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It has been an excellent stretch in English for the Latin Arians of the fourth century. They have gotten heftier, more robust, more formidable. Daniel Williams' *Ambrose of Milan and the End of the Nicene-Arian Conflicts* challenges what he calls "the prevailing view" that they "posed little, if any, serious threat" to the Nicene faith of the western European churches from the 350s through the 380s. Neil McLynn's *Ambrose of Milan: Church and Court in a Christian Capital* insists that the Milanese Arians complicated Ambrose's career more than previous chroniclers of christological conflict and the biographers of the bishop ever allowed. These are fascinating studies, wonderfully readable presentations of immense learning that will inspire admiration, and justifiably so. Nonetheless, I have a few reservations about the revisions they propose to that "prevailing view." I want to revisit Milan, to sift evidence for Arian supremacy during the 360s and for Arian influence in the 370s. The result: something of a reinterpretation of the election and early pontificate of Ambrose that differs from those on offer.

The Latin Arians are generally and more appropriately called neo-Arians and, after 359, homoioans. Although they shared Arian's hatred of Bishop Athanasius of Alexandria who opposed Arius at the council of Nicaea in 325, outlived him by a generation, and wrote against him until his death in 373, their christologies, Philip Rousseau comments, were only "mildly Arian" and closely resembled the compromise cobbled up at a council in Antioch in 341. Much as other neo-Arians, the homoioans could discover no scriptural warrant for the language of consubstantiality that church officials had introduced at Nicaea (*homoousios*); homoioans much preferred to think Jesus was like God (*homoios*, *similis*). The him-not-me reply to the supplicant in Mark 10.18 was among their favorite biblical passages, because it seemed to undermine arguments for consubstantiality and identity: "why do you call me good?" Jesus was heard to have asked and then to have instructed that "no one is good but God alone." Those defending the Nicene consensus explained statements of that sort as expressions of exemplary humility. They believed scripture, as a whole, revealed the equality of father and son, the unity of divinity. Hilary of Poitiers put the point perhaps too simply, albeit memorably: for Jesus received "the form" of man yet remained "in the form of God," and, Hilary went on, "to be in the form of God is none other than to be God." These remarks were part of a Nicene counteroffensive: during the 350s, bishops Valens of Mursa, Ursacius of Singidunum, Saturninus of Arles, and Germinius of Sirmium organized what Daniel Williams supposes was to become "a distinctive Homoian . . . coalition"; they struck at Hilary and a handful of others who soon struck back.

All this occurred as Emperor Constantius looked to reunify the empire. By 353, he had dispatched those responsible for the murder of his brother Constans three years earlier. Valens and his associates possibly promised him a confessional consensus, the sound religious basis for political solidarity and security; that seems a sensible inference from the little we know about the more prominent Danubian bishops and the court. And to deliver on that promise, Danubians canvassed the west, concentrating their attacks on Athanasius, who was hospitably received there the previous decade and whose Nicene christology formerly attracted the favorable attention of well-placed bishops and the support of Constans. Yet neo-Arians charged that Athanasius encouraged the enemies of Constans and Constantius. They blamed him for church corruption in Egypt. They insisted that bishops and councils in the west condemn him and approve the candidate Constantius chose to replace him. Hilary admitted that Christians in the west found it hard to imagine why the damnatio Athanasii was worth resisting and worth the price of resistance. But he and
Sulpicius Severus suggested that the Danubians were pressing simultaneously for the acceptance of "perverse" doctrine, that bishops in Gaul and Italy had been required to subscribe not simply to the humiliation of a single colleague but to an odd, alien, neo-Arian creed.  

Critics complained that the Danubians' strategy was devious; one admirer calls it "conciliarist." Church councils convened at Arles (353), Milan (355), Béziers (356), then Rimini (359), but deliberations apparently were forced, not free. One could say that consensus was reached under duress, if only because protests were punished with exile: Hilary, Eusebius of Vercelli, Dionysius of Milan, and several others were sent east. Athanasius imagined that the emperor contemplated the dissidents. Probably that story was circulated to suggest public sentiment was strong enough to deter him, but Neil McLynn now claims that reports of Nicene popularity and indignation at the bishops' distress were tremendously exaggerated—arguments for neo-Arian ascendancy and superiority could hardly surrender the streets to the enemies of Valens.  

Evidence for Arian unpopularity may be as untrustworthy as scholars rehabilitating the neo-Arians' effectiveness presume. Yet the evidence for effectiveness and ascendancy is, in some respects, equally suspect. Bishop Germinius closely collaborated with Valens but later allowed that his partner slyly dissimulated his christological commitments to reach agreements susceptible to subordinationists' interpretation and exploitation. Christians in Gaul discovered Valens had lied to them about what was happening elsewhere. Apparently he told them their colleagues in the east unanimously held the neo-Arian position and then warned that to rule against subordinationist christology was a monstrous assertion of territorial opinion over an otherwise generally accepted truth. Decades later, lecturing on a passage in the gospel of Luke (6:26), "woe to you when all men speak well of you," Ambrose of Milan scolded the bishops at Rimini who had eventually ratified the Danubians' doctrine. They let themselves be tricked, he insinuated; so strenuously were they "attempting to get in the good graces of their emperor [that] they forfeited the grace of God."  

