemispheric power except the United States to gain quasi acceptance at Chapultepec. Rockefeller revealed that the United States was attempting to eradicate this back door diplomacy among the American republics. He declared that:

One of the points we wanted to arrange at the conference is to get a line back of which all the Americas would stand together, to get away from the problem of not knowing what other republics are thinking And I think we have here something the Argentine Resolution which the Americas as a group — twenty republics represented here — can stand together on and subscribe to, so that for

27. Stettinius, Press Conference Statement, March 7, 1945, p. 1, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

28. Nelson A. Rockefeller, Press Conference Statement, March 7, 1945, p. 2, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

the first time we have got a unified position which eliminates all of this manuevering and moving around, in which nobody can quite tell where they are.²⁹

After assuring the reporters that the Argentine resolution did not commit the United States to granting diplomatic recognition to the Farrell regime, Rockefeller introduced Adolf Berle. The American Ambassador to Brazil explained Argentina's obligations if she signed the United Nations Declaration. The Buenos Aires government would have to devote all its military and economic resources to the struggle against the nations of the Tripartite Pact. Although this did not necessarily entail a declaration of war. Argentina would also have to pledge not to make a separate armistice or peace with the Axis powers.³⁰

Following their formal statements, both Berle and Rockefeller fielded questions from the press. One journalist inquired as to the most deplorable aspect of the Argentine situation. Rockefeller replied that "it was the Farrell regime's inability to put itself in a position to participate in the Chapultepec talks."³¹ Before concluding, Berle announced that the Argentine resolution would become a public document after the final plenary session on March 8. At that time, it would be attached to the final act of the conference.³²

29. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

30. Ibid., p. 6.

31. Ibid., p. 8.

32. Adolf Berle, Press Conference Statement, March 7, 1945, p. 8, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

From the press conference, the interests of the American delegation shifted to the 5:00 P.M. plenary session. Stettinius re-entered the picture as he participated in the final passage of various conference proposals. Voting was so rapid that only with the utmost difficulty could one keep up with what was being considered.³³ Ten of the last recommendations were decided upon by title, without any debate of the individual clauses within each text. The Secretary and his Latin American colleagues approved of measures ranging from guidelines for the progressive reduction of price controls to safeguards for democratic educational systems.

As the final conference proceedings moved into high gear, Stettinius spent part of the evening planning his schedule for the last day of the Chapultepec talks. He had to prepare himself for his plenary session address thanking Dr. Padilla and President Camacho for their work. The chief American delegate also had to arrange for his departure from Mexico City plus take care of last-minute details concerning his radio broadcast the following evening. As these matters were attended to, the prospect of successfully concluding the Mexico City Conference must have definitely pleased him.

MARCH 8, 1945

Edward Stettinius was a very visible figure on the last day of the Chapultepec talks. Shifting scenes quickly, he basked in

33. Hayden Raynor, Plenary Session Report, March 7, 1945, p. 1, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

the limelight of the final delegation meeting, plenary sessions, press conference, and radio broadcast. Praising his colleagues at these gatherings for their contributions in Mexico City, he in turn was congratulated for his efforts. Not only the sacrifices of Latin American diplomats, but also the friendly ways and personal diplomacy of the Secretary were acknowledged as instrumental in the successes of the conference.

At the last 9:00 A.M. delegation briefing, Stettinius depicted the Mexico City negotiations as a series of advances of real importance. He expressed his appreciation to Rockefeller, Messersmith, and their staffs for their part in attaining these positive results. Believing there had never been greater harmony between agencies of the United States government, starting with congressional representatives and going through both old-line and emergency branches, he declared that: "this demonstration of unity has inspired many and been of tremendous assistance to the Department of State."³⁴

Following these remarks of commendation, the chief American spokesman read an Associated Press dispatch from Argentina. This cable indicated that the Buenos Aires government was willing to take a conciliatory position. Farrell's Foreign Minister, Cesar Ameghino had issued a statement endorsing the aims of the Act of Chapultepec.³⁵ Though it now appeared that the controversy with Argentina might be near an end, Stettinius pointed out

34. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, March 8, 1945, p. 1, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

35. Ibid.

the possibility of a new threat to American foreign policy. Rumors persisted that some hemispheric republics might establish a common policy prior to the San Francisco Conference and thus form a Latin American bloc at the meeting. He charged Rockefeller with the responsibility of preventing such a situation.³⁶

In the absence of Tom Connally, the Secretary next called on Senator Warren Austin for a few remarks. The Vermont politician regarded the Mexico City Conference as a "helpful experiment" toward peace. He noted that a great example had been set by the cooperative action within the American delegation. Austin thanked the Foreign Service personnel for the treatment attributed him as a Republican opposition member of the United States Senate and especially the openness with which he had been dealt.³⁷

Before adjourning, Rockefeller rose to thank Stettinius on behalf of the delegation for devoting two weeks of his time to the Chapultepec talks. His subordinates appreciated his sacrifices at an important moment in world events to work in Mexico City in full equality with the representatives of the other American countries. Rockefeller stated that the Secretary's leadership had been a real inspiration to the United States delegation.³⁸

From the Hotel Reforma gathering, Stettinius went to the National Palace accompanied by Rockefeller, Messersmith, and

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., p. 2.

38. Ibid.

Warren Pierson, head of the Export-Import Bank, for an 11:00 A.M. appointment with President Camacho. The chief American delegate and the Mexican leader held a thirty-five minute conversation which was marked by extreme cordiality.³⁹ During a previous talk at Cuernavaca on March 3, the Secretary had conveyed to Camacho President Roosevelt's greetings and hopes for a renewal of the pleasant exchanges initiated the year before at Corpus Cristi and Monterrey. Stettinius praised Camacho for the constructive supervision he and Dr. Padilla had given the conference. He also commended the Camacho administration for its progressive programs which had strengthened ties between the United States and its southern neighbor.⁴⁰

The Mexican president replied with great emotion as he spoke warmly of Roosevelt and of the Secretary's efforts at Chapultepec.⁴¹ He felt that Washington and Mexico City would no longer be fearful of each other as they solved mutual problems without incident. Stettinius later noted in his journal that Camacho spoke with obvious sincerity and a certain amount of feeling. He observed that the President's manner of expression undoubtedly reflected his genuine attitude of friendship toward the United States.⁴²

After his conversation at the National Palace, the Secretary proceeded to the plenary session scheduled for noon. Padilla

39. Ibid., p. 4.

40. Ibid., p. 5.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., p. 6.

opened the meeting by asking whether there were any motions before the reading of the final act. Several delegates took this opportunity to make speeches complimenting the work of Padilla and Stettinius. The chief American spokesman then rose to deliver his final plenary address. In a brief two-minute talk, he paid tribute to the hospitality, generosity, and goodwill of the Mexican people and their leaders. The Secretary mentioned the deep interest and helpful influence of President Camacho in the labors of the conference. In reference to Padilla, he declared that "his outstanding work in organizing this historic assembly and brilliant manner in which he has conducted its deliberations have contributed beyond measure to its success."⁴³ Stettinius concluded by expressing his hope that it would be his good fortune to welcome many of the delegates including the Mexican hosts to the San Francisco Conference in a few weeks.⁴⁴

When Padilla regained the floor he unveiled the gratitude of his country by interpreting the advances of the conference in terms of the diligence and efforts of the visiting delegates. Having paid this compliment, he directed the passage of the final act and some sixty resolutions covering almost every field of human endeavor.

