2002

The rhetoric of legality vs. the rhetoric of morality: seeing justice through the eyes of dramatic works

Hannah C. Bate

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/honors-theses

Recommended Citation
Bate, Hannah C., "The rhetoric of legality vs. the rhetoric of morality: seeing justice through the eyes of dramatic works" (2002). Honors Theses. Paper 389.
The Rhetoric of Legality vs. the Rhetoric of Morality:
Seeing Justice Through the Eyes of Dramatic Works

I pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorized assistance during the completion of this work.

Hannah C. Bate
Senior Honors Thesis
Rhetoric and Communication Studies
Advisor: Dr. Marilee Mifsud
"Theater and law shared a common basis in myth and, arguably, also a comparable symbolic function in the staging of truth or enactment of the real" (Goodrich, Drama, 417). Both fields are often concerned with the same topics:

...both addressed the violence of fate and the passage of life toward death; both operated by means of fictions and within the formal constraints of staging, or demonstrating their narrative; both instituted the subject as an actor—a persona or mask—within the institutions of the intimate and commercial public spheres. (Goodrich, Drama, 417).

And so, it is through the theater that I hope to access a central conflict in the field of law: that which exists between morality and legality. Using four dramatic works from antiquity to the modern era—Sophocles’s Antigone, Hrotswitha of Gandersheim’s Sapientia, Pierre Corneille’s Cinna, and Arthur Miller’s The Crucible—my project seeks to gain insight into the ways in which dramatic authors rhetorically construct the conflict between legality and morality. What I found when I explored these constructions was a strict dichotomy between the concepts of morality and legality in Antigone and Sapientia, which slowly begins to blur and collapse in the later works—Cinna and The Crucible.

An understanding of these constructions is informed and supplemented with Aristotle’s On Rhetoric and Giambattista Vico’s New Science.

**METHODOLOGY**

A variety of methodological issues must be addressed, including this project’s relationship to rhetoric, the movement from theory to drama, the use of theoretical works, and problems with generalizability.

At the most basic level, the rhetorical quality of this project emerges when one comes to the understanding that rhetoric by definition is persuasive. Dramatic authors and their creations use a variety of rhetorical techniques, both artistic and inartistic, to
persuade the audience to adhere to one view or another. For example, just as Antigone
uses artistic means of proof to persuade her audience to support the justice of her cause,
so Sophocles uses artistic means of proof to persuade us to believe in his representation
of Antigone's world. The symbolic function mentioned by Goodrich, however, is the
topos through with the true rhetoricality of the project is revealed. Rhetoric, like drama
and law, is symbolic. And, like both of these disciplines, rhetoric is a "staging of truth"
and an "enactment of the real." Rhetoric is a symbolic construction of reality, a use of
our symbol system to express a vision of that reality. And so, rhetoric becomes a way of
understanding how dramatic and theoretical texts construct notions of justice. Rhetoric is
a tool by which we can see the inextricable intertwining of drama and justice, and
through which we can understand the symbolic arguing of jurisprudence through both
drama and theory.

A second methodological issue faced in this paper is the justification of moving
the site of inquiry into the tension between morality and legality from the purely
theoretical realm to the dramatic. Although the movement from the theoretical to the
dramatic might seem unusual, dramatic literature possesses certain qualities that are
lacking in theoretical works, and even by other forms of literature.

Overall, selecting drama as a site of critical inquiry into the rhetoric of justice
shares in the larger project of moving away from strictly theoretical studies of this topic.2

1 At this point, I must make the distinction between performative works and dramatic works. Although the
terms are often used interchangeably, they, in fact, have very different implications. Since I have been
unable to observe these plays as they would have been performed, and am conducting a textual analysis of
each work, I am treating them as a unique form of literature. This distinction is important, because it
avoids consideration of audience response, other than whether or not the productions continued to be
shown, while still providing the requisite public accessibility so necessary to the integrity of this project.
2 This sort of work is being done, albeit in a different form, throughout the field of rhetoric. For some
noteworthy contributions, see Nakayama, Thomas K. "Show/Down Time: 'Race,' Gender, Sexuality, and
The selection of dramatic literature enhances critical access to the common culture in a way that other literary genres might not. Other literary genres, such as novel writing, a popular site of inquiry beyond the theoretical (see Nussbaum), have a limited audience, due to their inherent presumption of literacy. Drama, and more recently cinema, is more commonly accessible. Plays and movies are truly consumed by the "common person," regardless of social class or educational background. For example, the "groundlings" in Shakespeare's Globe Theatre were unlikely to be literate, but could certainly hear and see the conflicts, emotions, and life-changing events experienced by the characters in the plays they attended.

Drama and the dramatic author are central to human connection. Martin Buber says that "the drama is pure dialogue; all feeling and all happening has in it become dialogue. It stands on the border of its art and points to that fulfillment and suspension in every other art in which the dialogue—is spoken" (20-21). Further, of Buber's work, Maurice Friedman writes that:

If Buber attributed a central human significance to the poet...it is in the dramatist above all others that this significance reaches its highest intensity and its greatest fulfillment...the importance of the poet does not lie in the fact that he gives poetic and dramatic expression to the life of the realizing man, asserted Buber, but that he is himself a realizing man who is, among realizing men, the mightiest in expression. (21)

Buber was not the only author to recognize that dramatic works seem to have their very root in human experience, and as such, are irrevocably entwined with the conflicts with which we are so frequently consumed, and that this relationship is mutual, as "life, after all, is as much an imitation of art as the reverse" (Turner 72). "The social drama, then, I
regard as the experiential matrix from which the many genres of cultural performance, beginning with redressive ritual and juridical procedures, and eventually including oral and literary narrative, have been generated" (Turner 78). Further, “a social drama first manifests itself as the breach of a norm, the infraction of a rule of morality, law, custom or etiquette in some public arena” (Turner 70). Consequently, conflicts, such as that between legality and morality, are often reflected in this form of expression.

Further, drama seems to be central to the overall human experience. Kenneth Burke contends that:

Man is the symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal inventor of the negative (or moralized by the negative) separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making goaded by the spirit of hierarchy (or moved by the sense of order) and rotten with perfection.

(16)

Additionally, Turner claims, “we have webs of interpretive nonverbal symbols. And we play one another…” (66). When these two conceptions of man are combined, we begin to have difficulty determining where the dramatic leaves off and reality begins. As Burke says, “the principle of drama is implicit in the idea of action” (18), and so, the dramatic seems embedded in every action we undertake. In fact, “the mere fact of the difference between men already implies a basic dramatic entanglement as an inherent component of human existence as such which drama only reproduces in clearer and heightened form” (Buber 44).

