7-1-1954

A study of the mysticism of Plotinus and Augustine

R. Baine Harris

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/masters-theses

Recommended Citation
A STUDY OF THE MYSTICISM OF PLOTINUS AND AUGUSTINE

BY

RANSOM BAINE HARRIS

LIBRARY

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND

VIRGINIA

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS IN PHILOSOPHY

AUGUST - 1954
Preface

Three major subjects are the concern of this study: Mysticism, Plotinus, and St. Augustine, any one of which would allow elaborate investigation. Here, we have made no attempt to deal with any one of these comprehensively, but have been concerned only to make a comparative analysis of the mysticisms of Plotinus and Augustine.

The writer's interest in Plotinus stems from the fact that Plotinus is both a first-rate philosopher and a mystic, being generally regarded as "the father of Western mysticism." The significance of Augustine in the history of Western Civilization and the fact that he is both a convert from neo-Platonism and a mystic make him an apt subject for comparison with Plotinus. Both men carried their first principles to their logical conclusions so effectively that even today one can detect overtones of their fundamental theses re-occurring within the various systems of contemporary philosophy and theology.

Admitting an appreciation for mysticism, the writer finds it difficult to accept a mysticism-for-the-sake-of-mysticism, but is rather attracted to mysticisms of the type of Plotinus and Augustine's—mysticisms that are clearly metaphysically related and also suggest a meaning for ordinary human experiences.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Introduction - The Meaning of Mysticism</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>The Metaphysics of Plotinus</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>The Religion of Plotinus</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>The Metaphysics of Augustine</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>The Religion of Augustine</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Comparisons and Conclusions</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Appendices

1. The Works of Plotinus
2. English Translation of Enneads
3. The Works of Augustine
4. Major Writings of Augustine

Bibliography 228.

Vita 231.
Acknowledgements

The writer wishes to express his appreciation to those who have assisted him in the production of this writing. Miss Lucy T. Throckmorton and Miss Josephine Nunnally of the University of Richmond Library have been extremely courteous and helpful. Miss Lucile Hudgins generously typed and mimeographed the manuscript without charge. Dr. Henry Brimm and the library staff of Richmond's Union Theological Seminary most graciously extended their full facilities, including air conditioning, for a summer, and other people have given assistance in various ways. The writer wishes to acknowledge his gratitude for the privilege of using the research facilities of the Library of Congress, the Library of the Catholic University of America, and Duke, University of North Carolina, and Columbia University libraries.

But most of all the writer wishes to thank Dr. B. C. Holtzclaw of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Richmond for his general advice and many hours of patient criticism and counsel.
Some of the footnotes have been made rather lengthy, especially in Chapters II, III, IV, and V. Such footnotes have been designed as an additional feature and serve the function either of illustrating the literary style and manner of argument of Plotinus and Augustine or of expanding certain of their ideas.

If the reader happens to be bored with lengthy footnotes, he may restrict himself simply to the reading of the text.
"The fire still burns on the altars of Flotinus."

Eunapius
Chapter I
Introduction
The Meaning of Mysticism

Only a small number of mystics have been philosophers of mysticism. Still a smaller number have been philosophical mystics. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the thought of two philosophical mystics, Plotinus (A.D. 205-270), the chief neo-Platonist, and St. Augustine (A.D. 354-430), Bishop of Hippo, Christian Church Father and chief Christian apologist of the first five centuries. Although Augustine was himself a neo-Platonist for a number of years before his conversion to Catholic Christianity, there are some basic differences in his mysticism and the mysticism of Plotinus. By comparing the systems of these two men we may be able to see these differences and to note the two fundamental strains of Christian and non-Christian mysticism evident throughout the development of Western thought. We shall seek to see what differences Humanism,
Supernaturalism, Emanationism, Trinitarianism, Revelation, etc. make in the formation of a mysticism. But, before we can analyze the mysticism of Plotinus and Augustine we must first make some study of the meaning of mysticism, itself.

What is mysticism? Is it an art, a process, a science, a technique, a religion, a philosophy, a way of life? How and where does it originate? Does it come from the mind or from some reality outside of the mind? Is it a product of natural causes or is it a Revelation? Is the condition pathological or healthful? Should it be praised or ridiculed, encouraged or challenged, held in reverence or held in scorn?

The uncertainty that most people have concerning the correct answers to these questions serves to illustrate the general confusion there is in the mind of the average man, and in literature, as to the exact meaning of mysticism. As Dean Inge aptly remarked, few words have been more loosely used in the English language, to the extent that there can never be any certainty in the mind of the user that anyone else has the same meaning of the term as he does. Anyone who attempts to use the term must first define it before he dare take its meaning for granted in his usage.

Generally, the term signifies an experience looked on as a direct communication with the ultimate reality of the universe, usually conceived of as God. It is characterized by feelings of
extreme bliss, or ecstasy, relaxation or self-abandonment, and certainty that there is direct knowledge of ultimate reality, itself. Most of the major cultures have recorded the existence of mystics, and often they have figured prominently in the history of religions, for example, Zoroaster, Buddha, Moses, Mohammed, Jesus, Paul, Augustine, Luther, Aquinas, Loyola, Zinzendorf, Wesley, and Jonathan Edwards, to name a few.

The definition of mysticism, however, is a rather difficult task due to the wide variations of opinions of both the mystics and the philosophers of mysticism concerning the exact nature, meaning, and scope of the experience. Judgments vary all the way from sheer quackery and "formless speculation" to the conclusion that it is the most elevated religious meaning possible to the heart and mind of man. Goethe termed it "the scholastic of the heart." Harnack called it "rationalism applied to a sphere above reason." F. H. Bradley writes:

"Nothing can be more real than what we experience in religion. The person who says that man in his religious consciousness is not in touch with reality does not know what he is talking about."

William James considered it a state or a feeling common to all religions, but Leuba, on the other hand, insists that only certain religions incorporate "true" mysticism. Roman Catholic

1. quoted by W. R. Inge, Mysticism in Religion, p. 15.
writers usually regard it as a supernatural suspension of natural law and relate its meaning directly to the sacraments of the Roman Catholic church. It has been regarded as auto-eroticism, self-hypnosis, and neurasthenia. James Hinton has termed it "an assertion of a means of knowing that (which) must not be tried by ordinary rules of evidence---the claiming authority for our own impressions." 2 R. A. Vaughan has termed it "that form of error which mistakes for a Divine manifestation the operation of a merely human faculty." 3 Victor Cousins has written:

"Mysticism is the pretention to know God without intermedialy, and so to speak, face to face. For mysticism, whatever is between God and us hides Him from us.... Mysticism consists in substituting direct inspiration for indirect, ecstasy for reason, rapture for philosophy." 4

Protestants vary widely in their opinion of mysticism, some such as Thomas Hywell Hughes insisting that Protestantism, with its evangelical concept of the direct experience of Christ through faith is mystical at its very core, and others, such as Paul Elmer More, concluding that it is a disease of religion. Luther was rather mystical, being influenced by Tauler and some other German mystics, but Calvin looked upon it with disfavor. Theologians in the Schleiermacherian tradition usually favor it whereas exponents of the Ritschlian position are opposed to it.

2. Ibid., p. 348.
3. Ibid., p. 347.
4. Ibid.
Such thinkers as Karl Barth and Emil Brunner have ranged themselves strongly against it.

It must not be concluded, however, that only confusion remains concerning the nature of mysticism. The difficulty of explanation lies in the fact that it is an essentially private experience. The mystics and philosophers who attempt to interpret mysticism must do so in terms of their own philosophies, and the philosophies themselves vary in their meanings. Actually, there is considerable agreement among all the mystics concerning the psychological aspect of mysticism. Certain characteristics seem always to be associated with the experience. William James has listed them as (1) ineffability, (2) passivity, (3) transciency, and (4) noetic certainty. Immediacy should possibly be added to this list due to its pronounced effect as part of the experience, although it is not necessarily a distinctive inner characteristic.

The mystical experience is immediate in that it is always a direct awareness of some other reality, that is, some reality other than the reality of one's ordinary self. It is not a secondary experience, a recall or a meditation on the principle of a thing. It is rather the immediate participation in the thing itself. All mystics seem agreed on this point.

The mystical experience is ineffable in the sense that the experience itself defies description by comparison with other
human experiences. Most mystics admit their inability to be
discursive about the matter and explain that the weakness lies
not in the lack of the richness of the experience but rather in
the inability of language adequately to communicate feeling.
Mystical literature makes use of poetic descriptions, similies,
and the like to attempt to incorporate some of the nature of the
feeling. William James comments on this characteristic: "In this
respect the experience is more like a state of feeling than a
state of intellect." The implication is that one must possess
a certain facility for understanding the experience, like the
ability to appreciate a symphony, before he may gain the meaning
and effect of what happens in the occurrence.

The mystical experience is passive in the sense that it is
an inner experience which seems to come of its own accord once
its conditions are met. The mystic does not bring it about or
cause it to occur except by meeting the conditions of its occur-
rence. However, the meeting of the conditions necessary to the
occurrence of the experience does not necessarily insure its
occurrence in every instance. In the highest level of the ex-
perience the individual seems to feel as if he were taken over--
possessed by some power outside of himself--some power that he
cannot control.

The mystical experience is transient in that its state of ecstasy or illumination, according to certain interpreters, remains only for a very short time. It may take days, or years, or even a lifetime to arrive at the high level of ecstasy, but once attained the experience itself may be only momentary, like a flash of light. William James says it may last only an hour or two at the most. Even though the experience itself is transient, the memory of the experience remains for quite a long time and constitutes a powerful influence upon the consequent behaviour of the individual.

Noetic certainty is always typical of the experience. There is always certainty in the mind of the believer about the fact of his experience, and often there is also the conviction of a revelation—of the reception of new ideas and meanings not previously known. Yet, revelation is not necessarily an integral part of mysticism, as mysticism may consist merely of the affirmation or denial of some idea previously known. Characteristically, mysticism is the affirmation or denial of the nature of reality—the affirmation that there is some ultimate spiritual reality attested to by its ability to be experienced. Technically, the concern is not so much that of the overall nature of ultimate reality as it is the bare assertion that such does exist in an experienceable way. Bertrand Russell has written aptly of this phase of the experience:
"The mystic insight begins with the sense of a mystery unveiled, of a hidden wisdom now suddenly become certain beyond the possibility of a doubt. The sense of certainty and revelation comes earlier than any definite belief. The definite beliefs at which mystics arrive are the result of reflection upon the inarticulate experience gained in the moment of insight."

In a rather loose sense, this process may be considered as a religious awakening or religious conversion.

Mysticism is often thought of as an art or process entered into and followed according to a formula of more or less scientific behaviour. The bulk of the literature written by avowed mystics deals mainly with the details involved in the practice of mysticism as an art, and there is a certain general similarity in the formulae they suggest. Whenever mysticism is considered as a technique or process it is usually conceived of in terms of a series of stages of experiences, which have been described by various writers as "the mystic way." These stages vary in terminology and place of division in the various mystical systems, but they may be roughly divided into (1) mortification, or bodily discipline, (2) purgation, or purification, (3) concentration, or mental fixation, and (4) illumination, ecstasy, and joy.

In mortification the mystic brings his physical nature under control of his mental or spiritual nature. The will becomes more

---

and more in control of the body. It might be necessary even to inflict damage upon the body in order to bring it under the control of the soul. The purpose of this stage is to cut oneself loose from the controlling impact of one's physical nature in order to allow the freer operation of the mental nature. Symbolically, it indicates an allegiance to that which is considered to be of higher value.

Purgation is mental purification. Not only must the individual be released from the effects of the passions, the mind itself must be cleansed of its impurities. It is a catharsis in which everything inconsistent with the nature of the objective sought is ignored and neglected, and, insofar as possible, deliberately excluded from consciousness.

Concentration is the stage of the active endeavor to think about the order or condition of the object sought. Consideration is given to the details of information known about the object. Whereas purgation is the elimination from thought of everything inconsistent with the goal of the mystic quest, concentration is the bringing to mind of everything consistent with it.

The stage of illumination is the one in which "the light breaks through." The nature of the object or condition becomes directly experienceable, culminating in union, joy, and ecstasy. The object of the quest is realized and the whole process is terminated, only to be begun all over again.
Fundamental problems concerning mysticism are the questions whether the experience may be termed normal or abnormal, whether it is to be considered valuable or disvaluable, and whether it is to be agreed that there is a revelation of reality in it. As has already been indicated, philosophers of mysticism are in disagreement concerning these questions.

Whether or not one wishes to term the experience "normal" depends, of course, upon what he defines as normal experience. To say the least, it cannot be called an ordinary experience. Whether or not it is an average experience or an experience universal to all men is not easily determined. Most mystics insist that the experience may come to anyone who meets its necessary conditions, but it is not certain if everyone has a native ability or capacity to meet the necessary conditions. Some interpreters think that there is a class of mystics, a certain group of people who are suited by their mental natures for being mystics, and the implication is that there are other people who could never bring themselves to meet the required conditions. The suggestion is that there are people who would be incapable of mysticism as a tone deaf person would be unable to appreciate a symphony. The answer to this question must be left uncertain as it would be practically impossible to fathom all of the reasons why a certain person seems suited or unsuited for mysticism. Mysticism does seem to be a normal
experience for very religious people. There is reason to believe that any man is capable of having mystical experience unless he has been hindered from entering into it by certain other psychological conditioning.

The value of mystical experience must be answered in terms of the query "valuable for what." All mystics will insist that the experience is valuable-in-itself, and should be encouraged as an end-in-itself. Philosophers judging mysticism sometimes disagree concerning whether or not the experience should be encouraged. Some insist that it causes damage to the general mental well-being of the mystic, especially in instances when it allows a free disregard of reason. All instances of mysticism more or less allow a break-down of the final appeal to reason. If the test would be "Does it lead to productive activity?" the answer would have to be that it has in some instances, and in others it has not. Many mystics are not vocal about their mysticism and certain types of mysticism seems to encourage activity more than others. Rufus Jones identifies mysticism with the creative element in religion. He writes:

"It is not too much to claim... that whenever, in the course of history, religious life and thought have had a fresh new birth, have surged up with a new intensity to a higher level, and have brought release of new power to live by, there has always been at the heart of the movement a leader of the creative type..."

Most of the founders of the world's great civilized religions have been mystics.

A crucial question, indeed, is whether or not there is a revelation of reality in mysticism. This is the central claim of all mysticism—all mystics agree that they have communicated with reality and that at least some message of affirmation or denial of the nature of reality has been indicated. This question must be decided on the basis of a decision as to whether the evidence is adequate and reliable enough to lead to this conclusion. Some philosophers have concluded that it is, and some have concluded that it is not. It would be a rather sweeping assertion to conclude that all mystics have been under an illusion about the nature and meanings of their own experiences, yet, certain interpreters conclude just this. Others admit the illusion, but sanction it as a value. In mysticism, we are faced with the problem of communicating inner feelings and intuitive meanings in a way that will be meaningful to people who do not have the same inner feelings and meanings. This is a problem in mysticism because it is a problem in meaning, language, and communication in general. Our suggestion is that the clue to the answer to this question will, in the final analysis, depend upon the particular metaphysical and religious understanding of the philosopher who makes the judgment. We cannot help but make our judgments on the basis of our own
experiences and their meanings. If one's own metaphysical and religious beliefs do not allow the possibility of mystical life, he will likely term all mysticism an illusion. On the other hand, if one feels that he has, himself, had experiences similar enough to those which the mystics assert to admit the reality and value of the experience, and if such are not contradictory with his own metaphysical and religious meanings, he will likely term the experience a true revelation of reality.

Our theory here is that a metaphysical and religious meaning must necessarily be involved in the basic meaning of mysticism itself—that any particular occurrence of mysticism will imply a specific metaphysical and religious position. Therefore, the meaning of any particular example of mysticism cannot be interpreted apart from an analysis of the basic metaphysical and religious concepts associated with and to a large extent prior to its occurrence. Our assertion is, that the objectives sought within mysticism are in reference to metaphysical meanings known at least in some sense—possibly symbolically—prior to the mystical experience. This metaphysical knowledge may not have the emotional quality of that obtained within the mystical experience, but it does have the power to serve as one of the reasons why the experience is entered into.
The wide variations in the metaphysical conceptions associated with the various philosophies of mysticism should serve as an adequate example of the importance of this factor in the understanding of mysticism. Our thesis is that variations in prior metaphysical concepts account in large measure for the variations in consequent ideas of the final ideal within the mystical process or experience. Of course, it might be admitted that mystical experience itself is a factor contributing to these metaphysical meanings, but such is not the exact concern of this thesis. Granting that metaphysical concepts are affected by the mystical process—that mysticism is essentially a conversion experience, philosophically, psychologically, morally, and otherwise—we are but adding the assertion that they also affect the reason for entering into the process and the inherent meaning of the process.

The meaning of mysticism can never be stated in a definition or indicated by a purely scientific explanation of the psychological process involved. Its final meanings are ontological meanings—beliefs about the nature of being, life, and value. As such, its meaning is better expressed by poetry than by logic—it is better felt than understood. Yet, we are faced with the need for an agreed upon working definition of mysticism for the purposes of this thesis. Here we are willing to accept for practical purposes the definition of W. R. Inge that mysticism is "the attempt to realize, in thought and feeling, the immanence
of the temporal in the eternal, and of the eternal in the temporal;" that of Pfleiderer who writes:

"Mysticism is the immediate feeling of the unity of the self with God; it is nothing, therefore, but the fundamental feeling of religion, the religious life at its very heart and center;"

and the definition of Albert Seth:

"Mysticism is a phase of thought, or rather, perhaps of feeling, which from its very nature is hardly susceptible of exact definition. It appears in connection with the endeavor of the human mind to grasp the Divine essence or the ultimate reality of things, and to enjoy the blessedness of actual communion with the highest. The first is the philosophical side of Mysticism; the second, its religious side."

It is quite erroneous to think of mysticism simply as an art or a process. In it there must be meanings that reach beyond the mere level of feelings—meanings whose essences involve more than the essences of the various psychological states, themselves, and have a point of reference beyond the limits of the psychological experience itself. The meaning of mysticism should be divorced from the conception of it as a science of the mastery of certain techniques and be thought of in terms of its particular concept of the nature of being and ultimate reality—as it is these meanings that matter most even within reference to the techniques themselves.

10. Ibid.
The mysticism of Plotinus and Augustine is to be found not only in the processes involved in their final ways of salvation, but also in the basic ontological concepts involved in their metaphysics and general religious meanings. In order to study their mysticisms we must study both their metaphysics and their religion. Our method will be to analyze their metaphysics, religion, and techniques of mysticism in order to determine certain similarities and differences and to see how their metaphysics and religious meanings affect the meanings of their mysticisms.
Chapter II

The Metaphysics of Plotinus

The root concept of the system of Plotinus is that of positing of the nature of ultimate reality as a supra-existent ideal form or order. Three factors apply in such an order: unity, intelligence (mind), and soul. The ultimate constituent of this order, variously called by Plotinus as "the First," "the One," "the Good," "the Simple," "the Absolute," "the Transcendence," "the Infinite," "the Unconditioned," and "the Father," is an inexpressible being devoid of qualities and surpassing existence. From it all existence and existing things come by means of its production of a next lower, less real stage of its own self expression. Such a stage in turn produces a next lower, less real stage of its self expression which in turn does the same thing, and so forth, on and on, until the level of pure nothingness or illusion is reached. The doctrine is that the universe is constituted of an indefinitely complicated and systematic series of levels ranging
from the ultimate Supra-existent Being, through the various forms of existence, to sheer nothingness, with every item having a precise location and relationship by virtue of the "Supra-Real's" impingement upon it within the system. Every phase of existence --everything that exists-- flows from, emanates or irradiates out of this ultimate reality and also aspires in its own consciousness to flow back toward it.

The most vital element of the system is best conceived of logically as unity. Being inexpresible and devoid of qualitative attributes, any conceptual indication of it will be inadequate. Strictly speaking, it is not a First Cause, for First Cause is a lower formulation than the Supra-Real itself. It may not be said to be non-existent and it may not be considered as a thing that exists. This situation beyond existence and the ordinary conceptions of being is defended by Plotinus on the grounds of its immanence in all things without its possibility of being identified with any of them.

1. All things, however exalted, august, are later than This (The One); It is the source of all, though in some sense it is no source: we must keep all things apart from It... even freedom of action... It can enter into no relation with the realm of Existence." VI. 8. 8.

"When we call it a Cause we are not making an assertion about it but about ourselves; we speak of what we derive from It while It remains steadfastly within Itself." VI. 9. 3. All quotations of the words of Plotinus are from the Stephen MacKenna Translation. See Bibliography and Appendix.

2. "The One is all things and no one of them: the source of all things is not all things; all things are its possession -- running back, so to speak, to it -- or more correctly, not yet so, they will be... (continued on next page)
When Plotinus speaks of the Supra-Real as "the Good," he is attempting to express the idea of its perfection — that there is nothing of evil or imperfection as a part of its nature. He writes:

"... The word "good" used of him (the One) is not a predicate asserting his possession of goodness; it conveys an identification. It is not that we think it exact to call him either good or The Good: it is that sheer negation does not indicate; we use the term The Good to assert identity without the affirmation of Being." VI. 7. 38.

"Unity seeks nothing towards its being or its well-being or its safehold upon existence; cause to all, how can it acquire its character outside of itself or know any good outside? The good of its being can be no borrowing: This is the Good. ... This Principle is not, therefore, to be identified with the good of which it is the source; it is good in the unique mode of being The Good above all that is good." VI. 9. 6

It is precisely because there is nothing within the One that all things are from it; in order that Being may be brought about the source must be no Being but Being's generator, in what is to be thought of as the primal act of generation. Seeking nothing, possessing nothing, lacking nothing, the One is perfect, and in our metaphor, has overflowed, and its exuberance has produced the new; this product has turned again to its begetter and been filled and has become its contemplator and so an Intellectual-Principle." V.2. 1.

"Generative of all, the Unity is none of all; neither thing nor quality nor quantity nor intellect nor soul; not in motion, not in time; it is the self-defined, unique in form or better, formless, existing before Form was, or Movement or Rest, all of which are attachments of Being and make Being the manifold it is." VI. 9. 3

"No wonder that to state it is not easy; even Being and Form are not easy, though we have a way, an approach through the Ideas. The soul or mind reaching towards the formless finds itself incompetent to grasp where nothing bounds it or to take impression where the impinging reality is diffuse; in sheer dread of holding to nothingness, it slips away. The state is painful; often it seeks relief by retreating from all this vagueness to the region of sense, there to rest on solid ground, just as the sight distressed by the minute rests with pleasure on the bold." VI. 9. 3.
On his idea of the Supra-Real as "the First," he writes:

"Anything existing after The First must necessarily arise from that First, whether immediately or as tracing back to it through intermediates; there must be an order of secondaries and thirdaries, in which any second is to be referred to The First, any third to the second. Standing before all things, there must exist a Simplex, differing from all its sequel, self-gathered, not inter-blended with the forms that rise from it, and yet able in some mode of its own to be present to those others; it must be authentically a unity, not merely something elaborated into unity and so in reality no more than unity's counterfeit. V. 4. 1.

"All that is not One is conserved by virtue of the One, and from the One derives its characteristic nature; if it had not attained such unity as is consistent with being made up of multiplicity we could not affirm its existence; if we are able to affirm the nature of single things, this in virtue of the unity, the identity even, which each of them possesses. But the all-transcendent, utterly void of multiplicity, has no mere unity of participation but is unity's self, independent of all else, as being that from which, by whatever means, all the rest take their degree of unity in their standing, near or far, towards it." V.3.15

His conclusion is that this Supra-Real is indefinable, beyond sense, beyond formulation, and in some degree, at least, beyond logic. He writes:

"Thus The One is in truth beyond all statement; any affirmation is of a thing; but the all transcending, resting above even the most august divine Mind, possesses alone of all true being, and is not a thing among things. We can give it no name because that would imply predication; we can but try to indicate, in our own feeble way, something concerning it."

V. 3. 13.

If this is the case, then, that the best expression of reality lies within the concept of unity -- sheer unity, pure and simple, but beyond language and activity, as Plotinus asserts to be the situation -- what hope is there for the attainment of any understanding of reality? The answer is found in the second element of his system: namely, intelligence, mind, or spirit.
By means of this second factor some connection may be established between the One and all existing things. Since mind is that which is most like the One, and nearer to it than all else, and yet is itself not transcendent, not a Supra-Real, but an existent functioning within the world of existents, it is the avenue of all understanding. It is that factor about reality that is understandable, and as such is understanding. It is form, pattern, principle, order, intelligence, meaning, purpose, and consistency. It is the inherent intelligence - factor or reason-principle of all being. All being below the One forms a part of mind or spirit. It is the factor through which all parts of the total universe are seen to be connected one with the other by virtue of the oneness of their purpose, intelligence, pattern, etc.

Conceived of as intelligence, or possibly as super-intelligence, some of the richness of the idea is likely to be lost unless the term "spirit" is also incorporated within it. This is because mind is not to be conceived of as pure abstraction but rather as an existing thing. It is the first and highest of the comprehendible realities -- the richest knowable reality. By his formulation of its status in his system Plotinus gives to intelligence a near-religious connotation, for as he sees it, mind is reality as we may know it.

Mind is produced by the One as a sort of by-product resulting from the overflow, irradiation or "emanation" of the One
itself. It constitutes a rough image of the One without being the One, much in the same sense that a mask may be a moulded image of a face without being that face. It is the first of the three major phases of emanations obtaining within the system, and the first one of all the many emanations there are within the realm of existing things. ³

³ Plotinus comments upon its order and origin:

"But how and what does the Intellectual-Principle see, and, especially, how has it sprung from that which is to become the object of this vision? The mind demands the existence of these Beings, but it is still in trouble over the problem endlessly debated by the most ancient philosophers: from such a unity as we have declared The One to be, how does anything at all come into substantial existence, any multiplicity, dyad, or number? Why has the Primal not remained self-gathered so that there be none of this profusion of the manifold which we observe in existence and yet are compelled to trace to that absolute unity? In venturing an answer, we first invoke God Himself, not in loud word but in the way of prayer which is always within our power, leaning in soul towards Him by aspiration, alone towards the alone. But if we seek the vision of that great Being within the Inner Sanctuary—self-gathered, tranquility remote above all else—we begin by considering the image stationed at the outer precincts, or, more exactly to the moment, the first image that appears. How the Divine Mind comes into being must be explained. Every moving has necessarily an object towards which it advances; but since the Supreme can have no such object, we may not ascribe motion to it. Anything that comes into being after it can be produced only as a consequence of its unfailing self-intention. Given this immobility in the Supreme it can neither have yielded assent nor uttered decree nor stirred in any way towards the existence of a secondary.