43. Stettinius, Plenary Session Speech, March 8, 1945, p. 1, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

44. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, March 8, 1945, p. 3, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

After the plenary session, Stettinius attended a mid-afternoon luncheon for delegation heads and then went on to hold his last press conference at the Edificio Imperial at 4:30. There he made just a brief statement revealing his intention to visit President Grau San Martin of Cuba after the conference. He also thanked the reporters for their cooperation at Chapultepec and bade them farewell until the United Nations talks.⁴⁵ Most of this conference was utilized as an opportunity for American advisors to publicize their views on the Chapultepec meetings. The Secretary looked on as his top aides — Rockefeller, Austin, Connally, and Messersmith — gave short speeches and fielded questions from reporters. Rockefeller, speaking first, repeated his remarks of the earlier delegation briefing praising his boss. He commended Stettinius for his policy of delegating authority to those around him and for his inspiring leadership. The Assistant Secretary also spoke highly of the journalists and regarded his association with them as one of his happiest relationships in Mexico City.⁴⁶

When a Venezuelan reporter asked if reactionary republicans would place obstacles in the way of the Good Neighbor Policy, Senator Austin answered with an emphatic "No!" The Vermont politician went on to voice his admiration for the conference practice of "open covenants openly arrived at."⁴⁷ He and his fellow senator,

45. Stettinius, Press Conference Statement, March 8, 1945, p. 2, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

46. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

47. Ibid., p. 3.

Connally, had participated in free and public discussions of hemispheric problems. Austin regarded the conference as a great "uplifting" for himself and declared that "we have really accomplished tremendous progress toward the objective that is of vital interest to every father and mother of a soldier . . . and we have discovered what warm sympathy there is among Latin Americans and South Americans."⁴⁸

Following his congressional colleague, Tom Connally talked to the reporters about the Act of Chapultepec. He remarked that the regional pact had realized his hope of some day making the security and safety of the Western hemisphere the responsibility of all the American states. The Texas Democrat observed that this "act of collaboration" consisted of two phases. In the first instance, the attack of a non-American country on any hemispheric republic would be regarded as an act of aggression by all the regional powers, who would present a united front against the potential conqueror. Secondly, Connally declared that as a family of nations, the hemisphere had taken a great step in the interest of self-preservation because "no American aggressor can, with safety, attack his neighbor, or any other nation without incurring the risk of unified hostility and resistance."⁴⁹ He concluded that the defense pact marked an epoch or era in international relations and international law and was "a great milestone along the highway which we hope is leading to peace and security throughout the world."⁵⁰

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid., p. 5.

50. Ibid., p. 6.

George Messersmith issued the last statement at the press conference. He spoke of the significance of the Chapultepec talks to the inter-American scene as well as the world picture. The United States Ambassador also revealed that he never had any doubts about the outcome of the conference. "I had no fears at all as to the success of this meeting because I had the absolute confidence that first of all the American delegation, headed by our dynamic and understanding Secretary of State, would come here with a full understanding of the problems which we had to face."⁵¹ Messersmith believed that at no time in the history of the American republics had a gathering of this kind been held in an atmosphere of such complete cordiality and seriousness.

Having given his aides the chance to voice their opinions on the Chapultepec talks, Stettinius revealed similar sentiments in a radio speech over the CBS network at 9:15 P.M. He felt that the conference had achieved truly historic results.

We have reaffirmed our wartime collaboration in the struggle against the Axis countries, strengthened our system of inter-American cooperation, and assured the participation of the American republics in the effort to organize the world for peace and security.⁵²

The Secretary speculated that the conclusions reached in Mexico City would contribute to the success of the upcoming San Francisco meeting and also foreshadow the complete and perfect organization

51. Ibid.

52. Stettinius, Radio Speech, March 8, 1945, p. 1, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

of the regional system at the inter-American conference scheduled for Bogota in 1946.⁵³

Summarizing the accomplishments of the Chapultepec talks, he outlined six agreements which he considered to be of extraordinary significance. First of all, the American states were united in their effort to stamp out every vestige of Nazi influence in the Western hemisphere. The delegates had passed resolutions aiming to eliminate Axis subversion and prevent the escape of war criminals. Secondly, after full deliberation, the hemispheric republics had endorsed the Dumbarton Oaks proposals as a basis for discussion at the United Nations conference. Recommendations from the Mexico City gathering would also aid in the creation of an international body. Stettinius announced that "the world can rest assured that the American states are prepared to join with the other United Nations in the successful establishment and maintenance of the world organization."⁵⁴

