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States and Nomads: Hegel's World and Nietzsche Earth

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What is Nietzsche's concept of the earth? While “earth” is often taken in a general way to refer to embodied life, to this world rather than to an imaginary and disastrous other world, I propose that the term and concept also have a significant political dimension—a geophilosophical dimension—which is closely related to the radical immanence so central to Nietzsche’s thought. I shall argue that he often and pointedly replaces the very term “world” (Welt) with “earth” (Erde) because “world” is tied too closely to ideas of unity, eternity, and transcendence. “World” is a concept with theological affiliations, as Nietzsche indicates in Beyond Good and Evil:

Around a hero everything becomes a tragedy, around a demi-god everything becomes a satyr play; and around God everything becomes—what do you think? perhaps the “world”? (BGE 150)

This can be amplified when we recall Nietzsche’s declaration that he was afraid we haven’t gotten rid of God yet, because we still have faith in grammar, his speaking of the lingering shadow of God, and his thesis that with the disappearance of the “true world” the apparent one disappears as well. The trinity of God, man, and world is a common philosopheme and set of philosophemes. Perhaps one of the late arriving insights that follow in the slow mourning process that accompanies God’s death has to do with the disappearance of that which we call “world.” Like all metaphysical and theological concepts, world has a political import, one evident to Nietzsche
in Hegel and those he considered Hegelians (for example, Strauss and Eduard von Hartmann); in *The Birth of Tragedy* he speaks contemptuously of “so-called world-history” and in his second *Unmodern Observations* he ridicules the fashionable notion of the *Weltprozess*—do we hear an anticipation of such notions as globalization there?—and exclaims “world, world, world!” in high exasperation (*UM* II:9). When Nietzsche comes to write of “great events,” they are not exclusively tied to the state and world-history, as they are for the Hegelians, but (as the chapter “On Great Events” in *Zarathustra* makes clear) events of the earth. If for Hegel “the state is the march (*Gang*) of God through the world,” for Nietzsche the earth is a human-earth of mobile multitudes that can prepare a way for the overhuman. In order to grasp Nietzsche’s “great politics” of the earth more perspicuously, it is useful to see how in rhetoric and substance it constitutes a response to the theologico-political treatise that is Hegel’s *Philosophy of World History* and to those Nietzsche saw as Hegelian epigones.

Since Nietzsche claimed that *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* was his most important work, let us begin by listening to some of Zarathustra’s striking invocations of the earth there. He calls on his listeners to sacrifice themselves for the *Sinn der Erde*; though this phrase is typically translated as “meaning” or “sense,” it could also be rendered as “direction.” Where is the earth going? Where do we want it to go? Zarathustra requires his disciples (*Jünger*) to give their loyalty (*Treue*) to the earth, addresses the condition of the human earth (*Menschen-Erde*), and encourages his listeners to think with “an earthly head that creates a direction for the earth (*einen Erden-Kopf, der der Erde Sinn schafft!*”) (*Z* “Prologue” 3; *Z* I “On the Gift-Giving Virtue”; *Z* III “The Convalescent”; *Z* I “The Afterworldly”). The earth must be rescued from the threatened domination of the last human: “For the earth has now become small, and upon it hops the last human, who makes everything small” (*Z* “Prologue” 5). After *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche’s later works typically refer to a project of evaluating moralities, religions, and cultures as ways of being “on the earth”: I hope to show that this is more than a conventional phrase.

Most critical engagements with Nietzsche’s idea of earth take one of several forms, which tend to ignore or minimize the political, geographical, and geological relevance of the concept. One approach sees earth as designating the immanent, bodily, or this-worldly, as opposed to imaginary afterworlds of religious and transcendental traditions; while not inaccurate, this characterization remains somewhat vague.1 A phenomenological interpretation emphasizes Nietzsche’s poetics and metaphors of the earth, sometimes enriched by recalling his experience as traveler,
walker, and poet receptive to the beautiful, sublime, and picturesque in natural and artificial landscapes.\(^2\) This approach includes Bachelard’s celebration of Nietzsche’s virtual flight (air as an earthly element) and Irigaray’s disappointed love letter, lamenting his avoidance of the feminine, maternal sea.\(^3\) Some readers focus on Nietzsche’s adaptation of poetic and philosophical topoi from early Greek thinkers and poets, especially Empedocles, for whom Gaia retained features of the divine.\(^4\)

