Notes on the Animal Kingdom of the Spirit

Gary Shapiro

University of Richmond, gshapiro@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/philosophy-faculty-publications

Part of the History of Philosophy Commons, and the Philosophy of Language Commons

Recommended Citation

Gary Shapiro

NOTES ON THE ANIMAL KINGDOM OF THE SPIRIT

Were I still capable of taking seriously that naive conception of the unity of the "ego" that's presupposed by the concept of insult, I suppose I'd be insulted by your apology for not, as you put it, "being able to compensate me for my contribution." I would be, that is, if it mattered to me in the slightest that—as I've heard recently—you promised to pay Bob Alter something in the ballpark of $500 for his contribution. That Alter should get five C's (which I should think he hardly needs) while I get zip is one of those Hegelian ironies of history that to me are so profoundly meaningless that the very propositions in which I attempt to formulate them seem nonsensical.

Gerald Graff
in Tri Quarterly (Spring 1978)

Amongst all the celebrated Germans none possessed more esprit than Hegel, but he also had that peculiar German dread of it which brought about his peculiar and defective style. For the nature of this style resembles a kernel, which is wrapped up so many times in an outer covering that it can scarcely peep through, now and then glancing forth bashfully and inquisitively, like "young women peeping through their veils," to use the words of that old woman-hater, Aeschylus. This kernel, however, is a
witty though often impertinent joke on intellectual subjects, a subtle and daring combination of words, such as is necessary in a society of thinkers as gilding for a scientific pill—but, enveloped as it is in an almost impenetrable cover, it exhibits itself as the most abstruse science, and likewise as the worst possible moral tediousness.

Friedrich Nietzsche
The Dawn (aphorism 195)

1. One of the more neglected chapters of Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, which contains neither the obvious drama of the master and slave dialectic nor the deep enigmas of the final pages on absolute knowledge, carries the somewhat puzzling title *Das gesitige Tierreich und der Bertrag oder die Sache selbst*. Of the major commentators on Hegel only Lukács has suggested its central place in the design of the whole; Kojève and Lowenberg (following Royce) have suggested vivid readings of it as an analysis of the conflicts and jealousies of intellectual, artistic, and professional work. What follows is a series of remarks and variations on Hegel’s text which agrees in the main with Lukács’ notion of its importance and with Kojève’s and Lowenberg’s account of what is important in it. To begin with an expression of indebtedness to one’s intellectual sources is an important gesture, for part of the point of Hegel’s chapter is to trace the illusions of ownership and sole responsibility to which intellectuals are liable. Just as the sheer *meinen* of sense-certainty (my attempt to really mean that which is truly mine—my present sensation) collapses into the most abstract and universal language, so my work, the more rigidly I insist that it is mine, turns out to be one more minor variation on the texts, commentaries, themes, and traditions of one school of thought or another.

2. How should we translate Hegel’s title? Baillie’s version is clumsy enough: “Self-contained individuals associated as a community of animals and the deception thence arising: the real fact.” It may be useful to point out that the agents whom Hegel is describing take themselves to be self-contained individuals, although (as so often) Baillie’s instructions to the reader are confusingly intermingled with the text. And his “real fact” fails to capture the sense of a goal or cause in terms of which the agents justify their work. Miller’s more recent and literal title is “The Spiritual Animal Kingdom and Deceit, or the ‘Matter in Hand’ Itself.” This has the merit of suggesting that we are dealing with an animalized or degenerate form of Geist—which is Hegel’s ultimate subject in this work in more senses than one. Hyppolite’s is even more succinct: “La règne animal de l’esprit et la tromperie ou la Chose même.”
The choice of a title is both a symptom and a statement of hermeneutic decisions which have more far-reaching consequences in terms of how one understands paragraphs, chapters, indeed the whole work. Baillie’s pedagogic incursions into and additions to the text show how he situates his work in relation to Hegel’s. Although he usually is at great pains to tell us that it is now the Middle Ages, or Antigone, or Aristophanes which is the subject of Hegel’s analysis (in notes that might be taken for Hegel’s own), he has played down the colorful hints of this title; perhaps the chapter raises painful questions about the mediating role of translators who might very well be among those rushing to a work started by another “like flies to fresh milk.” And it is just the incursive translator for whom the question of whether it is “my work” or “my work” (to use Lowenberg’s helpful phrases) ought to loom largest. The modest translator simply lets the emphasis fall on “my work.” But if we were to suggest some of the force and relevance of Hegel’s title we might try “The Spiritual Jungle and the Lie or Where It’s Really At,” so updating Royce’s “The Intellectual Animals and Their Humbug, or the Service of the Cause.” “Spiritual Zoo” (Findlay) is not right; first because it’s simply not a standard meaning of Tierreich and second because a zoo is a place where animals are exhibited and displayed rather than being free to engage in animal activity. (If Hegel had meant zoo, he would have said Tiergarten, which suggests placidity even more than does our word). The “jungle” is well-established colloquial English for a place in which humans behave like animals. To describe an academic department as a zoo would suggest a collection of relatively tame specimens from a wide array of species; to call it a jungle would emphasize both the similarities of the members and their activity.