Another great conference achievement, according to the Secretary, was the adoption of the Act of Chapultepec. The United States and its Latin American neighbors would band together in the future to resist aggression from without or within the hemisphere. Of comparable importance was the agreement to strengthen and reorganize the inter-American system. "Climaxing the steady growth of inter-American fraternity and cooperation during a cen-

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

tury," Stettinius stated, "it is now agreed that conferences of the American states will be held regularly at four year intervals; that there be regular annual and special emergency meetings of the Foreign Ministers; that the Pan American Union will be given increased powers."⁵⁵ In addition, he pointed out that the functions of numerous existing inter-American agencies of juridical, military, social and economic character had been extended or reemphasized.

The fifth advance made at Chapultepec was in the fields of economic cooperation and social welfare. The provisions of the Economic Charter of the Americas and the Declaration of Mexico represented the delegates' attempt to rededicate themselves to the high principles of humanity. Proposals had been designed to raise the standard of living of the hemispheric masses in an "environment of peace, liberty, and security."⁵⁶

The Secretary regarded the Argentine resolution as the final significant agreement. In an act of solidarity, the twenty American republics had devised an equitable way for the Buenos Aires government to return to the hemispheric fold. Under the just terms of this measure, the Farrell regime would become a signatory to the United Nations Declaration and the final act of the Mexico City Conference.

For all these achievements, Stettinius paid tribute to the vision and steadfastness of statesmen like President Camacho and Dr. Padilla. He also acknowledged that Franklin Roosevelt's long

55. Ibid., p. 2.

56. Ibid.

and earnest efforts to foster friendship among the hemispheric powers had been manifested by the successes of the conference. In closing, the Secretary depicted the Chapultepec agreements as a "concrete expression to that spirit of Good Neighbor which has long since found acceptance among all the peoples of the Americas."⁵⁷

Stettinius's participation in the CBS radio broadcast was his last public function at the Mexico City Conference. On Friday, March 9, he departed for a brief goodwill visit to Cuba and by Saturday afternoon, the American diplomat was back in Washington. In a final cable to Joseph Grew from Chapultepec, he exhibited his persistent optimism. With his conference duties fulfilled, the Secretary's dispatch portrayed the two and one-half week gathering as the culmination of a good, neighborly policy and an attitude which the Roosevelt administration had consistently pursued during the last twelve years.⁵⁸

57. Ibid., p. 3.

58. Telegram, Stettinius to Joseph Grew, March 8, 1945, p. 1, Box 286, Stettinius Papers.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Like Stettinius, the American public and press reacted quite favorably to the Mexico City Conference. The New York Times, Washington Post, and other leading newspapers labeled the assembly "as perhaps the most successful ever held by representatives of the American republics." A Life magazine editorial noted that "United States diplomacy had just come through a very tricky international conference and come through well."¹

The passage of time has permitted the historian to more clearly analyze the Chapultepec talks. Thirty years after the conference, one can perceive that although the meeting was comparatively successful, it did not settle very much.² Most of the important policy decisions made were of a recommendatory or provisional character. In order to make them definitive and effective, much still remained to be done by subsequent conferences.³ Several political matters, including the further reorganization of the regional system, were to be referred to the ninth hemispheric meeting in Bogota in 1946. Concrete economic affairs would be discussed at the Inter-American Technical and Economic Conference scheduled for July, 1945. Even the Act of Chapultepec was merely

1. Analysis of Conference Press Coverage, p. 1, Box 283, Stettinius Papers.

2. Gordon Connell-Smith, The Inter-American System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 138.

3. Arthur Preston Whitaker, Inter-American Affairs, 1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), p. 16.

provisional pending the conclusion of a collective security treaty and constitutional adjustments by the signatory powers.⁴

While the Mexico City Conference temporized on many issue, there were other matters it did not consider at all. The subject of Franco's Spain and the American activities of the Spanish Falange were termed irrelevant by the delegates. The future of European colonies and United States naval and air bases in Latin America was also not on the agenda.⁵

Though hindsight has shown the Chapultepec talks to be less a success than once thought, the negotiations still achieved some noteworthy results for American foreign policy. Stettinius and his aides helped to draw up a solution for eliminating Argentine isolation. They also overcame Latin American resentment toward the proposed United Nations and gained hemispheric acceptance of the Dumbarton Oaks plan. The Washington delegation allayed too the fears of its southern neighbors, that the United States would not support their postwar development programs.