Inspired by Nietzsche’s reading of Hölderlin and Heidegger’s reading of both, this approach tends to stop short of articulating the way in which, thinking with his *Erden-Kopf*, Nietzsche conceives the *Sinn der Erde* against the background of Hegel’s philosophy of history and doctrine of the state, or his noting the new paths developing in human geography, which highlighted human mobility: nomadism, migrations, and wanderings of peoples.\(^5\)

Another important strand in this thought complex should be explored more thoroughly—one involving Nietzsche’s sustained and critical dialogue with Hegel’s idea of world-history and sensitive, as Nietzsche was, to emerging trends in human geography. Nietzsche read Hegel’s lectures on *Weltgeschichte* as early as 1865.\(^6\) To read Nietzsche as the anti-Hegel is not unusual; it is one of the main themes of Deleuze’s Nietzsche book, which brilliantly explicates the differences between the negations involved in Hegel’s dialectic of recognition and Nietzsche’s discrimination of sovereign affirmation and the other-directed *ressentiment* of the base. Here I focus on another contrast, one Deleuze developed in part from his engagement with Nietzsche: that between states and nomads considered as forms of human organization and inhabitation associated with distinctive ways of thinking. It is Nietzsche’s attention to such themes that leads Deleuze and Guattari to credit him as the inventor of geophilosophy. History and the history of philosophy belong to the state, geography and geophilosophy to the nomads.\(^7\) Nietzsche, rather than Hegel, can help us think more perspicuously about themes on the contemporary philosophical agenda, which go by names like globalization, multiculturalism, diaspora, hybridity, and cosmopolitanism. (The Hegel whom Nietzsche confronts will strike some readers as a caricature, based on a selective reading of incomplete and questionable versions of his lectures. While more recent scholarship has given us a more subtle Hegel—actually, a choice among several versions of a more subtle Hegel—Nietzsche’s Hegel is firmly based in the text of *The Philosophy of World History* that was available to him. The popular Hegelians of Nietzsche’s day—for example Strauss and Hartmann—reinforced the caricature, if such it is, and made it a forceful presence in the 1870s and 1880s. Finally—but this is a point that I
can suggest only briefly in what follows—I believe that much recent scholarship has been overly zealous in its attempt to provide a Hegel who would be more acceptable to a democratic, pluralistic era, even to the point of producing somewhat misleading translations of key titles and passages.

Recall a few features of Hegelian Weltgeschichte that led Nietzsche to sneer repeatedly at "so-called world-history" and to exclaim with disgust at Eduard von Hartmann's grotesque version of Hegel: "world, world, world!" (D 307; UM I: 9). Why does he challenge the implicit political ontology and ideology of this mantra? The short answer is that he rejects Hegel's understanding of world-history as the story of freedom and as the history of states which embody and develop it. Nietzsche sees that story of freedom as vain narcissism, masking the animal nature and millennia of custom that shape human beings. He denies that the state is the realization of freedom, the eternal or highest attainable form of human organization (WS 12, D 18). Nietzsche contrasts "major history" (Hauptgeschichte) with world-history; Hauptgeschichte includes the many millennia of animal and customary life—the Sittlichkeit der Sitte—in addition to the recent history of states that feeds our vanity (BGE 32; GM III: 9; D 18). In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche considers the possibility that the role left for us critical thinkers in the carnivalesque atmosphere of modernity, swimming in our knowledge of the past and trying on one costume or mask after another, is to be "parodists of world history" (BGE 223).

