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Posthumanism and Educational Research

Edited by
Nathan Snaza and John A. Weaver

Introduction
Education and the Posthumanist Turn

Nathan Snaza and John A. Weaver

As Donna Haraway (1991) noted almost thirty years ago, biotechnologies, virtual realties, prosthetics, pharmacology, robotics, and genetic manipulation all create a situation in which distinguishing the "ontologically" human from the inhuman or nonhuman is difficult if not impossible. Working from this axiom, N. Katherine Hayles (1999) argues that we have *already become* posthuman. It is not a question of consciousness or recognition or even of a task. The present moment *is* posthuman (without becoming "transhuman"). A posthumanist viewpoint, however, is different (Wolfe 2010). It is about how one relates to that present and to the enormous, almost crushing weight of several millennia of humanist thought. Although posthumanists vary enormously in the specifics of their engagements (and we believe we are nowhere near discovering all the permutations), they share in turning toward the legacies of humanism and using posthumanist reconceptualizations of human/animal/machine/thing relations to diagnose how humanism ignores, obscures, and disavows the *real* relations among beings and things that make up the stuff of the world.

The contributors to this book believe that a growing assemblage of texts that can be understood as "posthumanist" has the potential to reconfigure education. The whole thing: not just pedagogy, not just curricular design, not just educational research, and not just disciplines or even institutions such as schools at different levels (from preschool through doctoral programs). We all engage questions of pedagogy, of disciplinary or subject-area knowledges, of curricular experiences, of schools and their relations to a world within and beyond their walls, but we all approach these concerns with a *sense they are implicated in a tectonic shift in the understanding of* "the human" that has undergirded virtually all educational thought in the West.

Like so many philosophers of education before us, we ask: What is the aim of education? Virtually every previous answer to this question took for granted that only humans *have* education. Beginning with the posthumanist claim that "the human" is a cultural, historical production (a production involving religion, philosophy, biology, the social sciences, the humanities, agribusiness, etc.), we try to figure out how to ask what education means

without presupposing that the answer will always, at least implicitly, take the form: "Education will make the kind of human who can . . ."

Since this book appears at a moment when "posthumanism" has become ubiquitous in humanistic and social scientific fields (and even to a certain extent in the "natural" sciences),[1] but has yet to receive much attention within educational fields, one task of this book is to introduce posthumanism. Indeed, in the second chapter of this book, Brad Petitfils sketches the importance of discussions surrounding the definition of the word *posthumanism* and its morphemes (especially the distinction between "the posthuman" and "posthumanism") within the field.[2] It is far from a settled matter, and rather than attempt any kind of homogenizing gestures, this book will operate from as broad an understanding of "posthumanism" as we can muster from our generally humanist, generally disciplinary vantage points.

It should not go without saying that our aim here is not to make the case for any particular theory or politics of posthumanism. Rather, we want to map a terrain for educational studies that is, almost entirely thus far, unacknowledged by contemporary academic discourse, science, and even common sense. Of course, this terrain is not actually "out there" in some elsewhere; it is, rather, the present, material, somatic, affective, and historical *stuff* of our world. Humanism, through a radical truncation of the definition of the "world" (so much is even suggested by the word's etymology), has made a tiny part of the world (what pertains to "humans") seem as if it were the whole. Humanism is, to combine phrases from classical rhetoric and Giorgio Agamben's (2004) philosophy, a machine that produces the human world as synecdoche. "Man" is *made to be* the measure of all things.

When "man" is the measure, it implies that humans and everything they do is inherently more valuable than any nonhuman animal or any thing (and what they do, although humanism has constructed elaborate frameworks for denying nonhuman actants the ability to "do" anything). As a result a hierarchical structure is invented to justify human actions and dismiss any other perspective that does not take into account or accept the predominance of a human viewpoint.[3]

When humanists wish to make a distinction between humans and other sentient beings, the differences concern not just "species" distinctions but also a drive toward human superiority. Let us take the human–animal distinction (in some ways the most fraught of the human's dialectical distanciations): Humans can think, animals cannot; humans can use language, animals do not; humans have souls, animals do not; humans feel pain and suffer, animals do not; and humans are rational, and animals are instinctual. What emerged from these dichotomies was the separation of humans from other animals to the point where humans were no longer viewed *as* animals. As these humanist mind-sets are challenged and exposed for being more ideology than reality,[4] what is also placed in doubt and questioned is the notion that humans are superior to other animals and, in fact, not

"animals" at all. To question "man" as the measure of all things is to join with Matthew Calarco's (2008, 149) in suggesting that "we could simply let the human–animal distinction go or, at the very least, not insist on maintaining it." What would a school curriculum be like that used this subjunctive declaration as a starting point in thinking about the meaning, purpose, and relationship of science, literature, language, history, and mathematics? What would a world be that did not insist on human superiority or dominance and that did not disavow the human's ecological entanglements?

