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The Innkeeper’s Lien and Due Process—Klim v. Jones

The problems associated with human mobility require constant testing and refining of the principles embodied in our common and statutory law. Furthermore, there has developed an increasing concern for the rights of the economically disadvantaged individual in contemporary America. The compound problems of the mobile poor have been partly resolved by the application of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to them.

An example of this trend of individual constitutional protection in a mobile society occurs in Klim v. Jones, where the court held that taking possession of a traveler’s possessions under a statutory innkeeper’s lien denied him due process of law. In Klim the manager of a hotel approached the plaintiff and requested payment. When the plaintiff denied owing anything the manager locked him out of his room, denying him access to papers and equipment necessary to his employment. The court held the lien unconstitutional because it failed to provide for a hearing before the manager could deprive the plaintiff of his property.

Even though the innkeeper’s lien had its beginning under Roman law where an absolute duty was imposed upon the innkeeper to insure the safety of the property of his guest, the common law innkeeper’s lien arose


4 The plaintiff, a painter, worked irregularly and was of limited financial means. Everything he owned was locked inside the room. His tools, driver’s license, birth certificate, and bank book were among the items detained. Id. at 111.

5 The court stated as follows:

... This court grants plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and declares California Civil Code § 1861 unconstitutional insofar as it fails to provide for a hearing prior to the imposition of the lien pursuant thereto. Id. at 124.

6 For the historical development of innkeepers dating from the Roman era, see W. Hale, The Law of Bailments and Carriers 254 n.1 (1896).

in Medieval England. The innkeeper was under a duty to take in travelers who might come to his door. Since the guest, who was usually unfamiliar with the area, had to give custody of his property to a servant or host who was a stranger to him, the innkeeper had the absolute duty of preventing loss and injury to the guest's property. Because of this responsibility, an innkeeper acquired a lien upon the property received by him in his capacity as an innkeeper for the reasonable value of the services rendered to the guest. The lien did not confer a right of sale, but only a right to hold the property until the guest made quantum meruit payment. The lien attached as soon as the property was brought on the premises and remained thereon even if the guest wrongfully removed it. Today this lien exists by statute in most states.

In Klim, the lien was attacked because it did not afford the guest a hearing prior to its imposition. The guest was on notice that his property would be held until payment. Fair notice and the opportunity to be heard

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8 See M. Dobie, Law of Bailments and Carriers § 90, at 241 (1914); R. Brown, The Law of Personal Property § 102, at 482 (2d ed. 1955). A large amount of traveling developed in England during that time. There were many dangers and hazards encountered by travelers. Roads were very often bad and there were also highwaymen and outlaws with which to contend. It was therefore imperative that the traveler seek shelter and safety along the way both for himself and his property. These dangers were considerably greater at night. See Navagh, A New Look at the Liability of Inn Keepers for Guest Property Under New York Law, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 62, 63 (1956).

9 See 1 L. Jones, A Treatise on the Law of Liens § 498, at 499 (3d ed. 1914); W. Hale, supra note 6, § 53, at 274-75; 40 Am. Jur. 2d Hotels, Motels, etc. §§ 62-3 (1968).

10 See Navagh, supra note 8, at 63.

11 Id. There are exceptions to this rule, however. The innkeeper was not liable where loss occurred by accidental fire, by an act of God or the public enemy, by reason of the inherent nature of the property, and where it was the fault of the guest, or his servant or companion. W. Hale, supra note 6, § 54, at 277; R. Brown, supra note 8, § 102, at 483; 40 Am. Jur. 2d Hotels, Motels, etc. § 126 (1968).

12 In return for the obligation imposed upon the innkeeper he is invested with a lien. The most noteworthy characteristic of the lien is that it is not confined to property owned by the guest, but attaches to all property brought with him and in good faith received by the innkeeper as the guest's property. See 1 L. Jones, supra note 9, § 498, at 449; accord, R. Brown, supra note 8 § 114, at 548; M. Dobie, supra note 8, § 100, at 285; 40 Am. Jur. 2d Hotels, Motels, etc. § 187 (1968).