Hegel's claim that history is the story of freedom is well known; I will not elaborate it at length here. World-history, in Hegel's system, is the highest development of objective spirit, a realm in which the state is the final realization of human freedom. Only with states is world-history possible, and world-history is exclusively concerned with states. Hegel's restrictive conception of world-history has been obscured by many commentators and translators; some of the latter blur the issues by translating Weltgeschichte as "universal history." But Hegel is clear:

The state is the divine Idea as it exists on earth. In this sense the state is the precise object of world-history in general.

In world-history, however, we are concerned with "individuals" that are nations, with wholes that are states.

For Hegel the concepts "world" and "world-history" are highly singular, unifying, and exclusive. In his most systematic account of the place of world-history in the Encyclopedia he describes the movement of spirit as demonstrating the realization of "the absolute final aim of the world"
where spirit "becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit—a world-spirit." 

World-history is the totality of states, and the succession of world-historical states is the home ground of Absolute Spirit—art, religion, and philosophy. Hegel famously compares the Oriental, Classical, and Germanic worlds in which one, some, or all are free—varying realizations of freedom all achieved through states. The life of states is contrasted with the existence of a "people" or "folk [Volk]," or, speaking more precisely, the state is the telos of a people, one sometimes achieved and sometimes not. Hegel insists that the mere Volk is not a subject of history: "A Volk with no state formation [a mere nation/Nation] has, strictly speaking, no history—like the Völker which existed before the rise of states and others which still exist as wild nations [als wilde Nationen]." 

A word concerning Hegel's reference to "mere nations" and "wild nations" is in order. Nation is an adaptation of a Latin term, whose verbal root is nascere, to give birth. Nations as such, then, are nothing but human beings of common ancestry, linked by "natality," that is genealogical affiliation. Hegel's terminology suggests that a nation may be more than this; it may become a people, and a people, with some degree of cultural coherence, is on the way to focusing itself in the form of a state.

Why are migrations and wanderings specifically excluded from world-history, and why do migrants and wanderers tend to remain in the status of mere or wild nations? The root intuition seems to be that a world-historical people must stay in its place. The state must have sovereignty over a given territory, which is the prerequisite for its crystallization of the spiritual meaning of its people. Without the state, there are simply wild nations living on the earth; there is as yet no world. Hegel could say of the "wild nations" what Heidegger said of animals, that they are weltarm, world-poor. "World-historical peoples" are those that form and live in states. When English translations render Weltgeschichte as "universal history," I assume that the aim, as in Carl Friedrich's introduction to the Sibree translation of the Philosophy of History, is to downplay Hegel's political theology, his idea that "the state is God's march [Gang] through the world."

Historical existence requires a state that has settled in a territory. Therefore, it initially seems strange that Hegel emphasizes that the Germanic world, which will see the full flowering of Spirit and state, begins with barbarous, wandering, predatory peoples—Goths, Visigoths, and so on. Yet Hegel implies that these groups are no different than any others; no Volk enters history until engaged in the process of state formation. Hegel makes German barbarism a virtue, claiming that it was the Germans' strength to begin by absorbing and appropriating, unlike earlier historical peoples who begin with an internal development:
The Greeks and Romans had reached maturity within, before they
directed their energies outwards. The Germans, on the contrary, be­
gan with self-diffusion—deluging the world, and overpowering in
their course the inwardly rotten, hollow political fabrics of the civi­
lized nations. Only then did their development begin, kindled by a
foreign religion, polity, and legislation.\(^{18}\)

The very being of the German people is their transformation through en­
counters with the other, so they are uniquely suited to confirm Hegel’s
concept of the true identity as the identity of identity and non-identity.
They seize Rome and appropriate Christianity almost thoughtlessly, but—
such is the cunning of history—they are transformed in the end by what
they have captured. They are predatory \textit{subjects} who will be transformed by
their \textit{object}. On Hegel’s account, it is this heritage that allows the Germans,
through the Reformation and the development of the modern state, to spiri­
tualize the secular. Their wandering, migration, and nomadism become sub­
ordinated to the process of state formation in which religion is essential.