3. Yet the most straightforward translation of Tierreich would be “animal kingdom,” conceived as one of the three kingdoms of nature: mineral, plant, and animal. To speak of a geistige Tierreich, then, turns out to be a deliberate crossing of Hegelian categories, since Logik, Natur and Geist are the three great Hegelian realms. “Kingdom” or “realm” would then be better than “jungle” to suggest the play of categories. It would also allow the possible reference to Kant’s Reich der Zwecke. The geistige Tierreich is clearly not a Reich der Zwecke because its members do not obey universalizable rules; yet it contains something of a parody of that realm. As in the Reich der Zwecke each member of the geistige Tierreich thinks of him or herself as autonomous and as working in a structure which supports the autonomous activity of other agents like him or herself. That the intellectual activity which seems to bring us asymptotically close to the
kingdom of ends may very well leave us in the animal kingdom is certainly part of the kernel of Hegel’s humor.

4. Perhaps something should be said about the argument of das geistige Tierreich, so as to show that Hegel is doing more than taking a parting shot at some contemporary forms of individual consciousness before passing on to Geist (see Charles Taylor’s Hegel, p. 167, for such a view). But let me first construe Hegel’s analysis as a narrative before asking how rigorous the argument is. Certain kinds of work appeal to us because they offer the possibility of doing at the same time that which is our very own thing (the particular) while being a part of or contributing to something of general meaning and importance (the universal). To think of ourselves as part of a community of workers, each of whom puts his or her talents to work in the service of some general goal is appealing; and even more appealing if we are aware of the difficulties encountered in observational reason or individual adventure in bringing these aspects together. So, as usual, Hegel proceeds by first showing the attractions of the form of consciousness to be examined and then demonstrating the unhappy experience which comes from really assuming the attitude involved. Here the attractions are many: being part of a community but having a unique identity and interest of one’s own, developing one’s own talents while contributing to an impersonal good, combining theory and practice in a work which is intelligible and articulated. Yet the disappointments are also many. For suppose that I throw myself into intellectual, artistic, or professional work of some kind (for the time being, consider these only as examples of the work Hegel has in mind, although I will show that they are paradigms). My first disappointment (let us remember how high and naive my initial expectations were) is the discovery that it doesn’t come easy, that there’s no simple and spontaneous gesture which does the whole thing and effectively completes a work that embodies both my activities and a general cultural or intellectual meaning. The writing is awkward, the drawing is wooden, I have little feeling for the guitar, and so on. So I must work on myself as well, but since I now seem to be more amorphous and untalented than in my earlier fantasies, where do I begin?