The council of Rimini was one of the two large regional assemblies that met in 359, after plans for a single conference in Nicomedia had been dropped. Approximately four hundred bishops from the west converged on the Adriatic coastal city. Delegates for the majority drafted a letter to the emperor that accused neo-Arians of experimenting doctrinally and to disastrous effect. "Not only were the faithful confused," they said, "but infideles were kept from the faith" by "novelties" that Valens, Ursacius, and Germinius highly valued, subordinationist ideas that made Christianity's mysteries seem like the pagans' fables. To return from confusion to certainty, Christians everywhere must turn to the council and creed of Nicaea, they counselled, begging the emperor to let that old consensus stand and to let them go home.  

The minority at Rimini sent Valens and a scrum of delegates to Constantius, reprising a neo-Arian theme. They attributed the confusion to the innovative and unscriptural language introduced at Nicaea. Theirs was scriptural, sana doctrina, they maintained, well rid of the Nicene syntax of consubstantiality. Constantius agreed and ordered that the representatives of the majority be detained until they did so as well. But he sent Valens and his confederates back to Rimini to convert the opposition. Williams is surprised and impressed "how quickly the pro-Nicene majority [then] became a minority." He calls it a "drastic capitulation." Too much, though, can be made of the speed and the significance. Bishops of the Nicene persuasion or party surely read the signs: the court had been backing the Danubians for some time. It was ready to confine the majority to council indefinitely or, worse still, to exile the most defiant bishops. Christians in the west learned as much at Arles, Milan, and Béziers, so what is truly impressive and startling is not the majority's swift surrender but its first and bold approach to Constantius. Furthermore, if "drastic" means "radical in effect," the word hardly applies to the resolution at Rimini. For, from the next year, Nicene bishops regretted their collapse, renounced the council's homoian creed, and counterattacked along with returning exiles, notably Hilary of Poitiers, Eusebius of Vercelli, and Liberius of Rome.  

Defiance, capitulation, then counteroffensive: the pattern was common in the west during the 350s. Liberius appears to have been the only leading church official to have gone through those motions without benefit of council. Soon after the conference at Milan adjourned in 355, he wrote to congratulate the bishops who had been exiled there for their intransigence. He elected not to attend and only later refused to join the others who did and who obligingly condemned Athanasius. We cannot tell whether Liberius objected more to the neo-Arians' christology or to the government usurpation of ecclesiastical prerogatives. The issue is important but beyond satisfactory settlement. Few question what
happened next, however, for the report was filed by Ammianus Marcellinus who usually understated Christianity's popularity: Liberius, condemned for nonconformity, was spirited into exile at night, under cover of darkness, because Roman Christians were devoutly attached to their bishop and likely to riot at his removal. When he finally purchased his release with an assent to the judgments at Arles and Milan, Liberius returned to Rome, nudged his court-designated replacement into retirement and, years later, stoked the reaction against Rimini. He allowed that conformists at the council had been victims of homoian fraud and should be granted clemency, but only after they had proven the sincerity of their repentance by repudiating those who misled them (qui obliqua et maligna subtilitate caliginis offendorunt innocentium sensus), who betrayed the catholic, apostolic faith defined at Nicaea.

The repudiations during the early 360s must have boosted the spirits of inveterate Nicene partisans. But then, for nearly two decades, confessional christological controversy was largely off the agenda. The Danubians, deprived of their patron by the death of Constantius, stayed east of the Adriatic. Their sweep west had been striking, as McLynn and Williams remind us. The results were not undone in a day; an obituary composed by Athanasius for neo-Arianism was premature in 363. Latin homoian literature written long afterward, "precious remnants" deployed by Daniel Williams, attests more than a fossil's survival, although we cannot tell exactly how much more. Williams, for example, admits that the homoians were "increasingly isolated" but insists that their communities "were no less cohesive and vibrant" than the Nicene congregations, only to be comforted at the end of his chapter on northern Italy by the much muted observation that they were "not dying."

One would do well to search for vital signs in a document drafted by Hilary in 364, shortly after his confrontation with Bishop Auxentius of Milan who, at Constantius' instigation, had replaced Dionysius nearly ten years earlier. As the new emperor, Valentinian I, settled in the city, Hilary came uninvited, tried to force Auxentius out, and composed his *Contra Auxentium* largely to explain why he failed. The failure and explanation can be used to show homoian resilience. Williams even suggests that Auxentius was able to turn Milan and unspecified parts of Lombardy into an homoian "stronghold" while elsewhere in the west the councils of the 350s were reversed or forgotten.

Hilary, of course, was writing for friends who were trying to reverse or forget. In earlier exegetical work, he criticized colleagues who doubted the divinity of Jesus, but only after he had been summoned to the council of Béziers in 356 and sent east into exile was Hilary looked on as something of a leader of the Nicene resistance. For a short time, however, fellow bishops in Gaul appeared to have deserted him and to have compromised with Constantius' agents. Their letters of encouragement, if any were written, failed to reach him. He felt cut off as well as cut out, but, by 360, he heard that the bishops *intra Gallias* repudiated the homoian settlement, whereupon he became their eyes and ears in the east, teaching them what he learned about the eastern churches' creeds and councils. Then, after the results at Rimini had been ratified by bishops in Constantinople, Hilary returned to the west to take on the homoians there whose staying power survived the death of Constantius and into the 360s, homoian bishops of whom we know only Auxentius by name.

Auxentius complained to Valentinian that Hilary was trying "everywhere" to divide the church, a notice calculated to arouse imperial officials who dreaded the ecclesiastical divisions that made their political work difficult. They kept peace on earth, a peace for which Hilary professed to care nothing. He identified with the apostles, the disrupters of another age, undeterred by the edicts of bygone governments. The apostles had the keys to the kingdom of heaven, Hilary declared, so they saw no good reason to bow to self-important authorities who claimed responsibility for a worldly and far inferior order.

Hilary's retrospect casts Auxentius and his patrons at court back to the first century and associates them with the enemies of Christianity's earliest missions, although the court was oddly, if only provisionally, attentive to his complaints. Auxentius was asked to answer his critic and proclaimed a faith that he said he had learned from infancy not from Arius, a faith confirmed at the council of Rimini: Jesus was the true son of God. But Hilary was hardly content with this reply; Auxentius allowed that Jesus was the true son, implicitly denying he was truly God. The homoians replaced a true Christ, that of Nicaea, with a "new Christ," Hilary objected, and deceptively acquiescent phrases could not hide the blasphemy. Homoian denial of full divinity spawned an assortment of *sententiae* that
denoted subordination rather than identity, complete equivalence, and consubstantiality.  

Hilary's supply of phrases denoting the contrary in his *De synodis* and *De trinitate* is enormous, ranging from an emphatic affirmative (*una substantia*) to a double negative (*indissimilis*). In the *Contra Auxentium*, though, he gave none of his terms a good run. He concentrated instead on pelting an homoian proposal that Auxentius seems not to have made at the inquiry, the assertion that Son and Father were similar.  

Similarity to the Father, according to Hilary, tilted the Son closer to creation and to humanity and away from divinity. For Adam was created in the image and likeness of God, as were all his heirs, and talk of similitudes seemed to the Nicenes to pair Christ with that flawed creation. Arius called Christ "the perfect creature," yet perfection and other elevating conditions he and the homoians introduced (*sed non sicuti ceterae facturae*) did not appease adversaries who fixed on creaturely status and charged that qualifiers were irrelevant or, as Hilary accused, malevolent, *malevolae significationes*, framed with "diabolical cunning" to mislead Christians. This was a well-worn indictment when Hilary recycled it, perhaps with good cause, although we will have occasion to wonder whether Auxentius' "cunning" in Milan could be read as tact, whether his conduct and discourse could be considered conciliatory rather than combative.  

Hilary had no doubt whatsoever. His encounter with Auxentius convinced him all the more of homoian mendacity, though he got no thanks for airing that conviction in Milan. The interrogation over, he was ordered to leave, and he weighed anchor angrily, hurling insults at the incumbent--"angel of satan," "enemy of Christ"--daring him to convene homoian councils once he, Hilary, had gone. In the *Contra Auxentium*, his final salvo echoes the sentiments he expressed at the start of the narrative: ceding Milan to its bishop, Hilary disdained the material culture of Milanesian Christianity, the homoians' "love of walls," *parietum amor*, for he learned more about God's will in the wild, he said, more from mountains, forests, and lakes than in the churches of heretics.  

In its staged or narrative form, Hilary's was a grand exit. But, fanfare to the contrary, Neil McLynn thinks that the court heard mostly "petulant mischief-making," wild accusations which would hardly have saved the Nicene party from "impotent obscurity upon the margins of the city." Harry Maier makes pretty much that point as he tries to imagine what worship was like in the "estate churches" of fourth-century Milan. Maier and McLynn assume Nicene partisans went underground or fled to the countryside to indulge what Hilary might have called their apostolic impulses. Maier gropes for evidence to fill the "private space" of the powerless, to create a "social world of religious protest," and he has some success locating pockets of dissident homoians during Ambrose's pontificate. But for Auxentius', neither he nor McLynn finds very much, save Hilary's comments, and they scarcely suggest a protest community that would fill a "social world" or even a significant "private space."  

Hilary referred instead to an inspirational ideal. During his exile, he learned that injury, narratively massaged, would generate empathy. In his *De trinitate* and *De synodis* he invited still comfortable coreligionists to participate in his exile, to share his hurt and heroism and to experience his serenity through their prayers, goodwill, and encouragement. Their empathic union with him and with other alienated contemporaries whose itinerancy allied them with the church's earliest apostles opened a route to faith and truth otherwise closed to Christians grown complacent, Christians who loved their walls and churches. That was the line Hilary brought to Milan, not one he drew from his observations there. His *Contra Auxentium* is exhortative rather than descriptive when it dwells on the outcast and apostolic.  

No truth so certain as a truth hated by the world: Hilary celebrated marginality in a forthright way that, had he lived to question Ambrose, would have made him something of a nuisance in those churches that evolved from neo-Nicene initiatives. But his target in 364 was Auxentius, whose church "boasts that it is loved by the world, though a church cannot be of Christ unless the world detests it." Why was it "loved" by the world and why vindicated by Valentinian? Had Auxentius effectively defused christological controversy? That would surely have earned him the government's goodwill, and he did specify, after all, that Hilary was making, not exacerbating, a schism in Milan. Did Auxentius' evasive replies to Hilary's accusations signal a centrist and inclusive posture, one that definitely did not satisfy ferocious consubstantialists who, as the Alexandrians of that age, insisted on listing him among Athanasius' enemies, but one that calmed a court set on order? Or, as Daniel Williams suggests, was Bishop Auxentius popular and politically correct because he was as consistently and narrowly loyal to Rimini as several phrases Hilary
ascribed to him make him seem and because he was able to organize and maintain a regional homoian outpost, a "stronghold," fortress Milan? 19

The argument for an impressive homoian organization feeds on the frustration of Auxentius' critics. Hilary was unable to stir up much Milanese opposition to the incumbent. A Nicene presbyter from Brescia, Filastrius, independently, failed to marshal much resistance. Damasus of Rome, around 370, armed with more than ninety episcopal signatures, could not unseat his colleague in Milan; as Williams and McLynn argue, Auxentius' position seems not to have eroded. Yet maybe they misconstrue that position. A comprehensivist or latitudinarian pontificate may just as easily explain the antagonism of overzealously Nicene bishops and more easily explain the pontiff's survival as well as the support of a christologically diffident government. Auxentius was occasionally linked to the despised Danubians--the better to discredit him--but he was much less successful rallying regional partisans than they had been during the 350s. In fact, the case for an homoian coalition seems to run aground at just this point; Auxentius' appointments to the local clergy and allies among neighboring bishops were insufficient to assure an homoian succession to the see of Milan. Williams and McLynn should have expected otherwise, for they mixed mortar from the Contra Auxentium to hold together a sturdier homoian front. 20

Hilary reported that nearly ten bishops gathered to hear his arraignment of Auxentius. Manlio Simonetti hints that Hilary had assembled an impromptu council of Nicenes whose verdict was then dismissed by the two court officials assigned to oversee all the deliberations. Given Hilary's wording, audiri nos a Quaestore et Magistro praecipit, consideribus una nobiscum episcopis fere decem, Simonetti's is not an altogether unreasonable inference, unless the nos and nobiscum refer to [End Page 431] Hilary and Auxentius rather than to Hilary and supporters he might have mustered. Possibly the impaneled bishops were among those "few partisans" allowed Auxentius in Sozomen's summary assessment of his pontificate, although, had that been so, would Hilary have tended to inflate the number to "nearly ten"? Nothing, however, save the verdict, argues that Hilary's panel of bishops voted with the emperor's representatives and voted as a block in Auxentius' behalf, and that argument suffers from our ignorance of protocol. Both the disposition and participation of the bishops who assembled for the investigation seem likely to remain matters for conjecture, as mysterious as their identities. Yet McLynn and Williams appear inclined to distance them from Hilary, possibly, in part, by what they take to be the import of his farewell remarks in 364. 21

They were more like parting shots, fired from the Contra Auxentium right after Hilary committed himself to a fugitive's fate. He would live at large, much as the apostles had, while Auxentius stayed within his walls, at odds with God, "enemy of Christ." Hilary dared him to call councils and pronounce against him and against Nicæa. Quite possibly he only meant to imply he was going where the homoian's curses were ineffectual. But maybe Hilary knew and revealed something more than has yet been guessed about Auxentius' command over his colleagues or, to be precise, about his lack of command. Daniel Williams speculates that the valediction refers to a sudden buzz of homoian conciliar activity that drew Hilary to the region to answer accusations. Neil McLynn puts the sentence, "let Auxentius call councils," in his case for an homoian coalition, where, "an almost casual remark," it shows that the bishop "could count on the support of his neighbors." Hilary happened not to have named those neighbors, but neither Williams nor McLynn sees any trouble. The bishops of Lodi and Pavia could conceivably have attended Auxentius' hypothetical councils; we hear nothing from them that suggests they would have stayed away if summoned. But should silence be taken as a symptom of homoian or Auxentian partisanship? The influential and Nicene bishops of Vercelli and Brescia, the bishops of [End Page 432] Aquileia, Trent, Piacenza, Modena, and others of the ninety episcopal subscribers to Damasus' brief against Auxentius would not have come when and if called, and that considerable crew constitutes quite a large proportion of the Italian episcopate. Hilary, therefore, could well have been calling his enemy's bluff, insolently alluding to Auxentius' relative isolation rather than to the prospects for an homoian rearmament. 22

Writing about the homoians nearly thirty years ago, Michel Meslin pegged Auxentius as a pragmatist, more politically astute than doctrinally partisan. His conclusion only seems inconsistent with the bishop's apparent isolation; discretion during the 360s would have dictated that even mildly contentious homoians keep a low profile. Regional homoian alliances in the west in the wake of neo-Nicene reproaches and after widespread repudiation of the results at Rimini, could only have upset a court, always unhappy with religious controversy. And Hilary complained that Auxentius had a knack for pleasing the authorities. 23
To counter that characterization, libelous in intent, we must have more than the few opinions pruned and packed in 364 into the abstract of Auxentius’ replies. Perhaps if we had more to go on, more than Hilary remembered or invented, that is, we would discover that Auxentius consistently plumped for homoian propositions. We might then find it easier to trust Athanasius who had identified Auxentius as one of Valens’ most conspicuous accomplices at Rimini. But, as McLynn wisely and often cautions, we would be smart not to swallow all that Athanasius sauced and scrambled; a version of the letter quoted by Athanasius survives without Auxentius’ name. Still, McLynn is sure that the bishop of Milan eventually "emerged as an eloquent spokesman for [Rimini's] homoian creed," and if Auxentius left us more on roughly the same themes that Hilary shuffled into his Contra, conceivably we could quite readily agree. I suspect, however, that, with more from and on Auxentius, we would equally or more likely have a clearer view of Meslin’s pragmatist.

Suspicions aside, only as the Latin homoians acquire greater heft and renown does Auxentius emerge as an outspoken and tough-talking partisan. McLynn and Williams contend that the bishop was intensely partisan; they occasionally come close to suggesting he was phenomenally effective. But I am unpersuaded by the evidence they cull from the Contra Auxentium. From the little that is left to us, I can only surmise a patchwork pontificate, so it should startle no one that they and I disagree about the election of Ambrose.

Auxentius died in 374. Decades later, Rufinus and Paulinus mentioned that a conflict held up the election of his successor. Their story is that the new governor of the province arrived to mediate between the Nicenes and homoians but left a candidate by consensus. Ambrose, raised in Rome, able advocate in Sirmium at the praetorian prefect's court, was elected the bishop of Milan surprisingly soon after his transfer back to Italy.

A deadlocked election and divided Milan hardly attest what Williams calls "the tight embrace which homoianism had on that city." Nonetheless, he and McLynn take the chroniclers at their word, acknowledging a beat-up yet belligerent "sizeable enough anti-Arian faction composed of followers loyal to the memory of Dionysius" who died in exile shortly after being deposed in 355. McLynn is sceptical about crowd resistance to the deposition but seems strangely disposed, as Williams is, to credit the existence of Nicene sentiment and influence in 374. To what do we owe that disposition? Habit may account for it; the scholarly community has long trusted Rufinus and Paulinus. Would they have staged a confessional conflict when and where none had erupted? Or would they have placed a formidable homoian faction at the election only to blame later homoian agitation on outsiders? These are questions worth asking and hard to answer with confidence, but surely Rufinus and Paulinus were intent on underscoring Nicene persistence and the Nicene party, an intention well served by contrasts in 374. Probably they saw no difficulty having their indigenous homoians of the 370s overtaken by imports during the 380s. Chroniclers of the fourth and fifth centuries feared no licensing procedures should they reduce messy sets of personal electoral conflicts to neat confessional crises. And a neatly divided Milan may now seem plausible because we have reliable intelligence on the division and double election in Rome fewer than ten years before. But maybe, above all, the outcome in Milan tempts readers of chroniclers' reports to accept recollections of the Nicenes' sudden reemergence. For Ambrose later proved to be an ardent Nicene, from the late 370s itching to take the battle to homoian bishops in Illyricum and then forced, a few years on, to struggle with Illyrican fugitives for control of his own see. Arguably, the bishop's developed opposition was read back into his election, both by his fifth-century admirers and, following them, his late twentieth-century minders.

Daniel Williams spends pages demythologizing the immediate aftermath of Ambrose's election, dismantling what he selects as "the principal arguments for Ambrose's swift action against the homoians in Milan." Ambrose's insistence on being baptized by a Nicene, according to Williams, was lightly regarded--the baptism itself, "wholly unspectacular." The new bishop did not rush about promoting Nicene interests, as some suggested. On the early parts of the pontificate, Williams' conclusions seem sound, although he only obliquely ascribes Ambrose's caution to the comprehensivist or centrist aims of episcopal administration as it was practiced, if not also articulated, by Auxentius. Williams simply says that Ambrose continued as a bishop the neutrality that served him and other imperial officials well in secular administration. Yet if Milanese priests and neighboring bishops had been "preponderantly homoian," as Williams claims, would they not have found something amiss? Could they have settled for episcopal neutrality or...
would they have overlooked a Nicene baptism, however inconspicuous it had been? On the other hand, if most who participated in the election were relatively unconcerned with christological and confessional politics--which is not to say that allegiances to, or exasperations with, local candidates for Auxentius' see could not have flared into the conflicts reported but misrepresented by Rufinus and Paulinus--Milanese Christians could have accepted Ambrose's attachment to Nicaea, as they had accepted Auxentius' to Rimini, together with a promise of a more or less impartial, peaceful pontificate.  

This comprehensivist prospect never occurs to Neil McLynn who says that Ambrose's standing as a compromise candidate was compromised from the moment he intervened. Had he not welcomed the Nicenes' participation, their faction could never have challenged the Auxentian and homoian leadership.

Ambrose came not to suppress [the] latest riot and preserve the status quo but to legitimize the Nicenes' interruption of the official 'Auxentian' succession ceremony. It is neither necessary nor particularly plausible to attribute to him any intention of pressing his own candidacy. But the Nicenes reacted all too enthusiastically to this long-awaited demonstration of official support. To Ambrose's dismay . . . they raised the cry "Ambrose for bishop!"

Paulinus said the cry came from a child. Clementina Corbellini speculates that Ambrose was sent from Sirmium by his superiors who planned on his becoming bishop and that the nomination came, according to plan, from a government source or "plant." McLynn finds another stand-in for Paulinus' child, a Milanese Nicene partisan, carried away by his faction's good fortune, carrying Ambrose into pontifical office.

His biographer insisted that the nominee was reluctant and tried at first to disqualify himself, and McLynn takes liberties with that portion of the tale as well. Although Paulinus assured that the crowd had relentlessly pursued its compromise candidate, McLynn simply cannot believe the homoian majority would have been so moved by Ambrose's apparent humility--or so easily gullible. The homoians therefore drop from the mix as McLynn redrafts the tale of spurning and urging; in his version, only the Nicenes dogged Ambrose and refused to be dissuaded ("your sin be on us") when their nominee kept company with whores or, still acting as governor, ordered the torture of prisoners.

McLynn very nearly makes the chase ceremonial--the Nicenes overruling the candidate's reluctance according to script, making him a "creature of [their] party," creating with their "creature" the spectacle that "baffled criticism" and dispelled "suspicions of collusion." Ambrose's hesitation, which might initially have been genuine, was worked into the spellbinding performance that eventually made homoians forget who had driven them to deliberate with the Nicenes. McLynn dubs the drama of chase and capture "the first of [Ambrose's] many spectacular public relations coups that became the distinctive mark of [his] pontificate." The homoians controlled the streets and churches but were controlled by Nicene impresarios. If homoians protested, their protests would not have been heard above the acclaim for Ambrose's candidacy reported to the emperor to get his consent. So the court was also controlled. As for homoian bishops who attended Auxentius' funeral in Milan and who would have stayed for the election and consecration of a successor, they fell silent, and McLynn admits his surprise that they had not, at the very least, left after-the-fact accounts of their setback. The reason, he infers, was the power of Ambrose's friends in government, particularly the Praetorian Prefect who sent him to Milan, Petronius Probus. In that event, destiny and perhaps treachery covered their tracks very well indeed; for the only evidence for intimidation seems to be the charge registered against Ambrose years later when Palladius, an homoian bishop in Illyricum, maintained that his nemesis, by then a near-fanatical Nicene, owed his election to influential, unspecified patrons rather than to his good character.

Had he known of Palladius' accusation or anticipated the inferences drawn from it, doubtlessly Ambrose would have denied ambition and conspiracy. "We are reeds," he preached, borrowing from Luke's gospel; arrogance was idiocy. In another, unrelated brief for humility, he appears also to have scored against the conspiracy theories founded on the chroniclers' narratives of confessional crisis. Fifteen years after his election, Ambrose remembered having acted against two men whose pride offended him. Sure enough, he went on, the two afterward proved unfaithful, one "at the time of the Arian disturbance." By locating that betrayal some distance from his election and designating the disturbance neither "the second" nor "the next," Ambrose, in effect, now suggests that a reappraisal of his supposedly crisis-driven candidacy may well be in order.
The disturbance to which he referred, *Arianeae infestationis tempore*, probably originated soon after 378. Were we to tell the little we know of what seems a labyrinthine tale of intrigue and anger, the tale would start in Illyricum where, McLynn concedes, Ambrose made "powerful enemies," who complained to the emperor in Sirmium. Gratian's court sent inquiries to Milan, questioning the bishop's orthodoxy. And Ambrose replied, then and later, as if he were answering appeals for instruction. But McLynn and Williams rightly point to the decidedly defensive tone of Ambrose's first response, the first two books of his *De fide*. Their argument may have been stitched together with sermons delivered as preemptive strikes against refugees from Illyricum, most of them flocking to Italy after the imperial defeat at Adrianople. Julian Valens, who was troublesome by the early 380s, might have arrived a few years before. Auxentius of Durostorum came later, perhaps at a summons or invitation from Empress Justina, Gratian's mother, who arrived from Sirmium and tried twice during the 380s to wrest churches in Milan from Nicene control. Ambrose, wary even before the imperial initiatives, advised one colleague against letting the Illyrican rabble into his church. Ambrose described "Arians" as heretical grubs (*tinea*) gnawing from within at the church's faith in the divinity of Jesus, and he came to think segregation and aggression were the best measures against them. 32

