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Taxation—Deductibility of Contributions to Segregated Private Schools—Green v. Kennedy

Brown v. Board of Education¹ set the stage for an extensive series of activities designed to circumvent the Court’s intention to abolish segregated public education.² However legally futile many of these endeavors have become,³ there remains one instrument of education over which the fourteenth amendment is powerless: the private school. Since tuition alone inevitably fails to generate sufficient revenue to fund the necessary expenses of construction and operation, private charitable contributions are needed, and are encouraged by their deductibility for federal income,⁴ as well as estate⁵ and gift⁶ tax purposes.

Recently, the constitutionality of a tax-exempt status, necessary for the deductibility of contributions, for the Mississippi private school system was challenged. Since 1967, the Internal Revenue Service has denied tax-exempt status to all schools which are affiliated with a political subdivision to a degree found by the courts to constitute state action.⁷ Green v. Kennedy⁸ enjoined the I.R.S. from granting exempt status to private Mississippi schools established to avoid integration. The court decided that the federal government was not constitutionally free to frustrate, by a tax benefit to the schools and to the donors, the only permissible state policy in favor of an integrated public school system.⁹ This decision was predicated upon the finding that the state had participated extensively in the establishment of the private system of schools. To the Green court, this past state action rendered tax benefits unconstitutional.

The state action concept extends the scope of the fourteenth amendment to all activities, however private, in which the government is significantly involved. This includes state, federal or local government

¹ 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
³ Id.
⁹ Id. at 1137.
at all levels. The type of involvement necessary to invoke the amend-
ment was broadly stated shortly after its passage to include state action
of every kind which impairs the privileges or immunities of, or denies
to, any citizen due process and the equal protection of the law. This
concept has been variously interpreted by the courts, to include the
operation of a private restaurant in a leased part of a public structure
and the action of a state court in enforcing a private discriminatory
covenant in a deed, as well as other activities connected to some level
of government by any tenuous link. In these situations, however,
the state action which triggered the amendment was present action,
not past. The employment of past action as sufficient to invoke the
amendment results in unequal application when present action is miss-
ing. Yet absent some connection between the activity and the gov-
ernment, the fourteenth amendment does not apply. Hence, it is
powerless to prohibit purely private discrimination.

The Green court’s declaration of unconstitutionality of a tax ex-
emption poses an obvious threat to the future of privately endowed ed-
ucational institutions practicing racial segregation. Although it is un-
clear whether the Green decision turned on past state action, this is

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10 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
13 See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (operation of a park left in trust for the
use of white residents was within fourteenth amendment although controlled by private
trustees); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964) (hospital accepting federal funds to aid expansion);
Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962) (sale of municipal
golf course to private party with reversion unless used for golfing rendered facility
subject to fourteenth amendment); Statom v. Board of Comm’rs., 233 Md. 57, 195 A.2d
41 (1963) (city furnished office space free to private boys’ club and allowed members
access to school playgrounds for recreational purposes).
14 See cases cited note 13, supra.
15 Given two identical situations, one in which the state had been substantially
involved previously but had divorced itself prior to the commencement of the action
to invoke the amendment, and the other in which state action had never been present,
the Green rationale suggests application of the fourteenth amendment in the former,
but not the latter.
16 “[A]ction inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only
such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States.” Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
17 “[P]rivate conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal
Protection Clause unless to some significant extent the state in any of its manifesta-
tions has been found to have become involved in it.” Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth.,
immaterial to those educational institutions, located predominantly in the South, where past state action preceded much of the presently private activity.\textsuperscript{18} Green found an analogy between the often-litigated state tuition grant practice,\textsuperscript{19} and the federal tax exemption, declaring the difference to be solely one of degree.\textsuperscript{20} Although the tuition grant practice in aid of segregation has been declared unconstitutional in many of its myriad forms,\textsuperscript{21} a similar declaration of tax exemptions has been rejected where tax benefits alone are urged to constitute state action.\textsuperscript{22} This is because such declaration would require the extension of the fourteenth amendment to private individuals and possibly to non-educational segregated institutions, including all charitable activity, previously outside its scope.\textsuperscript{23}

Implicit in the Green rationale is the influence of a public policy opposed to educational segregation. If policy considerations are involved, the court should not overlook the policy of encouraging charitable activities through the stimulation of private benevolence,\textsuperscript{24} which has its roots extending deep into our legal system.\textsuperscript{25} The restriction of private freedom to discriminate under the guise of unconstitutionality


\textsuperscript{21} See cases cited note 19, supra.

\textsuperscript{22} "While a tax exemption, by itself, may not impose upon the recipient the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . [i]t may attain significance when viewed in combination with other attendant state involvements." Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710, 713 (4th Cir. 1964).

\textsuperscript{23} "This court . . . is unable to hold that a simple tax benefit evokes state action. Were that the law then every citizen of the United States and every legal creature would be within the proscription of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is not a scintilla of legal precedent in that direction." Guillery v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674, 685 (E.D. La. 1962).

\textsuperscript{24} This policy is encouraged by the relief provided to the public treasury by private contributions. See Milward v. Paschen, 16 Ill.2d 302, 157 N.E.2d 1 (1959).

The exemption of income devoted to charity is due to public policy motives, and should not be narrowly construed. Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144 (1934).

\textsuperscript{25} Charitable trusts were accorded favorable treatment in England prior to the fifteenth century, and remain favored in the law. Vidal v. Girard's Exec's., 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844); 2 A. Scott, Scott on Trusts, § 348.2 (3d ed. 1967).
results in the impairment of freedom for all races, and constitutes an unwarranted deviation from judicial precedent. The doctrine of \textit{stare decisis} should not be abandoned for social expediency. Several hundred years' experience indicates the value of charitable activities to our society, whereas the value of educational racial integration is open to serious doubt, and where an irreconcilable conflict exists between these two policies, integration must yield.

\textit{C. K. T.}

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\item \textit{See} Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only."); Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) ("The Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation upon the exercise of power by the state or state agencies, not a limitation upon the freedom of individuals").
\item "Freedom of the individual to choose his associates or his neighbors, to use and dispose of his property as he sees fit, to be irrational, arbitrary, capricious, even unjust in his personal relations are things all entitled to a large measure of protection from governmental influence. This liberty would be overridden, in the name of equality, if the structures of the [Fourteenth] Amendment were applied to governmental and private action without distinction." Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
\item "Negro citizens ... are entitled to fair and impartial treatment. They are not entitled to special treatment. To emasculate ancient rules which have guided the Judiciary through its long history solely for the purpose of achieving a particular result, is to set the judicial ship afloat in troublesome waters without chart, compass or rudder." Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320, 331 (5th Cir. 1962), \textit{cert. denied}, 371 U.S. 911 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
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