The problem of the beginning is of course dear to Hegel’s heart; here Meno’s paradox is overcome (as in the Meno) by simply jumping in and doing things. Given my commitment to meaningful work I’ll find something to do, even if it’s public relations work for hospital management or grantmanship for the anthropology department. Suppose that I do manage to produce some result, some work
Gary Shapiro

(in the sense of a finished product). As a self-conscious person I can't help but realize that the finished work is not me; it is determinate and closed while I see new possibilities in it and beyond it. And anyone else who should come along will see it as even more of an alien reality than I do. So finished works are vanishing moments, ephemeral fulfillments at best. If I thought to realize myself in such a work, I can be thrown into a profound self-doubt, for I see that I've not only misunderstood the character of work but must have had a faulty conception of myself to have expected completion and reconciliation from writing that paper or producing that devastating legal argument. If work is still to offer fulfillment I must find a way of overcoming the vanishing character of the particular work, and I find this in the principle of work itself, die Sache selbst. Where it's really at is not in the work-object but in the work-activity. My particular work may be a vanishing moment but scientific research, the advance of art, scholarship, the profession, or the discipline—these can all be conceived as embracing and worthwhile ends to which I can devote my activities. But now the cause cannot be mine alone; the good of the profession, for example, can't be (just) my work. So just as self-consciousness destroyed the illusory stability of the work-object, the dialectic of recognition, already encountered between master and slave, will guarantee the impossibility of any simple identification of myself with die Sache selbst.

A social aspect has been implicit in das geistige Tierreich all along, for as an intellectual animal with a sense of my own identity, I had to be capable of at least acknowledging the possibility of others who would be formally if not materially similar to me. Since I now see that I will never realize myself in a single determinate work—or in any number or sequence of such works—I will want to be recognized by others (or at least by my own reflective self) as genuinely committed to the cause. So I think of myself as ehrlich, honest (or "integral," in Miller's translation) to the extent that I really do concern myself seriously with the cause. The problem now will be to maintain any substantial sense of this honesty or integrity in the face of the infinite malleability and dissolution of my work. For I have set the game up so well that everything counts as serious devotion to die Sache selbst. We have already seen that given the primacy of the larger goal, such as the state of the art or the health of the profession, every individual piece of work appears with the seeds of its own destruction built into it. Each painting or article or book is simply one of its kind and so demands to be answered, modified, criticized, parodied, or refuted. "It has incited the others to do this, and in the vanishing of its reality, still finds satisfaction, just like naughty boys
who enjoy themselves when they get their ears boxed because they are the cause of its being done" (Miller's translation—which from now on I shall designate “M”—par. 413).

If everything counts (and Hegel’s list of the ruses which the intellectual worker can use to make everything count is ingenious), then my honesty must consist in ignoring this wild vacillation among my pursuits and their justifications. In other words I must be absent-minded, so caught up in what I’m doing that I don’t know what I’m doing. Yet all along it’s been supposed that the consciousness in question is self-conscious; it must really be (or have an essential tendency to become) aware of its contradictory character. Sincere and absent-minded devotion to the cause is no longer a possible pose. If this doesn’t become apparent to me within the internal structure of recognition which I’ve rigged up to certify my own honesty, it will become painfully clear from my encounters with others. For all are still separate individuals and none has been more successful than I have in fusing myself with the cause. When we respond to one another’s work we all are aware of our own investment and interest, despite our attempts to justify ourselves by appealing to die Sache selbst. “It is, then, equally a deception of oneself and of others if it is pretended that what one is concerned with is the ‘matter in hand’ alone. A consciousness that opens up a subject-matter soon learns that others hurry along like flies to freshly poured-out milk, and want to busy themselves with it; and they learn about that individual that he, too, is concerned with the subject-matter, not as an object, but as his own affair” (M 418). But this is typical of all, and this is why Hegel says that “each and all find themselves both deceiving and deceived” (M 416). We discover ourselves, then, to be much more alike than was originally supposed: none is realized or satisfied, all are hungry for recognition, each is willing to justify his or her incursions, attacks, and neglect by a lofty appeal to the cause.