Drama is imaginative; it serves as an opportunity for us to observe the ways in which individuals deal with conflict and moral decisions without having these experiences ourselves. In dramatic works, we see our own “social dramas” reflected.

Perhaps more importantly, dramatic works have the ability to make us reflect on these experiences while still retaining connection with them. Turner says that:

Whether juridical or ritual processes of redress are invoked against mounting crisis, the result is an increase in what one might call social or plural reflexivity, the ways in which a group tries to scrutinize, portray, understand, and then act on itself. Barbara Myerhoff has written of cultural performances that they are "reflective in the sense of showing ourselves to ourselves. They are also reflexive, arousing consciousness of ourselves as we see ourselves." (75)

Drama has the power to personalize issues, to bring them out of the dry hypothetical and into the forefront of our minds and lives. In this way, the dramatic genre is central to this paper because it captures everyday life and invites us to reflect on those everyday experiences.

Correlatively, the dramatic genre is concerned with norms, a topic central to the issues with which this paper is concerned. As "inventors of the negative," humans are often extremely involved with this normative drive. Says Burke:

...if our character is built of our responses (positive or negative) to the thou-shalt-nots of morality, and if we necessarily approach life from the standpoint of our personalities, will not all experience reflect the genius of this negativity? Laws are essentially negative; 'mine' equals 'not thine'; insofar as property is not protected by the thou-shalt-nots of either moral or civil law, it is not protected at all. (11)

Our invention of the negative causes us to create laws, and these laws are reflected in the dramatic works we create. As Martha Nussbaum treats the literary, I treat the dramatic as a "morally controversial form, expressing in its very shape and style, in its mode of interaction with its readers, a normative sense of life" (Nussbaum 2). Nussbaum goes on to say "the reader's delight in the [literary] has yet a further moral dimension as a preparation for moral activities in many kinds of life" (42). I would argue the same about
the audience to a dramatic performance. The dramatic work is often a metaphor for the norms of the society in which it was created. According to Nussbaum:

The [literary work] presents itself as a metaphor. See the world in this way and not in that, it suggests. Look at things as if they were like this story and not in other ways recommended by social science. By reading the [literary work], we get not just a concrete set of images in terms of which to imagine this particular world, but also, and more significantly, a general cast of mind with which to approach our own. (43-44)

Dramatic works, and the characters contained within, often work to persuade an audience of the justice of the worldview that they present.

A methodological issue that seems tied to that just discussed is the role of theoretical works in this study. While I wish to focus on the ideas presented by the dramatic genre, theory is not without its merits as a contributing force. Although the primary texts for this study will be dramatic works, their insights will be supplemented by those provided by Aristotle’s *On Rhetoric* and Giambattista Vico’s *The New Science*. I do not assume the movement into dramatic works can replace or eliminate a need for theoretical understanding, but rather that theory and drama can work together to provide us with a more complete understanding of the issues with which this project is concerned. Discussion about this conflict has often taken place in theoretical work. Consequently, referencing theoretical works will provide me with parameters for my exploration, as well as a connection with the past. The theoretical works with which I am dealing are a ritualized guide to help me work through my primary materials. However, tradition alone is not sufficient because of its above-mentioned exclusivity. It privileges literacy, the highly educated, and abstract thought. This privileging of theory is problematic in that it is a reduction of the human experience of jurisprudence. My goal, therefore, is to bring
theory and drama into a dialogue, to have them touching so that both can be used to create knowledge and understanding.

The final methodological issue seems to be that of generalizability. Because of the restrictive sample size of this project, I am not attempting to argue that this study has the capacity to make any universal statements about this conflict. However, although I may not be able to make blanket statements about all views of the morality vs. legality conflict during these periods, I do not feel that this study and its discoveries are without merit. This project is interested in how these works address this conflict, not as representatives, but as existing instances of such work. I have selected my theoretical works on the criteria of their importance to the history of rhetorical theory, and their direct address through rhetoric of the conflict between morality and legality. My dramatic works were also selected based on a number of criteria. First, each work has as a central theme justice in its various manifestations. This is quite possibly the most important criterion, as it restricts us to works in which the main characters, narrator, and author are interested in expressing a certain opinion or perspective on the topic of justice. Second, each work must have been performed in a public arena to a common audience. Third, a sample was made of other theoretical and historical work written during or concerned with each period to establish which works other scholars and historians have considered significant in a study of conceptions of justice. For example, Sophocles’s Antigone is mentioned not only in Aristotle’s On Rhetoric and its discussion of justice, but also in many major rhetorical encyclopedias on the subject.

3 This sample began with rhetorical encyclopedias and a general library search. I then further explored those works that surfaced frequently in those searches.
I am attempting to explore how these works touch and how they speak to this important conflict. Through this exploration, I hope to present available ways to see the conflict between legality and morality, to help the reader, and myself, to better understand this conflict and its rhetorical construction from antiquity to modernity.

**DICHOTOMOUS FAVORING OF MORALITY IN ANCIENT THEORY**

Theoretically, the dichotomy between a universal conception of justice and a more localized and human sense of justice is clearly addressed in Aristotle’s *On Rhetoric*. In this work, Aristotle spends at least one book of the overall text in his consideration of the division between what he calls *common* and *specific* constructions of justice.

According to Aristotle’s *On Rhetoric*,⁴ “rhetoric is useful because the true and the just are by nature stronger than their opposites, so that if judgments are not made in the right way [the true and the just] are necessarily defeated [by their opposites]” (Aristotle 1355a). In this same work, Aristotle enunciates the dichotomous relationship between *common justice*, or the justice of nature, and *specific justice*, or justice according to man. When these two concepts are connected, it becomes clear that rhetoric, then, is necessary to assist in maintaining the superiority of truth and justice, which are connected intimately with common law. Common law, according to Aristotle, seems to have a connection with a more universal⁵ concept of justice, while specific law seeks to define justice for a community or for an individual. Consequently, common law seems to be connected with this usefulness of rhetoric in that it upholds the “universal” justice, which by nature is superior.

