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[Introduction to] Shaper Nations: Strategies for a Changing World

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Shaper Nations

Strategies for a Changing World

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INTRODUCTION

Making National Strategy in the Twenty-First Century

WILLIAM I. HITCHCOCK

THE ESSAYS in this book analyze the national strategies of key nations that are shaping the global politics of our century. The nations considered here—Brazil, China, Germany, India, Israel, Russia, Turkey, and the United States—of course vary a great deal. Some are geographically and demographically huge and some are small; some are global powerhouses and some are rising regional powers; some are transparent democracies while others are governed by opaque, authoritarian regimes; some possess nuclear weapons and some do not; some face serious security threats and others are less threatened. But they all share one major characteristic: in our multipolar and interdependent world, these states will have a decisive influence on their geopolitical “neighborhoods” and perhaps on international relations the world over. Since these nations will shape the future world order, policymakers and scholars need to be attuned to the factors that are most influential in the making of their national strategies, from geopolitical ambition to ideology to threat perceptions and historical identity. The more we know about what is driving the making of strategy, the better informed we will be to manage the desires, expectations, and fears of the world’s most powerful states.

This book aims to evaluate both the sources of national strategy in these nations as well as the impact that the pursuit of such strategies is having upon contemporary world politics. It is important to note that the contributors to the volume were chosen for their scholarly expertise as well as their national origin: each author lives and works primarily in the country about

which he or she is writing, and this is by design. Rather than rely on U.S.-based scholars, the editors of this book wished to learn about the making of national strategy from experts who have a keen “feel” for the debates and politics of their own countries. We have asked them to address the same set of questions with a specific aim. Rather than simply offering a collection of individual country portraits, we hope to illuminate their similarities and differences and what they can tell us about the sources and impact of strategies in the world ahead.

Our selection of these shaping nations needs some brief explanation. In our view, these eight countries are already having a significant effect on the politics, economic development, and security of their immediate geopolitical neighborhoods and will likely shape the future course of the global system. Earlier exercises in identifying such a list of key nations have used different criteria from ours. A 1996 study of “pivotal states,” for example, argued that American policymakers ought to take special care to examine certain nations “on the brink”—that is, nations whose internal and regional troubles were so great that, should they collapse, the ripple effects would be enormous. This was an argument for focusing attention on troubled states whose principal impact on the world order would be associated with *failure*.¹ We have taken a different approach. Our focus is on increasingly powerful and influential states whose current policies are already shaping key geopolitical zones in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Europe. It is because of their geopolitical prowess that these states have the capacity to shape regional outcomes. Our selection of countries is not meant to be comprehensive or complete. We are well aware that important countries like Japan, Iran, Indonesia, and Mexico, as well as Nigeria and South Africa, though not included here, have geopolitical significance. Our intent is not to consider every country that might potentially be a “shaper” of the future international order. Rather, we examine how national strategy is made in a representative range of these “shaping” countries, and, by doing so, we hope to illuminate the factors that influence shaper strategies as well as the kind of world these shaping nations will create.

Therefore, we include Israel because it has large conventional military capabilities, a nuclear arsenal, significant economic power, and the technological sophistication to hugely influence regional dynamics and international politics. Indeed, for the last sixty years, its employment of military force, its territorial expansion, its rejection of a nuclear nonproliferation regime, and its settlement policies have all shaped the politics of the Middle East

and greatly influenced world politics. By contrast, the large African nations do not possess these characteristics. Nigeria is beleaguered by civil strife, an insurrection it cannot suppress, and endemic corruption that has sapped the strength of its military establishment and hampered its economic potential. Nigeria might be a pivotal state, in that its failure would be a disaster for Africa, but it is not a “shaper” nation because its current policy choices are not altering world politics. Nor did we include South Africa. It does not have the military power, economic strength, technological sophistication, and political and social cohesion to be among the most important shapers of international politics in the years ahead. In terms of total GDP, it ranks around thirtieth in the world, far below Brazil and Turkey; its GDP per capita places it around eighty-fifth in the world.² In terms of national power index, which combines GDP, defense spending, population, and technology, South Africa is projected to decrease or remain at the same level of power, whereas the United States, Russia, China, Germany, Brazil, and India already constitute the top six, and Turkey and Israel are projected to increase in national power.³ None of this is to say that South Africa is unimportant. Rather, we believe that South Africa is unlikely to shape international relations globally in anything like the manner of our selected countries.