5. To see the argumentative, dialectical structure of this narrative is to see why the project it depicts is necessarily a failure and so just one more stage on that “highway of despair” Hegel calls the path terminating in Absolute Knowledge. What is aimed at is the reconciliation of the particular and the universal, but the particular is still a single individual competing with others while the universal is left so indeterminate that it cannot be concretely united with any particular agents. All of Part V of the Phenomenology is concerned with the ways in which consciousness, having played out the permutations of dependence and independence to their unhappy conclusion, “discovers the world as its new real world . . . the existence of the world
becomes for self-consciousness its own truth and presence: it is certain of experiencing only itself therein" (M 232). The world appears to reflect back the image of the individual consciousness. But in observation it finds at the end only its own dead skull, while in the search for individual pleasure, adventure, or virtue it finally confronts the way of the world—the objective order of society.

In *das geistige Tierreich* it finds a more lively version of itself, but one whose predatory character is hardly flattering. Its own other turns out to be nothing but all those who are alert to take up any task, to pounce on their rival, to deceive and be deceived for the sake of an elusive satisfaction. Where the theoretical mode of reason leads to death in the form of the skull and the practical mode leads to the metaphorical death of the fixed way of the world, the attempt to combine theory and practice through spiritually significant work leads to the constant threat of death so familiar from the struggle for recognition. If it is not actual death that is now at stake but the annihilation of one's work and individuality by all the others who are seeking whatever I am seeking, the situation is all the more hellish. For the life-and-death struggle terminates in death or the relatively settled condition of master and slave; but for Hegel (who did not believe in evolution within the animal kingdom), the spiritual animals may prey upon one another indefinitely.

Perhaps this is the place to gloss once more the irony of Hegel's title. Originally those who toil in the animal kingdom of the spirit are called animalistic for a fairly straightforward reason. Like animals they simply accept their given proclivities and environment and seek their own survival. In doing so they are of course untrue to their spiritual nature, which should give them a greater awareness of themselves and of others. So the self-consciousness that has been suppressed tends to make their struggles both more constant, deceptive and cruel than the occasional, but quick and clean, combats of the genuine animal kingdom. What was implicit animality in the original terms of the whole attitude thus becomes explicit animality—although only in that metaphorical sense in which, when we say that a man is an animal, we mean that he is far worse than one.

6. Yet why should we follow Kojève in identifying (more or less) the agent of *das geistige Tierreich* with the man of letters? Let us postpone for just a bit the vexed question of whether the whole *Phenomenology* is basically a disguised historical commentary. Adorno has suggested that intellectuals are tempted by an error of perspective to think the worst of their own kind: "The circumstance that intellectuals mostly have to do with intellectuals, should not deceive them
into believing their own kind still more base than the rest of mankind. For they get to know each other in the most shameful and degrading of all situations, that of competing suppliants, and are thus virtually compelled to show each other their most repulsive sides. . . . Intellectuals, who alone write about intellectuals and give them their bad name in that of honesty, reinforce the lie” (Minima Moralia, par. 7). Adorno makes no reference to Hegel’s chapter, yet the higher level of irony that can be detected in deceiving oneself and others into thinking that one’s kind is worse than they really are—all in the name of honesty—is one that Hegel would probably have relished. But the point might be put this way: In the elementary struggle for recognition Hegel has already depicted all human consciousness as prone to such struggles for survival and glory. Yet even here, among the articulate ones with training and culture, one finds a more refined version of the same thing. Et in Arcadia ego. And it is just such training, linguistic skill, and the resources for apparent justification contained in the possibility of appeal to notions like the good of the profession or the state of the art that render this version of the life-and-death struggle both more cerebral and more deceptive. Royce’s observation is acute: “of such is the kingdom of those who have no justification for their life task except that it is a life task.” This suggests that we are not dealing with all intellectuals or only with intellectuals, but with intellectuals who lack something essential. René Girard claims that a devouring envy is typical of intellectuals in the modern age because their work now lacks either a transcendent religious goal or obvious social supervision and pressure. Therefore they must fall back upon what others of their own kind think of their work; consequently they are caught up in an infinitely reduplicated play of mirrors in which each must envy the others, but can assert him or herself only at the risk of incurring a greater share of their envy. Girard convincingly cites Nietzsche’s envy of Wagner as such a case and finds Dostoyevsky’s narratives of doubles an important analysis of the whole phenomenon (see MLN, December 1976).

7. Marx and Lukács read the chapter as a description of the bellum omnium contra omnes of bourgeois society. Unlike Hobbes, Hegel does not see this total individualistic conflict as a permanent possibility of degradation which can be activated by any lapse of authority; rather he sees it as something that has come about and which assumes different forms in different social conditions. More specifically, Kojève reads the section as a commentary on the activities of the bourgeois intellectual. I’ve already suggested some reasons for favoring the more determinate interpretation. But this all supposes that
something like a historical reading of the *Phenomenology* has been established. Of course Hegel will say, later, that "philosophy is its own time comprehended in thought" and will describe the *Phenomenology* as a unique early work with a special relation to the time when it was written. Yet to identify the various attitudes of consciousness with particular historical developments would rob the work of both philosophical necessity and relevance to the present. In fact, Hegel, in exhibiting the spirit's passage to self-knowledge, is tracing one necessary path that has actually been taken. Despite the fact that the path has already been traversed by the race in general, there is reason to suppose that a good many individuals may never succeed in retracing it themselves and simply get stuck in one of the many way-stations which Hegel had charted in 1806.

8. Those who do not learn from the past may be destined to repeat it, but even those who do learn from the past may be condemned to repetition if history does come to an end. If Hegel is right and if a major phase of our history did reach a conclusion of sorts in 1806 or 1831, then the alternatives seem to be either a radically new beginning or some sort of a repetition of what we have already been through. Yet since historical awareness has become a common possession of intellectuals, the absent-mindedness involved in honestly proceeding as if this is not so or does not matter is reminiscent of the false absent-mindedness of Hegel's "honest" consciousness.

Being intellectuals and professionals, where else should we begin in considering what the end of history would mean than in seeing whether or not we have managed to work our way through the many impasses Hegel described to some new attitude toward our work? The force of Hegel's analysis, the Socratic element in the system (to which Kierkegaard is unfortunately so blind), is his biting analysis of our day-to-day activity, our desires and our fears. Although the *Phenomenology* was conceived as a vehicle of self-education to the level of philosophy for the cultured class of a whole generation, one of the indications of the fragmentation of cultural life (sometimes anticipated by Hegel) is the dissolution of a general audience for philosophical writing. Yet despite the dissolution of such an audience we are still here to consider Hegel's analysis.

9. Surely there is much in Hegel's account that cuts close to the bone of contemporary intellectual life. There is the cult of productivity, for example, in which it is not enough to have completed a body of work, but a demand that each scholar or artist be producing something now. The work, billed at first as one's *raison d'être*, quickly proves to be ephemeral; the only way of escaping from the bad
infinite of continually seeking fulfillment in the product only to find it criticized or outdated is just the allegiance to the cause which Hegel analyzes. Indeed, this is one of the more endurable stages of the development which Hegel traces—certainly more endurable than the pervasive envy and hypocrisy which he discloses among the intellectual animals. It may be thought that these are accidental features of intellectual life, or features which it has simply because those involved in it are also human beings with their specific passions and ambitions. As such they should be regarded as extraneous to serious intellectual activity: to take them more seriously is to overlook the efforts which various professions, institutes, and academies valiantly make toward minimizing and neutralizing the presence of such factors. Even more it seems scandalous to talk about these matters. A studied silence about such things—at least in our more serious and professional performances—is not only more dignified but necessary so that we don't give encouragement to the very envy and resentment of which we would be speaking. Briefly, it is supposed that there is a clear distinction, both morally and conceptually, between intellectual work and intellectual gossip. Now of course it is Hegel's claim that the insistence on such a distinction within das geistige Tierreich is just the symptom of its Betrug. From the standpoint of philosophy it is necessary to know the dialectical structure of the entire phenomenon and especially to be suspicious of any attempt to dismiss apparently inconsistent aspects of some attitude or practice as irrelevant. The gossip in which intellectuals indulge is the truth of their enterprise rather than its idle accompaniment. This is pointed out even more perspicuously in the Phenomenology when Hegel comes to analyze the witty and disintegrating consciousness of Rameau's Nephew.