That thinking developed during the late 370s and into the 380s. Afterward, Ambrose exploited the political uncertainties of the resident court to Nicene advantage, and he again thought that reconciliation and reintegration were desirable alternatives. 33 Perhaps one should say that partisan, divisive christological politics only distinctively marked his [End Page 438] "middle period." This should not be taken to mean that the episcopal election in 374 was uneventful. If rivals clawed each other, as the chronicles indicate, however, personal loyalties as likely as, or likelier than, party loyalties frayed nerves and caused the clamor. And party loyalties are not necessary to explain Ambrose's flight from episcopal office and the Milanese pursuit, for to decline election was often to elicit or tease from the citizens greater pressure to accept. Since the third century, popular consent was widely thought in the west to have represented God's consent and blessing. In the 250s, Cyprian of Carthage assumed that acclaim was tantamount to divine judgment on a candidacy. After Ambrose, Leo I of Rome stipulated that an ecclesiastical administrator in charge of all ought to be chosen by all. As McLynn elegantly and compellingly argues, Ambrose was a master at forging consent from the first: sermons, psalms, gestures, and monuments expressed and churned consent throughout his pontificate to create a consensual Christian community, *a plebs Dei*. For McLynn, the bishop of Milan was one of the most effective stage managers during the first few centuries of the Christian empire. Without factoring in partisan christologies, then, one can still appreciate the odd courtship of the bishop-elect in 374 as a personal triumph or "coup." 34

Ambrose recalled the haste but not the personal or party conflicts that allegedly preceded his being hustled from public office (*raptus de tribunalibus*), elected bishop, baptized, and consecrated. Selective memory, of course, was no great liability; it was something of an administrative prerogative and mission to rehearse episodes selectively and inspirationally and thereby to shape the collective Christian consciousness, putting the recent past as tradition close to the center of present practice. Even when describing his current difficulties in the 380s, Ambrose "made" history, silencing the indigenous Milanese homoiani who sympathized with his Illyrican critics, *ne quisquam de civibus erat.* 35

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Historians find few things more exhilarating than supplying what their principal sources and subjects uncooperatively forgot or suppressed. This is especially true and critical when previous generations of estimable historians neglected to do so. Thanks to Williams and McLynn, we may presume that Julian Valens, Auxentius of Durostorum, Empress Justina, and the other Illyrican "Arians" found some support in Milan, if not the raft of friends assembled by those two scholars at least a small skiff of survivors from the time of the first Auxentius. It now seems right to repeal the verdict Homes Dudden handed down sixty years ago: "Justina, with her supple courtiers and barbarian mercenaries," he said, "clung desperately to a creed which all sensible people recognized to be effete and lifeless." 36 Of course, we cannot now poll all those "sensible people." And, even if we could, we should not expect unanimity. Nor should we anticipate a split along party lines, sly neo-Nicenes facing a coalition of scrappy, diehard homoiani. After the neo-Arians' swift sweep east, the Rimini settlement, and its repudiation, religious politics probably were more disorderly than decisively Nicene or homoian.

Was Auxentius of Milan an exception? The Auxentius fashioned by and from Hilary's strident *sententiae* would surely have been. Yet the failure to secure an homoian succession in Milan in 373 seems lastingly to stand against the image
of an effective and militant twenty-year pontificate. I have tried to piece together an alternative, reassessing Hilary's *Contra*, reasoning from a few related circumstances and silences, returning to Michel Meslin's suggestion that Auxentius was more pragmatist than partisan. The bishop's last line of defense was simple and as reported: Rimini. Nonetheless, I suspect he was seldom driven to it, often enough to reward him with a good reputation in Illyricum and a terrible reputation elsewhere, but not often enough to polarize Christians in Milan. If that is so, it becomes harder to accept and build on the customary account of Ambrose's election and easier, I argue, to credit his sketch of the episode (haste without confessionally partisan hassle), to understand the relative quiet of his first years as bishop, and to accept the general cast, if not every detail of his explanations for the subsequent, christological controversy.

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**Notes**

*I am grateful to Neil McLynn and Daniel Williams for having identified, discussed, and corrected errors in an earlier draft of this paper. I could not ask for more perceptive and more generous critics; nor could I ask for more from them, although I'm soon to get it, happy to have it, and sure that readers as well as I will be beneficiaries.


3. See the preface (2.4-5) to Hilary's *Opus historicum*, CSEL 65:101, and Sulpicius Severus, *Chronica* 2.39, CSEL 1:92. Note Klaus Martin Girardet's attempt to identify that formula in his "Constance II, Athanase, et l'édit d'Arles" in *Politique et théologie chez Athanase d'Alexandrie*, ed. Charles Kannengiesser (Paris, 1974), 63-91, but also see Timothy D. Barnes, *Athenasius and Constantius: Theology and Politics in the Constantinian Empire* (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), 115-17, who suspects that the documents at Arles and Milan echoed a creed adopted in Sirmium several years before, and Hanson, *Search*, 329-34, who level-headedly assumes that the formula, though "not openly Arian," was "patient of an Arian interpretation." Contrary to this, Hanns Christoph Brennecke argues that only the fate of Athenasius, not creedal conformity was on the block, *Hilarius von Poitiers und die Bischofsopposition gegen Konstantius II: Untersuchungen zur dritten Phase des arianischen Streites (337-361)* (Berlin, 1984), 139-45. For a general study of the efforts to provide Constantius with a network (*reseau*) of compliant and conformist bishops, see Charles Pietri, "La politique de Constance II: Un premier 'Cesaropapisme' ou l'imitatio Constantini?" in *L'église et l'empire au IVe siècle*, ed. Albert Dihle (Geneva, 1989), 113-72.


misrepresentations, *Collectanea* A.1.1, CSEL 65:43-44.