13 See 1 L. Jones, supra note 9, § 525, at 483; 40 Am. Jur. 2d Hotels, Motels, etc. § 191 (1968). A remedy of sale after a certain period is generally provided by statute. See 1 L. Jones, supra note 9, § 525, at 483.

14 See 40 Am. Jur. 2d Hotels, Motels, etc. § 189 (1968).

15 At common law the lien was limited strictly to the innkeepers. See 1 L. Jones, supra note 9, § 515, at 462; 40 Am. Jur. 2d Hotels, Motels, etc. § 186 (1968). See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. §§ 43-31, 43-34 to -40 (1950).
are the two essential elements of procedural due process. The test applied in the past to determine whether procedural due process has been violated is the traditional "balancing test" wherein public and private interests are weighed. The *Klim* court, following the line of reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in *Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.*, concentrated its argument on the disastrous effects of the innkeeper's lien upon the individual to whom it was applied. The court felt that no special or

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16 The United States Supreme Court has relied on this principle as early as 1863. See Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223 (1863):

> Common justice requires that no man shall be condemned in his person or property without notice and an opportunity to make his defence. *Id.* at 233.

In several other decisions since this one, the Court has held these two requirements to be fundamental characteristics of procedural due process. See, e.g., Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944):

> The fundamental requirement of due process is an opportunity to be heard upon such notice and proceedings as are adequate to safeguard the right for which the constitutional protection is invoked. *Id.* at 246.


17 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), where the court remarked:

> The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be "condemned to suffer grievous loss" . . . and depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication. *Id.* at 262-63.


> ... [C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the governmental function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by the governmental action. *Id.* at 895;

**Frank v. Maryland,** 359 U.S. 360 (1959):

> Application of the broad restraints of due process compels inquiry into the nature of the demand being made upon the individual freedom in a particular context and the justification of social need in which the demand rests. *Id.* at 363;


> The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives to the procedure that was followed . . . , the balance of hurt complained of and the good accomplished—these are some of the considerations that must enter into the judicial judgment. *Id.* at 163 (concurring opinion, Frankfurter, J.).

18 395 U.S. 337 (1969), noted in 68 Mich. L. Rev. 986 (1970); 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 750 (1969); 22 VAND. L. Rev. 1400 (1969). This case involved a Wisconsin pre-judgment wage garnishment statute which did not afford an evidentiary hearing prior to the retention of a debtor's wages by his employer, the garnishee. The court held that such deprivation of a person's wages was in violation of the principles of due process and therefore unconstitutional. 395 U.S. at 342. The court weighed only the individual's interest in finding that procedural due process was violated.

19 315 F. Supp. at 122-24. What the *Klim* court, is actually saying is that the innkeeper's lien statute, California Civil Code § 1861, is procedurally defective because it substantively had or could have a disastrous effect upon the plaintiff.
overriding state or creditor interest warranted the existence of the lien without procedural guarantees.\textsuperscript{20} The \textit{Sniadach} decision was primarily concerned with the individual's interest with respect to a pre-judgment wage garnishment statute and did not even consider the needs of the creditor.\textsuperscript{21} The \textit{Klim} court reasoned that the greatest practical impact of the lien was upon such persons as the plaintiff, who were of limited financial means.\textsuperscript{22} It also cautioned that, as in the principal case, property detained under the lien might be needed by the guest to carry on a livelihood until trial of the issues.\textsuperscript{23} Furthermore, there was the possibility of economic coercion, because the innkeeper could detain the guest's property on the basis of dubious, or even fraudulent, claims.\textsuperscript{24}

In attempting to reconcile the requisites of procedural due process with those procedures used in pre-judgment attachment, courts have argued that such a detention of a person's property is merely deprivation of the possession or use, and not a defeasance of the title.\textsuperscript{25} It has also been sug-

\hspace{1cm}\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Id.} at 124.
\textsuperscript{21} See note 18 supra.
\textsuperscript{22} 315 F. Supp. at 122.
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Id.} at 123.
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{25} See \textit{Byrd v. Rector}, 112 W. Va. 192, 163 S.E. 845 (1932), citing \textit{McInnes v. McKay}, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), as follows:

\ \textit{If, after having full opportunity to be heard in defense of such claim, a judgment is rendered thereon against the defendant or his property, there has been no lack of due process. In the meantime there has been no deprivation of property. The attachment, quasi in rem in nature, has operated only to detain the property temporarily, to await final judgment on the merits of plaintiff's claim.} 112 W. Va. at 198, 163 S.E. at 848.


Since 1897 only five decisions have been handed down involving the constitutionality of the innkeeper's lien. \textit{See Brown Shoe Co. v. Hunt}, 103 Iowa 586, 72 N.W. 765 (1897). The innkeeper held the salesman's samples as security for the accommodations furnished and the court held that such was not a deprivation of property without due process. \textit{See McClain v. Williams}, 11 S.D. 227, 76 N.W. 930 (1898). The court felt it was unconstitutional to give an innkeeper a lien over goods of a third person not a guest, but which were brought upon the premises by the guest. \textit{But see} note 12 supra. The court implied, however, that it was not a violation of due process to impose a lien upon the guest's own property. \textit{See Nance v. Houck Piano Co.}, 128 Tenn. 1, 155 S.W. 1172 (1913). The court stated:

Hotels and boarding houses are public necessities, and the Legislature may give them such reasonable protection as, in its judgment, a sound public policy may demand. If the Legislature believed that keepers of hotels and boarding houses are exposed to fraud and deceit by a fraudulent show of baggage in possession of their guests and patrons, and apparently belonging to them, it is competent for it to provide a lien in their favor for the accommodations received from them.
gested that since the withdrawal of the owner's right to possession is only temporary, it does not violate his procedural due process.26 If the owner loses in court, his due process has not been violated, and if he wins, he has only lost possession temporarily, while retaining title the whole time. These arguments did not survive the reasoning in Sniadach when ap-

upon the strength and credit extended . . . . Id. at 2, 155 S.W. at 1173. See Van Laar v. Marchesini, 107 Misc. 186, 175 N.Y.S. 456 (1919). The court upheld the lien of the innkeeper to be constitutional but found that due process was violated in giving a boarding house keeper a lien on the goods of a third person brought upon the premises by the guest. Only the innkeeper had a lien at common law. See Lines Music Co. v. Holt, 332 Mo. 749, 60 S.W.2d 32 (1933), noted in 22 Geo. L.J. 101 (1933), the most recent case before Klim to decide the question of the constitutionality of the innkeeper's lien. The court held that a Missouri statute declarative of the common law innkeeper's lien was not unconstitutional since it did not violate due process of law.

26 McInnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), aff'd per curiam, 279 U.S. 820 (1928). This case's validity as to general attachment is questionable though as Justice Douglas stated in the majority opinion of Sniadach:

A procedural rule that may satisfy due process for attachments in general, see McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820, does not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case. 395 U.S. at 340. However, Justice Harlan was unwilling to admit that McKay met the essentials of due process. See 395 U.S. at 343 (concurring opinion).

27 The Sniadach court cited cases where such summary procedure would meet the requirements of due process in certain extraordinary situations. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950). The seizure of misbranded articles under § 304(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was allowed without a prior hearing.

In another case a conservator was appointed to take possession of a federal savings and loan association prior to a statutory hearing. The court upheld this summary procedure. See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947).

In the third exception mentioned by Sniadach, which involved the pre-judgment attachment of the property of stockholders in an insolvent bank, the Court said:

As to the lien, nothing is more common than to allow parties alleging themselves to be creditors to establish in advance by attachment a lien dependent for its effect upon the result of the suit. Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 31 (1928).

The fourth exception involved the pre-judgment attachment of the property of an out of state defendant. See Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921):

... [A] property owner who absents himself from the territorial jurisdiction of a State, leaving his property within it, must be deemed ex necessitate to consent that the State may subject such property to judicial process to answer demands made against him in his absence, according to any practicable method that reasonably may be adopted. Id. at 111.

See note 26 infra. Courts other than the Klim court, in applying Sniadach, have not agreed whether or not it is based strictly on due process principles or only concerned with the particular type of property involved—wages. Compare Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969) (applying Sniadach to garnishment of property other than wages) with Termplan Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969) (refusing to extend Sniadach to property other than wages). See also note 34 infra.
plied to pre-judgment wage garnishment, nor was the *Klim* court persuaded by them.

Attachment in general serves a dual purpose of conferring jurisdiction upon the court and preventing the perpetration of a fraud upon a creditor. General attachment is used to seize the debtor's property which is in the debtor's possession. Garnishment is a special form of attachment in that it detains the property of the debtor in the possession of a third party, the garnishee. The majority of garnishment actions would arise where the debtor is already settled within the jurisdiction of the court as the wage earner was in *Sniadach*. Under these circumstances the employee-debtor is not likely to quit his job, pack up, and leave the jurisdiction in order to avoid a garnishment proceeding. Thus post-judgment garnishment would be an effective substitute for the pre-judgment garnishment of wages held unconstitutional in *Sniadach*.

The innkeeper's lien is another specialized form of attachment in that the lien attaches before the innkeeper has actual possession of the guest's property. The likelihood of a guest leaving without paying is a threat to the innkeeper. If the innkeeper were required to have a hearing prior to the seizure of a guest's goods, the guest could easily avoid the proceedings by taking his property and leaving the jurisdiction before a hearing was had but after notice of it was given. Since a guest is usually a traveler, there is nothing to prevent his leaving quickly. By allowing the innkeeper to take possession of a guest's property prior to notice and a hearing, jurisdiction is conferred upon the court such that if an *in personam* judgment is not available, an *in rem* judgment against the property detained will at least partially satisfy the amount owed to the innkeeper. For these reasons the innkeeper has a greater necessity to detain his guest's property under the lien without a prior hearing than a creditor has to detain the

29 22 Vand. L. Rev. at 1402.
30 *Id.* at 1401.
32 40 Am. Jur. 2d *Hotels, Motels, etc.* § 189 (1968).
33 Unless the innkeeper is allowed to detain the property of his guest, it is impossible to guarantee either the guest's appearance in court or have a source from which to at least partially satisfy the value of the services rendered to the guest by the innkeeper.
property of a debtor in a pre-judgment wage garnishment proceeding. The
creditor interest in the innkeeper's lien is therefore a more substantial
one. The rationale of Sniadach should be limited to the pre-judgment
garnishment of wages and not extended into the area of the innkeeper's lien\(^34\) as it was in Klim.

The Klim court suggested payment in advance as an alternative to the
innkeeper's lien.\(^35\) Such a measure is impractical and contrary to the
convenience sought by travelers. To make prepayment effective, one would
be required not only to pay in advance for each day he stays, but to pay
for his meals and phone calls immediately rather than charge them to
his room.

The practical effectiveness of the innkeeper's lien lies in the innkeeper's
right thereunder to take possession of a guest's property prior to a hearing
of the case in order to prevent the guest from defrauding the innkeeper.
The Klim decision attempts to take this effectiveness away. Possession or
detention of property prior to a hearing is necessary to the effectiveness
of general attachment laws and of other possessory liens. If the applica-
tion of Sniadach is not limited to pre-judgment wage garnishment,\(^36\) which
Klim refused to do, the effectiveness of general attachment and of pos-
sessory liens on all personal property is left in question.

_M. E. B._

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\(^34\) The following statement of Justice Douglas in the majority opinion of Sniadach
suggests that the pre-judgment of wages has its own distinct problems which require
that it be treated differently than other general forms of attachment.

We deal here with wages—a specialized type of property presenting distinct
problems in our economic system. We turn then to the nature of that property
and problems of procedural due process. 395 U.S. at 340.

See also note 27 supra.

\(^35\) 315 F. Supp. at 124.

\(^36\) See note 34 supra.