What happened then? What are we to conceive as rising in the neighborhood of that immobility? It must be a circumradiation—produced from the Supreme but from the Supreme unaltering—and may be compared to the brilliant light encircling the sun and ceaselessly generated from that unchanging substance. All existences, as long as they retain their character, produce about themselves, from their essences, in virtue of the power which must be in them, some necessary, outward facing hypostasis continuously attached to them and representing in image the engendering archetypes: Thus fire gives out its heat, (continued on next page)
In certain passages Plotinus seems to identify mind with truth. The One cannot be truth since it is beyond expression, but mind

The Intellectual-Principle stands as the image of The One, firstly because there is a certain necessity that the first should have its offspring, carrying onward much of its quality, in other words that there be something in its likeness as the sun's rays tell of the sun. Yet the One is not an Intellectual-Principle: how then does it engender an Intellectual-Principle? Simply by the fact that in its self-quest it has vision: this very seeing is the Intellectual-Principle. Any perception of the external indicates either sensation or intellection, sensation symbolised by a line, intellection by a circle.

All there, too, is a unity, though a unity which is the potentiality of all existence. The items of this potentiality the divine intellection brings out, so to speak, from the unity and knows them in detail, as it must if it is to be an intellectual principle.

It has besides a consciousness, as it were, within itself of this same potentiality; it knows that it can of itself beget an hypostasis and can determine its own Being by the virtue emanating from its prior; it knows that its nature is in some sense a definite part of the context of that First; that it thence derives its essence, that its strength lies there and that its Being takes perfection as a derivative and a recipient from the First. It sees that, as a member of the realm of division and part, it receives life and intellection and all else it has and is, from the undivided and partless, since that First is no member of existence, but can be the source of all on condition only of being held down by one distinctive shape but remaining the undeflected unity.

That station towards the One (the fact that something exists in presence of the One) establishes Being; that vision directed upon the One establishes the Intellectual-Principle; standing towards the One to the end of vision, it is simultaneously Intellectual-Principle and Being; and attaining resemblance in virtue of this vision, it repeats the act of the One in pouring forth a vast power.
being the thing nearest to the One, and yet expressible, is truth. Mind is a "secondary God,"

Since the Intellectual-Principle is expressible it may be seen as ultimate truth, for intellection both begins and ends in this realm of mind.

universe of authentic beings, the Truth: as such it is a great god or better, not a god among gods but the Godhead entire. It is a god, a secondary god manifesting before there is any vision of that other, the Supreme (the One) which rests over all, enthroned in transcendence upon that splendid pediment the Nature following close upon it. The Supreme in its progress could never be borne forward upon some soulless vehicle nor even directly upon the soul: it will be heralded by some ineffable beauty, before the great King in his progress there comes first the minor train, then rank by rank the greater and more exalted, closer to the King the kinglier.... In that royal progress the King is of another order from those that go before him, but the King in the Supreme is no ruler over externs; he holds that most just of governances, rooted in nature, the veritable kinship, for he is King of Truth, holding sway by all reason over a dense offspring of his own, a host that shares his divinity, King over a king, and over kings and even more justly called father of Gods."

5. "This Intellectual-Principle, if the term is to convey the truth, must be understood to be not a principle merely potential and not one maturing from unintelligence to intelligence — that would simply send us seeking, once more, a necessary prior — but a principle which is intelligence in actuality and in eternity.

... A principle whose wisdom is not borrowed must derive from itself any intellection it may make; and anything it may possess within itself it can hold only from itself; it follows that, intellective by its own resource and upon its own content, it is itself the very things on which its intellection acts.... What then is its characteristic Act and what the intellection which makes knower and known here identical?

Clearly, as authenticIntellection, it has authentic intellection of the authentic existent, and establishes their existence. Therefore it is the Authentic Beings...." 

V. 9. 5.

"We take it then, that the Intellectual-Principle is the authentic existences and contains them all — not as in a place but as possessing itself (continued on next page)
Plotinus views mind as the same as both truth and being. Truth cannot get beyond mind either in reference to the One (due to the inexpressibility of the One) or in reference to Soul (for Soul only has meaning and understanding in terms of mind). Mind also extends over the entire range of everything that may be said to exist, giving forth the very suggestion of being or existence in any instance by virtue of its evidence of principle. Mind is both a thinker and "thoughts." Thinker, thinking, and objects of thought are all identical. Ideas are not copies of the universe, rather the universe (the practical universe) is the imperfect copy of the one essential idea: mind.

On the subject of the relation of mind as a unity with individuals, Plotinus' own words are clear enough:

"Intelleot as a whole must be thought of as prior to the intellects actualised as individuals; but when we come to the particular intellects, we find that what subsists in the particulars must be maintained from the totality. The Intelleot subsisting in the totality is a provider for the particular intellects, is the potentiality of them: it involves them as members of its universality, while they in turn involve the universal Intelleot in their particularity, just as the particular science involves science the total.

The great Intellect, we maintain, exists in itself and the particular intellects in themselves; yet the particulars are embraced in the whole,

cont. and being one thing with this its content. All are one there and yet are distinct: similarly the mind holds many branches and items of knowledge simultaneously, yet none of them merged into any other, each acting its own part at all quite independently, every conception coming out from the inner total and working singly. It is after this way, though in a closer unity, that the Intellectual-Principle is all Being in one total — and yet not in one, since each of these beings is a distinct power, which, however, the total Intellectual-Principle includes as the species in a genus, as the parts in a whole..."
and the whole in the particulars. The particular intellects exist by them-
selves and in another, the universal by itself and in those. All the
particulars exist potentially in that self-existent universal, which ac-
tually is the totality, potentially each isolated member: on the other hand,
each particular is actually what it is (its individual self) potentially
the totality. In so far as what is predicated of them is their essence,
they are actually what is predicated of them; but where the predicate is a
genus, they are that only potentially. On the other hand, the universal
is so far as it is a genus is the potentiality of all its subordinate
species, though none of them in actuality; all are latent in it, but
because its essential nature exists in actuality before the existence of
the species, it does not submit to be itself particularised. If then the
particulars are to exist in actuality— to exist, for example, as species—
the cause must lie in the act radiating from the universal." VI.2.20.

"How then does the universal Intelлект produce the particulars while, in
virtue of its Reason-Principle, remaining a unity? In other words, how
do the various grades of Being... arise...?

It is a universal rule that whatever reasoning discovers to exist in Nature
is to be found in Intelлект apart from all ratiocination: we conclude that
Being has so created Intelлект that its reasoning is after a mode similar
to that of the principles which produce living beings; for the Reason-
Principles, prior to reasoning though they are, act invariably in the
manner which the most careful reasoning would adopt in order to attain the
best results... .

Everything exists forever, unfailing, involved by very existence in ete-
nity. Individuals have their separate entities, but are one in the (total)
unity. The complex, so to speak, of them all, thus combined is Intelлект;
and Intelлект, holding all existence within itself, is a complete living
being, and the essential Idea of Living Being. In so far as Intelлект sub-
mits to contemplation by its derivative, becoming an Intelligible, it gives
that derivative the right also to be called "living being." VI. 2. 21.

When we think of Being we have to think of it in terms of cer-
tain categories. The categories of mind are: life, Being, motion,
stability, identity, and difference. He says of life:

"We have found Substance (Essence) and life simultaneously present in
Soul. Now, this Substance is a common property of Soul, but life, common
to all souls, differs in that it is a property of Intelлект also.
Having thus introduced Intellect and its life we make a single genus of what is common to all life, namely Motion. Substance and the Motion which constitutes the highest life we must consider as two genera; for even though they form a unity, they are separable to thought which finds their unity not a unity; otherwise it could not distinguish them. Observe also how in other things Motion or life is clearly separated from Being—a separation impossible, doubtless, in True Being, but possible in its shadow and namesake. In the portrait of a man much is left out, and above all the essential thing, life: the "Being" of sensible things is just such a shadow of True Being, an abstraction from that Being complete which was life in the Archetype; it is because of this incompleteness that we are able in the Sensible world to separate Being from life and life from Being." VI. 2. 8.

Life is not the typical indication of the order of mind, but it is a property of mind. Although life applies to soul, still mind can not be said to be lifeless. Plotinus says the Intellect

"... lives a life that endures and keeps a thought acting not upon any future but upon that which already is, upon an eternal present—a thought self-centered, bearing on nothing outside of itself."

VI. 2. 8

Both motion and stability are characteristic of mind. There is both change in the universe and an inherent stability to it all. The mind moves, but it does not go any place; it is rather its movement within itself. Mind does not change, it rather acts maintaining its typical stability in the midst of its action.

Plotinus introduces Stability to Being and Motion viz.:

"Being, then, containing many species, has but one genus. Motion, however, is to be classed as neither a subordinate nor a supplement of Being but as its concomitant; for we have not found Being serving as substrate to Motion. Motion is Being's Act; neither
is separated from the other except in thought; the two natures are one; for Being is inevitably actual, not potential...

Now Motion, thus manifested in conjunction with Being, does not alter Being's nature -- unless to complete its essential character -- and it does retain forever its own peculiar nature: at once, then, we are forced to introduce Stability. To reject Stability would be more unreasonable than to reject Motion; for Stability is associated in our thought and conception with Being; even more than with Motion; unalterable condition, unchanging mode, single Reason-Principle -- these are characteristics of the higher sphere.

Stability, then, may also be taken as a single genus. Obviously distinct from Motion and perhaps even its contrary, that it is also distinct from Being, so also would Motion be, with equal right. Why identify in the case of Stability and not in that of Motion, when Motion is virtually the very life and Act both of Substance and of Absolute Being? However, on the very same principle on which we separated Motion from Being with the understanding that it is the same and not the same -- that they are two and yet one -- we also separate Stability from Being, holding it yet, inseparable; it is only a logical separation entailing the inclusion among the Existents of this other genus. To identify Stability with Being, with no difference between them, and to identify Being with Motion, would be to identify Stability with Motion through the mediation of Being, and so to make Motion and Stability one and the same thing.”

"Being, the most firmly set of all things, that in virtue of which all other things receive Stability, possesses this Stability not as from without but as springing within as inherent. Stability is the goal of intellection, a Stability which had no beginning, and the state from which intellection was impelled was Stability, though Stability gave it no impulsion; for Motion neither starts from Motion nor ends in Motion. Again, the Form-Idea has Stability, since it is the goal of Intellect: intellection is the Form's Motion.

Thus all the Existents are one, at once Motion and Stability; Motion and Stability are genera all-pervading, and every subsequent is a particular being, a particular stability and a particular motion.”

VI. 2. 8.

Identity and Difference need little explanation beyond the indication that mind maintains its essential identity and yet undergoes an active process of dealing with different particulars.
Plotinus explains briefly:

"... Identity and Difference have the generic status independently of the particular. They will, moreover, be primary genera, because nothing can be predicated of them as denoting their essential nature. Nothing, of course we mean, but Being; but this Being is not their genus, since they cannot be identified with any particular being as such..."

"In sum, the unity exhibited in Being on the one hand approximates to Unity-Absolute and on the other tends to identify itself with Being: Being is a unity in relation to the Absolute, is Being by virtue of its sequence upon that Absolute: it is indeed potentially a plurality, and yet it remains a unity and rejecting division refuses thereby to become a genus."

VI.2.9.

Mind is manifested in the whole of the universe and any part of Being will manifest mind. Over and above the appearance of all particulars in their multiplicity is both a transcendent and an immanent unity in virtue of the Intellectual-Principle.

In the second element in his system, Plotinus solves the ancient problem of how the universe may be both fixed and in movement. Mind is not identical with the total universe for there are certain elements and factors within the universe inconsistent with it. Yet, Mind is identical with the rationale of the universe to the extent that all forms, all Being, find their ideal archetypes and even their individual meaning within Mind. Mind, however, is not an aggregate of little minds. It is rather itself one unbroken, extensive, consistent and comprehensive simplex. It pervades all Being -- more correctly -- all Being is its immediate identity and production.

Within the universe there are certain elements, factors,
situations, etc., inconsistent with mind. These are not a part of Being for they are so possessed with inconsistencies, multiplicities, falsehood, and so far removed from beauty and goodness so as to have no evidence of mind. In their rapid changing state they form a contrast to the inherently ordered relation of mind. Whereas their movement involves change and disordered motion, the movement of mind involves no change at all for mind is always continuously in action, in self-expression, within its fixed and eternal realm. Change and multiplicity in things indicate their lack of mind, their lack of authentic existence. Ordered, unified action indicates the presence of mind, the participation in the fixed orders and relationships of Being, an identity with the overall stability in the universe.

We may conceive of mind, then, as not the logical ultimate of existence, but rather as the practical ultimate of our understanding. It is truth (truth is a practical idea), it is authentic existence, it is spirit, reason, intelligence, and perhaps even personality. Anything devoid of it is non-existent, and yet it emanates itself in lesser degrees of richness, eventually to have a logical determination as Soul.

The third factor in Plotinus' system is Soul. It is the Second Emanation of the whole system, logically coming from mind in essentially the same manner as mind logically continually issues forth from the One. Soul constitutes a sort of
second order of being, its reality being by virtue of some
inherence of mind. To the order of Soul belongs all living
things, for the principle of soul is the principle of life.

Soul is less real than mind due to its status of being
more distantly removed from the One. Although there is no clear-
ly indicated distinction between any of the stages of emanation
so that there is a continuous flow of unbroken series continuing throughout, soul may be conceived of as occurring after the
final (hypothetical) stage of mind. This is to say that the
first order of soul (the first soul emanation) is lower in de-
gree than the last order of mind.

Soul may be conceived of as mind in movement, or as the
fixed motion of mind. The concept is nearly identical with the
concept of life, for as Plotinus sees it, everything that is
alive is a soul. The doctrine is not that everything that is
alive has a soul, but rather that everything that is alive is
a soul, for to be alive is to be a soul and to be a soul is to
be alive.

In the physical universe in which we live we see most:
things in their soul-condition. We customarily think of life
in reference to soul and soul in reference to life. Both
concepts are abstractions in which there is embodied something
of the energizing aspect of the universe. Plotinus, in one of
his passages, bids us to look deeper into the nature of things
as we see them in their soul-condition to observe that beyond soul there is mind, that beyond mere movements there is the principle of movements, -- beyond principles there is a pattern based upon an even more ultimate ideal unity.

The concept of the soul in Plotinus is so closely interwoven with the concept of mind, and also with even the One, that it may be understood only in reference to prior established concepts. Soul is so closely identified with mind that it would not be incorrect to say that soul is mind in exactly the same sense that it would not be incorrect to say that mind is unity or the One. Yet, from a practical point of view different words must be used to describe the various aspects of reality in the system of Plotinus.

Soul is the immanence of mind. In an ultimate sense, of course, it is also the immanence of the One through the media of mind. Soul is mind in process, the more local, immediate, sensible effect of mind: mind operative on its practical, existential level. Whereas it is the distinctive nature of mind in itself to be fixed, non-evolutionary in order, unchanging, and according to principle, Mind nevertheless, emanates out to a lower functioning level wherein external change and multiplicity may become so associated with it that it must no longer be called mind but soul.
Soul still retains the fundamentals of mind in its fundamental order. Soul, as a lower order of mind, just as mind is a

6. "Soul is subsequent to Intellect, yet by its very nature it involves Intellect in itself and perceives more clearly in that prior." VI, 2. 22.

"... That vision directed upon the One establishes the Intellectual-Principle; standing towards the One to the end of vision, it is simultaneously Intellectual-Principle and Being; and attaining resemblance in virtue of this vision, it repeats the act of the One in pouring forth a vast power. This second outflow is a Form or Idea representing the Divine Intellect as the Divine Intellect represented its own prior, The One. This active power sprung from essence... is Soul. Soul arises as the idea and act of the motionless Intellectual-Principle --- which itself sprang from its own motionless prior --- but the soul's operation is not similarly motionless; its image is generated from its movement..."

V. 2. 1

"Soul, for all the worth we have shown to belong to it, is yet a secondary image of the Intellectual-Principle: reason uttered is an image of the reason stored within the soul, and in the same way soul is an utterance of the Intellectual-Principle: it is even the total of its activity, the entire stream of life sent forth by that Principle to the production of further being; it is the forthgoing heat of a fire which has also heat essentially inherent. But within the Supreme we must see energy not as an overflow but in the double aspect of integral inherence with the establishment of new being. Sprung, in other words, from the Intellectual-Principle, Soul is intellective, but with an intellective operating by the method of reasonings: for its perfecting it must look on that Divine Mind, which may be thought of as a father watching over the development of his child born imperfect in comparison with himself." V. 1. 3.

"Time at first... lay, self-concentrated, at rest within the Authentic Existent: it was not yet Time; it was merged in the Authentic and motionless with it. But there was an active principle there, one set on governing itself and realising itself (the All-Soul), and it chose to aim at something more than its present: it stirred from its rest, and Time stirred with it... For the Soul contained an unquiet faculty, always desirous of translating elsewhere what it saw in the Authentic Realm, and it could not bear to retain within itself all the dense fullness of its possession... Putting forth its energy in act after act, in a constant progress of novelty, the Soul produces succession as well as act; taking up new purposes added to the old it brings thus into being what had not existed in that former period when its purpose was still dormant and its life was not as it since became..."

(continued on next page)
lower order of the One, may be viewed in its own connotation as the lively aspect of mind: mind in action, mind in motion.

Time, however, is not to be conceived as outside of Soul; Eternity is not outside of the Authentic Existence: nor is it to be taken as a sequence or succession to Soul. ... It is a thing seen upon Soul, inherent, coeval to it, as Eternity to the Intellectual Realm.

III. 7. 11.

"The (Universal) Soul --- containing the Ideal Principles of Real-Beings, and itself an Ideal Principle --- includes all in concentration within itself, just as the Ideal Principle of each particular entity is complete and self-contained; it, therefore, sees these principles of sensible things because they are turned, as it were, towards it and advancing to it: but it cannot harbour them in their plurality, for it cannot depart from its Kind; it sees them, therefore, stripped of Mass. Matter, on the contrary, destitute of resisting power since it has no Act of its own and is a mere shadow, can but accept all that an active power may choose to send. In what is thus sent, from the Reason-Principle in the Intellectual Realm, there is already contained a degree of the partial object that is to be formed: in the image making impulse within the Reason-Principle there is already a step (toward the lower manifestation) ... ."

III. 5. 18

"Let every soul recall, then at the outset the truth that soul is the author of all living things, that it has breathed the life into them all, that whatever is nourished by earth and sea, all the creatures of the air, the divine stars in the sky; it is the maker of the sun; itself formed and ordered this vast heaven and conducts all that rhythmical motion; and it is a principle distinct from all these to which it gives law and movement and life, and it must of necessity be more honourable than they, for they gather or dissolve as soul brings them life or abandons them, but soul, since it can never abandon itself, is of eternal being. ... As the rays of the sun throwing their brilliance upon a lowering cloud make it gleam all gold, so the soul entering the material expanse of the heavens has given life, has given immortality: what was abject it has lifted up; and the heavenly system, moved now in endless motion by the soul that leads it in wisdom, has become a living and a blessed thing; the soul domiciled within, it takes worth where, before the soul, it was stark body, ---clay and water--- or, rather, the blankness of Matter, the absence of Being. ... " V. 1. 2
Whereas the mind is more of a simple unity, soul is a complex embodying the whole vital essence of the world and of all individual in it so that the whole universe fits together as one living organism.

If then, it is the characteristic of soul to be active ---what does it do? The answer is that it produces bodies. It does not create them out of nothing but rather creates them out of itself: it emanates them as by-products. According to the thinking of Plotinus, being does not come and go, it remains eternally in its fixed limits, eternally having its same degree of intensity and reality. Individual things, however do come into existence, have an individual history and pass away. Soul shares in this process, producing bodies as an emanation in similar manner in which mind produces soul and in which mind is produced by the One. Soul acts as a shaping and arranging

7. He writes concerning the soul of the universe: "If we can trace neither to material agencies (blind elements) nor to any deliberate intention the influences from without which reach to us and to the other forms of life and to the terrestrial in general, what cause satisfactory to reason remains? The secret is: firstly, that this All is one universally comprehensive living being, encircling all the living beings within it, and having a soul, one soul, which extends to all its members in the degree of participant membership held by each; secondly, that every separate thing is an integral part of this All by belonging to the total material fabric unrestrictedly a part by bodily membership, while, in so far as it has also some participation in the All-Soul it possesses in that degree spiritual membership as well, perfect where participation is in the All-Soul alone, partial where there is also a union with a lower soul. . . . This One-All, therefore, is a sympathetic total and stands as one living being; the far is near; it happens as in one animal with its separate parts: talon, horn, finger, and any other members are not continuous and yet are effectively near. . . . Where all is a living thing summing to a unity there is nothing so remote in point of place as not to be near by virtue of a nature which makes of the one living being a sympathetic organism." IV.4.32
factor in giving a pattern or principle to the more remote, multiple, diffuse, and dis-arranged levels of emanations. These distant emanations are so diffuse, so inconsistent, so disarranged that in their state apart from soul they may said to have no being. This is Plotinus' idea of theoretical matter: that which is so multiple, chaotic, and disorganized that it has no affinity with unity. Technically, pure matter does not actually exist. It is not a part of Plotinus' system of real being, yet, it is a part of his system of becoming. It may not properly be included as authentic existence, however, Plotinus must suggest its logical existence below the level of Soul. It is the logical extreme of his system of emanations, namely emanation out of sheer nothingness itself.

Bodies are matter that tends toward form: form matter. Yet, the form of bodies does not come from the nature of matter itself but rather from soul. All evidences of form come from soul. Each particular soul emanates its own body, the form of the body coming from soul. The logical conclusion from Plotinus' doctrine on the subject would be that every body is a soul "embodied", although he usually makes reference to the concept of living bodies only to about the level of "vegetal" things. He writes that every part of the universe has a life of its kind: "We cannot think of the universe as a soulless habitation, however vast and varied, a thing of materials easily told off, kind by kind --- wood and stone and whatever else there be, all blending into a kosmos: it
must be alert throughout, every member living by its own life, nothing that can have existence failing to exist within it. And here we have the solution of the problem, "How an ensouled living form can include the soulless?" for this account allows grades of living within the whole, grades to some of which we deny life only because they are not perceptibly selfmoved: in the truth, all of these have a hidden life; and the thing whose life is patent to sense is made up of things which do not live to sense, but, none the less, confer upon their resultant total wonderful powers towards living..." IV. 4. 36.

Since life is identified with soul, living bodies are those that have more soul as a part of their nature. The soul is present with the body, but is not within it, for the body is penetrated in every part by the soul that created it. It is a situation in which souls have bodies rather than bodies have souls.

---

--- Sometimes elaborated on this point in an excellent passage:

"The soul... may not be considered to be within the body as in a space: space is a container, a container of body; it is the home of such things as consist of isolated parts, things, therefore, in which at no point is there an entirety; now, the soul is not a body and is no more contained than containing.

Neither is it in body as in some vessel: whether as vessel or as place of location, the body would remain, in itself, unensouled. If we are to think of some passing-over from the soul ---that self-gathered thing ---to the containing vessel, then soul is diminished by just as much as the vessel takes...

Nor can it be in the body as in some substratum: anything in a substratum is a condition affecting that ---a colour, a form ---but the soul (is no condition of something else), is a separate existence.

Nor is it present as a part in the whole; soul is no part of body. If we are asked to think of soul as a part in the living total we are faced with the old difficulty: --- How it is in that whole. It is certainly not there as the wine is in the wine jar, or as the jar in the jar, or as some absolute is self-present.

Nor can the presence be that of a whole in its parts: It would be absurd to think of the soul as a total of which the body should represent the parts. It is not present as Form is in Matter; for the Form as in Matter is inseparable, and, further, is something superimposed upon an already existent thing; soul, on the contrary is that which engenders the Form residing within the Matter and therefore is not the Form. If the reference is not to the Form (continued on next page).
Just as mind, conceived of as a totality may be pictured as embracing all the reason principles, patterns, and explanations of all individual things, so soul may be conceived of as a totality of all the active life principles of all individual things. Conceived of individually, every individual thing or item exists in direct and immediate relationship to soul. "Individual" souls are to be conceived of only in terms of one total soul-nature in general.

9. "The soul is the author of all living things, ... it has breathed the life into them all, whatever is nourished by earth and sea, all the creatures of the air, the divine stars in the sky; it is the maker of the sun; itself formed and ordered this vast heaven and conducts all that rhythmic motion; and it is a principle distinct from all these to which it gives law and movement and life, ... they gather or dissolve as soul brings them life or abandons them. ... The material body is made up of parts, each holding its own place, some in mutual opposition and others variously interdependent; the soul is in no such condition; it is not whittled down so that life tells of a part of the soul and springs where some such separate portion impinges; each separate life lives by the soul entire, omnipresent in the likeness of the engendering father, entire in unity and entire in diffused variety. ..."  

IV. 3. 20.

V. 1. 2
Being indestructible life-principles, souls do not come into being within time. However, individual souls do have histories in their relationship with bodies: that of being imprisoned with a particular body for a certain period of time --- a tragic process which occurs over and over again constituting the endless episode of reincarnation of every individual soul. Strictly speaking, birth and death cannot apply to souls.

Perhaps the most significant fact about Plotinus' teachings about soul is his explanation that man is most characteristically a soul. He is only one among many sorts of souls within the universe, and his relationship to mind and the One is essentially the same as that of all other souls. He shares the common lot of all souls in the manner of his coming into existence as an individual in his connectedness with the universe, and in the fact of his meaning and destiny being incorporated within the nature of the system. Among the order of souls, man is ranked a little above center in the scaling of individual souls. On this Plotinus writes:

"In the Universe the middle and lower members are human beings; above them, the Heavens and the Gods that dwell there; these Gods with the entire circling expense of the heavens constitute the greater part of the Kosmos; the earth is but a central point. . . .

But humanity, in reality is, poised midway between gods and beasts, and inclines now to the one order, now to the other; some men grow like to the divine, others to the brute, the greater number stand natural. . . ."

III. 2. 8.
As an individual human being, man consists of an individual soul that has generated a body with which it is associated. As a soul man is part of mind and part of the One. His body, being incidental to his being, is composed of matter, which acts contrary to the inherent nature of soul and provides a constant struggle between the soul and the body. Everything there is that is bad about man is due to his involvement in matter. Everything noble and worthy about his is due to his soul nature. Strictly speaking, we may not say that man has a soul nature, for he actually has only soul nature. His personality is to be identified with his soul-ness, and with this alone. Neither can we say that man has a mind. It is rather the case that man is a part of mind by virtue of being a soul. His particular reason principles, patterns, ideal forms, destiny, etc., are but a part of mind in general and ultimately, as we have indicated, are a part of the inherent unity of the universe.

Yet, so long as we maintain the setting of man distinctively as a soul we may to some extent picture him as having a particularized mental aspect. The position of man in the universe and his involvement as a soul limited by matter set the stage for the drama of human history.

On various occasions Plotinus refers to the analogy of a series of concentric circles with radii extending from the ultimate center as a means of describing his system. His comments concerning these may well summarize the presentation
of his system. He writes:

"...A circle related in its path to a centre must be admitted to owe its scope to that centre; it has something of the nature of that centre in that the radial lines converging on that one central point assimilate their impinging ends to that point of convergence and of departure. the dominant of radii and terminals: the terminals are of one nature with the centre, separate reproductions of it, since the centre is, in a certain sense, the total of terminals and radii impinging at every point upon it; these lines reveal the centre; they are the development of that undeveloped. In the same way we are to take...Being. This combined power springs from the Supreme, an outflow as it were development from That and remaining dependent upon that Intellective nature, showing forth That which, in the purity of its oneness, is not Intellectual-Principle since it is no duality. No more than in the circle are the lines or circumference to be identified with that Centre which is the source of both: radii and circle are images given forth by indwelling power and, as products of a certain vigour in it, not cut off from it."  
VI. 8. 18.

"...Imagine a small luminous mass serving as centre to a transparent sphere, so that the light from within shows upon the entire outer surface, otherwise unlit: we surely agree that the inner core of light, intact and immobile, reaches over the entire outer extension; the single light of that small centre illuminates the whole field. The diffused light is not due to any bodily magnitude of that central point which illuminates not as body but as body lit, that is, by another kind of power than corporeal quality: let us then abstract the corporeal mass, retaining the light as power: we can no longer speak of the light in any particular spot; it is equally diffused within and throughout the entire sphere...."  
VI. 4. 7.

"...As a help towards stating the nature of the produced multiplicity--we use the example of many lines radiating from one centre; but while we provide for individualization we must carefully preserve mutual presence. Even in the case of our circle we need not think of separated radii; all may be taken as forming one surface: where there is no distinction even upon the one surface but all is power and reality undifferentiated, all the beings may be thought of as centres uniting at one central centre: we ignore the radial lines and think of their terminals at that centre, where they are at one. Restore the radii: once more we have lines, each touching a generating centre of its own, but that centre remains coincident with the one first centre...."  
VI. 5. 5.
Perhaps we may diagram his system as follows:

EXAMPLES

- Gods
- Demons
- Man
- Dog
- Tree
- Rock

---

THE ONE

MIND

SOUL

MATTER
In summary, the four elements of Plotinus' system are The One, Mind, Soul, and Matter. Everything after the One is a gradation of the One insofar as it exists in any reality. Everything that exists is a part of the One so that to be real and to be the One are one and the same thing. Mind, Soul, and Matter, in order, are less real than the One, each in succession being less real than the one before, but the reality of all three may be analyzed into the One. Everything that exists after the One, exists inside of the One and as a part of it, but is not solely identical with it.

This arrangement of things accounts for the explanation of the nature of the universe and also for its origin. The universe is itself eternal as the One is eternal. Time or succession do not apply in the case of any of the parts of the system.

Life is inferior to both Mind and the One, being identified with movement and change rather than with unmoving existents. Qualities of differentiation apply more in the case of the inferior parts of the system, such as in the case of souls, individual things, and matter, rather than in reference to the richest centers of reality: Mind and the One. Although all other things spring from the One in origin and meaning, there is no change in position within the framework of the system, all movement and change being self-movement or change within position.

Man is a soul, and as such is a part of both Mind and the One. His soul emanates a body, which is a burden to him and from which he longs to be free. Within the system, man is located at about midpoint between the extremes of disvalue and value: matter and pure unity, ο λη and ευ.
Chapter III
The Religion of Plotinus

According to Porphyry, Plotinus was not a religious man according to the then-contemporary standards for judging a religious man. He abstained from all rites and sacrifices, rejected the popular Greek polytheism of his day, and participated in no forms of public or private worship. Typical of his attitude in these matters, Porphyry tells, was his utterance: "The Gods must come to me, not I to them."

Plotinus, notwithstanding, was quite a religious man. His philosophy is essentially a religious philosophy and his concepts are fundamentally religious concepts. It seems to be the case that he was so concerned about religion that he could not tolerate any meager expressions of it, so that his scorn for popular religion was but his way of testimony to a higher level of religious devotion. From what Porphyry has to say about his behaviour in general and on the basis of the centrality of religious concepts in his system, he is to be seen as an intensely religious man, completely absorbed in ultimately
religious concepts and dedicated to a religious way of life. It might be well said of him, as it was said of Spinoza, that he was a "God-intoxicated" man. His non-conformity is but a clue to his over-all honesty in refusing to profess his religious allegiance except in terms of his own philosophy, which, at the time, happened to be alien to his contemporaries. He belongs to that long list of men who are formally "irreligious", not because they think religion is unimportant, but because they feel that its meaning and essence cannot be incorporated in symbolisms and ceremonies, but must be connected, related, and explained within a system.

It is not a simple undertaking to attempt to analyze the religion of Plotinus. Due to his disposition on the subject he never discusses religion in any categorical way. That which he has to say that may be termed "religious" is rather scattered over the whole of his writings. We must also grant that categorical concepts of religion often do not mean the same thing in different settings, so that in a study of religious ideas, that which was said within one system must necessarily be translated into that which is understood in terms of another system or set of categories. Add to this the abstractness and abstruseness of many of the ideas of Plotinus and the task becomes difficult and challenging.

We propose an analysis of the religion of Plotinus under
the headings of (1) his concept of deity, (2) his idea of man, (3) his concept of sin, (4) his ideas of life and death, and (5) his philosophy of salvation.

Reference has already been made to Plotinus' skepticism concerning the ordinary deities of Greek polytheism. Throughout the Enneads numerous references are made to them, but there is no reason to believe that the terms are to be taken to have meaning except in a literary sense. "Ouranious (heaven) is sometimes used to denote unity, "Kronos," sometimes means mind, and "Zeus" is often used to indicate the World-Soul.

1. A typical example of the latter is: "But Zeus ordering all, governor, guardian and disposer, possessor for ever of the Kingly soul and the Kingly intellect, bringing all into being by his providence, and presiding over all things as they come, administering all under plan and system, unfurling the periods of the kosmos, many of which stand already accomplished—would it not seem inevitable that, in this multiplicity of concern, Zeus should have memory of all the periods, their number and their different qualities.... Even this matter of Zeus' memory of the kosmic periods is difficult.... Zeus cannot know the number of his works.... Zeus knows his own unlimited life, and in that knowledge, knows the activity that flows from him to the kosmos...."

IV. 4. 9

and again:

"When under the name of Zeus we are considering the Demiurge we must leave out all notions of stage and progress, and recognise one unchanging and timeless life...."

IV. 4. 10

(see also: III. 5. 8, 9; V. 1. 7; & V. 8. 12)
The question of determining what is Plotinus' doctrine of God, specifically, what is to be considered God, according to his interpretation, is not so easily determined. The question demands some elaboration.

Plotinus uses the word God or "theos" many times in his writings. However, he does not explain the meaning that he would attach to the term, and apparently uses the term loosely to apply to different parts of his system at different times. We may not deduce his doctrine of God from an analysis of his use of the word alone.

There are five possible ways of interpreting Plotinus' idea of God. They are (1) the identifying of God with Plotinus' concept of gods and demons, (2) the identifying of God with the World-Soul, (3) the identifying of God with the Diviné-Mind, (4) the identifying of God with the One, and (5) the identifying of God with Plotinus' entire system of real being (authentic existence).

The possible argument for the first case is that Plotinus believed in the existence of a collection of beings existing between the level of man and the World-Soul. They were souls greater than men, not as completely "embodied" as men, more powerful than men --- serving in some sense as mediators between the higher order than they and men. In short, the view seems to have a rough parallel to the concept of the Olympian deities,
with the exception that these gods and demons were even less limited and less colorful than the popular Greek deities. The demons were lesser powers than the gods, but both were of the same general type, the difference being that the gods ranked higher and were essentially more noble in character.

2. Plotinus speaks of this second higher level of spiritual beings above men viz.: "You are wronged; need that trouble an immortal? You are put to death; you have attained your desire. And from the moment your citizenship of the world becomes irksome you are not bound to it. Our adversaries do not deny that even here there is a system of law and penalty: and surely we cannot in justice blame a dominion which awards to every one his due, where virtue has its honour, and vice comes to its fitting shame, in which there are not merely representations of the gods, but the gods themselves, watchers from above, and--- as we read---easily rebutting human reproaches, since they lead all things in order from a beginning to an end, allotting to each human being, as life follows life, a fortune shaped to all that has preceeded --- the destiny which, to those that do not penetrate it, becomes the matter of boorish insolence upon things divine.... We must recognise that other men have attained the heights of goodness; we must admit the goodness of the celestial spirits, and above all of the gods ---those whose presence is here but their contemplation in the Supreme, and loftiest of them, the lord of this All, the most blessed Soul. Rising still higher, we hymn the divinities of the Intellectual Sphere, and above all these, the mighty King of that dominion, whose majesty is made patent in the very multitude of the gods."

II. 9. 9

And again: "We must, therefore, lay down the grounds on which we distinguish the Gods from the Celestials—that is, when we emphasize the separate nature of the two orders and are not, as often in practice, including these Spirits under the common names of Gods. It is our teaching and conviction that the Gods are immune to all passions while we attribute experience and emotion to the Celestials which, though eternal Beings and directly next to the Gods, are already a step towards ourselves and stand between the divine and the human.... It is best not to use the word "Celestial" of any Being of that Realm; the word "god" may be applied to the Essential-Celestial --- the auto-daimon --- and even to the Visible Powers of the Universe of sense down to the Moon; and even to the Visible Powers of the Universe of sense down to the Moon; Gods, these too, visible, secondary,sequent upon the Gods of the Intellectual Realm, consonant with Them, held about Them, as the radiance about the star. What then are these spirits? A Celestial is the representative generated by
Although it is true that Plotinus speaks of these higher spiritual beings as gods, we can be content with the conclusion that he intended for such to be his total doctrine of deity. Such animism is quite inconsistent with his more elaborate concept of being, in general, and it would be difficult to think that which we would term "deity" existing on a lower level than some other formulated concept of being.

A much better argument can be made for identifying the World-Soul as deity. Plotinus goes to great detail to emphasize his doctrine of man's essential identity with the World-Soul, the great life of the universe. It is his distinctive message about man that as a soul he is identified with all souls in the universe and even with the universe as a soul. For all practical purposes man's connection with any other aspect of being is directly dependent upon the World-Soul, for man must reach
even mind and unity through the medium of soul.

3. Plotinus writes: "But what becomes of the soul's infinity if it is thus fixed. The infinity is a matter of power: there is question not of the soul's being divisible into an infinite number of parts, but of an infinite possible effectiveness: it is infinity in the sense in which the Supreme God, also, is free of all bound. This means that it is no external limit that defines the individual being or the extension of souls any more than of God; on the contrary each in right of his own power is all that it chooses to be; and we are not to think of it as going forth from itself (losing its unity by any partition): the fact is simply that the element within it, which is apt to entrance into body, has the power of immediate projection any whither: the soul is certainly not wrenched asunder by its presence at once in foot and in finger. Its presence in the All is similarly unbroken; over its entire range it exists in every several part of everything having even vegetal life, even in a part cut off from the main; in any possible segment it is as it is at its source. For the body of the All is a unit, and the soul is everywhere present to it as to one thing."

IV. 2. 8

"...While the Soul (as an eternal, a Divine Being) is at rest --- in rest firmly based on Repose, the Absolute --- yet, as we may put it, that hugh illumination of the Supreme pouring outwards comes at last to the extreme bourne of its light and dwindles to darkness.... Imagine that a stately and varied mansion has been built; it has never been abandoned by its Architect, who, yet, is not tied down to it; he has judged it worthy in all its length and breadth of all the care that can serve to its Being --- as far as it can share in Being --- or to its beauty, but a care without burden to its director, who never descends, but presides over it from above; this gives the degree in which the Kosmos is ensouled, not by a soul belonging to it, but by one present to it; it is mastered not master; not possessor but possessed. The soul bears it up, and it lies within, no fragment of it unsharing.
The kosmos is like a net which takes all its life, as far as ever it stretches from being wet in water, and has no act of its own; the sea rolls away and the net with it, precisely to the full of its scope, for no mesh of it can strain beyond its set place: the soul is of so far-reaching a nature --- a thing unbounded --- as to embrace the entire body of the All in one extension; so far as the universe extends, there soul is; and if the universe had no existence, the extent of the soul would be the same; it is eternally what it is. The universe spreads as broad as the presence of the soul; the bound of its expansion is the point at which, in its downward egression from the Supreme, it still has soul to bind it in one...."

IV. 3. 9.

(continued on next page)
The chief objection to identifying the World-Soul as God cont.

"The Intellectual-Principle in the Supreme has ever been the sun of that sphere -- let us accept that as the type of the creative Logos -- and immediately upon it follows the Soul depending from it, stationary Soul from stationary Intelligence. But the Soul borders also upon the sun of this sphere, and it becomes the medium by which all is linked to the over-world; it plays the part of an interpreter between what emanates from that sphere down to this lower universe, and what rises -- as far as, through Soul, anything can -- from the lower to the highest."

IV. 3. 11

"The administration of the cosmos is to be thought of as of a living unit: there is the action determined by what is external, and has to do with the parts, and there is that determined by the internal and by the principle.... And in the case of the universe, the administration is all the less complicated from the fact that the soul actually circumscribes, as part of a living unity, all the members which it conducts. For all the Kinds included in the universe are dominated by one Kind, upon which they follow, fitted into it, developing from it, growing out of it, just as the Kind manifested in the bough is related to the Kind in the trees as a whole."

IV. 4. 11

"We cannot think of the universe as a soulless habitation, however vast and varied, a thing of materials easily told off, kind by kind -- wood and stone and whatever else there be, all blending into a kosmos: It must be alert throughout, every member living by its own life, nothing that can have existence failing to exist within it.

And here we have the solution of the problem, "How an ensouled living form can include the soulless": for this account allows grades of living within the whole, grades to some of which we deny life only because they are not perceptibly self-moving: in the truth, all of these have a hidden life; and the thing whose life is patent to sense is made up of things which do not live to sense, but, none the less, confer upon their resultant total wonderful powers towards living. ..."

IV. 4. 36.

"Fire, air, water, earth, are in themselves soulless -- whenever souls is in any of them, that life is borrowed -- and there are no other forms of body than these four: even the school that believes there are has always held them to be bodies, not souls, and to be without life. None of these, then, having life, it would be extraordinary if life came about by bringing them together; it is impossible, in fact, that the collocation of material entities should produce life, or mindless entities mind. No one, moreover, would pretend that a mere chance mixing could give such results: some regulating principle would be necessary, some Cause directing the admixture: the guiding principle would be -- soul...."

IV. 7. 2.

(continued on next page)
in Plotinus is the fact that Plotinus also clearly refers to the Divine Mind as deity. Deity cannot be accounted for apart from something that is itself greater than soul. Immanence may effect a meaning but it is not itself that meaning. From the standpoint of pure immanence there would be much argument for the view that the World-Soul alone is all that may be considered deity in Plotinus, but if we look to the meaning of experience in something that is itself transcendent of the experience itself, we must appeal to that which is more divine than soul, namely mind.

Thus in sum, the soul, a divine being and a dweller in the loftier realms, has entered body: it is a god, a later phase of the divine: but under stress of its powers and of its tendency to bring order to its next lower, it penetrates to this sphere in a voluntary plunge. The act reveals the power, a power hidden, and we might almost say obliterated or non-existent, unless at some moment it became effective; in the world as it is, the richness of the outer stirs us all to the wonder of the inner whose greatness is displayed in acts so splendid."

IV. 8. 5.

"Now are we to hold similarly that your soul and mine all are one, and that the same thing is true of the universe, the soul in all the several forms of life being one soul, not parcelled out in separate items, but an omnipresent identity? First we must assure ourselves of the possibility of all souls being one as that of any given individual is...

IV. 9. 1.

"How can a multitude of essential beings be really one? Obviously either the one essence will be entire in all, or the many will rise from a one which remains unaltered and yet includes the one-many in virtue of giving itself, without self-abandonment, to its own multiplication. It is competent thus to give and remain, because while it penetrates all things it can never itself be sundered: this is an identity in variety..."

IV. 9. 5
To identify Plotinus' concept of mind with deity would be to identify God with principle, pattern, intelligence, and spirit. It would be the conceiving of being and deity as one and the same thing. In this connection it will be remembered that unity or the One does not conform to the normal requirements of the concept "being" in that it is being's source, a Supra-being in the sense that its intensity of being is too high to be known. To interpret the Divine-Mind as God would also be the viewing of the whole system of authentic being, for even soul as mind-in-motion must ultimately be identified as mind, pattern, principle, spirit, intelligence, etc. Some suggestion along these lines is given by the fact that Plotinus gives an unusual prominence to the treatment of mind in his system. He at least once identifies the Intellectual-Principle as God. When Plotinus speaks of Prayer the implication is quite strong that it is to be directed toward mind. The very concept of prayer would seem to be rather ridiculous unless that which responds existed in some condition of mind. The following passage from Plotinus gives some implication to this effect, but the point is debatable:

4. "Thus we have here one identical Principle, the Intellect, which is the universe of authentic beings, the Truth: as such it is a great god, or, better, not a god among gods but the Godhead entire. It is a god, a secondary god manifesting before there is any vision of that other, the Supreme which rests over all, enthroned in transcendence upon that splendid pediment, the Nature following close upon it."

V. 5. 3.
"But how and what does the Intellectual-Principle see and, especially how has it sprung from that which is to become the object of its vision? In venturing an answer, we first invoke God Himself, not in loud word but in that way of prayer which is always within our power, leaning in soul towards Him by aspiration, alone towards the alone... V. 1, 6.

It is not here explicit whether "alone towards the alone" implies direction toward the Intellectual-Principle as an object or towards the One as an object. On the basis of other passages one could get no farther than the Intellectual-Principle in the medium of prayer even though he may be directed to an object beyond it.

The objection to the identity of mind and deity in Plotinus is that such a view sacrifices logical scope in the concept of deity to the practicality of devising deity as an object. The view is not so much an explanation of deity in Plotinus as it is a resort to the necessity of conceiving of deity in terms of understandable categories.

Although not many interpreters have suggested it, there is some reason to identify the One and God. From this approach, God is always conceived of in terms of ultimates. Anything less than an ultimate is not God. It might be a secondary god or a mediation of God, but worship may only be directed toward a logical ultimate. This view is that Plotinus indicates a logical definition of what God must be even though such a God is not the God of human experience. The One or unity is to be seen as the ultimate combination and coherence of all known
values in a manner so as to be "infinitely infinite," to borrow a phrase of Samuel Alexander. Often Plotinus refers to the One or unity as "The Good" and by this connotation he means something more than rightness in behaviour. He means that whose very existence is entirely good. This doctrine is consistent with the ancient and traditional tendency to merge the concept of independent or ultimate good in with the concept of ultimate deity and vice versa.

This view presents the One as a sort of God of Philosophers. There is a sense in which Philosophers will worship a logical God rather than a practical God. It is necessary to experience all values in their ultimate formulations before the admission of the thesis that they must logically exist in ultimate combination. The abstract mind always worships more than it experiences.

The identity of unity and deity is not at all inconsistent with the Hebrew concept of the utter holiness of God as Jahveh, the ultimately self-existent "I am that I am." It would be difficult to calculate how God could be anything less than the ultimate coalescence of values and still meet the logical demands that must be put upon the concept of deity. The question at issue in this interpretation of the God of Plotinus is whether or not the concept of deity in Plotinus may be limited to the ultimate logical merger of values. That which he ascribes to
the One is usually ascribed only to deity. The One is perfect, or more correctly The Perfect or Perfection. Soul and Mind are not perfect in themselves for they must have their perfection only through the emanation of the One. The One is at peace with itself, being its own object, whereas mind must have the One for its object and soul must have mind. The One was not produced, it contains its own self-causality within itself. Mind and soul, however, are productions. The One is absolute will in the sense that it constitutes its own object as well as its own desires. The One is a complete self-activity: a self-identical essence (VI.8.13), logically situated above even thought and thinking (I. 7. 1). In itself it is complete in every sense. It would seem to be the case that Plotinus' own description of the One is the same as our usual description of deity.

There is further evidence, however, that Plotinus himself did not identify the concepts "God" and "The One." He writes at one place:

"Think of The One as Mind or as God, you think too meanly; use all the resource of understanding to conceive this Unity and, again, it is more authentically one than God, even though you reach for God's unity beyond the unity the most perfect you can conceive. For This is utterly a self-existent, with no concomitant whatever. This self-sufficing is the essence of its unity. Something there must be supremely adequate, autonomous, all-transcending, most utterly without need." VI. 9.6.

A tentative suggestion at this stage is that Plotinus seems to rank God less than he ranks the One. Plotinus appears ambiguous
as to a conclusion about the matter as sometimes seems to rank God as something less than the One and sometimes appears to use the idea of God to serve as a synonym for the One. The answer to the problem is too difficult to undertake within the limits of this study. May it suffice to say that there is considerable evidence to support the identity of deity with the One, but also evidence in Plotinus to the contrary.

The most likely view, in the opinion of the writer, is the fifth possibility, namely the view that the God of Plotinus is the identity of all three elements or states: unity, mind, and soul as one deity. This would be saying that the entire system of metaphysical reality as Plotinus suggests it is the same thing as deity --- that the real world (authentic existence) and God are one and the same thing. This would be a modified pantheism rather than a thorough-going pantheism due to the fact that God could not be identified with our entire phenomenal world. Only that part of the universe that might be concluded to be real could be considered as deity. Illusions, Matter, Evil --- all the negative aspects of our universe conceived of as sheer multiplicity, chaos, etc. share no part of reality, being or deity.

As Plotinus would have it, deity is everywhere --- in the Sun, Moon and heavenly bodies, in spirits and demons that inhabit the upper world, in anything that possesses life. He even says that inanimate things have a "life of their own" even
though we through our senses may not discern the peculiar life within them. Plotinus speaks of both soul and mind as God, upon different occasions. One question at issue in these instances is whether he is thinking of the soul as God in the sense that it is the One and in that sense only, or whether he is considering the soul as soul as making up a part of deity. The arguments already given in this chapter for possibility # 2 namely, the identifying of God with the World-Soul seem to indicate that soul considered in itself is treated as deity. The same situation occurs in reference to mind, as already heretofore mentioned, so that the conclusion that should follow is that Plotinus treated both soul and mind as God, and implicitly so treated the One. Something of his teaching about deity would be left out if the concept were limited to any one of the three parts of his system of authentic being. Unless it can be shown that in associating soul and mind with deity Plotinus means for soul and mind to be considered as God only in the sense that they may be considered the One, the best practical solution to the question is the identity of deity with the whole system of authentic being.

5. He writes: "We cannot think of the universe as a soulless habitation however vast and varied, a thing of materials easily told off, kind by kind—wood and stone and whatever else there be, all blending into a kosmos: it must be alert[ alive] throughout, every member living by its own life, nothing that can have existence failing to exist with it." IV. 4.36
Although it would not be necessary to think of Plotinus' view of man as a religious one, his doctrine of man is a vital part in the religious aspect of his system. Religion is possible because man can do something about his condition. Even though man is closely identified with nature, and especially with all being by virtue of his existence as soul, his destiny is not purely determined by his situation or environment. He can choose the high road or the low road and his choices make a moral difference in the determination of future reward and punishments.

As has already been indicated, man is significantly a soul. He is a soul embodied with that not consistent with soul. This accounts for the struggle within the consciousness of man between that tendency toward the noble and good and that tendency toward the ignoble and evil. Matter makes man evil, soul makes him good. The moral struggle is the struggle to be more soul-like in total disposition rather than to relax into the downward pull and degradation of matter.

Man as soul is not notably different from any other soul in general with the exception that he is a higher soul than some of them and a lower soul than others. It is the distinctive message of Plotinus that man is located in the mid-point of the total universe. As a soul he shares in the world of being and as a soul embodied he shares in the world of becoming. Even in the ranking of the souls he does not belong to the highest order of souls, but is again ranked in the middle of the order of souls.
It is the doctrine of Plotinus that man is the central figure in the universe although not the epitome of its value.

Man can and does sin, according to Plotinus. Sin consists simply in man's choosing of that which is below him in preference to that which is above him: the surrender to a lower value (for that which has no value) instead of allegiance to supreme values. Sin is being like the nature of matter instead of being like the nature of soul, mind and unity.

Punishment for sin is mainly reserved for future life and is effected by karma. Like all souls, man as a soul undergoes reincarnation. Justice is effected by the fact that the soul in its next existence is incarnated in a body most in keeping with the faculty that it has developed most in its previous incarnation. Plotinus writes:

"Those that have attained the human level are men once more. Those that have lived wholly to sense become animals --- corresponding in species to the particular temper of the life --- ferocious animals where the sensuality has been accompanied by a certain measure of spirit, gluttonous and lascivious animals where all has been appetite and satiation of appetite. Those who in their pleasures have not even lived by sensation, but have gone their way in a torpid grossness become mere growing things, for this lethargy is the entire act of the vegetative, and such men have been busy be-treeing themselves. Those, ••• that otherwise untainted, have loved song become vocal animals; kings ruling unreasonably but with no other vice are eagles; futile and flighty visionaries ever soaring skyward, become high-flying birds; observance of civic and secular virtue make man again, or where the merit is less marked, one of the animals of communal tendency, a bee or the like."

III. 4. 2

Perhaps Plotinus is not completely serious in everything he says in this particular passage and may even be presenting the idea
in the "myth" tradition, but his doctrine of reincarnation is to be taken as a serious explanation of the possibility of justice in reference to sin.

Sin is to be seen, nevertheless, as a possibility under the self-determination of souls rather than as an indication of any indeterminancy of soul. Souls as particular souls exist under a system of rigid determination and whatever freedom of choice men or other souls have occurs within a limit of their particular order, within their power to act as free agents insofar as freedom is operative in their current incarnation. The doctrine is, further, that the higher the order of the particular soul, the greater the degree of free choice. Men have more free choice than horses, and spirits and demons have more free choice than men. Even though choices are determined by the particular

---

6. Plotinus expresses the idea more technically, viz. : "In that archetypal world every form of soul is near to the image (the thing in the world of copy) to which its individual constitution inclines it; there is therefore no need of a sender or leader acting at the right moment to bring it at the right moment whether into body or into a definitely appropriate body: of it own motion it descends at the precisely true time and enters where it must. . . . The Souls go forth neither under compulsion nor of freewill; or at least, freedom, here, is not to be regarded as action upon preference; it is more like such a leap of the nature as moves men to the instinctive desire of sexual union, or in the case of some, to fine conduct; the motive lies elsewhere than in the reason: like is destined unfailingly to like, and each moves hither or thither at its fixed moment." IV. 3. 13.
essential nature of the soul in its current incarnation, they are still to be considered as free choices in that the responsibility for the current condition resides in choices made in previous incarnations. Action in accordance with providence is not necessarily action to which the soul is determined by providence. Hence, misfortune and suffering are to be viewed as the just payment for sin committed in a previous incarnation. In like manner, goodness, virtue, and nobility as well as vice, suffering and pain are to be conceived of as the result of moral action on the part of souls acting as free agents. In summary, although the soul as soul cannot will to do evil, sin may be considered as the impulse of souls to free themselves from their participation in the nature of the World-Soul and to allow themselves to become like the nature of matter.

Essential in every religion is some qualitative concept of life, some suggestion of the nature of the summum bonum for man. Parallel with that will be the opposite condition, usually conceived of as "death." In this sense life is conceived of as nearly identical with the concept of value in contrast with the less qualitative concept of being as existence. Implicit in the concept is the suggestion that man can do something about making existence more qualitative, and the doing of such is at least part of what is involved in religion.

Plotinus' summum bonum is the mystical identity of the soul
(i.e. man as a soul) with the One, an estatic joyous relationship that can only rarely occur. It is the high peak of his religion, the culmination of his discipline of salvation. Plotinus, however, also granted the fact of the impossibility of life being lived on such a high plane of joy. In a secondary sense, then, we may say that his concept of the good life is the life dedicated to the discipline of attaining mystical identity of the soul with the One. By similar parallel, death occurs when sin is effective — when soul is so limited by its involvement in matter as not to typify the inherence of the One in it. In short, life for Plotinus is the joy of identity in communion with the One, death is merger into Matter and multiplicity.

But how does one reach the summum bonum according to Plotinus? What technique or routine does Plotinus suggest as the way of salvation for man? The answer constitutes his philosophy of Salvation.

As has already been indicated, the metaphysics of Plotinus is a system of ideal reality: the conceiving of the real as the ideal in typical Platonic fashion. However, in his doctrine of Salvation Plotinus indicates a practical religious way of life in which man may come into immediate union with the ideal. In this manner, he counteracts the possibility allowed by Plato of conceiving of ideal life as a sheer abstraction. For Plotinus,
the real world is no abstraction, no mere idea in the mind. Instead, it was a thing there to be known, more or less, by means of and virtue of the souls proper behaviour in the process of its search for ideal life.

The whole necessity for Salvation rests upon the thesis of Plotinus that the soul (man as soul: man as an individual) exists in the universe in a "fallen" state. Man finds his identity with deity by conceiving of himself as soul, as having emanated ultimately from the very ideal world for which he longs. Parallel to his doctrine of Emanation as it applies in the broad metaphysical sense (wherein the ultimate overflows to produce less real stages which overflow repeating the same process in turn) Plotinus's soterology incorporates the doctrine of "Epistrophe," namely the desire and attempted return of the soul to that from which it ultimately came. Apparently, for Plotinus, Salvation is possible only among individual souls, and possible to all individual souls.

Salvation, as Plotinus sees it, is essentially a technique involving three processes: (1) Catharsis, or purification (morality); (2) dialectic, or the practice of the discipline of philosophy; and, (3) illumination, or enlightenment (ἐπίστασις) — a state of ecstasy wherein the soul finally comes into direct communion with the One itself. The way of Salvation is a journey from soul to mind to the One, the emanations are re-
traced in the process so that the soul progressively realizes its identity with the World-Soul, the Divine-Mind, and finally with the One itself.

Salvation occurs in stages. The stages and processes are not to be seen as distinct in themselves but rather as gradually flowing from one into the other. They constitute a gradual inclined plane rather than steps of a pyramid. They are to be interpreted not so much as a formal process entered into as they are as an informal way of life, a prolonged and sustained effort to penetrate deeper and deeper into spiritual realities of life --- into "faith in the unembodied" as Plotinus himself terms it. Affirming the existence of an ideal order and supra-sensual reality, the way of Salvation is an introspective journey away from the world of sensuous reality into the world of the soul, and hence into the world of the mind until the journey finally stops in the ecstasy of enlightenment, the direct communion of man as a soul with the Ultimate. It is a shifting of the center of our conscious attention away from matter to soul, mind, and spirit --- the focussing of our minds away from their own mental processes to an awareness of divinity -in-general.

It seems to be the teaching of Plotinus that everyone is capable of entering into the process of Salvation, although he
concedes that all may not begin at the same level. Plotinus further grants that all may not use the same method in the journey toward union with the One. He indicates three fundamental methods or temperaments that apply in the entrance into Salvation: that of the musician, that of the lover, and that of the philosopher.

7. "Anyone not of the strength to lay hold of the first soul, that possessing pure intellect, must grasp that which has to do with our ordinary thinking and thence ascend; if even this prove too hard, let him turn to account the sensitive phase which carries the ideal forms of the less fine degree, that phase which too, with its powers, is immaterial and lies just within the realm of Ideal-principles. One may even, if it seem necessary, begin as low as the reproductive soul and its very production and thence make the ascent, mounting from those ultimate Ideal-principles to the ultimates in the higher sense, that is to the prinals." V. 3. 9.

8. "In ourselves the relation to the Supreme is not identical from soul to soul; some of us are capable of becoming Uniate, others of striving and almost attaining, while a third rank is much less apt; it is a matter of the degree or powers of the soul by which our expression is determined --- the first degree dominant in the one person, the second, the third (the merely animal life) in others while, still, all of us contain the powers." IV. 3. 6.

9. "How lies the course? Is it alike for all, or is there a distinct method for each class or temperament? For all there are two stages of the path. . . the first degree is the conversion from the lower life; the second, held by those that have already made their way to the sphere of the Intelligibles, lasts until they reach the extreme hold of the place, the Term attained when the topmost peak of the Intellectual realm is won. . . . We must begin by distinguishing the three types. Let us take the musician first and indicate his temperamental equipment for the task. The musician we may think of as being exceedingly quick to beauty, drawn in a very rapture to it: somewhat slow to stir of his own impulse, he answers at once to the outer stimulus; as the timid are sensitive to noise so he to tones and the beauty they convey; all that offends against unison or harmony in melodies and rhymes repels him; he longs for measure and shapely pattern. This natural tendency must be made the starting-point to such a man; he must be drawn by the tone, rhythm and design in things of sense; he must learn to distinguish the material forms from the Authentic-Existential (continued on next page)
Art, morality, and philosophy --- all may encourage the individual along the journey toward the One for in them all there is a certain catharsis, a purification. They all must be

which is the source of all these correspondences and of the entire reasoned scheme in the work of art: he must be led to the Beauty that manifests itself through these forms; he must be shown that what ravished him was no other than the Harmony of the Intellectual world and the Beauty in that sphere, not some one shape of beauty but the All-Beauty, the Absolute Beauty; and the truths of philosophy must be implanted in him to lead him to faith in that which, unknowing it, he possesses within himself. What these truths are we will show later.

I. 3. 1.

The born lover, to whose degree the musician also may attain --- and then either come to a stand or pass beyond --- has a certain memory of beauty but, severed from it now, he no longer compregends it; spellbound by visible loveliness he clings amazed about that. His lesson must be to fall down no longer in bewildered delight before some one embodied form; he must be led under a system of mental discipline, to beauty everywhere and made to discern the One Principle underlying all, a Principle apart from the material forms, springing from another source, and elsewhere more truly present. The beauty, for example, in a mble course of life and in an admirably organised social system may be pointed out to him --- a first training this in the loveliness of the immaterial --- he must learn to recognise the beauty in the arts, sciences, virtues; then these severed and particular forms must be brought under the one principle by the explanation of their origin. From the virtues he is to be led to the Intellectual-Principle, to the Authentic-Existent; thence onward, he treads the upward way.

I. 3. 2.

The metaphysician, equipped by that very character, winged already and not like those others, in need of disengagement, stirring of himself towards the supernal but doubting of the way, needs only a guide. He must be shown, then, and instructed, a willing wayfarer by his very temperament, all but self-directed. Mathematics, which as a student by nature he will take very easily, will be prescribed to train him to abstract thought and to faith in the unembodied; a moral being by native disposition, he must be led to make his virtue perfect; and after the Mathematics he must be put through a course in Dialectic and made an adept in the science." I. 3. 3.
followed by dialectics, however, so that considered categorically the three processes of Purification, Dialectics and Ecstasy still obtain in any manner of the way of Salvation.

With this in mind, how, then, may we chart the course of the soul in its journey in the various processes on the way to Salvation? The first of the processes, Cartharsis, is an elementary act of self-purification. It is a cleansing of the mind (soul) from all things alien to its essential nature. Purification in Plotinus is to be interpreted as an act of morality as if Plotinus were saying that Morality constitutes the first demand for Salvation. The basic moral act, according to Plotinus, is the turning away from sense to soul, from body to mind. Matter is evil and souls have their defilement by connection with bodies. Any process of salvation must begin with the disassociation of souls from bodies.

9. "If a man has been immersed in filth or dabbed with mud his native comeliness disappears and all that is seen is the foul stuff besmearing him: his ugly condition is due to alien matter that has encrusted him, and if he is to win back his grace it must be his business to scour and purify himself and make himself what he was. So, we may justly say, a Soul becomes ugly by something fostered upon it, by sinking itself into the alien, by a fall, a descent into body, into Matter. The dishonour of the Soul is in its ceasing to be clean and apart. Gold is degraded when it is mixed with earthy particles; if these be worked out, the gold is left and is beautiful, isolated from all that is foreign gold with gold alone. And so the Soul; if it is to be but cleared of the desires that come by its too intimate converse with body, emancipated from all the passions, purged of all that embodiment had thrust upon it, withdrawn, a solitary, to itself again --- in that moment the ugliness that came only from the alien is stripped away. I. 6. 5."
Self-purification, or morality at this level begins first by the beginning of the practice of ordinary moral life in the sense of being a good citizen. It consists of active emphasis upon and participation in the natural or public virtues, called by Plotinus, "the civic virtues." These are the same virtues as the four cardinal virtues of Plato, namely, wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. (I. 2. 1) These virtues alone are inadequate to lead the soul to the One but they do serve an elementary and practical function in the process.

Plotinus writes of their value: "The Civic Virtues ... are a principle of order and beauty in us as long as we remain passing our life here; they enable us by setting bound and measure to our desires and to our entire sensibility, and dispelling false judgment --- and this by sheer efficacy of the better, by the very setting of the bounds, by the fact that the measured is lifted outside of the sphere of the unmeasured and lawless. And further, these Civic Virtues --- measured and ordered themselves and acting as a principle of measure to the Soul which is as Matter to their forming --- are like to the measure reigning in the overworld, and they carry a trace of that Highest Good in the Supreme. . . ." (I. 2. 2)

Civic virtues, as Plotinus sees them, have some minor image of the One in them but their function is limited primarily to the realm of sense, to the functioning of souls with bodies. They serve the value of restraining men from entering into vice, and of purifying them from entering into evil action, but much more than this is necessary for the attaining of Salvation. As Plotinus incidentally comments:

"... our concern is not merely to be sinless but to be God." (I. 2. 6)
Beyond the simple negation of sense, morality also involves the positive affirmation of the ideal. Following Plato, Plotinus suggests that the Civil virtues are but poor examples of a higher order of virtues, namely these same sorts of virtues in their more idealized or intellectualized form.

As the soul becomes more and more introspective, purification becomes more and more a matter of inner purity. The civil virtues, apart from intercourse with bodies, become ideal virtues, virtues in distinctive reference to the soul itself. The soul, in effecting its morality, turns more and more into itself and looks upon its own reason --- looks to the deeper purifying of soul as soul. By this Plotinus seems to be saying that morality itself is more than a negative limitation of the power of body,

10. "To Plato, unmistakably, there are two distinct orders of virtue, and the civic does not suffice for Likeness: 'Likeness to God,' he say, 'is a flight from this world's ways and things'; in dealing with the qualities of good citizenship he does not use the simple term Virtue but adds the distinguishing word civic; --- and elsewhere he declares all the virtues without exception to be purifications. 'But in what sense can we call the virtues purifications, and how does purification issue in Likeness? As the Soul is evil by being interfused with the body, and by coming to share the body's states and to think the body's thoughts, so it would be good, it would be possessed of virtue, if it threw off the body's moods and devoted itself to its own Act: the state of Intellection and Wisdom; never allowed the passions of the body to affect it: the virtue of Sophrosyne [temperance] knew no fear at the parting from the body: the virtue of Fortitude [courage] and if reason and Intellectual-Principle rules: in which state is Righteousness [justice]. Such a disposition in the Soul, become thus intellective and immune to passion, it would not be wrong to call Likeness to God..." I. 2. 3.
it is a positive affirmation of the purity of soul. He summarizes many of his ideas concerning morality as follows:

"The solution is in understanding the virtues and what each has to give; thus the man will learn to work with this or that as every several need demands. And as he reaches to loftier principles and other standards, these in turn will define his conduct: for example, restraint in its earlier form will no longer satisfy him; he will work for the final disengagement; he will live, no longer, the human life of the good man — such as Civic Virtue commends — but, leaving this beneath him, will take up instead another life, that of the Gods. For it is to the Gods, not to the Good, that our Likeness must look; to model ourselves upon good men is to produce an image of an image: we have to fix our gaze above the image and attain Likeness to the Supreme Exemplar."

I. 2. 7.

The principle advocated here, under the idea or doctrine of Purification is the appeal to the ideal order of mind and unity over and against the satisfaction associated with bodies. An educational process takes place in the sense that the soul learns to dis-like the sensuous and to appreciate the ideal and beautiful.

11. Plotinus comments: "Our interpretation is that the soul—by the very truth of its nature, by its affiliation to the noblest Existents in the hierarchy of Being—when it sees anything of that kin, or any trace of that kinship, thrills with an immediate delight, takes its own to itself, and thus stirs anew to the sense of its nature and of all its affinity."

I. 6. 2.

"He that has the strength, let him arise and withdraw into himself, foregoing all that is known by the eyes, turning away for ever from the material beauty that once made his joy. When he perceives those shapes of grace that show in body, let him not pursue: He must know them for copies, vestiges, shadows, and hasten away towards That they tell of... 'Let us flee them to the beloved Fatherland': this is the soundest counsel. But what is this flight? How are we to gain the open sea? The Fatherland to us is There whence we have come, and There is The Father.

(cont. on next page)
Civic virtues and a love for the ideal finally will lead to the third stage or level of Purification, namely, a rigid asceticism in which there is a complete disassociation of soul and body. Plotinus explains that this is more than a mere withdrawal from certain evil aspects of the body --- it is a flight of the soul entirely away from the body and all sensuous desire.

"And this inner vision, what is its operation? Newly awakened it is all too feeble to bear the ultimate splendour. Therefore the Soul must be trained---to the habit of remarking, first, all noble pursuits, then the works of beauty produced not by the labour of the arts but by the virtue of men known for their goodness: lastly, you must search the souls of those that have shaped these beautiful forms... Withdraw into yourself and look. And if you do not find yourself beautiful yet, act as does the creator of a statue that is to be made beautiful: he cuts away here, he smooths there, he makes this line lighter this other purer, until a lovely face has grown upon his work. So do you also. cut away all that is excessive, straighten all that is crooked, bring light to all that is overcast, labour to make all one glow of beauty and never cease chiselling your statue, until there shall shine out on you from it the godlike splendour of virtue, until you shall see the perfect goodness surely established in the stainless shrine.... If the eye that adventures the vision be dimmed by vice, impure, or weak, and unable in its cowardly blenching to see the uttermost brightness, then it sees nothing even though another point to what lies plain to sight before it. To any vision must be brought an eye adapted to what is to be seen, and having some likeness to it. Never did eye see the sun unless it had first become sunlike, and never can the soul have vision of the First Beauty unless itself be beautiful. Therefore, first let each become godlike and each beautiful who cares to see God and Beauty..."
In so doing, all individual souls realize their identity with the World-Soul. Individual things lose their consciousness of their particularity. The Soul instead of seeing itself as distinct, an item of individuality such as a single soul with a single body, sees itself as more truly but one overall soul unit. As such, each individual soul is not a function of the World-Soul, nor does it in any sense "belong" to the World-Soul. Each one is distinct in itself apart from body or other souls, however, by virtue of the interrelatedness of each soul with all other souls the overall likeness of souls, one to another, may be seen. Although they exist separately, all souls may be said to partake of the nature of the World-Soul and find their overall identity in the fact that their similarity is greater than their dis-similarity. By this technique the soul comes to see its true existence as soul by ridding itself of its illusion of its reality as body. It looks upon its own reason and attains its highest purity within the process of its discovery of the nature of itself as soul, of soul-ness in general, and of the overall likeness of all souls.

Purification, then, can help the soul to see itself as an item of value apart from body, but it cannot in itself lead the soul to see its significance as mind. By catharsis and an ultimate asceticism the soul of man may see its identity with the World-Soul: the Soul of the World, all souls in general, but catharsis alone cannot lead man to the Divine Mind or to the One.
In order to go higher, in order to attain identity with the Divine Mind, the soul must turn away from itself as an object and fix its attention upon the Divine Mind. In so doing it enters into the second major process in the way of Salvation, namely, Dialectics.

This second process is the science of philosophical inquiry, the practice of philosophical method in the analysis of the real world. It is not philosophy in general but the discipline or method of philosophy. Plotinus writes on this point:

"But this science, this Dialectic...what, in sum, is it? It is the method, or Discipline, that brings with it the power of pronouncing with final truth upon the nature and relation of things—what each is, how it differs from others, what common quality all have, to what Kind each belongs and in what rank each stands in its Kind and whether its Being is Real-Being, and how many Beings there are, and how many non-Beings to be distinguished from Beings. Dialectics treats also of the Good and the not-Good, and of the particulars that fall under each, and of what is the Eternal and what the not-Eternal.... All this accomplished, it gives up its touring of the realm of sense and settles down in the Intellectual Kosmos and there plies its own peculiar Act: it has abandoned all the realm of deceit and falsity, and pastures the Soul in the "Meadows of Truth:" it employs the Platonic division to the discernment of the Ideal-Forms, of the Authentic-Existence and of the First-Kind (or Categories of Being): it establishes, in the light of Intellecction, the unity there is in all that issues from these Firsts, until it has traversed the entire Intellectual Realm: then, resolving the unity into the particulars once more, it returns to the point from which it starts.

I. 3. 4.

He further writes directly concerning the relation of dialectic and philosophy:

"Is Dialectic, then, the same as Philosophy? It is the precious part of Philosophy. We must not think of it as the mere tool of the metaphysician: Dialectic does not consist of bare theories and rules: it deals with verities; Existences are, as it were, Matter to it, or,
at least it proceeds methodically towards Existences, and possesses itself, at the one step, of the notions and of the realities...."

I. 3. 5.

"Philosophy has other provinces, but Dialectic is its precious part: in its study of the laws of the universe, Philosophy draws on Dialectic much as other studies and crafts use Arithmetic, though, of course, the alliance between Philosophy and Dialectic is closer. And in Morals, too, Philosophy uses Dialectic: by Dialectic it comes to contemplation, though it originates of itself the moral state or rather the discipline from which the moral state develops."

I. 3. 6.

Dialectics may be interpreted as the soul's transition from its introspection in which it sees itself as soul, and as identified with the World-Soul, to its vision of itself as mind. The soul reaches the Divine-Mind by means of the practice of dialectics. This must be done gradually, even painstakingly. That which is authentically mind is determined by critical analysis, step by step and process by process, involving every real thing in the universe. As the process develops into its fulness the soul ceases to see itself as an object and fixes its attention entirely upon mind. Plotinus explains that there are essentially two phases within dialectics: (1) the process of rising to the level of the intelligible from the level of the world of sense, and (2) a further process of discipline that takes place within the intelligible world after that sphere has been reached. Of the three general types of men capable of being saved, the musician, the lover, the philosopher, the first two of these need a more thorough-going catharsis than does the philosopher since the philosopher by nature will already have been disengaged from the powers of sense. It would be well to point out in this
connection that the transition from catharsis into dialectics is not so much of the order of a clear-cut division or distinction of one phase from the other as it is of a gradual, even subconscious change. Typical of the thought of Plotinus is the general doctrine of the gradual evolvement of one phase or stage of a thing into its higher or lower level as a flowing change without specification as to the exact time of change from one level to another.

Plotinus writes that dialectics is a science that makes us capable of reasoning about the nature of things in order to determine their real values. It involves such inquiries as the similarities and differences of all things one to another, their overall unities and possible differences. It concerns itself with the meaning and determination of good and evil, of what is eternal and what is transitory, and of the careful analysis and ranking of all forms of being following after the One. The appeal is not to the senses, but to reason and principle evident within the intelligible world here and now. Plotinus says that dialectics employs the Platonic method of division to discern ideas and to define objects in order to conclude the various kind of essences, the correlation and systematizing of essences, and the final deduction of various conclusions from the material presented. To this Plotinus adds, however, that dialectics thereafter reverses itself in order to point back in explanation to the One,
the place from which it ultimately started. When it arrives back at the One it "rests" having no further need to busy itself with a multitude of objects, having arrived at unity itself.

The ultimate object of dialectics is the One. From an observation of the various mind-principles the soul realizes the unity of the Divine Mind and that even it finds its unity in something superior to itself.

---

12. "... Cleared of all evil in our intention towards The Good, we must ascent to the Principle within ourselves; from many, we must become one; only so do we attain to knowledge of that which is Principle and Unity. We shape ourselves into Intellectual-Principle and set it firmly in That; thus what That sees the soul will waken to see: it is through Intellectual-Principle that we have this vision of The Unity; it must be our care to bring over nothing whatever from the sense; to allow nothing even of the soul to enter into the Intellectual-Principle: with Intellect pure, and with the summit of Intellect, we are to see the All-Pure. If the quester has the impression of extension or shape or mass attaching to That Nature he has not been led by Intellectual-Principle which is not of the order to see such things; the activity has been of sense and of the judgment following upon sense: only Intellectual-Principle can inform us of the things of its scope; its competence is upon its priors, its content and its issue: but even its content is outside of sense; and still purer, still less touched by multiplicity, are its priors, or rather its Prior. The Unity, then, is not Intellectual-Principle but something higher still: Intellectual-Principle is still a being but that First is no being but precedent to all being; it cannot be a being for a being has what we may the shape of its reality but The Unity is without shape, even shape Intellectual. Generative of all, The Unity is none of all; neither thing nor quantity nor quality nor intellect nor soul, nor in motion, not at rest, not in place, not in time: it is the self-defined, unique in form, or, better, formless, existing before Form was, or Movement, or Rest, all of which are attachments of Being and make Being the manifold it is." VI. 9. 3

"If the mind reels before something thus alien to all we know, we must take our stand on things of this realm and strive thence to see. But in the look beware of throwing outward, this Principle does not lie away somewhere leaving the rest void; to those of power to reach, it is present; to the inapt, absent. In our daily affairs we cannot hold an object in mind if we have given ourselves elsewhere, occupied upon some other matter; that very thing must be (continued on next page)
The message of Plotinus is that Man as soul by means of the dialectic comes to see himself as mind. Just as catharsis leads man to see himself as soul and eventually to realize his inherent identity with the World-Soul the dialectic leads him to see his identity through soul with mind and leads him up to the point of merger with the Divine-Mind. As Plotinus expresses it a number of times, it is a process of arriving at "faith in the unembodied" by means of a scientific study. The dialectical process will indicate, as it progresses step by step, that there must be something of the order of mental life behind each level that is discovered. The various things that exist in the universe are revealed to exist not in themselves but by virtue of some principle of operation superior to the things themselves. Each level of probing for a cause will reveal a deeper and "more-mental" cause behind each particular stage of existence. On and on the dialectical process goes until nature of mind becomes less complex and more simple and intense in its nature. Finally,
the top level of the dialectic is reached and process ceases, for the soul has then entered into the third stage, the level of enlightenment, illumination and ecstasy.

There are two phases to this third stage of Salvation, according to Plotinus: (1) unity with the Divine-Mind, and (2) unity with the One. The first of these may be considered to be a mental process, the latter may not be so considered. The first of these is characterized by its flash of insight and understanding of various mysteries --- the joy of finding meaning. The last phase is characterized by sheer ecstasy, a beyond meaning union with deity --- a state of being inebriated with deity.

13. "Intellectual-Principle, thus, has two powers, first that of grasping intellelctively its own content, the second that of an advancing and receiving whereby to know its transcendent; at first it sees, later by that seeing it takes possession of Intellectual-Principle, becoming one only thing with that: the first seeing is that of Intellect knowing, the second that of Intellect loving; stripped of its wisdom in the intoxication of the nectar, it comes to love; by this excess it is made simplex and is happy; and to be drunken is better for it than to be too staid for these revels.... In this seeing of the Supreme it becomes pregnant and at once knows what has come to be within it; its knowledge of its content is what is designated by its Intellelction; its knowing of the Supreme is the virtue of that power within it by which in a later (lower) stage it is to become "Intellective." As for soul, it attains that vision by --- so to speak --- confounding and annuling the Intellectual-Principle within it; or rather that Principle immanent in soul sees first and thence the vision penetrates to the soul and the two visions become one."
The third stage is not an advanced level of dialectics. It is a process which takes place after dialectics. Movement occurs in the first phase of it (union with Divine-Mind) but does not occur in the last phase (union with the One). Union with the Divine-Mind occurs in the merger of the soul as mind with the overall mind-principle of the universe. In the final analysis it is of the order of a revelation of the ultimate sameness of all mental life. It is more than a mere similarity of one individual mind to another individual mind. It is the realization that the two minds are not two minds but rather truly one and the same mind.

In the beginning Plotinus argues the fact of man as a mind must be granted. He writes:

"Man... must be some Reason-Principle other than soul. But why should he not be some conjoint—a soul in a certain Reason-Principle—the Reason-Principle being, as it were, a definite activity which however could not exist without that which acts...? The higher man...rises from the more godlike soul, a soul possessed of a nobler humanity and brighter perceptions.... The higher soul enters to bestow a brighter life, or rather does not so much enter as simply impart itself; for soul does not leave the Intellectual but maintaining that contact holds the lower life a perdant from it, blending with it by the natural link of Reason-Principle to Reason-Principle: and man, the dimmer, brightens under that illumination."

VI. 7. 5.

"But how can that higher soul have sense-perception? It is the perception of what falls under perception There, sensation in the mode of that realm: it is the source of the soul's perception of the sense-realm to the lowest extremity of its counterpart There, proceeding from the fire Intellectual to the fire here which becomes perceptible by its analogy with that of the higher sphere. If material things existed There, the soul would perceive them; Man in the Intellectual, Man as Intellectual soul, would be aware of the terrestrial. This is
how the secondary Man, copy of Man in the Intellectual, contains the Reason-Principles in copy; and Man in the Intellectual-Principle contained the Man that existed before any man. The diviner shines out upon the secondary and the secondary upon the tertiary; and even the lastest possesses them all..."

VI. 7. 6.

Although we must speak of man as characteristically a soul, it is part of the wisdom of Plotinus to indicate that man's soul-ness may be explained only in terms of his mind-ness. The first phase of the third and final stage of Salvation concerns man's discovery of himself as mind. Such a discovery comes as a flash of insight after the long process of dialectics. It is an illumination in the sense that an identity is seen. The recognition of the nature of man as more basically mind than "soul" is explained by Plotinus by mean of argumentation from the nature of Intellectual-Principle in general. Having established the fact that all

14. He writes: "Being, thus, at once Collective Identity and Collective Difference, Intellectual-Principal must reach over all different things; its very nature then is to modify itself into a universe. If the realm of different things existed before it, these different things must have modified it from the beginning; if they did not, this Intellectual-Principle produced all, or rather was all. Beings could not exist save by the activity of Intellectual-Principle; wandering down every way it produces thing after thing, but wandering always within itself in such self-bound wandering as authentic Intellect may know; this wandering permitted to its nature is among real beings which keep pace with its movement; but it is always itself; this is a stationary wandering, wandering within the Meadow of Truth from which it does not stray. It holds and covers the universe which it had made the space, so to speak, of its movement, itself being also that universe which is space to it..."  

(cont. on next page)
being is of the order of mind and that soul and life are of the order of mind, facts which will be clearly indicated by dialectics.

The Intellectual-Principle is the Intellectual Act; its movement is complete, filling Being complete. And the entire of Being is the Intellectual Act entire, comprehending all life and the unfailing succession of things. Because this Principle contains Identity and Difference its division is ceaselessly bringing the different things to light. Its entire movement is through life and among living things.

"There is infinity in Intellectual-Principle since, of its very nature it is a multiple unity, not with the unity of a house but with that of a Reason-Principle, multiple in itself: in the one Intellectual design it includes within itself, as if were in outline, all the outlines, all the patterns. All is within it, all the powers and intellections.

"...Intellectual-Principle becomes all things, knows that fact in virtue of its self-knowing and at once becomes Intellectual-Principle, filled so as to hold within itself that object of its vision, seeing all by the light from the Giver and bearing that Giver with it. In this way the Supreme may be understood to be cause at once of essential reality and of the knowing of reality..."

"A first must transcend its derivatives; the giver transcends the given, as a superior. If therefore there is a prior to actuality, that prior transcends Activity and so transcends Life. Our sphere containing life, there is a Giver of Life, a principle of greater good, of greater worth than Life; this possessed Life and had no need to look for it to any giver in possession of Life's variety. But the Life was a vestige of that Primal not a life lived by it; Life, then, as it looked towards That was undetermined: having looked it had determination though That had none. Life looks to unity and is determined by it, taking bound, limit, form. But this form is in the shaped, the shaper had none; the limit was not external as something drawn about a magnitude; the limit was that of the multiplicity of the Life There, limitless itself as radiated from its great Prior."
Plotinus further explains Illumination as the soul's awareness of its own awareness of its overall identity with mind. As has

15. He writes: "But since Thence come the beauty and light in all, it is Thence that Intellectual-Principle took the brilliance of the Intellectual Energy which flashed Nature into being; Thence soul took power toward life, in virtue of that fuller life steaming into it. Intellectual-Principle was raised thus to that Supreme and remains with it, happy in the presence. Soul, too, that soul which as possessing knowledge and vision was capable, clung to what it saw; and as its vision so its rapture; it saw and was stricken; but having in itself something of that principle it felt its kinship and was moved to longing like those stirred by the image of the beloved to desire the veritable presence... By only noting the flux of things it knows at once that from elsewhere comes the beauty that floats upon them and so it is urged Thither, passionate in pursuit of what it loves; never—unless someone robs it of that love—never giving up til it attain. There indeed all it saw was beautiful and veritable; it grew in strength by being thus filled with the life of the True; itself becoming veritable Being and attaining veritable knowledge, it enters by that neighbouring into conscious possession of what it has long been asking."

VI. 7. 31

...our self-knowing comes to the knowing of all the rest of our being in virtue of this thing patently present; or by that power itself communicating to us its own power of self-knowing; or by our become identical with that principle of knowledge. Thus the self-knower is a double person: there is the one that takes cognisance of the principle in virtue of which understanding occurs in the soul or mind; and there is the higher, knowing himself by the Intellectual-Principle with which he becomes identical: this latter knows the self as no longer man but as a being that has become something other through and through: he has thrown himself as one thing over into the superior order, taking with him only that better part of the soul which alone is winged for the Intellectual Act and gives the man, once established There, the power to appropriate what he has seen.... A man becomes Intellectual-Principle when, ignoring all other phases of his being, he sees through that only and sees only that and so knows himself by means of the self—in other words attains the self-knowledge which the Intellectual-Principle possesses."

V. 3. 4.

"The soul therefore (to attain self-knowledge) has only to set this image (that is to say, its highest phase) along side the veritable Intellectual-Principle which we have found to be identical with the truths constituting the objects of intellecation, the world of Primals and Reality: for his Intellectual-Principle, by very definition, cannot be outside of itself, the Intellectual Reality: self-gathered and unalloyed, it is Intellectual-Principle through all the range of its being—for unintelligent intelligence is not possible—and thus it possesses of necessity self-knowing, as a being immanent to itself and one having for function and essence to be purely and solely Intellectual-Principle."
been suggested the first phase of the last stage of Salvation for Plotinus, namely, union with the Divine-Mind, is to be seen as the soul as mind realizing its own identity with eternal truth. In this process the soul sees itself as identified with all that is meaningful and steady by virtue to its real being as mind, as an eternal participant in the overall reason principle of the universe. Multiplicity and change are seen to be a part of body, not of mind, the real essence of man. There is satisfaction at the realization that there is something in man that is of enduring value. Union with the Divine-Mind, or Illumination, takes...

---

16. "...The Intellectual-Principle must have, actually has, self-vision, firstly because it has multiplicity, next because it exists for the external and therefore must be a seeing power, one seeing that external; in fact, its very essence is vision. Given some external, there must be vision; and if there be nothing external the Intellectual-Principle exists in vain. Unless there is something beyond bare unity, there can be no vision; vision must converge with a visible object. And this which the seer is to see can be only a multiple, no undistinguishable unity; nor could a universal unity find anything upon which to exercise any act.... An agent must either act upon the external or be a multiple and so able to act upon itself: making no advance towards anything other than itself, it is motionless and where it could know only blank fixity it can know nothing. The intellective power, therefore, when occupied with the intellectual act, must be in a state of duality, whether one of the two elements stand actually outside or both lie within: the intellectual act will always comport diversity as well as the necessary identity, and in the same way its characteristic objects (the Ideas) must stand to the Intellectual-Principle as at once distinct and identical.... There can be no intellect except of something containing separable detail.... The Intellectual-Principle, thus, is informed of itself by the fact of being a multiple organ of vision, an eye receptive of many illuminated objects.

...Similarly the knowing principle itself cannot remain simplex, especially in the act of self-knowing: all silent though its self-perception be, it is dual to itself. Of course it has no need of minute self-handling since it has nothing to learn by its intellective act; before it is (effectively) Intellect it holds knowledge of its own content. Knowledge implies (continued on next page)
place as an inherently meaningful experience. It is a coming into meaning, an enlightenment in the sense that some understanding comes in reference to situations that were previously not meaningful or understood. There is a joy connected with it but it is not the same joy as the joy that occurs in union with the One. Joy in the Divine-Mind is the joy of discovery—the discovery of meaning. It is the joy of relaxation from human struggle, release from the tension of intellectual inquiry, and the sheer intellectual pleasure of seeing experiences unified in meaning. In it, there is no loss of identity and intellection continues to take place. The soul retains its own self-consciousness at the same time that it is aware of its identity and interaction with another entity seen as a larger value-whole.

The final phases of the third stage of Salvation according to Plotinus is an absolute union of the soul with the One. This union is not the same as the sort of intellectual union described above for it is a literal merger of two entities. Such is the sumnum bonum for man, the complete absorption of the soul into...
that which is its original source, a joyful reunion of that which is not different in any respect.

Plotinus describes union with the One in terms of sheer ecstasy. Such ecstasy is pure joy, positive and unmixed, above reason, above beauty, and above any categorical conception of goodness. It cannot be described as a process for there is no change occurring at any time, no struggle, no relaxation, no movement of any sort.

17. "Now it rests; instructed and satisfied as to the Being in that sphere, it is no longer busy about many things: it has arrived at Unity and it contemplates; it leaves to another science all that coil of premisses and conclusions called the art of reasoning."

I. 3. 4.

...the highest has come to her, or rather has revealed its presence; she has turned away from all about her and made herself apt, beautiful to the utmost, brought into likeness with the divine—by those preparations and adoring which come unbidden to those growing ready for the vision—she has seen that presence suddenly manifesting with her, for there is nothing between: here is no longer a duality but a two in one; for, so long as the presence holds, all distinction fades: it is as lover and beloved here, in a copy of that union, long to blend; the soul has now no further awareness of being in body and will give herself no foreign name, not man, not living being, not being, not all; any observation of such things fall away; the soul has neither time nor taste for them; This she sought and This she has found and on This she looks and not upon herself; and who she is that looks she has not leisure to know. Once There she will barter for This nothing looks she has not leisure to know. Once There she will barter for This nothing the universe holds; not though one would make over the heavens entire to her; than This there is nothing higher, nothing of more good; above This there is no passing; all the rest however lofty lies on the downing path; she is of perfect judgement and knows that This was her quest, that nothing higher is. Here can be no deceit; where could she come upon truer than the truth? and the truth she affirms, that she is, herself; but all the affirmation is later and is silent. In this happiness she knows beyond delusion that she is happy; for this is no affirmation of an excited body but of a soul become again what she was of old,—office, power, wealth, beauty, knowledge—of all she tells her scorn as she never could had she not found their better.

(continued on next page)
What is the underlying thesis of Plotinus' way of Salvation?

"Such in this union is the soul's temper that even the act of Intellect once so intimately loved she now dismisses; Intellect is movement and she has no wish to move, she has nothing to say of this very Intellectual-Principle by means of which she has attained the vision, herself made over into Intellectual-Principle and becoming that principle so as to be able to take stand in that Intellectual space. Entered there and making herself over to that, she at first contemplates that realm, but once she sees that higher still, she leaves all else aside.... In this state of absorbed contemplation there is no longer question of holding an object; the vision is continuous so that seeing and seen are one thing; object and act of vision have become identical; of all that until then filled the eye no memory remains."

VI. 7. 34.

"...There were not two; beholder was one with beheld; it was not a vision compassed but a unity apprehended. The man formed by this mingling with the Supreme must—if he only remember—carry its image impressed upon him: he is become the Unity, nothing within him or without inducing any diversity; no movement now, no passion, no outlooking desire, once this ascent is achieved; reasoning is in abeyance and all Intellection and even to dare the word, the very self: caught away, filled with God, He has perfect stillness attained isolation; all the being calmed, he turns neither to this side nor to that, not even inwards to himself; utterly resting he has become very rest. He belongs no longer to the order of the beautiful; he has risen beyond beauty; he has overpassed even the choir of the virtues; he is like one who, having penetrated the inner sanctuary, leaves the temple images behind him—though these become once more first objects of regard when he leaves the holies; for There his converse was not with image, not with trace, but with the very Truth in the view of which all the rest is but of secondary concern.

...This is the life of gods and of the godlike and blessed among men, liberation from the alien that besets us here, a life taking no pleasure in the things of earth, the passing of solitary to solitary."

VI. 9. 11.
It is that the soul may come to see that it is divine. When soul is disciplined by mind, when it comes to function according to the inherent stability of mind and the final unity of the One, its way of self-control has reached its peak. It can of itself do no more to effect its salvation. Then, it is that the final insight comes, namely, the insight that the soul itself, through its inherent identity with mind, is itself identical with the One. Soul is itself divine, man shares in his order a part of that which is the supreme value. In a figurative sense, man is part of the One; in a literal way, the One is a part of man.

The Salvation of Plotinus resolves, then, to a self-intellec
tive process, an intellectual re-evaluation of the nature of the soul. The ascent of the soul in its final stages is but a jour
ney of the mind in its process of introspection, a journey that ends in a final illumination and merger of mental orders into a pure unity. There is no change in the fixed positions and re-
lations between soul, mind, and unity, and the soul remains in its same order and with the same body that it has until the body's death. Rather, it is the case that soul, by introspection, makes itself over into mind, assumes to its highest extent its inherent possibilities as mind, and so comes to reach its full mentality until eventually it climaxes into the order of sheer unity itself. In this final ecstasy, Plotinus is convinced that there is a passage from the level, or order, of intellectual harmony or
mental identity to a virtual merger with the One itself. This is to say that the so called soul to One identity, in the final analysis, is in reality not a soul to One identity but a one to One identity. A virtual union or merger with the One is possible only because the soul is itself but a part of the One. There can be complete identity or merger only among parts that are themselves completely the same in order. It is the message of Plotinus, derived through the mystical experience itself, that man's most real nature, if he but knew it, is God Himself.

In its journey up the way of Salvation, the soul first cleanses itself, removes from itself all impurities. Then, it devotes itself to positive enterprises, self-edification processes, and eventually to careful mental discipline. As a result of the precision of the dialectical process the soul gradually comes to have a new realization of itself --- a new opinion of the basis of its inherent nature, a new opinion of its over-all meaning and destiny. Yet, it is not, actually, the gaining of something new, but the regaining of something once known but lost. In its purification processes it comes to see itself as "not body but soul." In its realization of its identity with the World Soul it comes to see itself as not an individual but a part of the whole. In its identity with the Divine Mind, it comes to see itself as "not soul only, but also mind." In its eventual union with the One it comes to see itself as "not only soul and mind but
also the One." In the case of its union with the World-Soul, the relationship understood is that of soul to Soul. In the case of union with the Divine-Mind, the relation is that of mind to Mind. In the case of identity of the human soul with the One, the relation that of one to One. All three processes take on the form of a religious experience—an identity of the soul with God, which, in the final analysis is but the self-realization of the soul that it is itself a part of God, and that without getting beyond itself, it may know in actuality that which is the Supreme value in and of the universe: it may so directly know Ultimate Reality Itself. In the most technical sense, soul must cease to be characteristically soul, and mind must cease to be characteristically mind at the precise time of the one to One relationship. Man must cease being man in order to become God: it is impossible to be characteristically man and God in the same instance.

18. "In our self-seeing There, the self is seen as belonging to that order, or rather we are merged into that self in us which has the quality of that order. It is a knowing of the self restored to its purity. No doubt we should not speak of seeing; but we cannot help talking in dualities, seen and seer, instead of holding, the achievement of unity. In this seeing, we neither hold an object nor trace distinction; there is no two. The man is changed, no longer himself nor self-belonging; he is merged with the Supreme, sunken into it, one with it: centre coincides with centre, for on this higher plane things that touch are all one; only in separation is there duality; By our holding away, the Supreme is set outside. This is why the vision baffles telling; we cannot detach the Supreme to state it; if we have seen something thus detached we have failed of the Supreme which is to be known as one with ourselves."

VI. 9. 10

"The soul in its nature loves God and longs to be at one with Him in the noble love of a daughter for a noble father; but coming to humān birth (continued on next page)
Plotinus claims to have had such a self-identity with divinity a number of times. He writes:

"Many times it has happened: Lifted out of the body into myself [note that he did not go out of himself but into himself]; becoming external to all other things and self-centered; beholding a marvelous beauty; then, more than ever, assured of community with the loftiest order; enacting the noblest life, acquiring identity with the divine; stationing within It by having attained that activity; poised above whatsoever within the Intellectual is less than the Supreme . . . ." etc. IV. 8. 1.

Again he argues that we could not know that which is above thought unless it were like (or of the same order as) that which we have within ourselves:

"...but this Entity [The One, The Good] transcends all of the intellectual nature; by what direct intuition, then, can it be brought within our grasp?

To this question the answer is that we can know it only in the degree of human faculty: we indicate it by virtue of what in ourselves is like it. For in us, also, there is something of that Being; nay, nothing, ripe for that participation, can be void of it...." III. 8. 9.

The point is further defended in Plotinus' own explanation of

---

This same ideal is borne out in the report of Plotinus last words. Eustochius, his physician, reports that he said: "I am striving to give back the Divine in myself to the Divine in the All."

the difference between the sort of union that occurs in the soul's union with the Divine Mind (mind to Mind) and the kind that occurs in the union with the One (one to One):

"...since the souls are of the Intellectual, and the Supreme still loftier, we understand that contact is otherwise procured, that is by those powers which connect Intellectual agent with Intellectual Object; this all the more, since the Intellect grasps the Intellectual object by the way of similarity, identity, in the sure link of Kindred. Material mass cannot blend into other material mass: unbodied beings are not under this bodily limitation; their separation is solely that of otherness, of differentiation; in the absence of otherness, it is similars mutually present. Thus the Supreme as containing no otherness is ever present with us; we with it when we put otherness away...."

VI. 9. 8.

It is to be emphasized that Salvation is purely something that the soul does in and to itself. Man, alone, begins the whole enterprise, solely within his own initiative. Every step along the way, every development, every result, is something that man does in and by himself to himself. Thus, the way is a technique of self-discipline and self-control that may enter into and works out totally by his own powers. There is actually nothing unnatural, abnormal, or "numinous" about it: Man simply saves himself. And what is the meaning of Salvation: what does it

---92---

19. "It is not that the Supreme reaches out to us seeking our communion: we reach towards the Supreme; it is we that become present. We are always before it; but we do not always look: thus a choir, singing set in due order about the conductor, may turn away from that center to which all should attend; let it but face aright and it sings with beauty, present effectively. We are ever before the Supreme---cut off is utter dissolution; we can no longer be---but we do not always attend; this is rest; this the end of singing ill; effectively before Him, we lift a choral song full of God." VI. 9. 8.

"God---we read---is outside of none, present unperceived to all; (continued on next page)
mean to be saved? Plotinus' answer is that it is the knowledge that man is a thing of value: of Supreme value. It is the realization by means of ecstatic experience of the astounding fact that the soul is a part of God. From this a philosophy of life may be deduced wherein man finds new courage to face the hardships of this life. Now he knows that there is some deeper meaning to life than that which comes from routine observation. Now he knows that there is some righteous destiny for the soul—-that there is something of ultimate goodness at large within our universe. He knows, and he knows most convincingly. He knows because he has had direct experience of that value.

20. Plotinus writes: "Our being is the fuller for our turning. Thither, this is our prosperity; to hold aloof is loneliness and lessening. Here is the soul's peace, outside of evil, refuge taken in the place clean of wrong; here it has its Act, its true knowing; here it is immune. Here is living, the true; that of today, all living, apart from Him, is but a shadow, a mimicky. Life in the Supreme is the native activity of Intellect; in virtue of that converse it brings forth gods, brings forth beauty, brings forth righteousness, brings forth all moral good; for of all these the soul is pregnant when it has been filled with God. This state is its first and its final, because from God it comes, its good lies There, and once turned to God again, it is what it was. Life here with the things of earth, is a sinking, a defeat, a failing of the wing. That our good is There is shown by the very love inborn with the soul;...the soul, other than God but sprung of Him must needs love. So long as it is There, it holds the heavenly love; here its love is the baser....

Those to whom all this experience is strange may understand by way of our earthly longings and the joy we have in miming to what we most desire—remembering always that here what we love is perishable, hurtful, that our loving is of mimicy and turns awry because all was a mistake, our good was

(continued on next page)
Salvation, then, is to know God (either the One or possibly the whole godhead of One, Divine-Mind, and World-Soul), to be in touch with God—to have an estatic experience (or experiences) as a convincing point of reference as to the real existence of items of true (enduring?) value. It is to know the Ideal existentially to the extent that a new moralizing process begins to take place. Having known a new meaning of what is Good the soul attempts to re-educate itself into a new order, even striving to be consistent with That order.

Such a system of salvation by means of self-discipline is reminiscent of the Raja Yoga, or science of the soul, of philosophical Hinduism. Both Plotinus and Hinduism affirm the inherent dignity of man and suggest a way for the realization of the self as God. Both suggest a type of religious experience wherein all self-individuations cease in a complete merger of 'I' and 'Thou' into a "Thou art Thou." ("That art Thou," in the

cont.
not here, this was not what we sought: There only is our veritable love and There we may hold it and be with it, possess in it its verity no longer submer-
ed in alien flesh. Any that have seen know what I have in mind: the soul takes another life as it approaches God; thus restored it feels that the dispenser of true life is There to see, that now we have nothing to look for but far otherwise, that we must put aside all else and rest in this alone. This become, This alone, all the earthly environment done away, in haste to be free, impatient of any bond holding us to the baser, so that with our being entire we may cling about This, no part in us remaining but through it we have touch with God."  

VI. 9. 9.
"The One" or "That One" (tad ekaṁ) of the Upanishads is an inexpressible Absolute and exists as "The All" without differentiation of being from non-being. This is quite similar to The One of Plotinus with the exception that Plotinus does attempt to explain its differentiation. The Divine-Mind, or First Principle of Plotinus is quite similar to the Vedantic "Ishvara" or Universal Mind. World-Soul is similar to the Hiranyagarbha or "resplendent germ" of the Upanishads.

It will appear, then, that the mysticism of Plotinus is a rational mysticism in all but its final stage. It is a rational way of life that culminates in certain rare instances in an ultimately irrational sort of ecstasy. All processes along the way of Salvation: catharsis, dialectics, and even union with the Divine-Mind, may be termed essentially "rational." Only the sumnum bonum itself is irrational.

Such, then, are the views of Plotinus concerning Salvation, Salvation on the human scene, and, as a matter of fact, salvation for everything that is a soul. If religion may be seen, in the final analysis, as a way of Salvation involving a peculiar ontology, epistemology, and axiology, and resulting in a distinctive philosophy of life, we may take the above views of Plotinus to be his religion.
Chapter IV
The Metaphysics of Augustine

The root concept in the teachings of Augustine is "God." Everything begins and ends in God. God is the only genuine reality. God is reality and reality is God. All things that have reality do so because God is either present in them or with them. God is responsible for the existence of the universe, being its chief and only cause. However, God cannot be identified simply with the universe. Neither can the universe be identified simply with God. God exists in his own right apart from the universe. All that appears to be real is not necessarily God, only that which may be established as genuine reality can be identified directly with God.

Augustine's metaphysical system is founded directly upon his particular doctrine of God. In effect, Augustine makes ontology and theology one and the same discipline. In the strictest sense, God may not be said to be within Augustine's system—He is outside of it holding it together.¹ As the

¹ "Indeed the power of the Creator and His omnipotent and all-swerving strength is for each and every creature the cause of its continued existence; and if this strength were at any time to cease from directing (Continued on next page)
cause of all that has been made, he is not a part of that which is made. He is a cause of the system, the first requirement for its existence, its source, its solidarity, its final meaning. The universe was brought into being by an act of God. God, not the things which have been created, at one and the same time both their species would cease to be and their whole nature would perish. . . . Since we are other than He, we are not in Him for any other reason except that He caused it, and this is His work, whereby He contains all things. . . . And by this disposition 'in Him we live and move and are' (Acts xvii, 28). Whence it follows, that if this His working were withdrawn from things, we should neither live nor move nor be."

De Genesi ad litteram, IV, xxii, 22, 23. Translated by Erich Przywara in An Augustine Synthesis, p. 117.

2. "As in the seed there are invisibly and at one time all the things which in course of time will grow into a tree, so the universe must be conceived—since God created all things at the same time— as having had at the same time all the things which were made in it and with it, when the day of creation came, not only the heavens with the sun and the moon and the stars, whose species remain in their retary motion, and the earth and the deeps, which suffer changing movements, and joined together below produce the other parts of the world; but also those things which earth and water produce potentially and causally, before in the course of time they came into being in the shape of which they are now known to us in those works which God 'worketh until now' (John v, 17)."

De Genesi ad litteram, V, xx iii, 45. Translation by Przywara, op. cit., p.119.

"Of all visible things, the world is the greatest; of all invisible, the greatest is God. But that the world is, we see; that God is, we believe. That God made the world, we can believe from no one more safely than from God Himself. But where have we heard Him? Nowhere more distinctly than in the Holy Scriptures, where His prophet said, 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.' (Gen. i, 1.) Was the prophet present when God made the heavens and the earth? No; but the wisdom of God, by whom all things were made, was there, (Prov. viii, 27) and wisdom insinuates itself into holy souls, and makes them the friends of God and His prophets, and noiselessly informs them of His works. They are taught also by the angels of God who always behold the face of the Father, (Matt. xviii, 10) and announce His will to whom it befits. Of these prophets was he who said and wrote, 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.' And so fit a witness was he of God, that the same Spirit of God, who revealed these things to him, enabled him also so long before to predict that our faith also would be forthcoming." De Civitate Dei, XI, iv. Translation in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Philip Schaff, editor, Vol. II. p. 206.

see also De Genesi ad litteram, VI, vi.
the universe is etern al, the only eternal being. He is that which is, was, and always will be. The world begins, and so does metaphysics, as Augustine sees the situation, in God's primal act of creation. The universe did not just happen. It was made, and there is reason, purpose, and end-in-view in its making because it all comes from a source that has meaning. As genuine reality, or true reality, God may be considered as the actual reason, energy, power, force and meaning in and behind all there is, the factual under-support of all that exists. The whole of reality may be said to be within God.

God's chief attribute is his eternality. He is that which always was, is, and ever will be without any degree of change whatsoever — the only absolutely steady individual.

3. "Because therefore the Word of God is One, by which all things were made, which is the unchangeable truth, all things are simultaneously therein, potentially and unchangeably; not only those things which are now in this whole creation, but also those which have been and those which are to be. And therein they neither have been, nor shall be, but only are: and all things things are life, and all things are one; or rather it is one being and one life. For all things were so made by Him, that whatsoever was made in them was not made in Him, but was life in Him. Since, 'in the beginning' the Word was not made, but 'the Word was with God, and the Word was God, and all things were made by Him;' neither had all things been made by Him, unless He had Himself been before all things and not made. But in those things which were made by Him, even body, which is not life, would not have been made by Him, except it had been life in Him before it was made. For 'that which was made was already life in Him;' and not life of any kind soever: for the soul also is the life of the body, but this too is made, for it is changeable; and by what was it made, except by the unchangeable Word of God? For 'all things were made by Him; and without Him was not anything made that was made.' 'What therefore, was made was already life in Him;' and not any kind of life, but 'the life (which) was the light of men; the light certainly of rational minds, by which men differ from beasts, and therefore
Nothing in, on, or about God Himself evolves in any respect. Rather than being devoid of qualities, He is supremely rich in them, the chief ones being His goodness, justice, and love. He is at least like the order of mind, existing in himself as a unity, infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, and creative. He is a positive being, his state being rich, intense, and noble. He

4. "What is the same, save that which is? What is that which is? That which is everlasting. For what is always different at different times, is not, because it abideth not. Not that it altogether is not, but is not in the highest sense. And what is that which is, save He who when He sent Moses, said unto him, I AM WHO AM (Exod. iii, 14) ? " Errationes in Psalmos, CXXX,5. Translation by Przywara, op. cit. p. 93.

"... for anything, whatever in short be its excellence, if it is changeable, does not truly exist; for there is no true existence so far as changed, is not that which was: if it is no longer what it was, a kind of death has therein taken place; something that was there has been eliminated, and exists no more. ... Whatever changes, and is what it was not, I see there a kind of life in that which is, and death in that which was ... Sift the mutations of things, thou wilt find WAS and WILL BE: think on God, thou wilt find the IS, where WAS and WILL BE cannot exist." In Joannis Evangelium tractatus, XXXVIII, 10. Translated by John Gibb and James Innes in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol. VII, p. 220.

"God always is, nor has He been and is not, nor is but has not been, but as He never will not be; so He never was not." De Trinitate, XIV, xv. Translation by Przywara, op. cit., p. 97.
incorporates a fundamental holiness in the whole of his order, being of the highest righteousness and dignity.

The qualities or attributes of God occur in or with him in their supreme state of occurrence. It is a situation in which the qualities themselves occur in a state of intensity beyond the limited level of human comprehension. The case is not that "qualities" are inadequate to describe God's nature, but rather that there is a lack of human capacity to realize the infinite character of the qualities that God possesses. God's qualities never change in any respect, but man's awareness of them may do so.

Technically, according to Augustine, the world begins in nothing. All reality other than God came into being out of nothing for there was absolutely nothing existing before it out of which it was made. God made both the matter of the universe as well as the forms of the universe, and made them both out of

5. "That out of which God has created all things is what possesses neither species nor form; and this is nothing other than nothing. For that which in comparison with completed things is called formless, is, if it have any form however slight, however inchoate, not quite nothing, and consequently this also, in so far as it is, is only from God. Therefore, even if the universe was created out of some formless matter, this very matter was created from something which was wholly nothing. For that which is not yet formed, but is nevertheless in an inchoate state, so that it can be given form, is formable by the goodness of God; for it is a good to have form. Consequently the capacity to be formed is also some good. Hence, the Author of all good, who gives the form, also gives the power to receive the form. Thus everything that is, in so far as it is, and everything which not yet is, but which can be, holds this from God...." De vera religione libri i, xviii, 55-56. Translation by Przywara, op. cit., p. 122. See also: Confessiones, XII
absolutely nothing --- all by his divine fiat. Anything short of the making of both matter and forms would fall short of actual creation and be only the arrangement of that which would logically demand a still more prior creation. God is the ultimate source of the existence of everything that exists. Beyond such a concept of ultimate beginning only nothingness could occur.

The world not only came into being by an act of God, it is sustained in its ordered condition by God. It is God's undergirding or over-reaching support that keeps the universe as it is. Without this support, that which is real would immediately lapse into nothingness. The Creator is ever behind the world, his creation.

Creation is predominantly an act or an event. It is a process occurring within an event. The six days in which God created the universe, as recorded in the book of Genesis, are to be treated as six episodes or eras occurring within the one creative event. All creation took place "in the beginning." Nothing is created now, although that which was formed potentially in the beginning can come to be realized in its actual manifestation in the due course of time.

6. See footnote # 1
7. "For it is one thing to make and administer the creature from the innermost and highest turning-point of causation, which He alone does who is God the Creator; but quite another thing to apply some operation from without in proportion to the strength and faculties assigned to each by Him, so that (continued on next page)
Creation does not occur within time. It occurs "in the beginning," that is, at the time at which time began. The world exists in time, but it was not created in time for time was created along with the world when it was created. Time is itself a creation, a creature. It once came to be and it, like the world will pass away. From Augustine's point of view, time-continuity is not the primary concern in creation. The main

... (continued on next page)
point in creation is the fact that it is something that God does. "Primacy" seems to be more of a key to his thought about creation than does "continuity" or "routine." "In the beginning" for him means "foremost in rank, order, or causality." The beginning of time is only of a secondary concern, having importance only the various parts of which motion and change, as they cannot be simultaneous, succeed one another, and thus, in these shorter or longer intervals of duration, time would begin? Since then, God, in whose eternity is no change at all, is the Creator and Ordainer of time, I do not see how He can be said to have created the world after spaces of time had elapsed, unless it be said that prior to the world there was some creature by whose movement time could pass. And if the sacred and infallible Scriptures say that in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth, in order that it may be understood that He had made nothing previously, for if He had made anything before the rest, this thing would rather be said to have been made "in the beginning," then assuredly the world was made, not in time, but simultaneously with time." De Civitate Dei, xi, 6. Translation by Dods in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 208.

9. "God, whom all things serve, that serve, to whom is compliant every virtuous soul. By whose laws the poles revolve, the stars fulfill their courses, the sun vivifies the day, the moon tempers the night; and all the framework of things, day after day by vicissitude of light and gloom, month after month by waxings and wanings of the moon, year after year by orderly successions of spring and summer and fall and winter, cycle after cycle by accomplished concurrences of the solar course, and through the mighty orbs of time, folding and refolding upon themselves, as the stars still recur to their first conjunctions, maintains, so far as this merely visible matter allows, the mighty constancy of things. God, by whose everdancing laws the stable motion of shifting things is suffered to feel no perturbation, the thronging course of circling ages is ever recalled anew to the image of immovable quiet: by whose laws the choice of the soul is free, and to the good rewards and to the evil pains are distributed by necessities settled throughout the nature of everything. God, from whom distil even to us all benefits, by whom all evils are withheld from us. God, above whom is nothing, beyond whom is nothing, without whom is nothing. God, under whom is the whole, in whom is the whole, and with whom is the whole..." Soliloquiorum, libri ii, I, i,4. Translation by John Gibbes and James Innes in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol. VII, p. 538.
in reference to the history of man and the universe, and not applying in any significant way to God, who is eternal. Time has meaning only in reference to the history or continuity of individual created things.

Augustine is not so interested in the routine of creation as He is in the fact of creation. Creation is simply "the beginning of things." When thinking of the beginning of things we must go back beyond their actual occurrence in time as an individual existing thing to their ultimate beginning in the will of God. Creation is the ultimate beginning or origin of all things (other than God) in God's primal act of creation. This

10. "When anything is to come into being, is an eternal in the word of God, and it comes into being at the time when it ought to come into being, it is in that Word, in which there is no then and sometime, since this Word in its entirety is eternal." De Genesi ad litteram, I, ii, 6. Translation by Przywara, op. cit., p. 113.

"...the will of God, 'who maketh His angels spirits, and His ministers a flaming fire,' (Ps. ciii. 4) presiding among spirits which are joined in perfect peace and friendship, and combined in one will by a kind of spiritual fire of charity, as it were in an elevated and holy and secret seat, as in its own house and in its own temple, thence diffused itself through all things by certain most perfectly ordered movements of the creatures; first spiritual, then corporeal; and uses all according to the unchangeable pleasure of its own purpose, whether incorporeal things or things corporeal, whether rational or irrational spirits, whether good by His grace or evil through their own will... And so it comes to pass that the will of God is the first and highest cause of all corporeal appearances and motions." De Trinitate libri quindecim, III, iv, 9 Translation by Haddan in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol. III, p.58.

"The proposition holds that that which came into being through Him is to be understood as being life in Him, in which life He saw everything when He made it; and as He saw it, so He made it: not seeing anything except Himself, He enumerated in Himself all the things that He made." De Genesi ad litteram, V, xv, 33. Translation by Przywara, op. cit., p. 112.
occurred for all things in the universe in the same primal creative event "in the beginning." All things were created "in the beginning" in God's six eras of creative activity (in one event) in the sense that the fundamental order of all items of being was determined altogether in the one, ancient, creative event. Augustine does not suggest that we take the Genesis story literally, with the consequent implication that everything in the universe always has been as it now is since creation. He rather suggests that in it there is the figurative meaning that the world ultimately begins (began) in an act of will on the part of God in producing everything potentially in both matter and form, that is to be realized actually in some individual form in due time. The fundamental principles or "seeds" as he calls them (rationes seminales, rational principles) are determined in creation in the beginning and individual things do not alter from their seed principles. Creation is to be thought of more in terms of design and basic functioning principle, the beginning of the ultimate principle of a thing, than it is in terms of the specific occurrence of a thing in time. Creation, for Augustine, means that the "seeds" or rational principles of all things that exist were made along with all "spiritual matter" and spiritual beings in both matter and form and all brought into a meaningful pattern and ordered arrangement by activity.
on the part of God as Logos "in the beginning." 

In no sense may the universe be thought of as developing out of God. It is not an overflow of God nor any automatic expression or division of God. Although God is the cause of the world, it did not of necessity come out of him. The world came from God but it is not of God. It came out of nothing. Since the created universe and God are two separate things there is no need to speak of one as being a part of the other. Perhaps this

11. "Just as in that seed there were together (simul) invisibly all the things which would in time develop into the tree, so the world itself is to be thought to have had together—since God created all things together—all the things which were made in it and with it when the day was made, not only the heaven with the sun and the moon and the constellations...and the earth and the abysses...but also those things which the water and earth produced potentially and causally, before they should arise in the course of time in the way we now know them, through those operations which God carries on even till now." De Genesi ad litteram, V, 23. Translation by William A. Christian, in an article entitled "Augustine on the Creation of the World," in Harvard Theological Review, Vol. XLVI, no. 1 (January, 1953), p. 16.

"That whole ordinary course of nature has what one might call its own natural laws, according to which even the spirit of life, which is a created thing, has what one might call its own appetites determined in some way, so that even the evil will cannot go beyond them. And the elements of this corporeal world have their established power and quality, defining how much each one will flourish or not, and what may or may not arise, so each in its own time and of its own kind, they enter upon their comings forth and progressions and limits and decreasings." De Genesi ad litteram, IX, 17. Translation, Ibid., p. 17.
can be expressed diagrammatically as follows:

```
G   O   D
```

```
WORLD
```

The world can never be identified simply with God for God and the world are two different "things." Yet, the reality of the

12. "...if God is the soul of the world, and the world is a body to Him, who is the soul, He must be one living being consisting of soul and body, and that this same God is a kind of womb of nature containing all things in Himself, so that the lives and souls of all living things are taken, according to the manner of each one's birth, out of His soul which vivifies that whole mass, and therefore nothing at all remains which is not a part of God. And if this is so, who cannot see what impious and irreligious consequences follow, such as that whatever one may trample, he must trample a part of God, and in slaying any living creature, a part of God must be slaughtered? But I am unwilling to utter all that may occur to those who think of it, yet cannot be spoken without irreverence. But if they contend that only rational animals, such as men, are parts of God, I do not really see how, if the whole world is God, they can separate that? Concerning the rational animal himself,---that is, man---what more unhappy belief can be entertained than that a part of God is whipped when a boy is whipped? And who, unless he is quite mad, could bear the thought that parts of God can become lascivious, iniquitous, impious, and altogether damnable? In brief, why is God angry at those who do not worship Him, since these offenders are parts of Himself...?" De Civitate Dei, IV, 12, 13. Translation by Dods, in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 71.
world lies in the immanence of God within it. Value in the world is by virtue of a richer connection with that which is more like the nature of God, and ultimately by direct connection with God himself. In the relation of God and the world there is an identity of causality without an identity of content.

Even though the world does not rise out of God by necessity, the world is still rigidly determined by God. Every thing that exists in every place does so because God has desired that it should be as it is and where and when it is. Everything that there is has a meaning within the mind of God, even though man may not be able to see it. Most items in the created order have no possibility of changing themselves from their fixed patterns and routines of life, but the higher creators, men and angels, possess a freedom to will and to act according to their own decisions. Both men and angels can sin, that is, they can refuse to act according to their predestined plan for their particular lives and histories—they can refuse to follow the plan that they should follow. Not only does God have a plan for all particular things, he also has knowledge of how the "free" creatures are going to choose at each future time when they, under their own free will, make their actual decisions.

13. "I beheld all other things that are beneath Thee, and I saw that they had neither any absolute being, or that they had absolute no being at all. They have a being because they are of Thee; and they have no being because they be not that which Thou art. For that truly is, which doth immutably remain." Confessionum libri tredecim, VII, xi, 17. Tr., Praywara, op. cit., p. 123.
II

Angels are the second major item in the metaphysics of Augustine. After God, they rank next highest in order. Angels are not in any sense equal with God. They are not co-eternal with God although they are everlasting. They are creatures, they were created by God, yet they do not share in the temporality of the world in the sense that they will ever pass away. They are special creations of a special order different from the exact nature of God, the world, matter, man or souls. They exist in their own order with their own special natures created as such by God.

Angels are the first of God's creations both in rank and in order of creation. They came into being by the very pronouncement "Let there be light," and are to be identified with both the scriptural ideas of "day" and "light." They were both

14. "The angels therefore existed before the stars; (Job xxxviii,7) and the stars were made the fourth day. Shall we then say that they were made the third day? Far from it; for we know what was made that day. The earth was separated from the water, and each element took its own distinct form, and the earth produced all that grows on it. On the second day, then? Not even on this; for on it the firmament was made between the waters above and beneath, and was called 'Heaven,' in which firmament the stars were made on the fourth day. There is no question, then, that if the angels are included in the works of God during these six days, they are that light which was called 'Day,' and whose unity Scripture signalizes by calling that day not the 'first day,' but 'one day.' For the second day, the third, and the rest are not other days; but the same 'one' day is repeated to complete the number six or seven, so that there should be knowledge both of God's works and of His rest. For when God said, 'Let there be light, and there was light,' if we are justified in understanding
created and formed at the same instance, coming into form out of formless matter by the expression of the Word of God. Because of their close connection with God they share directly in the wisdom and knowledge of God. Their formation is due to their direct illumination by the Logos, for illumination by the Word of God is itself form giving. Like a light shining on phosphorous material, the Word of God, the Divine Logos, deflects itself upon formless matter, so that it takes on a radiance akin, more than anything else created, to the order of God. It is as if God were radioactive, and having become associated with formless matter, caused it to take on a degree of radioactivity. The directness of the relationship between God and angels accounts for their more holy order and superior condition as a created thing.

cont.
in this light the creation of the angels, then certainly they were created partakers of the eternal light which is the unchangeable Wisdom of God, by which all things were made, and whom we call the only-begotten Son of God; so that they, being illumined by the Light that created them might themselves become light and be called 'Day,' in participation of that unchangeable Light and Day which is the Word of God, by whom both themselves and all else were made. 'The true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world, (John 1,9)---this Light lighteth also every pure angel, that he may be light not in himself, but in God; from whom if an angel turn away, he becomes impure, as are all those who are called unclean spirits, and are no longer light in the Lord, but darkness in themselves, being deprived of the participation of Light eternal.' De Civitate Dei, XI, 9. Translation by Dodson. Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol. II, p.210

15. "Likewise has Thou said to me, with a strong voice, in my inner ear, that creature, whose will Thou alone art, is not co-eternal unto Thee, and which, with a most persevering purity drawing its support from Thee, doth, in place and at no time, put forth its own mutability; and Thyself being ever present with it, unto whom with its entire affection it holds itself, having no future to expect nor conveying into the past what it remembereth, is varied by no change, nor extended into any times." Confessionum
Although the inherent nature of angels is mutable, it is made less mutable by their direct association with the Word of God. This is why angels, as created things, may be everlasting. They can, however, suffer change and are free beings, their freedom being more assured by closer connection with God. Although they are everlasting, that is exist with time and beyond time, they are not themselves conscious of time. Among them there is no worry, no striving, no goals, no superior and inferior states of consciousness.

Angels possess both bodies and souls. Their bodies are unique bodies, existing in greater obedience to their souls than human bodies in obedience to human souls. Augustine speaks about the difference of the bodies of angels from the bodies of men, and also, of the difference of the souls of angels from the souls of men, at various times in his writings. Angels have bodily senses superior to those of the human body. Their sense of perception is so very keen that perception in man does not begin to compare with it. When angels appear to men they have the ability to assume a sort of body that is perceptible to man, sometimes being mistaken for a human body. Augustine states that...
there is a difference in the matter of angels and the matter of the
the firmament, or earthly matter and may be termed "spiritual." He also clearly states that the form of heaven is not the same
form as that of earthly form. From this the conclusion would logically follow that the form and matter of angel bodies differ from
the form and matter of human bodies. It will also appear to be
the case that the form and matter of angel souls differ in order
from the form and matter of human souls. Augustine asserts that
the form of souls is always different from the form of bodies. He
also makes quite a difference in the condition of matter in
the heavenly order and matter in earth. Since he established a
parallel between human body and human soul and the case of angel
body and angel soul, indicating, among other things, the superior
allegiance of angel body to angel soul, the final result of the
general comparison of angels and men in this respect would appear
to be a rather complex collection of a number of items each
differing in kind from the other, namely: angel souls with their
special form and special sort of matter, angel bodies with their
unique form and unique matter, human souls with a form different

16. In De Genesi ad litterum, IV. 21, Augustine explains the creation of
light in terms of the formation of spiritual matter. Since he has already
identified the creation of angels with the creation of light (De Gen. ad,
litt., II, 8), it follows that the matter of angels is the same as spiritual
matter. The designation 'purely intellectual creatures' applied to angels
and the strong assertion that all created things are composed of some sort
of matter leave no other alternative than the conceiving of a unique kind
of angelic spiritual matter. In De Genesi ad litterum, III, 10, Augustine
comments that angels have "ethereal" bodies whereas demons have "aerial" bodies.
from that of the form of angel souls and with a matter differing from the matter of angel souls, and human bodies with a form and matter differing as form and matter from any of the other mentioned types. Thus, there would be eight different items, each differing in kind, involved in the comparison of angels and men.

An overall summary description that Augustine uses to distinguish between the heavenly order and the earthly order is the assertion that the heavenly order is more spiritual than the earthly order. The conclusion would logically follow that the matter of angels, both soul matter and body matter, is more "spiritual" than the matter of men, and that the same suggestion would apply in the comparison of human soul and angel soul, the point here being that angels are more like the order of God as pure spirit than are men. Yet, it must be remembered that the overall dualism of spirit and matter between Creator (pure spirit) and Creature (matter) does not necessarily apply in the case of the comparison of angels and men for then the comparison is between created things, all of which are matter (formed matter).

Angels do not know things by means of their bodily senses, or at least, not so in their characteristically superior way of knowing. If their bodies are keenly sensitive, as Augustine suggests, their sense knowledge is superior to the sense knowledge of men, but this does not constitute the reason for the superior level of knowledge they possess. Their highest way of
knowing is by means of their direct illumination by the Word of God. Through their souls they know in a way superior to that possible through even their kind of bodies.

The abode of angels is in heaven. In fact, Augustine defines heaven as the realm where the angels are. He explains that by heaven he does not mean the sky of the earth, the natural, or visible firmament of the heavens --- the heaven of this earth or "sidereal heaven." He rather means the "intellectual heaven" that was created before our world was created. This heaven

17. "I am of the opinion that every act of our mind produces some effect in the body, and that, however heavy and slow our senses may be, they feel this effect, in proportion to the intensity of the mental act, as when we are angry or sad or joyful. From this it may be concluded that, when we think something which has no apparent effect on our body, it can nevertheless be apparent to the supernatural and heavenly spirits, whose perception is so very keen that ours does not deserve the name of perception in comparison with it." Epistulae IX. Translation by Sister Wilfrid Parsons in The Works of St. Augustine, Letters, Vol.I, (The Fathers of the Church, Ludwig Schopp, editor), p. 21.

"Those holy angels come to the knowledge of God not by audible words, but by the presence to their souls of immutable truth, i.e., of the only-begotten Word of God....Thus, too they know the creature also, not in itself, but by this better way, in the wisdom of God, as if in the art by which it was created; and, consequently, they know themselves better in God than in themselves, though they have also this latter knowledge." De Civitate Dei, XI, 29. Translation by Dods, Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol.II, p. 222.

18. "This heaven which I see, and this earth upon which I tread (from which is this earth that I carry about me), Thou hast made. But where is that heaven of heavens, O Lord, of which we hear in the words of the Psalm, 'The heaven of heavens are the Lord's,' but the earth hath He given to the children of men? (Ps. cxv. 16) Where is the heaven, which we behold not, in comparison of which all this, which we behold, is earth? For this corporeal whole, not as a whole everywhere, hath thus received its beautiful figure in these lower parts, of which the bottom is our earth; but compared with that heaven of heavens, even the heaven of our earth is but earth; yea, each
is also a creature, supposedly a body only, composed of a superior type of formed matter --- possibly the same matter as the matter of the body of angels. Augustine does not make this last suggestion but it is quite consistent with his teachings on the subject and a logical deduction from the situation as he describes it.

An interesting teaching of Augustine in this connection is that some of the order of heaven laps over into earth. It is literally possible to have "heaven on earth" in a precise and technical way as the two orders do not exist in strict isolation from one another. It is the case of one order overlapping with another order, the heavenly order dipping down into the earthly order rather than that of one order having two different natures simultaneously. As we shall see later, this fact shows up prominently in his mystical theory.

cont.

of these great bodies is not absurdly called earth, as compared with that, I know not what manner of heaven, which is the Lord's, not the sons of men." Confessionum libri tredecim, XII, 2, Translation by Pilkington, in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 176.

"...That heaven of heavens, which Thou in the Beginning didst create, is some intellectual creature, which, although in no wise co-eternal unto Thee, the Trinity, is yet a partaker of Thy eternity, and by reason of the sweetness of that most happy contemplation of Thyself doth greatly restrain its own mutability, and without any failure, from the time in which it was created, in clinging unto Thee, surpasses all the rolling changes of times. Ibid., p. 176.
III

Physical bodies are the third item in Augustine's system. According to Augustine, after God made the angels he made the physical world and all that there is within it. Three elements were made in creation: (1) angels (day, light), (2) the firmament, and (3) men. The creation of all physical bodies is to be identified with the formation and development of the firmament involving all of the remainder of the days of creation from the second through part of the sixth.

In the teachings of Augustine, the whole of creation essentially involves the creation of "matter." It is not the situation of the creation of form and matter as such or the creation of spirit and matter. It is a situation of the creation of different sorts of matter. As it has already been indicated Augustine speaks of the "spiritual" matter of angels. A certain sort of matter is involved in the nature of souls. Creation is always creation of matter. The case at issue in reference to the firmament, however, is the specifically physical kind of matter. The second day of creation was given to the formation of bodies out of the same primitive "formless" or "unformed" matter from which angels were made. That which takes place during the third through the sixth days, with the exception of the making of man, is but a further more detailed specification
in the formation of corporeal matter.