For a man not formally trained in the field of international affairs and considered by many just a "caretaker secretary," Stettinius did an admirable job as the chief American delegate in Mexico City. Demonstrating his ability to work under pressure, he surmounted the problem of French sponsorship and avoided any possible embarrassment stemming from the United States' dual interest in the regional system and the world organization. The

4. Connell-Smith, The Inter-American System, p. 138.

5. Whitaker, Inter-American Affairs, 1945, p. 17.

Secretary's personal diplomacy won him the friendship of the Mexican hosts, namely Camacho and Padilla, and also improved working relations with Latin American diplomats, many of whom later collaborated with him on the United Nations Charter. In addition, Stettinius established good rapport with the press and consequently, received favorable publicity for his department. American journalists endorsed his practice of having laymen, representative of different sectors of society, on the delegation. They also supported his efforts to obtain a freedom of information resolution. Utilizing the medium of radio, the Secretary brought into focus for the public Washington's diplomatic goals and State Department operations. His policy of passing on responsibility to top aides could only have helped to improve the morale of the department. Besides this, permitting Rockefeller, Pasvolsky, Raynor, and others to direct certain activities in Mexico City must have impressed hemispheric representatives with the cohesiveness of the American delegation. In view of these facts, Edward Stettinius conducted himself and American foreign policy in a very competent manner at the Mexico City Conference of 1945.

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The section of the Stettinius Papers entitled "The Mexico City Conference" was the most important primary source, representing eight of more than nine hundred boxes. It contains background and position papers on the conference and dossiers filled with biographical sketches of foreign diplomats. Commission reports, press surveys, and public opinion polls are also found in the boxes. Each of Stettinius's Chapultepec speeches is included in the collection. Most important of all, his calendar notes and daily journal entries from February 20 to March 9, 1945 are found here. All correspondence between the Secretary and his associates, particularly Joseph Grew are included in this too. Overall, the Stettinius Papers contain one of the best descriptions of the Mexico City Conference.

2. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, The American Republics, Volume IX. Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969.
A good source on the diplomatic correspondence involved in planning a hemispheric meeting.

Notter, Harley. Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945. Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1949.
Excellent eye-witness account of State Department planning for the Chapultepec talks.

Department of State Bulletin, February, March, 1945.
Not very helpful except as a source for excerpts from conference speeches.

3. NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES

Cianfarra, Camille M. New York Times, February 21-March 9, 1945.
Brief, but good journalist's account of conference.

Newsweek, February, March, 1945.
Not very helpful.

Padilla, Ezequiel. "The American System And The World Organization," Foreign Affairs, XXIV (October, 1945), 99-107.
Only slight reference to the Mexico City Conference.

Reston, James. New York Times, February 21-March 9, 1945.
Excellent eye-witness account of conference proceedings
characterized by interesting editorial comment.

Time, February, March, 1945.
Good personality sketches and background information.

4. PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS

Bohlen, Charles E. Witness to History, 1929-1969. New York:
W. W. Norton and Company, 1973.
Career diplomat draws comparisons relating to the office
of Secretary of State.

Brynes, James F. All in One Lifetime. New York: Harper, 1958.
Stettinius's successor gives no new insights.

Gildersleeve, Virginia C. Many a Good Crusade. New York: Mac-
Millan, 1954.
A fine character study of the chief American delegate to
the San Francisco Conference.

Grew, Joseph C. Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years,
1904-1945, Volume II. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952.
Surprisingly short account by Stettinius's Undersecretary.

Hull, Cordell. Memoirs, Volume II. New York: MacMillan Company,
1948.
Stettinius's predecessor comments on the State Department
reorganization.

