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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

Dear Readers:

The Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest is pleased to present you with our annual winter issue. This issue covers a wide variety of topics currently at the forefront of legal and policy debates.

*The Business of Punishing: Impediments to Accountability in the Private Corrections Industry,* written by Stephen Raher, explores the general implications of using nongovernmental prisons. The author provides a brief history of private prison contractors, discusses problems related to the privatization of prisons, and offers various solutions to the problems.

Jennifer Black, in *Reforming 501(c)(3): Putting the “Charity” Back in the Charitable Deduction,* argues for a redefinition of charity for tax deduction purposes. Her proposal would ensure that only those organizations that adequately benefit the public are eligible to receive tax-deductible donations.

Clay Landa’s comment, *Wyeth v. Levine: What Does It Mean and Where Do Pharmaceutical Companies Go from Here,* discusses the recent landmark decision *Wyeth v. Levine,* in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that FDA approval of drug use or warning labels did not necessarily preempt state tort claims. The author then suggests numerous ways in which pharmaceutical companies can limit their liability and continue to market drugs profitably in the wake of *Wyeth v. Levine.*

Finally, Ryan Nevin’s *Title VII Antiretaliation: The United States Supreme Court’s Decision in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, Tennessee on the Scope of the Opposition Clause* analyzes the Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of the opposition clause, questions the Court’s expansive definition of passive opposition, and argues for a new definition of opposition.

We hope that reading this issue will provoke further thought about the various topics presented.

Sincerely,

Summer Laine Speight

Executive Editor

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