This physical matter is simply our common sense concept of matter, the physical universe all about us: earth, air, stars, fire (aether) water, planets, bones, seeds, flesh, etc. Some of it undergoes a process of rapid change and some of it appears

19. "Hast not Thou taught me, O Lord, that before Thou didst form and separate this formless matter, there was nothing, neither colour, nor figure, nor body, nor spirit? Yet not altogether nothing; there was a certain formlessness without any shape.... What, in all parts of the world, can be found nearer to a total formlessness than the earth and the deep? For, from their being of the lowest position, they are less beautiful than are the other higher parts, all transparent and shining. Why, therefore, may I not consider the formlessness of matter—-which Thou hast created without shape—to be fittingly intimated unto men by the name of earth invisible and formless...? That heaven of heavens was for Thee, O Lord; but the earth, which Thou has given to the sons of men (Ps. cxiv.16), to be seen and touched, was not such as now we see and touch. For it was invisible and "without form," (Gen.i.2) and there was a deep over which there was not light; or darkness was over the deep, that is, more than in the deep... But the entire deep was almost nothing, since hitherto it was altogether formless; yet there was then that which could be formed. For Thou, O Lord, hath made the world of a formless matter, which matter, out of nothing, Thou hast made almost nothing, out of which to make those great things which we, sons of men, wonder at. For very wonderful is this corporeal heaven, of which firmament, between water and water, the second day after the creation of light, Thou saidst, Let it be made, and it was made, (Gen. 1.6-8.) Which firmament Thou calledst heaven, that is, the heaven of this earth and sea, which Thou madest on the third day, by giving a visible shape to the formless matter which Thou madest before all days. For even already hadst Thou made a heaven before all days, but that was the heaven of this heaven; because in the beginning Thou hadst made heaven and earth. But the earth itself which Thou hadst made was formless matter, because it was invisible and without form, and darkness was upon the deep. Of which invisible and formless earth, of which formlessness, of which almost nothing, Thou mightest make all these things of which this changeable world consists, and yet consisteth not; whose very changeableness appears in this, that times can be observed and numbered in it." Confessionum libri tredecim, XIII, iii, vii. Translation by Pilkington, in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 176-177.
very little, yet, all of it changes to some extent. The whole of the physical universe was created within the six days of creation but this does not mean that everything in it was formed at that time in its present state and condition. As has already been suggested, creation is to be thought of more in a potential sense than it is in an actual sense. Some of the items of the physical world undergo a development in time of their potential orders and and other items were completely produced in creation. Those things created first in the routine (although there was actually no routine) were usually finished at creation, eg. the Seas, trees, seeds, stars, planets, etc. Some of the species seem to be complete at creation and some do not. Trees remain as they were but there is room for variation as to the various types of trees. However, even the technical variations among the types of trees was so constituted potentially in creation that its actual realization in time is but a development from its seed principle (rationes seminales). There is no variation among the seed principles themselves.

20. "And, under these names heaven and earth, the whole creation is signified, either as divided into spiritual and material, which seems the more likely, or into the two great parts of the world in which all created things are contained, so that, first of all, the creation is presented in sum, and then its parts are enumerated according to the mystic number of days." De Civitate Dei, XI, 33. Translation by Dods, Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 224.

"For neither at that time (creation) were those seeds so drawn forth into products of their several kinds, as that the power of production was exhausted in those products; but oftentimes, suitable combinations of
As has already been suggested, the physical world exits within time only, or more technically, along with time, so that it both comes into being in Creation and passes away in some final consumation. History only makes sense in reference to physical things for history is but the record of the continuity of the change of a thing. As has already been suggested, 

Augustine considered the firmament of the heavens, the sidereal heavens, as physical.

Generally speaking, Augustine seems to be able to incorporate souls as a part of physical bodies. The one major exception is Man as a soul. The creation of man, however, as we shall see, is quite a specialized kind of creation and it may well be argued that the soul of man does not fit in with Augustine's general understanding and meaning concerning "soul." Some bodies have life and are directed by souls. He readily grants the existence of rational souls in or with bodies and even expresses his own uncertainty as to whether the world as a whole is animated by a world-soul. In any case, such is not God. He

cont.

circumstances are wanting, whereby they may be enabled to burst forth and complete their species. For consider, the very least shoot is a seed; for if fitly consigned to the earth, it produces a tree....But of this grain also there is further still a seed, which although we are unable to see it with our eyes, yet we can conjecture its existence from our reason; because, except there were some such power in those elements, there would not so frequently be produced from the earth things which had not been sown there." De Trinitate, libri xv, iii, 8. Translation by Haddan, Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol.III, p.60.
assumes the existence of animal soul and further indicates that plants do not have souls even though they possess an immanent principle of life. He even points to the similarity of the souls of men and the souls of brutes in his process of contrasting their differences, one difference being the dependency of the brute soul upon its body in contrast to the independency of the human soul. He indicates that both man and beast have a higher faculty of reason. In short, Augustine seems to take soul for granted as a part of the physical universe.

21. "Come now, and let us see where lies, as it were, the boundary line between the outer and inner man. For whatever we have in mind common with the beasts, thus much is rightly said to belong to the outer man. For the outer man is not to be considered to the body only, but with the addition also of a certain peculiar life of the body, whence the structure of the body derives its vigor, and all the senses which he is equipped for the perception of outward things; and when the image of these outward things already perceived, that have been fixed in the memory, are seen again by recollection, it is still a matter pertaining to the outer man. And in all these things we do not differ from the beasts, except that in shape of body we are not prone, but upright. And the beast, too, are able both to perceive things corporeal from without, through the senses of the body, and to fix them in the memory, and remember them, and in them to seek after things suitable, and shun things inconvenient. But to notice these things, and to retain them not only as caught up naturally but also as deliberately committed to memory, and to imprint them again by recollection and conception...to combine again imaginary objects of sight...to examine after what manner it is that in this kind, things like the true are to be distinguished from the true...—these acts, and the like, although performed in reference to things sensible, and those which the mind has deduced through the bodily senses, yet, as they are combined with reason, so are not common to men and beasts. But it is the part of the higher reason to judge of these corporeal things according to incorporeal and eternal reasons." De Trinitate, libri xv, XII, 1,2.
Translation by Hadd an.

"Many animals surpass us in sense perception, and the reason for this is not to be gone into just now, but in mind and reason and knowledge God has placed us over them. The sense perception of animals, aided by the (cont. on next page)
Life is connected directly with light, as Augustine sees it. The degree of life possessed by a created thing is determined by the degree of light (angel nature) in which they participate. Life in plants is more static or sluggish than it is in animals and men, since it is not then related in with soul. Light does not reach the level of "knowledge" until the higher animal level. There is further distinction in the manner in which an animal has knowledge, namely, from physical things themselves, and the way men gain higher knowledge, namely via revelation.

Cont.

Great force of habit, enables them to pick out the things that satisfy their souls, and this is done all the more easily because the brute soul is more closely bound to the body, and, of course, the senses belong to the body, the senses that the soul uses for food and for the pleasure that it derives from the body. But, because reason and knowledge, of which we are treating now, transcend the senses, the human soul, by means of reason and knowledge, withdraws itself as far as it can from the body and gladly enjoys the delights of the interior life. The more it stoops to the senses, the greater its similarity to the brute." De Quantitate Animae, XXVIII, 54. Translation by John J. McMahon, in The Fathers of the Church, op. cit. Vol. II of The Writings of Augustine, p. 121.

"This can be said, also, of the irrational soul or life, that the rational soul cannot be converted into the irrational. If the irrational soul itself were not subjected to the rational by reason of its inferior rank, it would assume a form in an equal way and be like the latter." De immortalitate animae, XVI, 25. Translation by Ludwig Schopp, in The Fathers of the Church, op. cit. Vol. II of The Writings of Augustine, p. 45.

22. The superior qualities of animals and/or animal souls over that of plants seems to reside in the fact that some greater degree of light (angelic nature) was involved in their creation. Animal souls do not "know" as do human souls, however, the superior sensory and sentient capacities of animals over plants give evidence to the existence of some greater degree of incorporation of light in their present order.
Men constitute the fourth item in Augustine's metaphysics. Man was created "in the image of God" in the latter phase of the creative event, the last part of the sixth day of creation. There is strong intimation that the animal part of man had been created already in an earlier stage of creation, but man as an animal is not the point at all. Man is not considered as "man" until he is created "in the image of God." Only man is in the image of God and to be created in the image of God is to be man. Man was completely created on the sixth day of creation. He was created both male and female on the sixth day for all creation ceased at the end of the sixth day. The story of the special creation of woman is but an example of "Hebrew parallelism." It is a repetition of the same situation that has already been described but with more details added. No problem really arises concerning the difference in creation of male and female as the story of the creation of Eve is but dealing with the special creation of sexual differences within the same order of man which had already been created. Apparently,

23. Writers statement, not Augustine's, yet Augustine says essentially the same thing in his emphasis that all seven days are to be taken as but one day—the latter days being but a continuity for the sake of explanation of that which really happened apart from time. Augustine did not know the Hebrew language very well, and it is doubtful if he was aware of the "parallel" characteristic of Hebrew literature, yet his teaching on the creation incorporates the same idea.
the implication is that in his earlier stages of creation man (mankind) was either non-sexual or else bi-sexual. The story of the creation of Eve is to be taken as a more detailed description of that which occurred in the latter phase of the sixth day of creation.

Man is composed of body and soul. Like the angels he possesses two kinds of matter: spiritual matter and physical matter. His physical matter is a part of the physical universe of the order of animal nature. His spiritual matter is his soul, a unique sort of soul not the same sort of soul as animal soul or the same sort of matter as the spiritual matter of angels. Human soul is immortal. Animal soul, as a part of

---

24. "If matter be used as a term denoting everything which in any form has a separate existence, whether it be called an essence, or a substance, or by another name, the soul is material. Again, if you choose to apply the epithet immaterial only to that nature which is supremely immutable and is everywhere present in its entirety, the soul is material, for it is not at all endowed with such qualities. But if matter be used to designate nothing but that which, whether at rest or in motion, has some length, breadth, and height, so that with a greater part of itself it occupies a greater part of space, and with a smaller part a smaller space, and is in every part of it less than the whole, then the soul is not material,...Whence it is perceived that the soul, whether it be termed material or immaterial, has a certain nature of its own, created from a substance superior to the elements of this world,—a substance which cannot be truly conceived of by any representation of the material images perceived by the bodily senses, but which is apprehended by the understanding and discovered to our consciousness by its living energy." Epistolae, CLXVI.4. Translation by J. G. Cunningham, in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 524.

25. "The soul of man is in a sense proper to itself immortal. It is not absolutely immortal, as God is...but because when alienated from the life of God it so dies as not wholly to cease from living in its own nature, it is found to be from a certain cause mortal, yet so as to be without reason called at the same time immortal." Ibid, p. 523
the universe, is not immortal.

Although man was created completely in the sixth day of creation the meaning is not necessarily that he was then formed as now. Both the body and the soul of man were completely created, at the same time, on the sixth day of creation, but body undergoes a process of formation in time. This is contrary to the creation of angels who were created completely formed in both spiritual and bodily natures at the original creative act.

Augustine notes that man was formed (not created) from the dust of the earth. This, he believes, refers to the formation of man's body in time according to its potentialities of creation. Although Augustine is not very specific on this point, the likely conclusion is that something special occurred in the case of the formation of the body of man that did not occur in the formation of the bodies of animals. The implication is that there was some further direct activity on the part of God in the formation of man's body, unless, perhaps, it might be concluded that a substantial portion of man's formation occurred also at the time of his creation. Certainly the formation of sexuality in bodies required some special activity on the part of God, but again, much of this, if not all of it, might have occurred.

26. In De Genesi ad litteram, VI, Augustine explains in some detail his opinion that the formation of man from the slime of the earth took place in the time and does not refer to his creation in a technical or ultimate sense.
at the time of creation.

The formation of the soul of man, on the other hand, occurs itself in creation at the breathing of the breath of God into man. Hence, the soul is formed before the body is completely formed and must be united with the body in time. The soul of man in nowise arises out of the bodily order. Its nearest of kin is angelic nature, yet, it was created after angels were created and is more changeable in its order being situated not as close to God as are angels. The manner of the creation of the soul is the same as that of the creation of angels, namely the acting upon matter by light, the Word of God, however, the net result is different due to the difference in order and time of the matter. Matter acted upon by the Word of God in its primordial formless state results in the formation of nearly unchanging angelic matter and form. Matter acted upon by the Word of God later in time, after a certain formation has occurred results in a type soul-matter nearly like angelic matter but considerably more changeable.

27. It is difficult to specify how much of formation may have occur in the creation. For example, it is not clear whether sexuality is a created or formed difference in man.

28. The mode of the creation of angels and the human soul seems to be similar but the material out of which they were created was different. The resulting matter of souls and matter of angels is different. See De Genesi ad litteram, VII, 27, 39.
Although the soul of man is composed of a unique sort of soul-matter different from angel matter, it is distinctively spiritual and in no wise similar to the corporeal souls of animals. It is, yet, distinctively a creation or creature, not itself a part of God. It was specially made, both created and formed, exactly as it is with no process, change, or evolution whatsoever occurring in its own case. It was created not out of God but out of nothing, yet is itself everlasting (immortal) like the angels. Man is like God only in his soul.

Apparently, the conclusion from Augustine is that the union of the soul of man and the body of man occurs in time after creation. He explains that the soul of man, although already formed lies hidden in the work of God until united with a human body. Between the human soul and the human body there is a rigid dualism. Either caused the other. However, this is not reason to assume that they exist in opposition or conflict with one another in any necessary sense. The body is not

29. "...Thou hast not said, 'Let man be made after his kind,' but, 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness'... And therefore this being said in the plural, 'Let us make man,' it is yet subjoined in the singular, 'and God made man;' and this being said in the plural, 'after our likeness,' is subjoined in the singular, 'after the image of God.' Thus is man renewed in the knowledge of God, after the image of Him that created him; (Col.iii,10) and being made spiritual, he judgeth all things,---all things that are to be judged,---'Yet he himself is judged of no man.' (I. Cor.ii.15). Confessionum libri tredecim, XII, xii, 32. Translation by Pilkington, in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol. I., p. 200. See also De Genesi ad litteram, VII, 28, 40.
necessarily negative toward the soul and neither is the soul negative toward the body. To the contrary, Augustine advances the very interesting doctrine that the human soul has a natural desire to be united to the human body.

30. "Finally, united with the body (and this not in space, although the body occupies space) the soul is affected prior to the body by those highest and eternal principles, changeless and not contained in space, and not only prior, but also to a greater extent. For, the prior affect in the soul occurs to the extent that the soul is nearer to these principles, and, by the same token, the soul is more greatly affected in proportion to the superiority over the body. This nearness is not one in space, but in order of nature. In this order, then, it is understood that a form is given by the highest Being through the soul to the body—the form whereby the latter exists, in so far as it exists.

Hence, the body subsists through the soul and exists by the very fact that it is animated, whether universally, as is the world, or individually, as is each and everything that has life within the world.

This yields the conclusion that the soul, through the soul, could become a body, and that this would be possible in no other way at all. Because this does not happen—as the soul remains soul in that through which it is soul, and the body subsists through the soul, which gives, but does not take away, its form—the soul cannot be changed into a body.

For, if the soul does not give the form which in turn it receives from the supreme Good, the body is not formed by it, and, if body is not formed by it, it is either not formed at all, or it assumes a form as close to the Supreme Good as the soul; it would be like the soul. But the important point here is: The soul is the more excellent the closer (to the Supreme Good) the form is which it assumes. But, the body also would have assumed a form close ((to the Highest)) if it had not received its form from the soul. For, if there were not an intermediate cause, the body would have assumed a form close ((to the Highest)) if it had not received its form from the soul. For, if there were not an intermediate cause, the body would have assumed a form quite as close as the soul.

There is nothing between the supreme Life, which is immutable Wisdom and Truth, and that which is brought to life as the last one, i.e., the body, except the vivifying soul. If the soul gives a form to the body in so far as it exists, it does not, through this transfer, take away the form; however, by a transformation of the soul into a body the soul would lose its form.
Augustine is himself uncertain about the creation or production of individual souls as individual souls. He suggests that it is possible that individual souls come from individual individual souls just as individual bodies come from individual bodies and it is also possible that each soul is specially created as an individual whenever it comes into existence. Traducianism would appear to be more consistent with his general teaching about creation, namely that all things were created "in the beginning." On the other hand, it would seem that souls must be "specially created" if there is no prior existence to their individual form and materiality.

The main point that Augustine seems to be emphasizing is that man is a soul. Man is more distinctively to be identified with "the image of God" part of his order than with any other part. Of course, man is something else than his soul part, but he is most distinctively and characteristically to be identified with his soul order.

In summary, the metaphysics of Augustine incorporates four...
main ideas: (1) God, (2) angels, (3) physical bodies, and (4) man. All of these items, except God, are created things and material. God alone exists apart from a material order and is as such a pure spirit. The matter of souls is different from physical matter and the matter of angels is different from the matter of souls. All of the items, except God, undergo some degree of change, with the angels changing the least, and almost not changing at all; physical bodies, including the body of man, changing a great deal; and human souls changing more than angels but not nearly so much as physical bodies. God alone is eternal, utterly changeless. Angels and the soul of man are everlasting and immortal --- like the number series they come into being but do not pass away. Physical bodies come into being in time (with time) and pass away in time (along with time). History is mainly in reference to the continuity of physical bodies although it can in some sense apply to angels and human souls in reference to the degree of change that they do have. The over-all dualism is not between form and matter or body and soul --- these are only secondary dualisms. The basic dualism is between Creator and creature, God and the universe, Spirit and matter.
Perhaps his metaphysics can be composite diagrammed as follows:
The religion of Augustine is the religion of an intellectual who was not convinced that religion is solely an intellectual matter. His religion is not a religion within the limits of reason alone for the appeal in religion is over and beyond reason. Yet, he is characteristically analytical and critical in his outlook even when dealing with religion. Although he appeals to reason in establishing his philosophy, his basic religious meaning is established on the basis of revelation. He sees religion as existing in its own right apart from a formal system of philosophy, more universal and less technical and specialized than philosophy. Rather than conceiving of religion as a "system," he sees it as the broader raw material out of which systems are produced. It is an experience, a feeling, an inner meaning, rather than a formal philosophy or a science.
Religion, for Augustine, is a faith. It is a testimony to certain beliefs rather than an argument for the establishment of beliefs. It is more a report of a discovery than it is a quest for a faith, more of a witness than an argument. Yet, Augustine did not hesitate to argue about religion and always seems willing to give an apology for the faith that he asserts. It must be understood, however, that the faith is not necessarily established on the grounds of the arguments used in its defense. His appeal is always ultimately to revelation.

In the strictest sense, the philosophy of Augustine is an outgrowth of his religion. As has been indicated, his metaphysics is really founded upon his religious concepts—upon revelation. Augustine can see no clash between philosophy and religion for he will not admit the right of philosophy to stand on its own grounds apart from revelation. Augustine never views philosophy as an end-in-itself. It is merely an aid of religion, and in some instances a tool of religion, always entirely subordinate to religious meaning. The problems of philosophy are not the same as the problems of religion. To solve the problems of philosophy is not to solve the problems of religion and the solution of distinctively religious problems does not necessarily mean the solution of philosophical problems. Since his philosophy is separated from and subjugated to his religion, Augustine is more properly termed a philosophical religionist than a religious philosopher.
Although Augustine does not appear to have been intoxicated with the idea of God, as has been suggested about Plotinus, his idea of God is the key to the whole of his thought. Just as it was the key to the understanding to his metaphysics, so it is also the key to the understanding of his religion. However, Augustine's religious meaning of God is somewhat different from his metaphysical meaning of God. In his philosophy he attempts to speak of God in a technical, systematic, and objective way. In his religion he speaks of God in a more intimate and subjective way. Whereas he waxes "intellectual" when he talks about metaphysical matters, he becomes "emotional" when he talks about distinctively religious meanings. He seems to feel that it is

1 A good example of this is in the Soliloquies:

"God, who art loved, wittingly or unwittingly, by everything that is capable of loving. -- whom God, in whom are all things, to nevertheless neither the vileness of any creature is vile, nor its wickedness harmful, nor its error erroneous. God, who hast not willed that any but the pure should know the truth.

God, the Father of truth, the Father of wisdom, the Father of the true and crowning life, the Father of blessedness, the Father of that which is good and fair, the Father of intelligible light, the Father of our awakening and illumination, the Father of the pledge by which we are admonished to return to Thee..." Soliloquiorum, librii, I, i, 2. Translation of John Gibb and James Innes, in A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Philip Schaff, Editor, First Series, Vol. VII, p.537.

"God, whom all things serve, that serve, to whom is compliant every virtuous soul. By whose laws the poles revolve, the stars fulfill their courses, the sun vivifies the day, the moon tempers the night: and all the framework of things, day after day by vicissitudes of light and gloom, month after month by waxings and wanings of the moon, year after year by orderly successions of spring and summer and fall and winter, cycle after cycle by (continued on next page)
one matter to define God categorically as the pivot within a metaphorical system, and another to speak of him as Saviour and Redeemer. The first is a function of philosophy; the latter is a function of religion. Augustine's idea of God does not appear to have changed very much after he became a Catholic Christian. As he went from religion to religion, he appears to have been really going from idea of God to idea of God; and it might also be suggested that changes in his idea of God were the reasons for his changes of religion.

As has been suggested, Augustine conceives of God metaphorically as pure spirit, mind, infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, and creative. He is not a soul or the soul of the world; yet, he exists over the world and beyond the world in a manner so as to be both apart from the world and also with it, and even to some extent in it. In his religion, however, Augustine

cont.
accomplished concurrences of the solar course, and through the mighty orbs of time, folding and refolding upon themselves, as the stars still recur to their first conjunctions, maintains, so far as this merely visible matter allows, the mighty constancy of things. God, by whose everdureing laws the stable motion of shifting things is suffered to feel no perturbation, the thronging course of circling ages ever recalled anew to the image of immovable quiet: by whose laws the choice of the soul is free, and to the good reward and to the evil pains are distributed by necessities settled throughout the nature of everything. God, from whom distil even to us all benefits, by whom all evils are withheld from us. God, above whom is nothing, beyond whom is nothing, without whom is nothing. God, under whom is the whole, in whom is the whole, with whom is the whole...." Soliloquiorum, libri ii. I, i, 4. Translation, Ibid., p. 538.
emphasizes the nature of God as complete goodness, complete justice, and complete love. Perhaps his teaching concerning the love of God may be considered his major religious emphasis. Around it is focused his doctrines of Christ, mediation, redemption, election, sanctification, and his mystical theory.

The theology of Augustine is unified around the concept of the triune God. The whole Trinity: Father, Son and Holy Spirit were involved in Creation. God, the Creator, exists eternally as the Trinity, the unity of the Godhead and the multiplicity of deity. Augustine suggests that the term "person" is not an exactly correct one to apply to the Trinity but that it is the nearest term we have to describe the situation. Augustine thinks of God as a person and usually refers to him as a mind or a will. Augustine sees God's relationships as essentially

2. "Why...do we not call these three together one person, as one essence and one God, but say three persons, while we do not say three Gods or three essences; unless it be because we wish some one word to serve for that meaning whereby the Trinity is understood, that we might not be altogether silent, when asked, what three, while we confessed that they are three? For if essence is the genus, and substance or person the species, as some think, then I must omit what I just now said, that they ought to be called three essences, as they are called three substances or persons; as three horses are called three horses, and the same are called three animals, since horse is the species, animal the genus. For in this case the species is not spoken of in the plural, and genus in the singular, as if we were to say that three horses were one animal; but as they are three horses by the special name, so they are three animals by the generic one. But if they say that the name of substance or person does not signify species, but something singular and individual; so that any one is not so called a substance or person as he is called a man, for man is common to all men, but in the same manner as he is called this or that man, as Abraham, as Isaac, as Jacob, or anyone else who,
personal, and even "intimate." This is why he emphasizes

if present, could be pointed out with the finger: so will the same reason
reach these too. For as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are called three individuals
so are they called three men, and three souls. Why then are both the Father
and the Son and the Holy Spirit, if we are to reason about them also accord-
ing to genus and species and individual, not so called three essences, as
they are called three substances or persons? But this, as I said, I pass
over: but I do affirm, that if essence is a genus, then a single essence has
no species. Therefore the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not three species
of one essence. But if essence is a species, as man is a species, but those
are three which we call substances or persons, then they have the same species
in common, in such as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob have in common the species
which is called man; not as man is subdivided into Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,
so can one man also be subdivided into several single men; for this is alto-
gether impossible, since one man is already a single man. Why then is one
essence subdivided into three substances or persons? For if essence is a
species, as man is, then one essence is as one man is: or do we, as we say
that any three human beings of the same sex, of the same constitution of body,
of the same mind, are one nature,—for they are three human beings, but one
nature,—so also say in the Trinity three substances one essence, or three
persons one substance or essence,...? Neither do we so call the Trinity three
persons or substances, one essence and one God, as through three somethings
subsisted out of one matter (leaving a remainder, i.e.); although whatever
that is, it is unfolded in these three. For there is nothing else of that
essence besides the Trinity. Yet, we say three persons of the same essence,
or three persons of one essence; but we do not say three persons out of the
same essence, as though therein essence were one thing, and person another, a
as, we can say three statues out of the same gold; for there it is one thing
to be gold, another to be statues. And when we say three men of one
nature, or three men of the same nature, they also can be called three men
out of the same nature, since out of the same nature there can be also
three other such men. But in that essence of the Trinity, in no way can any
other person whatever exist out of the same essence. Further, in these
things, one man is not as much as three men together; and two men are some-
thing more than one man: and in equal statues, three together amount to
more of gold than each singly, and one amounts to less of gold than two.
But in God it is not so; for the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit
together is not a greater essence than the Father alone or the Son alone;
but these three substances or persons, if they must be so called, together
are equal to each singly: which the natural man does not comprehend...."

De Trinitate, VII, vi. 11. Translation by Arthur West Haddan, in the

"They ((the Greeks)) indeed use also the word hypostasis
(ὑπόστασις); but they intend to put a difference, I know not what, between
(continued on next page)
the love of God, for in love there is the expression of will in intimate relationship.

The whole of the Trinity exist eternally in itself and is both apart from the world and immanent within it. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three equal orders of the same thing, being compared to memory, understanding and will—or memory, understanding and love—instead of to three men. The Father is the

3. "But in these three, when the mind knows itself and loves itself, there remains a trinity: mind, love, knowledge; and this trinity is not con­founded together by any commingling; although they are each severally in themselves and mutually all in all, or each severally in each two, or each two in each. Therefore all are in all.... Therefore these three things are marveously in separable from each other, and yet each of them is severally a substance, all together are one substance or essence, whilst they are mutually predicated relatively." De Trinitate, IX, v, 8. Tr. Ibid., p. 128.