Having identified our key shaping states, we zero in on the making of national strategy in each. What do we mean by strategy? We do not limit ourselves, as Clausewitz did, to thinking of strategy as “the art of using battles to win the war.”⁴ Like a number of scholars and theorists, we have adopted a much more capacious definition. “A strategy,” Lawrence Freedman has written, “is much more than a plan,” which is simply a linear procession of steps one might take toward a goal. Strategy is more demanding. In a complicated world that is dynamic and unstable, national strategy must account for constant change, the possibility of conflict and war, and the unpredictable consequences that pursuit of one’s strategy might trigger. Developing a strategy to achieve national ends requires thoughtful consideration of all aspects of national power, from military capabilities to economic potential, diplomatic influence, and considerations of ideology and domestic politics, as well as strong national leadership. Strategy must be both proactive and reactive, for it must account for the cost of pursuing a set of goals that may appear detrimental to others, thus leading to possible conflict. Furthermore, wise strategy integrates the need for diplomacy, since the pursuit of national interests usually requires support from allies and the cultivation of coalitions. Finally, strategy must take into

consideration popular support for the ends that the government has identified. As Basil Liddell Hart put it, “a good cause is sword as well as armor”; it can augment national strength. But a poor cause can be disruptive and erode national effectiveness. For all of these reasons, strategy-making is a constantly adaptive process that ranges across military, political, and economic policy. National strategy must respond to ever-changing internal, geopolitical, economic, and even moral circumstances.⁵

Typically, scholars of “grand” strategy—that is, strategic action on a national and global scale rather than in an operational, military sense—have directed their attention toward the actions of “great powers.” Since Thucydides, the study of strategy has examined nations or empires that have emerged as preeminent and that face a series of challenges to that preeminence. To study the fate of Periclean Athens, or Philip II’s Spanish Empire, or nineteenth-century Britain, or even the United States since 1945, is to explore the behavior of polities that are at the apex of a particular configuration of power and are anxious to hold their position.⁶ By contrast, the essays in this volume are not limited to the study of one or two hegemonic states. Rather, the authors have tried to pull back the curtain to reveal the strategic thinking and policymaking in states which, while indisputably powerful, are nonetheless still searching for their place in the twenty-first-century world order. These nations are riding a wave of historical change that may lift them into positions of regional or global preeminence. We seek to understand how their strategic cultures will guide them as they shape international politics.

Strategy, however, is not crafted in a laboratory under controlled conditions. The strategies of these states are not merely expressions of preferred ends, with means to match. On the contrary, specific context matters, as does the centrality of ideas that are seen as core values for each nation.⁷ What makes the analysis of these states so compelling is that we can observe the making of strategy in a national context that is in flux: as these states rise in influence, they are forced to adjust and adapt their strategic thinking and behavior to match their new circumstances and to contend with the shifting configurations of power. For the nations we have studied here—nations whose economies, domestic political arrangements, and security environments are rapidly changing—making strategy is like skeet-shooting from the stern of a ship on a foaming sea: you may see your target clearly only for the briefest of moments before your environment has shifted and your calculations must be adjusted. In the contemporary world, the strategy-making process is one of flux, dynamism, revision, and improvisation.

This is not to suggest that these states are simply reacting in a hasty, ill-conceived manner to a series of short-term crises. On the contrary, strategic choices, however improvisational they may seem, are usually framed by a number of powerful forces that direct or restrict strategic behavior. Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley argue that the most significant ingredients in the evolution of national strategy include geography, history, ideology (and/or religion), economic capabilities, form of government, and individual leadership.⁸ While policymakers may at times appear to be acting rashly or impetuously, careful examination usually reveals that national strategy is strongly shaped by such long-term environmental factors, lending a coherence and predictability to the actions and choices of states. It is the purpose of this book to highlight the ways such long-term background factors influence the making of strategy in these key nations.