⁴ All references to *On Rhetoric* refer to Book 1, Chapter 13: *Topics About Justice and Injustice Useful in Judicial Rhetoric*, unless otherwise specified.
Aristotle wished to “classify all unjust and just actions, beginning first with the following points. Just and unjust actions have been defined in reference to two kinds of law” (Aristotle 1373b), which he further defines as common law and specific law. Common law is based on a “common principle of the just and unjust that all people in some way divine, even if they have no association or commerce with each other” (1373b). Common laws are those guidelines that are omitted by the specific and written law, but for which we believe people ought to be admired or condemned. “Fairness, for example, seems to be just; but fairness is justice that goes beyond the written law” (1374a). Specific law is written and “has been defined by each people in reference to themselves” (1373b). This is the law of the legislature, which has definite terms of obedience and of punishment when injustice is committed. Common law is universal and refers to an internal sense of right and wrong, of just and unjust, while specific law is based on the laws of a certain culture, society, or ruler.

Clearly, Aristotle does not necessarily believe the relationship between common and specific law to be combative. In fact, On Rhetoric seems to present these concepts as necessarily intertwined. In particular, specific law is often based on those things that common law considers to be just or unjust. However, this relationship is not reciprocal, which leads to the favoring of common law, because only in it is the idea of infinite fairness possible. The requirement for a flexible concept of law that allows for the infinite possibility of justice creates a natural favoring of common justice in Aristotle’s On Rhetoric. Aristotle feels this to be natural because he admits that specific law lacks the capacity to address all of those things that are forbidden by common law.

5 When Aristotle uses “universal,” he is in reality limiting himself to the “civilized” world, essentially to Greece. Although he speaks in generalities, his words should not be taken to mean universal in the sense of
we should and should not do, but more importantly what we may and may not do.

Common law is abstract, universal, and flexible:

> Whence the universal rules of law require constant modification and adaptation to circumstances, and this is equity, 'the mitigation of the austerity' or the relaxation of the exact rigour of written law, and a leaning to the side of mercy, indulgence, liberality. (Cope 191)

It is this capacity for adaptation, mitigation, relaxation, and leaning that allows common law to fulfill, or at the very least come close to, this concept of the infinite possibility for justice. In contrast, the "exact rigour of written law" does not allow for mercy, even in those cases in which we intuitively believe that it is necessary.

Although Aristotle enunciates this conflict in terms of "common law" vs. "specific law," it is in reality simply an alternative expression of the ongoing conflict between legality and morality. Common law, in this instance, represents morality—those unwritten codes which we all sense must be followed—while specific law is synonymous with legality—the written, specific, codified expression of the expectations of a society's government and law enforcement agencies.

**DICHOTOMOUS FAVORING OF MORALITY IN ANCIENT DRAMA**

Although Aristotle's work is theoretical, and therefore somewhat abstract, the conflicts with which he is concerned are evident in a variety of literary works, including Sophocles's *Antigone* and Hrotswitha's *Sapientia*. Like Aristotle, both of these authors seem to favor morality over legality. In *Antigone*, morality is supported by Antigone and represents custom and divine law, while legality is supported by Kreon and his edicts. In *Sapientia*, the conflict takes similar form—morality is divine in nature and is supported by Sapientia and her daughters, while Hadrian argues the virtues of legality through his personal authority. Although these two conflicts manifest themselves in different
terms—common vs. specific in *Antigone* and rhetorical vs. procedural in *Sapientia*—they are simply different expressions of this overriding morality vs. legality conflict.  

In Sophocles's tragedy *Antigone* the dichotomy between morality and legality becomes adversarial when Antigone supports the superiority of natural law and her uncle Kreon clings to the strength of the laws of man. Throughout *Antigone*, Antigone claims that justice requires proper burial for her brother, Polynieces, despite Kreon’s edict, which expressly forbids it. Kreon, then, becomes the natural proponent of specific law, as he consistently argues that his edict must override the right to proper burial because he must serve as protector of the community. The tension that exists between the specific justice of punishment owed to traitors and the common justice of proper burial is so profound and powerful that it eventually leads to the destruction of Kreon’s entire family. Antigone commits suicide because she believes so strongly in the right owed to her brother. Kreon’s son, Haemon, also commits suicide because of his sorrow over the death of his betrothed, and his mother quickly follows out of sorrow for her son. Eventually, Kreon himself recognizes that his decision was wrong and retracts his edict, but only after it is too late to save his family.

An understanding of the space that emerges between common and specific law is essential to facilitate an understanding of the conflict that occurs between King Kreon and his niece Antigone. When Kreon defines the actions of Polynieces as unjust and fashions his own specific law to deny him proper burial, Kreon opens this space by

---

6 I use different terms in the two cases in order to effectively emphasize the different methods of expression utilized by the authors of these two works. Although both are manifestations of the same overriding conflict, Sophocles’s work aligns itself more closely with the ideas of Aristotle, probably because they are products of the same culture, while Sapientia’s work does not fit as precisely into those categories.

7 In this literature, the laws of nature can also be interpreted as the laws as set down by the gods. However, it is important to avoid confusing this concept with Plato’s ideas on ideal Justice (see *Gorgias*). In Greek mythology, Gods were more human than in Christian dogma, so their laws were not absolute ideals.
defining as just that which common law defines as unjust. "Kreon has inflicted upon the 
dead Polyneices a punishment which the Greeks looked upon with peculiar terror, namely 
that his body should not receive the requisite funeral rites" (Oates and O'Neill 186). The 
language used by the opposing forces in Antigone reflects the quality of this conflict. 
Kreon's language tends toward the concrete through his reliance on inartistic proofs, 
which are by nature concrete. Authority, law, oaths, and contracts—these are all concrete 
elements to which we may refer in definite and specific terms. 

The language of Antigone captures the abstract quality of common law, as can be 
seen in the following quotation: 

For it was not Zeus that had published me that edict; not such are the laws 
set among men by the Justice who dwells with the gods below; nor 
deemed I that thy decrees were of such force, that a mortal could override 
the unwritten and unfailing statutes of heaven. For their life is not of to­
day or yesterday, but from all time, and no man knows when they were 
first put forth. 