Now consider some of Nietzsche’s encounters with those he saw as the
reigning Hegelian thinkers of his time. The first of Nietzsche’s “assassina­
tion attempts” (as he called them in \textit{Ecce Homo}) was directed at David F.
Strauss in the first \textit{Untimely Meditations}. He pilloried Strauss as a repre­
sentative of the “cultural philistinism” of the emerging Bismarck era. From
our post-Kojève perspective, we can read Strauss as an “end of history”
thinker, a predecessor of Kojève and Francis Fukuyama, who believed that
the German state was consolidating a final realization of human potential.
While Strauss sought to distinguish himself from Hegel, embracing Dar­
winism and rejecting Hegel’s insistence on religion as a necessary legiti­
mizing and unifying component of the state, Nietzsche sees that this old
“young Hegelian” has deeper ties to the master he ostensibly repudiates.
Strauss’s criticism of republics and democracy, and his insistence on the
necessity of monarchy to provide a principle of national unity are close
to Hegel’s views. When Hegel famously describes world-history as a
“slaughter-bench,” he is not speaking about the violence of some (pre­
historical) state of nature, but about the destruction of republics, whether
aristocratic or democratic (these include Greece, Rome, Italian city-states,
the first French republic).\(^{19}\) Hegel’s examples of world-historical figures—
like Caesar, Alexander, and Napoleon—are men whose mission was to
transform republics into empires. Hegel’s “world” is not only the world of
states but, in its highest and final development, monarchical states with
official forms of Protestant Christianity.
Strauss’s description of the United States as a spurious union echoes a specific diagnosis Hegel offers in his Lectures. Hegel implies that the United States is not a genuine state and has only a starkly contractarian and atomistic parody of a real constitution. It must be one of those republics destined for the dustbin of history. Hegel sought to explain how this simulacrum of a state exists, because he cannot consistently dismiss gross and obvious facts as mere appearances. He argues that the territorial expansion of the United States serves as a safety valve through which the excesses of a state not grounded in a Volk, or given unity by monarchy and religion, can nevertheless continue. Mobility and cultural indeterminacy, ordinarily enemies or predecessors of the Hegelian state, are here invoked to save the appearances, to explain a state that is not a true state. Forty years later, Strauss amplified this verdict, arguing that the United States Civil War and its aftermath had demonstrated the ontological instability of the United States. Hegel might have seen the United States’ western move to Hawaii and Alaska as an understandable extension of the solar movement of world history and a continuation of its evasion of true statehood by territorial expansion. A contemporary Hegelian could explain the Alaskan secessionist movement and Sarah Palin’s political ascent in 2008 as signs of the impossibility of the secular contractarian state. Such a theorist might go on to speculate that Palin’s affiliation with an apocalyptic, territorial form of Christianity that reverts to prehistorical forms of animism and belief in witches demonstrates the collapse of the world-historical back into ahistorical geography. With the United States division into red states and blue states, along with current and brewing conflicts over energy, water, immigration, and the fundamentalist social agenda, the Hegel of the new millennium would ask whether this experiment of a self-designing, federal constitutional republic without a religion could be expected to continue indefinitely. Yet the persistence of a secular, multicultural republic, still not swept away by the movement of world-history should be an incentive to examining Nietzsche’s interrogation of Hegel’s intertwined conceptions of state and world.

Nietzsche, I am arguing, turned away from the prevalent Hegelian concept of world, entangled as it is with that of the state, and toward a notion of the earth as the most general site of human life. For a politics of the earth, the state will not be an essential constituent or ultimate goal, but one among a number of social and political forms whose genealogy can be traced and whose dissolution can be envisioned. Beginning in Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche explicitly moves toward such an analysis by arguing that the contemporary state is intrinsically unstable and introducing the
contrast of state and nomad. Despite the noisy nationalism of the early Bismarck era, he argues that there is a real counter-movement to statism, with Europeans becoming increasingly mobile or "nomadic," leading to a loosening of traditional ties and identities. Nietzsche effectively repudiates Hegel's "so-called world-history," beginning as it does with the exclusion of wanderings and migrations. Nietzsche takes nomadism to be an indisputable facet of European modernity:

