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UNITED STATES OPINION

FROM MUNICH TO THE BLITZKRIEG

Barbara Evans
January 16, 1967
Outline

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Introduction

In the late nineteen-thirties "isolationism" referred to the American attitude toward Europe. Basically, the term, used to describe that period, refers to the belief that the United States should have no part in foreign quarrels.

This paper will attempt to analyze the feelings of the majority of Americans. Many men counselled non-involvement for many reasons, and extremists ranged from the Catholic priest, Father Coughlin, a man with definite pro-German sympathies, to Charles A. Lindberg, who thought that Hitler could not be beaten. Attention here will not be directed at these extremely small fringe groups, but at the "average" American, as far as his thoughts can be known, and at the political leaders of the period, as far as they allow their thoughts to be known.

Neither will an attempt be made to describe geographical variations in the strength of isolationism, for the polls do not reveal significant differences in reactions to events. They show that the Middle and Far West tended to be slightly stronger in their adherence to this philosophy than were the East and South, and this observation is supported by the fact that isolationist leaders in Congress represented the former areas. The data, however, are not sufficient to permit any further generalization.
Chapter 1
The Mood Before Munich

Isolationism came to a peak in the turmoil of the thirties, both at home and abroad. The emotional shock of the Depression coupled with the aggressive activities of new despots in Europe and Asia convinced Americans that they should concentrate on reconstructing their own demoralized country. As the decade wore on the conviction grew that strong legal barriers should be erected to keep the United States free of all foreign entanglements.

On May 1, 1937 Congress, led by its more extreme isolationist elements, passed the Neutrality Act. It decreed that, when war broke out abroad, the President should declare that hostilities existed, and upon his declaration a battery of restrictions would go into effect. In addition to outlawing all trade in munitions, the bill prohibited non-military commerce with belligerents on any basis other than "cash and carry." Section 3 said that no one would be allowed to deal in the bonds of or extend any credit to these countries. Even voluntary contributions were prohibited. In addition, the President could forbid the entry of any warship of a belligerent into United States ports, and no Americans, ninety days after the initial proclamation, would be allowed to travel on vessels of the warring countries.

Behind this act stood the belief that the United States should have no foreign responsibilities outside the Western Hemisphere. According to the revisionist interpretation of World War I then popular, guilt for starting the conflict lay equally on the shoulders of all combatants.
The idea was carried even further, and some Americans claimed that Europe was incapable of solving her problems peacefully, citing as evidence the saber-rattling of Hitler and Mussolini. A writer summed up the common opinion by saying, "War occurs in Europe about every thirty years and it has done so since about the beginning of time."

Why, then, had the United States, a peace-loving nation, fought for the Allies? Three forces had played on her for three different reasons. President Wilson and his highest aides were warmongers. Britain and France had invested heavily in this country and thus roused the capitalist affections of big business. Combining with the manufacturers, the President added his battle cries to theirs and to those of the propaganda flowing from Britain. As a result of this collusion, the American people were led to believe that they were embarking on a great crusade.

One essential point in revisionist theory was that the crusade had been fruitless. American troops had won the war for the Allies, but they had lost the fight for ideals. At the Versailles Conference Clemenceau and Lloyd George revealed that the Central Powers had no monopoly on a desire for conquest. The vindictive settlement imposed there on Germany had as its purpose the gratification of French and British greed. In their lust for land, they disregarded the well-being of the conquered and, therefore, directly created the conditions which were to produce Hitler.

Americans believed they had something to learn from their World War I experience. They had sent troops to die for the Allies, and the Allies
had proved no more dedicated to making the world safe for democracy than were the Central Powers. The country also remembered the horror of the world's first experience with mechanized warfare, and the mass violence seemed even worse, because it had been pointless. Senator Gerald P. Nye, usually an extremist, summed up public feeling when he said, early in 1939, "I make bold to assert that 20 years ago we were led like lambs to the slaughter into the most cruel and merciless and useless war the world has ever witnessed."

American foreign policy, therefore, should pursue a course consistent with Washington's pronouncements against entangling alliances. The President must stand for the ideals of democracy, he should preach those ideals to the world, but he must never go beyond verbal encouragement, and he should stay aloof from even peaceful settlements of foreign quarrels.

Revisionism appealed to America in the thirties, because it reflected other basic beliefs then held. The country had entered World War I by voluntary choice, for it had not been physically menaced. War twenty years later would be a repeat of the first, with airplanes and strategic bombing, but it would remain in Europe. If the country wanted to stay at peace, therefore, the oceans would protect her from attack, just as they always had.

And the country would stay at peace. As Senator Arthur H. Vandenburg said, "...We are not, we cannot be, the world's protector or the world's policeman." As long as the United States could import the necessary raw materials, she could remain aloof from the perpetual foreign quarrels and solve her own problems, which included a depression still unconquered.
The first reaction of a child of the Atomic Age to such apparent blindness is, "You cannot wish an aggressor away." Unfortunately this lesson had to be taught by Hitler not only to America, but also to England and France. In 1938, United States public opinion was shocked and alarmed by the ruthlessness of Nazism, which the people saw as the most powerful form of oppression the world had yet produced, but the country was not aware of the danger it posed. Americans considered Hitler a madman who had victimized the German people, but they hoped, as did the rest of the world, that he could be reasoned with. Few men realized the lengths to which he was willing to go, nor did they know how far Germany would follow him. When the events of 1938-1939 gave a clear indication of his megalomania, Americans grew even more afraid of war. The fear was not, however, that the country would be attacked, but that she would once again be duped into renewing her crusade for democracy, a crusade that no one could pursue without disaster.

Joining these beliefs was another which the cynical may say explains all of isolationism. Americans thought Britain and France, leading the smaller, free European countries, could defeat the Axis, if war finally came. On September 13, 1938, a Gallup Poll reported that 86% of those questioned had faith in the victory of the democracies. One year later, when Poland lay in ruins from the blitzkrieg, 71% answered the same question the same way.

To place too much emphasis on the importance of this belief, however, is to ignore the facts. Hitler conquered all of Europe and bombed Britain before the United States entered the war, and if,
The idea was carried even further, and some Americans claimed that Europe was incapable of solving her problems peacefully, citing as evidence the saber-rattling of Hitler and Mussolini. A writer summed up the common opinion by saying, "War occurs in Europe about every thirty years and it has done so since about the beginning of time."

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Joining these beliefs was another which the cynical may say explains all of isolationism. Americans thought Britain and France, leading the smaller, free European countries, could defeat the Axis, if war finally came. On September 13, 1933, a Gallup Poll reported that 80% of those questioned had faith in the victory of the democracies. One year later, when Poland lay in ruins from the blitzkreig, 71% answered the same question the same way.

To place too much emphasis on the importance of this belief, however, is to ignore the facts. Hitler conquered all of Europe and bombed Britain to rubble before the United States entered the war, and if,
in 1941, anyone cherished the illusion that England could stop the Axis from European domination, it was a belief based on an inability to read the newspapers. And yet the country did not intervene, for isolationism was more than just the opinion that Germany could be beaten.