Truman, Harry S. Years of Decision. New York: Doubleday, 1955.
Not very much help.

Vandenberg, Arthur H. and Morris, Joe Alex. The Private Papers of
Senator Vandenberg. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952.
Reveals how Stettinius's warm personality could overcome
the animosity of a congressional leader to establish a
good friendship.

SECONDARY SOURCES

1. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

Johnson, Walter. "Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.," in An Uncertain
Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth
Century. Edited by Norman A. Graebner. New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1961.
Historian Johnson, a close friend of Stettinius, has written
a brief but good chapter on the Secretary. He has outlined

clearly the warm personality of Stettinius. This book was useful in researching the introductory chapter.

Walker, Robert. "Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.," in The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, Volume XIV. Edited by Samuel Flagg Bemis and R. H. Ferrell. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1967.

Walker has written an excellent sketch of Stettinius's tenure as Secretary of State. He has drawn interesting comparisons between Stettinius and other Secretaries. This book contains the best bibliography in print on Stettinius. The work was heavily utilized in the first chapter.

2. GENERAL TEXTS ON AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

Bailey, Thomas A. A Diplomatic History of the American People. 9th ed. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974.

Bailey's text provides good bibliography on Latin American-United States relations during World War II.

DeConde, Alexander. A History of American Foreign Policy. New York: Scribner, 1963.

Helpful source for background material on Argentine-American relations during World War II.

Leopold, Richard William. The Growth of American Foreign Policy. New York: Knopf, 1962.

Not a very good source. Just gives a general outline of hemispheric relations during World War II.

3. WORKS ON LATIN AMERICAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS

Connell-Smith, Gordon. The Inter-American System. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966.

Good secondary work on the reasons for and goals of the Mexico City Conference.

Green, David. The Containment of Latin America. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971.

The best secondary source on the Chapultepec talks. Slightly critical but honest account pointing out difficult issues, analyzing the accomplishments, and drawing conclusions on the conference.

Holmes, Olive. The Mexico City Conference and Regional Security. New York: The Foreign Policy Association, 1945.

Comments on just the issue of regional security. Too narrow a work to aid the thesis.

Mecham, John Lloyd. The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1967.
A good synopsis of the Mexico City Conference. Clearly outlines the issues and results of the conference.

Whitaker, Arthur Preston. Inter-American Affairs, 1945. New York: Columbia University Press, 1946.

A fine job of focusing in on the preparations, issues, and accomplishments of the Chapultepec talks. Good analysis of the results of the conference.

_____. The United States and Argentina. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954.
Probably not the best work on Argentine-American relations.

4. WORKS ON THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION

Bishop, Jim. F. D. R.'s Last Year. April 1944-April 1945. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1974.

A recent work depicting adequately the personalities around Roosevelt. Continuous, but brief reference to Stettinius.

Campbell, Thomas M. Masquerade Peace, America's UN Policy, 1944-1945. Tallahassee: Florida State Press, 1973.

Interesting observations by a Stettinius scholar.

Dean, Vera Michele. The Four Cornerstones of Peace. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1946.

General sketch of the conference included in this work. Although, the author is more involved in portraying Roosevelt and Trumans' attempts to resolve the world-wide hostilities rather than just the Chapultepec talks.

Guerrant, Edward O. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy. Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 1950.

Adequate study within the Guerrant work on Argentine-American relations.

Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate Biography. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948.

Contains brief references to Stettinius.

Welles, Sumner. Where Are We Heading? New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946.

Slightly critical commentary on Roosevelt foreign policy.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

William Kowba was born in Rochester, New York, October 31, 1951. He now resides in Virginia Beach, Virginia with his wife Maureen. He graduated in May, 1973, magna cum laude from Saint Bonaventure University with a Bachelor of Arts in history. His Bachelor's thesis, entitled The Kornilov Affair: A Study in Counterrevolution, was accepted with honors and, at graduation he received the history alternate award. He is a member of Phi Alpha Theta, the history honor society, and Delta Epsilon Sigma, the Catholic college honor society.