Trade and industry, the post and the book-trade, the possession in common of all higher culture, rapid changing of home and scene, the nomadic life now lived by all who do not own land—these circumstances are bringing with them a weakening and finally an abolition of nations . . . (HH 475)

In contrast, Hegel marginalizes two significant geopolitical phenomena, involving human mobility: the contemporary rise of the United States and the seven or so centuries of the spread of Islam. He sets up a logical contrast between two roughly contemporaneous developments, the wanderings of the Germanic Völker and the spread of Islam. The Völker are merely particular in origin, tied to arbitrary, contingent events and traditions; in opposition, Islam is the rule of abstract universality and is especially suited to Arabs roaming the wide expanses of the desert, compared in a stock metaphor to the boundless sea. Here Hegel sees nothing but an episodic succession of wars, caliphates, and kingdoms where "nothing firm abides."21 The moment of individuality comes with Charlemagne's empire, uniting various Germanic tribes, drawing a firm line with Islam, and instituting the outlines of a state. While Hegel did not claim to predict specific futures, he did exclude certain possibilities. He denies that the United States in its democratic, secular form, and Islam as a religious-political phenomenon, can be genuine players in the field of world-history. In this respect Hegel and his heirs are still in thrall to the principles of national sovereignty, territory, and religion laid out in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.

For Nietzsche, since the nation state conceives itself as a population of common ethnic origins and culture, it finds itself in an intrinsically unstable position, as mobility and mingling contribute to forming a "mixed race" (Mischrasse). Nietzsche welcomes the process and sees no point in resisting the inevitable. While some mobility has to do with individuals seeking employment, opportunity, or freedom from old, restrictive traditions, Nietzsche is also thinking about the movements of families, subcultures, and groups. In his vocabulary, the nomadic generally designates a collective rather than an individual mode of inhabiting the earth. Nietzsche notes that the main factor retarding the transformation or abolition
of the national state is its scare tactics, its exaggeration or fabrication of external or internal threats to the population’s security; these furnish the excuse to declare a state of exception, in which constitutional or traditional liberties are overridden and the sovereign unity of the state is affirmed. Hegelian monarchy, with its theological affiliation, is being replaced by the national security state. Nietzsche speaks of a “Not-und Belagerungszustand,” the equivalent of Carl Schmitt’s Ausnahmezustand (HH 475). Fifty years later Schmitt was to define sovereignty in these terms: the sovereign is the one who declares the exception. Appropriately, from a Nietzschean perspective, Schmitt offered this definition in his book Political Theology, which argues for a fairly strict parallel between the sovereignty of God and the state. Nietzsche could have taken the equation in a different sense: just as the famous passage on the death of God tells us that this news is still on the way, and scarcely comprehended, so the state is in a long-term process of dissolution. It is a shadow of God that still lingers after his disappearance (GS 125, 108).

Nietzsche foresees a long period of “transitional struggles,” during which “the attitude of veneration and piety” toward the state will be undermined, and it will increasingly be seen in a pragmatic and utilitarian perspective (HH 472). Much of the work of government will be reassigned to “private contractors”—“outsourcing” is the current word—another sign of the gradual “decline and death of the state” (HH 472). This would surely entail the collapse of Hegel’s state-centered world-historical narrative; on the post-state earth, “a new page will be turned in the storybook of humanity in which there will be many strange tales to read and perhaps some of them good ones” (HH 472). Just as the domination of the organizing principle of the racial clan gave way to the family and then to that of the state, so humanity will eventually hit upon “an invention more suited to their purpose than the state” (HH 472). (Again Nietzsche eschews the vocabulary of “world” and “so-called world-history,” and speaks of the earth as the sphere of human activity, suggesting that “a later generation will see the state shrink to insignificance in various parts of the earth.” [HH 472].)