In these eight nations, we find a number of common patterns that apply across the whole group and which contemporary policymakers must bear in mind if they are to make sense of what is driving national strategy in the contemporary world. The common factors that are shaping today's strategic thinking include the nonnational nature of most security threats, the importance of domestic politics in shaping national strategy, the powerful and distorting effects of history and national identity upon national strategy, and the economic capabilities and ambitions of each nation; finally, there is the sheer difficulty, in the face of so many powerful internal and external constraints, to shape and pursue an effective national strategy. Let us consider briefly each of these interpretive categories.

Most Security Threats Are Nonnational

One striking feature of the early twenty-first century is that security threats have become deracinated from a national context. For most of these "shaping" powers, the central security threat is not the prospect of war with one or two neighboring states. Security challenges are more diffuse than ever, leaving states to contemplate a broad range of shifting threats. Strategy therefore requires a more sophisticated calculation about the importance of relative threats presented by a combination of problems. These might include terrorism (Israel, India), a worsening of the "neighborhood" as a result of failed states (Turkey, India), rival bids from competitors for regional economic hegemony (Brazil, China), ethnic tensions along geopolitical fault-lines (Russia), or the weakening of international institutions and agreements that have

held a certain favorable order in place (Germany). The United States, as the world's dominant power, has an even greater challenge: it must prepare for both conventional military rivals as well as nonstate threats—terrorism and Islamic radicalism, global economic turmoil, ecological and public health crises, cyber-attacks, and so on. For the states analyzed here, with the possible exception of India, a state-to-state war with a rival nation or coalition is among the least urgent of threats. Instead, these nations view their main strategic challenges coming from disruptive nonstate forces that may persist for a long time precisely because their origins are diffuse and resistant to traditional security countermeasures.

Strategy Starts at Home

Because the chief security threats are diffuse in nature and often resistant to easy quarantine, most of these states worry about internal instability and fractiousness as much as they do about direct external challenges. In states like India, Russia, China, and Turkey, the main threats to national security lie in the disruptive power of regional and global forces—whether ideological, religious, ethnic, or economic—and the way those forces threaten to inflame domestic politics. Many of the leaders examined here understand that their foreign and security policies are in many ways being driven by domestic politics precisely because domestic politics has become a “front” in the battle of ideas over how to shape foreign and security policy. If they wish to “keep their state,” in Machiavelli’s phrase, national leaders must shape their foreign policies in ways that either appease domestic criticism or unite the polity through a shared sense of grievance and hostility toward an external rival. This is a dangerous move, for an environment in which domestic political power struggles are driving choices in foreign and security policy tempts leaders to adopt radical policies in order to achieve a rally-round-the-flag effect, even as they trigger a security dilemma that leaves them more vulnerable.

For example, Yaprak Gürsoy (in Chapter 7) shows the powerful influence of domestic politics on Turkish national strategy. Turkey’s foreign policy of late is characterized by wary relations with the United States, bad relations with Israel, hostility toward the West, and a search for regional partners to quell Islamist unrest. These remarkable departures from many decades of Turkish pro-Western orientation have derived from calculations of domestic politics, most notably the bid by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to consolidate the power of his Justice and Development Party. In Russia, as Fyodor

Lukyanov shows (in Chapter 6), a failed economic development strategy and a lack of domestic political rewards have led Vladimir Putin's government into striking out at Crimea and Ukraine, partly in a bid to reassert regional influence but mainly, perhaps, in an effort to mask the failure of his regime to produce economic growth and good governance. Consolidating "lost" Russian populations in neighboring Ukraine while blocking the perceived "threat" of an expanded European Union into the former Soviet Union seems to Putin to be a successful strategy for mobilizing popular support for his otherwise much-embattled regime. And democratic states, too, play this game, though perhaps less brazenly. In Brazil, for example, as Matias Spector shows (in Chapter 1), even political leaders who have sharply differing philosophies about economic development nonetheless join in adopting a rhetorical stance that stresses a "bullying," interventionist United States and directs attention at the threats of neoliberal economic policies in an effort to shore up domestic political support. Other examples in this book illuminate how the quest for domestic political consensus shapes the making of national strategy, and the trend is worrisome, to say the least.

History and Identity Matter

Because the audience for strategic choices is as much internal as external, leaders of these "shaping powers" are eager to present their national strategies as flowing from the natural course of history. This is obvious for example in Russia, where Putin has constructed a national ideology that is premised upon the past—a past filled with glorious achievements, centuries-long expansion into Eastern and Southeastern Europe as well as Asia, heroic responses to external threats and aggression, the rapid modernization of the homeland, and its rise to great power status, all serving to transform Russia into a world power. It stands to reason that no rival or coalition can or should ever turn Russia away from her rightful place among the great powers, nor deny Russia the right to impose its will on small neighbors who threaten that historical destiny.

But the appeal to history and national identity is a powerful force in many states examined here. China has an acute awareness of its recent geopolitical weakness, having been a target of rapacious imperialism and humiliation at the hands of outsiders from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. The terrible years of World War II, the revolution and the civil war, when as many as twenty million Chinese perished, deeply

influenced China's strategic culture. Ever since, China has felt a need to develop sufficient military power to control its own territory and extend influence along its periphery. Nor should the persistence of conflict in the region after 1945 be forgotten. At various times since the war, China has been engaged in military encounters with Taiwan, Tibet, the United States, the Soviet Union, India, and Vietnam. Clearly, Chinese leaders, when they ponder recent history, may have every reason to be kept awake at night by the same "*cauchemar des coalitions*" that haunted Bismarck and Wilhelmine Germany in the 1880s.⁹

Perhaps no country is more engaged with its history and identity as is Israel, and the public debates about these matters directly shape national strategy. Ariel E. Levite (in Chapter 5) reminds us that Israel's founders looked to biblical history to lend legitimacy to their claim for the creation of *Eretz Israel*, and ever since 1948, politics and security strategy have been governed by the need to sustain the legitimacy of that claim. The question of identity has also become a battleground in Israel: what kind of society and nation does Israel wish to be? Should it be a Jewish or a multicultural nation? Should it be a secular or a religious society? Should it keep faith with the socialist traditions of its founders or embrace market capitalism? Can it be democratic and yet maintain Arab Israelis in a second-class status? The answers to these questions strike at the heart of Israel's national identity and, therefore, its strategy, because so many of the thorny questions that bedevil Israel's relations with its neighbors are overlaid with historical claims: the status of Jerusalem, the right of return for Palestinian refugees, and the issues of borders and national sovereignty.

But the implications of "history" for the countries discussed in this book go beyond the shaping of strategic ambitions. Powerful framing narratives, premised on a reading of the past, can close off opportunities for collaborative action in the international arena. If one nation chooses to place long-standing grievances or claims of "national destiny" at the center of its public debates over strategy, leaders may quickly find themselves unable to uncouple their strategic interests from their ideologies. As a consequence, we find that states with shared interests are often unable to overcome the polarizing forces of national identity. Consider the goals that might pull key states together into collaboration: Russia and the United States both wish to stamp out Islamist radicalism, China and the United States wish to contain nuclear proliferation in Asia, Israel and Turkey both want to quell

insurgencies throughout the Arab world, Germany and Russia would like to nurture economic ties especially in the energy section, and India and China both desire global economic development. Yet these powerful forces of attraction are often undermined by the enduring power of nationalist historical narratives that stress grievances, threats, and old animosities. Not only do history, memory, and identity matter in shaping strategy; they have the power to trump even the most basic of national interests.