10. The temptation persists to suppose that Hegel is speaking only of a degraded form of intellectual life. Of course there is much truth in this. What I want to insist on is that this spiritually degraded form of intellectual life can be overcome only by a rather difficult spiritual movement. Hegel himself, even in the Phenomenology, portrays forms of artistic and intellectual life (in Chapters VII and VIII) which have managed to avoid the traps of the geistige Tierreich. But it must be noted that these forms are distinguished from the normal, degraded form of intellectual life in civil society by their commitment to an overriding religious or philosophical quest—one which not only fills the place assigned to die Sache selbst in the degraded form, but which is capable of taking on sufficient concreteness and determinacy so that the strictly individual self can indeed find satisfaction in
working for it. In fact, the free market model which is often proposed for the life of the artist and intellectual is close to the framework described in the *geistige Tierreich*. It's often been pointed out that the last of the classical entrepreneurs are to be found among artists and intellectuals who have succeeded in staking out a new stylistic nuance or a novel area of scholarship. Of course the presence of the successful entrepreneur is a symptom that many more are unsuccessful and that the structure which breeds such success must involve envy and deception. Since the prevailing tendency—despite corporate and socialist drift in the rest of society—is to propose something like the laissez-faire structure of civil society for the realm of the spirit, it can be seen how intellectual life could be capable of a systematic regression and self-degradation from the Hegelian perspective.

11. Hegel is of course not alone in his awareness of the dangers. The whole Hegelian school has a tendency to speak a bit more candidly than do philosophers of some different persuasions about the prevalence of market-like conditions in the spiritual world. The brilliant if somewhat heavy sarcasm of the opening pages of the *German Ideology* is in this vein:

When the last spark of [Hegelianism's] life had failed, the various components of this *caput mortuum* began to decompose, entered on new combinations and formed new substances. The industrialists of philosophy, who till then had lived on the exploitation of the absolute spirit, now seized upon the new combinations. Each with all possible zeal set about retailing his apportioned share. This naturally gave rise to competition, which, to start with, was carried on in moderately staid bourgeois fashion. Later when the German market was glutted, and the commodity in spite of all efforts found no response in the world-market, the business was spoiled in the usual German manner by fake and shoddy production, deterioration in quality, adulteration of the raw materials, falsification of labels, fake purchases, bill-jobbing and a credit-system devoid of any real basis.

Now Marx, who was fond of the *geistige Tierreich* chapter (letter to Engels, June 18, 1862) has in this passage, written with Engels, a quite different purpose than Hegel, even if they do employ similar metaphors. Given the primacy of material conditions for Marx, one expects to find intellectual life reproducing the social relations of production, whereas Hegel sees the competition of the phase as transitional; for Hegel, bourgeois society can continue to exist while intellectual life escapes from the constraints of civil society.

This miraculous escape from the terrors of civil society through philosophy (and via religion) is just where Lukács sees the argument of the *Phenomenology* going wrong. What neither Hegel nor Marx envisioned was the continuation of bourgeois relations within the
artistic and intellectual classes within an increasingly collectivist society. Such continuation is over-determined. It is to be attributed, paradoxically, both to the apparent determination of bourgeois society to leave its intellectuals alone and its need that they reflect the society's own ideal notion of itself. A secular and liberal society, in professing to leave its artists and intellectuals on their own, opens up the possibility Girard has described of their increasing dependency on the opinions of their own kind and their consequent envy. Yet in fact, this leaving them on their own is not so neglectful as it appears for it involves a complex network of support which provides for a degree of insulation from the wider society. Within that insulation the intellectual classes can act out that animal kingdom of the spirit which is rapidly disappearing from the wider society but whose image that society requires. Given the relative publicity of what artists and intellectuals do (contrary to their own frequent impression that they are neglected), their animal behavior will enact that which society in general is less and less able to do. As Sartre said in Search for a Method, the bourgeoisie is the class which as soon as it discovers the fact of history wishes to bring it to an end.

12. Let us consider a self-confessed Hegelian of another stripe, and a strong advocate of scientific objectivity, Charles Peirce. Peirce, so it seems, saw the commitment to eventual agreement and a willingness (or, better, eagerness) to put one's own results and hypotheses to the test as the minimal conditions of scientific practice. In doing so, Peirce seems not to be prescribing for a scientific utopia but describing the presuppositions of any scientific work—and Peirce's broad sense of science, it should be remembered, includes philosophy and such of its branches as aesthetics and phenomenology. Yet Peirce believed that these minimal prerequisites for scientific work were identical with the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity (given a suitably broad and non-sectarian yet still "Buddho-Christian" interpretation of those virtues). And in what seems to be a logical examination of the problems of probability he characteristically states that "He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole world, is, as it seems to me, illogical in all his inferences, collectively" (Selected Writings, ed. Buchler, p. 162). Within the systematic framework of Peirce's philosophy, this is not surprising, since he holds logic (including scientific inquiry) to be a normative science subordinate to the normative science of ethics. Like Hegel, he believed in a marriage of science and religion and recoiled even more strongly from the suggestion that the individualistic political economy of the Nineteenth Century could furnish a model for any admirable
intellectual or moral achievement. There's no doubt that this pragmatist would be appalled by the suggestion that the intellectual community could operate on the basis of a widespread moral and cognitive relativism. Without faith in the truth the scientific community is on the verge of falling back into the animal kingdom.

13. There are some interesting points of contact between Hegel's account of *das geistige Tierreich* and Nietzsche's analysis of scientific praxis. Both are attempts to describe concretely what the life of science amounts to and to disclose the instinctive or egoistic drives which alternately give force to or undermine the impersonal scientific ideal. In *The Genealogy of Morals* Nietzsche attempts to turn science on itself by proposing to analyze the true heritage of the scientific way of life. It is an Oedipal inquiry which begins with the recognition that "We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge," and proceeds to argue that the values implicit in scientific work are subtle and refined forms of the ascetic ideal that is generated by the weak, through *ressentiment*, in response to the powerful. The scientist takes over the form of this ascetic ideal by accepting the necessity of subordinating his individuality to the goal of truth. Like Peirce's scientist, he has faith not in his own results but in the process of science itself and its presumed asymptotic approach to the truth. He must be willing to sacrifice pleasure and honor in order to add just a bit—even in the form of a refuted hypothesis—to the accumulating edifice of the scientific enterprise. At this point, however, Nietzsche's analysis becomes a bit fuzzy. The ascetic ideals which he had interpreted earlier were all said to stem from *ressentiment* toward fairly identifiable others: slave morality is directed against the masters and Christian morality against all that which is healthy and well turned out. Now there are hints in Nietzsche's account that suggest it could be either the strong and healthy man in general or the adventurous artist, in particular, unconstrained by the tyranny of the facts, who is the object of the scientist's *ressentiment*.

Hegel's phenomenology of scientific praxis is more radical and perspicuous at this point. The envy which is at work in science (keeping the broad sense of *Wissenschaft* in mind) is a mutual envy among the members of what Nietzsche would call the scientific herd. Here, of course, there is a suggestive distinction to be made between the two animal metaphors: the herd, with at least an internal peacefulness, and the mutual voracity in *das geistige Tierreich*. Hegel, with his analysis of the generality of the struggle for recognition, would be able to see the possibility of intellectual envy being minimized or suppressed by being directed toward some outside group—philistines,
laymen, administrators, and so on. This suppression will probably occur more frequently when the intellectual animals are forced by the threat of outside intervention to assume the attitude of the herd; but where they are more numerous and their status not in great danger, they will again focus their envy on their own kind. Die Sache selbst is bread enough to accommodate both possibilities.