TOWARD AN OPEN DEFINITION OF POSTHUMANISM

What if the human doesn't have to be the measure? We would call "posthumanist" any thinking that responds to *this* question. Rather than jumping headlong into providing specific answers (as readers of "educational research"—at least as that term has come to be defined in an intellectual context almost wholly subsumed by neoliberal, globalized capitalism—might desire), we try to begin by noting how difficult this asking is. The main issue, one that Derrida and legions of deconstructionists, feminists, and postcolonial thinkers devoted considerable attention to, is that it is impossible to think, criticize, and write about a system *except from inside it*. One must always inhabit the discourse one wishes to throw into question. Thus, Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy call for "re-treating": to go over a discourse (a tradition, a text, an institution) again, carefully and with absolute textual rigor, in order to detach oneself from it, to move away from it, to retreat from it or enable it to retreat from you. It is to turn toward in order to move away from.

Given our saturation in humanism, it is not even remotely possible at the present moment to conceptually or practically lay out a theory of posthumanist education or outline the contours of a posthumanist pedagogy. In Deleuze and Guattari's (1983) terms, the present moment is one of deterritorialization, when previously "solid" aspects of the world become fluid and things blur together; everything gets mixed up and moved around. If we rush to control the form it takes when it is over (to attempt to *plan* it), we automatically repeat the gesture that, in the end, will have been humanism's greatest repetition compulsion: the desire to plan. Reterritorializations will no doubt occur, but for the moment we want to revel in potential drifts.

The problem of planning and letting go of the desire to do so takes us directly to the ways humans and animals have been understood in relation, for the animal is said to not "have" the future. When you realize that much of our sense of what *will* happen is dependent on our being able to think with "future tense" verbs, this gets even more tricky, as the animal is said to lack language. Since politics means open (however limited) discussion of what to do about securing the future of a *polis*, and since animals cannot take part in the debate (because they lack language) and because they

couldn't understand what the debate is about anyway (no language, no sense of "the future"), they have no part in "politics." An animal cannot "plan" for the future, but a human can.

Planning, in a different way, takes us to ways the human understands itself in relation to machiniality. However smart a computer is, we are told, it is no match for the human brain because it is materially limited by what it has been programmed (by a human) to do. What this difference amounts to is saying that computers cannot "plan" beyond what a human has "planned" for them (*Blade Runner*, the *Terminator* movies, etc., are a symptom of our fear that this is not the case). In both cases, we are told that the human—and the human alone—is capable of planning. Moving into the educational context, the thing that the human plans above all else is the desired form an educated human will take. As Rousseau wrote in *Emile* (1979): "remember that before daring to undertake the formation of a man, one must have made oneself a man" (95). Those who are already "human" will control the educations of the young so that they too become "human." The most important "learning outcome" (to use the language of contemporary schooling) is that students become "humans" capable of participating in the global economy as productive workers and consumers. The posthumanist challenge is to give up on planning in order to actualize the kinds of potential indicated in a Spinozist immanent ethics: We don't know yet what a body can do, nor do we know what we beings who are used to thinking of ourselves as "human" are capable of.

If giving up on planning seems too much a stretch at the moment, at the very least posthumanist politics would require us to rethink what a democracy means by extending the parameters of who and what is permitted to participate in and be part of a "public" and "public" debate. According to Jane Bennett (2010, 101), publics do not exist naturally; they are invented, configured, and reconfigured depending on the topic at hand. They are also not solely "human": "Problems give rise to publics, publics are groups of bodies with the capacity to affect and be affected." The newly sworn in mayor of New York City, Bill de Blasio, has proclaimed that the horse-drawn carriages in New York City are examples of animal cruelty. The unionized represented by the Teamsters have fired back, citing all the different ways the horses are treated in humane ways, including, since a 2010 agreement, the horses' entitlement to vacation days. In the middle of this public debate are the horses, who in many paradoxical ways have more "rights" than many who live in New York City or anywhere (most working Americas are not entitled to vacation days or suitable shelter). How the horses are treated, viewed, positioned, and represented demonstrates how animals affect and are affected by public debates, even if this also dramatizes how the animals are systematically excluded from participation. If the mayor succeeds in banning carriages in the city, the futures of the drivers will be placed in doubt, but so will those of the horses. For Bennett (2010, 108), what this kind of debate does is to create what she

calls a "vital materialist theory of democracy" that "seeks to transform the divide between speaking subjects and mute objects into a set of differential tendencies and variable capabilities." A vital materialist theory of democracy requires humans to plan differently, to account not only for the different human constituencies, but also the nonhuman *participants* in public debates. This requirement will not only transform planning in public settings; it will certainly make it more complex and multilayered in a way that goes beyond humanist "democracy."

As these last three paragraphs reveal, one way to begin tracing posthumanist thought is to sketch how it is critically interrogating the relations among the terms in the "cybernetic triangle" of human, animal, and machine. Posthumanism draws from a wide range of academic disciplines, including biology, cybernetics, philosophy, animal studies, political theory, psychology, and literary studies, in order to challenge long-standing ideas about the definition of "the human" and its place in the world (Haraway 2008; Wolfe 2010). Indeed, one of the reasons we are so excited about posthumanism is that it doesn't just require interdisciplinary thought; it calls into question the entirety of the disciplinary structure, its segregations of fields, its methodological provincialism. Posthumanism, therefore, offers unmeasurable potential to stimulate antidisciplinary research that cuts across the natural and social sciences as well as the humanities (since these very divisions are all constructed around the human, even if only as "knowing" subject). It would be very possible, for example, to imagine a curriculum studies project undertaken by a theorist of pedagogy, a horticulturist, an etymologist, a geneticist, an urban planner, a sociologist, and an architect.

Such a research project, radical as it may seem from prevailing disciplinary perspectives, does not address what will turn out to be the greatest difficulty facing a future posthumanist (educational) research: acknowledging the "agency" of knowing in nonhuman subjects. What sorts of research could emerge that might include nonhumans as *subjects*? Although this question is implicit in many of the contributions to this volume, Stephanie Springgay's chapter takes it up directly, pointing to the ways in which affect theory, Deleuze-Guattarian philosophy, and a pragmatics of aesthetics open onto radically in- or ahuman forms of research. As in the posthumanist engagements with ecological action and education in the chapters by jan jagodzinski, Jason Wallin, and Nikki Rotas, embodiment—material, affective, finite—proves to be of greater importance (ontologically) than consciousness. This shift away from consciousness (which is not a move toward psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious) was signaled by Hayles (1999, 2–3): "the posthuman view considers consciousness, regarded as the seat of human identity in the Western tradition long before Descartes thought he was a mind thinking, as an epiphenomenon, as an evolutionary upstart trying to claim that it is the whole show when in actuality it is only a minor sideshow." In this move away from consciousness and toward embodiment,

materiality, and affect, posthumanism puts enormous pressure on human-
ist research methods that remain stuck in this "sideshow." As Wolfe (2009,
572) puts it, "It is a matter, then, of locating [posthumanism] and its chal-
lenge to humanist modes of reading, interpretation, and critical thought
not just 'out there,' among birds and beasts, but 'in here' as well, at the heat
of this thing we call human." Part of posthumanist thought, then, involves
diagnosing the ways that humanism has come to structure our thought,
our research, and—perhaps most crucially—our sense of what politics and
education could mean in a future not beholden to humanist enclosure.

John Weaver's (2010) *Educating the Posthuman* is an important touch-
stone for this collection in that it is—so far as we are aware—the first book-
length engagement among curriculum studies, educational philosophy,
and posthumanism. The final part of the book contains three essays, all
to varying degrees autobiographical, that take Weaver's book (and, in the
cases of Noel Gough's and Annette Gough's essays, its engagements with
their earlier work) as a point of departure. The field has changed so rapidly
since the publication of *Educating the Posthuman* that Weaver's chapter in
this volume takes up the lacunae in that book, revisiting his arguments in
relation to critical animal studies and the emergence of "Object Oriented
Ontology" (OOO). This is so because while the term *posthumanism* gained
attention in the mid-1990s for its attentions to cybernetics, biosciences,
science fiction, and related questions of the human–machine interface, in
recent years it has come to include a set of problems and questions associ-
ated with the (similarly emergent) field of "critical animal studies." Draw-
ing extensively on the work of Haraway (1991), these scholars examine
human–animal interactions (companion animals, factory farming, animal
experimentation), human–animal hybridization, and the largely disavowed
animality of the human (Lemm 2009). In different ways, chapters by Marla
Morris, Alyce Miller, and Helena Pedersen in this volume emerge from
developments in this stream of research and grapple with its implications
for education.

Returning to the human–machine relation, but with a crucial differ-
ence, the burgeoning OOO movement asks not about machines but about
"things" (beginning with Graham Harman's reinterpretation of Heidegger's
writings about a hammer). As Weaver and Jason Wallin explore in this
volume, OOO seeks to restore ontological priority to *all* things, without
asking about what things mean *for* humans. Although this field is so new
that its potential and its problems are not yet entirely clear, it has the signal
virtue of demonstrating that when only focusing on the cybernetic triangle,
"posthumanism [. . .] is not posthumanist enough" (Bogost 2011, 8). At
stake is the production of a *radically* nonanthropocentric account of the
world, one that must acknowledge the seeming inescapability of anthro-
pocentrism for the human "knower." In other words, OOO pushes us to
foreground the necessary *failure* of human knowledge to gain access to the
world. While this might sound like a depressing form of resignation, the

hope of this field, as Bogost (2011) makes clear, is to return us to "wonder" in the face of the world.

POSTHUMANIST EDUCATION AND EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH

We think that educational studies could benefit from more wonder. Indeed, in large part due to the neoliberal takeover of schooling at all levels and its attendant shrinking of "educational research" to mean randomized, large-scale quantitative studies of specific pedagogical and curricular interventions, educational studies have become tedious, instrumental, and boring. The present moment's restriction on what counts as "education" and "educational research" have resulted in public debates about schooling that spin in circles, asking again and again the question "what works?" without bothering to ask the far more important question, "works for *what*?" Posthumanism, by virtue of seeming so far outside the realm of what is ordinarily considered relevant to these discussions, may just be able to explode these tired debates, reorienting us toward futures that are far less foreclosed, far less preplanned.

In precisely this way, posthumanist education is a continuation of the radical, democratic, even utopian projects of the twentieth-century.[5] All the contributors to this volume seek not only schools that are less authoritarian and oppressive, but also a global social formation that is not driven by exploitation, dehumanization, and asymmetrical violence.[6] Thinking about machines, animals, and things is important not (only) because it turns us away from narrowly human political concerns but because the *humanist* relations to these things is shot through with violence and exploitation. Indeed, one of the factors that made dehumanization such a central facet of modernity is the ease with which "humans" feel they can do *anything they want* to all "nonhumans" simply by virtue of these other things and beings' noninclusion in that political category (Snaza, this volume). We believe that contemporary issues like animal rights, the already accomplished ecological catastrophe, bioethics and biotechnology, and the increasing imbrication of human culture with computers and other machines are simply not thinkable within existing humanist frames of thought (Morton 2013). The most glaring problems of our present politics cannot be understood, let alone addressed, within politics or education as we presently understand them (Smith 2011; Wolfe 2012). We need a politics that would recognize animals and things as subjects, and the contributions to this book all explore forms of education that do the same. Given that humanist ideas have installed themselves in literally *every* aspect of "human" thought, the scope of this project is enormous and probably Sisyphean. Although the chapters that follow will all take up some aspect of this task, we want to highlight two issues here that will be of special importance to the educational scholar.

First, the problem of disciplinarity. While we live in a moment when inter-disciplinary work is the watchword of deans, funding agencies, and cutting-edge journals, our institutions are overwhelmingly and often unconsciously disciplinary. Of course, "educational studies" has long been interdisciplinary in the sense that its practitioners mobilize "methods" from a variety of social sciences (psychology, sociology, and anthropology primarily) to understand the "objects" called schools, curricula, and pedagogies. What a broad, post-humanist approach to the history of education and educational institutions reveals is that the most primary divisions in the contemporary academic world—distinctions separating the "human" sciences from the "natural" sciences and the humanities—all *presuppose* "the human" in some form or other and cannot be understood without that "human."

This realization will require us to rethink all the disciplinary divisions that have multiplied at universities in recent decades (many universities now offer more than *one hundred* majors), as well as the divisions among "sub-jects" that prevail in K–12 schools (and we might recall that at one time, those "subjects" were divided in order to prepare students for the disci-plines they would encounter in college). Here, despite an obvious human-ism at the level of their lexicons, the alternative, progressive experiments in education associated with Dewey, Montessori, and Steiner might prove fruitful in novel ways (see Morris, this volume). To give one example that is increasingly visible, the practice of building elementary curricula around gardens opens up not just a thorough integration of different types of disci-plinary knowledge (one needs math, ecology, history, economics, and biol-ogy in order to undertake even the most basic experiments in agriculture) but also a potentially posthumanist viewpoint. While there are no doubt such curricula that are radically humanist, offering students a dominion- or stewardship-based way of understanding the human's relations to plants, soil, animals, wood, water supplies, tools, and so on, these curricula could also produce the awareness of the fundamentally *interconnected*, non-dis-sociable nature of these relations (see Rotas, this volume). "Humans" *are* not without all these Others: These nonhuman Others are not here for us to "use"; they are the condition of possibility for our existence. Although this is one example among myriad possible examples, it gives a quick thumb-nail sketch of how posthumanism might reconfigure classroom practice and curriculum.

The posthumanist challenge to prevailing ideas of disciplinarity also plays out at the level of educational research. The research "methods" that dominate the field—whether quantitative or qualitative—all presume a knowing "human" researcher capable of objectively knowing the stu-dents, teachers, schools, and curricula s/he observes, measures, and seeks to understand. Traditional educational research methods assume a subject/object relationship in the world. The "researcher" is the subject who enters into the "world" or object in order to understand and give meaning to the world. This subject–object hierarchy instinctively and presumptively

alienates the researcher from the world, and as a result from reality, and demotes the world to an object to be analyzed, probed, prodded, tested, manipulated, and silenced. By separating the researcher from the world educational research creates an authorial relationship between humans and nonhumans. In quantitative research this subject–object relationship has created a fantasyland in which databases and correlational numbers have served as substitutes for realities. A language of dominance has emerged in which the researcher hides behind "data" and the researcher proclaims s/he is "just allowing the data to speak." Data, if they had mouths, do not speak; researchers who manipulate, compile, aggregate, and sort data speak through data. In qualitative research, what has emerged from this subject–object invention is a confessional lamentation in which the researcher mourns his or her inability to capture an uncertain, confusing, complex, and always *shifting reality and apologizes for speaking for* other people and objects. Yet, this is all they can do. This is all anyone can do, even quantitative researchers who would contest and deny their own involvement in inventing data. The current subject–object relationship has created what we call a methodocentrism in which the methodology of a researcher and their faithfulness to a method is the primary concern of most research. Methodocentrism relegates most humans, other sentient beings, and nonsentient objects to a subordinate position in which the role of these beings in their own reality and other realities is removed from the researchers work.

What would happen is the subject–object relationship and methodocentrism were rejected and replaced? What if educational scholars began to look at the world as one in which objects simultaneously interact with one another, shaping their realities through these interactions but, at the same time, always receding from these realities in order to create and shape their own reality? What this means in terms of educational research is that whenever research is conducted in schools there is much more going on than interaction between a teacher and students or teachers and teachers or students and students. There are experiences happening all the time, all over the school, independent of humans. There are always interactions between humans and nonhuman sentient beings and humans and nonsentient objects, such as computers, doors, playgrounds, hallways, utensils, trays, balls, windows, desks, and so on. This is a domain where educational scholars will find it very helpful to consult the recent developments in OOO or Speculative Realism. With some hope and shifts of mind-set, what Michel Serres (2012, 33) argues is happening in the life and earth sciences can emerge in education: "They practice a more sharing, open, connected way of knowing, in which he who knows participates in the things he knows, is even reborn from them, tries to speak their language, listens to their voices, respects their habitat, lives the same evolutionary history, is enchanted by their narratives, limits finally, through them or for them, his power and his politics."

POSTHUMANIST POLITICS

The contributions to this collection strive to situate posthumanist thought in relation to both educational studies—especially educational philosophy and curriculum studies—and politics. The problem is not simply how to produce *more* critiques of prevailing social formations, institutions of learning, disciplinarity, pedagogical practices, and so on. We hope that posthumanism offers something like a self-organizing structure that draws together a variety of politico-theoretical fields that have all been taken up individually by educational scholars: feminist, antiracist, postcolonial, queer, and disability studies; post-structuralism; Nietzschean, Deleuzian, and Foucaultian philosophy; animal studies; media and cultural studies; affect theory; new materialisms; and ecology. Politically, posthumanism offers a way of connecting what have been sadly separable strands of interdisciplinary political thought and revealing powerful new ways of putting these forces to work in the service of the affirmation of different potential futures (Chen 2012; Grosz 2004). That is, posthumanist politics is not, except contingently, driven by critique of the prevailing order. It is, instead, a radical commitment to experimentation with *new*, unpredictable, perhaps even seemingly impossible forms of relation among animals, plants, objects, machines, and, yes, even those of us who still think of ourselves as "humans." While the *post* in posthumanism will be taken up differently in each chapter that follows, posthumanism's greatest contribution to our thought might not be apparent until we can *get over* humanism and get to work doing something *else*. Education can be so much more than we think. We can be so much more than we think. Just wonder.

ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

This book is divided into four parts. The first, "Humanism, Posthumanism, and Educational Research," lays out some of the most crucial directions in which posthumanist educational research is emerging. In one sense, the section has an introductory function, even though only one chapter, Snaza's "Toward a Genealogy of Educational Humanism," is explicitly so, sketching an account of the educational "humanism" against or after which posthumanist education unfurls. Petitfils meditates on terminological complexity within posthumanism and, in the process, reveals technological posthumanism's entanglements with, but divergences from, postmodern theories (of education). Morris situates the anthropocentrism of humanist progressive education in relation to animal bodies and animal "interiority," thus posthumanizing critical curriculum/animal studies. Pedersen uses a posthumanist variety of critical animal studies to address problems of educational policy making in ways that acknowledge the more-than-human inhabitants of schools. Springgay pushes posthumanist (and

affective) theories of knowledge into an uneasy, experimental methodology that throws into question the entirety of what "research" would or could entail. These chapters cannot be said to provide an overview of posthumanist thought, but they constellate a series of questions and concepts that will help readers orient themselves through the later parts.

The two chapters in Part II, "Attuning to the More-Than–Human Complexities of the Classroom," emerge out of material and embodied classroom engagements, engaging theory in order to account for the more than human complexities of these engagements. Rotas's chapter turns on an "ugly" class, revealing the insidiousness of "obviousness" in pedagogy and curriculum studies. Miller examines a course on "Animals and Ethics," both in its design and teaching, in relation to a complex set of tensions between animal studies and feminism, animal's and women's bodies, feminine and masculine pedagogies. What these chapters demonstrate is the urgency of locating posthumanist experiments with pedagogy at the most bodily, affective, institutionally captured levels.

Part III, "Ecological Aesthetics," sees jan jagodzinski and Jason Wallin—who recently cowrote *Art-Based Research* (2013)—constellating aesthetics, geophilosophy, and a "dark" approach to the ecological and educational possibilities in the Anthropocene. Both turn to artworks in order to consider forms of pedagogy—not often housed in schools—that attempt to attune viewers to a more-than-human world in which the human's place is radically threatened by an already accomplished ecological catastrophe.

The final part, "What Educational Posthumanism Will Have Been," contains chapters by three of the most well-known posthumanist educational scholars who find occasion to revisit their past research in relation to a very quickly growing and changing field. All three chapters also begin by addressing Weaver's (2010) *Educating the Posthuman*. Noel Gough and Annette Gough, in fact, address Weaver's writing about *their own* work in this book—work that was undertaken at the intersection of environmental education, autobiography, and continental philosophy—and which *subsequently* became "posthumanist." Weaver's chapter closes the book by taking up the significant gaps that now appear in *Educating the Posthuman* given how quickly the field has expanded in just four years. We end the book with this sort of recursive loop in order to spur readers into a future educational philosophy and research that will have made this book, too, seem limited. We hope, before this happens, that readers will find cause to wonder at just how *open* posthumanism makes education—and its theorization—feel.