In Thus Spoke Zarathustra the alternative proposed to life in the shrinking, globalized “world” of modernity is called loyalty to the earth. Earth is best understood in contrast to the world of Hegel’s world-history. The earth of Nietzsche’s phantasmatic landscape poem offers a rich variation of mountain, sea, islands, towns, and cities. It is there to be traversed and inhabited, rather than reterritorialized by states. Zarathustra teaches both himself and others not only by speaking, but by his travels and wandering on the earth, a meaningful itinerary that is too complex to be explored
here in any depth. Consider the chapter "On Great Events" whose title apparently alludes to Hegel. Hegel expressly confines "great events" to the state-centered and centering realm of world-history, and the Hegelian writers of Nietzsche's day, as he emphasized throughout his Untimely Meditations, persisted in this association. Nietzsche's struggles with the idea of the "great event" are evident in his unmodern essay on Wagner. There, the "last great event" is said to be Alexander's joining of Europe and Asia, and Wagner is hailed as ushering in the next great event, which will be the definitive cultural expression and realization of Europe (UM IV:4). The chapter "On Great Events" questions the credibility of all so-called great events, and the so-called world history that they are thought to constitute. To his disciples—those who have sworn fidelity to the earth—Zarathustra recounts his dialogue with the fire-hound, an ego puffed up with an expansive desire for crude power, a rebel or revolutionary. Such fiery demagogues are at most “ventriloquists [Bauchredner] of the earth,” producing the illusion of a politics that speaks from the ground of being. They give the impression that it is the earth as reterritorialized by the state which constitutes a nation's true identity. The secret unknown by the fire-hound (and the state-philosophy he represents) is that “the heart of the earth is gold” (Z II "On Great Events"). This explicitly geographical and geological chapter insists that the resources of the Menschen-Erde are rich in possibility. It is constituted by passionate, mobile human bodies, their combinations, and transformations in, by, and through the earth.

At the end of his talk, Zarathustra informs his disciples that it was only his shadow or specter that they had seen flying into the mouth of a volcano, which led them to think he was descending to hell. Yet he puzzles over the specter’s exclamation: “It is time! It is high time!” (Z II "On Great Events"). Time for what? For a great event involving the earth? This question hangs in the air. If it receives an answer, it is in Part III where Zarathustra emerges from his struggle with his "abysmal thought" of eternal recurrence, confessing that the human-earth had seemed to turn into a cave of death and decay. Earlier, Zarathustra had prophesied “Verily, a site of convalescence shall the earth yet become!” (Z I “On the Gift-Giving Virtue” 2). Convalescing from this agon, he accepts his animals' cheering news that the world awaits him as a garden (Z III “The Convalescent”), and goes on to sing his celebratory song of the earth, “The Seven Seals” (Z III “The Seven Seals”), which imagines an earth freed from boundaries and borders, a counter-apocalypse where the earth frees itself from the world. The figure of the garden is a frequent one in Nietzsche, and of course it recalls a long history of associations, beginning with Eden, of a transformed world. Traditional gardens were walled and enclosed spaces (as the
Persian source of the word “paradise” testifies). Yet the English landscape garden that emerged in the eighteenth century and came to dominate European garden style in the nineteenth sought to eliminate the appearance of enclosure and boundaries, if not their reality. Nietzsche’s combination of the garden motif with that of a radical disappearance of boundaries in the final chapters of Zarathustra III should be read as a poetic anticipation of a transformed geoaesthetics and geopolitics.

Unlike Hegel, Nietzsche does not define Europe in terms of its supposed destiny to establish a certain kind of political state. Europe is in crisis—whether it knows it or not—as it struggles with the collapse of Christianity, the emergence of democratic attitudes and practices, the threat of nihilism, and the possible rule of the herd and the last man. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche describes the emergence in Europe of “an essentially supra-national and nomadic type of person who physiologically speaking, is typified by a maximal degree of the art and force of adaptation” (BGE 242).26 While this tendency may lead to homogeneity and the production of a type prepared for “slavery in the most subtle sense,” other aspects of the development may point in different directions (BGE 242).