The government which led the country shared many of these beliefs. Throughout the following pages references to political decisions in Washington will mainly concern Roosevelt's attitudes. William Langer and Everett Gleason, in The Challenge to Isolation: 1937-1940, confirm the popular idea that the President was as independent in foreign policy as he was in domestic. For advice he turned to Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring, and Secretary of the Navy Claude A. Swanson.

Hull and Welles, the most important men for our study, seem to have varied in Roosevelt's attentions, for he was more personally drawn to the latter and tended to show this favoritism, a fact which infuriated Hull. Whatever the personality clashes, the President did depend on his Secretary of State, and the two did share common goals and methods.

These goals and methods inspired at the time considerable controversy. A popular myth, propounded most vocally by extreme isolationists, relates that Roosevelt consciously maneuvered this country into war. This conspiracy theory echoes revisionist wishful thinking about Wilson, and it has little empirical backing. The President left no diary; he was always an enigmatic figure; so one searching for his motives must be content with memoirs of first hand observers and with the record of the
foreign policy he pursued.

When he took office in 1933 he obviously concentrated on the New Deal. Later, when isolationist frenzy produced the Neutrality Act, there is no evidence that he tried to block it. Roosevelt was fresh from a landslide election; he later considered that mandate sufficient to approve his packing of the Supreme Court. If he disagreed with the ideas of the legislation and yet kept silent, it was one of the few times in his career he did so.

The evidence points to the fact that the President shared the isolationist views of his countrymen until the news from Europe convinced him that he had been wrong. Over the course of 1933-1939 he apparently never seriously considered sending American troops abroad. If he did plot in such a way, he kept it a well guarded secret.

This paper will be an attempt to understand how the country reacted to the events of the year that plunged Europe into war. All who read must be cautioned against thinking in terms of facts alone. Isolationism was a mixture of rationality and emotion, and one simply cannot say the country weighed what it saw as the evidence and came to the conclusion that it need not become involved. The mood of the late thirties blended with political reality an intense fear of war, a disillusionment with Europe, and a faith that the United States would be all right if left alone. To disregard the complexities of the era's thought is to do a disservice to the people who lived it.
Chapter 2
Fall, 1938

The Munich Crisis began with methods of intimidation that were to become familiar to Americans in the course of the next year. Hitler ranted about Czech atrocities against Germans in the Sudetenland, called for annexation of that territory on the grounds that it rightfully belonged to his country, fomented terrorism by Nazis there, and massed troops on the border. When war seemed inevitable, Neville Chamberlain decided to intervene, flying to Godesburg on September 22. The meeting with Hitler was stormy, as the German dictator refused to make concessions and demanded evacuation of the Sudetenland by September 28. The British Prime Minister managed to convince him to set back the date to the first of October and then returned to London to confer with his cabinet.

Meanwhile, England sent a message to the State Department asking Roosevelt for a statement approving Chamberlain's peace efforts. The President and his aides agreed that no such announcement would be made, for it would enable Britain to shift "partial responsibility" for any settlement on the United States.

The next few days saw the situation in Europe grow more desperate, and finally Roosevelt felt that he should take some action. Accordingly, a letter to Hitler was drafted, despite the disapproval of Hull. The Secretary of State thought force alone would change the dictator's mind, that an appeal could only inflate his already magnified opinion of his
own power, and that as a result the United States would be branded an appeaser. Pierrepont Moffat, Chief of the Division of European Affairs, had recorded in his diary as early as September 17 that top officials in The State Department feared Chamberlain intended to sell Czechoslovakia to buy peace.

When the situation reached the crisis stage on September 26, Roosevelt wrote a letter. He urged negotiation, but deleted from the State Department version of the message an offer of United States' aid in reaching a settlement. Instead, the President stressed American non-involvement, writing, "The United States has no political entanglements. It is caught in no mesh of hatred. Elements of all Europe have formed its civilization."

Hitler's reply repeated his usual claims that Germany had been robbed in 1918. Sudeten Germans were being discriminated against, and no one could blame Germany if such atrocities forced her to go to war for her people.

On the night of September 26, the dictator renewed his violent denunciations in the Sportzplatz in Berlin. Again, Roosevelt sent a message proposing negotiation, and Hull cabled United States diplomats to encourage the governments with which they dealt to urge peaceful settlement. Europe and America were terrified at the threat of war, but, then, on September 29, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Germany, conferring without the Czechs, reached an agreement to partition the tiny country.

Hull expressed the official United States government reaction in a press conference the next day. "As to immediate peace results...
they [the terms of the settlement] afford a universal sense of relief," he said. He made no comment on those terms themselves.

Unlike the State Department, Roosevelt initially welcomed Munich as the first of many negotiated settlements. He could not have cherished that hope long. On October 3, William C. Bullitt, ambassador to Paris, dispatched to Hull a record of a conversation with Edouard Daladier, president of the French Council of Ministers. "Daladier . . . realizes fully that the meeting in Munich was an immense diplomatic defeat for France and England and recognizes that unless France can recover a united national spirit to confront the future a fatal situation will arise within the next year." Confirming this opinion of the settlement, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes wrote in his diary on October 9, "There is a growing impression that the Czechoslovak solution was a totally disgraceful thing...."

Press reaction to the Munich crisis was as uncertain as was that in Washington. Few observers fully grasped the true nature of Hitler's aggressiveness, no one was certain what he wanted, and many clung to the comforting thought that his declarations of protecting Germans were genuine. Time and Newsweek expressed the hope that the meeting had set a precedent for future negotiation of differences, while four other major periodicals predicted that Hitler's appetite had been whetted not sated.

Like the press, the American people reacted ambivalently toward the crisis. The great majority thought Germany's claims were unjustified, but many also felt Britain and France took the right course in choosing appeasement. The same poll which yielded these results reported
that 60% of those contacted felt there was now a greater possibility of war, and, 17 days later, the number had climbed to 74%.

As for United States policy, few wanted Roosevelt to criticize Hitler and Mussolini during the crisis. The vast majority thought the country should stay out of European quarrels, and only about one third of those answering pollsters in late October placed confidence in the President's ability to avoid war without the guarantees of stronger neutrality legislation. A significant poll reported that the majority of Americans felt that if a major European war came, the United States would be drawn into it. The people had been badly frightened by Hitler's militancy and they saw the danger of 1917 looming again.

Roosevelt, watching Europe simmer through October, was beginning to alter his concept of the American role in a confrontation with Germany. On October 11, he called for $300,000,000 more to be spent on defense in that fiscal year, and in a speech the next day he stressed the need for preparedness.

Then on October 19, Ambassador Joseph Kennedy announced in London that he thought the dictatorships and the democracies should make a concerted effort to work together for world peace. Reporters in the United States and abroad clamored to know if the speech had indicated a change in foreign policy, and Roosevelt was forced to go on radio a week later to calm their fears. Once again stressing the need for adequate defense, the President made it abundantly clear that he planned no rapproachment with the Nazis. "There can be no peace," he said, "if the reign of law is to be replaced by a recurrent sanctification of sheer force."
In November violence burst out again in Europe, this time producing the strongest anti-German reaction in the United States to date. A Polish Jew in Paris filled a German diplomat, and, on November 9 and 10, Germany exploded in bloody pogroms and a legislation which deprived the Jews of their few remaining rights.

The President's reaction was more this time than a protesting letter. At a press conference November 15, he announced the recall of Ambassador Hugh R. Wilson for consultation. Mr. Wilson never returned to Berlin.

Press and public were equally horrified by the atrocities. The pogroms, they felt, had been deliberately planned and executed by the Nazis on the most obvious of pretexts. The New Republic wrote, "Not since the end of the Great War has Germany been so hated in the United States as she is today for her current treatment of the Jews."

Ambassador Hans H. Diekhoff, later recalled in retaliation for Roosevelt's action, reported to Berlin that those Americans who had been uncommitted in their attitude toward Germany before were now definitely anti-German. With shocked surprise he wrote, "Yesterday in an old Protestant church in Massachusetts they went so far as to have a Rabbi [sic] preach for the first time, departing from a 300-year-old tradition, in order to show that in a situation like the present they stand by the Jews."

Anti-German sentiment did not mean a change in isolationist sentiment, however. The people still felt Europe was not their battleground. Changes were coming, but they were mainly in Washington.
Chapter 3
Winter, 1938-39

It may have been the pogroms that finally convinced Roosevelt that he must return to the concept of collective security; probably all the reasons for his decision will never be known. Certainly pressure was put on him by his advisers. As early as September 3, cabinet members favored aid to the democracies in every way possible short of war.\(^1\)

In November William Bullitt returned from Paris for consultation and joined his colleagues in urging moves to allow economic aid to Britain and France. The ambassador felt Europe would be at war in the near future, which meant that even if the United States could stay out, she would be seriously hurt by the effect on world trade. Britain and France must be supported, for they were the only buffers protecting her from Germany. Hull, as previously stated, also considered Hitler a greater menace than did Roosevelt, and he, too, felt all measures possible should be taken to prevent war.

Thus for the President had not taken a stand, according to-\(^2\) his colleagues, because he saw no need to and because he had lost so badly in the bi-elections. In mid-November, deciding the United States could no longer stay completely aloof, he began to formulate a plan to deal with Hitler, for it was obvious to him by then that words were not enough. On November 10, he wrote in a private letter, "Our British friends must begin to fish or cut bait. The dictator threat from Europe is a good deal closer to the United States and the American Continent than that it was before."\(^3\)
Roosevelt chose to return the country to the system of collective security which she had abandoned in the mid-thirties. The President would continue to use all his powers of persuasion to maintain peace in Europe, but if such efforts failed, America must be ready to stand behind Britain and France economically. Roosevelt still believed that the democracies could defeat the Axis if they were properly supplied.

During the last two months of 1938, the President presented a program calling for a build-up in the size of the armed forces and in arms production for hemispheric defense. His goals appear to have been three-fold: (1) he wanted the United States to be prepared for any eventuality; (2) he wanted to have munitions to sell to the democracies; (3) he wanted Hitler to be assured that American aid would be more than mere moral support.

Three obstacles to the realization of his goals confronted the President. First there were the people, second, the extreme isolationists in Congress, and thirs, the Neutrality Act. The presence of the arms embargo and the absence of the cash and carry provision (It was due to expire May 1.) would block any attempt to aid Britain and France if they went to war. To have these sections of the Act changed, Roosevelt would have to break down the resistance both on and off Capitol Hill.

On January 4, he delivered the 'State of the Union Message' to Congress, and in it he called for reviews of existing neutrality legislation and of the means for hemispheric defense. "...The world has grown so small," the President said, "...that no nation can be safe ... so long as any other powerful nation refuses to settle its grievances at the council table."
Definite proposals followed in other messages sent to Congress in January. The first called for preparations for hemispheric defense in the form of stronger air forces, stockpiles of items requiring a long time to manufacture and of scarce goods which had to be imported, improvements in coastal defenses, and better fortifications to protect the Canal Zone. The second requested appropriations to expand the Air Force.

In response to these proposals, isolationists sprang to their feet, bitterly protesting any change in neutrality legislation. Then came two incidents which they could, and did use, to high advantage. On January 23, a bomber on a training mission crashed in California, and the news got to the press that a French official had been on board. Isolationists all over the country screamed their objections to such a security violation and forced Roosevelt to admit four days later that he had secretly authorized the sale of planes to France.

The President then called the Military Affairs Committee to the White House to soothe its ruffled feathers. After the meeting the story leaked to the press that Roosevelt had said, "The American frontier is on the Rhine." Again the isolationists seethed, and Senator Nye led the chorus of opposition by refusing to attend the Military Affairs Committee meetings until their procedure was made public.

Whether the people reacted as violently as Congress is doubtful, but the President felt he had to answer his critics; so, on February 3, he called a press conference to restate his position. Roosevelt denied flatly that he had ever made the statement about the Rhine, labelling the story a "deliberate lie." The government stood for four principles in foreign policy: (1) free world trade; (2) no entangling alliances; (3) disarmament; (4) freedom. He had not, nor would he ever, depart from the traditional position of the United States.
The announcement was designed to calm the public, not to appease Congress, for Roosevelt rarely conferred with Congressional leaders on foreign policy. He seems to have thought, with considerable justification, that little could be gained by trying to placate the extreme isolationists, and most of his appeals for support of Britain and France were directed at the people.

The press reacted to these incidents with apprehension. They saw the President's moves as attempts to frighten Hitler, as well as measures to insure adequate defense. Defense was important, but few felt the dictator would pay much attention to United States' action, and all concurred in believing that he was not satisfied, but only waiting.

Public reaction was much the same. From the three month vantage point, most Americans still saw Munich as the best that could have been done with a bad situation. A poll reported that 49.2% of those questioned blamed the crisis on Hitler's lust for power and 24% on Germany's need for raw materials. The majority thought, as it had in September, that if there should be a European war the United States would be drawn in. Another poll revealed that 56% of those contacted felt the democracies, including America, should stop Hitler from taking any more territory, but then Hitler had not moved for three months.

Unlike the more violent isolationists in Congress, most of the American people agreed with Roosevelt's rearmament proposals, 86% supporting a larger navy, 82% a larger army, and 90% a larger air force. A majority, although smaller, also favored the sale of planes to France on a cash and carry basis. Americans in January, 1939, a period of
relative calm, temporarily forgot the stories of the devilish munitions makers and became more pro-Allies as they grew more anti-Axis.

The old fears were still there, however, and Roosevelt knew it. Ickes records in his diary a lunch conversation with the President, January 28. Roosevelt said that if Hitler gained control of the small European countries only, he could still endanger the United States economically. Ickes, more of an interventionist that the Chief Executive, replied that the people should be told. "He [Roosevelt] said that it would be absolutely impossible for him or for me to go on the air and talk to the World [sic] as we were talking. The people simply would not believe him."
Chapter 4
Spring, 1939

Throughout February the isolationists continued to scream in Congress and in the news media, but Roosevelt ignored them and concentrated on reports from abroad. In late January rumors came that Hitler would move by the end of the next month against Western Europe, but subsequently the news grew more cheerful. Anthony J. Biddle, ambassador to Poland, wrote that that government felt the dictator would turn his attention to the colonies lost in the Peace of Versailles. Kennedy's dispatches reported that Chamberlain thought Hitler would take no action, that a Russo-German pact was unlikely, and that any crisis which arose could be dealt with peacefully. Even the dispatches sent from Berlin by Attaché Truman Smith were optimistic.

One note of what should have been taken as a warning did come to Washington. Prentiss Gilbert, charge in Germany, wrote on February 24 that any and all action depended on Hitler's will, which was notoriously hard to predict. Soon thereafter, the dictator proved the correctness of the American's estimation and shattered government optimism.

On March 13, Berlin newspapers once more carried stories of Czech atrocities against Germans. The same day Bullitt reported that Hitler planned to move first on Czechoslovakia and then on Rumania, and that Britain and France were doing nothing. Raymond H. Geist, the new charge in Berlin, confirmed this dismal forecast, writing the same day that an attack on the dismembered neighbor was definite.
That day Czech President Emil Hacha met with Hitler. He was completely helpless before the dictator, German troops crossed the border, and on March 15 Hitler entered Prague.

Roosevelt was furious. He had not trusted the Austrian before, but neither had he expected aggression to be so blatant, so swift, and so easy. Sumner Welles levelled a stinging attack on the final rape of Czechoslovakia two days later, saying, "It is manifest that acts of wanton lawlessness and of arbitrary force are threatening world peace and the very structure of modern civilization."

According to Pierrepoint-Hoffat, Roosevelt had been debating since February whether he should return Ambassador Wilson to Berlin. The strain in relations with Germany had seemed to be easing, but the President feared the effect the action might have on American public opinion and on Hitler's estimation of United States' resolve to aid Britain and France. By March 13 he had decided to send Wilson back, for the diplomat was anxious to go. On March 15 all such plans were cancelled.

Hoffat also speculated that Roosevelt was considering a complete diplomatic break with Germany. He rejected, however, suggestions from Bullitt that he soundly renounce Hitler's action and go personally to Congress to call for repeal of the Neutrality Act.

At a cabinet meeting the seventeenth, Roosevelt presented his program of reprisals. The United States government would refuse to recognize the protectorate Hitler had set up in Prague. Countervailing duties would finally be levied against Germany in retaliation for taxes it had already put on American goods, and the special privileges which had been
granted to imports from Czechoslovakia were revoked.

The press, as outraged as the government at Hitler's action, declared that the dictator had finally revealed his true nature. Some periodicals expressed surprise, some said it was to be expected, but all agreed that any pretense of righting the wrongs done to German minorities was ridiculous. The march into Czechoslovakia should teach all who watched that Germany was capable of unlimited rapacity and treachery.

Among most Americans, the reaction was the same. The German charge d'affaires in Washington, Hans Thomsen, reported that the public felt Hitler was never again to be trusted and that his desires for conquest were not yet sated. In the minds of most men, the dictator had come to represent an enemy of every value they cherished.

Yet still the aloofness remained. Welles telephoned Bullitt and, when summing up the American attitude toward the aggression, reflected, "It is a reaction to something horrifying and shocking, but not personally connected...."

An incident in late February illustrates the strength of anti-German feeling in America when the Nazis acted closer to home. On Washington's birthday a rally of 20,000 members of the German-American Bund was held at Madison Square Garden. Police stood guard in large numbers, but, even so, violent demonstrations against the meeting occurred in the streets surrounding the auditorium. The German consul general in New York, Borchers, wrote to Berlin that Americans saw the Bund as an attempt to weaken the country from within, and he urged his government to dissociate itself from the organization.

Throughout the year now under consideration, the Nazi organization drew little attention in press and polls; so one can assume the people
generally disregarded it. A rally on Washington's birthday, however, garbed in all the respectability of traditional American patriotism, was apparently more than New Yorkers could tolerate. When viewing Hitler from a safe distance, their hatred of him could be detached, but Nazi activity in their own country disgusted, incensed, and perhaps even frightened them.

News from Europe in the weeks following the seizure of Czechoslovakia continued to dominate the front pages. On March 23, Lithuania, under pressure, ceded the seaport of Kelmel to Germany. A week later Britain and France announced unqualified support of Poland. On April 7, Mussolini marched on Albania.

The reports pouring into the State Department were even more alarming. Geist wrote from Berlin that no one could predict what would happen next. The Germans had a sense of mission, he felt, which made their aggressiveness more than just a drive for land. The next moves would be eastward, and no amount of appeasement would have any beneficial effect.

Roosevelt decided at this point to make another attempt at talking Hitler into peace. When he told Hull of his plan to send a message to the dictator, the Secretary of State said he did not think it would have any positive results. He was still afraid such letters would brand the United States an appeaser and thereby hurt American chances of influencing Hitler in future crises. Roosevelt agreed that the likelihood of success was small, but that at least all blame for war would be laid directly on the Axis.
Accordingly, the "Saturday Surprize" was sent to Hitler and Mussolini on April 14. Proposing a European conference to settle European problems, it also called on the Axis powers to make an honest statement of policy, which Roosevelt would communicate to other world leaders. There followed a list of 31 European and Near Eastern countries which they were to promise not to attack for at least ten years, preferably not for 25. Finally, Roosevelt called for an international conference concerning disarmament and world trade which the United States would attend.

To dispel any isolationist fears, the President held a press conference the next day. He stressed the fact that his proffered role was intermediary, not mediator, and that the United States would discuss in conference only trade and disarmament, two issues about which she had always been willing to talk.

The offer, regardless of Roosevelt’s statements to the contrary, was a departure from the withdrawal of the last four years, but Americans, possibly welcoming any attempt to restore calm, reacted favorably, although few thought it would have any effect. Then they waited for the reply.

Mussolini’s answer came in a speech denouncing Roosevelt on April 20. Little attention was paid to him, however, for everyone knew his German master would give the real Axis answer.

Bullitt reported that Hitler was angry that Roosevelt had felt called upon to meddle in Europe, but that he thought he must make some reply to such a direct challenge. It came in the Reichstag speech of April 28. The Austrian was in a devastatingly sarcastic mood, and, after reiterating for the thousandth time his justification of German actions...
thus far and his new demands on Poland, he launched into his answer to Roosevelt. He repeated the appeals of the American, twisted in ludicrous fashion, and then prefaced each rebuttal with a clipped, "Answer!" which convulsed the Nazis before him.

Europe could settle its problems better, he said, if those not involved would stay at home and tend to their own affairs. The United States was calling for an international conference, and yet Hitler remembered that, at the international conference at Versailles, America had done nothing to prevent the rape of Germany. In reply to the President's list of countries not to be attacked, the Austrian said he had contacted all of them and none felt threatened, but if they requested a guarantee of safety, he would certainly be more than nappy to give it.

Drawing the speech to a close, Hitler, always an actor par excellence, said humbly, "Mr. Roosevelt! I fully understand that the vastness of your nation and the immense wealth of your country allows you to feel responsible for the history of the whole world.... I, sir, am placed in a much more modest and smaller sphere." He then, modestly, painted a picture of his role as savior of Germany.

Roosevelt was probably furious, but there was nothing he could do. His offer had been ridiculed out of existence. Perhaps he found comfort in the fact that his purpose of laying blame on the Axis for any war to come would be fulfilled and that his message had placed the United States firmly in the position of opposing all future aggression.

Public reaction to the Reichstag speech was divided. Moderates thought it closed the door on any chance of peace; some isolationists
saw a glimmer of hope in what they thought was a request for definite peace proposals. Those isolationists who were not so optimistic felt the dictator's intransigence was even more reason for staying uninvolved.

Meanwhile, the attitude toward aid to Europe had been changing. As the country became more anti-German, it grew more willing to give economic help to the democracies. When asked to list the most pressing problems before the United States, however, those polled named, in order of importance: (1) staying out of war; (2) solving unemployment; (3) recovery for business. The old fear of being drawn in was still paramount, and the people had little faith in the President's actions having any effect on Europe.

By the end of April, some hope that Europe would be able to solve her own problems began to grow, an optimism which would increase with the coming of summer. Throughout the year in question, prospects seemed brighter when Hitler lapsed into relative inactivity, as he did in those months. Men could more easily remember the horror of war than the terror in Germany.
Chapter 5
Summer, 1939

The summer of 1939 in Europe was an endless diplomatic maze of frantic activity over Danzig; in the United States it was marked by pessimism in Washington and optimism in the rest of the country.

Information pouring into the capital gave Roosevelt and his advisers an accurate view of the situation abroad, for, in addition to able work by the diplomatic service's regular channels, there were leaks in the German Foreign Office which supplied valuable reports. In mid-May the feeling prevailed that war was less likely; Britain and France were building alliances and Germany had economic troubles. Then came the old familiar pattern of Nazi-arranged uprisings of Germans, this time in the free port of Danzig, as Hitler renewed his demands for occupation of that city and access to it through the Polish Corridor. Soon diplomats began predicting a move before the end of the summer.

By May Roosevelt had long since abandoned any faith in appeasement, and Britain and France finally seemed determined to stand firm; so the President turned his attention to revision of the Neutrality Act in the hope that such action would assure Hitler of American ability and intention to aid the Allies. Although at that time non-violent solutions still seemed possible, the Chief Executive felt any steps that would further increase the probability of peace must be taken.

On May 1, the cash and carry provision had expired. Roosevelt had entrusted renewal of it and revision of the Act to Senator Key Pittman,
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, but he had been bungling the task since March, and in early May he reported that passage was unlikely.

The President, therefore, chose Sol Bloom, chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, to introduce a new, even stronger bill there. It called for repeal of the arms embargo and renewal of cash and carry, but it also gave the president the power to name an aggressor in a conflict and levy sanctions accordingly. The bill was reported out of committee favorably, but the vote was purely along party lines. The real fight lay on the House floor.

Hull then wrote a letter to Pittman and Bloom stating government reasons for asking for the changes. The United States was now too big not to affect the rest of the world. The aim of its foreign policy, said the Secretary, must be maximum security coupled with attitudes and actions which would discourage war.

In a conversation with Senate Republican leader Charles L. McNary before the introduction of the Bloom Bill, Hull asked his estimation of the chances for repeal of the arms embargo. The seasoned politician replied, "...I guess you will be in for considerable trouble if you press repeal.... Some people feel pretty strongly, and most of the rest don't want to do anything now." McNary's analysis proved correct not only of the embargo, but of cash and carry as well.

One pleasant incident drew attention away from Congressional haggling in early June. King George VI and Queen Elizabeth, after a visit to Canada, came to Washington. Mrs. Roosevelt wrote that the President considered England America's "first line of defense," so that he planned the trip to rally public support. The presence of royalty in the White
House caused considerable consternation over protocol; Bullitt even sent the First Lady a detailed, secret memorandum recording the proper way to receive a king and queen. Despite much strain for the professional worriers and an unusually severe heat wave, the visit was a success, and the royal couple captivated everyone.

The isolationists in the House reclaimed the stage. George and Elizabeth vacated, and if they were not as charming, they were considerably more vocal, as they rose to protest each major section of the Bloom Bill. The arms embargo and non-renewal of cash and carry were necessary, they felt, to protect this country from foreign involvement. The opposition pointed out that refusal to sell would directly aid the Axis, since Britain, controlling the seas, would be the only country capable of buying from the United States. Representative Hamilton Fish replied that neutrality meant: playing no part in a war. If the United States acted to help the Allies by repealing the embargo, it would be "endeavoring to take sides before war is declared."

Supporters of Roosevelt’s position tried to point out the inconsistency of the isolationist position by saying that trade in other commodities was as necessary to maintain an army as munitions, and yet the objection was just to dealing in munitions. Fish answered that anyone who wanted to engage in commerce with belligerents would do so at his own risk, with the government taking no action when his goods were destroyed at sea.

Perhaps the most bitterly protested point of the bill was the new passage which empowered Roosevelt to name and then levy sanctions against an aggressor. The isolationists freely admitted that they did
not trust the Chief Executive; Representative George H. Tinkham branded the Bloom proposals "a bill for war at the pleasure of the president." He and his colleagues felt Roosevelt had dangerously interventionist views, and if he were given such power he would, by labelling one nation responsible for a war, prepare the way for the United States to be drawn in on the other side of the quarrel.

In resistance to the bill, all the old, familiar arguments were brought out, and in final defense some men even voiced assurances that peace would last. Representative Carl T. Curtis, after damning the munitions makers as warmongers, said calmly, "The people of those countries are all good people. It is the people who fight the wars, not the governments."

Representative Edouard N.H. Izac summed up isolationist reasons for opposing any change in existing neutrality legislation by saying, "You must actually put an iron ring around the Western Hemisphere and keep everybody out of there, but it cannot be done according to international law."

The Bloom Bill passed June 30, but it had been emasculated by amendments which deleted the renewal of cash and carry, denied Roosevelt's power to name an aggressor, and restored the arms embargo. It did not even reach the floor of the Senate, for it was shelved July 13 by the Foreign Relations Committee on a vote of 12 to 11.

The isolationists' reasons for rejecting the bill were a mixture of their old fears, partisanship, distrust of the President, and a genuine feeling that there would be no war before January. The majority of Congress remained largely apathetic and allowed the minority to have its
way, and Roosevelt himself bungled his role.

The President did not push for passage with his typical fervor until it was too late, because, some feel, he was afraid of showing the world how strong isolationist sentiment really was. After the bill had died, as reports from Europe became more and more alarming, he refused to give up the fight. Builitt wrote in late June that a crisis was likely as soon as the German army finished it maneuvers in July. German troops had already begun infiltrating Danzig. Anthony J. Biddle dispatched from Poland on July 12 the report that a peaceful settlement was doubtful.

On July 14, Roosevelt sent a message to Congress urging passage, and four days later he called Senatorial leaders to the White House to convince them to change their vote. Senator William E. Borah proceeded to infuriate Hull, reportedly bringing tears of rage to his eyes, by saying that his sources in Europe did not predict war. Writing his memoirs almost ten years later, the Secretary was still angry at this slur on the work of the diplomatic service, and he said sarcastically that Borah's source was a minor press service in London. Hull closed the chapter with these words:

Trying to win over the isolationists was for me a nerve-racking and back-breaking experience. As I looked at the isolationists..., they reminded me of the somnambulist who walks within an inch of a thousand-foot precipice without batting an eye.

On July 21, Roosevelt held a press conference, and, when the question of neutrality legislation was raised, the President said that the Senate must take the blame for not acting. Europe would go to war in
the immediate future; to shelve the bill had been to declare to him that it was inevitable.

Roosevelt and Hull thought that Hitler would be encouraged by the refusal to act, both because Britain and France could not buy from the United States and because the country had shown an unwillingness to stand behind them. Samuel I. Rosenman, a close associate of the President's for many years, wrote, "Although he denied it specifically, I know from what he said frequently that he did feel a great deal of bitterness at the frustration of one of his last and best hopes for peace."

Whether this hope in the power of American actions over Germany was justified is doubtful. Hull wrote that diplomats told him rejection of the act would encourage Hitler. William L. Shirer, correspondent in Berlin, conversely said that he never had any indication that summer that German officials paid any attention to the United States. Nevile Henderson, British ambassador, does not even mention the event in his record of his mission. Evidence points to the fact that Hitler had already made his plans when the Senate refused to act. In May he had told a group of his generals that the determination to secure Danzig would mean war, but that it was a risk which must be taken to fulfill Germany's Lebensraum.

In late May German Chargé d'affaires Thomsen, estimating America's attitudes and military strength, wrote that the country did not want to fight abroad, but that Roosevelt was trying to stir up the people. Although he habitually overstated the President's power and his hatred of Germany, he rightly felt that no military aid could be sent to Europe for some time. Thomsen had held this view since at least March, and he main-
tained it through the rest of the summer. Such reports probably en-
couraged Hitler far more than any Congressional stubbornness, [if he paid
attention to the United States at all.]

Press reaction to the rejection of the neutrality legislation varied. Some periodicals thought it bad; some said it made no difference. They correctly judged that the reasons for shelving were partisanship, dis-
trust of Roosevelt, and isolationism, with the latter being the most fre-
quently named. Unlike the Congressmen, the journalists thought the pro-
spects for peace in Europe were growing dimmer by the day.

The people, however, saw hope in the future. In January, 44% of
those polled thought there would be a European war within the year.
With the Czech crisis the figure rose to 51%, but by May it had dropped
to 32%, and July saw it down to 23%. Still, a large majority had con-
fidence in the ability of Britain, France, and Russia to defeat the Axis,
if necessary. The Allies had finally taken a firm stand, and the
people felt Hitler would now think twice before provoking war. After
all, he had been quiet for four months.
Chapter 6
War, 1939

Roosevelt and Hull knew Europe was far from peace. As the possibility of war loomed larger, the President focused his attention on the alliance negotiations between Britain, France, and the USSR. He did not like Stalin, but he was tolerant of him and he considered his aid necessary if the Allies were to stop Hitler; so in late July he again took the course of written persuasion:

A top secret message was cabled to Paris and carried from there to Ambassador Lawrence Steinhardt in Moscow by courier. Roosevelt urged Stalin to unite with Britain and France, but declared that he could do nothing about the terms of an alliance. The sending of the letter was to be kept secret.

Steinhardt wrote back to Hull that Moscow's leader was mainly concerned about the rising menace of Japan. If Hitler turned on Russia, he would have to go through Poland and Rumania first, and, Stalin reasoned, such action would bring a declaration of war from Britain and France.

Meanwhile, gloomy reports poured into Washington from abroad. Pierrepont Moffat predicted on August 2 that Germany would move by the end of the month. Alexander C. Kirk, charge d'Affaires in Berlin, wrote six days later that Hitler would act by mid-September, and the American echoed the confusion of diplomats forced to deal with a government completely dominated by such an enigmatic, volatile man.

With Hitler applying pressure to Poland in the manner by now so
familiar, Roosevelt prepared for war. Barger—and Gleason—felt he acted slowly, thereby revealing his reluctance to admit that little hope was left. On August 4, the War Resources Board was set up to administer neutrality, and $10,000,000 became available to build stockpiles.

Two days later Welles instructed Biddle to tell Josef Beck, Polish foreign minister, that Poland must not make the first move, lest she be branded an aggressor. Bullitt reported on August 11 that French leaders felt that a "crisis [could come] in any 24 hours."

For the last two weeks of the month the wires to Washington screamed warnings from Europe. Kirk reported in a handwritten message that Hitler was not convinced that Britain and France would stand firm; Daladier told Bullitt the attack would come in eight days; Bullitt wrote that the French for the first time saw no hope.

Then, August 24, the non-aggression pact between Russia and Germany was signed. Roosevelt, rushing back to Washington from a fishing trip off Canada, hoped that Spain, Italy, and Japan would be disillusioned, but he also feared the appeasing tendencies of the Allies. Opinion in the State Department varied over the full effect of Germany's diplomatic triumph, but no one felt cheerful.

Once again messages were sent, this time to Hitler, Victor Emmanuel, the king of Italy, and Ignace Moszicki, president of Poland. Roosevelt proposed negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration, with his role that of intermediary. Moffat wrote in his diary that everyone knew the attempt was doomed, but that the message had to be sent. "...Any chance could be taken and above all... the record should be abundantly clear,"
he said. Two days earlier, on August 22, he had set the odds for
peace at 75 to 25.

The country was stunned by the announcement of the pact. For years
Nazis had screamed foul epithets at communism; now they united with it
and the two giants of Europe joined in a mammoth war machine. The press
cried that the announcement marked a disaster. War seemed inevitable.

The public reacted with the same shocked confusion, as no one
seemed to know what would happen. The old hatred of Communism flared
up again. Everyone felt the dictators had proved their natural trea-
chery and had given the United States even greater reason for doing its
utmost to avoid entanglement.

On August 25, Roosevelt held a cabinet meeting to announce the emer-
gency measures he had taken. The Treasury Department would require
clearance for all foreign ships in American ports. If war came, he would
urge the departments of State and Justice to delay the neutrality dec-
laration, so that as much arms and equipment as possible could be got
to Britain and France. In a press conference the same day, Roosevelt
said war was not certain, but his optimism must have been based more on
hope than facts.

The President and the State Department correctly thought that there
would be no rapprochement this time, because Poland seemed determined to
stand firm, assured that Britain and France would be forced to support
her. So desperate was Chamberlain that he told Kennedy to suggest to
The United States that it put pressure on the Poles to back down, but
Washington scornfully rejected the idea.
The last day of the month Hitler sent his reply to the President's peace message, and its complete denial of any German guilt for the crisis snuffed out hope that America could help avert war. Moffat summed up feeling in Washington when he wrote, "The last two days [August 26 and 27] have given me the feeling of sitting in a house where somebody is dying upstairs. There is relatively little to do and yet the suspense continues unabated."

The next press conference at the White House convened to hear Roosevelt announce the invasion of Poland on September 1. In answer to the question of whether the United States could stay out of war, the President said, "...I not only sincerely hope so, but I believe we can." Two days later he repeated this assurance in a "fireside chat," adding to the original draft of the speech his opinion that Americans could not be expected to remain neutral in thought as well as in deed. War had only strengthened his resolve to rally American support for the Allies.

On September 8 the President declared the neutrality of the United States. Congress was called into special session to repeal the arms embargo, which the majority now consented to do, and the bill became law on November 4.

Roosevelt's reaction to the end of the year of European blunders must have been a mixture of sorrow and foreboding. He had spent that year trying to convince leaders abroad to confer over their differences, and all the effort had been wasted.

Once again attention must be turned to the idea that Roosevelt
planned for United States intervention. As late as September, Langer-and-Gleeson feel he honestly thought the war could stay out of actual conflict, while supplying Britain and France economically. Hull says, although writing from a vantage point of almost ten years, that he and the President always worked to avoid entanglement. Robert Sherwood, one of Roosevelt's ghost writers, advances the thesis that the Chief Executive's reaction to the outbreak of the war was an underestimation of German power and a fear of appeasement by the Allies that would allow Hitler to rearm, rally the support of his people and partners, and play on isolationist sentiment in the West. Mrs. Roosevelt writes that her husband never thought war was inescapable and that he continually said he hoped that, if it came, the United States could stay out.

If these close observers are wrong, if Roosevelt really harbored a desire to send American troops abroad, the fact remains that from September, 1939 to December, 1941, all he asked for was economic aid to the Allies. The U.S. moved closer, but did not enter the war until she was attacked.

Press and public reaction to the invasion of Poland are easier to see. The press thought Britain and France would be the winners of a war fought in trenches. A stalemate would develop, with Britain controlling the seas and France holding Germany at the Maginot Line. No one understood Hitler's blitzkrieg or foresaw the brilliance of his unconventional tactics.

As for the United States, it could stay out, and the press agreed on the course the country should take. The neutrality laws should be enforced, after having restored cash and carry. The government should
act to prevent the growth of belligerent credit here. Above all, Americans must remember World War I, and they must truly want to remain uninvolved.

The people shared these views. They blamed Hitler fully for provocging the war, and thought Britain and France had been right in standing firm. On August 17, only 12% of those questioned wanted the Allies to give in. In mid-September, 73% answering pollsters believed England and France should stand by Poland. One month later, with that country in ruins, 79% polled thought the Allies should remain at war. The year since Munich had taught Americans that appeasement would not work.

Like the press, the people believed Germany would lose. In early October, 64% of those polled favored Britain and France; two weeks later the figure had risen to 71%. Of those answering in such a manner, 62% said they were very confident of an Allied victory.

America could stay out if she wanted, but she must make a concerted effort to do so. One observer wrote, "We are as a nation undoubtedly suffering from a psychosis, a fear that we shall be trapped into war in spite of ourselves." The polls revealed that Americans still felt the entrance into World War I had been a mistake. The majority believed Roosevelt should remain aloof from the crisis and concentrate on keeping the country uninvolved.

As for the policy he should pursue, a Roper poll reported that opinion was divided. Only 37.5% of those questioned supported the renewal of cash and carry.
The next largest number (29.9%) felt the country should not even reinstate the defunct measure. Few (14.7%) supported entrance into the war if the Allies faced defeat, and even fewer (8.9%) proposed supplying Britain, France, and Poland, while refusing to sell to Germany.

Despite the fact that polls are a deceptive form of evidence, they do indicate opinions, and in conjunction with press and governmental reactions, these surveys substantiate the thesis upon which this paper has been built. Although more opposed the Hitler than they had been a year earlier, although, after the initial war scare cooled, more willing to aid Britain and France, Americans in the fall of 1939 were still basically isolationist. The old feeling that war was fruitless remained, and with it the fear that somehow the United States would be forced once again to fight a European war for the benefit of Europeans.

Franklin Roosevelt called his wife at 5 a.m., September 1, to tell her of the invasion, and her reaction was probably the same as that of many Americans, even if few would admit it. She woke two friends, and the three ladies sat together in the early morning.

...a sense of impending disaster was on us. The thing we had feared had finally come, and we seemed to know that sooner or later we would be dragged into the vortex with all the European countries. ...I had a feeling that... there was not much chance for any part of the world to escape it, though in the meantime we hoped for some miracle.

Mrs. Roosevelt was right. America would not escape the war against which her husband had fought and into which Europe had blundered. Hitler would destroy the remnants of Pax Britannia, forcing the United States to lead the free world, for isolationism, an earnest desire to be left alone, could not survive the death of the old order.
Appendix, Bibliography, Footnotes
### Reaction to Munich Settlement

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<td></td>
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<td>Time</td>
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*All agreed that Hitler had showed true colors.*

### REACTION TO REICHSTAG SPEECH

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### Reaction to Rejection of Neutrality Legislation

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### Reasons for Rejection

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### REACTION TO GERMAN—USSR PACT

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### EFFECT OF PACT

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### REACTION TO WAR

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<tr>
<td>Harper's</td>
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<td>New Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Sept. 11</td>
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### REACTION TO WAR

<table>
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<td>Christian Century</td>
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<td>(if Allies lose)</td>
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<td>Time</td>
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The following articles were used to gather the information presented in the preceding appendices.

**Munich**

2. *Atlantic Monthly*, CLXII (November, 1938); no mention.

**Pogroms**

1. *Atlantic Monthly*, CLXII (December, 1938); no mention.
2. *Current History*, XXXIX (December, 1938); no mention.
3. *Harper's Magazine*, CLXXVIII (December, 1938); no mention.
4. "Let the Jews Come In!" *New Republic*, LXXXVII (November 23, 1938), 60.


### Mood in January


### Rearmament


   No mention.


   No mention.


Czechoslovakia

   No mention.


   No mention.