Of course it should be remembered that the Hegelian and Nietzschean dialectics move in essentially different directions. Hegel’s moves toward a concrete synthesis of particularity and universality which does promise the possibility of spiritual life free from the struggle for recognition. Nietzsche’s drive is toward an increasingly deeper and more intense conception of the individual (and so he is interested in the body, which classically individuates the individual) until that point is reached (as Zarathustra reaches it in his realization of the eternal recurrence) in which the ultimate dissolution of the individual must be confronted. This, I take it, is the philosophical background of Graff’s speaking of “that naive conception of the unity of the ‘ego’ that’s presupposed by the concept of insult.”

14. It should be clear that the kind of conflict which occurs in the geistige Tierreich is not a struggle for survival or for scarce goods of any material sort. As even Hobbes observes the human war of all against all is not for these alone but also for “glory.” Now whatever Humpty-Dumpty may have to say about the meaning of that word, it designates a recognition which cannot be granted to all for it consists in one being recognized by others as having attained a marked superiority of some sort. Yet it might be thought that a human community could—as in an ideal aristocratic society—rest on a basis of mutual recognition of the remarkable achievements of its members. Whether in fact this is possible, and to what extent, is not my present concern. Hegel is widely interpreted as believing that the modern state of the form described in his Rechtsphilosophie does achieve such mutuality of recognition. However, it should also be remembered that this is not a recognition of great achievement but of citizenship, and so hardly satisfies the urge for glory. Although Hegel implies that the service of Absolute Spirit will help us transcend the problem of envy and Marx suggests the same about a society free of class divisions, both are disappointingly vague as to how this is supposed to happen.

In this respect some of the anarchist theorists of the Nineteenth Century may have had a deeper intuition of the radical change that such a dissolution of envy would require in all social values and structures, even if they had no real sense of how such a change could be brought about. When Proudhon says that work is the most private
and sacred of human activities he is suggesting a transvaluation of our standards of judging ourselves and others and of the divisions which we draw between the public and the private. The private and sacred is that which is beyond evaluation and comparison. The original alienation of labor in this perspective is not its control or use for the sake of another but its entry into the circle of mutual observation that constitutes civil society. The use of religious language is of course an indication that the moral change desired is not one which is intelligible from a Hegelian or Marxist perspective; like the more recent calls to do your own thing, it is not likely to be effective in a world in which the dialectics of recognition seem destined to cover more and more areas of life. The anarchist ideal is in fact a reversion to the attitudes which Hegel takes up just before the geistige Tierreich in the *Phenomenology* in which "the law of the heart" or the faith in one's own virtue are destined to run up against "the way of the world."

15. It may seem as if envy is a topic for literature and psychology rather than for philosophy. This is indicated by Aristotle who treats envy not in his *Ethics* but in the more literary context of his *Rhetoric*. (There Aristotle makes a useful distinction between emulation and envy. The former is the desire to be honored as others are for their value or accomplishments while the latter is the desire for a recognition which will exclude others. Since Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is based upon what it seems plausible to say within the *polis*, the distinction may be weakened considerably when it is recalled that both forms of the desire for glory occur within a social structure which depends on the recognition of the master by the slave. Hegel's account is arguably more inclusive because it takes this context into account.) But the easy relegation of problems to non-philosophical fields may itself be a refusal of the kind of self-knowledge that Hegel's analysis invites. It may in fact be true, as René Girard says in *Mensonge romantique et viré romanesque*, that the most penetrating accounts of envy and even a close structural analysis of the same are to be found in the novels of Stendhal, Dostoyevsky, and Proust. A critic might turn this against Hegel by suggesting that it simply shows once more his tendency to tell stories, to write an idealized *Bildungsroman* of world history, rather than to provide solid conceptual analysis. Now, while Hegel is in many respects what Schelling called a "narrative philosopher," it is just the ability of this philosophical narrative to include such uncomfortable facts that makes it a model of philosophical achievement. Dismissing such narrative philosophy excludes any *philosophical* analysis of the kinds of questions which Hegel raises.
about intellectual work, although it may allow us to demonstrate once more our honest consciousness and our allegiance to the good cause, die Sache selbst, of philosophy. But what audience (in foro interno or externo) would we be trying to convince? And what would be the source of our passion?

University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas