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Adam Smith and His Sources: The Evil of Independence

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Adam Smith and his sources

The evil of independence

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The following statements constitute a test question:

- I am richer than you are, therefore I am superior to you.
- I am more eloquent than you are, therefore I am superior to you.

But the following conclusions are better:

- I am richer than you are, therefore my property is superior to yours.
- I am more eloquent than you are, therefore my eloquence is superior to yours.

But you are neither property nor eloquence.

Epicurus, Encheiridion, para. 44

... the Stoics ... have the glory of being the earliest thinkers who grounded the obligation of morals on the brotherhood, the conjunction of the whole human race.

John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1866: 319)

Introduction

This paper explores the foundations of Adam Smith’s view that the philosopher is the same as the street porter. Despite their innate similarity, Smith recognized that the role of the philosopher, someone who provides useful instruction to fellow humans, is not that of the street porter (Peart and Levy 2005; Schliesser 2006). He also knew that this potentially useful employment may entail a biased perspective on human conduct. Motivated by matters too distant for ordinary people to notice, the philosopher may come to believe that he is better than those he studies and to regard himself as independent from their concerns. Viner expressed Smith’s position:

Under normal circumstances, the sentiments make no mistake. It is reason which is fallible. Greatest of all in degree in fallibility is the speculative reason of the moral philosopher, unless the legislator is on a still lower level.

(Viner 1972: 78-9)
In Smith’s account, ordinary people overcome a bias in perspective by relying upon proofs that summarize common experience (Pearl and Levy 2005). The philosopher, steeped in the study of ancient texts, does not avail himself of proverbial wisdom. Instead, Smith locates the means to correct the bias of philosophers in Stoicism. He singles out Stoicism as a philosophy which, in spite of the failings of Stoic philosophers, directed its adherents toward the greatest good. It reached the judgments of the men within the breast and motivated selfless and partial beings toward unselfishness and impartiality.

This paper locates the foundations of Smith’s egalitarianism in Stoic cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism implies that our place in the world ought to be immaterial; everyone should be valued impartially. Smith offered a solution to the deep problem in Stoicism, how the Stoic maxim of life according to natural inclinations also served cosmopolitanism. For Smith ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are natural and motivating and so they constrain us to act reciprocally even though, by nature, we value those closest to us more than we do those further away. Like the Stoics, Smith developed a coherent theory of the human, characterized by innate sociability and for whom beliefs articulated in language have motivational force. Finally, we show how Smith’s proposed cure for the intolerance of religious factions appeals to innate sociability. Rather than risk being alone, religious teachers will exchange beliefs and intolerance becomes attenuated.

We recognize that the relationship between Smith’s doctrine and Stoic teaching is centered in recent secondary literature (Raphael and Macle 1976; Wieser 1984; Griswold 1990; Vivanco 2001; Montes 2004, 2006; Fleischhacker 2004; Henle 2006). While the common identification of liberalism and cosmopolitanism (Mill 1866: 419; Furniss 1920: 6; Hechinger 1935: 35 6; Montes 2008) suggests Stoic roots to Smith’s teaching, the Stoics were providentialists, and the consensus among scholars is that Smith ‘never required belief in God as a condition for his empirical explanations to work’ (Fleischhacker 2004: 45). In what follows, we shall attempt to reconcile these seemingly contradictory assessments. To suggest how the argument will unfold, consider whether beliefs motivate. Supposing they do, then even if the consensus view that God or providence does not provide motivational force in Smith’s system, as long as we believe in God or providence, these beliefs might motivate. Smith is clear that people are, in fact, motivated by religious beliefs, although he allows that whether for good or for ill must be discovered. He is also clear that, in spite of Stoicism’s seeming conflict with human nature, it was a force for good.

**Philosophy in Smith**

We divide this section into three parts. First, we consider a Stoic discussion in which the pride of the teacher is corrected by appeal to the teaching. Second, we sketch Smith’s account of Stoic doctrine and the temptation of the Stoics. Third, we discuss Smith’s account of the context in which the attitude commonly called ‘stoicism’ was both natural and necessary. The modality of necessary and possible do not often enter into the history of economics, so we need to be aware that Smith appeals to necessity in a Stoic context. In what is necessary for humans we find what is true for all.

**Stoic teaching and the teacher.** As a clue to what Smith might find attractive in Stoicism, consider the following passage from Epicurus, who came to the occupation of philosopher from slavery. When he discussed the importance of reason and logic, Epicurus countered the unjustified pride of the philosopher with his own philosophy.

"What, then, is your admirable achievement? To understand the will of nature. Very well; do you understand it all by yourself? And if that is the case, what need do you have? For if it is true that 'all men err involuntarily', and you have learned the truth, it must needs be that you are doing right already. But, so help me Zeus, I do not comprehend the will of nature. Who, then, interprets it? Men say, Chrysipus. I go and try to find out what this interpreter of nature says. I begin not to understand what he says, and look for the man who can interpret him. Look and consider what this passage means", says the interpreter, 'just as if it were in Latin! What place is there here, then, for pride on the part of the interpreter?'

(Epicurus *Diotogenes* I.xvii.13–15)

**Stoic levels.** One can always replace the teacher with the teaching common to all.

"Why, there is no just place for pride even on the part of Chrysipus, if he merely interprets the will of nature, but himself does not follow it, how much less place for pride, then, in the case of his interpreter! For we have no need of Chrysipus on his own account, but only to enable us to follow nature. No more have we need of him who divides through sacrifice, considered on his own account, but simply because we think that through his instrumentality we shall understand the future and the signs given by the gods ... nor do we admire the crow or the raven, but God, who gives his signs through them."

(Epicurus *Diotogenes* I.xvii.18–19)

We shall explore how Stoic teaching might be employed to correct the biases of its adherents.

**Stoic teachings and temptation.** Smith taught us how to understand the teachings of ‘amieu philosophy’.
In the ancient philosophy, whatever was taught concerning the nature either of the human mind or of the Deity, made a part of the system of physics. Those beings, in whatever their essence might be supposed to consist, were parts of the great system of the universe, and parts too productive of the most important effects. Whatever human reason could either conclude, or conjecture, concerning them, made, as it were, two chapters, though no doubt two very important ones, of the science which pretended to give an account of the origin and revolutions of the great system of the universe.

(Laertius 1925, vii.143)

Providentialism follows from the claim that nothing is 'better than the world'. The link between God and the world will be important.

The substance of God is declared by Zeno to be the whole world and the heaven, as well as by Chrysippus in the first book of his tractate On Providence, by Apollodorus in his Physics, and by Posidonius. It is a living thing in the sense of a animate substance endowed with sensation, for animal is better than non-animal, and nothing is better than the world, ergo the world is a living being.

(Laertius 1925, vii.148)

Humans are given pride of place in the providental order: 'Also they hold that there are demons who are in sympathy with mankind and watch over human affairs' (Laertius 1925, vi.151).

Sympathy will be discussed at length below.

From ancient philosophy Smith draws the lesson that there is no outside vantage from which to judge the universe. There is no external vantage to which a philosopher might escape and obtain a god's view of the universe. Instead, all places in the Stoic world provide God's eye views (TMS vii.6.39), but, from our place in the world, social connections emerge naturally. When the Stoic philosopher distances himself from his fellow creatures, he contradicts his teaching of innate sociability.

Smith's characterization of Stoic teaching supposes that we must view ourselves as a 'citizen of the world', a cosmopolitum:

Among the moralists who endeavour to correct the natural inequality of our passive feelings by diminishing our sensibility to what peculiarly concerns ourselves, we may count all the ancient sects of philosophers, but particularly the ancient Stoics. Man, according to the Stoics, ought to regard himself, not as something separated and detached, but as a citizen of the world, a member of the vast commonwealth of nature. To the interest of this great community, he ought at all times to be willing that his own little interest should be sacrificed. Whatever concerns himself, ought to affect him no more than whatever concerns any other equally important part of this immense system. We should view ourselves, not in the light in which our own selfish passions are apt to place us, but in the light in which any other citizen of the world would view us. What befalls ourselves we should regard as what befalls our neighbour, or, what comes to the same thing, as our neighbour regards what befalls us. 'When our neighbour', says Epictetus, 'loses his wife, or his son, there is nobody who is not sensible that this is a humane calamity, a natural evil along with according to the ordinary course of things; but, when the same thing happens to ourselves, then we cry out, as if we had suffered the most dreadful misfortune. We ought, however, to remember how we were affected when this accident happened to another, and such as we were in his case, such ought we to be in our own'.

(TMS III.3.11)

In Smith's view, the Stoics have their moral facts in order. There is no 'commonly honest man' who does not 'inwardly feel the truth of that great stoical maxim' that unjust acts are 'contrary to nature'. Maxims are motives in Smith's account. This is so even when simple 'utilitarian' considerations argue against justice:

One individual must never prefer himself so much even to any other individual, as to hurt or injure that other, in order to benefit himself, though the benefit to the one should be much greater than the hurt or injury to the other.... There is no commonly honest man... who does not inwardly feel the truth of that great stoical maxim, that for one man to deprive another unjustly of any thing, or unjustly to promote his own advantage by the loss or disadvantage of another, is more contrary to nature, than death, than poverty, than pain, than all the misfortunes which can affect him, either in his body, or in his external circumstances.

(TMS III.3.6)

A central passage in Smith's Moral Sentiments establishes the link between providential order and individual responsibility. Rational creatures within the creation, such as ourselves, who act to enhance the happiness of mankind, 'co-operate with the Deity'. God's will depends upon our actions on His behalf:

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The happiness of mankind, as well as of all other rational creatures, seems to have been the original purpose intended by the Author of nature, when he brought them into existence. . . . But by acting according to the dictates of our moral faculties, we necessarily pursue the most effectual means for promoting the happiness of mankind, and may therefore be said, in some sense, to cooperate with the Deity, and to advance as far as in our power the plan of Providence. By acting otherwise, on the contrary, we seem to obstruct, in some measure, the scheme which the Author of nature has established for the happiness and perfection of the world, and to declare ourselves, if I may so say, in some measure the enemies of God. Hence we are naturally encouraged to hope for his extraordinary favour and reward in the one case, and to dread his vengeance and punishment in the other. (TMS III.5.7)

This is an important line of argument because it implies that the providential order depends upon people following the 'dictates of our moral faculties'. Smith believes religious teaching is the method by which that moral instruction is diffused. We shall encounter the question below of what it is that ensures that religious teaching will have a beneficial impact.

Teachers fail. In Smith's telling, the Stoic philosophers were tempted by their providentialism towards apathy. Apathetic providentialism denies the importance of our place in the world. That place forms the centre of all the connections we make in life. We naturally judge on the basis of our place in the world and we are better judges of near than remote events:

The ancient stoics were of opinion, that as the world was governed by the all-ruling providence of a wise, powerful, and good God, every single event ought to be regarded, as making a necessary part of the plan of the universe, and as tending to promote the general order and happiness of the whole: that the vices and follies of mankind, therefore, made as necessary a part of this plan as their wisdom or their virtue; and by that eternal art which educes good from ill, were made to tend equally to the prosperity and perfection of the great system of nature. No speculation of this kind, however, how deeply wears it might be rooted in the mind, could diminish our natural abhorrence for vice, whose immediate effects are so destructive, and whose remote ones are too distant to be traced by the imagination. (TMS III.3.4; emphasis added)

Stoical disdain for this central fact of place denied the innate sociability of humans with those close to them. Smith is contemptuous of the stoic doctrine of the insolvability of experience (Nativitas 2001: 59; Montes 2004) in which the murder of one’s father is said to be no more important than the death of a chicken.

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The stoical apathy is, in such cases, never agreeable, and all the metaphysical sophisms by which it is supported can seldom serve any other purpose than to blow up the hard inscrutability of a cosmos ten times its native importance. The poets and romance writers, who best paint the refinements and delicacies of love and friendship, and of all other private and domestic affections, Racine and Voltaire; Richardson, Marmion, and Racolbot; are, in such cases, much better instructors than Zeno, Chrysippus, or Epictetus. (TMS III.3.14)

In everyday experience, connections with others are the centre of life. Those who deny the importance of ordinary morality, deny human experience and human nature.

The necessity of Stoicism. The question then arises, why is Stoic teaching so important to Smith? Smith explains the origin of Stoic doctrine by appeal to the facts of life in the ancient world. In that world of factional violence, people were treated like cattle, butchered or brutalized by enslavement. All were at risk and no social distinction mattered:

During the age in which flourished the founders of all the principal sects of ancient philosophy; during the Peloponnesian war and for many years after its conclusion, all the different republics of Greece were, at home, almost always distracted by the most furious factions; and abroad, involved in the most sanguinary wars in which each sought, not merely supremacy or dominion, but either completely to extirpate all its enemies, or, what was not less cruel, to reduce them into the wretchedness of all states, that of domestic slavery, and to sell them, man, woman, and child, like so many herds of cattle, to the highest bidder in the market. The smallness of the greater part of those states, too, rendered it, to each of them, very probable, that it might itself fall into that very calamity which it had so frequently, either, perhaps, actually inflicted, or at least attempted to inflict upon some of its neighbours. In this disorderly state of things, the most perfect innocence, joined to both the highest rank and the greatest public services, could give no security in any man that, even at home and among his own relations and fellow-citizens, he was not, at some time or another, from the prevalence of some hostile and furious faction, to be condemned to the most cruel and ignominious punishment. If he was taken prisoner in war, or if the city of which he was a member was conquered, he was exposed, if possible, to still greater injuries and insults. (TMS VII.ii.128)

Smith proposes that the attitude we call stoicism is the natural, the necessary, response to this situation. What is true in the ancient world holds true in the American world of Smith's time:
But every man naturally, or rather necessarily, familiarizes his imagination with the distresses to which he foresees that his situation may frequently expose him. It is impossible that a sailor should not frequently think of storms and shipwrecks, and finding on sea, and of how he himself is likely both to feel and to act upon such occasions. It was impossible, in the same manner, that a Greek patriot or hero should not familiarize his imagination with all the different calamities to which he was sensible his situation must frequently, or rather constantly expose him. As an American savage prepares his death-song, and considers how he should act when he has fallen into the hands of his enemies, and is by them put to death in the most lingering torments, and amidst the insults and derision of all the spectators; so a Greek patriot or hero could not avoid frequently employing his thoughts in considering what he ought both to suffer and to do in honour, in captivity, when reduced to slavery, when put to the torture, when brought to the scaffold. But the philosophers of all the different sects very justly represented virtue: that is, wise, just, true, and temperate conduct; not only as the most probable, but as the certain and infallible road to happiness even in this life. This conduct, however, could not always exempt, and might even sometimes expose the person who followed it to all the calamities which were incident to that unsettled situation of public affairs.

(TMS VII.i.1.28; emphasis added)

All the great schools of ancient philosophy separated happiness from fortune.

They endeavoured, therefore, to show that happiness was either altogether, or at least in a great measure, independent of fortune: the Stoics, that it was so altogether; the Academic and Peripatetic philosophers, that it was so in a great measure... though it should fail of success, yet the mind was not left without consolation. The virtuous man might still enjoy the complete approbation of his own breast, and might still feel that, how unworthy soever things might be without, all was calm and peace and concord within. He might generally comfort himself, too, with the assurance that he possessed the love and esteem of every intelligent and impartial spectator, who could not fail both to admire his conduct, and to regret his misfortune.

(TMS VII.i.1.28)

Our situation encourages us to embrace permanent things. We are encouraged to abstract from the applause of those we see to concern ourselves with approbation from those we imagine. In this imaginative act, we begin to generalize. For Smith, the Stoics were simply the most systematic of all the schools because they separated happiness entirely from the randomness of fortune and so they removed the importance of the particular from their teaching. Stoic cosmopolitanism is a systematic version of the natural response to a common fate.

Perhaps the Stoics are more Spartan than Smith found them to be. Epicurus, the former slave who was, for Smith, the ‘greatest apostle’ of the Stoic ‘conception of life and death’ (TMS, VII.i.1.35), asked about the worst case, the ‘forlorn’ state. He wondered why it would be natural to believe that God Himself could be forlorn and he concluded that we cannot even conceive of the mode of life of one who is all alone.

Why, if being alone is enough to make one forlorn, you will have to say that even Zeus himself is forlorn at the World-Conflagration, and bewails himself: ‘Wretched man! I have neither Hera, nor Athena, nor Apollo, nor, in a word, brother, or son, or grandson, or kinsman’. There are even those who said that this is what he does when left alone at the World-Conflagration; for they cannot conceive of the mode of life of one who is all alone, starting as they do from a natural principle, namely, the facts of natural community of interest amongst men, and mutual affection, and joy in intercourse. But one ought none the less to prepare oneself for this also, that is, to be able to be self-sufficient, to be able to consume with oneself even as Zeus communizes with himself.

(Epictetus Discourses III.viii.4–7)

In Epictetus’s Stoicism, happiness entails mutuality. That fear of loneliness appears in a critical aspect of Smith’s argument when he explains how to combat the biases of religious teachers.

**Motivation and necessity**

Natural and necessary, as well as the motivational force of language, comprise the logical centre of Stoicism. The topics covered in Stoic logic were wider than in modern logic. Epicurus pointed out the fallacy of the inference from unequal possession or skill to inequality of persons. Many of the broader aspects of Stoic logic link to Smith’s enterprise. The motivational force of language is part of a central puzzle of Stoic teaching that serves to distinguish between ‘true’ and ‘truth’. As we have seen, Smith talks about the development of attitudes that the Stoics referred to as ‘natural’ and ‘necessary’. These, too, are concepts in Stoic logic. To this background we now turn.

**Motivation by truth.** Stoic logical doctrine holds that truth is epistemic (knowable) and popular, democratic even (demos). From corporeality and popularity, we can infer that the words of ordinary people serve to motivate. As these texts are not widely discussed in the context of Smith’s teaching on the motivational impact of language, we quote at length. The Stoic consensus is that only body can move body. So, for language to have motivational impact, it needs to be embodied. We quote from Sextus Empiricus’s *Against the Logicians*: 

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As for the truth, some people, and especially the Stoics, think that it differs from what is true in three ways, in being, in composition, and in power. In being, in so far as the truth is a body (soma) while what is true is incorporeal. And reasonably so, they say, for the latter is a proposition and the proposition is a sayable, and the sayable is incorporeal. The truth, by contrast, is a body in so far as it is thought to be knowledge that is capable of asserting everything that is true and all knowledge is the leading part in a certain state (just as the hand in a certain state is thought of as a first). But the leading part, according to these people, is a body; therefore the truth too is bodily in kind.

(Sextus Empiricus 2005 and 1935, i.38-9)

Modern logicians note the Stoic distinction between 'true' and 'truth' with care, but have emphasized the 'true' and, perhaps, neglected 'truth'. Sextus continues, making a distinction in composition between 'true' and 'truth'.

'Truth' as knowledge, is 'an aggregation of many things':

In composition, as far as what is true is thought of as something uniform and simple in nature, such as (at present) 'It is day' and 'I am having a discussion', while the truth, on the contrary, is supposed (on the assumption that it consists of knowledge) to be composite and an aggregation of many things. Thus, just as the populace is one thing and the citizen another, and the populace is the aggregation of many citizens while the citizen is the single one. By the same reasoning truth differs from what is true, and the truth resembles the populace (ἀνωτέροις) and what is true resembles the citizen, because the former is composite, and the latter simple.

(Sextus Empiricus 2005 and 1935, i.40-1)

What Heath translates as 'populace' and Matz (1996: 52) transliterates as ἄνωτέροις, Liddell-Scott-Jones's Lexicon defines as ordinary country people.

If truth is corporeal and only body affects body, then we need a corporeal explanation of the adoption of opinions that come to be accepted as the truth. The Stoics explained the criterion of truth by some impressions. Smith takes a Stoic path when he explains the adoption of opinions by a desire for approbation, not in terms of whether the opinion is true or not. The desire for approbation provides the motivational link to the language community and allows Smith to pass from mind to mortal:

Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of the like faculty in another. I judge of your sight by my sight, of your ear by my ear, of your reason by my reason, of your resentment by my resentment, of your love by my love. I neither have, nor can have, any other way of judging about them.

(IMS i.3.10)

Acceptance of opinions is driven by a desire for approbation:

To approve of another man's opinions is to adopt those opinions, and to adopt them is to approve of them. If the same arguments which convince you convince me likewise, I necessarily approve of your conviction; and if they do not, I necessarily disapprove of it: neither can I possibly conceive that I should do the one without the other. To approve or disapprove, therefore, of the opinions of others is acknowledged, by every body, to mean no more than to observe their agreement or disagreement with our own. But this is equally the case with regard to our approbation or disapprobation of the sentiments or passions of others.

(IMS i.3.2)

Necessity: In a logic of necessity, one can make statements about the nature of things. Stoic logic begins when Zeno studied with Diodorus (Laritzen 1925, vii.25). We quote a report of an argument between Diodorus and another one of his students, Philo, about the logic of conditionals:

Philo says that a true conditional is one which does not have a true antecedent and a false consequent, e.g., when it is day and I am conversing, 'if it is day, then I am conversing'; but Diodorus defines it as one which neither is nor ever was capable of having a true antecedent and a false consequent. According to him, the conditional just mentioned seems to be false, since when it is day and I have become silent, it will have a true antecedent and a false consequent; but the following conditional seems true: 'If atomic elements of things do not exist, then atomic elements of things do exist', since it will always have the false antecedent . . . and the true consequent.

(Matza 1949: 235)

Philo's conditional is the 'material implication' of modern fame. The question is what to make of Diodorus's conditional? As reconstructed by Matza (1949, 1953) and Prior (1955), the Diodorean implication holds for all time. In the example given, it is the nature of things to be atomic and nature, unlike the fact of talking, this does not change.

We can thus define human nature by appeal to what is true for all members of the species. Some goal is natural for a species if and only if all members of the species have that goal. All animals have at least one goal in common, to continue to exist.

An animal's first impulse, say the Stoics, is to self-preservation, because nature from the outset endows it to itself, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work On Ends: his words are, 'The dearest thing to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof'; for it was
not likely that nature should arrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either entanglement from or affection for its own constitution. (Laertius 1925, vii.85)

While humans have the ability to reason logically in pursuit of our goals, we know from Chrysippus that this does not make us unique. Dogs too can solve logical problems in pursuit of desire. The distinction between action for pleasure and action by nature depends upon the time structure. All species are directed by impulses which precede pleasure:

As for the assertion made by some people that pleasure is the object to which the first impulse of animals is directed, it is shown by the Stoics to be false. For pleasure, if it is really felt, they declare to be a by-product, which never comes until nature by itself has sought and found the means suitable to the animal's existence or constitution; it is an aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom.

(Laertius 1925, vii.85–6)

Then follows the argument for human exceptionality. Like other species, we start impulsively but then we come to understand the consequences. Here is the organization of later Stoic ethical teaching:

The ethical branch of philosophy they divide as follows: (1) the topic of impulse; (2) the topic of things good and evil; (3) that of the passions; (4) that of virtue; (5) that of the end; (6) that of primary value and of actions; (7) that of duties or the befitting; and (8) of inducements to act or refrain from acting, ...

And nature, they say, made no difference originally between plants and animals, for she regulates the life of plants too, in their case without impulse and sensation, just as also certain processes go on of a vegetative kind in us. But when in the case of animals impulse has been superadded, whereby they are enabled to go in quest of their proper aliment, for them, say the Stoics, Nature's rule is to follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life. For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically.

(Laertius 1925, vii.84–6)

If we think of the Stoic doctrine that action proceeds foresight of advantage, then Smith's explanation of trade, so disconnected from modern economics (Levy 1992; Robinstein 2000), comes into clearer focus:

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This division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general utility to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual, consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in view so much extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.

(WN I.i.1)

We trade because it is in our nature to trade. It is a defining characteristic of our species:

Whether this propensity be one of those original principles in human nature, of which no further account can be given; or whether, as seems more probable, it be the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech, it belongs not to our present subject to examine. It is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other species of contracts. Two greyhounds, in running down the same hare, have sometimes the appearance of acting in some sort of concert. Each turns her towards his companion, or endeavours to intercept her when his companion turns her towards himself. This, however, is not the effect of any contract, but of the accidental concurrence of their passions in the same object at that particular time. Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog. Nobody ever saw one animal by its gestures and natural cries signify to another, this is mine, that yours; I am willing to give this for that.

(WN I.i.2)

'Indifference' is a Stoic concept which can refer to a goal that is not universal but only specific to a time and a place. While thought experiments can rationalize otherwise odd choices,49 sexual practices provide a real world example of Stoic indifference. If we believe an account of Smith's view of anatomy as a 'thing indifferent'50 then again we find a Stoic source in Smith's views.51 Less dramatically, Smith is clear in WN that moral codes appealing to poor people carry different imperatives about sexuality than moral codes attractive to the rich.52

Providence and sympathy

Smith told us that Stoic doctrine comes in fragments that need to be read with care.53 It is often recited only to be opposed in part or in whole. The teaching of the Stoic on providence and sympathy provides a case in point. If the truth is carried by what people in fact believe, what do we make of their views on the gods? From the universal consensus that the gods exist, the Stoics and others inferred that the gods exist.54 From the existence of
2.41. The Stoics actually argue when they are particularly eager: ‘If there are gods, there is division; the gods are, therefore, there is division’. It would make much more sense to say: ‘There is no division, therefore, there are no gods’.

2.81. But all kings, peoples, nations, make use of auguries. As if anything were as universal as the fact that people are stupid!

(Lack 1985: 273)

Concluding that ‘people are stupid’ is precisely what we do not wish to do. Instead, we attempt to follow the Stoic reasoning on this matter. So, we step into their universe, containing as it does a place for magic.

‘Sympathy’ enters the discussion. In this famous text Epictetus is questioned about persuading a man that he is under the eye of God ‘Do you not think, he answered, that all things are united in one?’ I do, said the other.

‘Very well, do you not think that what is on earth feels the influence [sympathesia] of that which is in heaven?’ (Epictetus I.civ.2.3).

‘Sympathesia’ is translated by modern specialists as ‘co-affection’ or ‘interaction’.

Epictetus’s translator adds the following note:

This is the famous principle of sympathesia..., the physical unity of the cosmos in such a form that the experience of one part necessarily affects every other. This doctrine, especially popular with the Stoics, is essentially but a philosophic formulation of the vague ideas that underlie the practices of sympathetic magic.

(Oldfather 1925 at Epictetus Liv.2.36)

An extraordinarily interesting passage from Cicero denies the divination but not the sympathy in interconnections; indeed, it is principle of unanimity. We quote from Kild’s translation which points to the fact that Cicero does not offer a Latin equivalent of sympathesia but simply gives the Greek:

You can put forward hundreds of examples like this to illustrate a natural relationship between remote separate things. Well, let’s grant this natural relationship. In no way does it overturn this argument of mine: in what way can any kind of split in the liver forecast financial gains? What natural coupling, what concord (to put it so) or unanimity, which the Greeks call sympatheia [the Stoic technical term, sympathesia] can be the cause of a harmonisation between a split in a liver and my petty cash, or between my little windfall and heaven, earth and the laws of nature?

(Posidonius 1990, F106)

‘Sympathy’ is a word of magic. As such, it was attacked by mechanical philosophers. Francis Bacon was particularly sharp, but there were others. A belief in what seems to us to be magic has been hard to accept in those who made great contributions to natural science. Knowing the relationship between Bacon and Thomas Hobbes, Bacon’s attack on sympathetic explanations helps us appreciate why both Shaftesbury and Smith provide sympathetic accounts in opposition to Hobbes and the Hobbesianism in Hume (Pock and Schlesier 2006).

Shafesbury’s distinction between ancient and modern philosophy is central in this response to Hobbes. Shaftesbury explains the difference between ancient philosophical accounts and the modern philosophy taught by Hobbes when dealing with the messy aspects of human motivation.

Shafesbury 2000 [1711] 1.73:

The question of ‘interest’ and ‘selfishness’ will be important in what follows. Shaftesbury’s target, Hobbes, made his contribution to later ‘national choice’ considerations by formulating self-interest accounts in terms of the independence of acting agents. For Hobbes, words which connect people are of no consequence:

For the Laws of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and in sumnum doing to others as we would be done to), of themselves, without the terror of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like. And Covetousness, without the Sword, are but Words and of no strength to secure a man at all.

(Hobbes 1985 [1651] ii.17.2)

In terms of twentieth-century game theory, the independence assumption implies that all cells in a game matrix are feasible. What is best for me, given
that I do not expect you to reciprocate, is often very different from what is best for me given that I expect you to reciprocate.

To challenge Hobbes’s account of the independence of acting agents, Shaftesbury appealed to the hidden property of sympathetic vibration among agents which establishes harmony. Harmony is both a musical and an ethical concept.41 In Shaftesbury’s account, the awareness of our sympathetic inter-relationship with others is a key to our happiness:

And in the next place, as PARTIAL AFFECTION is fitted only to a short and slender Enjoyment of those Pleasures of Sympathy or Participation with others, so neither is it able to derive any considerable Enjoyment from that other principal Branch of Human Happiness, viz. Consciousness of the actual or Merited Favor of others.

(Shaftesbury 2000[1711].ii.64-5)

As Smith explained Stoic teaching, the esteem we merit nary substitute for happiness when fortune fails and we get less than we deserve.

From truth claims to belief claims

Viner never averted his attention from the role Smith assigned to providence in the social order. As Viner found the role of providence more pronounced in Theory of Moral Sentiments than in Wealth of Nations, he took his position on the “Adam Smith Problem.” His explanation for the disconnect between Smith’s two great books was that Smith analyzed one human in two spheres. Here is Irwin’s summary, quoting Viner’s final position on the problem:

Smith dealt with only one man ‘who operates in two worlds, which impinge on him psychologically in different manners: first, in the non-market world, the world of his family, his neighbors, his community and country, and second, the world of market transactions, of improbity and anonymity, where the sense of justice is the only moral sentiment which has an important psychological role to play’. (Irwin 1991: 19)

Viner’s ‘two worlds’ reading of Smith is in line with how students of Viner have read Smith.42

In our view, by contrast, TMS offers an explanation of what people believe, while people act on the basis of such beliefs in both TMS and WN. We give two examples of this below. The first is taken from WN and is developed without any explicit discussion of whether Smith thinks the belief is ‘true’ or ‘false’. It is simply there. The deleterious consequences will be noted in the last edition of TMS. In the second example, from TMS, the difference between ‘true’ and ‘false’ belief becomes important. Smith judges factional beliefs that violate universality to be ‘false’.

Adam Smith and the evil of independence

In our reading, Smith moved Stoic thinking about magic from claims about the world to claims about how people interpret the world. Consequently, the providentialism with which Smith disagrees in Stoic doctrine will appear in the troubling beliefs of ordinary people. Contrary to Viner’s argument that there are no flaws in the benevolent order in Theory of Moral Sentiments, we point to Smith’s worry about ‘false’ religious belief driving the problem of faction. But Smith does not, as a consequence, endorse Cicero’s conclusion that people are stupid. Instead, he addresses the problem in Wealth of Nations with the argument that harmful religious beliefs would be exercised in a competitive equilibrium by what is most natural to humans, the desire to avoid loneliness.

Gambling for approbation. Consider one widely deployed aspect of Smith’s economics, his explanation of why individuals systematically engage in gambles that fail plausible expected value calculations. One aspect of his explanation is worthy of some attention. A class of gambles interests spectators who reward the winners with approbation and this changes the calculations of the gamblers (Levy 1999). We need to ask why the spectators reward the winners with approbation. For Smith, spectators impute more ‘win’, the judgment ‘deserve to win’ (Peart and Levy 2005). Smith explains Stoic teaching in terms of a gamble with life itself:

Human life the Stoics appear to have considered as a game of great skill in which, however, there was a mixture of chance, or of what is vulgarly understood to be chance. In such games the stake is commonly a trifling, and the whole pleasure of the game arises from playing well, from playing fairly, and playing skillfully. If notwithstanding all his skill, however, the good player should, by the influence of chance, happen to lose, the loss ought to be a matter, rather of repentance, than of serious sorrow. He has made no false stroke; he has done nothing which he ought be ashamed of. Human life, with all the advantages which can possibly attend it, ought, according to the Stoics, to be regarded but as a mere two-penny stake; a matter of far too insignificant to merit any serious concern.

(TMS VII.i.1.24; emphasis added)

For the Stoics, chance is the doctrine of the un instructed. Chance does not really exist in the kosmos:

If I am going to sail, says Epicurus, I choose the best ship and the best pilot, and I wait for the fairest weather that my circumstances and duty will allow. Prudence and propriety, the principles which the Gods have given me for the direction of my conduct, require this of me; but they require no more: and if, notwithstanding, a storm arises, which neither the strength of the vessel nor the skill of the pilot are likely to withstand, I give myself no trouble about the consequences... Whether
we are to be drowned, or come to a harbour, is the business of Jupiter, not mine.

(TMS VII.ii.1.20)

The spectator who believes as the Stoics do would of course impute from the successful arrival of the ship that the passengers travelled with the will of God. But we must remember that, for Smith, the doctrines of moral philosophy are a systematical ordering of the commonplace.

Now consider what Smith tells us in the chapter on market wages in competitive equilibrium. Here is how spectators interpret the outcome of a high stakes gamble:

"To excel in any profession, in which but few arrive at mediocrity, is the most decisive mark of what is called genius or superior talents. The public admiration which attends upon such distinguished abilities, makes always a part of their reward; a greater or smaller in proportion as it is higher or lower in degree. It makes a considerable part of that reward in the profession of physic; a still greater perhaps in that of law; in poetry and philosophy it makes almost the whole."

(WN I.x.24; emphasis added)

‘Genius’ is from a Latin word which is sometimes used to translate skilmon a Greek spirit. The spectator interprets outcomes by imputing providential design, so those who are successful are seen as having deserved success. What for the Stoics is a claim about the kosmos is for Smith a commonplace belief.

What if meritised approbation is supposed to be payment for virtue, but public applause, actual approbation, is a payment for wealth obtained by any sort successful gamble? Smith flags this for attention in the modifications of TMS made post-WN:

This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and mean condition, though necessary both to maintain and to sustain the distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments.

(TMS III.3.1)

Thus, a failure of approbation occurs as a result of a belief in the beneficence of the kosmos, the providentialism of the people Smith studies. From a win people impute that the win was deserved. Smith appeals to proverbial wisdom as a way to disregard the extremes:

In the middling and inferior stations of life, the road to virtue and that to fortune, to such fortune, at least, as men in such stations can reasonably expect to acquire, are, happily in most cases, very nearly the same. In all the middling and inferior professions, real and solid professional abilities, joined to prudence, just, firm, and temperate conduct, can very seldom fail of success. Abilities will even sometimes prevail where the conduct is by no means correct. . . . The success of such people, too, almost always depends upon the favour and good opinion of their neighbours and equals; and without a tolerably regular conduct these can very seldom be obtained. The good old proverb, therefore, That honesty is the best policy, holds, in such situations, almost always perfectly true. In such situations, therefore, we may generally expect a considerable degree of virtue; and, fortunately for the good morals of society, these are the situations of by far the greater part of mankind.

(TMS III.3.5)

The universalism in proverbial wisdom that honesty is the best policy, can help counteract the common providentialism of imputing desert from winning an unjust gamble.

When belief is ‘false’; Smith does not move directly from sympathetic judgments to behaviour. Rules, religion and education are all intermediate steps between sympathy and behaviour. We come to believe in the gods and we enter into their situation in our imagination. Just as we project our mind into the situation of the gods, we imbibe our sentiments into the situation of the gods. Sympathetic projection, as Smith describes, equalizes. We suppose the gods are just like us:

This opinion or apprehension, I say, seems first to be impressed by nature. Men are naturally led to ascribe to those mysterious beings, whatever they are, which happen, in any country, to be the objects of religious fear, all their own sentiments and passions. They have no other; they can conceive no other to ascribe to them. Those unknown intelligences which they imagine but see not, must necessarily be formed with some sort of resemblance to those intelligences of which they have experience. During the ignorance and darkness of pagan superstition, mankind seem to have formed the ideas of their divinities with so little delicacy, that they ascribed to them, indiscriminately, all the passions of human nature, those not excepted which do the least honour to our species, such as lust, hunger, avarice, envy, revenge.

(TMS III.5.4)

Reflection and discussion make a difference as we move from gods who are just like us to gods who are what we would become:

They could not fail, therefore, to ascribe to those beings, for the excellence of whose nature they still conceived the highest admiration, those sentiments and qualities which are the great ornaments of humanity, and
which seems to raise it to a resemblance of divine perfection, the love of virtue and beneficence, and the abhorrence of vice and injustice.

TMS III.5.4

Our sympathy is embodied in our beliefs about the gods. This argument is consistent with Viner’s reading.

What is not consistent, is Smith’s next step. Smith asks, do things always work out well? A problem arises when religious beliefs are fractional.

False notions of religion are almost the only causes which can occasion any very gross perversion of our natural sentiments in this way; and that principle which gives the greatest authority to the rules of duty, is alone capable of disturbing our ideas of them in any considerable degree.

TMS III.6.12, emphasis added

Has Smith abandoned Stoicism to appeal to the sympathy of people? Smith’s answer is found in WN. A natural characteristic of human will purge religion of evil if we do not hinder it.36

The teachers of each sect, seeing themselves surrounded on all sides with more adversaries than friends, would be obliged to learn that candour and moderation which is so seldom to be found among the teachers of those great sects, whose tenets being supported by the civil magistrate, are held in veneration by almost all the inhabitants of extensive kingdoms and empires, and who therefore are nothing round them but followers, disciples, and humble admirers. The teachers of each little sect, finding themselves almost alone, would be obliged to respect those of almost every other sect, and the concessions which they would mutually find it both convenient and agreeable to make to one another, might in time probably reduce the doctrine of the greater part of them to that pure and rational religion, free from every mixture of absurdity, imposture, or fanaticism, such as wise men have in all ages of the world wished to see established, but such as popular law has perhaps never yet established, and probably never will establish in any country because, with regard to religion, popular law always has been, and probably always will be, more or less inclined by popular superstition and enthusiasm.

(WN V.1.8)

There is a trade in the passage.

The Stoic context of the ‘invisible hand’

Smith insists that our natural inclinations are to seek our own happiness and, because our place in the social world has motivational weight, the approval of our friends and neighbours (TMS III.2.15). Smith’s critical worry is that religions might create factions. With factions, the connection between the actual approval of our neighbours and the moral approval of the wider world is attenuated. Smith’s answer, quoted above, emphasizes the importance of connections. It is not natural for a person to be alone. This is the fundamental axiom of the doctrine of human sociability. To cure benevolent people talk. In a system of natural liberty in religion, they find that they disagree. What happens? The teachers of each little sect, finding themselves almost alone, would be obliged to respect those of almost every other sect. … By trade in the space of belief, they keep the conversation going. They compromise and agree to disagree because without the trade, they risk being alone. As Epicurus argued, it is natural to believe that even God fears loneliness.

Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ is offered to encapsulate the argument that individuals, pursuing their natural inclinations, will be led to promote a larger good, the interests of “the great society of mankind.”37 Smith presupposes the doctrine of human sociability. The Stoic philosophers put forward the imperative of universal happiness and connection.38 A life according to nature is the Stoic maxim.39 The question that arises is to what degree these Stoic teachings are consistent. The burden for Smith between a life by natural inclination and instruction and the goal of universal happiness is faction. Since for Smith there is no difference between trade and discussion, we can see factions by making it necessary to trade as we discuss.

Situation matters. The Stoics lived in a world in which it was natural to ask whether God existed. But Smith also lived in a world in which people were still treated as if they were cattle and from that vantage point, perhaps, he could read more deeply into Stoic texts than those of us who inherited a happier world. We who do not see the social world that way but who are still troubled by the problem of factions might consider that Adam Smith and his Stoic masters have something still to teach us. The faction which most concerns us, to speak to our research, is the faction of experts. The problem which Smith encountered, to remove the bias of the teacher from the teaching, is precisely what we have encountered there (Pearl and Levy 2008, Levy and Pearl 2008).

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Notes

1. Smith’s celebrated ‘man of system’ passage gives a context in which philosopher and legislator come together (TMS VIII.2.17).
The reasoning of philosophy, it may be said, though they may confound and perplex the understanding, can never break down the necessary connection which nature has established between causes and their effects. The causes which naturally excite our desires and aversions, our hopes and fears, our joys and sorrows, would, no doubt, notwithstanding all the reasons of Stoics, produce upon each individual, according to the degree of his actual sensibility, their proper and necessary effects. The judgments of the sum within the breast, however, might be a good deal affected by those reasons, and that great innate might be taught by them to attempt to overcome all our private, partial, and selfish affections into a more or less perfect tranquility. To direct the judgments of this innate is the great purpose of all systems of morality. That the Stoical philosophy had very great influence upon the character and conduct of its followers, cannot be doubted; and that though it might sometimes invite us to unnecessary violence, its general tendency was to animate them to actions of the most heroic magnanimity and most extensive benevolence" (TMS VII.I.47).

"The plen and system which Nature has sketched out for our conduct, seems to be altogether different from that of the Stoical philosophy" (TMS VII.I.43).

"Most people thought, if the gods took to dissemble, they would adopt no other system than that of the Stoics" (Diogenes Laertius, 1715, viii.180). "Offered and to have been the greatest logician of ancient times. Chrysippus was regarded as the second founder of Stoicism; according to an old saying, "If there had been no Chrysippus, there would have been no Stoics." It seems likely that Chrysippus was responsible for the final organization of Stoic logic into a calculus" (Mates 1953, 7).

"In terms of the Stoic technique, Smith means 'place' motivational weight. We are born at a particular place. Appealing to an axiom of innate sociability which Smith and the Stoics share, we know that the connections which we develop in that place will naturally flow to us. Therefore, place is connected to Smith's system: in the classical Stoic systems place along with table, void and time are the Incorporated (Long and Sedley 1987: 162-65). "That" is defined in terms of table and void and is distinguished from 'truth' as we see below.

We argue that utilitarianism in the classical period (before F. H. G. Edgeworth) needs to be read with the supposition of sympathetic agents, Pearl and Levy (2005).

"Vivenza (1881: 22) uses this passage as the first classical text in her book.

"Zeno formulated the concept and ideal of cosmopolitanism. Since there is only one world, we must believe that all human beings are citizens of this world. This ideal is contrary to all the ancient and modern particularisms and nationalism, but it has had wide appeal in many ages, and also in our own century. It has often been forgotten that the merit of this concept is due to Zeno..." (Kristeller 1991: 34-5).

Thus, the identification of liberalism with cosmopolitanism, as Mall (1979: 1966): 419: Furnov 1920: 4; and Hecker: 1953: 33-5) pays homage to the Stoic roots of the liberal tradition. Our obligations to "all other rational creatures" may speak to Hume's "other rational species" problem (Levy and Pearl, 2004).

"These natural hopes and fears, and suspicions, were propagated by sympathy, and continued by education; and the gods were universally represented and believed to be the rewards of humanity and mercy, and the avengers of perfidy and injustice. And thus religion, even in its most fatal form, gave a sanction to the rules of morality, long before the age of artificial reasoning and philosophy. That the terror of religion should enforce the natural sense of duty, was of too much importance to the happiness of mankind, for nature to leave it dependent upon the showiness and uncertainty of philosophical researches" (TMS III.3.4).

"Epictetus (44) is quoted as the first epigraph.

"Now it might be thought that "truth" meant merely the characteristic of being true and first consistency, when the senses of "true" were determined; the senses of "truth" would thus be determined. In State usage this was the rate" (Mates 1953: 35).

"The criterion for determining the truth of presentations, much discussed by the Stoics, is an epistemological problem and not within the scope of this work" (Mates 1953: 35-6). By the "leading part" Sextus here means the intellect, which is part of the soul and therefore, for the Stoics, material. He held, then, that the "truth" refers to a complete body of knowledge as it may be possessed by a person or persons, while "true" is an adjective applied to an axioms. The linguistic distinction appears to be a little eccentric, but it perfectly intelligible. We shall not be further concerned with the truth in the "true sense" (Korshe and Koelke 1962: 150).

"A presentation (or mental impression) is an impression on the mind the name having been appropriately borrowed from the imprint made by the soul upon the wax" (Lasar 1925, vii.46). 'The Stoa agree to put in the forefront the doctrine of presentation and sensation, inasmuch as the standard by which the truth of things is tested is generically a presentation... "(Lasar 1925, vii.49).

"In the years immediately preceding his work on Stoic logic, Prior questioned the motivational claims which Smith must assert: it would probably be acknowledged that we would be in fact approving of all opinions coinciding with our own, and of no others, but why would we? Plainly, many would say, because to raise an opinion "our own" is to regard it as true, i.e., as a perception or representation of a fact beyond the opinion itself; and it is because of the supposed accordance of another man's opinion with this fact, rather than because of its own accordance with our own opinion, that we approve it, i.e., we consider it true" (Prior 1949: 66-7). Subsequent (2005) gives evidence that Smith's presentation in the 'History of Astronomy' is as much in accord with Prior's principles as his own..."

"Disorders managed to define a plausible sense of 'implication' that is stronger than Natural implication and weaker than Strict implication -- a fact requiring no little skill" (Mates 1949: 235). The technical context of debates over necessity -- the 'master argument' -- is reported in Epictetus' Discourses (II.3.40) (Mates 1953: 38). Prior (1955) offers a solution to the master argument which shows how classical discussions of modal logic fit into the modern systems.

"From the logic of natural as universal, the sceptic denies that there are natural goods: 'fire, which burns by nature, appears to everyone to be productive of heat, and snow, which by nature appears to everyone to be productive of coldness, and all the things which are affective by nature affect the same way those who are, as the Dogmatists put it, in a natural condition'; but, as we shall show, none of the so-called 'good' affects everyone as being good; therefore, there does not exist anything that is good by nature" (Mates 1956: Sextus Empiricus' Outlines, I.2.3:179).

"And according to Chrysippus, who was certainly no friend to non-animal animals, a dog can share in the celebrated Dialectic. In fact, this author says that the dog uses repeated applications of the fifth undetermined argument which, arriving at a junction of three paths, after sniffing at the two down which the quarry did not go, hesitates to cross the unsought path. In an essay on the nature of authority, the dog in effect reasons as follows: the animal either went this way or that way to the other, he did not go this way and he did not go that; therefore, he went the other" (Mates 1996: Sextus Empiricus' Outlines, I.14.69).

"But some say that none of the things indifferent by nature are truly preferred or rejected; for every indifferent thing appears, in different circumstances, sometimes preferred and sometimes rejected. For they say, if the wealthy are being plotted against by pragmatists, the poor are left in peace, everyone would
choose to be poor rather than wealthy, so that wealth becomes a thing rejected. Consequently, since every so-called "indefinite" thing is called "good" by some people and "bad" by others, whereas all alike would consider it "indefinite" by nature, nothing is indifferent by nature (Makazi 1996 – Sextus Empiricus Outlines 2.28.192-3).

"Adam Smith, whom I know well, was a man of much investigation, knowledge, and sagacity; with a heart overflowing with benevolence and sociability, but he was strong furnished with French Philosophy and rhetoric" To mention two circumstances, in which I cannot be mistaken, because spoken to myself, and although contradictory to the sentiments I had expressed, not spoken in publish, where men often spot opinions for argument, but in the familiarity of individual conversation, where the unsolicited sentiments are spoke. These were: "That the Christian Religion defines the human mind" and that "Society was a thing in itself indifferent." (Dalyrapel 1800: 4). Salmon first pointed out this text to us.

"...among us sodomy is regarded as shameful... whereas by the Germain, they say, it is not considered shameful but just a customary thing. But is there anything surprising about this, when not only the followers of the Cyre philosophy but also those of Zeno of Citium, namely Chneus and Crispus, say that this practice is indifferent?" (Makazi 1996 – Sextus Empiricus Outlines 2.34.169-170).

In TMS Smith responds to Manoeuvre on電腦 and charity, suggesting that sympathy follows consequences: "Those virtuous, however, do not receive an entire indeliverability to the object of the passions which they mean to governo. They only aim at restraining the violence of those passions so far as not to hurt the individual, and neither disturb nor offend the society. (TMS VIII.4.11)WMakes it clear that consequences depend upon what society says it. "In the liberal or loose system, luxury, wanton and even disorderly sorts, the pursuit of pleasure to some degree of impropriety, the breach of charity, at least in use of the two sorts, etc. provided they are not accompanied with gross indelicacy, and do not lead to falsehood or injustice, are generally treated with a good deal of indulgence, and are usually either excused or pardoned altogether. In the master system, on the contrary, those excesses are regarded with the utmost abhorrence and detestation. The vices of levy are always notorious to the common people. (WN V.I.10).

In his published work, "fragments" is used only in a Sjost context. "The Sjost, in the few fragments of their philosophy which have come down to us, sometimes talk of leaving life with a paty, and even with a levy, which, were we to consider those passages by themselves, might induce us to believe that they imagined we could with propriety leave it whenever we had a mind, wantonly and capriciously, upon the slightest disgust or unchangeable. (TMS VIII.1.26). The few fragments which have come down to us of what the ancient philosophers had written upon these subjects, form, perhaps, one of the most instructive, as well as one of the most interesting remains of antiquity. The spirit and method of their doctrines make a wonderful contrast with the degenerating, phœnix, and rising tone of some modern systems. (TMS VIII.1.29).

"Fragment" also appears when Smith wrote to David Hume to make arrangement for his papers in the event of his death. "I must tell you that except those which I carry along with me there are none worth the publishing, but a fragment of a agent work which contains a history of the Astronomical Systems that were successively in fashion down to the time of Den Carter. Whether this might not be published as a fragment of an intended joint work, I leave entirely to your judgment. (Corr. Letter 137, 16 April (1773).

Sextus Empiricus, Against Physicains 1: 60-61 discusses proofs for the existence of gods and puts universal agreement about the existence of the gods in first place.

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This seems to be a persuasive argument. The argument that myths about faded are incorrect (Sextus Empiricus 1: 79-82) does not apply to beliefs about the gods. Sextus credits the States here.

24 Postodionas 1899-1999, p. 26: "Great friend Postodionas published five books on "divination". Kold comments: "Postodionas was without doubt valued by Cicero, but certainly exclusively." Cicero's respect and attention is as clear as can be: Postodionas 1899-1999, p. 31: "Postodionas by whom I was trained." 33: "...the famous Postodionas, the greatest of all the States."

With the Eudo-ch regiment, Kold Postodionas as a guide, one might read what Smith read and hear Postodionas agree with Chrypsys. Postodionas's emphasis on the rule of emotion in ethics, (146-5) is important for Smith's (Hume) Eudo-ch: Kold could help determine what type of ancient world could have told Smith about Postodionas's contributions (Kristeller 1991: 123-39) and so saved Smith from his assertion that there was no State who was a component antiquarian (Smith 1930) [1978] "Aristotle, iv. 14).

Long & Sedley (1987: 489). Liddell & Scott-Jones's Lexicon gives an older translation "private feeling, sympathy" "Co-sympathy" suggests the denial of independent agency which we take as critical to Smith's argument and suggests his opposition well-documented in the literature to the apathy idea, apathy.

26 Luck 1985: 3-4. "One important concept in all magic is the principle of cosmic sympathy, which has nothing to do with compassion but means something like "action and reaction in the universe". All creatures, all created things, are united by a common bond. If one is affected, another one, no matter how distant or seemingly unconnected, feels the impact. This is a great and noble idea, but in magic it was merely applied in order to gain control. Scientists think in terms of cause and effect, while magic think in terms of sympathy or correspondence in the sense defined above... and by some sort or direct mechanical influence but rather by a hidden "vibration"... This doctrine was held, with variations, by Pythagoreans, Platonists, and Stoics. Among the Stoics, Postodionas of Apamea (c. 135-20 BC) should be mentioned.

Perhaps the most famous linkage between magic and sympathy via vibration occurs in Plotinus Ennead (1991) IV.4.40-1. The magician is inside the world of enchantment. Supporting the image to stand outside the All, his evocations and invocations would no longer exist to draw up or call down... The prayer is answered by the mere fact that part of and other part are brought onto one tone like a musical string which, plucked at one end, vibrates at the other also... The complementariness of State sources for Plotinus are discussed by Bodek et al (1977).

There are hundreds of references to "sympathy" and "sympathetic magic" in Thoamakia (1925-35). For instance in volume 8 the index entry "sympathy" (1928: 87-87) is approximately the same size as the entry for "earth" (1925: 37-37). Two modern specialists accounts of ancient science list anthology of the State doctrine of sympathy: DiIkelaneth (1950: 84) and Lloyd (1977: 44). The distinction in Wallace (1958: 8-10) distinguishes between the impact of sound and other senses.

27 Bacone (1620, parr. 55): "Again the students of natural magic, who explain everything by sympathes and antitheses, have in their mind and most skilful recurrences ascribed to substances wonderful virtues and operations: and if ever they have produced works, they have been such as aim rather at admiration and mostly than at utility and fruit." Seen belles oeuvres found this for us.

Leibniz's comment on Newton's principle of action mentions the mysticism of sympathetic explanations: "la interception est certaine, on passe tienon a d'autres oppositions semblables, comme il la peint le frere de Savoie. A l'entrevue de Moos, Nemo, a des sympathes et antithes de voleurs et vice versa.

Keves (1995: 34): “The major innovation in Newton’s scientific work, the concept of force, was derived from his beliefs in the occult powers of the natural magic tradition, of which, for him, the most important part was alchemy.” C. F. Henry (1988).

Keves purchased a box of Newton’s alchemical manuscripts and described the reactions of earlier scholars who looked into it. “After his death Bishop Horsley was asked to inspect the box with a view to publication. He saw the contents with horror and slammed the lid. A hundred years later Sir David Brewster looked into the box. He covered up the tracts with carefully selected extracts and some straight ribbon. His latest biographer, Mr. Mont, has been more candid. Keves (1931: 177), A later specialist’s judgement is even harsher than Keves’s (Dobson 1975: 11-14).

“Our modern Philosopher” says Courage is constant anger” (Shattuck 2000 [1711]: 75), the reference is万余元’s definition of anger.

Upon the whole, it may be said properly to be the same with the Affection of Passion in an Animal Constitution, as with the Cord or Strings of a Musical Instrument. If these, this is ever so just proportion one to another, are struck beyond a certain degree, ’tis more than the Instrument will bear. The Wire or Lyre is broken, and its Effect lost. On the other hand, if while some of the Strings are duly excited, others are not struck up to their Due proportion then is the Instrument still in disorder, and it Part III perdu. The several Species of Creatures are like different sorts of Instruments. And even the same Species of Creatures (as in the same sort of Instruments) one is not exactly like the other, nor will the same Strings for each. The same degree of Strength which winds up one, and the several Strings to just Harmony and Content, may in another part both the Strings and Instrument itself. But Men who have Liveliest Sense, and are the easiest affected with Pain or Pleasure, have the need of the strongest Influence or Force of the Affections, such as Tenderness, Love, Sociability, Compassion, in order to preserve a right Balance within, and to maintain them in their Decay, and in the just performance of their Part; whilst others, who are of a cooler Blood, or lower Key, need not the same Allay or Counterpoise; nor are made by Nature to feel those tender and enduring [7] Affections in an exquisitive degree” (Shattuck-2000 [1711] ii.5).

Walker gives suggestions as to why the sense of hearing was considered more important than that of sight (1938: 10–11). Long (1996) also attends to the role of sound in the Stoic tradition. Using Aristotelian texts, he conjectures: “May we take the Stoics to be developing a comparable analogy between musical and ethical harmony?” (1996: 204). Levy and Petit (2004) find sympathy as vibration in Homer’s Iliad. Account of sensitivity as vibration did not end with Smith. One can be found in Francis Darwin’s domain: Garden (1791). Petit and Levy (2005) discuss nineteenth-century biological thinking about sympathy.

Irons (1991, 18) summarizes the position: [In TMS] The beneficent order in nature shown by sense flows and operations to promote the well-being of mankind. Viner maintains that although traces of this approach appear in the Wealth of Nations, "on the points at which they come into conflict there is a substantial measure of irreconcilable divergence between the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations, with respect to the character of the natural order".

Justice is not the only moral sentiment in the Wealth of Nations. In TMS Smith explains carefully the distinction between justice and generosity (Levy and Petit 2004). There is generous behaviour in the Wealth of Nations, as without beggars who love by the generosity of others (WN I, l.2; l. 5.3; II, l. 5). The significant orders receive considerable attention (WN IV, l.20; V, l.10). There is also the more complicated issue to which we return below that of the desire for approbation which is central to Smith’s theory of the egalitarianism of societies, and the advantages of employment in competitive equitarians, rightly regarded by Stigler as one of Smith’s triumphs (Oates 1976: 120).

Viner’s description of the sympathetic machinery: in terms of psychology speaks to whether there is any substantial difference between Viner’s and Smith’s reading of Smith, as argued in Medora (forthcoming) Stigler (1960: 44) traces the independence between economics and psychology to Smith. In fact Smith’s professional work, on psychology (in the Theory of Moral Sentiments) bears scarcely any relationship to his economics, and this tradition of independence of economics from psychology has persisted… Stigler mentions Smith’s use of inferences in the work of Smith’s psychological account of the stability of labor discipline (1794: 997). He emphasizes that he is not sure whether Smith is in error here.

Thus, the doctrine that the lot reveals the will of God can be found most clearly in Jonah. This is cited as a point upon which adherents of all doctrines agree in Beddoe’s Colloquy. “If a storm arose and could not be calmed with prayer, men of old used to cast lots and throw overboard the one on whom the lot had fallen. How is it the prophet Jonah, on whom the lot had fallen, was thrown overboard, the storm suddenly subsided… Would that customs were again put into practice. The lot used to fall rather often upon a very influential man, though never unless he desired it. However, because of his powerful bodyguard he was able to uncle the sacred box. Therefore, the lots on ships fell into disuse” (Beddoe 1975: 12–13).

Smith’s argument is sketched in Levy (1976) on the logic of contract and concern for connections. Brinton (2004: 184, 186) highlights the importance of faction for the reading of Theory of Moral Sentiments but seems not to appreciate the importance of competition of religions in Wealth of Nations as a way out.

The rich only select from the heap what is most precious and agreeable. They consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, they never view their own convenience, though the sole end and those to which they propose from the benefits of all the thousands whom they employ, he the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessary of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal parts among all its inhabitants, and that without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford rooms to the multiplication of the species. When Providence divides the earth among a few very numerous species, it either: forgets saw abandoned those who seemed to have been left out in the partition” (TMS IV. 10). The more famous passage in WN is less ambiguous: “For generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own ease, and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse, the society for the good that it was no part of it. This is also the case of those who are more effectually than when he really intends to promote it” (WN IV. 9).

Each one of us, as it was entirely encompassed by many circles, some smaller, others larger, the latter encasing the former on the basis of their different and unequal dispositions relative to each other. The first and closest circle in the one which a person has drawn as though around a stone, his own mind. This circle encloses the body and anything taken for the sake of the body. For it is virtually the smallest circle, and almost touches the centre itself. Next, the second one further
removed from the centre . . . contains parents, siblings, wife, and children. The
third one has in it uncles and aunts, grandparents, nephews, nieces, and cousins.
The next circle includes the other relatives, and this is followed by the circle of
local residents, then the circle of fellow-citizens, next that of fellow-citizens,
and then in the same way the circle of people from the neighboring towns, and
the circle of fellow-countermen. The outermost and largest circle, which
encompasses all the rest, is that of the whole human race. Once these have been
all surveyed, it is the task of a well tempered man, in his proper treatment of each
group, to draw the circles together somehow towards the centre, and to keep
jealously transferring those from the enclosing circles into the enclosed ones . . .
39 "They [the Stoics] say that being happy is the end, for the sake of which every-
things is done, but which is not itself done for the sake of anything. This consists
in living in accordance with virtue, in living in agreement, or, what is the same,

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