Economic Capabilities and Ambitions

Students of grand strategy know that economic capabilities are an essential ingredient in the projection of power, and indeed economic growth in one major country will tend to shape the responses of its neighbors. It is the oldest lesson of international politics, taught by Thucydides: “what made war [between Athens and Sparta] inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”¹⁰ Ever since, scholars have looked to shifts in relative economic power to predict, or explain, military-strategic rivalry between states. Paul Kennedy in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* considered rapid economic growth—and the relative decline this entailed for certain states—to be the chief source of strategic rivalry and war in the modern era. More recent scholarship has pursued this line of inquiry.¹¹

The essays in this volume, however, complicate the picture somewhat. If one looks at certain key economic measurements (see Figures I.1 and I.2), one would conclude that China and the United States are on a collision course. China has the world’s second-largest gross domestic product (GDP) and is growing at the rate of 7 percent a year (down from 10 percent annual growth four years ago), compared to America’s anemic growth rate of 2 percent annually. In 2010, China displaced the United States as the world’s largest manufacturer and now holds a 22 percent share of world manufacturing compared to 17 percent for America. Yet are we to conclude that China and the United States are destined to go to war? The issue is a hotly contested one. Certainly, the economic rivalry between these nations has security implications, and there are plenty of other geopolitical flashpoints in the U.S.-China relationship. But Men Honghua (in Chapter 2) argues that China knows its welfare is linked to that of its neighbors. Indeed, China’s growth is premised upon finding global buyers for its products and global sellers of raw materials. So it does seem possible that China’s rapid growth may serve




Figure I.1. GDP and PPP (purchasing power parity) in China and the United States (current USD).

as a force for further global cooperation rather than conflict. Because the relationship is so important and also so fragile, James Steinberg, one of the contributors to this volume, has argued for a policy of “strategic reassurance” designed to fend off the security dilemma and guide the U.S.-China relationship along a productive path. Even so, other analysts anticipate a much more fraught and dangerous future for this relationship.¹²

Rapid global economic shifts typify our epoch—up to a point. China’s rise is astonishing, while Brazil and India have climbed to take the eighth and ninth positions, respectively, in the global manufacturing rankings. But what is perhaps of more significance, and less discussed, than the sudden rise of the global South is the persistence of the older modernized states at the top of the pile: the United States, Japan, and Germany today rank second, third, and fourth, respectively, among manufacturing nations, and they were also the top three in 1990—twenty-five years ago.¹³ This would suggest that there is a certain stability built into the global economic system such that the sudden rise of China need not be seen as an existential threat to other status quo powers. If so, this is surely good news.




Figure I.2. GDP rankings of China and the United States (current USD).

In another way, too, economic factors may drive these states toward policies of restraint rather than aggression. Many of the countries we examine here (with the important exception of Russia) know that the legitimacy of their political systems depends upon delivering greater prosperity to their peoples. The imperative to sustain economic growth at home has a decided impact upon a range of policy choices among these states, in areas as diverse as defense spending, education, social welfare, and health care. Srinath Raghavan (in Chapter 4) shows that internal economic growth continues to be the “core objective” of the Indian state and that India’s external policies are evaluated through the prism of this chief goal. Similarly, Matias Spektor demonstrates that Brazil’s national strategy is fundamentally shaped by a desire to insure fiscal stability (after long stretches of economic mismanagement), enhance the welfare state, and integrate Brazil’s economy with the world. There is an interesting strategic challenge visible here: economic growth may make the projection of power possible, but the projection of power can cause conflict and thus threaten internal economic development. Such a calculation suggests that the imperative for economic growth may tend to encourage cooperation rather than rivalry.

The Challenge of Crafting National Strategy

One alarming conclusion that emerges from these essays is that these “shaping” states are not always competent, or confident, in crafting national strategy. Consider Barry Posen’s definition of “grand” strategy: it is a logical chain of arguments—in essence, a theory—about how a state can best secure its interests. To be effective, however, a grand strategy “must identify likely threats to the state’s security and it must devise political, economic, military, and other remedies for those threats. Priorities must be established among both threats and remedies because, given an anarchical international environment, the number of possible threats is great . . . and resources are scarce.”¹⁴ Identify threats; establish priorities to meet them; then deploy sufficient and available resources in ways that are carefully adjusted to achieve those goals while not creating additional security threats. This is the essence of grand strategy. But if we try to assess the effectiveness of strategy-making among the states analyzed here, we find a spotty record at best.

On a spectrum from good to bad, we might place China near the top. As Men Honghua shows, China knows what it wants: internal political stability, the continuation of economic growth, and a free hand to project its growing power across Asia. China is also clear in what it considers threats: chiefly, any restriction on its economic expansion, any direct military threat to its sphere of influence in East Asia and the Pacific, and any hint of internal subversion. China has shown that it knows how to achieve these ends without exhausting its national resources. Economically, it has maximized opportunities for industrial and economic development, and militarily it has kept its robust defense buildup just short of triggering a security dilemma with the United States. Even so, China has adopted a risky strategy: its internal political stability is dependent upon rapid economic growth, and any significant fall-off of that growth might undercut the implicit bargain the Chinese government has struck with its people: prosperity in return for obedience. Further, its economic and military growth has been so rapid that the United States has undertaken a “pivot to Asia”—a reorientation of its security strategy that assumes a long-term rivalry with China.

Brazil has managed to emerge from a period of dramatic change and economic growth with opportunities to shape its region as never before. Yet even so, Brazil has had little experience of expressing its national interests in terms of “grand strategy.” Its recent democratization and its rise to global economic power have compelled a debate in the country about how best to frame its

interests, and that debate, as Matias Spektor shows, continues to rage, making the strategy process difficult indeed. At times, Brazil has seemed to desire a close accommodation with the United States, riding along the wave of globalization in order to increase prosperity and ease inequality at home. At other times, Brazil has seemed to want to pursue a power-balancing strategy against the United States, pushing back against global economic arrangements dominated by the United States and even pursuing a maverick foreign policy in the Middle East and Arab world. While Brazil's regional policies, such as the pursuit of a South American Union, have more coherence, Brazil has not been able to project its power across the region in a fundamental way. Nor has it been able to leverage its ties to other "BRICS" (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) into genuine global power. In short, Brazil remains an economically powerful state in search of a coherent national strategy.

India, for all its internal and external security problems, has done reasonably well in articulating a national strategy. Its principal goal, as Srinath Raghavan argues, is to sustain its internal economic transformation, thus enabling India to address crippling domestic social problems while also strengthening its regional influence. After experimenting with a variety of economic policies in the post-independence years, India has largely embraced high-growth and pro-business policies that reflect its urgent need to create employment and promote prosperity. In its security policies, however, India has not been able to transcend its intense rivalry with Pakistan. Since their partition, these two states have been locked in a fierce struggle with one another; as both are armed with nuclear weapons, the stakes of the struggle are high. Moreover, the launching of terrorist attacks out of Pakistan against India has intensified the tension. Attempts to manage the relationship expose leaders in both countries to charges of appeasement. Both states are locked in a security dilemma and there seems to be no clear path out. And with the rise of China to global power status, India faces an even more important potential rival in the region. India's strategy, therefore, is wedded to its economic policies: rapid growth may mask some of these unresolved security problems, but not indefinitely.

A bit lower down the spectrum of effective national strategies comes Germany. Germany's national strategy is adrift and in need of remediation. Constanze Stelzenmüller (in Chapter 3) points out that Germany has not really developed the habit of developing grand strategy because for decades after 1945 its sovereignty was circumscribed. After 1990, when a reunited Germany did regain *de jure* sovereignty, it remained constrained by the institutions

which were deemed central to regional and global stability, such as the European Union, NATO, and the United Nations. In its economic strategy within the EU, Germany has managed to alienate states that are demanding more inflationary monetary policies and has won few allies by championing fiscal retrenchment. Austerity has not reinvigorated the EU, raising the question of whether Germany, despite its economic power, really has the ability to save Europe and secure the Continent's future stability. Without success on that front, Germany will be unmoored at a time when Russian aggressiveness has made European unity more important than ever.

Israel, as Ariel Levite shows, has achieved a number of major strategic successes over its history. In a constant state of war and facing daily threats, it concentrates its resources on security. In this narrow sense, Israeli strategy has succeeded. But at what cost? Here the flaws with Israeli strategy become visible. Diplomatically, Israel has increasingly lost friends and allies; the United States now is Israel's only consistent great power supporter. Moreover, each step Israel takes to increase its security—whether building walls in the West Bank, using military force to fight Hamas in Gaza, or arming itself against threatening states like Iran or Syria—inflames anti-Israeli sentiment in the region, thereby reinforcing the security dilemma in which Israel finds itself. Equally worrisome are the profound cleavages that the pursuit of this strategy has opened in Israeli society. The disagreements are not so much over security policies, which are largely uncontroversial, but over the issues of identity that have been stirred up by the pursuit of its security policies: what kind of nation does Israel aspire to be? Can it become an Athens of the Near East, with an open, vibrant, and tolerant culture, economically prosperous and socially equitable, as its founders had hoped? Or is it destined always to be a Sparta, a militaristic society whose sole purpose is to organize its resources for war? In this environment, the making of national strategy has become increasingly fraught.

At the lowest end of the spectrum sit Turkey and Russia. These states have pursued risky national strategies that seem unlikely to succeed in the long run. Turkey has fallen under the sway of a powerful leader whose grip on power has grown. In the quest to consolidate his authority, Erdoğan has inflamed nationalist opinion, worsened ties to the West, and pursued regional deals with Arab regimes that share Turkey's strategic goals. Turkey has nursed its wounds since its rebuff by the European Union and now has sought to become a regional power, downgrading its Western orientation. It is a high-risk strategy, especially in light of the turmoil triggered by Syria's

civil war, in which Turkey has taken sides but cannot exert a decisive influence. In a similar manner, Russia's actions on the world stage reveal a state that has no national strategy. Russia's strategic thinking has been clouded by conspiracy theories and raw national memories of mistreatment by the West. The result has been a sequence of daring gambles and strategic mistakes that have left Russia isolated and the target of economic sanctions. An angry and embittered Russia, governed by a backward-looking autocrat, fueled by nationalist fury, and armed with nuclear weapons, creates a dangerous situation indeed.

Finally, how has the United States managed its strategy in this new world order? James B. Steinberg (in Chapter 8) suggests that for all of the troubles that have beset American national security policy since 9/11, the global configuration of power today presents significant opportunities for the United States. We may live in a multipolar world, but even so, the United States is uniquely powerful and has greater military and economic capabilities, as well as credibility, to shape the world order than any other single nation. Moreover, its ambitions are not territorial: the United States seeks global economic growth, prosperity, and stability because those goals foster its own national interests. With little to fear in the short run from the other shapers and acknowledging many overlapping interests, U.S. strategy would be wise, says Steinberg, to focus less on purely military preeminence and more on implementing a multipart diplomatic and economic strategy. Washington, he argues, should nurture multilateral institutions, support the rule of law, preserve existing alliances, and engage and coopt potential rivals. These policies will be most effective, Steinberg suggests, if they also take into account the particular historical and economic circumstances that drive strategy inside each of the major powers.

Certainly, the "shapers" will need the United States to play a positive role in constructing a stable world order. The essays in this volume suggest that strategy-making is very difficult when, as is the case for most of these shaper nations, it is hobbled by institutional weaknesses, internal political divisions, and ideological modes of thinking. These essays show that in many of these shaper states, domestic politics clash with geopolitical interests, regional struggles endanger national economic ambitions, and government leaders deploy ethnic arguments and exploit memories of historical grievances at the expense of collaborative initiatives. The lack of effective and consistent strategy-making in these states, as Jeffrey W. Legro argues in the conclusion to this volume, has made world politics less orderly and predictable. Shaper

states, seeking short-term opportunities, focused on regional influence, and led by powerful individuals catering to domestic audiences, are unlikely to provide a firm foundation for international stability. It is our hope that the more we know about the sources of strategy for these emerging nations, and the more we take into account the hopes, fears, ambitions, and anxieties of this dynamic but uncertain group of countries, the more able we will be to manage a world filled with both promise and danger.