13. *Contra Auxentium* 5-8. Years later, Ambrose would demand the phrase "true God"; see Markschies, *Trinitätstheologie*, 201-03, commenting particularly on *De fide* 1.17.117 and 5.14.174 against homoian notions of subordination.


19. See Contra Auxentium 4, for the world's hatred of the truth, and 15, for schismata facere. And, for the Alexandrians' opposition, note Ad Afris 1, PG 56:1030.


21. See Contra Auxentium 7, Simonetti, La crisi ariana, 381-82, Sozomen, Ecclesiastical History 6.23, McLynn, Ambrose, 24-25, and Williams, Ambrose, 78-79. McLynn and Williams possibly glanced upriver, nearly two centuries closer to the source, to the editor who reduced the Quaestor and Magister to "witnesses" and left the bishops to judge (PL 10:614), citing Ambrose's subsequent statement that the emperor typically consigned church disputes to ecclesiastical justices. But Ambrose learned during the 380s that courtiers could agree to have charges brought against him heard in the palace and sifted by the laity.


23. Contra Auxentium 7 and Meslin, Ariens, 44.


26. Williams, Ambrose, 112-13, emphasizes that loyalty to Bishop Dionysius was not necessarily devotion to the Nicene "platform" but apparently does not accept that the same may apply to Auxentius and "homoianism." See McLynn, Ambrose, 14-16, for 355, and 1-10 and 43-44, for 374. Both Williams and McLynn refer to the dispute in Rome, but neither candidate there was an homoian; consult, on that count, Pietri, Roma Christiana 1:407-18 and Jerome's letter to Damasus 15.4, CSEL 54:66, which contrasts the Roman candidates and, perhaps wistfully, Ambrose and Auxentius as well.

27. Compare Williams, Ambrose, 116-19. Yet the case for a quick and inconspicuous baptism ("not . . . a declarative act") is likely to come apart on some evidence Williams himself cites, on Ambrose's story of his brother's adventure and baptism. Satyrus, shipwrecked, desired to be baptized before continuing his voyage, both to give thanks for delivery from death and as a precaution. Williams has him "hastily baptized," apparently forgetting what Ambrose did not: despite a fear of going to sea again unbaptized, Satyrus did delay and disembark when he was unable to find a priest in his place of temporary refuge who conformed to the faith of Rome. That is, Ambrose recalled that the choice of a priest had been important enough to dare danger, De excessu fratris 1.47-48, CSEL 73:235-36.


30. Palladius, Apology 120, SC 267:303. The editor, Roger Gryson, answers the complaint with the conventional wisdom that Ambrose was a consensus choice, although Gryson admits that the bishop's rapid rise from catechumenate to episcopacy was irregular (pp. 303-05). For Probus, consult Ammianus Marcellinus, Res Gestas 27.11
McLynn's estimates that the acclamations "did not represent an authentic desiderium populi" and that "the emperor was given a seriously distorted picture of the situation in Milan," of course, are predicated on the confidence that, from this distance, our impressions of popular sentiment and the political situation are more disinterested and less distorted (Ambrose, 46-52).

31. Ambrose, De officiis 1.18.72, PL 16:49. Williams, Ambrose, 121-22, makes much the same point. (The second offender, already in orders, defected at an unspecified time for love of money, pecuniae studio.) Corbellini, "Sesto Petronio," 187-88, is particularly struck by Ambrose's remark that Valentinian I predicted that his election as bishop would bring peace to the precincts of Milan, Epistle 75.7, CSEL 82.3:77. But this formulaic response to the announcement of election does not corroborate the claim that an homoian-Nicene conflict complicated the election of 374. McLynn, Ambrose, 59, imagines Nicenes' "disappointment" at Ambrose's failures to defrock the homoian clergy immediately after his consecration, but see Duval, "Ambroise," 254-55.

32. Ambrose, Epistle 36, CSEL 82.2:18, and Expositio Lucam 1.13, SC 45:53. Christoph Markschies, Trinitätstheologie, 92-93, writes of Ambrose's need at the time "to immunize" Christians against an homoian infection and guesses that the sermons were the source of the De fide.


34. McLynn may occasionally overstate Ambrose's theatricality ("set-piece invectives"; "solidarity conjured up through song"), but his final allusion is incontestably apt: "It was [Ambrose] who at last 'created' an episcopal role for the stage of the Christian empire." See McLynn's Ambrose, particularly 220-51 and 377. Also note Leo's argument, "qui praefuturus est omnibus ab omnibus eligatur," in his epistle 10.6, PL 54:634, and Cyprian's sentiments in epistles 67.4-5 and 68.2, CSEL 3.2:738-40 and 3.2:744-45. For Cyprian, also consult Jakob Speigl, "Cyprian über das judicium Dei bei der Bischofseinsetzung," Römische Quartalschrift für christliche Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte 69 (1974): 37-41.

35. Ambrose, Epistle 76.12, CSEL 82.3:114, and De paenitentia 2.18.72, CSEL 73:192-93, for raptus. Also note Expositio Lucam 8.73, SC 52:132, and De officiiis 1.1.4, PL 16:27.