Mixing, wandering, and migration also produce a variety of singular hybrids, higher humans like Napoleon, Goethe, Beethoven, Stendhal, Heine, Schopenhauer, and Wagner (BGE 256). These experimental anticipations of the European Zu-kunft embody diverse mixtures of traditions and lineages. Although Europe “wants to become one,” the “truth” of this desire is, at least for now, the proliferation of singularities (BGE 256). Accordingly, in the concluding aphorism of “Peoples and Fatherlands,” Nietzsche emphatically declares that “this is the century of the multitude [Menge]!” (BGE 256). It is ironic that Nietzsche’s translators have not always been attentive to the pointers in On the Genealogy of Morals (GM I) that ask us to be careful in discriminating the terms that designate nuanced distinctions of human types, and have often rendered Menge as “masses.” The Genealogy, which Nietzsche advertised as a text meant to be helpful in understanding Beyond Good and Evil, insists on an acutely sensitive philosophical and differential reading of terms for social and political categories.27

The multitude is diverse, masses are relatively uniform. The multitude is formed by a mixing of races, cultures, ethnicities, and so on. This might result eventually in the formation of herds and masses, but it need not. Exemplary here is Nietzsche’s discussion of the emergence of what we think of as the Greeks from a mixing of Mongols, Semites, and others (KSA 8:5[198]).28 Mixing was the necessary precondition for creating the Greeks.

The chapter on “Peoples and Fatherlands” (BGE) should be read as a thorough critique of Hegel’s Weltgeschichte in which Nietzsche challenges
Hegel on the state, human mobility on the earth, the persistence of national types, and even the supposed east to west movement of the 
Weltgeist, that ghost or phantom, which is dispersed by the rise of the multitude who will not stay put to observe its passage. We need look no further than the United States-Mexican border to see the pertinence of this reconfiguration of the Hegelian story in terms of a north/south axis which does not coincide with the rise of states.

For Hegel, the decisive event of the German world after its Christianization is the Reformation, seen as a necessary step in human freedom. Nietzsche despises the Reformation, and argues that it was possible in Germany only because the masses there could be given a direction from above, although he suggests this required the contingent fact of Luther’s intransigent temperament (GS 149; AOM 226). Yet no reformation was possible in Greece because the Greek Menge consisted of diverse groups who were impervious to the best efforts of Empedocles, Pythagoras, and Plato to effect one. In The Gay Science (GS 149) Nietzsche repeatedly draws contrasts between the uniform Masse and the heterogeneous Menge, or multitude, a distinction that must be kept in mind in reading his declaration in Beyond Good and Evil that “this is the century of the Menge!” (BGE 256). We might speculate that certain modern states like the Soviet Union collapsed because they were unsuccessful in transforming their population into masses, and could not resist the entropy of the multitude, which was the unintended consequence of their policies.

Nietzsche’s conception of the conjunction of the Reformation, Germany, and the modern form of the state then, is the antipode of Hegel’s. For Hegel, the Reformation is crucial to the story of history as the achievement of freedom. The Reformation, according to Hegel, has allowed peoples to rally around “the banner of free spirit”:

Time, since that epoch, has had no other work to do than the formal imbuing of the world with this principle, in bringing the reconciliation implicit [in Christianity] into objective and explicit realization . . . States and laws are nothing else than religion manifesting itself in the relations of the actual world.

This is the essence of the Reformation: man is in his very nature destined to be free. 29

In this connection Hegel praises the uniformity, according to general principles, of “law, property, social morality, government, constitutions” as rational expressions of free will. Nietzsche, as we have seen, takes the very fact of Reformation as a sign that it has operated upon an unfree
mass, and “where there are masses, there is a need for slavery” (GS 149). The Auseinandersetzung of the two thinkers extends to the issues of the corruption of the church and the analysis of the varying fates of the Reformation in different areas of Europe. For Hegel, the corruption of the Catholic Church was essential, and consisted in its recognizing God in a sensuous, external form. This leads, when the power of the Church is firmly established, to superstition, “slavish deference to authority,” credulous belief in miracles, and finally to “lust of power, riotous debauchery, all the forms of barbarous and vulgar corruption, hypocrisy and deception.”