Reichstag Speech

   No mention.

   No mention.

   No mention.


Neutrality Legislation

   No mention.


   No mention.


German-Soviet Pact

1. *Current History*, LI (October, 1939).
   No mention.


   No mention.


War


Footnotes

Chapter 1


5. Congressional Record, part 2, 1923.


7. Ibid., October 24, 1939, 1185.


9. Ibid., 8.

10. Ibid., 16.

Chapter 2


3. Ibid., 297.


8. Ibid., pp. 532-535.


10. Ibid., 430.


14. "4 Chiefs, One Peace," *Time*, XXII (October 10, 1938), 17; "Britain's "Peace With Honor": Tempered by Reservations"; "Newsweek, XII (October 10, 1938), 16.

15. See appendix. In the future, when reference is made to the opinions of the press, it will be made to the author's survey of the reactions of *The Atlantic Monthly, Christian Century, Current History, Harper's Magazine, The Nation, New Republic, Newsweek, and Time*. Specific articles will be footnoted. The results of this survey are tabulated in the appendix.


17. Ibid., September 23, 1938, 163.

18. Ibid., October 2, 1938, 966.

19. Ibid., September 23, 1938, 966.


24. Ibid., 564.
Chapter 3

1. Ickes, The Secret Diary, II, 481.


3. Ibid., 39.


6. Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember (New York, 1949), 203.

7. Roosevelt, Public Papers, VIII, 3.

8. Ibid., 4.

9. Ibid., 2.

10. Ibid., pp. 71-73.

11. Ibid., 103.

12. Ibid., 113.

13. Congressional Record, part 1, 1010.


15. Ibid., 111.


18. Ibid., 781.
Chapter 4

2. Ibid., 14.
3. Ibid., 17.
4. Ibid., 24.
5. Ibid., 23.
6. Ibid., 37.
7. Ibid., 38.
9. U.S. Department of State, Peace and War, 455.
11. Ibid., 232.
12. Ibid.
14. Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, VI, 35.
15. Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, IV, pp. 675-678.
20. Ibid., pp. 208-217.


24. Ibid., pp. 464-480.

25. Pratt, Cordell Hull, II, 310.


Chapter 5


2. Ickes, The Secret Diary, II, 634; Ibid., 636.

3. Pratt, Cordell Hull, II, 312.


5. Ibid., 141.


8. Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember, 183.

9. Ibid., 184.

10. Congressional Record, part 7, 7924.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., 7924.
13. Ibid., 7928.
14. Ibid., part 8, 8154.
15. Ibid., 8234.
17. Ibid., 143.
18. Ibid., 81.
20. Ibid., 197.
21. Roosevelt, Public Papers, VIII, 381.
24. Ibid., 666.
30. Bullock, Hitler, 455.
31. "Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, VI, pp. 526-533.
32. Ibid., pp. 129-135.
33. Ibid., VII, pp. 275-276.
34. Cantril and Strunk, Public Opinion, January 10, March 21, May 2, July 17, 1939, 781.
35. Ibid., May 26, 1939, 1185.
Chapter 6

2. Ibid., pp. 160-161.
3. Ibid., 162.
5. Ibid., 205.
8. Ibid., 212.
9. Ibid., 226.
10. Ibid., 350.
11. Ibid., 356.
16. Ibid., 257.

27. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins; An Intimate History (New York, 1948), 125.

28. Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember, 207.

29. See "Background for War," Time, XXXIV (August 28, 1939), pp. 26-35. Also, Thomas M. Johnson, "As the War Begins," Current History, LI (October, 1939), pp. 30-35. A survey of the estimation of military preparation in Europe was also made of the issues mentioned in the tabulation of the reaction to the outbreak of the war.


31. Cantril and Strunk, Public Opinion, August 17, 1939, 1165; Ibid.

32. Ibid., September 11, 1939.

33. Ibid., October 10, 1939.

34. Ibid., October 3, 1939, 1185.


37. Ibid., October 10, 1939, 760.

38. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 127.

39. Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember, 207.
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"America Stirred by New War but Set on Staying Neutral." Newsweek, XIV (September 11, 1939), 25-27.


"A Month's History in the Making." Current History, XXXIX (February, 1939), 11-12.


"As the War Begins." Current History, LI (October, 1939), 30-37.


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"4 Chiefs, One Peace." Time, XXXII (October 10, 1938), 15-17.


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"Europe After Munich." Christian Century, LV (October 12, 1938), 1224-1226.

"Europe's Foes Unleash Forces After Slow Start of New War." Newsweek, XIV (September 11, 1939), 10-14.

"Exit Czecho-Slovakia." New Republic, LXXXXVIII (March 22, 1939), 177.


"Hitler Answers." New Republic, LXXXIX (May 10, 1939), 4-5.


"Hitler Says No." The Nation, CXXXVIII (May 6, 1939), 516-517.


"Hitler and Stalin Clasp Hands." Christian Century, LVI (August 30, 1939), 1035.

"How to be Neutral." Time, XXXIV (July 17, 1939), 17-19.

Cover domestic and foreign affairs; well written.

"Invitation to a Holy War." Christian Century, LVI (January 18, 1939), 78-80.

Johnson, Thomas M. "As the War Begins." Current History, LI (October, 1939), 30-35.

"Let the Jews Come In!" New Republic, LXXXVII (November 23, 1938), 60.

"Measures Short of War." The Nation, CXXXIX (September 9, 1939), 260-261.

"Miscalculation." Newsweek, XIV (September 11, 1939), 15-18.


Diary gives valuable pictures of Hull, Roosevelt; good on State Department reactions.

"Nazi Caesar." Newsweek, XIII (March 27, 1939), 19-21.

"Nemesis Postponed." New Republic, LXXXVI (October 12, 1938), 255-257.


"Next Steps in Neutrality." Christian Century, LVI (July 26, 1939), 918-919.


Poorly indexed. Polls from Europe as well as America.

"Red Star and Swastika." The Nation, CXXXIX (August 26, 1939), 211-212.

Has absolutely nothing, and considering the editor, it is not difficult to see why.


"Surprise? Surprise?" *Time,* XXXIII (March 27, 1939), 16-17.


"The Door is Open." *Christian Century,* LVI (May 10, 1939), 593-600.

"The Shape of Things." *The Nation,* CXXXVII (October 8, 1938), 337-341.


"The Shape of Things." *The Nation,* CXXXIX (July 22, 1939), 85-86.


Collection of government documents made public when written.


"War Against the Jews." *The Nation,* CXXXVII (November 19, 1938), 324-325.
"Well Said, Mr. President!" Christian Century, LVI (September 13, 1939), 1095-1096.


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Information not outdated by later books. Journalistic.


Fairly objective; well written.


Excellent study of foreign policy. Good bibliography.


Text book style, but thorough. Good bibliography.

Roosevelt, Eleanor. This I Remember. New York: Harper and Brothers, [1949].


Covers domestic and foreign policy.


Mainly concerned with domestic policy.