She relies on artistic proofs—pathos, ethos, and logos—which are abstract, indefinite, 
and highly rhetorical. She is a pathetic figure and uses pathos to appeal to her audience. 
She plies the emotions of those who observe her, appealing to their pity for her sorrow 
over the loss of her brother and her anger over the injustice done to him. Emotions 
cannot be touched in a concrete way and cannot be held up by the rhetor as supporting 
evidence. Instead, they must be created and felt, just as we must intuitively feel the force 
of common law. The same is true for logic and for character. Her reasoning is 
enthymematic, and therefore uses logos, although this enthymeme is clearly collapsed. 
Because members of Thebian society deserve proper burial, and her brother Polynoeices is 
a member of Thebian society, he deserves proper burial. These elements lack the 
concrete quality of inartistic proofs, but possess the same universality as common law.
Pathos, ethos, and logos may be used in any culture and in any situation, as may common law. Antigone believed that she was following the laws of nature and of the gods in her desire to bury her brother properly. She addresses the superiority of common law throughout the play in speaking of her loyalty to the dead and of Kreon’s inability to make laws that would have the ability to nullify the laws of nature. She speaks about rights, justice, duty, and allegiance. She says that Kreon “hath no right to keep me from mine own” and that she “owe[s] a longer allegiance to the dead than to the living” (189). Justice, in the eyes of Antigone, demands that Polyneices be provided with religious burial, and that she, as his sister, be allowed to bury him and mourn him properly, as the unwritten laws of their culture demand.

In contrast with Antigone’s artistic rhetorical techniques, Kreon uses primarily inartistic rhetorical proofs, which are identified by Aristotle as “laws, witnesses, contracts, evidence taken under torture, and oaths” (1375a), and which are culturally contingent and situationally contingent, as is specific law. Kreon’s essential argument is that Polyneices violated the law, and therefore deserves to be punished. He refers, at least implicitly, to his oath and contract to defend the best interests of the city of Thebes. His argument lacks artistry, relying instead on his authority and title to make his point. While Antigone argues in terms of artistic techniques, such as emotion and logic, Kreon essentially tells his audience that because he says it, so it must be, based on the strength of the laws as he defined them and on his own authority.

In the eyes of Kreon, Polyneices’s attack on the land of Thebes and treachery toward his brother, who was crowned rightful king upon the death of their father Oedipus, is an injustice. Polyneices has violated not only the specific law that made his
brother Eteocles king, but has also done injustice toward the community of Thebes by committing treason. Kreon believes that he is acting justly by punishing Polyneices, and so he issues an edict that forbids any person to administer the proper rites of burial, while Eteocles is buried with the full honors due a hero and a king. As king, it is Kreon’s responsibility to punish violations of the law and to “guard this city’s greatness” (193). He believes this edict to be in accord with his duties to the community. When Antigone chooses to bury her brother, thus intentionally violating a specific law, she must also receive just punishment for her actions.

Kreon’s favoring of the specific law is obvious when he says to his son Haemon, “if any one transgresses, and does violence to the laws, or thinks to dictate to his rulers, such a one can win no praise from me. No, whomsoever the city may appoint, that man must be obeyed, in little things and great, in just things and unjust…” (Antigone 805-810). The language used by Kreon is interesting in this instance, because he speaks of the punishment for a violation of specific law in terms that recall those used for common law by Aristotle. “[Unwritten laws] are, on the one hand, what involves and abundance of virtue and vice, for which there are reproaches and praises and dishonors and honors and rewards…” (1374a). Kreon speaks of praise in the above quotation, raising his concept of specific law to the level of common law. By favoring his concept of justice above that which is demanded by common law, Kreon opens the space for injustice mentioned earlier in this paper.

Like Sophocles’s Antigone, Hrotswitha’s Sapientia tells the story of a woman confronted with a concept of specific law that comes into direct conflict with her ideas of a greater justice. Sapientia (Wisdom) and her three daughters Fides (Faith), Spes (Hope),

8 Aristotle is referring here to specific, not common laws.
and Karitas (Charity) are forced to defend their Christian faith against the will of Emperor Hadrian, ultimately at the expense of their own lives. On the surface, this conflict appears to be one between the four Christian women and their pagan Emperor. However, upon searching further, one will be confronted with the more transcendent conflict between the rhetoric of morality and that of legality.

Hadrian’s argument is based on governmental authority and legal procedure, rather than on the moral righteousness of his claims. While Sapientia and her daughters construct their arguments through rhetorically artistic means, relying on ethos, pathos, and logos, Hadrian defines himself as an expert, refers only to the procedures required by the laws of Rome, and only uses inartistic arguments to make his case. The arguments of the women are constructed along universal terms, referring to the ultimate power and justice of their Christian God. In contrast, although Hadrian demands that the women worship his Roman gods, he does not argue from a position of the universal justice of the Roman religion, but rather from his position of earthly authority. The women are called before him because of his advisor’s belief that their presence and convictions are threatening to the security and strength of the state and of Hadrian’s authority. Although both Hadrian and Antiochus, his advisor, refer to the weakening of the Roman religion in the face of the Christians, this weakening is important in terms of its effects on the status of Hadrian’s personal authority, not on the stability of the Roman gods. Instead, Hadrian and Antiochus discuss the Christian religion as a threat to the strength of the empire and the “peace of civil concord.” Christianity, then, is not a threat to the Roman religion, but rather to the Roman state. Consequently, Hadrian’s arguments are consistently constructed through this idea of the procedure required by the laws of the state.
Sapientia and her three daughters, in contrast, never refer to their own authority or position. When Hadrian attempts to make the argument procedural, appealing to Sapientia’s noble birth, his techniques are quickly disregarded by the women, who focus instead on the duty and loyalty owed to their God. While Hadrian’s arguments are consistently focused on the nobility of his birth and power of his person, Sapientia states “we do not care much for pride of birth” although “it is true that [her] family traces its origin to an illustrious line” (152). Instead, Sapientia turns to the “Truth” of her faith, voicing her intentions to “betroth [her] daughters to Christ” (153). As she digresses into a game of numbers concerning her daughters’ ages, Sapientia continues to appeal to this universal base, as she glories in the power of scientific thought, which focuses on methods to create universal truths.

Upon receiving a sentence of death, Fides responds with joy that her “dearest wish” has been fulfilled—she has been allowed to “die in Christ” (162). In response, Hadrian proceeds “coldly, as a judge following the legal formula” and requests that Antiochus follow procedure and “ask her...whether she will yield or not” (162). This contrast is powerful, as Hadrian is aligned with the cold, mechanical process of procedural law, and Fides responds emotionally, using pathos to elicit sympathy from the audience. Through his procedural eyes, Hadrian can see only the legal punishment of death, while the women see their victory through eternal life, turning the tables on the emperor and making his punishments into rewards. Not once does Hadrian respond emotionally or morally, justifying his position through the justice and rightness of the Roman way of life. Instead, he consistently responds through inartistic means, torturing the women and using his authority to argue his position. Even when Hadrian seems to
attempt to use ethos to persuade the women, calling on Spes to obey his wishes and be loved as his own child, he is using the argumentative force of his authority, calling on the young girl to obey him as she would a father figure—a figure of authority and strength.

The arguments of Sapientia and her three daughters are entirely moral and are rhetorically artistic; they argue through the ethos of their loyalty to God and the pathos of their family connections. They utilize complex rhetorical tropes as they turn Hadrian’s means of proof against him. Says Fides when thrown into a cauldron of boiling wax, “Where are all your dire threats now? Look at how I swim about happily unharmed in the boiling pitch. And instead of its fierce heat I feel the freshness of the morning dew” (164). The three girls use this technique frequently, feeling joy at the prospect of martyrdom rather than sadness and fear at the pain of torture and death.

This is the ultimate example of the victory of the rhetoric of morality over the rhetoric of legality, as the emperor’s enforcement of his law and authority through inartistic means utterly fails to accomplish his goals. The faith and conviction of these four women is not weakened through torture or loss, but is instead strengthened through their beliefs that they are dying in a just cause and will be rewarded when they ascend to heaven. Through their words and actions, these women rhetorically construct an idea of justice that is greater and more powerful than the justice backed by the authority of the Roman Empire.

Hadrian argues from the base of the procedural requirements of law, not constructing his own moral justice but rather drawing on a concept of justice that has already been created, the women use the rhetorical process to create an idea of justice that has the power to defy death and remain victorious.
Hadrian’s utter failure to defeat this moral justice, even in death, is the ultimate failure of the rhetoric of legality. Although the emperor has the strength of authority and force on his side, he is unable to defeat the wills of four weak women—three of whom are mere children. This failure echoes the failure of Kreon to defeat the convictions of Antigone, a young woman who is not only under his authority as her king, but also as her uncle. Both of these playwrights align legality with the government and morality with the persecuted and marginalized minority. And yet, while we would expect the rhetoric of legality of the powerful state to be victorious, both authors surprise us, emphasizing the power of the rhetoric of morality, as it is ultimately victorious despite the fact that its champions are culturally and socially weak.

Although these dichotomies are phrased in different terms—as common vs. specific, as artistic vs. inartistic, or as the rhetoric of morality vs. the rhetoric of legality—they are in fact examples of a similar construction of justice. In both antiquity and the medieval period, we are presented with a dichotomous and oppositional conception of justice. Further, the element of this dichotomy which is representative of a universal sense of justice is favored consistently over that which represents the laws of man, the legislature, or a specific ruler.

THE COMPLICATION AND COLLAPSE OF THE STRICT DICHOTOMY IN MODERN THEORY

Throughout his New Science, Vico presents us with an image of justice and law as a progression. In the beginning, he explains, “lacking letters, all nations in their barbarian period were first founded on customs, and [only] late, having become civilized, were governed by [statutory] laws” (36). Vico claims that the “natural law of nations” evolved from this early sense of morality; he says that “human choice, by nature most
uncertain, is made certain and determined by the common sense of men with respect to human needs or utilities, which are the two origins of the natural law of nations” (57).

Clearly, like Aristotle, Vico seems to recognize different types of justice, which he often refers to as jurisprudence. Unlike Aristotle, however, Vico does not divide law into *common* and *specific*, but rather *divine*, *heroic*, and *human*. As he explains them:

The first law was divine, for men believed themselves and all their property to depend on the gods, since they thought everything was a god or was made or done by a god. The second was heroic law, the law of force, but controlled by religion, which alone can keep force within bounds where there are no human laws or none strong enough to curb it...The third is the human law dictated by fully developed human reason. (304)

Although the connection is by no means direct, divine jurisprudence seems roughly equivalent to Aristotle's “common” law and heroic to “specific law.” Human jurisprudence, then, seems to be a blending of morality and legality; it “looks to the truth of the facts themselves and benignly bends the rule of law to all the requirements of the equity of the causes” (309). Additionally, for judgments made through human jurisprudence, “the governing consideration is the truth of the facts, to which, according to the dictates of conscience, the laws benignly give aid when needed in everything demanded by the equal utility of causes” (324).

Vico expands this threefold definition of law into several areas, and seems, on all fronts, to favor his conception of the “human.” For example, Vico speaks of authority in the same terms, saying:

There were three kinds of authority. The first is divine, and of this we ask no accounting by providence. The second is heroic, resting entirely on the solemn formulae of the laws. The third is human, based on the trust placed in persons of experience, of singular prudence in practical matters, and of sublime wisdom in intellectual matters. (311)

---

9 This “natural law of nations” seems to be Vico's conception of a more “universal” set of statutory codes.
In all cases, “human” law is connected with civilization, wisdom, and intelligence. The reliance on strict legality or strict morality seems, in the eyes of Vico, to be unjust. He claims that “custom is like a king and law like a tyrant; which we must understand as referring to reasonable custom and to law not animated by natural reason” (81). However, he also wishes for us to understand that both are important and that, in many cases, legality is especially vital for existence. He says, “the weak want laws; the powerful withhold them; the ambitious, in order to win a following, advocate them; princes, in order to equalize the strong with the weak, protect them” (76). Further, a nation without laws cannot maintain itself:

…a people or nation that has not within itself a sovereign civil power vested with all the aforesaid properties is not properly a nation or people at all, nor can it exercise abroad in its relations with other peoples or nations the natural law of nations, but both the law and its exercise will fall to another people or nation superior to it. (211)

However, Vico does not wish for us to forget about the importance of morality. These statutory codes seem to have, as their foundation, a sense of morality, even of divinity. He claims, “that which regulates all human justice is therefore divine justice, which is administered by divine providence to preserve human society” (90).

In the end, Vico’s sense of human jurisprudence seems to be the ideal ending point of the evolution of justice: “thus divine and heroic jurisprudence laid hold of the certain when nations were rude, and human jurisprudence looked to the true when they had become enlightened” (310). It is this sense of justice that he wishes for us to favor and to pursue. Governments of any kind may pursue this goal, and will be considered to be just if they strive to be “human” in orientation:
...human governments, in which, in virtue of the equality of the intelligent nature which is the proper nature of man, all are accounted equal under the laws, inasmuch as all are born free in their cities...it is also the case in monarchies, in which the monarchs make all their subjects equal under their laws, and, having all the force of arms in their own hands, are themselves the only bearers of any distinction in civil nature. (305)

Vico’s definition of justice, then, adds a level of complexity that did not seem to be present in that of Aristotle. Although both theorists address the morality-legality conflict, Vico begins to complicate and, to some degree, collapse the line between the two poles.