In a sequence of aphorisms in The Gay Science devoted to the politics of religion, Nietzsche seems to agree with Hegel that the Reformation took hold in Germany because there the Church “was the least corrupt” (GS 148). Yet in a reversal of Hegel’s valuations, Nietzsche maintains that the corruption of peoples and institutions should not be understood moralistically, but as signs of healthy diversity and harbingers of new creative life. The point is argued at length in The Gay Science (GS 23), “The signs of corruption.” Even superstition—one of Hegel's key signs of corruption—must be transvalued. In a condition of corruption, superstition is “colorful” and emancipatory:

As soon as corruption sets in anywhere, a colorful superstition takes over, and the previous common faith of a people becomes pale and powerless against it: for superstition is free-spiritedness of the second rank—whoever succumbs to it selects certain forms and formulas that appeal to him and allows himself some freedom of choice . . . superstition always appears as progress against faith and as a sign that the intellect is becoming more independent and demanding its rights . . . Times of corruption are those in which the apples fall from the tree: I mean the individuals, the seed-bearers of the future, the spiritual colonizers and shapers of new states and communities. (GS 23)

It could be said, then, that corruption is the element of the multitude, the Menge.

Hegel feels compelled to give an account of why the Reformation arose in Germany and had greater success in the north and west than in the south and east. In examining the case of “the Romanic nations”—Italy, Spain, Portugal, and (to some extent) France—he offers an explanation that could appeal to Nietzsche, at least in formal terms: the spirit of those countries’ population was too diverse, lacking the resolute “inwardness” of the Germans:
The Romanic nations . . . have maintained in the very depth of their soul—in their spiritual consciousness—the principle of disharmony: they are a product of the fusion of Roman and German blood, and still retain the heterogeneity resulting from that.31

We note that Nietzsche praises such fusion and multiplicity in the case of the Greek multitude, which resisted reformations led by those he considered vastly more gifted and talented reformers than Luther. Again, there is a minimal, formal agreement on the question of conditions, but an extreme opposition regarding the values of uniformity and diversity. Hegel’s discussion of the modern post-Reformation world needs to be read alongside Nietzsche’s analysis of “peoples and fatherlands” in Beyond Good and Evil, where he longs for creative rearrangements of north and south, east and west.

Nietzsche then emerges as a theorist of nomadism, migration, immigration, diaspora, cosmopolitanism, and hybridity. He is better equipped than Hegel to understand the demise or evisceration of the monarchical state with a state (Christian) religion. Nietzsche could see a self-described hybrid like Barack Obama as a paradigmatic voice of and for the multitude. We should also note that the Menge is not a universal class, but is conceived as an audience, which is not coextensive with the population at large (BGE 263, 269). In Beyond Good and Evil (BGE 256), which announces the century of the multitude, it is introduced as the audience of the higher humans (Napoleon to Wagner) listed there. Goethe constructs a dialogue about such a multitude in Faust’s “Prelude in the Theater,” where the Menge is described as relatively educated, widely read, yet mixed in mood and background.32 The century of the nomadic multitude, then, as it frees itself from peoples, fatherlands, and states, is not so far from the society of the spectacle, making allowances for technological innovations in its promulgation and marketing. The bad news is that the multitude can be an audience for “tyrants of all sorts, including the most spiritual” (BGE 242), and the good news may be that, at present, they are still sufficiently diverse to resist a powerful religious reformation like the German one that brought Europe such disaster, including religious wars and the modern state system (AOM 226). However shifting and unstable the earth’s multitude may be, its very diversity may be sufficient—if we are lucky—to resist the more monolithic forces of assassins and crusaders with their unitary visions of the world.33

Much recent political thought focuses on questions having to do with the movement and mixing of peoples, the rise of new cultural configurations, and the constitution of a diverse population. Nietzsche saw that by mar-
ginalizing human mobility, Hegel made it difficult to think these phenomena to which he then gave names like nomadism, hybridity, and multitude. We may be wary about where Nietzsche is going with these analytical tools, but we may also find other uses for them as we struggle with concepts such as cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism.