Iron vs. gold: a study of the three Anglo-Dutch wars, 1652-1674

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PREFACE

The purpose of this paper is to show that, as the result of twenty-two years of intermittent warfare between England and the Netherlands, the English navy became established as the primary naval power of Europe. Also, I intend to illustrate that, as a by-product of this naval warfare, Dutch trade was seriously hurt, with the major benefactors of this Dutch loss of trade being the English.

This paper grew out of a seminar paper on the first Anglo-Dutch war for a Tudor and Stuart English History graduate seminar class taught in the fall of 1966 by Dr. John R. Rilling of the University of Richmond. Because in the present paper I attempt to cover such a large topic, all other aspects of English history of this period will be covered only insofar as they affected the Dutch wars.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. The First Anglo-Dutch War</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. The Second Anglo-Dutch War</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. The Third Anglo-Dutch War</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Appendices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. A Map of the Main Battle Area</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. A List of English Men-of-War</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. A List of Dutch Men-of-War</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. A Letter from Clifford to Arlington</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter I

The First Anglo-Dutch War

On the surface, war did not appear likely in 1652; both England and The Netherlands were protestant in religion and republican in political organization. Each country had agents in the other's capital working for closer mutual relations.\(^1\) Indeed, there was even a vague dream of English republicans to unite the two nations and form a mighty, protestant republic.\(^2\)

But this was only one side of the picture in 1652; if one looks deeper he can see underlying differences between the two nations. In the first place, a majority of the Dutch were shocked at the execution of Charles I and the establishment of a republic in England.\(^3\) When they recovered from their shock, the Dutch people gave

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support to his son, the de jure ruler of England, Charles II. This anti-republican, pro-royalist feeling would naturally cause resentment in England, but, in addition to this, the English were jealous of Dutch wealth and trade which, they felt, was conducted at the expense of England. The Dutch fisheries, which were a major cornerstone of Dutch world trade, collected their fish in English waters north of Scotland. Also the Dutch bought unprocessed English cloth at low prices, dyed it and sold it back to the English at higher prices. As if adding insult to injury, the Dutch were cutting into the English trade with their own colonists. Thus, there was a feeling among the English that they were being exploited and that a good proportion of the wealth flowing into the Netherlands rightfully belonged to England.

An important phase of the balance-of-trade argument, which came to be an obsession with writers of the age, derives from the resentments which English merchants and politicians felt against what they deemed to be England's subservience to the Dutch economic system. Why was treasure draining away from England? Why was trade hampered and strangled by a physical scarcity of coin? The answer was plain. So long as the Dutch sucked England dry of her stocks of raw materials, there could be no development of England's manufacturing

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4 Ibid., p. 48.
5 Ibid., p. 5.
6 Ibid., p. 33.
7 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
8 Ibid., p. 9.
capacity, no opportunity for English merchants to benefit by the most profitable stages of the economic process. So long as English purchasers could be tempted in an uncontrolled market by succulent Dutch imports and so long as English importers were undersold by the competition of Dutch rivals in an open market, it was impossible to correct the disequilibrium in the balance of trade.

The reason that this fear of Dutch trade seems to have suddenly appeared in the 1650's was that administrative measures against the use of Dutch-owned ships, some English acquisitions of ships built in Holland and Dutch involvement in war in the 1620's and '30's blunted the impact of Dutch competition with England. With the end of the Thirty Years' War in 1648 and the virtual end of the English Civil War at the execution of Charles I in 1649, fear of the Dutch reappeared in an intensified form, shattering all complacency among English merchants. The initial reaction was a belated but widespread recognition by English shipowners of the advantages of Dutch ships in handsomeness for the carriage of bulk trade and cheapness of operation and handling.10

By the use of abundant and cheap capital, lower wages, timber floated down on navigable waters, more up-to-date methods and machinery and the use of mass production methods,

9 Ibid., pp. 144-145.
the Dutch could build a ship at a cost to them of four pounds ten shillings a ton, while it would cost seven pounds a ton to build that same ship in England. In 1669 a ship could be built in Holland for eight hundred pounds that would cost thirteen hundred pounds in England. A larger ship, costing fourteen hundred pounds in Holland, would cost twenty-four hundred pounds in England. "The English merchant could not build cheaply because he could not import timber and other materials cheaply, and he could not import cheaply because he could not build cheaply." 12

The Dutch enjoyed this advantage in ships and shipbuilding and with it the advantage of being the middleman for the world's goods because they started first. The Netherlands had become "the Phonecia of modern times" 13 because she traded while other nations fought. England had a large trade with Portugal, Brazil, the Canaries and Madeira in sugar, "speckled wood" (mahogany), fruit and wine, with France in canvas, linen, brandy and wine, with the Baltic countries in naval stores and with the Mediterranean in spices, silk, fruit and oil. England traded for these goods with fish, tin, lead and manu-

13 A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783 (Boston, 1890), pp. 96-97.
factured goods, mainly cloth. Some imports, such as tobacco from Virginia and Maryland and sugar from Barbados, were re-exported.\textsuperscript{14}

While, from our point of view, the outlook for the growth and expansion of English trade was good, to the Englishman of the seventeenth century the failure of the old chartered companies to provide adequate outlets for the export of English goods was another surface indication of Dutch superiority. The Merchant Adventurers were in debt; the Levant Company was suffering from rivalry with the French and the frauds of its factors; the Greenland Adventurers were ceasing to pursue the whale; the African Company was barely able to hold its own against the Dutch on the west coast of Africa; the East India Company was having its troubles with the Dutch in the East Indies; and the herring in British waters was being caught and marketed by the "Flemings"\textsuperscript{15} within sight of helpless English spectators on the shore.\textsuperscript{16}

The Navigation Acts of 1651 and 1660 were enacted in

\begin{footnotes}
\item[14]ogg, I, pp. 222-223.
\item[15]Davis, p. 47.
\item[16]ogg, I, pp. 222-223.
\end{footnotes}
order to gain control of the trade that rightfully belonged to England. 17 There has long existed a view among historians that this was the direct cause of the war; 18 however the view now held is that the Navigation Acts were only a representation of the underlying causes of the wars. In fact, the immediate effect of the Navigation Act of 1660 was to drive the English from the Baltic trade, to the advantage of the Dutch. The reason for this was that English importers had been using foreign built ships for their Baltic trade, which they were prohibited from doing legally by this act and, since English ships were unsuitable for carrying the bulk cargoes of the Baltic trade cheaply, the English were forced out. 19

Another point on which the English and Dutch conflicted was the right of search. The Dutch were in favor of establishing the principle that the flag covered the safety of the goods, while the English felt they had the right to search any neutral ships during wartime. 20

A more immediate cause of the war was the Dutch decision in 1652 to add one hundred fifty warships to their existing

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19 Ogg, I, p. 238.
20 Wilson, p. 58. An informal, undeclared, maritime war with France had been in existence since 1649, because France gave refuge and support to Charles II. Ibid.
fleet of seventy-six.\textsuperscript{21} While done ostensibly to make the English think twice before entering a war with the Dutch, the effect was to cause a corresponding escalation of war feeling in England.\textsuperscript{22} In an effort to prevent war, Dr. Dorislaus, a Dutchman by birth, had been sent over by the English as an ambassador in 1649,\textsuperscript{23} but he was murdered by royalist assassins. The English did not use this as a pretext for war, however, but tried to ignore this violent act by sending a new embassy. While this embassy did not meet with open violence, the official reception was cold and the reaction of the crowds, incited by English Royalist emigrés, was angry and anti-English. From this time on, war was considered only a matter of time.\textsuperscript{24}

While the Dutch did not want to provoke an incident, they were reaching a point where they could no longer afford as a matter of national pride to back down in another conflict concerning the right to search. Accordingly, on May 10, 1652,\textsuperscript{25} Lieutenant Admiral Tromp of the Dutch navy received instructions from the States General of the Netherlands to prevent Dutch ships from being searched by "foreign ships".\textsuperscript{26} On May 15, Tromp gave instructions to his cap-

\textsuperscript{21} Of the projected one hundred fifty ships, the Dutch built eighty-eight. Gardiner and Atkinson, I, p. 228.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., I, pp. 51-52.
\textsuperscript{24} Wilson, p. 48.
\textsuperscript{25} To avoid confusion, all dates will be given, as this one is, according to the New Style or Gregorian calendar.
\textsuperscript{26} Gardiner and Atkinson, I, pp. 155-159.
tains to resist all attempts at boarding. On the 19th, Tromp left Dover Bay, where he had been permitted by Commodore Bourne to repair damages done by a recent storm, and put out to sea intending to make for Calais. On the way, he received word (which later turned out to be exaggerated) that a Dutch fleet had been attacked by the English. He immediately decided to go to their aid and thus encountered the English fleet.

When the commander of the English fleet, Admiral Blake, saw the Dutch fleet approaching, he fired three warning shots at Tromp's flag to indicate to Tromp that he should strike his flag as was customary for foreign vessels encountering English ships in the channel. Instead of doing this, Tromp fired a broadside at Blake and ran up a red flag, signalling his fleet to fight. Although outnumbered by forty capital ships to twenty-three, eight of which did not arrive until late in the battle, Blake emerged the victor, capturing one ship of thirty guns and probably sinking another. This incident was the immediate cause of the war, although the Dutch ambassadors in London continued to work for a peace

27 Ibid., I, pp. 165-168.
28 Ibid., I, pp. 196-199.
29 Ibid., I, pp. 192-196.
30 As I am using it here, a capital ship is one carrying in excess of thirty guns.
which was no longer possible.\textsuperscript{32}

As previously indicated, the Dutch were primarily a commercial people whose entire economy depended on trade. Only about ten per cent of the Dutch population was engaged in agriculture, whereas twenty per cent was engaged in the fishing industry and forty per cent made their living from trade.\textsuperscript{33} The English at this time were primarily a self-supporting, agricultural nation,\textsuperscript{34} whose only weakness exposed to attack by an enemy navy was the coastal coal trade from Newcastle to London.\textsuperscript{35} The Dutch were at a geographical disadvantage first because of the proximity of England and her position athwart the major Dutch trade routes\textsuperscript{36} and, secondly, because during three-quarters of the year the prevailing winds in the area were westerly, making it very difficult for even a superior navy to greatly endanger the English harbors on the North Sea.\textsuperscript{37}

The Dutch were also at this time experiencing internal political difficulties. There was a conflict between the Regents, the upper-middle class of prosperous merchants who favored peace at all costs and a Republic (controlled

\textsuperscript{32}Gardiner and Atkinson, I, p. 228.
\textsuperscript{33}Wilson, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{34}Gardiner and Atkinson, VI, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{35}Wilson, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{36}Gardiner and Atkinson, I, p. 228.
\textsuperscript{37}Tbid., p. 5.
by them, of course), and the Orangists, the majority of the population. This latter faction was staunchly Calvinistic (while the Regents had been the last to accept Calvinism) and favored the House of Orange over the oligarchic rule of the Regents. The Orangists also did not want war with England, but favored instead renewed warfare with the Spanish papists; however, the Orangists were the group most affected by the execution of Charles I.\textsuperscript{38}

In addition to this basic division, the Dutch governmental structure was also disunited. Each municipality of the Dutch Republic sent deputies to the seven Provincial States which, in turn, sent deputies to the States General; however, sovereignty rested ultimately with the municipalities.\textsuperscript{39} The control of the Dutch navy was also divided among five different admiralty boards, each exercising separate control and depending for coordinate action on the States General.\textsuperscript{40} A further setback to Dutch naval unity had been provided by the death of the Prince of Orange, William II, in 1650.\textsuperscript{41} When the Regents gained control of the government following his death, the oldest, most experienced of the Dutch captains

\textsuperscript{38}Wilson, pp. 12-18.
\textsuperscript{39}Gardiner and Atkinson, I, pp. 54-55.
\textsuperscript{40}Michael Oppenheim, \textit{A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy and of Merchant Shipping in Relation to the Navy} (London, 1896), p. 305.
\textsuperscript{41}Gardiner and Atkinson, I, pp. 31-35.
were forced out because of their allegiance to the House of Orange.\(^{42}\)

England, on the other hand, showed a unity and strength of purpose one usually associates with an efficient dictatorship. Under Cromwell's rule, officials owing posts to court influence, purchase or seniority were replaced to a large extent by people who had given proof of their ability by their conduct in parliament or, better still, on the field of battle in the recent civil war. As a result, the administrative head of the English navy, the Admiralty Committee, strove to provide the navy with whatever it demanded. While it did not always fulfill this ideal, the administrative record of this war was one of the best in English naval history.\(^{43}\)

In March of 1654, shortly before the end of the war, an English sea-captain named Foster captured a richly laden Dutch ship off the Dogger Bank. Since he spoke Dutch and the Dutch skipper spoke English, Foster asked him why the Dutch had entered the war when England virtually had them surrounded. His answer was that the Dutch had a large, experienced navy, fresh from victory over Spain, whereas the English had a small navy.\(^{44}\) For this reason, the Dutch

\(^{42}\) Oppenheim, p. 306.

\(^{43}\) Ibid., pp. 305-306.

hoped to hurt the English with one or two battles, forcing them into port to mend. While this was going on, the Dutch would be blockading English ports and disrupting the coal trade, thus forcing the English to agree to peace on Dutch terms. In addition, the Dutch had an ace up their sleeves in the form of Charles II who would be readily available in the event of a revolt in England. The Dutch commander blamed the Dutch defeat on the fact that the Prince of Orange died in 1650 and the States General turned out all his friends in the Dutch navy and replaced them with gentlemen creatures. He pointed out that the English parliament, on the other hand, turned out all the King's captains who were gentlemen and replaced them with seamen. He believed that if this had been the other way around, the Dutch would have won.45

While the eventual English victory in this war may in some part be explained by the political strength of England as opposed to the disunity in the Netherlands, more of the credit belongs to the strength and conduct of the English navy. After its Elizabethan greatness, the navy had fallen into a period of decay. England's merchant shipping expanded and the navy declined in size and importance. One result of this was an increase of piracy which, by 1640, had grown so bad that it was

45Gardiner and Atkinson, I, pp. 31-33.
thought necessary to extinguish the light in the Lizard lighthouse because of its assistance to pirates. Another result of the decline of English naval supremacy in its own waters was that in late October of 1639, England was unable to prevent a naval battle between the Dutch and Spanish in the Downs, England's front yard. In the latter days of James I and Charles I, the pendulum began to swing slowly the other way. Despite some setbacks, there was a continued slow improvement until Parliament obtained control over the navy during the civil war. From this time on the navy's strength greatly increased.46

When the English civil war spread to the sea with the defection of several capital ships because regular army officers were being placed in command, the navy of Parliament was given a chance to learn the art of naval warfare against a relatively weak opponent. Although the Royalist ships were eventually led by Prince Rupert who had as many as four capital ships as well as lesser vessels, the navy performed its task well. Blake, Deane and Popham were made "generals at sea" and led the navy in pursuit of Rupert.47 Because of this vigorous pursuit from Holland to Portugal to the Mediterranean Sea to the West Indies, Rupert's fleet melted away and in 1653, Prince Rupert had only one ship left.

with which he retired to France. \textsuperscript{48}

While the Dutch navy had more ships than the English, the English ships, on the average, were bigger with more and heavier guns and more men. \textsuperscript{49} On September 5, 1653, it was reported that there were one hundred forty Dutch warships \textsuperscript{50} but, as a list of June, 1652 shows, the majority were not capital ships. In that list, there was only one ship in excess of fifty guns, one with more than forty guns and there were forty ships carrying in excess of thirty guns. \textsuperscript{51} In a list of English ships of September, 1653, there were one hundred twenty-eight warships of which eighty-seven were capital ships. Of these capital ships, there was one carrying one hundred guns, one with eighty-eight guns, there were three with more than sixty, thirteen carrying in excess of fifty guns, twenty-five with over forty and forty-four mounting more than thirty guns. \textsuperscript{52} As a rule, the weight of capital ships ranged anywhere from five hundred fifty to one thousand tons with the heavier the tonnage, the more guns that ship could carry. \textsuperscript{53} Until the last months of the war, no Dutch vessel exceeded eight hundred tons and fifty-six guns and there was only one of this type, the "Brederode."

\textsuperscript{48}Marcus, I, pp. 135-136.
\textsuperscript{49}Wilson, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{50}Gardiner and Atkinson, VI, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{51}Ibid., pp. 260-266.
\textsuperscript{52}Gardiner and Atkinson, VI, pp. 49-53.
\textsuperscript{53}Oppenheim, pp. 330-334.
The major ship used by the Dutch merchants was the fluitschip or flyboat. In its design, speed and maneuverability were sacrificed for carrying capacity and cheapness of handling. As a result, the boats were usually slow and usually unarmed. Their only protection was to travel in a convoy escorted by large numbers of warships.

Because the English were not as heavily engaged in overseas trade as the Dutch, their merchant ships were not designed primarily for cargo carrying. Of sixty-three merchant ships in the Thames in 1653, twenty-six displaced from two hundred to three hundred tons, twenty-five were of three hundred to four hundred tons, seven were between four hundred and four hundred fifty, four were of five hundred tons and one was six hundred tons. Because of their design, English merchant ships could easily be changed into warships or privateers; however, in July of 1652, letters of marque were to be given only to owners able to send out ships in excess of two hundred tons and carrying more than twenty guns.

Accompanying these major differences were several of lesser importance. The Dutch ships were flat-bottomed
because they had to sail the shallow and sandy coasts of their home waters. While this gave them a slight advantage in avoiding the English if they had to by ducking into shallow water, they were less weatherly than English ships which were faster when sailing on a wind and better adapted for tacking and maneuvering. Thus, the English were more successful in gaining the weather gauge. 57 This difference in construction may have been the reason the hulls of Dutch ships were weak and unable to stand severe punishment. 58

Another difference between the two navies was one of tactics. The Dutch gunners, for the most part, fired at the English masts, rigging and sails in an attempt to render the English ships helpless so that they could be captured, while the English gunners fired primarily at the Dutch hulls with the intention of sinking the ship and/or killing the men of the crew. 59

In 1637, an English man-of-war being built at Woolwich in Kent was described by a man named Heywood. The ship exceeded one thousand tons with gunports for more than eighty guns. The length of the keel was one hundred twenty-eight feet and the ship measured forty-eight feet wide and seventy-six feet from the bottom of the keel to the main deck. The

57 Marcus, I, p. 138.  
58 Gardiner and Atkinson, IV, p. 3.  
59 David Hannay, Admiral Blake (New York, 1886), p. 96.
utmost length of the ship from the tip of the beakhead to the aft end of the stern was two hundred thirty-two feet. On the beakhead sat King Edgar trampling seven kings along with Cupid straddling and bridling a lion and six other statues representing counsel, care, industry, strength, virtue and victory. Emblems and symbols, pertaining to both land and sea, decorated the rest of the ship. Finally, the whole magnificent structure was painted gold and black, a handsome color for this seventeenth century idea of a warship.

While descriptions of the differences of the warships may give an idea of the causes for English victory, the ships alone did not fight the battles of the first Anglo-Dutch war; a portion of this paper must be set aside to describe both the men who sailed and the men who commanded the men-of-war. Although the Dutch had four times as many seamen to draw on as a reserve supply for their warships, they were less well paid and fed worse than their English counterparts. One reason for this was that each Dutch captain was contracted to provision his own ship.

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60 The beakhead was the ornamented prow which served as a lavatory for the crew. John Smith, The Seaman's Grammar and Dictionary (London, 1691), p. 10.
61 T. Heywood, A True Description of His Majesties Royal Ship Built 1637 at Woolwith in Kent (London, 1637), pp. 29-45. Upon examination one gets the distinct impression that this book was government sponsored propaganda to encourage people to pay their ship-money and to show them how well it was being spent. For this reason, the figures with regard to the size of the ship may have been somewhat exaggerated.
62 Oppenheim, p. 306.
Another reason was that the Dutch government gave the men only half pay, assuming that the men would be eager to serve again in order to receive the rest of their pay.63 The highest paid member of the ship's crew was the captain, who received as much as one hundred thirty guilders a month.64 The next ranking officer received around thirty-six guilders a month. Skilled sailors, such as cooks, surgeons, carpenters and gunners, received between fourteen and thirty guilders a month, while the ordinary seaman got around six to eleven guilders per month.65

While the English sailor's pay scale was about the same, he almost always received full pay, although not as promptly as he would have liked. Skilled sailors received twenty-four shillings a month and ordinary seamen were paid nineteen a month.66 In addition to his pay, an English sailor received a share of the prize value of a captured Dutch ship. At the beginning of the war, one-third of the value of the prize was divided among the crew, except in the case of a captured man-of-war, when they were given one-half the prize and the other half went to the fund for the sick and wounded sailors and the widows and orphans of sailors. While the needs of the Treasury later caused the government to greatly reduce this gener-

63 Gardiner and Atkinson, III, pp. 10-11.
64 A Dutch guilder was worth two English shillings.
65 Ibid., p. 104.
66 Ibid.
67 Oppenheim, p. 314.
osity, every sailor still received a share of the prize and the sick and wounded and the widows and orphans were still provided for. 67

The Dutch sailors' diet consisted mostly of cheese, hard bread and fish, supplemented by meat two days a week and butter, salt, vinegar and a little more beer in summer than in winter. 68 While the English officers ate better than their men, ham in the winter and smoked meat in the summer along with butter, sugar, white biscuits, oil and mustard-seed, common and green cheese, all washed down with French wine, Spanish wine, brandy and good beer, the average English seaman had a decidedly better menu than the Dutch sailor. There was plenty of bread and meat, mostly beef and pork, supplemented by cheese, butter and fish. This fare was accompanied by beer that was very often bad and had to be replaced by water. When this happened, however, the men were to be paid two pence a day for each day they had to drink water instead of beer. Although there was some corruption here and there and sometimes insufficient funds were provided the Victuallers, the English sailors were comparatively well-fed. 69

Besides being well-paid and well-fed, the English sailor was well-clothed. Although he usually was expected

67 Ibid., p. 309.
68 Gardiner and Atkinson, I, p. 92.
69 Oppenheim, pp. 325-326.
to pay for his own clothes, he was provided with a two pound sum to replace clothes lost in action or shipwreck. The clothes the ordinary seaman wore were a canvas jacket and canvas drawers, a cotton waistcoat and cotton drawers, shirts, shoes and linen and cotton stockings.\textsuperscript{70}

Considering the medical conditions of the seventeenth century, the sick and wounded were well taken care of. A man injured in action continued to draw his pay until his recovery or death. In addition to the hospital space provided by the leading ports and London and the work of such eminent physicians as Dr. Daniel Whistler,\textsuperscript{71} each English ship was to be provided with five pounds worth of medical supplies (although rather crude at this time—rice, oatmeal and sugar) per one hundred men every six months.\textsuperscript{72}

The major reason that the discipline of the English crews was superior to the Dutch\textsuperscript{73} was that they had a strong, well-enforced legal code. On December 25th, 1652, Commons passed thirty-nine Articles of War for the maintenance of discipline. Thirteen offenses were listed which carried an unconditional death penalty while twelve offenses to be punished by death or lesser punishment, to be decided by a court of war (court-martial). The trial conditions were relatively fair. The charges were to be heard before

\textsuperscript{70}Ibid., p. 329.
\textsuperscript{71}Gardiner and Atkinson, IV, p. 200.
\textsuperscript{72}Oppenhein, p. 321.
\textsuperscript{73}Gardiner and Atkinson, I, p. 218.
the captain and seven officers of the ship in which the crime was committed. Then the accused was only to be tried in the presence of flag officers and no finding involving loss of life or limb was to be carried out without the approval of the senior officer in command. Thus a prisoner had a fairly good chance of getting an impartial trial.74

As in any war, the officers received most of the attention; therefore, some mention of them should be made here. The English admirals had received little previous experience on the water; however, the majority of them had held commands in the army during the civil war. The most famous of the English "generals at sea" were Blake, Deane, Ayscue, Penn and Monck.75 From the start, Blake assumed the leadership of the navy and, while he was no Cromwell or Nelson, he was bold and inspiring with the ability to do the best with what he had. Monck, who assumed co-leadership of the fleet when Blake was wounded, was essentially a land-commander who proved himself a very capable sea-commander in the latter part of this war (and even more so in the second war). The Dutch naval leaders, Tromp, Dewith, De Ruyter, Evertson and Floritz, had spent more time on the sea than their English opposites; in fact, Tromp had served as a cabin-boy on his father's ship.76

74 Oppenheim, pp. 311-312.
75 Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, II, p. 136.
76 Dixon, p. 217.
While Dewith was brave to the point of rashness, he lost his self control when confronted by lack of discipline.77 Tromp, on the other hand, was an able strategist, a skillful tactician and considered the best seaman on either side.78

Mention has been made of the contribution of the English administrative machinery towards the English victory, but there has been no attempt to define and describe this organization. Naval administration was largely in the hands of the Admiralty Committee of the Council of State and the Commissioners of the Navy. While there was another committee, the Committee of the Merchants of the Navy and Customs, this body took no real part in naval administration and was dissolved in 1654. The Admiralty Committee met daily during the war and, theoretically, had control over the Commissioners of the Navy, but, because the Commissioners were comprised of more experienced personnel, it was practically allowed to control administrative affairs.

The duties of the Admiralty Committee and the Commissioners of the Navy were to supervise the building, repairing and fitting out of ships, the purchase and distribution of stores, the control of the dockyards and the

77Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, II, p. 136.
78Marcus, p. 146.
maintenance of discipline.\textsuperscript{79} The degree to which these duties were carried out can be seen with respect to the building of new ships by comparing warship production during the reign of Charles I and during the Commonwealth. During Charles\textsuperscript{8} reign, if one or two ships were constructed in one year, this event was greeted with great rejoicing. During the Commonwealth, men-of-war were turned out at the rate of ten a year on the average with the peak production of twenty-two warships in 1654. All this would not have been possible, however, without the greater revenues provided by Parliament. Where Charles I had been able to raise only one million pounds a year, Parliament raised an average of two million pounds a year with a maximum annual expenditure approaching three million pounds in 1652-1653.\textsuperscript{80}

Along with the problem of building ships, the Admiralty had to see that they were armed and fitted out. Practically the only home source of new cannons was George Bourne, who had been the Royal Gunfounder. Since the output of his works was inadequate to meet the demands brought on by war, guns were obtained by disarming inland forts, taking guns from captured merchant ships and men-of-war, importing cannons from abroad and expanding the home gun-founding industry.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{79}Oppenheim, pp. 346-354.
\textsuperscript{81}Oppenheim, pp. 360-362.
Before the war, both nations imported naval stores (masts, hemp, pitch, tar, etc.) from the Baltic states; however, the Dutch were able very early in the war to persuade the King of Denmark to close the straits to English shipping, forcing the English to look elsewhere for naval stores.82 This need was filled by obtaining masts, hemp, pitch and tar from New England, Scotland83 and captured Dutch ships.84 The English ships were then fitted out at the major ports, Harwich, Plymouth, Chatham, Woolwich, Deptford and Portsmouth.85

As it has been indicated, the Dutch objective, indeed their only hope, was to seek an engagement with the entire English fleet and knock it out in one battle.86 The English objective was to attack and cripple Dutch commerce; it was not at this time considered the primary duty of an English navy to destroy the enemy's fleet in preparation for a land invasion.87 In fact, this was unnecessary since the Dutch relied on their merchant fleet for their existence.88

After the first conflict on May 19, 1652, both navies put into their home ports to refit, but the English, because they had suffered less, were ready to sail sooner

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82 Gardiner and Atkinson, III, p. 369.
83 Ibid., V, p. 216.
84 Ibid., III, pp. 1-2.
85 Oppenheimer, p. 363.
86 Wilson, p. 66.
87 Gardiner and Atkinson, I, p. 299.
88 Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, II, pp. 121-122.
than the Dutch. On June 20, Blake was given instructions to sail to the North Sea and seize the homeward bound Dutch East Indies fleet, to scatter and destroy the Dutch fishing fleet and, if the first two objectives were carried out successfully, to disrupt the Dutch Baltic trade. He set sail after the 24th of June and, by July 11, was within sight of the Dutch fishing fleet. Before proceeding further, he issued orders to Penn and his other officers to attack only the Dutch men-of-war guarding the fishing boats. Meanwhile the Dutch fleet under Tromp had set out in pursuit, but, because of the unco-operative wind, Tromp decided on the 14th of July to attack Ayscue's smaller fleet anchored in the Downs. He tried to enter the Downs, but was hampered first by calms and then by gales and on the 22nd, the wind shifted causing him to change his mind again and pursue his primary objective, Blake.

In spite of its capriciousness, the weather was not Tromp's only problem; he was running short of supplies. He had a fleet of over ninety ships, the crews of which consumed food at the rate of over sixty thousand pounds of hard bread, three hundred fifty to four hundred twenty barrels of beer and three hundred fifty to four hundred

89 Gardiner and Atkinson, I, p. 301.
90 Ibid., I, p. 313.
91 Powell, p. 168.
twenty barrels of water a week. This problem was further increased by the fact that a supply fleet would have a difficult time finding him without an appointed meeting place and time. Because he was pursuing the English fleet and did not know where he would be at a given time, he could not establish an appointed rendezvous.92

Ayscue, with only twenty ships,93 was indeed fortunate that the wind changed. In his report, he attributed this good fortune to the will of God: "They thought to have performed wonders upon our fleet here in the absence of General Blake, but the Lord was pleased to disappoint them and to bring to nought their counsels."94 Meanwhile Blake's fleet met the Dutch fishing guard on July 12 and captured twelve Dutch men-of-war of between twenty and thirty guns each; however, three had been so badly damaged in the battle that they had to be sunk.95

In spite of the fact that his ships were running very low on provisions and scurvey had broken out, Tromp continued the pursuit and, by August 4, he was within sight of Blake's fleet. Tromp was on the verge of attacking when a severe storm broke up his fleet and forced the Dutch ships to head for home.96 Considering his lack of pro-

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92Gardiner and Atkinson, I, pp. 338-368.
93Ibid., I, p. 369.
94Ibid., I, p. 374.
95Ibid., I, pp. 383-385.
96Ibid., I, p. 391.
visions, the outbreak of scurvey and the ease with which the English fleet defeated the Dutch guard, this wind may have been a blessing in disguise for Tromp.

While Tromp was pursuing Blake in the North Sea, the Admiralty Board of Amsterdam sent word to the States General on July 25 that the silver fleet at Cadiz needed an escort home. The value of the silver aboard this fleet was put at between fifteen and sixteen million guilders (this figure can be better appreciated when it is known that it cost the Dutch one million four hundred thousand guilders to maintain a fleet of thirty-five sail in the Mediterranean Sea for one year). On the 27th, word was sent to the silver fleet that it should set sail because there would be a fleet in the channel waiting to escort it home. On the 29th De Ruyter was put in command of this fleet and plans were made to rendezvous with the silver fleet. By August 3, the Dutch plans were for De Ruyter to escort an outward bound convoy through the channel and then, leaving two men-of-war to continue with the convoy, to cruise in the channel and watch for the fleet from Spain. If by any chance he should meet the silver fleet before the merchant fleet was entirely out of the channel, De Ruyter's orders were to immediately abandon the outgoing fleet, with the exception of the two men-of-war, and bring in the silver fleet.  

97Ibid., II, pp. 14-45.
By August 14, Ayscue's fleet in the Downs had increased to over forty sail, whereas De Ruyter's fleet consisted of only a little over twenty ships until the 21st, when sixty ships were added to his fleet. Despite the arrival of these ships, De Ruyter's fleet was not as strong as it would appear, for, as De Ruyter reported, the majority of these ships were of poor quality and ill equipped with insufficient crews and provisions for only two months. Nevertheless, he was able to get between fifty-five and sixty of them in shape and on the 26th of August he was escorting a merchant fleet of twenty-five ships when he was attacked by Ayscue. Of De Ruyter's fleet, twenty-five were capital ships, while only twelve of the forty or more English ships were of that size. The Dutch claimed that the English lost three of their best ships in the fighting and that only the wind, which allowed the English to escape because of its timely shift in direction, prevented their complete destruction. On the other side, the English claimed the Dutch lost three of their best ships and three others were so badly battered as to be near sinking. It appears that the battle was little more than a draw with the Dutch the victors, since it was the English who broke off the action and declined to fight the next day. It also appears that, since the

98Ibid., II, pp. 68-159.
99Ibid., II, pp. 105-106.
Dutch were not in the habit of escorting such a small merchant fleet with such a large number of warships, the English had fallen for a trap.

After his failure to prevent the English from destroying the Dutch fishing fleet, Tromp was replaced in command of the Dutch navy by Dewith. By the 30th of September, Dewith had convoyed the merchantmen out of the channel and made contact with the silver fleet, bringing it into port on the 4th of October. On October 8, Dewith's fleet of about sixty sail was cruising alone in the channel when it was spotted by an English fleet of more than sixty sail. This battle, known as the Battle of the Kentish Knock, was decidedly an English victory. Blake's fleet reported sinking three Dutch capital ships in excess of forty guns and capturing three other capital ships. The English loss was put at one man-of-war and two merchant ships damaged badly enough that they had to put into port in danger of sinking.

The English considered this such a decisive victory that they decided to send thirty ships to relieve their hard-pressed Mediterranean fleet. The English had first appeared in strength in the Mediterranean Sea in 1650 when Blake was in pursuit of Rupert. Since that time a new turn of English naval policy had taken place. The previously unprotected Levant trade was now organized into a regular
convoy system because the task of trade protection was now regarded as one of the first duties of the English navy.  

The Mediterranean phase of the first Anglo-Dutch war was almost a forgotten story, but it deserves some mention here, not only because it was part of the larger action, but because this was practically the only time and place in English naval history that the English were completely driven off the seas.  

One reason for the English defeat in the Mediterranean was that when the war broke out the Dutch fleet was united at Toulon, while part of the English fleet was at Leghorn and part was at Smyrna. Another reason was that the English commander at Leghorn, Appleton, was unenterprising and incompetent, whereas the Dutch were commanded by the very capable Van Galen. Even so, the English, under the command of the captain of the Smyrna fleet, Badiley, might have been able to make up for Appleton's blunders, had it not been for the fact that the Dutch gave their Mediterranean fleet full support, whereas the English gave no thought to their fleet in the Mediterranean until flushed with success after the Battle of the Kentish Knock. Because of this support, the Dutch, who only outnumbered the English by fifteen to twelve at the start of the war, grew to over thirty-three sail, while the English grew to a divided force of twenty

104 Marcus, I, p. 136.  
sail.

The reason the English continued to remain divided was that Appleton did not take advantage of the chance to leave Leghorn at the start of the war, allowing Van Galen plenty of time to blockade him. Another cause of the eventual defeat was the necessity of having to rely on neutral ports. The Duke of Tuscany felt the English had overstayed their welcome and told Appleton to leave. While Appleton might have been able to join Badiley, who was waiting just off Leghorn, he hesitated too long and was crushed by Van Galen. Because of the loss of this naval battle in late February of 1653 and because of the overwhelming Dutch superiority in the Mediterranean, Badiley was forced to head for home. About the only compensation the English had was that Van Galen died of wounds received in the battle.106

After Dewith's defeat at the Kentish Knock, he was relieved of command of the navy and replaced by Tromp.107 Tromp's general orders were given in a resolution of the States General of October 19, 1652:

It is understood that it is the first and principle object of the State to do all possible harm to the English fleet to be sent out, and for that end a sufficient body of ships is to be kept together,
in order that they may put to sea about Nov. 1, to the damage and offence of the English fleet, and also to give convoy to the west. 108

In this proclamation can be seen one of the major causes of the Dutch defeat in the first war. It is not enough that Tromp was supposed to engage and destroy the English fleet; he constantly had to provide convoy escorts to the large Dutch merchant fleet.

While on escort duty, Tromp, with a fleet of over ninety men-of-war escorting three hundred merchantmen, met Blake's fleet of just over forty ships on December 12. In the battle that followed, twenty English vessels, whom Blake later termed "merchant freebooters", did not engage and the English were badly beaten. Like a true Puritan, Blake wrote to the Admiralty Committee: "I presume your Honours long for an account of what hath passed between us and the Dutch fleet, and I hope you have hearts prepared to receive evil as well as good from the hand of God." 109 Once again, the English gained the wind and were able to retreat, 110 but this battle, known as the Battle of Dungeness, was such a complete Dutch victory that Tromp was thinking of sailing up the Thames after Blake. Luckily for the English, Tromp did not have the pilots to negotiate

108 Gardiner and Atkinson, III, p. 23.
109 Ibid., III, pp. 91-108.
110 Ibid., III, p. 252.
the shallow waters and gave up the idea. The degree
to which the Dutch controlled the sea at this time can be
illustrated by the fact that lighthouses were issued in-
structions in late December of 1652 and early January of
1653 telling them how and when to light so that the Dutch
would not be able to use their light.

While this was the high water mark of the Dutch navy
in this first war, Blake was working hard to repair his
fleet and make it ready to sail in February. The fleet
sent to help Badiley in the Mediterranean was recalled
and by February, Blake had seventy-three State's Ships and
thirty merchant ships ready to sail. On the 20th, he
left the Thames in search of Tromp. At this time, Tromp,
with a fleet of seventy ships had escorted an outward bound
convoy and was in the process of bringing in a convoy of
three hundred merchantmen when he was met by Blake's entire
fleet. The Dutch merchant fleet was in the van and had
slipped past the English fleet, thus, the three day Battle
of Portland, beginning on February 28, was fought between
the English fleet and the Dutch rearguard. Even so, it
was a tremendous English victory. Eleven Dutch warships
were sunk or burned and six capital ships of around forty
guns each were captured along with around fifty merchantmen.

111 Ibid., III, pp. 154-156.
112 Ibid., III, p. 303.
113 Ibid., III, p. 335.
The Dutch considered the damage to their fleet to be so serious that they called home fourteen ships of their Mediterranean fleet. 114 The Battle of Portland cleared the English Channel of Dutch shipping, forcing the merchantmen to use the northern route around Scotland. For this reason, Portland can be considered the Turning Point of the war for the English.

In addition to being forced to put into port to make repairs and refit, the English fleet suffered a blow in the form of Blake's injury. 115 He had been wounded above the left knee which was not serious, but he caught a bad cold after going ashore. 116 He took a turn for the worse and, for a while, it was felt that he would never be able to go to sea again. 117

Along with Blake, the English had a large number of sick and wounded and were greatly in need of men. As Penn wrote to the Admiralty Committee on April 13: "A great part of the fleet is but a short time victualled, several have foul bottoms and other defects which will call for sudden repair; our want of men is much and universal, especially in the bigger ships, who in time of service will most require them." 118 The English were in such a need of men.
that they were not only getting soldiers to serve on shipboard, but there was such a large number of soldiers that it was feared there would not be enough sailors to show the soldiers what to do.119

While the Dutch had been hurt more than the English in the last battle, both fleets were ready to sail again at about the same time.120 Led by Monck and Deane in the brand new eighty-eight gun "Resolution", the English put to sea and on June 12, 1653 they engaged the Dutch fleet off the Gabbard. The two fleets met about eleven in the morning and fought until nightfall when they drifted apart. The next day, the battle was renewed again at about eleven o'clock. This day's battle lasted until after sunset when the Dutch sought refuge in shallow water and the English fleet broke off the action and reformed. This English victory was even greater than the last because, while only about twenty Dutch ships were sunk, destroyed or taken, the English fleet was so little hurt that it was able to keep the sea and blockade the Dutch coast.121 The only major English loss in the Battle of the Gabbard122 was Deane who was killed in the heat of battle, cut in two by a cannon shot.123

119 Ibid., IV, p. 253.
120 Ibid., V, p. 1.
121 Ibid., V, pp. 16-85.
122 Ibid., V, p. 119.
123 Hannay, p. 112.
The English were now the undisputed masters of the sea, able to harass Dutch merchantmen and fishing boats at will. Also, the blockade of the Dutch coast, carried out by a fleet of one hundred ten sail, had a disastrous effect on the Dutch economy. The price of corn, which had been at thirteen shillings a bushel in 1652, rose four pounds after the defeat off the Gabbard and was expected to rise even higher if the blockade were not lifted. Trading was dead, money was scarce and people were eating old pickled herring and longing for the old days of wealth and plenty. Also at this time, there was a strong desire for peace in the Netherlands, especially in Holland.

Much of the suffering of the Dutch people was due to the alarming rate at which English warships captured Dutch merchantmen. At the very start of the war, many homecoming Dutch merchantmen were easily picked up because they did not know of the war. After this initial success, captures declined, but, in the Letters and Papers relating to the First Dutch War, one constantly reads about English ships bringing in Dutch merchantmen, often laden with valuable cargos. Even when English fortunes were at

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124 Gardiner and Atkinson, V, p. 118.
125 Ibid., I, p. 375.
126 Ibid., V, p. 119.
127 Ibid., V, pp. 200-201.
128 Ibid., V, pp. 263-264.
129 Ibid., V, p. 233.
their lowest, during the Battle of Dungeness, an English frigate not in Blake's fleet brought in two Dutch merchantmen captured while homeward bound from Spain with cargos of oil, wine, hides, silver, tobacco and salt. In all, the English captured between eleven and fifteen hundred Dutch merchant ships during the first war, a heavy blow to the Dutch economy.

At this point, something should be said about the relative maturity of the two navies. One evidence of this maturity was the fact that battles were no longer as confused as in earlier naval engagements due to the tactics of fighting in line ahead formation. While there is considerable dispute as to whether the Dutch or the English originated this battle formation and as to exactly when it was first used, the English, as can be seen in the last three battles of the war, used it with greatest effect. The first official recognition that has been found of the line as a naval tactic is contained in the Commonwealth Orders of 1653:

...All the ships of every squadron shall endeavor to keep in a line with their chief unless the chief be maimed or otherwise disabled (which God forbid!), whereby the said ship that wears the flag should not come in to do the service that is

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130 Ibid., III, p. 102.
131 Oppenheim, p. 307.
requisite. Then every ship of said squadron shall endeavor to keep in a line with the Admiral or he that commands in chief next unto him, and nearest the enemy.\textsuperscript{133}

Another evidence of the maturity of the two navies, particularly of the English, was the development during the war of two distinct types of warships - the large capital ship with firepower designed to smother the enemy in a pitched battle and the commerce raider, a light, nimble and swift frigate, able to prey on enemy trade at sea.\textsuperscript{134}

Meanwhile the pressure of Monck's blockade made the Dutch anxious to get out to sea as soon as possible; however, it took eight weeks for Tromp to repair the damages done to his fleet in the last battle.\textsuperscript{135} During this time he was able to collect around one hundred ships, of which he wrote: "...a good thirty of these ought to be struck off the list if better ones could be had in their place."\textsuperscript{136}

While Tromp was collecting his fleet, Monck left a screen of warships and took the major part of the fleet home to Sole Bay on July 15 to be cleaned and reprovisioned.\textsuperscript{137} The amazing thing, is that while Monck was gone, Tromp had no idea of his absence.\textsuperscript{138} By August, Blake was said to be recovering enough to be able to get back to sea shortly;

\textsuperscript{133}Julian S. Corbett (Ed.), \textit{Fighting Instructions, 1530-1616} (London, 1905), p. 100.
\textsuperscript{134}Wilson, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{135}Gardiner and Atkinson, \textit{V}, pp. 150-152.
\textsuperscript{136}Ibid., \textit{V}, p. 203.
\textsuperscript{137}Ibid., \textit{V}, p. 255.
\textsuperscript{138}Ibid., \textit{V}, p. 161.
however, Monck was still in command and by August 5, he was back blockading the Dutch coast with his entire fleet of over one hundred ten sail.\textsuperscript{139}

On August 8, Tromp appeared with over one hundred ships. His plan was to draw Monck away so that Dewith, with some twenty-five sail, would be able to get to sea and hopefully join Tromp. Monck fell for the bait and chased Tromp, fighting a brisk, four hour battle which ended with the English still having the wind; however, that night Tromp tacked northward and slipped past the English fleet. The next day was stormy, but on the 10th of August, Tromp, joined by Dewith's fleet, gained the wind and bore down on the English. In the ensuing conflict, the two fleets passed through each other's line four times, the fourth being the occasion of the heaviest fighting. As Monck wrote later, two Dutch flagships came up to the "Resolution", "at which time the very heavens were obscured by smoke, the air rent with the thundering noise, the sea all in a breach with the shot that fell, the ships even trembling and we hearing everywhere messengers of death flying."\textsuperscript{140} When the Dutch fleet broke off the action, they had lost about fourteen ships sunk

\textsuperscript{139}Ibid., V, p. 325.
\textsuperscript{140}Ibid., V, p. 368.
or burnt and Tromp killed by a musket shot. The English fleet was greatly damaged in its masts and rigging and had to put into port.

After the defeat of their last attempt to destroy the English fleet in pitched battle and the death of Tromp, the Dutch peace efforts, which had been in operation since after the first conflict, were stepped up. Although the Dutch were able to continue naval operations after the Battle of the Texel, as evidenced by Dewith's escorting three hundred forty merchant ships with forty-three warships around the northern route in September of 1653, the strength of their fleet was greatly reduced. The Dutch people were in favor of peace as early as November of 1652 and Dutch envoys had been sent asking for peace on July 3, 1653 shortly after the Battle of the Gabbard. Although the war dragged on after the Battle of the Texel, there were no more major battles and the misery and privations brought on by continued conflict and restriction of trade produced a desire for peace which resulted in the Treaty of Westminster, May 1, 1654.

At this first treaty of Westminster, the English made
the harsh demands of the victor and the Dutch had to tone them down. Cromwell wanted an annual sum from the Dutch for the right to fish in English waters, compensation for the Massacre of Amboina, punishment of the officials responsible for it, a limit on the number of Dutch warships in English waters, striking of the flag whenever meeting English ships and the right of search. While these demands were pretty severe, the blockbuster was Cromwell's desire that the Prince of Orange would never succeed to any of the offices and dignities held by his ancestors and that he should never be appointed to military command.

De Witt realized that he could never get the Dutch people to agree to any of these demands, especially since it meant allowing a foreign power to interfere in her internal affairs. For this reason, De Witt prepared to strengthen and continue the war effort. But Cromwell's desire for peace was genuine and he conceded on minor points and even said he would be content to allow the exclusion of the Prince of Orange to be included in a secret article. De Witt knew the Dutch would not even stand for this, so he entered into clandestine negotiations with Cromwell through the leading Dutch envoy, De Witt's personal friend, VanBeverningh. When told of the Dutch popular feeling on this point, Cromwell agreed to be satisfied if the Estates of Holland alone affirmed a declaration that the Prince of Orange be excluded. In achieving this highly
delicate diplomatic objective De Witt proved himself a master of the "art of diplomatic chicanery and intrigue." The Dutch agreed in the open treaty to pay compensation for the Amboyna massacre of 1623, to acquiesce in regards to the Navigation Act, to make annual payment for the right of fishing in English waters and to recognize the English right of the flag.
Chapter II

The Second Anglo-Dutch War

The termination of the first Dutch war allowed England to resume her interrupted policy in the Mediterranean Sea. Immediately after the peace with Holland the advantage in the Mediterranean shifted back and forth; it was becoming clear that the power that achieved supremacy in this area would be the controlling force in Europe. With respect to the Mediterranean there were three clear leading motives in the maze of mystery that was Oliver Cromwell's foreign policy: (1) It was Cromwell's mission to become the leader of a great protestant coalition to finally halt the counter-reformation. (2) The Elizabethan war against Spain and alliance with France was to be revived with the objective of opening the New World to British trade and withdrawing British subjects from the jurisdiction of the Inquisition in Spanish ports. (3) Vengeance was to be taken for insults heaped on England since she became a
republic. 1

Before war started with Spain, the greater part of the English fleet was sent into the Mediterranean Sea as a show of force. Like Nelson, Blake perceived the policy of his superiors and dared to show them how it could be carried out. "So it is we see him, full of the love of God and his country, raging round the Mediterranean to seek a foeman worthy of the weapon he has tempered, and finding none." 2 It was during this cruise that the English navy wrote another chapter in the progress of naval science. Blake's destruction of the Turkish fortress at Tunis was the first time that a fleet of ships had anchored close under powerful batteries and crushed them by firepower alone. 3

Except for the continued employment given to the sailors of the English navy in a victorious naval war (highlighted by Blake's destruction of the Spanish fleet at Santa Cruz, April 20, 1657), the Spanish War of 1655-1660 was a failure. The only benefit of the one military fiasco of Cromwell's life, the so-called "western design", was the acquisition of Jamaica, a weak point in the Spaniard's Carribean line of defense to which the English

2Ibid., p. 300.
3Ibid., p. 307.
retreated on being repulsed from their primary objective, San Domingo. While the English were successful in taking Dunkirk from the Spanish, with French help, this bloody victory was indecisive in promoting the protestant cause against the Catholic (in fact, an alliance with Catholic France was used in taking Dunkirk). While England maintained a fleet in the Mediterranean Sea throughout the war and was well on the way to becoming the dominant power in that area,⁴ English commerce suffered heavily from Spanish privateers, losing almost as many ships as they had taken from the Dutch in the first Anglo-Dutch war (England lost an estimated between one thousand and eighteen hundred ships to the Spanish).⁵ England emerged from the Spanish war, which was ended at the Restoration of Charles II, with a victorious navy, but a depleted merchant fleet.⁶

During the Spanish war and immediately after there were many minor incidents that could have led to war between England and the Netherlands. The very fact that the two nations did not go to war at this time "was the first and most remarkable proof that neither conflicting economic ambitions nor the problems of neutral rights need necessarily lead to war if those who held power exercised prudence and restraint."⁷ In April of 1662, De Witt allowed the

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⁵Davis, p. 51.
⁶Ibid., p. 316.
⁷Wilson, pp. 80-81.
English to arrest several regicides (Okey, Barkstead and Corbet) and send them to England for execution. This was a move designed to smoothe relations between monarchist England and republican Holland, and, while the Dutch still distrusted the English enough to enter into a defensive alliance with France (On April 27, 1662, the French and Dutch promised to aid each other in a European war provided the other was not an aggressor.), the English and Dutch agreed, in another Treaty of Westminster, September 14, 1662, to aid each other against their rebels. 8

Because the English navy was neglected immediately after the death of Oliver Cromwell 9 and because of the failure of the Spanish War, there was a belief among historians that Cromwell had no influence on English history in the field of foreign affairs and that nothing survived him. In his work, England in the Mediterranea, J. S. Corbett holds this belief to be false:

In all that concerned the British attitude to the outside world he changed much and left much behind him. He found his country impotent and neglected in the councils of Europe, and taught her how to speak with a commanding voice. He gave her, in the first place, the instrument - a perfected navy in the true modern sense - a navy of war ships wholly independent of merchant auxiliaries - a thing which had never yet been seen in modern times. It was a stride

8Ogg, I, p. 247.
as great as that which Drake and his fellows made when they perfected a sailing navy, and the results for England were no less invigorating. But Cromwell gave still more. He gave the sentiment for using the instrument. For he bequeathed to the restored monarchy a definite naval policy in the Mediterranean and an indestructible ambition for what we now call imperial politics.¹⁰

The fighting ships of the Restoration navy were provided with skilled personnel and training in seamanship by the great trading companies, most notably the East India Company, the Newfoundland fisheries and the fleets of Newcastle colliers. Three alms houses were maintained for old seamen and widows and children of seamen by Trinity House, a corporation founded in the reign of Henry VIII to assess rates for pilotage, appoint fit pilots and to maintain lights on the coast, buoys, beacons, etc.¹¹ Under the later Stuarts there was specialization in material and personnel and the Navy was more definitely dissociated from the Mercantile Marine. No one could fly the Union Jack without a license from the Lord High Admiral; merchant captains could only fly the red ensign. His Majesty's stores were marked with the broad arrow and all ropes used by the Royal Navy were distinguished by a white strand in order to aid in detection when stolen.¹²

Life on board a Stuart warship was more informal than one would expect; an "immoderate number of healths were drunk", great quantities of ammunition were wasted in salutes on the flimsiest pretext, and women friends of the crew were allowed on board and sometimes remained aboard ship for extended periods of time. Pay for sailors at the end of the reign of Charles II was only slightly higher than during the first Dutch war. A fleet vice-admiral was paid fifty shillings a day, while a captain of a first rate received twenty-one pounds a month and the captain of a sixth rate collected seven pounds a month. The lieutenant received between four pounds four shillings and two pounds sixteen shillings a month; the master between seven and four pounds a month and the boatswain slightly less than the lieutenant. The gunner, purser and carpenter received four pounds a month, while the surgeon and cook were paid two pounds ten shillings and one pound five shillings, respectively. The able-bodied seaman and the ordinary seaman received the same as they did in the 1650's, while a ship's boy was paid nine shillings sixpence a month.¹³

One often reads, in the contemporary accounts of the period and in secondary accounts, of the difficulty the navy had in recruiting sailors. The main reason for this, aside from the fact that a man's chances of losing his life

¹³Ibid., p. 275.
in the Royal Navy were greater, was that a sailor could get higher wages serving in an English merchant ship. Wages for merchant seamen rose during wartime and fell during peace (the exception to this rule was just after the London fire when great numbers of experienced seamen were needed to bring in the timber needed to rebuild the city.). During the first Dutch war, the wages of merchant sailors were between thirty and thirty-eight shillings a month. After this war, they fell to between twenty-three and twenty-four shillings and then climbed back up to between thirty and thirty-eight during the Spanish War. After 1660, the wages of merchant seamen fell to twenty shillings or less, but during the Second Dutch War they reached between thirty-five and thirty-eight a month. Once again wages for merchant seamen fell when the need for them was not as great, but this time not as low, only to between twenty-seven and thirty shillings a month. During the last Dutch war, a merchant seaman could earn between thirty-five and forty shillings a month.14

Another condition in the life of the Stuart seaman was the punishment meted out to minor offenders. By our standards, this punishment alone would seem to be enough to cause a sailor in the Royal Navy to seek employment elsewhere, but by seventeenth century standards the pun-

14Davis, p. 135.
ishment was relatively lenient. Minor offences were punished thusly:

1. For swearing and drunkenness, forfeiture of one day's pay.
2. For telling a lie, able-bodied seamen and inferior ratings were to be hoisted on the main-stay, having a broom and shovel tied to their backs, and to remain in this posture for half an hour; while the ship's company cried out 'A liar, A liar'. For ratings above that of able-bodied seamen forfeiture of one day's pay.
3. For theft, the culprit to be towed ashore, and the amount made good out of his wages.
4. For going ashore without leave, forfeiture of two days' pay.
5. Neglect of watch, forfeiture of one day's pay.
6. Defiling the decks, not more than twelve lashes.

The period of the later Stuarts was one of the most formative in English naval history because of the steady improvement in administration and the accumulation of a vast fund of experience in the hard struggles with the Dutch. Between 1660 and 1673 there were added to the one hundred fifty-six ships in existence in 1660 a total of one hundred forty-seven vessels, an increase of sixty thousand tons, twenty thousand men and four thousand guns. Losses incurred in the Dutch Wars were more than made good.

In line with most of the restoration settlement, the

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150gg, I, p. 275.
16Ibid., pp. 274-275.
17Ibid., p. 280.
existing Admiralty and Navy Commissioners were temporarily kept in office and such old parliamentarian officials as Penn, Batten and Peter and Phineas Pett were kept and worked harmoniously with Royalists such as Slingsbie, sir George Carteret and Lord Berkeley of Stratton. The only major change that occurred at the Restoration was the revival of the office of Lord High Admiral with the Duke of York being appointed to fill this position.\(^\text{18}\)

The Lord High Admiral's principal officers, Carteret (treasurer), Slingsbie (controller), Batten (surveyor) and Pepys (clerk of the acts), worked with the Navy commissioners, Berkely, Penn, Peter Pett and William Coventry (appointed in 1662). The Navy Board, or Lord High Admiral's Advisory Council, made contracts, paid ships' companies, regulated rates of pay, selected candidates for commissions and supervised dockyards and naval ship-building. The Navy Board had summary jurisdiction over seamen committing riots on shore and over dockyard employees. The treasurer paid estimates and obtained his funds from the treasury. The controller kept duplicate accounts and supervised victualling. The surveyor kept himself informed of the state of ships and dockyards, and the clerk of the acts served as secretary and kept minutes and records. The advantage of this system was that it associated the personal initiative

\(^{18}\)Ibid., pp. 257-258.
of a Lord High Admiral such as James, Duke of York, with the competence and energy of men like Pepys and Coventry.\textsuperscript{19}

During the third Dutch war, the Test Act forced James to give up his office, so his powers lapsed to Charles II, who delegated them to a commission made up of Prince Rupert, Shaftesbury, Osborne, Anglesey, Buckingham, Monmouth and Lauderdale - men not distinguished for maritime service (with the exception, of course, of Rupert). Thus there was created an Admiralty Board, with no technical knowledge, but supreme executive and military functions working with a Navy Board possessing considerable administrative experience, but little or no executive authority. While, in theory, these two bodies should have supplemented each other, in practice they generally overlapped. However, this defect was offset somewhat by the fact that James, in spite of his exclusion from office, continued to exercise considerable influence throughout the third Dutch war.\textsuperscript{20}

The chief merit of the Duke of York as an administrator was that he recognized and appreciated ability and industry when he saw them and that he used the authority of his rank to uphold the best of his subordinates against the intrigues of interested parties. For this reason James can claim no first hand credit for the reforms that made the British Navy a power in European politics, but

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., pp. 258-259.

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid.,
his importance is that he showed intelligence in recognizing the outstanding genius of men such as Pepys and Coventry and steady loyalty in constantly supporting them.21

The main difficulty in naval administration of the mid-seventeenth century was lack of money. The English legislators did not comprehend the expense of an adequately maintained fleet and especially its increased cost in time of war. The cost of the peace-time Navy at the Restoration was four hundred thousand pounds a year and by 1670 it had increased to five hundred thousand pounds. This was one-third of the total revenue that parliament thought necessary for national services, but failed to provide. The first two years of the Second Dutch War cost three million pounds, almost all of it spent on naval expenditure. The consequences of the shortages of money were that the seamen were unpaid, supplies had to be bought high prices (sometimes as high as forty per cent more) because of the low level of government credit and, due to a dearth of money to pay for necessary repairs, some ships had to be put out of commission.22

Recruiting of new seamen, a hard job at best, was even more difficult because a sailor's lot was likely to be semi-starvation and extreme poverty. In fact, conditions were so bad for seamen that there were an estimated

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three thousand English and Scottish seamen serving in the Dutch fleets throughout the last two Dutch wars.\textsuperscript{23} The food of the last two Dutch wars was often bad beer, moldy bread and meat from animals which had died natural deaths.\textsuperscript{24}

In order to supply the needs of the Royal Navy, sailors were often impressed from homeward-bound ships, although colliers, fishing boats, transports and the barge of the Archbishop of Canterbury were theoretically exempt from the press. Many seamen were recruited from the wherries (passenger and freight rowboats) of the Thames. The maritime counties were scoured of men who looked as if they knew something about salt water. So great was the shortage of men during the last two Dutch wars, especially between 1665 and 1667, that farmers and teamsters were pressed. Those picked up by the press were often old men, children, or the diseased. In the second Dutch war, the shortage was so great that sixth rate ships were laid up in order to provide crews for the larger vessels. In the third Dutch war, voluntary enlistment was encouraged by giving a bounty of six weeks' pay and a certificate, indicating that the sailor had served in the Royal Navy at such and such a date.\textsuperscript{25} Because of the lack of funds with which

\textsuperscript{23}This was in spite of the fact that they were subject to immediate lynching if caught by their former countrymen. \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{24}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25}\emph{Ibid.}, pp. 262-264.
to pay the seamen, the navy resorted to a policy of paying off ships where the least sum paid off the most men. The result was that those who had served least were more likely to get paid than those who had served most and needed their money more.26

The gradual elimination of the superiority in tone and discipline in the navy which had been carried over from the Commonwealth period has been attributed to "the corrupting influence of court favor in a licentious government".27 In fact, it may have been due to William Coventry that the English navy had any capable officers at all. Despite considerable opposition, he continued to press for the re-employment of professional sailors of the interregnum and to promote promising officers.28

In the 1660's, the Dutch government, while not yet gaining full efficiency, had done much to correct some of the major causes for its defeat in its first war with England. Before the first Anglo-Dutch war, the basically unmilitary States General, conservative in money matters, had allowed its fleet to degenerate into a mere assembly of armed merchantmen, due partly to long and easy victory over the decrepit navy of Spain.29 It was largely due to the leadership of John De Witt, who only started to attain

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26 Tanner, Pepys' Naval Minutes, p. 66.
28 Wilson, p. 136.
29 Mahan, p. 126.
political power on the death of Adrian Pauw, the old leader of the Regents, that the Dutch recovered so rapidly from their defeat.30

De Witt was a financier and organizer of the highest order who also displayed a swiftness of courageous decision in moments of emergency. The immediate effect of the first Dutch war was to show the Dutch how inferior in size and armament their war-vessels were to the English. De Witt's reaction to this realization was to undertake a complete re-organization of the Dutch fleet. The custom of converting merchantmen into ships of war at the outbreak of hostilities was abandoned and large, strongly constructed, powerfully armed men-of-war, carrying sixty, seventy, or eighty guns, were built. As usual the Dutch ships were specially built to pass in and out of the shallow waters along the Dutch coastline, but they were built for strength rather than speed. While the major reform was carried out in the size and strength of the large ships, De Witt did not fail to notice the small, lightly armed, swift-sailing English frigates. De Witt had this type of vessel copied to be used for scouting and preying on the enemy's commerce in the event of another war. Aside from the reforms in shipbuilding, the supply and training of seamen was revised

30Edmundson, p. 218.
and re-organized as was the whole system of prize-money and pay.31

The Dutch comeback had started as early as 1657, when they checked the French insults against their commerce and in 1658 they checked the Swedish power in the Baltic and regained control of the entrance to that inland waterway.32 While the Netherlands had recaptured most of the power and prestige lost in the first Dutch war, their continued power and even their daily bread depended on peace. Their highly organized credit had been severely strained by the first war; an example of this is that they paid a yearly interest of five hundred thousand pounds on war debts. Another reason why the Dutch government would not want war was that it was likely to upset the republic and bring the Orange family back to power.33

Charles II's first Dutch war sprang from those national antagonisms which defy the most pacific of governments. Feuds and conflicts accumulated for half a century were pressing for solution, and to solve them without recourse to arms would have asked, on either side, a rare magnanimity coupled with absolute power. But magnanimity could not be expected from mercantilism, and both Charles II and De Witt depended for political existence on mercantile support.34

Here we have the basic cause of the second Anglo-Dutch

31Ibid., pp. 225-228.
32Mahan, p. 98.
33Keith Feiling, British Foreign Policy 1660-1672 (London, 1930), p. 84.
34Ibid., p. 83.
war, the fact that the commercial jealousies, the numerous conflicts between the English and Dutch in the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas and the trade antagonisms in the East Indies, West Indies and West Africa had not been settled by the first Dutch war. While Charles II's personal hatred for John De Witt may have had some influence in bringing on the second war, Charles cannot receive full blame for starting this war.

A great share in the responsibility for the second Dutch war must go to the English merchants, especially the East India Company, for their constant complaints against the Dutch. The East India Company presented the government with a long list of vessels confiscated by the Dutch between the years 1654-1659 and valued at three hundred thousand pounds. The Dutch had paid fifty thousand pounds as an indemnity with regards to three specified ships under an agreement of 1659 and contended that this must eliminate all previous claims, but the East India Company continued to present its claims and complaints against the Dutch before the government of Charles II.

Reinforcing the pressure of the merchants on the government was the belief that the economic conditions of pros-

37Feiling, p. 102.
perity during the first Anglo-Dutch war were due to the English success in that war. Coupled with this mistaken belief was the fact that the English merchants had suffered heavily in the war with the Spanish and believed that they could more than make good their losses in another war with the Dutch. 38

Under this barrage of pressure from the merchants, the government was forced to take actions short of war against the Dutch, actions which in themselves could heighten the tensions between England and Holland and lead dangerously to war. One action that the government took was to publish and distribute anti-Dutch literature, such as an anonymous government publication, Dutch Boare dissected; or a Description of Hogg-land, which said, "A Dutchman is a lusty, Fat, Two-legged Cheese-Worm. A creature that is so Addicted to eating Butter, Drinking Fat Drink and Sliding, that all the World knows him for a Slippery Fellow. An Hollander is not a High-Lander but but a Low-Lander; For he loves to be down in the Dirt, and Boarlike, to wallow therein." 39

The fuse of the second Dutch war powderkeg was ignited in Guinea, a section of West Africa where the Dutch and English, as in India, were contesting the remains of an ancient Portuguese dominion. The seizure of New Amsterdam in October of 1664 did not bother the Dutch as much as a

38 Wilson, p. 149.
39 Ibid., p. 126.
strong English attempt earlier that year to gain control of Cape Verde in Guinea. While the Dutch had apparently written off their colony in America as not worth the tremendous cost it would take to defend it, they felt so strongly about keeping their possession in West Africa that in October they ordered a fleet in the Mediterranean under De Ruyter to proceed to Guinea. 40

The Dutch did not want war and before taking the giant step of sending De Ruyter to West Africa, Dutch ambassadors at London had repeatedly protested the English acts of aggression in New Netherlands and Guinea, with about the same results that such strongly worded protests meet today. The English reaction to the Dutch decision to send De Ruyter was to begin a war of reprisal in November, 1664, attacking Dutch merchant ships and capturing over a hundred by the New Year. The stage that follows diplomatic feverishness before it touches the crisis of war had been reached by November, 1664 and from then on both nations cancelled sailing orders, massed their fleets in home waters and laid an embargo on merchant shipping. 41 It was not until a Saturday in March, 1665 that the King's declaration of war was solemnly proclaimed at Westminster by two heralds in coats of arms, accompanied by four mace-bearers, nine

40 Ibid., pp. 125-132.
41 Fellinger, pp. 125-135.
trumpeters and two troops of horse and greeted with great shouting and rejoicing by the people. 42

To carry out the English objective of hindering Dutch trade, a large fleet of over a hundred sail was concentrated off the enemy's principal base at the Texel under the command of the Duke of York and his subordinates, Prince Rupert and the Earl of Sandwich. In this position, the English cut off the bulk of the Dutch navy from the smaller Zealand squadron and could block the commerce of Amsterdam, forcing the Dutch to either fight at a disadvantage or lose their vital convoys. 43 The governing factor of this plan was how long the English could remain at sea, and it was due to James' failure to heed the lessons of the first war that the English had to abandon their station and lose the initiative. James did not provision his fleet at all well, considering he was planning a long blockading action, and had to put back into port to revictual after only three or four weeks at sea. 44

The Dutch joined their two fleets and gave chase under the command of a former cavalry officer, Opdam. 45 He had been placed in command because De Ruyter was still at sea,

43 Feiling, pp. 156-157.
44 Wilson, p. 132. Seventeenth century war vessels were capable of staying at sea at least three or four months if well-provisioned.
45 He was also known as Wassenaer-Obdam, Obdam or Wassenaer. Blok, Netherlands, pp. 318-319.
but he was not allowed to operate on his own initiative; he had been given strict orders to seek the enemy out and do battle with him. This interference with a commander in the field or afloat has been throughout history one of the most common temptations to a government, and it has usually resulted in disaster. 46

The two fleets met off Lowestoft on the Norfolk coast on June 13, 1665. Even though the Dutch van gave way in the beginning of the fight, the battle was fairly even until the Dutch center, Opdam's squadron, crumbled. A junior admiral in this squadron had been killed and his crew panicked and mutinied, taking his ship out of the action. The ships immediately around the deserting ship did not know the cause of this movement, but most assumed this was being done on order of Opdam, so twelve or thirteen other ships did the same, leaving a huge gap in the Dutch line. Opdam was unable to signal these ships to return to the fight, so, in a desperate effort to save the day, he headed straight for the flagship of the Duke of York, but in the ensuing struggle, his ship was blown up and he was killed. The Dutch retreated under the cover of Admiral Tromp 47 and, although there is a long, involved

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46 Mahan, p. 108.
47 This Admiral Tromp was the son of the Admiral Tromp that commanded the Dutch Navy during the first war and was killed at the Battle of the Texel, the last battle of that war. Ibid., p. 109.
story as to why the English failed to pursue, the most logical reason is that their masts and rigging were so crippled by the Dutch fire that they were unable to give chase.

Because the Dutch fleet had been able to retreat to safety and the English had not pursued, the defeat was not as bad for the Dutch as it could have been; however it was a stinging defeat. The Dutch lost sixteen ships sunk or destroyed, nine captured, two thousand men killed (including three admirals) and about two thousand men captured. The English lost one ship sunk, less than a third as many men killed and among the dead only one admiral. The Dutch people were so upset and angry about the defeat that they threw the elder Everston, who had been second in command, in the sea and threw stones at him.

Throughout the early part of the war, the French tried to mediate for peace between the two belligerants, but the English victory in the battle of Lowestoft made the English terms in any treaty with the Dutch too hard for the Dutch.

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48 The popular story for the English failure to pursue the Dutch after this battle was that James's personal secretary, Brouncker, had had enough of the fight and wanted to leave the deck. In order to prevent the suspicion that he was a coward, he pretended that he was entering the Duke's cabin because he had an order to shorten sail. The Captain of the ship believed him and did not wake James up to verify his order, so that by the time James awoke, the Dutch were gone. Ogg, I, p. 288.

49 Edmundson, p. 273.

50 Wilson, p. 237.

51 Ogg, I, p. 288. He was rescued by some of his sailors, only to be court-martialed, along with several captains, but he was acquitted at his court-martial. Edmundson, p. 237.
to stomach. Fortunately for the Dutch, the English did not fully exploit their victory. Immediately after Lowestoft, Prince Rupert and Prince James went ashore to enjoy the fruits of victory, leaving the Earl of Sandwich in command of the fleet. Sandwich was in a position to pull off one of the greatest English victories of all three wars, for Michael De Ruyter was returning from punishing the English on the West coast of Africa, in the West Indies and off Newfoundland. He was loaded down with prizes and his fleet was barely seaworthy, a certain prey for an Admiral in command of the North Sea, but Sandwich got tired of waiting for him and tried to hit the Dutch elsewhere.

In the Danish harbor of Bergen was a rich Dutch merchant fleet which had fled there seeking safety from the English. The neutral Danish king offered, for a share of the booty, to allow the English fleet to attack the Dutch merchant ships, but a misunderstanding arose while the English warships were entering the harbor and the guns of the Danish forts opened fire on the English, killing and wounding four hundred men; among the dead were six English captains. To get out of the mess he was in, the Danish king allied with the United Provinces and declared

52Feiling, pp. 144-145.
54Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, II, p. 56.
war on England.55

While Sandwich's fleet was occupied in the Bergen fiasco, De Ruyter's fleet sailed north around Scotland and into the Texel.56 The Earl thought he had compensated for his blunder by capturing a convoy of nine Dutch East Indiamen valued at two hundred thousand pounds, but he made the mistake of distributing some of the plunder to his officers without communicating with James and getting permission. This gave his personal enemies, Monck (now the Duke of Albemarle) and Coventry, an excellent opportunity to remove the Earl of Sandwich from a position of influence. Sandwich narrowly escaped impeachment and ended up as ambassador to Spain.57

The importance of Sandwich's downfall lay in the fact that he, along with Penn and James, were the foremost members of the so-called "formal" school of thought of English naval tactics. These commanders put their faith in rules and were prepared to spend much time in maneuvering for position, whereas their opposites in naval tactical thought, the so-called "dashing" school, represented by Albemarle and Rupert, believed in hard fighting and taking risks in order to secure an advantage. The time spent in maneuvering at Lowestoft and the failure to press the advantage dis-

57Ogg, I, pp. 290-291.
credited the "formal" school, resulting in the supercession of York and Sandwich by Albemarle and Rupert.\textsuperscript{58}

But before the "dashing" school had a chance to prove itself, England was stricken by the last of the great outbreaks of bubonic plague.\textsuperscript{59} In the words of Bishop Gilbert Burnet, a contemporary chronicler:

...as soon as the war broke out, a most terrible Plague broke out also in the city of London, that scattered all the inhabitants that were able to remove themselves elsewhere. It broke the trade of the nation, and swept away about an hundred thousand souls; the greatest havock that any Plague had ever made in England. This did dishearten all people; And, coming in the very time in which so unjust a war was begun, it had a dreadful appearance. All the King's enemies and the enemies of Monarchy said, here was a manifest character of God's heavy displeasure upon the Nation; as indeed the ill life the King led, and the viscousness of the whole Court, gave but a melancholy prospect.\textsuperscript{60}

When Michael De Ruyter reached home in August of 1665, his fleet of nineteen sail and seven prizes filled with sugar and five or six chests of gold was in bad shape. His sails and cordage were badly out of order and there was less than six days' victuals left for his fleet.\textsuperscript{61} Tromp had been appointed admiral in De Ruyter's absence, but upon his hoped for, but unexpected, return De Ruyter was appointed

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., pp. 267-268.
\textsuperscript{59} Clark, p. 63.
to command the Dutch fleet, which numbered at this time ninety-three men-of-war, twelve fireships and twenty galleys and speed yachts. The warships carried forty-three hundred guns and twenty thousand men, of whom four thousand six hundred were marines.

With their spirits lifted greatly by the return of De Ruyter, the Dutch set out to build the finest fleet they had ever sent to sea. The fleet that left the Dutch coast in search of the English fleet in early June consisted of eighty-four warships, thirteen frigates, eight yachts and four fireships. Although the number of warships De Ruyter commanded in June of 1666 was less than that he had assumed command of in August, 1665, the number of guns, forty-six hundred, and the number of men, over twenty-two thousand, was greater. Over thirty of these men-of-war were of greater strength than the biggest Dutch ships of the previous year.

Before De Ruyter's fleet set sail, the Dutch had achieved a diplomatic success which, as it worked out, enabled them to win the longest, bloodiest battle of the wars. Through their earlier defensive alliance with France they were able to persuade Louis XIV that it was to his advantage to join them against the English. While in

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62 Blok, De Ruyter, pp. 205-208.
63 Ibid., p. 205.
64 Ibid., p. 226.
reality, French naval strength was much weaker than the English thought, the very existence of a French squadron whose avowed purpose was to link up with the Dutch in the North Sea was enough to profoundly affect the naval campaign of 1666.65

After the French declaration of war, Sir Jeremy Smith was ordered into the Mediterranean in command of a strong squadron whose mission was primarily convoy duty to protect the English Levant trade. The French assembled a fleet, under the command of Beaufort, which consisted of thirty French men-of-war, besides fire-ships and auxiliaries, and eight Dutch ships. While this sounds like an impressive fleet, the flotilla was felt by its commander to be so weak, that he would not move it until it was reinforced by a squadron of twelve galleys, ships which were rapidly becoming relics of the past.66

Monck overestimated the French strength in the Mediterranean (the major action of the Dutch in this war in the Mediterranean was to serve as auxiliaries to the French) and pulled out a force which, in J. S. Corbett's estimation could have easily put an end to the danger of the French. Monck was not of this opinion and, moreover, he felt Smith's squadron was needed at home for the great

65Edmundson, p. 239.
push against the Dutch. As soon as English strength in the Mediterranean Sea disappeared with the last of Smith's men-of-war, Beaufort moved his force out of the Mediterranean and up the Spanish coast to Lisbon. This move was immediately misinterpreted by Charles II as a major attempt by the French fleet to link up with the Dutch and, in an effort to intercept the "French Fleet", the King detached Rupert's squadron from the main fleet and sent it to the Isle of Wight. 67

On the first day of June, 1666, the two fleets met off the French coast near Dunkirk. 68 The splitting of the Duke of Albemarle's fleet did not bother him perhaps as much as it should, for before the battle he was so certain of victory that his only fear was that the Dutch fleet might not come out. 69 When Monck first spied the enemy fleet he noticed at once the weakness of the Dutch order of battle and bore down on Tromp's squadron. Tromp cut his cables and made sail on the same tack as Monck. The Dutch rear and center also cut their cables and moved to join the battle, but could not come into the action between Tromp and Monck for some time. In his haste to attack Tromp before he could be assisted by the main part of the Dutch fleet, Monck had left some of his slower ships behind.

67 Ibid., pp. 58-61.
68 Mahan, p. 118.
69 Burnet, p. 321.
As these ships came up to assist Monck, they were met by the Dutch center, under, De Ruyter, who was coming up to aid Tromp.

Some of the heaviest fighting of that first day occurred at this point and the English were rather badly mauled, losing two flagships, one by a fireship. Another English Admiral, Sir John Harman, was also heavily engaged, but he fought valiantly, drawing his sword to keep his panicky crew in line. He was wounded by a topsail yard, which was sheared off by Dutch fire, falling on his leg and breaking it. The Dutch vice-admiral, the younger Evertson, saw Harman's plight and bore down on him, offering him quarter. Harman's answer to this was "No, no, it is not come to that yet," and he ordered his men to fire a broadside at the Dutch ship, which killed Evertsen and drove the other ships off.70

While the English had lost more heavily than the Dutch, they had won a tactical victory because Monck had taken advantage of the Dutch weakness and attacked a superior force in such a way that only part of it could come into action. On the second day of the action, the Dutch, who outnumbered the English ships by eighty to forty-four, were still in a badly formed line of battle. Tromp tried to correct this defect by an independent action which

70 Mahan, pp. 119-121.
exposed him to the full fire of the English fleet. De Ruyter saw that Tromp was cut off and hauled up to him and, because of the superior Dutch numbers, the English broke off the action.71

After the English retired, Monck started to retreat towards his coast, in the hopes that he could link up with Rupert's squadron. On the third day of the battle, he continued the retreat, burning three disabled ships, sending ahead the most crippled and bringing up the rear with the ships that were most in fighting condition, some sixteen to twenty-eight men-of-war. The fact that the Dutch were unable to seriously slow Monck's steady and orderly retreat shows that they had been hurt almost as much as the English.

Towards evening of the third day Rupert's squadron was spotted and the two English units linked up during the night. The next day, the Dutch had the weather gauge, but Monck and Rupert attacked as soon as they could. The battle raged all along the line with the two fleets firing broadsides at each other for two hours before the English turned and charged through the Dutch line, destroying all regularity of order. Although the action was thoroughly confused, the Dutch, for the most part, continued to control the wind and eventually the English were forced to

71Ibid., pp. 121-122.
One of the best contemporary accounts there is of the Four Days' Battle is a letter from Sir Thomas Clifford, who had been sent expressly by the court of Charles II to gain the fullest information about the battle, to Lord Arlington. Clifford left England in a small, fast shallop of six guns on Friday night and reached the scene of the battle at eight o'clock the next morning. By eleven o'clock his small sloop was in the midst of the battle and by two o'clock, Clifford was able to board the Royal Charles, Monck's flagship. For two or three hours, the battle looked good for the English, but then five of the bigger English ships, second and third rates, were forced by their shattered condition to withdraw from the action.

During that night and the next day, Sunday, Monck conducted his retreat in good order, with sixteen of the largest and least damaged of the thirty-four fighting ships he had left bringing up the rear and shoving the other ships before him in a line. The formation looked like a "T" with the top of the "T" being the rearguard and the perpendicular line the disabled ships heading for England. Monck maintained this order throughout Sunday until about three that afternoon when the fleet of Prince Rupert was seen, causing much rejoicing and shouting in the English

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72 Ibid., pp. 123-125.
In an effort to join Prince Rupert the English fleet passed a little too close to the Galloper sands and several ships, the Royal Charles, the Royal Katherine and the Royal Prince ran aground, but the Royal Charles and the Royal Katherine were able to free themselves. The Royal Prince, however, drew much more water than the others and stuck fast, while the Dutch frigates sailed quickly towards her. Then, to Clifford's dismay, the captain and crew of the Royal Prince surrendered without a shot being fired at or by the enemy.

On Monday morning, the Dutch had the weather gauge, but Monck and Rupert were fully joined and decided to attack. Led by some of their braver commanders, Sir Christopher Mings and Sir Robert Holmes, the English charged the Dutch line and broke through in several places. Although the English on several occasions managed to divide the Dutch fleet temporarily, the Dutch showed great skill in reforming their battle order. About five o'clock that afternoon, the English divided the Dutch fleet so badly that it appeared as if that portion of the Dutch fleet to the leeward of the Royal Charles was setting all the sail they could to make a run for it. The English started in pursuit, picking up some of the damaged Dutch ships, when suddenly, that part of the Dutch fleet that was to windward of the Royal Charles tacked in upon the English, separating
the Duke of Albemarle's squadron from Prince Rupert's squadron. Throughout the rest of this hot and heavy battle, Monck tried to fight his way back to Rupert, which he was finally able to do at the end of the battle when the Dutch broke off contact.

Because of the heavy damage done by the English to the Dutch and disregarding the heavier damage done by the Dutch to the English, Clifford considered this battle to be an English victory. He was sure that, if the English replenished their supplies of ammunition and other provisions and quickly paid off their sailors, the English could be ready to put to sea before the Dutch, and then the world would see who won the battle. On the other hand, Clifford had nothing but contempt for those English, those "cowardly ones", who had quit the battle. He ended his letter to Lord Arlington with a very conservative estimate of the English losses, eight hundred killed and fifteen hundred wounded, and not more than five ships sunk, destroyed or captured by the enemy.73

The Dutch considered the Four Days' Battle to be their victory, as it was, but they felt it was such a great victory for them and a disastrous defeat for the English that public disaffection in England would cause the King to bow

out of the war.74 The initial news of the four days' fight in England was that the English had won a tremendous victory. As the days passed and reports continued to come in, it became increasingly obvious that the battle was not such a tremendous victory, and perhaps not a victory at all, but the inability of the Dutch to follow up their victory showed that they had been hurt perhaps as much as the English.75 It was certainly not considered such a serious defeat by the English as to discredit the tactics of the Duke of Albemarle and Prince Rupert. After the English Navy Board, led by the guiding spirits Penn, Coventry and Pepys, had worked miracles to get the fleet back to sea in early August of 1666 (at which feat the Dutch were astonished), Rupert and Monck were still in command.76

In the last major battle of this war, the English fleet once again caught the Dutch at a disadvantage. The strong wind of the day before and the shifting of the wind on the day of the battle separated the Dutch fleet and gave the weather gauge to the English.77 Even so, De Ruyter tried to get his fleet in order and might have been able to put up a much better fight than he did if not for Tromp, who once again disobeyed the order of battle and went off

74 Colenbrander, I, p. 368.
75 Wilson, p. 137.
76 Blok, De Ruyter, p. 238.
77 Ibid., p. 240.
independently to attack a segment of the English fleet. This action left De Ruyter's squadron to bear practically the full weight of the English fire. The Dutch were so outnumbered and even the position of De Ruyter's ship looked so hopeless that the great admiral lost his composure for probably the first, last and only time in his life. He cried, "Oh my God! how wretched am I, that among so many thousand balls not one will bring me death." His brother-in-law, Cornelis De Witt (the brother of John De Witt, the Grand Pensionary) heard him and suggested that if his position was so hopeless that he charge into the midst of the English fleet and try to grapple the English flagship as Opdam had done in the Battle of Lowestoft. This snapped De Ruyter out of his depression and soon he was able to take his crippled fleet to safety in the shallow waters of home.

After the Battle of the North Foreland on August 4, 1666 (or as it is sometimes called, the St. James Day Fight because on the old style calendar, the battle was fought on July 25, St. James Day), the English controlled the sea and were able to take advantage of this fact. On August 8, Sir Robert Holmes was ordered to attack the islands of Vlieland and Ter Schelling. While doing this, Holmes discovered

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78 Ibid., p. 247.
a fleet of one hundred fifty Dutch merchantmen waiting for an opportunity to make their harbors and protected by only two men-of-war. The English attacked, easily defeating the two warships and then proceeded to destroy most of the merchantmen by fireships. Only a few of the Dutch ships escaped by sailing up a nearby creek; this was a tremendous loss for the Dutch, estimated at one million pounds.80 After destroying the Dutch merchant fleet, the English landed a force on Ter Schelling and pillaged, plundered, looted and burned.81

Almost before the English had had sufficient time to digest their victories a new calamity struck. On the night of September 2, 1666, a fierce eastern wind in a very dry season caused a small fire to spread uncontrollably through London. The night was light as day for ten miles around82 and the fire acted "as if it had a commission to devour everything that was in its way".83 The fire lasted for two days84 and paralyzed the English war effort.

Later in September the English and Dutch fleets came within sight of each other off Boulougne, but both sides

80Ogg, I, p. 303. An interesting thing about this action was that the English were guided into the Vlie by a Dutch pilot, Lawrence Heemskerk, who had been banished from his country. Davies, p. 54.
81Mahan, p. 131.
83Burnet, p. 322.
84De Beer, p. 450.
avoided a fight. While the shortages of men and supplies on both sides was probably the main reason the two navies did not want to fight, an influential factor may have been, as Charles Wilson thinks, the apparent futility of fighting without reaching a decision was taking the heart out of both commands.85

Because of lack of money to cope with the continued war, the Plague and repairing the extensive damage of the Great Fire, Charles embarked on a policy of economizing in the war effort. The English great ships were laid up and the smaller ships of the English navy were to concentrate their actions against Dutch trade rather than against the Dutch navy. On paper this plan looked pretty good; commerce-destroying, when successful, greatly embarrasses the foreign government and distresses its people. But to be effective, there must be little or no enemy navy caused by the destruction of that navy in battle or its being overawed by a stronger naval force.86 In effect, Charles II's economizing act of laying up the battle fleet was an attempt to enjoy a victory not yet secured.87

By Autumn of 1666, Charles's plan was beginning to have bad results. The Dutch took advantage of the absence of the English battle fleet to establish a limited blockade

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85Wilson, pp. 137-138.
86Mahan, pp. 131-132.
87Marcus, I, pp. 160-161.
of English ports, severely harassing the coal trade and
gravely endangering the vital supplies of masts and naval
stores from the Baltic. By December, the arrival of four
mast-ships from New England was looked on by Pepys as “a
blessing mightily unexpected, and without which, if for
nothing else, we must have failed the next year.”

By May of 1667 both sides were so tired of the war
that they entered into peace negotiations at Breda.
Because the negotiations dragged along, with neither side
making any substantial concessions, De Witt decided to
carry out a project he had been planning for a long time,
a sortie up the Thames by the Dutch fleet.

Early in June, 1667, a small Dutch force under Van
Ghent tried to sail up the river running through Edinburgh,
but was forced back out to sea. Rumors spread immediately
that the Dutch had been practicing to sail up the Thames,
and measures were put into effect to protect the river,
but a few days passed; the rumors died down and the work
fell off. On the 14th of June, 1667, a fleet of between
sixty and seventy Dutch men-of-war left the Texel under the
command of Michael De Ruyter and Cornelis De Witt. They

88 Ibid., I, p. 160. Charles’s handling of the last
phase of the war was so distasteful to Pepys and Coventry
that they tried to wash their hands of all responsibility
for this new policy. Wilson, p. 139.
89 Marcus, I, pp. 160-161.
90 Blok, Netherlands, IV, p. 329.
reached the mouth of the Thames on June 19 and decided to try to force their way into the Medway on the twenty-second.91 It was well evident from the very beginning that this expedition had been well-timed and well-planned. Soundings of the Thames Estuary had been made; Van Ghent's movement towards Edinburgh had proved to be a feint and the whole enterprise was timed so that advantage could be taken of the spring tide.92

A large measure of responsibility for the success of the Dutch adventure must go to the English for the almost unbelievable mismanagement and disorganization with which they handled the affair. The hastily erected shore batteries failed, not just because they were manned by hastily recruited volunteers, but because the oak planks that should have been available in more than adequate quantities had been stolen and/or embezzled. As a result the heavy cannons of the shore batteries had to be mounted on very thin boards (called deal) and every time the guns fired the wheels broke through the planks and sank into the ground.93 Another example of the poor planning that the English used in their hasty defence was that, in their hurry to sink ships to

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91Edmundson, p. 243.
92Ogg, I, pp. 309-310. The Dutch were advised in their attack up the Thames by Samuel Ravens, an assistant master-shipwright to Christopher Pott, who left England at the time of the Restoration. Tanner, Pepys' Naval Minutes, pp. 46-47.
93Ogg, I, p. 311.
block the channel, they sank a brand new ship and another ship loaded with valuable supplies for the fleet.  

The Dutch surprise attack was a complete success. They broke through the chain across the Medway and the line of sunken ships and captured the flagship of the English fleet, the Royal Charles, at Chatham. Then, along with a couple of other prizes, the Dutch retreated back out to sea.

The Dutch attack on Chatham must be accounted one of the most brilliant, audacious, and completely successful strokes in the annals of naval warfare. From start to finish the operation was conducted with consummate skill. The navigation of the Thames estuary by so large a fleet, and still more, the orderly retreat down the Medway, spoke volumes for the fine seamanship of the Dutch officers and crews.

Even Pepys, who was no admirer of the Dutch, gave them their due: "Thus, in all things, in wisdom, courage, force, knowledge of our own streams, and success, the Dutch have the best of us, and do end the war with victory on their side."  

Before discussing the Treaty of Breda, there is one phase of the war that should be discussed. Though he showed little inclination to help the Dutch, Louis XIV took advantage of his alliance with them to advance into the West Indies.

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95Blok, Netherlands, IV, pp. 336-337.
96Marcus, I, p. 161.
97Ibid., p. 162.
French forces captured St. Kitts in April of 1666, Antigua in November and Monserrat in February of 1667, but in April of 1667, Sir John Harmon arrived in the area in command of a strong English naval force. Charles II may have been economizing in home waters, but the French danger to English possessions in the Caribbean was too great for him to ignore. On May 20, 1667, Harman's fleet defeated a combined Anglo-Dutch fleet off Montserrat and the next month the French fleet was decisively defeated off Martinique, ending the French threat and saving the English West Indies. 98

After the trip up the Thames, the Dutch controlled the seas as the English fleet had done in 1654. In July of 1667, both sides finally reached an agreement and the Treaty of Breda was signed. Contraband was restricted to munitions of war, visit and search were lightened, the principle of "free ship, free goods" was acknowledged and the Navigation Act of 1660 was modified so that the Dutch could import into England commodities of the growth, production or manufacture of the German hinterland of Holland. England kept Delaware, New Jersey and New York 99 and the Dutch kept Surinam, which they had captured from the English in March of 1667. 100

99 Wilson, pp. 141-142.
100 Edmundson, p. 243.
called by Wilson "an act of moderation and good sense", the Treaty of Breda marked a turning-point in Anglo-Dutch relations. "The most acute phase of colonial and economic rivalry was now over. In the West Indies and West Africa the main problems were settled; elsewhere they were well on the way to settlement. The ensuing period laid the foundations of a community of interest which ultimately found expression in alliance." Although this treaty helped, it was not the final answer. "The Breda treaty helped the two peoples to keep out of each other's way; but if other circumstances had set them on opposite sides of European quarrels more lastingly than they did in the war of 1672-4, their economic rivalry, instead of fading away, might have been fought out to a finish."  

101 Wilson, p. 142.  
102 Clark, pp. 66-67.
Chapter III

The Third Anglo-Dutch War

The third war between England and Holland in less than a quarter of a century was unlike the first two mainly because it was not primarily a result of commercial jealousy between England and the Netherlands. The major responsibility for getting England involved in this attempt by Louis XIV to crush and/or absorb the Dutch goes to Charles II, who was believing more and more that the United Provinces were the permanent and unalterable enemies of England.\(^1\) While there was some support among the great and rising mercantile community as well as Charles II's court for another round with the Dutch and while the English were yearning to revenge the humiliating defeat of the Medway,\(^2\) the hatred of the Dutch by the English had generally abated, so much so that an alliance with the Dutch was popular with the

\[^{1}\text{Maurice Lee, Jr., The Cabal (Urbana, Illinois, 1965), p. 80.}\]

\[^{2}\text{Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, II, p. 74.}\]
people.

"In the third quarter of the seventeenth century English foreign policy was moving toward one of those massive changes of direction which occur at long intervals in the international relations of major states." The last change had been a clear identification of Spain as the major enemy during the middle of the sixteenth century, with the French and Dutch as potential friends. While the power structure in Europe had substantially altered since Elizabethan times, the policy makers of the English government had been very slow to see this. Most of Charles's advisors favored a French alliance, but after the close of the second Dutch war Lord Arlington had gained the ear of the King and had persuaded him that an alliance with the Dutch was in England's best interest. As a result, the Triple Alliance was formed between England, Holland, and Sweden on January 13, 1668.

To Charles the alliance with Holland did not in any way impair his relations with France, but served as a demonstration to Louis XIV that alliance with England was valuable and should be bought at a decent price. Charles knew that only by an alliance with France could success in foreign policy be attained cheaply. From the second Dutch war, Charles had learned that England alone could not defeat the Dutch, but he felt that Eng-

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4 Ibid., p. 79.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid. pp. 92 - 93.
land and France together could easily do so. An easy, quick victory over the Dutch would reconcile the English public to the French alliance, which he knew would be unpopular in the beginning. By enormously expanding English trade, the Dutch defeat would swell the King's revenues so greatly that his financial problems would be solved and he, Charles II, would be well on the road toward independence of Parliament, the Stuart dream.

For this reason Charles entered into the secret treaty of Dover with Louis XIV in 1670. Charles was to declare himself a Catholic and to support a French war against the United Provinces with the English Navy. In return, Louis was to supply Charles with money to fight the war. Both sides knew that Charles would never declare himself a Catholic and each knew that the other knew, but they went ahead and decided on the spring of 1672 as the date to start the war. Charles knew that the English people would never stand for his declaring himself a Catholic or accepting money from a foreign power, so the public Treaty of Dover, signed in December of 1670, made no mention of these conditions and was only an alliance between England and France.

Now all Charles had to do was to find the money to prepare for and fight the war. In 1671, the King's financial situation

7 Ibid., pp. 96 - 97.
8 Ibid., pp. 112 - 113.
was as grim as it had been in 1667. Government revenue was pledged a year to eighteen months in advance to repay loans already contracted; the French subsidy was inadequate and when Charles asked for eight hundred thousand pounds for the navy in October of 1670, Parliament gave him slightly more than three hundred thousand. To provide money for the war, Charles postponed the payments outstanding until a later date to liberate the government revenue for the expenses of war. It is easy to see from this that Charles was betting all he had on a short, quick and decisive victory, a war that would not last more than six months.

In January of 1672 England sent the United Provinces an ultimatum summoning them to acknowledge the right of the English crown to the sovereignty of the British seas. The Dutch finally saw that the increasingly belligerent acts of England were being backed by France and could no longer be appeased by concessions. In February of 1672, the Dutch ordered seventy-five ships of the line into commission. On March 23, 1672, the English attacked the Dutch Smyrna fleet of merchantmen without a declaration of war. While this attempt to secure rich booty from the enemy immediately failed, it was too late to turn back. On the twenty-ninth of that month, England declared war on Holland, ostensibly because of Dutch failure to salute the English flag, and France

Ibid., pp. 144 - 152.
followed suit on April 6, 1672.

The most important way in which the last of the Anglo-Dutch Wars differed from the first two was that in this war England was not Holland's chief opponent and for that reason the naval operations were not the main part of the war. To Louis XIV the war was a semi-divine punishment of a recalcitrant race; to Charles the war was a personal bargain with some advantage to his subjects; but to the Dutch the war was a time of disaster, revolution and heroic struggle for national existence.

The main feature of the sea war was that, except for the opening battle, the Dutch did not send their fleet out to meet the enemy, but fought a defensive-offensive war, hiding in the shoals and only attacking when it was to their advantage to do so. Another characteristic of this war is that the English and French together were far too strong for the Dutch to try anything in the Mediterranean Sea.

The initial plan of the English and French was to proceed to the North Sea and anchor near the Dogger Bank in the path of the homecoming Dutch trade. This would force the Dutch to come well out to sea where it could be brought to decisive action on English and French terms. While the French Navy lacked fast

10 Mahan, p. 143.
11 Clark, p. 74.
12 Ogg I, p. 357.
13 Mahan, p. 144.
15 Marcus, I, p. 165.
frigates and their smaller ships were unfit for North Sea storms, the addition of this force to the English Navy brought total strength to ninety-eight warships of six thousand guns and thirty-four thousand men. In comparison, the Dutch had only seventy-five warships with four thousand five hundred guns and twenty thousand men.

The Dutch republic was not as well prepared for war as it should have been. De Witt's policy of strengthening the navy at the expense of the army because of the fear of the military power of the Orange family had left the Dutch army in very poor shape. Also, De Witt had convinced himself that the war would be against France alone and, because the Dutch Navy was more than a match for the French Navy alone, the Dutch Navy had been somewhat neglected. However, when it became obvious in March that England was to be in this war, efforts were started to bring the strength of the Dutch Navy up to one hundred twenty ships with thirty thousand men.

The first Dutch plan was to strike the French fleet in their home waters before they had time to join the English, but De Witt was unable to get the navy ready in time to do this. The next plan was to strike the English fleet in the Thames, before the French fleet could arrive from Brest. The Dutch Navy under De

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16 Ogg, I, p. 358.
17 Blok, Netherlands, p. 371.
18 Pontalis, II, p. 248.
Ruyter was physically capable of achieving this objective, but was suffering at that moment from a case of acute decentralization of the naval administration and the project was never put into effect.

When in June De Ruyter's fleet was finally able to put to sea, his plan was to meet the combined Anglo-French fleet and bring it to battle. He met the enemy and fell back toward his own coast, expecting to fight on his own terms. Apparently the Duke of York, who was in command of the combined fleet, (Monck died in January of 1670) thought the French weren't ready and decided to go home, so he ordered the Anglo-French fleet to retire to Southwold Bay (also known as Sole Bay). De Ruyter turned and followed them and decided to fight them on the seventh of June, 1672.

The Dutch fleet came up so quickly on the allies that drums were beaten to give notice to all seamen to retire immediately to their ships and bailiffs were sent to throw all sailors out of the ale houses. The French were in the van to the south and the English were in the center and rear. The wind was blowing towards the coast, which at this point ran nearly north and south, giving the Dutch the weather gage. The Dutch advanced so rapidly that they caught the French and English in an awkward position; the allies had first to cut their cables and get under way and

19 Mahan, p. 145.
20 Ibid., pp. 145 -146
they were not able to fall back to gain time or room to set up their battle line. For some unknown reason, the English headed north-northeast on a course which forced them soon to turn about and the French went down the coast in the opposite direction in order to get out to sea. This serious split in the allied fleet at the very beginning of the battle put the Dutch in a tremendous position. De Ruyter sent one division to hold the French while he fell on the two English divisions with superior numbers.

Technically the battle was indecisive, both sides losing heavily, but actually the substantial advantages were all with the Dutch. They had attacked a superior force in its home waters and took advantage of a weakness which was in part due to their rapid advance. Because they were able to check the French while they fought the English, they upset the allied plans of a French land invasion supported by naval action by about a month.

For a while it seemed as if the French Army needed no assistance of any sort. The French Army invaded the United Provinces early in May and, following the policy of bypassing the smaller occupied towns, within a month had carried all before them. It seemed in June as if the Dutch had lost; three provinces had been overrun, Utrecht was in danger of falling and the Dutch had only nine thousand men to stop the one hundred twenty thousand of Turenne

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22 Mahan, p. 146.
23 Ibid., p. 147 - 148.
24 Ibid., p. 149.
and Condé.  

The rapid French advance caused strong public feeling against John and Cornelis De Witt, despite De Ruyter's naval victory. Rather than allow the house of Orange to come to power, De Witt offered to capitulate to Louis's peace demands, but the French demands were too severe for even De Witt, as hard pressed as he was, to accept. While De Witt was negotiating with the French, the Dutch resistance began to crystallize with the opening of the dikes by Amsterdam on June 24, 1672. The other cities of the Netherlands followed her example and opened their dikes and on July 8, William of Orange was made Stadtholder and commander of the army and navy. What De Witt had tried to prevent all his life -- the revival of the House of Orange -- had occurred because Louis XIV was too greedy and would not tone down his demands. A few weeks later the transformation of Holland from a republic to a limited monarchy was complete with the murder of the two De Witts by an angry mob.

The first task of the new government was to form an army. The Dutch Navy was not needed for a while after the victory at Sole Bay, but the Dutch Army needed men, so one-third of the ships were unrigged to free their sailors and marines for the new Dutch Army. The Dutch even secured an alliance with Spain which netted

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25 Baxter, p. 70.
26 Edmundson, p. 253.
27 Mahan, pp. 149 - 150.
28 Blok, Netherlands, p. 379.
them some Spanish regiments and by the autumn of 1672, the Stadtholder was in command of an army of fifty-seven thousand men, with which he started his upward climb against the French.

In one of the first acts after he became Stadtholder, William showed that he was a wise and capable leader by keeping De Ruyter in command of the Dutch Navy, although he had been a friend of John De Witt and was Cornelis De Witt's brother-in-law. In fact, he increased De Ruyter's command by making him Lieutenant-Admiral of the Provinces with almost unlimited instructions. William allowed himself to be wholly guided by De Ruyter in naval affairs and the only favor that he asked of De Ruyter was that he allow Tromp to be reinstated into the fleet, which De Ruyter did.

In June of 1673, the Anglo-French fleet, under the command of Prince Rupert (The Duke of York had been forced to retire from public office in June of 1673 by the Test Act ) was cruising along the southern Dutch coast, hoping that De Ruyter's fleet would come out from behind the shoals to fight. The Dutch were seen riding within the sands of Schoneveldt and a detached squadron was sent to draw them out. De Ruyter, however, needed no invitation, for the wind was in his favor, giving him the advantage

29 Baxter, p. 70.
30 Edmundson, p. 258.
31 Davies, pp. 127-128. Tromp had been deprived from naval command at De Ruyter's request after his independent action and disobedience of orders severely hurt the Dutch in the battle of the North Foreland. Edmundson, p. 241.
32 Ogg, I, p. 370.
of the weather gage. He used his advantage well and came out so quickly that the allied line was hit before it was formed.

This hit-and-run action of De Ruyter was indecisive, but a week later in the second battle of the Schoneveldt, De Ruyter attacked again when it was to his advantage to do so. In another indecisive action he hurt the Anglo-French fleet badly enough to force it to return to the English coast to refit and take on new supplies. In both battles the Dutch and English had only a little over fifty ships of the line and the French had a little less than thirty.

Prince Rupert's failure to bring De Ruyter to decisive action in the campaign of 1673 was due in part to the fact that the government could not adequately man, provision and equip the fleet or even maintain a sufficient reserve of stores for refitting and repairs. Obviously Charles's gamble on a six

33 Mahan, pp. 151 - 152.
34 Ibid., p. 152.
35 Marcus, I. p. 167. In fact, as a result of this, the Dutch fleet had gotten to sea before the English and in early May tried to block the narrow Swin channel of the Thames estuary with sunken hulks filled with rocks. If it had worked, a considerable part of the English fleet would have been immobilized, but at the last minute a dense fog forced the Dutch to sail slowly as they were escorting the sinkers into place, allowing the English to be warned in time. Then Rupert, in a daring feat of seamanship, sailed through the fog and the shoals and took the Dutch force by surprise, forcing them to abandon the sinkers and return to Holland. Ibid.
month war had not paid off. The initial enthusiasm for the war rapidly faded away as the war dragged on, and the reluctance of the French to fight greatly increased their unpopularity in England.

In August, the Anglo-French forces appeared off the northern Dutch coast, with the intention of landing troops, but De Ruyter stayed in the shallow waters along the coast, biding his time. During the night of the twentieth, the wind shifted so that it was to De Ruyter's advantage. With about seventy ships he came out to fight sixty English and thirty French ships. Once again, De Ruyter's strategy was to hold the French in check while they fought the English on equal terms.

Martel, the French admiral commanding the van of the French fleet, was ordered to stretch ahead, go about and gain to windward of the Dutch van, in order to catch the Dutch in a crossfire, but the Dutch Admiral, Bankert (who had lost a leg in the battle of Lowestoft) saw the danger and ran through the remaining French ships with his twelve. Bankert then stood down to join De Ruyter, who had been drifting out to sea with Rupert. This was a deliberate act on the part of the Prince,

36 Ibid., p. 172.
37 Mahan, p. 152.
designed to draw the Dutch away from their coast so that if the wind shifted the Dutch would be unable to return to the protection of their shallow waters. D'Estrees, the commander of the French fleet, claimed that this separation of the center from the van prevented his aiding the English; however Bankert was coming from the same direction and was able to join De Ruyter.

The main fighting of the battle of the Texel was in the center between the Dutch and English where two duels were taking place. The fighting between Sir Edward Spragge and Tromp was so fierce that both admirals had to change ships three times, and on the third change of flag, Spragge was killed. Rupert was so hard-pressed by Bankert and De Ruyter that he was firing broadsides to windward and leeward. He managed, however, to edge over to his rear-admiral to gather his forces for one last fight.

In the words of Prince Rupert, "If the French, then lying within distance to windward, had obeyed my signall, and borne downe upon the enemy according to their duty, I must have routed and torne them all to pieces. It was the plainest and greatest opportunity ever lost at sea."

As a result of the Battle of the Texel (or as the Dutch called it, the Battle of Kijkduin), another indecisive action,

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38 Ibid., pp. 152 - 153.
40 Marcus, I, p. 171.
41 Blok, Netherlands, p. 413.
the Dutch harbors were cleared for returning merchantmen and the possibility of an enemy landing was eliminated. An even more important result of this battle was that it fanned the flames of distrust of the English for the French. The English people were much more appreciative of a determined enemy than they were of a fickle ally. A captured Dutch seaman said of the French unwillingness to aid the English that the French "have hired the English to fight for them and all their business here is to see that they earn their wages." An English evaluation of the value of the alliance is given in this contemporary letter:

...for they are here not a little perplexed, as well by reason of the want of money, as naval ammunition; to which add the daily graving jealousy against the French, which the King must dissemble against his will, being obliged to say against his better knowledge, and to still the report, that the French had fought well, apprhehending that if he should owne the truth, he would be reproached by the whole nation, for having too hastily engaged himself with the French, who see nothing else than by corruption and fraud to get the monarchy of all Europe. For, since the late fight it hath been said plainly enough, that the French DESESEIN appears, and the English, among other kindnesses, have shewed them not only the manner and order of fighting at sea, without endangering them, but taught them also the coasts, sands, banks, advenues, and in short, LE FORTE ET LE FOIBLE of this kingdom. 

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42 Ibid.
43 Oge, I, p. 376.
44 Mahan, p. 155.
45 Colenbrander, II, p. 126.
The growing resentment against the French, the improbability of ever fighting a conclusive action against the Dutch and the tremendous lack of money with which to continue the war caused an anti-war feeling in England which Charles II could not ignore. On February 19, 1674, despite the Treaty of Dover, England signed a separate peace with the Dutch. Louis XIV wanted to sign a peace treaty with the Dutch while he still had control over large amounts of Dutch territory, but the Dutch had the upper hand now and fought on until 1676. By that time Louis XIV was fighting the House of Hapsburg in Spain and Germany and had to pull his troops out of Holland.

The treaty of Westminster was another act of moderation and good sense. The honor of the flag was again ceded to England and British waters were defined as stretching from Cape Finisterre to Van Staten in Norway. The Dutch allowed the English colonists to leave Surinam with their slaves and possessions and returned New York, which they had captured during the war. While nothing was said about the position of the Prince of Orange or of herring fishing in British waters, the Dutch paid the English an indemnity of nearly two hundred thousand pounds.

The two most important changes that occurred during the Dutch wars were the rapid advances made in naval technology and naval tactics and the tremendous losses the Dutch suffered.

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46 Mahan, p. 158.
47 Groen, State Papers, 1664 - 1665, pp. 386 - 387.
in terms of their merchant fleets, their trade, their credit and their economy. The most significant change in naval technology was the greatly increased size and firepower of the large ships. The big ships of the first Dutch war were the medium-sized ships of the second and third wars.

However, one must remember that, in the words of Sir Anthony Deane, the great seventeenth century English shipbuilder:

...no one shape of a ship can be in general said to be the best; for every distinct use requires a different shape, and the skill lies only in building best for the particular use designed, which differs as your purposes for this or that depth of water, for speed, for strength, for weight of guns, for number of men, for calm or rough seas, for short or long voyages, for storage of goods, and many other circumstances, as fewness of hands to sail with, bearing sail, etc.48

While the English had the bigger ships and the bigger guns at the start of the wars, they too benefited from the advances in naval technology. The English benefited from both the French and the Dutch designs. In the second Dutch war, the English noticed that the lower tier of guns on Dutch ships was four feet from the water and that the Dutch ships could store provisions for four months while the lower deck guns in English ships were three feet from the water and English ships carried provisions for only ten weeks. Led by Sir Anthony Deane, English shipwrights copied the Dutch and came out with

48 Tanner, Pepys' Naval Minutes, p. 37.
the Warspite and the Defiance which carried their lower tier of guns four and a half feet from the water and could store provisions for six months. In the third Dutch war, the English noticed that the French ships were wider in the beam, making them more battle-worthy, which design the English then copied.

The statement has often been made that the English ships were more heavily armed than the Dutch, but just how great a difference was there? The armament of the Royal Prince, a first class ship taken by the Dutch in the Four Days' Battle of the second Dutch war, was fourteen guns firing shells weighing forty-eight pounds, fourteen thirty-two pounders, thirty twenty-four pounders, sixteen twelve pounders and fourteen six pounders. While for the most part the heaviest cannon on a Dutch ship fired a twenty-four pound cannon ball, there is record of a few thirty-six pounders, but no mention of any forty-eight pounders. This apparently tremendous disparity between the sizes of the guns carried by both fleets is not as great as it seems, however. The English tactics of firing at the enemy hulls, to be effective, would call for heavy guns, while the Dutch would not need more than a twenty-four pounder to carry out their tactics of firing at the enemy's masts and rigging. Another point to consider is the fact that the more

50 Ibid., p. 274.
51 Green, State Papers, 1664-1665, p. 395. Colenbrander, I, p. 30
water it would draw, negating its advantage of being able to retreat to safety in the shallow water of its coastline. Also, there is evidence that the Dutch invented chain shot, the first recorded use of which is in the Four Days' Battle. This new weapon greatly increased the effectiveness of the Dutch battle tactics and lessened the need for heavy guns on Dutch ships.

While there was a tremendous increase in the size and firing power of English and Dutch ships between the first and second Dutch wars, the increase was not as great between the second and third wars. In the second Dutch war, the heaviest English ships carried between ninety and one hundred guns and this was increased only slightly in the third war. For this war, the English had three first-rate ships, the Sovereign, the Prince; and the Charles, mounting one hundred ten guns, carrying crews of almost eight hundred men and having a tonnage of two thousand or more. The English even had one ship, the Prince Royal, carrying one hundred twenty guns.

Because of the shallowness of their waters, the Dutch could not build much bigger ships than they built in the second Dutch war. Although the Dutch ships of the second war were bigger and stronger than those of the first, because of greater

\[52\]
Burnet, p. 321. De Witt was commonly considered the inventor. *Ibid.*

\[53\]
Ogg, p. 265.

\[54\]
Pontalis, II, p. 248.

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Tanner, *Pepys' Naval Minutes*, p. 37.
and thicker timbers being used, making the ships wider and giving the guns and crew more room. There was not that much difference between the Dutch ships of the second and third wars. As an example, De Ruyter's flagship, the Seven Provinces, carrying four hundred seventy-five men and eighty guns, was brand new in 1665 and was the same ship De Ruyter used throughout the third war. De Ruyter's flagship also serves to illustrate another point, the fact that the Dutch ships of the second and third Dutch wars were much stronger and more able to withstand heavy fire than those of the first war. De Ruyter's flagship was in the thick of the fighting throughout the second and third wars and survived every battle.

In naval tactics there was not as rapid progress throughout the wars as there had been in naval technology. The most important improvement was the line-of-battle formation, which evolved during the first war. Until the Dutch met their equals at sea in the form of the English, the necessity of war did not force sailing fleets to sail in line. Since the disappearance of the galley, almost all the guns on a ship of war were found on the sides, thus the beam, or side of a ship, should at all times be turned towards the enemy. Another advantage of the line was that the enemy could best be kept in sight by a line ahead formation.

The fighting instructions issued by the Duke of York were

56 Colenbrander, I, p. 172.
57 Blok, De Ruyter, pp. 216 - 223.
58 Edmundson, p. 240.
59 Mahan, pp. 115 - 116.
based on those of 1654, but a distinction was introduced between defense against an attack from windward and against that from leeward and an attempt was made to achieve greater mobility. One must remember, however, that the scientific element in maritime tactics in the seventeenth century was very small; the severe deficits of the square-rigged ship limited the primary objective of a fleet to sinking or capturing the enemy, by gun-fire, fire ships, boarding or forcing the enemy on the shoals. The primary prerequisite for attaining these objectives was to obtain the weather-gauge, that is, to get to windward of the enemy and retain this tactical advantage throughout. The advantages of this position were that the fleet with it had the initiative, since it could down on the wind and attack or hold back if it were not to its advantage to attack. Another advantage was that gunners on the windward ships had an unimpeded view of the enemy, because the smoke was being blown away. Also, fireships, the most dreaded engines of naval warfare, could be drifted downwind towards the enemy. The one disadvantage of the weather gauge was that, in a stiff breeze, the lower tier of guns on the leeward side were likely to be under water and thus could not be brought into action.

The gaining of the weather-gauge was like winning the toss of the coin in a football game but, after this winning of the initial advantage was obtained, there was no clearly defined principle to follow. In the last two Dutch wars, the general practice was for the two fleets to file past each other, firing

Ogg, I, p. 266.
at the enemy's hulls and rigging. Then the ships in the lead (the van) bore round to take up position behind the rearmost ships in order to repeat the attack. When the order of battle was broken, there was usually a general mêlée in which the disabled ships might be burnt by fireships or boarded. The English were better disciplined than the Dutch because they did not have roving free-lances like the younger Tromp, nor were their fleets divided into Orange and De Witt factions. But the main distinguishing characteristic of the English was the precision with which they kept their line. In the words of a Frenchman who witnessed the Four Days' Battle (a Dutch victory):

Nothing equals the beautiful order of the English at sea. Never was a line drawn straighter than that formed by their ships; thus they bring all their fire to bear upon those who draw near them .... They fight like a line of cavalry which is handled according to rule, and applies itself solely to force back those who oppose; whereas the Dutch advance like cavalry whose squadrons leave their ranks and come separately to the charge.\(^6^2\)

Another characteristic of the English Navy was their great faith in their gunners, causing them to place less reliance on boarding than did other navies (notably the French). The bulk of the great Dutch hulls, plus the proportion of unseasoned wood in the hulls, caused the English to aim at the Dutch hulls, while the English presented a smaller freeboard (the distance between the waterline and the deck) strongly influencing the Dutch to aim at their masts and rigging.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., I, p. 267.
\(^{62}\) Mahan, p. 126.
\(^{63}\) Ogg, I, p. 267.
The most important occurrence during these twenty-two years of intermittent warfare was the creation of two well-nigh invincible navies, each with its own advantages and differences, knocking heads viciously three times in less than a quarter of a century, but each navy unable to fatally hurt the other. It is unusual in history for two such powerful navies to develop side by side, and the disappearance of one navy would naturally leave the other supreme on the seas. In the remaining two years of the Franco-Dutch land struggle, the Dutch fought a war of reconquering lost territory. The drain on the limited Dutch resources overtaxed Dutch strength, forcing Holland to sacrifice her navy in order to maintain a large standing army with which to fight France.

In the first war there was a great controversy as to whether the Dutch Navy should be used primarily to convoy the Dutch merchant ships or to attack and try to destroy the English Navy, but this was no longer an issue by the second and third wars. In the first war the ruling oligarchy of Holland was so worried about losing money in a war with England that they seriously hampered the Dutch war effort by assigning it to convoy duty. By the time of the second war, the Dutch had profited by their mistakes. They had seen that major conflicts with the English Navy would force it back to its home base to refit and the Dutch could then sneak in convoys of merchantmen with only light escorts needed to drive away English privateers and commerce-

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64 Marcus, I, p. 174.
raiders. Thus, the main duty of the Dutch Navy in the second war was to attack the enemy fleet, and the protection of merchant convoys was only a minor duty. In the third Dutch war, the main duty of the Dutch fleet was to prevent a landing by the Anglo-French forces and, if possible, to damage them enough in battle to send them home for a while. No ships were dispatched for convoy duty, leaving the merchantmen practically on their own.

In any war with the English, the Dutch merchants were bound to suffer heavily because England was situated in such an advantageous position as to be able to threaten the major Dutch trade routes, while the English trade routes were not as easily threatened. The success of the Dutch policy of attacking the English fleet rather than providing large convoys for Dutch merchantmen was evidenced in that, while the Dutch may have lost as many as one thousand eight hundred ships to the English in the first war, they lost only about five hundred in each of the other two wars. Still, losing "only" five hundred ships is a tremendous blow to a nation's economy. In spite of the English overseas trade being much smaller than that of the Dutch at this time, the English merchants keenly felt the loss of the five hundred ships that the Dutch were able to capture or destroy throughout all three wars.

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65 Wilson, pp. 132 - 133.
66 Marcus, I, p. 165.
67 Davis, p. 51.
The second Dutch war had proven to the English that the successes of the first war could not be improved upon or even as easily repeated. After the third Dutch war, the agitation about Dutch maritime superiority failed to reappear in any strength because the English had been shown, through the use of Dutch prizes, the way to cheaper shipment of goods and shifted that way themselves. While on the one hand the gradual naval evolution of the seventeenth century eventually excluded armed merchantmen from navies so that if they served at all it was as provision ships, convoy escorts or fire ships, on the other hand, the emergence of the English Navy from the Dutch wars as the most powerful navy afloat eliminated the need for English merchant ships to be heavily armed.

"The great hopes of them of Holland is that this warre will not continue long, the length and continuance whereof must certainly mine them and turne the trade into other channels, every nation getting a share thereof." Here, in a letter of April 28, 1665, from Downing, the English ambassador in Holland, to Lord Arlington, is seen the contemporary view of the hurt being done to Dutch trade by continued warfare with the English. The significance of this letter is that it was written during the second Dutch war, while most of the damage to Holland was done

68 Wilson, p. 155.
69 Davis, pp. 53 - 54.
70 Barbour, p. 261.
71 Colenbrander, I, p. 167.
during the first and third Dutch wars. The Dutch commerce suffered so heavily in the first war and their highly organized credit had been so strained that they were paying a yearly interest of five hundred thousand pounds on war debts. The second war hurt by increasing this debt, but the last war was the crushing blow for the United Provinces. The fact that Holland was fighting for her very existence against a superior army and a superior navy caused her to exert a tremendous effort to prevail over almost overwhelming odds. She had preserved her independence, but this tremendous effort had fatally undermined her prosperity and cost the Netherlands her maritime and commercial preeminence. The tragedy of the Dutch wars was that both England and Holland made the common error of supposing that the trade of either people could only prosper at the expense of the other.

Just before the start of the first Anglo-Dutch war, the older statesman of the Regent party, Pauw, said that "the English are about to attack a mountain of gold; we are about to attack a mountain of iron." His prediction came true in that the English benefited tremendously from the three great wars between two almost equally matched naval powers. On the one hand the way was paved for English commercial expansion while

72 Feiling, p. 84.
73 Marcus, I, p. 173.
74 Barbour, p. 290.
75 Wilson, p. 60.
76 Gardiner and Atkinson, VI, p. 11.
on the other hand, a global navy was born with the existence of a powerful reserve kept in the Downs, a Mediterranean station, a moderately strong West Indian squadron and the beginnings of a North American station. In the future, this navy was to be an influential factor in continental politics. These were the benefits resulting from attacking a mountain of gold; for attacking a mountain of iron the Dutch lost heavily. While, technically, the Dutch lost the first war and won the next two, they were Pyrrhic victories. While the Dutch checked the aggressors, the tremendous cost in so doing, meant the eventual loss of a large part of their world trade to the English and decline from their position of power.

77 Oppenheim, pp. 302-303.
78 Ibid., p. 305.
Appendix A

A Map of the Main Battle Area
Compiled from the charts published by John Seller, Hydrographer to King Charles II

Key:
- Battles of First \( \times \) Second \( \times \) and Third \( \times \) Wars
- Shoals ---

England

Holland
Appendix B

A List of English Men-of-War

Below is a list of English ships with the number of men and the number of guns they carried, as of June, 1666:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship's Name</th>
<th>Number of Men</th>
<th>Number of Guns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Rate Ships -</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Soveraigne</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Royal</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Charles</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal James</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second Rate Ships -</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyal London</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royall Oake</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royall Katherine</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tryumph</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old James</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiftsure</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. George</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Andrew</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rupert</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defyance</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warspite</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unicorn</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanguarde</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rainbow</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As one can see, there were no hard and fast rules for determining whether a ship belonged to one rating or another. In addition to the ships given above of the first, second and third rating, there were at this time:

- 62 fourth rate ships carrying between 34-52 guns,
- 27 fifth rate ships carrying between 20-36 guns,
- 27 sixth rate ships carrying between 6-14 guns,
- 6 hired merchant ships carrying between 36-70 guns, and
- 20 Dutch prizes carrying between 38-70 guns.

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1 Colenbrander, I, pp. 319-331.
Appendix C

A List of Dutch Men-of-War

Below is a list of Dutch ships and the number of men and guns they carried as of May, 1665:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship's Name</th>
<th>Number of Men</th>
<th>Number of Guns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concord</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liefde</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marseven</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court de Zelande</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Hollandia</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oosterwijck</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delflant</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sevenwolden</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Maison de Swieten</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oostergo</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilversun</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passe-Temp</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruyningen</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberte</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couverden</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leopard</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ville et Villages</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelre</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westfrise</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medenblick</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoveren</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suyderhuys</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Paix</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gouda</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ship Name</td>
<td>Length</td>
<td>Width</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Parcq d'Hollande</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westergo</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campden</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tromp</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maison d'Haerlem</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carolus V</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite Hollandia</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaersvelt</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provinces</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duyvenvoorde</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakende Boey</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelbloom</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Bourse</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concorde</td>
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<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josua</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princess Albertina</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terveer</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oostlandia</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Maurice</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the above named ships, the Dutch also had at this time 43 ships carrying between 30-48 guns and 9 ships carrying from 18-26 guns.\(^1\)

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Appendix D

A Letter from Clifford to Lord Arlington

Below is printed the text of the letter referred to in Chapter II, pages 83-74:

...Upon Friday night the 1st instant, we had a fresh gale of wind all night and next morning, by eight of the clock of which, we made both the fleets engaged, and they had been so from three of the clock in the afternoon of the day before, for my Lord General going that day for the Gun Fleet, his scouts brought him notice of the Dutch fleet near him, and so he made his engagement of them almost necessary. By 11 of the clock Saturday, we came close up to the engagement with our little shallop of six guns, and my Lord of Ossory would fain have had an opportunity of giving the Dutch Admiral a broadside in her. By two of the clock, in the heat of the fight, with much ado we got into the R. Charles, where we found things all well, and matters looked with a good aspect on our side for two or three hours, but then, after another pass, five of our better sort of ships of the second and third rates were so shattered that they made - some with leave and others without leave - toward our own ports, which was a great disheartening to the rest, especially since so many good ships also had left the fleet the day before, immediately after the
first pass, without any notice of their condition given to my Lord General, of which are the Henry, the Swiftsure, the Rainbow, the Loyal Merchant, and I think, the Portland. In fine, upon Saturday night, we found we could make but 34 fighting ships, and the Dutch hard enough upon us; and then there was nothing to be heard among the common seamen but complaints against dividing our fleet and sending away Prince Rupert. This was a strait, and my Lord General’s conduct was here well seen to be very good, for he chose 16 of the greatest ships of these 34, to be a bulwark to the rest, and bring up the rear in a breast, and so shoved on the other in a line before him, and in this manner we maintained an orderly and good retreat all Sunday, the 3rd instant, till about three of the clock that afternoon, when from topmast head we made a fleet coming toward us, which we supposed to be, as it was, Prince Rupert and his squadron. Within little we made their flags and hulls, and then in our whole fleet there was such shouting, and the English halloo that the Dutchmen that were all along firing at us were at a little pause, however kept on after us, and we, endeavouring to join with Prince Rupert, fell too near the shoal ground, and first the Royal Charles herself struck upon the sands they call the Galloper, but came presently well off, so did also the Royal Katherine; but the Royal Prince, drawing more water than either stuck fast. The Dutch with their small frigates immediately made towards her, attended with a fireship or two, and we sent four or five of our frigates to defend her, that drew least water, and we ourselves would come as near as we durst for the sands; but to the wonder of the whole fleet, we saw the flag and ancient struck, and she yielded when she had not herself either shot ten guns in her defence or received ten shot from the enemy; 15 of their men came to us in their boats, and they say they had four fathom of water upon one side, and but two on the other of their ship. When we had joined with Prince Rupert, we hastened up
where she lay, for though the Dutch had possession of her, yet she still stuck fast, and when they saw they could not keep her, they set her on fire, the sight of which was a sensible touch to every man's heart in our fleet, especially since a little resistance would have preserved her, and that she was so able to stand it out. She was like a castle in the sea, and I believe the best ship that ever was built in the world to endure battering, but she is gone, and this is an ill subject to be long upon.

This evening, the 3rd, we followed the Dutch as close as we could and the night would permit us. Monday morning, the 4th instant, at sun rising we had sight of them only at topmast head, to the windward of us. We made what haste we could to them, and they staid for us till we came at a convenient distance, and then made toward us. They, having the wind, kept at a greater part from us than we would have been willingly at, and therefore our braver commanders, impatient of it, bore in upon them to go through and through, of which were Sir Christopher Kings and Sir Robert Holmes in several places, that had each many brave seconds, and they had success enough, for by it we divided their fleet and did them much mischief, though to give them, the enemy, also their due, they soon, upon many of these passes that day, came together again with great art and dexterity. We made five passes this day, and not one of them ended but with a good appearance and aspect upon our side, in which we fired several of their ships and they not one of ours, and at the last of them, about five of the clock, we divided their fleet, fell so after them in the rear that in plain terms, those that were to leeward of us in dividing of their fleet, set all the sail they could and began to run, and while we were in chase of them and picking up some of their lame geese, that part of the fleet that was to windward of us tacks upon us; and being then divided, part with the Prince and part with the Duke of Albemarle, they gave the Duke of Albemarle's
squadron no breath at all, but tack immediately again upon us. The Prince in the Royal James had in the last pass lost his mizen and main topmast, and his squadron was at such a distance that they could not come to our relief, being also so shattered and maimed; and most of our own frigates, to avoid the shock, runs to leeward and shelter themselves under the Royal Charles. Scarcely any but the Defiance diverted the enemy from pouring their whole broadside upon us; but we bore it well enough, though at this time very much disabled in our rigging and masts, which indeed was the only aim of the Dutch, for the most part placing their shot above our hulls. De Ruyter soon observed the advantage he had by our fleets being divided and both our admirals disabled, that he makes again a sudden tack upon us. My Lord General, as ill as his ship was, gives orders for tacking likewise to preserve our lamed frigates; but having received in the pass before two shots in his powder room, between wind and water, they could not be stopped but by standing upon the same course; besides our main topmast was so disabled by a shot through him that we were fain to lower our main topsail, and our foremast had received so many shots that it was the general opinion there was danger of bringing her by the board in tacking, and no signs for any of the rest to tack would prevail anything with them, so that we were forced to see them fall upon our frigates in the rear, without being able to rescue them; but we saw also by this they could do us but little harm; indeed none at all, if the Essex had not most indiscreetly and unskilfully fallen foul of a prize, a Dutch frigate that we had just before taken, by which not only the Essex but the said frigate fell again into their hands. The Convertine also, being an old Dutch ship and a slow sailor, was overtaken by two of their little frigates, and without shooting a gun or making any resistance, she struck her ancient and yielded. We might else have brought her off with some of our frigates; but Captain Pearce, the commander, was the more to be blamed for that he had scarce engaged the whole day. Our business was now to bear
away before a wind to join with the Prince's squadron, and this cannot be called even by
the Hollanders a running away, but the proper course to join, which was the most
justifiable working, and when we were joined, the Dutch made no further after us. But by
this time it was sunset, and most of our ships in an ill condition, as I have told
your lordship our two admirals were, other wise we might have steered to have met with
them this morning again, for by all that we can guess by the working of the enemy,
they were to be quit of us as we of them, for in that last pass before the division
of our fleet, at least ten of their frigates got homeward maimed, and perchance, if the
two generals had been in one ship, or if either of the courses that either of them
had taken had been jointly followed, viz.,
either to have pursued them in the rear
that we had severed to the leeward of us,
or to have tacked to have weathered their
whole fleet, perchance we had done their
work, and not have left it as it is now
for a drawn battle; for if the losses of
each side be considered, the enemy hath
little cause to boast, for besides that we
took, we burnt in the four days flight (sic.)
seven of their men-of-war, and all their
men are lost, which is a considerable one to
them. We have still in custody the captain
of the frigate we took. Now on the other
hand, our loss of the Prince Royal was great,
so was the Essex and the Convertine, and
their men too are considerable; however,
they are not so bad as the men of the Dutch
ships, for ours are but prisoners, and re-
deemable, and so our stock not diminished,
whereas theirs are blown up or drowned;
and for our two other ships, viz., the
Black Eagle and St. Paul, two old Dutch
ships, that were sunk and the other fired
by us when she was unserviceable by shots
and leaks, we saved all the men of both,
and I do not yet hear of any other loss
we have, only there is discourse about the
fleet as if the Swiftsure were taken, but
she hath not been seen in all their fleet,
but on the contrary Sir John Chicheley says
he saw her go off clear, after the first
pass upon Friday. We have net no news,
neither of those ships I mentioned in the beginning, that went off with him; we do yet also miss Sir Christopher Kings and the Rupert, but have no reason to doubt but that they are well, though not with us.

The damage to the Hollands fleet must needs be as much if not more than ours, for there were left of them now, at last, not above 40, and they were in the beginning 84 fighting ships. It must be confessed many of ours got away after the first day, for when Prince Rupert came to us, we had but 34 ships, and if the King do not cause some of the captains to be hanged, he will never be well served. We hear of two good ships that were coming out of the swing to put to sea when they heard shooting again they went back; we have this relation from a ketch. By this backwardness in some of his captains, the King still loses the contest, for when they engage frankly and are not seconded, the enemy hath advantage upon them, and often cuts them off, when the cowardly ones still remain to omit their duties another time. If a severe course be not taken in this matter, this is alone enough to ruin any great action of our fleet.

This quitting of the seas is more than ever yet the Hollander could obtain, and though it be for the present some honour to them, and may, abroad, somewhat lessen our reputation, yet that will signify but little to them or us, if ammunition or stores be suddenly provided, for this is the chiefest matter that is wanting, some of the ships having spent all to five or six rounds or less; provisions also must be thought upon, and then if Sir Jo. Mennes bring money enough to pay off the arsars, the men will be in better heart than ever. I heard some of them mutter that they had twenty months behind; these things will be necessary to be hastened. It is also requisite that Sir William Coventry direct a new press for seamen, and if these matters can be dispatched, that our fleet may be upon their coast before they are ready, the world will then see who had the greatest loss, and the Hollanders' brags, which undoubtedly
they will set forth to the world in a high measure, will vanish and turn to their dis-
advantage.

I am not yet certain of the number of our slain and wounded, but by my strictest inquiry and by conferring with my Lord General, we conclude that there cannot be less than 1500 wounded and 800 slain on our part; we have not lost many commanders beside Capt. Terne, Capt. Bacon, and the captains of the Unicorn, the Triumph and the St. George....

1Green, State Papers, 1665-1666, pp. xix-xxiv.
Primary Sources:

Burnet, Gilbert. A History of his own Time. London: Printed for T. Davis, in Russel Street, Covent Garden, 1766. This was a moderately useful book for getting the mood of seventeenth century England, but it is somewhat unreliable and should not be used alone.

Colenbrander, H. T. Beschijden uit Vreemde Archieven omtrent de Groote Nederlandsche Zeeoorlogen. Groenhage, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1919. This is a valuable collection of original documents in English, Dutch and French. While the work covers the years 1652-1676, it would have been more useful to me if I spoke French and/or Dutch.

Corbett, Julian S. (Editor). Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816. London: Printed for the Navy Records Society, 1905. This work was helpful in explaining the naval tactics of the line formation and the progress made by the English and Dutch navies throughout the wars.

De Beer, E. S. (Editor). The Diary of John Evelyn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955. This book was also moderately useful for getting the mood of the seventeenth century, but is more reliable than Burnet.


Green, Mary A. E. (Editor). Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles II. L664-1665, 1665-1666, 1672. London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1863. This was not as useful as I thought it was going to be, but it helped fill the gaps.

Heywood, T. A True Description of His Majesties Royal Ship Built 1637 at Woolwich in Kent. London: Printed by John Okes for John Aston, 1637. This small, ancient book was not very helpful, but interesting.
Penn, Granville. *Memorials of the Professional Life and Times of Sir William Penn, Knt.* London: James Duncan, Paternoster Row, 1833. I was about to give up this practically useless book for a lost cause when I turned the page and finally found a list of Dutch ships, a treasure I had been unable to find elsewhere.

Powell, J. R. (Editor). *The Letters of Robert Blake, together with supplementary documents.* London: Printed for the Navy Records Society, 1937. This book was little used because most of the material in it was duplicated in the *Letters and Papers*.


Tanner, J. R. (Editor). *Samuel Pepys' Naval Minutes.* London: Printed for the Navy Records Society, 1926. This book was surprisingly useful in providing me with little bits of trivia with which I filled the footnotes of this paper.


Secondary Sources:

Anderson. "Operations of the English Fleet". *English Historical Review*. 1916. pp. 406-428. This article was an account of the English navy just prior to the first war and, since it was not my intention to go into detail about Rupert's exploits, it was only slightly used.

Ashley, M. P. *Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate.* London: Humphrey Milford, 1934. This work was used to correct an error made by Oppenheim.

Barbour, Violet. "Dutch and English Merchant Shipping in the Seventeenth Century." *Economic History Review*. 1930. pp. 261-290. This was a very useful article for background material on the commercial rivalry between England and Holland.

Beadon, Roger. *Robert Blake, Sometime Commanding all the Fleets and Naval Forces of England.* London: Edward Arnold and Co., 1935. Like the other biographies of Blake, I used this only slightly for background material.

Blok, P. J. *History of the People of the Netherlands.* New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1907. This work was somewhat dated and used only in this paper for background material on Holland.

Blok, P. J. *The Life of Admiral De Ruyter.* London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1933. This work was somewhat better than Blok's earlier work.


Clowes, W. Laird. *The Royal Navy, a History.* London: Sampson, Low, Marston and Company, Limited, 1897. This work was only moderately useful and is dated.

Corbett, Julian S. *England in the Mediterranean, a study of the rise and influence of British power within the straits.* New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1904. This work was extremely useful in relating the story of the naval action in the Mediterranean throughout this period and was moderately used.

Davies, C. M. *History of Holland.* London: John W. Parker, West Strand, 1854. Despite its date of publication, this turned out to be a very useful book.

Davis, Ralph. *The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the 17th & 18th Centuries.* London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1962. This is a very fine work which provided me with much useful information.


Edmundson, George. *History of Holland.* Cambridge: The University Press, 1922. This was a very useful book which I found at the Library of Congress when looking for Blok and Colenbrander.

Gardiner, Samuel Rawson. History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, Four Volumes. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897. Vol. II. This work was extremely useful in putting the first war in its political perspective.


Mahan, A. T. The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1890. This once influential work is now quite dated and is unreliable in some respects, but if used carefully it can be of great help in illustrating and explaining naval tactics and strategy of the seventeenth century.

Marcus, G. J. A Naval History of England, Volume I - The Formative Centuries. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961. This work was useful for background material on the English navy of the seventeenth century and for that reason was used moderately.

Ogg, David. England in the Reign of Charles II. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934. This was an excellent work which was very useful for details of the last two wars and for that reason was used heavily.

Oppenheim, Michael. A History of the Administrative of the Royal Navy and of Merchant Shipping in Relation to the Navy. London and New York: John Lane the Bodley Head, 1896. This work was extremely useful in explaining the administrative phase of the first war and for that reason was used heavily in the first chapter.

Pontalis, M. A. L. John De Witt Grand Pensionary of Holland or Twenty years of a Parliamentary Republic. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1885. This was a work of only minor significance to my paper and for that reason was used only slightly.
Stephen, L. and Sidney Lee. The Dictionary of National Biography. London: Humphrey Milford, 1917. I used this to find when Dorielaus was killed.

Trevelyan, G. M. England under the Stuarts. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1965 (First Published in 1904). This work was useful in filling some background gaps.

Turner, F. C. James II. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946. This work was also useful in correcting some of my misconceptions about James's administrative qualities.
VITA

William Terry Curtler is a graduate of Richmond Professional Institute (June, 1966). He has always been interested in History ever since early high school. In the fall of 1967 he will be an American History teacher at Manchester High School in Chesterfield County. He plans to teach there for a year or two and then to make a try for his doctorate at an as yet undetermined location.