THE COMPLICATION AND COLLAPSE OF THE STRICT DICHOTOMY IN MODERN DRAMA

The work of Giambattista Vico seems to indicate a revision of the strict morality vs. legality dichotomy. While Vico continues to recognize these two forces, the lines between them begin to be blurred, and new constructions of “ideal” justice emerge. In Pierre Corneille’s Cinna, a third perspective, that which combines legality and morality takes shape. This collapse of the dichotomy is seen to a greater degree in Arthur Miller’s The Crucible, in which the audience is presented with a plurality of justice constructions, each with its own persuasive power and associated weaknesses.

In Pierre Corneille’s Cinna the title character begins to question his reliance on a justice of morality. Throughout this play, many of the characters, on both sides of this conflict use both artistic and inartistic techniques to support their cause. It is through a careful blending of the two powers, manifested as legality tempered by morality, that true justice seems to be upheld.

On once side of Corneille’s representation of this conflict, supporting the cause of morality, we find the title character and his lover, Amelia. Opposing them, we find
Caesar Augustus and Empress Livia, aligned with legality through their positions as lawmaker and law enforcer. Augustus murdered Amelia’s father during his rise to power. Although she is now considered a favorite of the Caesar, she retains a desire for vengeance. Consequently, as prerequisite for marriage, Amelia demands that Cinna arrange for Augustus’s assassination. At the beginning of the play, Cinna, with the help of his friend Maximus, has formulated and organized such a plot, and the planned time of assassination is drawing near. As Cinna and Amelia discuss details of the plot, Cinna is called before the Caesar. Relying on their loyalty as close friends and advisors, Augustus depends on Cinna and Maximus to help him as he debates giving up the throne and creating a new Roman republic. Afraid that his plot will be destroyed, and that Amelia will refuse to marry him if the Caesar is not killed, Cinna convinces Augustus to retain his power, convincing him that it is in the best interests of the state. Unbeknownst to Cinna, however, Maximus has fallen in love with Amelia; acting on advice from his freed-man, Euphorbus, Maximus fakes his own death and sends Euphorbus to disclose the details of the plot to the Emperor, so that Cinna might be punished, making Amelia available. When confronted with the treason of three of his favorites, Augustus is forced to make a decision regarding the administration of justice. He calls Cinna and Amelia before him, and Maximus eventually resurfaces. While he originally plans to punish the traitors as prescribed by law, namely with a death sentence, Augustus relents and chooses to allow all three to live and to retain their positions.

Clearly, we are presented here with a new image of “true” justice—a justice that seems to consist of legality tempered by mercy. This form of justice seems to correlate with Vico’s sense of human jurisprudence; it is this form of jurisprudence that is favored
throughout Vico's *New Science*, and which seems to be favored by Corneille. Such a concept of justice seems to be a blending of legality and morality; it envisions true justice as strict legality with the capacity to account for circumstance. This blending of legality and morality seems to be reflected in the language used by Augustus and his empress, which blends artistic and inartistic techniques.

Cinna and Amelia's words and actions seem to be guided purely by the morality of vengeance, ignoring the requirements of law. As such, their arguments are almost entirely artistic. Amelia begins the play with arguments of loyalty, love, and duty, similar to those made by both Sapientia and Antigone. She speaks of her sorrow and anger over the death of her father, her undying love for Cinna, and the revenge owed to a murderer. Through her monologue in the first scene, and her dialogue with her confidante, Fulvia, in the second scene, she uses *pathos*, *ethos*, and *logos* to bring the audience over to her cause. She frequently utilizes collapsed enthymemes, as when she claims, "No contract binds a child that would avenge her father" (69). In this statement, she is not only using an enthymeme about the duty owed to a parent, but also directly attacking the strength of contracts, an inartistic form of rhetorical proof.

Her statements are echoed in the next scene by the title character, as he establishes his ethos, saying, "Heaven entrusts to us the fate of Rome" (72). He tells of the pathos used to evoke the sympathy of his followers, through a "long recital of the woes, which in our youth our fathers had endured" (72). He criticizes the specific law of the Emperor, describing the "bloody steps by which Augustus chose to mount the throne and force his laws on us" (74). Cinna further aligns himself with a more "universal" sense of law throughout the rest of the play, designating his as the cause of heaven and of
the nation. As the time of the assassination grows nearer, however, Cinna begins to question his intended violation of the law. He laments that “whatever fruits I hope to pluck in this—the happiness of love, the joy of vengeance, the honor to have freed my native land—are not sufficient to enchant my mind if treason be the means of winning them” (95). Unlike the characters with which we have previously become familiar, Cinna seems to be recognizing that a morality that conflicts with such legality lacks persuasive power.

In the end, the arguments of Augustus prove victorious, both through their persuasive power and through the ultimate outcome of the play. Augustus seems to be a commander of human authority, as he emphasizes his responsibility to his subjects and seems to judge through wisdom and experience. He argues simultaneously through his authority, identifying himself as king and sovereign, and through the ethos involved in such a position. He curses Cinna, whose “deceit convinced me to retain the sovereignty, for which you wish to punish me, who think me criminal, yet make my only crime; you who sustain a throne usurped solely to strike it down and cover your intention with shameless zeal, and set yourself against the welfare of the State to murder me” (104-105). He emphasizes his authority over the plotters, telling them, “you have no rank or power except I give it you, and for your fall there needs but the withdrawal of my hand, which is your sole support” (115). However, he is also aligned with the same sort of universals with which Cinna aligns himself, as Empress Livia explains to Amelia that “crimes of state, committed for the crown, Heaven absolves once the crown is given, and in the sacred rank which Heaven favors the past is justified, the future free” (118).
Ultimately, Augustus's arguments are successful in persuading not only the audience, but also his would-be assassins. Amelia, the last of the three to hold out against the Caesar, eventually acquiesces:

And I surrender, Sire, to your great kindness. With clear brilliance I regain my sight. I recognize my crime, which I thought justice, and—what no fear of punishment could do—I feel a strong repentance born within me and acquiescence in my secret heart. Heaven has set its seal upon your grandeur and for the proof, Sire, I am satisfied. (Corneille 121)

All at once, Amelia recognizes what the audience has come to realize throughout the course of the play: an understanding of true justice, at least as envisioned by Corneille, comes from a combination of statutory law and kindness.

Vico and Corneille both seem to view the blending of morality and legality as positive, even necessary. While true justice for both these men seems to be a combination of morality, legality, and reason, neither seems to recognize the complexities of reaching such a blend. In Arthur Miller's *The Crucible*, we are presented with a society that attempts to translate its moral code directly into a set of legal statutes. And, while we are certainly shown that the blending of morality and legality has great possibility, we are also told that such a blending has the possibility of great disaster, as well. Throughout the play, the audience is forced into an uncomfortable juxtaposition between the powers of morality and of legality. Each character seems to argue at one instant from morality and from legality in the next. The sense of order to which we have become accustomed through the last three plays is suddenly upended. Both sides of the argument argue artistically and inartistically, morally and legally.

Miller explains, "the people of Salem developed a theocracy, a combine of state and religious power whose function was to keep the community together, and to prevent
any kind of disunity that might open it to destruction by material or ideological enemies.” (6) The government and legal system themselves emerged from an effort to translate the strict morality of Puritan ideology into a practical code of statutory laws. It is no wonder, then, that the characters, as well as the audience, are confused about the distinction between the two. Reverend Samuel Parris is the community pastor; his daughter’s affliction, along with the dabbling of his niece Abigail and her friends in the occult arts, marks the beginning of the witchcraft accusations. Soon, their accusations are supported and legitimized by the power of the court and government, personified in Judge Hathorne and Deputy Governor Danforth, and a series of trials occurs. Slowly, an ever-widening group of villagers are accused and convicted, and the audience is taken deeper into the actual trials and executions, as well as the in-fighting and personal grudges surrounding them. The alleged witches include John Proctor and his wife Elizabeth. Proctor had an affair with Abigail during her time as a servant in his house, and her accusations seem to be motivated, at least in part, by a desire to remove her competition, namely Elizabeth, from the picture. Reverend Hale, a witchcraft expert called in to monitor the progression of the witchcraft “epidemic,” eventually becomes a supporter of the accused. In the end, John Proctor is sentenced to death, Hale leaves the village in frustration, Parris loses his position, and it seems, his mind, and Abigail flees the village. Salem Village itself is virtually destroyed, as it is wholly occupied by the trials and its citizens are divided over their outcome. A substantial portion of the village is either sentenced to death or wasting in prison, and children and livestock wander the streets un-cared for and unsupervised.

Each of the major combatants, or group of combatants, constructs the intersection of legality and morality in a different way. For Parris and his niece, morality seems to be
central, but their methods and means tend toward the legal. Abigail seems concerned with the morality of love as she pleads with John Proctor, saying:

I never knew the lying lessons I was taught by all these Christian women and their covenanted men! And now you bid me tear the light out of my eyes? I will not, I cannot! You loved me, John Proctor, and whatever sin it is, you love me yet! John, pity me, pity me! (22)

However, to enforce this morality, she turns to the courts through her witchcraft accusations, thus relying on a very inartistic proof. Likewise, for her uncle, the spiritual guide of the town, morality is a focal point, as is his concern for the advance of the devil. However, his arguments seem to be argued through authority and contracts. He reminds his audience that:

I am not some preaching farmer with a book under my arm; I am a graduate of Harvard College... You people seem not to comprehend that a minister is the Lord's man in the parish; a minister is not to be so lightly crossed and contradicted... There is either obedience or the church will burn like Hell is burning! (28)

While these arguments are phrased in terms of God's authorities, the concerns addressed are entirely earthly:

It is not the children who are unmindful of their obligations toward this ministry... my contract provides I be supplied with all my firewood. I am waiting since November for a stick, and even in November I had to show my frostbitten hands like some London beggar. (27)

On the other extreme, we find the courts, which seem to argue through a perspective of pure legality. Most obvious in this is Deputy Governor Danforth, who argues consistently for the strength of the court:

Postponement now speaks a floundering on my part; reprieve or pardon must cast doubt upon the guilt of them that died till now. While I speak God's law, I will not crack its voice with whimpering. If retaliation is your fear, know this—I should hang ten thousand that dared to rise against the law, and an ocean of salt tears could not melt the resolution of the statutes. (119)
However, the root of Danforth’s strict legality is problematic, in that it is based on Biblical authority. He explains to Abigail and the other girls, “Now, children, this is a court of law. The law, based upon the Bible, and the Bible, writ by Almighty God, forbid the practice of witchcraft, and describe death as the penalty thereof. But likewise, children, the law and Bible damn all bearers of false witness” (95). Danforth, like the supporters of strict legality before him, speaks in terms of absolutes. When speaking with those who question the fairness of the decisions passed down, he explains, “You must understand, sir, that a person is either with this court or he must be counted against it, there be no road between. This is a sharp time, now, a precise time—we live no longer in the dusky afternoon when evil mixed itself with good and befuddled the world” (87).

Repeatedly, the law is treated as an absolute and uncontrollable power. When asked for mercy, Danforth replies, “Mr. Hale, as God have not empowered me like Joshua to stop this sun from rising, so I cannot withhold from them the perfection of their punishment” (120).

The problem with both these extremes is captured by the words of their two staunchest supporters. As Danforth explains:

In an ordinary crime, how does one defend the accused? One calls up witnesses to prove his innocence. But witchcraft is ipso facto, on its face and by its nature, an invisible crime, is it not? Therefore, who may possibly be witness to it? The witch and the victim. None other. Now we cannot hope the witch will accuse herself; granted? Therefore, we must rely upon her victims—and they do testify, the children certainly do testify. As for the witches, none will deny that we are most eager for all their confessions. (93)

He is supported by Parris, who recognizes that “we are here, Your Honor, precisely to discover what no one has ever seen” (96). How then, does absolute morality or an
absolute legality address an issue that seems to be neither absolute nor easily classified? The obvious answer, it seems, is that it cannot. The alliance of these two extremes in the one cause should be an indication to us that there is something amiss in either construction of justice.

In between these two extremes, and on the other side of the witchcraft accusations, we find Reverend Hale and John Proctor, who seem best able to blend the forces of legality and morality. As one of the accused, John Proctor’s interest in the careful balance of legality and morality is a matter of life and death. He questions the law’s reliance on the simple word of the accusers, recognizing the failure of such reliance to establish legal distinctions:

If she is innocent! Why do you never wonder if Parris be innocent, or Abigail? Is the accuser always holy now? Were they born this morning as clean as God’s fingers? I’ll tell you what’s walking Salem—vengeance is walking Salem. We are what we always were in Salem, but no the little crazy children are jangling the keys of the kingdom, and common vengeance writes the law! This warrant’s vengeance! I’ll not give my wife to vengeance! (73)

However, he also wishes to condemn his accusers on moral grounds, warning, “them that quail to bring men out of ignorance, as I have quailed, and as you quail now when you know in all your black hearts that this be fraud—God damns our kind especially, and we will burn, we will burn together!” (111). In his attempt to undo moral wrongs within the bounds of the legal system, Proctor becomes more sympathetic as a character, and redeems himself for the sins of his past.

Hale is unique in his position as a possessor of spiritual and legal authority, which are at once constructed through inartistic and artistic means. He recognizes the power of earthly authority, saying, “[the books] must be [heavy]; they are weighted with authority”
and explaining that "theology, sir, is a fortress; no crack in a fortress may be accounted small" (64). However, he also acknowledges the power of supernatural forces, warning, "there is a misty plot afoot so subtle we should be criminal to cling to old respects and ancient friendships. I have seen too many frightful proofs in court—the Devil is alive in Salem, and we dare not quail to follow wherever the accusing finger points" (68). It is he who most graphically combines morality and legality, claiming, "my duty is to add what I may to the godly wisdom of the court" (64). His speech is at once legal and moral, and it is he who, in the end, recognizes the ultimate failing of any attempt to translate the Bible into statutory code:

The very crowns of holy law I brought, and what I touched with my bright confidence, it dies; and where I turned the eye of my great faith, blood flowed up. Beware, Goody Proctor—cleave to no faith when faith brings blood. It is mistaken law that leads you to sacrifice. Life, woman, life is God's most precious gift; no principle, however glorious, may justify the taking of it. I beg you, woman, prevail upon your husband to confess. Let him give his life. Quail not before God's judgment in this, for it may well be God damns a liar less than he that throws his life away for pride...before the laws of God we are as swine! We cannot read His will! (122)

And so, while it might be true that real justice emerges when we can combine morality and legality, such a blending is problematic, in that it makes obvious the subjectivity of the interpretation. Through the variety of constructions of justice presented throughout this work, the reader begins to question the presence of a realistic possibility for an "ultimate" justice, as conceived by the authors who came before.

*Cinna* and *The Crucible* seem to begin to move us toward a new understanding of the rhetoric of justice. Instead of the black and white world of strict legality and strict morality, both works plunge their audience into a world where neither seems to have exclusive claim on ultimate justice. And, although these two authors construct justice
differently, combining the forces of morality and legality in different ways, they do seem to bring us to a similar understanding. Both authors support Vico’s emphasis on the importance of reason, which seems to reflect a similar emphasis that emerges in Enlightenment and Modern thinking. Also, both authors warn us graphically against extremes; we are told through the words of the characters and the outcomes of the plays that legality must be tempered by morality to be just, and vice versa. Vico warns us against “law not animated by natural reason” (81). An equivalent warning against morality not tempered by legal reason seems appropriate, in light of the above-mentioned works. Above all else, both plays seem to remind us that the forces of legality and morality must be blended, and carefully so, in order to come close to an understanding of true justice.

CONCLUSION

Whether explicitly or implicitly, each of these four plays is centrally concerned with the ongoing conflict between the rhetoric of legality and the rhetoric of morality. And, while each of the four authors—from Sophocles and Hrotswitha to Corneille and Miller—constructs this conflict differently, there are some elements of continuity among their ideas. All four recognize the existence of these two distinct forms of justice, acknowledge that a conflict between the two exists, and attempt to reconcile the two seemingly opposing forces. The means by which they accomplish this is reflective, in many ways, of some of the trains of thought that dominated their historical context, as can be seen through their connections with the works of theorists such as Aristotle and Vico. This paper has not attempted to evaluate these representations, but rather to reflect and describe their presence.
In these works, selected from antiquity to the modern era, we see a complication and a collapse of the strict dichotomy between legality and morality. Some post-modern theorists, including Fish, suggest that this process of collapse will continue, as we begin to recognize that legality and morality, like other similar manifestations of the content-form dichotomy, are merely constructs, created by humans through rhetoric. As Fish explains when describing the anti-formalist viewpoint:

Abstract laws are never abstract or universal but are always reflections of some (albeit unacknowledged) context; and an understanding of context will never be simply inductive, but will always be produced by principles (themselves contingent and transformable) already in place. (22)

Both Corneille and Miller seem to be moving in this general direction through their recognition of "shades of gray" between the black and white of legality and morality. In the future, will we see the black and white of this dichotomy disappear completely? Or, will we as humans continue to cling to our sense of some sort of absolute? These questions seem impossible to answer at this point. However, what seems clear is that this conflict has been central to rhetorical, legal, and dramatic thought since antiquity. And, it is likely that they will continue to be so well into the future.

Future research on this topic could expand this project into a number of different areas. First, the issue of gender emerges, as the protagonists in the earlier works are marginalized females supporting the strength of morality, while the later works present us with females who create conflict. These issues of gender are embedded in these works,

---

10 As enunciated by Fish (1989), this dichotomy concerns these basic oppositions:
...first, between a truth that exists independently of all perspectives and points of view and the many truths that emerge and seem perspicuous when a particular perspective or point of view has been established and is in force; second, an opposition between true knowledge, which is knowledge as it exists apart from any and all systems of belief, and the knowledge, which because it flows from some or other system of belief is incomplete and partial (in the sense of biased). (474)
and it is likely that further explanation would provide a rich understanding of the interaction between gender and justice. Also, as these works are being taken, to a certain degree, as a reflection of the societies in which they were situated, a further connection between the texts, both dramatic and theoretical, might supplement an understanding of the ways drama was viewed in these historical eras. Finally, although I have examined these works through a historical perspective, this research certainly has contemporary implications, both in the dramatic and in the real world. An exploration of court documents, other dramatic texts, or political events might be an interesting arena into which to expand this exploration. These areas are just a few of the many possibilities for future expansion of this investigation.


Works Consulted