"Putting aside, then, for a little while all other things, of which the mind is certain concerning itself, let us especially consider and discuss these three—memory, understanding, will.... Since, then, these three, memory, understanding, will, are not three lives, but one life; nor three

(continued on next page)
"beginning" of the distinction between Father, Son and Holy Spirit, "Father" has meaning only in relation to "Son," and vice versa. The Son proceeds from the Father only in a categorical sense of a comparison of persons or substances, not in time or rank. Since the essence is the same in all of the Trinity, there is no "beginning" in the sense of source; there is only beginning and subordination in person and relation. Just as the Father 

cont.

minds, but one mind; it follows certainly that neither are they three substances, but one substance. Since memory, which is called life, and mind, and substance is so called in respect to itself; but it is called memory, relatively to something. And I should say the same also of understanding and of will, since they are called understanding and will relatively to something; but each in respect to itself is life, and mind, and essence. And hence these three are one, in that they are one life, one mind, one essence; and whatever else they are severally called in respect to themselves, they are called also together, not plurally, but in singular number. But they are three, in that wherein they are mutually referred to each other; and if they were not equal, and this not only each to each, but also each to all, they certainly could not mutually contain each other; for not only is each contained by each, but also, all by each. And, therefore, while all are mutually comprehended by each, and as wholes, each as a whole is equal to each as a whole, and each as a whole at the same time to all as wholes; and these three are one, one life, one mind, one essence...." De Trinitate, X xi, 17, Translation, Ibid., p. 142.

"But we have come now to that argument in which we have undertaken to consider the noblest part of the human mind, by which it knows or can know God, in order that we may find in it the image of God. For although the human mind is not of the same nature with God, yet the image of that nature than which none is better, is to be sought and found in us, in that which our nature also has nothing better.... This trinity ((memory, understanding, love)), then, of the mind is... the image of God...because it can also remember, understand, and love Him by whom it was made. And in so doing it is made wise itself...." De Trinitate, XIV, viii, II, and xii, 15. Translation, Ibid., p. 189, 191.
"begets" the Son, so do both the Father and the Son beget the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit proceeds from both Father and Son in one beginning. Although the persons of the Trinity are the same in essence, there is a literal or actual distinction in person. This difference is an eternal difference, for the Godhead is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit eternally. Never was there any adoption of the Son as Son by the Father, and the relationship is in no senses figurative.

The three-in-one and one-in-three relationship is quite consistent with the doctrine of the fundamental separateness of God from the World, of Creator from creation. It allows the

4. "As therefore, the Father begat, the Son is begotten; so the Father sent, the Son was sent. But in like manner as He who begat and He who was begotten, so both He who sent and He who was sent, are one, since the Father and the Son are one. So also the Holy Spirit is one with them, since these three are one. For as to be born, in respect to the Son, means to be from the Father; so to be sent, in respect to the Son, means to be known to be from the Father. And as to be the gift of God in respect to the Holy Spirit, means to proceed from the Father; so to be sent, is to be known to proceed from the Father. Neither can we say that the Holy Spirit does not also proceed from the Son, for the same Spirit is not without reason said to be the Spirit both of the Father and of the Son....For the Spirit of God is one, the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, the Holy Spirit, who worketh all in all (I. Cor. xii.6)." De Trinitate, IV, xx, 29. Translation. Ibid. p. 84.

"For the Spirit came forth, not as born, but as given; and so He is not called a son, because He was neither born, as the Only-begotten, nor made so the by the grace of God He might be born into adoption, as we are. For that which is born of the Father, is referred to the Father only when called Son, and so the Son is the Son of the Father, and not also our Son; but that which is given is referred both to Him who gave, and to those to whom He gave; and so the Holy Spirit is not only the Spirit of the Father and of the Son who gave Him, but He is also called ours, who have received Him De Trinitate, V, xiv, 15. Translation, Ibid., p. 94."
possibility of God to have self-existence as a personality for the three persons may form their own community. Will, understanding, and love could not exist within themselves in utter isolation. Understanding, for example, must be of another object or relationship. In order for God to be adequate within himself and at the same time of the order of personality, he must possess a community within his one essence. Augustine suggests that this is what Paul means by "the fullness of Godhead" (Coloss. i.9).

The personality of God is established not by logic or reason but by revelation. Starting with the revelation that man is in the image of God, he deduces the conclusion that God must be perfectly what man in his highest state is imperfectly, namely, a self-conscious mind or will, capable of memory, understanding, and love. It is the very distinction of persons or substances within the Godhead that makes the personality of the one essence possible, as has been suggested. To be personal is to be self-conscious and to enter into knowledge about the nature of the self and of other objects in relation. Communion, for example, must be between person, between item which exist in distinction from one another. The multiplicity of God within his own unity allows him to distinguish himself from himself and hence to enter into all the relationships necessary in personality.

5. This is his basic line of argument in De Trinitate.
That God is love is also established by Revelation. That God is a will can be easily established from the principles of Greek philosophy. Plato also argued that God should be conceived of as love on the grounds that anything possessing the completeness of God without the quality of love must be considered of the order of a devil, granting that once will be added to the order, unless that will be a good will. The scriptures tell of the love of God and explain that love is from God, and this witness of the scriptures is made effective in human experience by the work of the Holy Spirit. Augustine strongly insists that the fact that God is love is from logic or from the experience of Nature. It does come, however, from the nature of experience for revelation itself occurs within experience as also does direct knowledge of God. Augustine attempted to interpret the

6. "Therefore, if Holy Scripture proclaims that God is love, and that love is of God, and works this in us that we abide in God and He in us, and that hereby we know this, because He has given us of His Spirit, then the Spirit Himself is God, who is love. Next, if there be among the gifts of God none greater than love, and there is no greater gift of God than the Holy Spirit, what follows more naturally than that He is Himself love, who is called both God and of God? And if the love by which the Father loves the Son, and the Son loves the Father, ineffably demonstrates the communion of both, what is more suitable than that He should be specially called love, who is the spirit common to both? For this is the sounder thing both to believe and to understand, that the Holy Spirit is not alone love in that Trinity, yet is not specially called love to no purpose, for the reasons we have alleged; just as He is not alone in that Trinity and both the Father is holy, and the Son is holy,—as piety doubts not. And yet it is not to no purpose that he is specially called the Holy Spirit; for because He is common to both, He is specially called that which both are in common. (cont. on the next page)
justice of God, so strongly emphasized in the Old Testament, in terms of the actual love of God, according to the revelation of the New Testament. He writes:

"...the end of every commandment is charity...every commandment has love for its aim. (I. Tim. i. 5)"

Man learns that God is love only through the Church, the Gospel, and the Scriptures. Usually when Augustine speaks of the love of God, he speaks poetically rather than deductively or analytically. Yet, he usually incorporates a subjective philosophical meaning.

---

"Inchoate love, therefore is inchoate holiness; advanced love is advanced holiness; great love is great holiness; "perfect love is perfect holiness,"--but this "love is out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and of faith unfeigned," (I. Tim. i. 5) which is this life is then the greatest, when life itself is contented in comparison with it. (apparently cited from Pelagius) I wonder, however, whether it has not a soil in which to grow after it has quit this mortal life! But in what place and at what time soever it shall reach that state of absolute perfection, which shall admit of no increase, it is certainly not "shed abroad in our hearts" by any energies either of the nature or the volition that are within us, but by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us, (Rom. v. 5) and which both helps our infirmity and co-operates with our strength. For it is itself indeed the grace of God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, to whom, with the Father and the Holy Spirit, appertaineth eternity, and all goodness, for ever and ever..." De natura et gratia, LXX. Translation by Peter Holmes and Robert E. Wallis, in Nicene Fathers, op. cit. p. 151. vol. V.

"'What I say, 'is man,' a creature going astray from the Creator, (cont. on the next page)
The love of God is most significantly demonstrated in the fact of the Incarnation and Atonement. That God's love is attested to by the fact that he saves. Christ, as Mediator, was love in his mediatorial function. God's love is shown by his provision of a way of Atonement. Perhaps it is the case that Augustine puts more emphasis upon the love of God than he does upon Christ and the work of Christ because he sees Christ and the Atonement as but an example of that which is greater even than the Atonement; namely, the love of the Father, the ultimate source of the Atonement. The personality of God is broader than the person of Christ and the meaning of God is more than the meaning of Christ. As crucial and cataclysmic as was the Atonement, it is the message and meaning of God as love behind the fact of the Atonement that is to be emphasized. In a sentence Augustine seems to be saying that the meaning of Christ involves the concept that the power behind the universe is steady, kind, and affectionate—even intimate—in meeting the deep needs of the human spirit.

The personal character of God is not only in Christ Incarnate, but continues ever active within human experience through the

---

cont.

unless his Creator 'be mindful of him,' (Ps. viii. 4) and choose him freely, and love him freely? Because he is himself not able to choose or love, unless being first chosen and loved he be healed, because by choosing blindness he perceived not, and by loving laziness he perceived not, and by loving laziness is soon wearied... In good men it is the love of God which (cont. on next page)
Holy Spirit.

Although Augustine does not give man the same prominence within the system of the universe as do most later Greek philosophers, he does consider man an object of worth both in body and in soul. Augustine counteracts the possibility of idolatry by insisting that man is not the ultimate center or item of worth within our world as we know it, and that there are items and issues within the world more important and more valuable than man. The worth of man lies in the fact that he was created good—both in body and soul. However, the unique worth of man lies in the fact that he is a soul; and in the fact that he, in his soul, is in the image of God. As a spiritual being, man's worth exceeds everything else that was created, with exception of angels. Because man is inherently worthy, he is to be loved. Such love does not mean the acceptance of every aspect of any man, but rather love for the order of mankind as an order.9

---

9. "Now he is a man of just and holy life who forms an unprejudiced estimate of things, and keeps his affections also under strict control, so that he neither loves what he ought not to love, nor fails to love what he ought to be loved less, nor loves that equally which ought to be loved either less or more, nor loves that less or more which ought to be love equally. No sinner is to be loved as a sinner; (cont. on next page)
Augustine suggests that all "things" may be divided into three classes: (a) things to be enjoyed, (b) things to be used, and (c) things which use and enjoy. God alone is to be enjoyed. Never is he to be used. It is quite proper to use man, however, but not to enjoy man. Such use that is made of man must be consistent with the fact that he is a spiritual being. There must be no disrespect to his existence as a will, and he must be respected as a soul. This fact not withstanding, there is nothing inherently wrong with man's use of man so long as his inherent nature is not offended. Man cannot be enjoyed as an end in himself because all enjoyment is, in the final analysis, enjoyment of God. That which is seen to be of value in man exists only by virtue of the image of God within him. In the case of God, however, God both uses and enjoys—he uses man and enjoys himself. Man's situation is reversed: he uses himself and his
Augustine's idea of man is actually rooted in his doctrine concerning the love of God. If man is in the image of God, he may be considered of such inherent value that he should be regarded as a worthy object of love. The very capacity to love man is itself an outgrowth of the love of God made effective within experience. Man is converted by the experience of the love of God into a new man: he is endowed with a new appreciation of the human order in general as a value object worthy of love. Love for mankind finally leads to a new appreciation of one's self, of one's neighbor, and of the nature of selfhood in

10. "Among all these things, then, those only are the true objects of enjoyment which we have spoken of as eternal and unchangeable. The rest are for use, that we may be able to arrive at the full enjoyment of the former. We, however, who enjoy and use other things are things ourselves. For a great thing truly is man, made after the image and similitude of God, not as respects the mortal body in which he is clothed, but as respects the rational soul by which he is exalted in honor above the beasts. And so it becomes an important question, whether men ought to enjoy, or to use, themselves, or to do both. For we are commanded to love one another; but it is a question whether man is to be loved by man for his own sake, or for the sake of something else. If it is for his own sake, we enjoy him; if it is for the sake of something else, we use him. It seems to me, then, that he is to be loved for the sake of something else. For if a thing is to be loved for its own sake, then in the enjoyment of it consists a happy life, the hope of which at least, if not yet the reality, is our comfort in the present time. But a curse is pronounced on him who places his hope in man (Jer.xvii.5). Neither ought any one to have joy in himself, if you look at the matter clearly, because no one ought to love even himself for his own sake, but for the sake of Him who is the true object of enjoyment. For a man is never in so good a state as when his whole life is a journey towards the unchangeable life, and his affections are entirely fixed upon that. If, however, he loves himself for his own sake, he does not look at himself in relation to God, but turns his mind in upon himself, and so is not occupied with anything that is unchangeable." De Doctrina Christiana, iv libri, I, xxii, 20, 21. Translation, Ibid, p. 527.
Augustine teaches that Revelation indicates, via the Scriptures, that both parts of man are legitimate value objects worthy of love. The body is inherently good, just as is the soul, because the body was created good. Only a perversion of its created nature (sin) can cause either body or soul to lose their "goodness." Such perversions are more likely to come from the nature and influence of the soul than they are from the natural order of the body.

Perhaps the most significant fact about man, from Augustine's point of view, is the fact that he is a will. God is conceived of in terms of will as a pure spirit. Man, being in the image of
God to the extent of exemplifying something of God's spiritual nature incorporates in his soul order God's gift of will. Man's rationality, being directly a result of his being a soul, grants him the capacity of being a will. Metaphysically, Augustine argues for the case of the nature of the Trinity from the nature of man as memory, understanding, and will. Religiously, Augustine proclaims that man possesses will by virtue of the revelation of his being in the image of God.

Man's free will makes him a responsible being. To some

12. "There is, to begin with, the fact that God's precepts themselves would be of no use to a man unless he had free choice of will, so that by performing them he might obtain the promised rewards. For they are given that no one might be able to plead the excuse of ignorance, as the Lord says concerning the Jews in the gospel: 'If I had not come and spoken unto them, they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin.' (John xv, 22). De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, 2. Translation by Holmes and Wallis, Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol., p. 444.

"What is the import of the fact that in so many passages God requires all His commandments to be kept and fulfilled? How does He make this requisition, if there is no free will...? Now wherever it is said, "do not do this! and 'Do not do that,' and wherever there is any requirement in the divine admonitions for the work of the will to do anything, or to refrain from doing anything, there is at once a sufficient proof of free will. No man, therefore, when he sins, can in his heart blame God for it, but every man must impute the fault to himself. Nor does it detract at all from a man's own will when he performs any act in accordance with God. Indeed, a work is then to be pronounced a good one when a person does it willingly; then, too, the reward of a good work be hoped for from Him concerning whom it is written, 'He shall reward every man according to his works.' (Markxvi.27) Ibid, p. 444-445.

"Now it was expedient that man should be at first so created, as to have it in his power both to will what was right and to will what was wrong;

(continuation on next page)
extent man is more responsible than the angels and freer than the angels, for he more typically operates as a will than do angels, even though, they, also, possess a will. Angels, being so closely connected with that which is changeless, mirror or absorb something of the changeless quality of God. Hence, they rarely ever use their freedom. Men, being further from God, are more likely to misuse their freedom.

Granting free will, Augustine still believes that more than free will is necessary in religion. Free will can make man responsible before God for his actions but the mere situation of free will, in itself, does not afford the extra support and encouragement that man needs in order to choose the way he knows that he should choose. Here it is that grace is important in religion. It is an aid to man, an extra contribution of God

Cont.

not without reward if he will the former, and not without punishment if he willed the latter. But in the future life it shall not be in his power to will evil; and yet this will constitute no restriction on the freedom of his will. On the contrary, his will shall be much freer when it shall be wholly impossible for him to be the slave of sin." Enchiridion, 105 Translation, by Shaw in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., III, p. 271.

13. "...That there may be an evil will even without any spirit either seducing or inciting, is sufficiently clear in the instance of the devil himself, who is found to have become a devil, not through some other devil, but of his own proper will." De Patientia, 21. Translation by H. Brown, in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., III, p. 534.
to man as a means of encouragement in leading a moral life.\(^{14}\)
The entrance of grace into religion makes guilt for sin even worse than before man realizes God's grace, for in the latter instance sin is also a rebellion against love. Men who sin in the face of grace are greater sinners than men who sin without grace under the law alone.

Augustine is quite convinced that man is a sinner. He is a sinner in two senses, one of which he cannot help, the other as a result of his own deliberate action. He is a sinner by virtue of the original sin in Adam, the ancient "fall" or entrance into depravity of the human order, and by virtue of his rejection of love and grace. Original sin is to be interpreted as an

\(^{14}\) What, indeed, affords clearer evidence of the grace of God than the acceptance of prayer in any petition. If our Saviour had only said, "Watch that ye enter not into temptation," He would appear to have done nothing further than admonish man's will; but since He added the words, "and pray," He showed that God helps us not to enter into temptation. It is to the free will of man that the words are addressed: "My son, remove not thyself from the chastening of the Lord." (Prov. iii. 11). And the Lord said: "I have prayed for thee, Peter, that thy faith fail not," (Luke xxii. 32). So that a man is assisted by grace in order that his will may not be uselessly commanded. De gratia et libero arbitrio, 3, 5, 9. Translation by Nicene Father, op. cit., Vol. V, pp. 444, 445, 447.
imperfection in the order, a flaw, blemish, or affliction of the nature of man. 15 It is transmitted by physical generation. Associated with it are shame and sexual lust (concupiscence). 16

15. "Man's nature, indeed, was created at first faultless and without any sin; but that nature of man in which every one is born from Adam, now wants the Physician, because it is not sound. All good qualities, no doubt which it still possesses in its make, life, senses, intellect, it has of the Most High God, its Creator and maker. But the flaw, which darkens and weakens all those natural goods, so that it has need of illumination and healing, it has not contracted from its blameless Creator—but from that original sin, which is committed by free will." De natura et gratia, III, Translation in Nicene Fathers, op. cit. Vol. V, pp. 122.

"From the moment... when one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, in whom all sinned, (Rom.v.12) the entire mass of our nature was ruined beyond doubt, and fell into the possession of its destroyer." De peccato originali, contra pelagium, 34(xxix). Translation by Peter Holmes and Robert E. Wallis, in Nicene Fathers, op. cit. Vol. V, p. 249.

16. "He ((Pelagius))... makes one and the same root productive both of good and evil fruit, in opposition to gospel truth and apostolic teaching. For the Lord declares that 'a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit.' (Matt. vii.18) and when the Apostle Paul says that covetousness is 'the root of all evils, ' (I. Tim. vi. 10) he intimates to us, of course, that love may be regarded as the root of all good things. On the supposition, therefore, that two trees, one good and the other corrupt, represent two human beings, a good one and a bad, what else is the good man except one with a good will, that is, a tree with a good root? And what is the bad man except one with a bad will, that is, a tree with a bad root? The fruits which springs from such roots and trees are deeds, are words, are thoughts, which proceed, when good, from a good will, and when evil, from an evil one,... The 'capacity', then, of which we speak is not the one identical root both of good things and evil. For the love which is the root of good things is quite different from the cupiditas which is the root of evil things—as different, indeed, as virtue is from vice. But without doubt this 'capacity' is capable of either root; because a man is not only able to possess love, whereby the tree becomes a good one; but he is likewise able to have cupiditas, which makes the tree evil. This human cupiditas, however, which is a vice, has for its author man, or man's deceiver, but not man's Creator. It is indeed that 'lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, which is not of the Father, but is of the world.' (I John ii.16) De Gratia Christi, 19,21. Translation by Peter Holmes and Robert E. Wallis, in Nicene Fathers, op.cit. Vol. V, p.224, 225.
Every individual is under sin because of the concurrence by which he is propagated. Human nature, even though created perfect, has been changed by the Fall and goes the way of self-will, toil, and death. Baptism is necessary to the cleansing of all men from this original sin.

17. "Where God did nothing else than by a just sentence to condemn the man who willfully sins, together with his stock; there also, as a matter of course, whatsoever was even not yet born is justly condemned in its sinful root. In this condemn stock carnal generation holds every man; and from it nothing but spiritual regeneration liberates him... The fault of our nature remains in our offspring so deeply impressed as to make it guilty, even when the guilt of the self-same fault has been washed away in the parent by the remission of sins—until every defect which ends in sin by the consent of the human will is consumed and done away in the last regeneration... Infants, although incapable of sinning, are yet not born without the contagion of sin,—not, indeed, because of what is lawful, but on account of that which is unseemly: for from what is lawful nature is born; for what is unseemly, sin. Of the nature so born, God is the Author, who created man, and who united male and female under the nuptial law; but of the sin the author is subtly of the devil who deceives, and the will of the man who consents... The guilt, therefore, of that corruption of which we are speaking will remain in the carnal offspring of the regenerate, until in them also it be washed away in the laver((bath)) of regeneration. A regenerate man does not regenerate, but generates, sins according to the flesh; and thus he transmits to this posterity, not the condition of the regenerated, but only of the generated.... The very sacraments, I say, of the hold Church show plainly enough that infants, even when fresh from the womb, are delivered from the bondage of the devil through the grace of Christ...." De peccato originali, contra Pelagium. 43, 44, 42, 45(xxvii, xxxix, xxxvii, xl). Translation by Holms and Wallis in Nicene Fathers, op.cit., Vol.V. p.253-4)

Augustine considered sexual intercourse, except for the direct purpose of propagation, an evil, calling sexual desire a 'disease.' In the Soliloquies he wrote: "I perceive that nothing more says the citadel of manly strength, whether of mind or body, than female blandishments and familiarities. Therefore, if (which I have not yet discovered) it appertains to the office of a wise man to desire offspring, whoever for this reason only comes into this connection, may appear to me worthy of admiration, but in no wise a model for imitation: for there is more peril in the essay, than felicity in the (cont. on the next page)
Augustine further distinguished between "original sin" and "actual sin." Free will alone, although it applies in the case of Adam, or mankind-in-general, does not account entirely for man's guilt as an individual. In the strictest sense, the infant is not a sinner, but still is guilty of sin; for actual sin is always a result of an act of will. Actual sin is always the result of a free choice. Sin is not the result of a mere natural functioning of the body; it is by definition an act of will. Even original sin is an original act of will, the guilt of which is transmitted to the individual apart from his will in individual instances. Human individuals are under the guilt of original sin by virtue of their being sons of an order which exercised an act of will in "falling" from the perfection of the created state and by virtue of the guilt which the specific individual accumulates by having been sexually generated. Human individuals are under the guilt of actual sin by virtue of a rebellion against the expressed love of God—the free choice of a lower good in the place of a higher one. One of the examples

Cont.


He defended the polygamy of the Old Testament on the grounds that it allowed greater continence for the wives. De nuptiis et concupiscentia, 10. 18. "gain, in the clause which follows, "In which all have sinned, (cont.on next page)
of our "damaged" human nature as a result of original sin is our defective will. To counterbalance this defect of will in us there is the impact of the grace of God in Christ.

Punishment for sin occurs both in this life and in the future life. God does not directly take the initiative in administering punishment for our sin. Instead, he allows our sins to punish us. The tragic result of the consequence of a lower value when there is a higher value possible is itself a punishment. Since it is the soul (human soul) that sins, it is the soul that will be rewarded and punished, both now and in the future, everlasting. Heaven is the place near God where the human soul shall be rewarded at a future time for its earthly righteousness, sacrifice, and love. Heaven is of the order of the spirit or soul, a creation, made the first day. It is somewhat material, but in a minor way, as its spirit nature overshadows its existence as a body. Since this is the case, the location of heaven in space is of minor importance. We must be satisfied with the rather loose conclusion that it is not of the order of this world,

---

(Rom.v.12) how cautiously, right, and unabiguously is the statement expressed! For if you understand that sin to be meant which by one man entered into the world, 'in which (sin) all have sinned,' it is surely clear enough, that the sins which are peculiar to every man, which they (cont. on next page)
and is located near to God. 19 The Kingdom of God on earth, which is the Church, is a part of heaven; heaven on earth. Heaven is the final place of rest, reward, and happiness—the everlasting abode—of the true sons of God; a prepared

cont.
themselves commit and which belong simply to them, mean one thing; and that the one sin, in and by which belong simply to them, mean one thing; since all were that one man..." De pecatorum meritis et remissione, I, II, (x). Translation by Peter Holmes and Robert E. Wallis, in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol. V. p. 19.

19. "We behold so great an interval between heaven and earth, there is so wide a separation, and so great a space of regions between: we wish to climb thither, we see no ladder; do we deceive ourselves, because we sing the Song of Degrees, that is, the Song of ascent? We ascend unto heaven, if we think of God, who hath made ascending steps in the heart. Was is to ascend in heart? To advance towards God.... If...we understand by heaven the firmament which we see with our bodily eyes, we shall indeed so err, as to image that we cannot ascend thither without ladders, or some scaling machines: but if we ascend spiritually, we ought to understand heaven spiritually: if the ascent be in affection, heaven is in righteousness. What is then the heaven of God? All holy souls, all righteous souls. For the Apostles also, although they were on earth in the flesh, were heaven; for the Lord, enthroned in them traversed the whole world. He then dwelleth in heaven. How? ...How long are they the temple according to faith? As long as Christ dwelleth in them through faith; as the Apostle saith, 'ThaQ Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith.' But they are already heaven in whom God already dwelleth visibly, who see Him face to face; all the holy Apostles, all the holy Virtues, Powers, Thrones, Lordships that heavenly Jerusalem, wanderers from whence we groan, and for which we pray with longings and there God dwelleth. Thither hath the Psalmist lifted up his faith, thither he riseth in affection with longing hopes: and this very longing causeth the soul to purge off the filth of sins, and to be cleansed from every stain, that itself also may become heaven; because it hath lifted up its eyes unto Him who dwelleth in heaven. For if we have determined that that heaven which we see with our bodily eyes is the dwelling of God, the dwelling of God will pass away; for 'heaven and earth will pass away.' (Matt. xxxiv.35) Then before God created heaven and earth, where did He dwell? But some one saith: and before God made the Saints, where did He dwell? God dwelt in Himself, he dwelt with Himself, and God is with Himself...." Emnrationes in psalmos, CIII (Lat. CXII), 2, 3. Translation by Cleveland Coxe, in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 596.
place for prepared people. Humans do not enter into the fullness of heaven until the morning of the resurrection when the souls of the faithful will again be united with bodies; namely, bodies that are spiritual bodies. The souls of the true sons rest in "Paradise" (the bosom of Abraham) from the time of death until the day of the Resurrection.

20. "...The souls of departed saints are not affected by the death which dismisses them from their bodies, because their flesh rests in hope, no matter what indigities it receives after sensation is gone. For they do not desire that their bodies be forgotten, as Plato thinks fit, but rather because they remember what has been promised by Him who deceives no men, and who gave them security for the safe keeping even of the hairs of their head, they with a longing patience wait in hope of the resurrection of their bodies, in which they have suffered many hardships, and are now to suffer never again.... The bodies of the righteous, then, such as they shall be in the resurrection, shall need neither any fruit to preserve them from dying of disease or the wasting decay of old age, nor any other physical nourishment to allay their cravings of hunger or of thirst; for they shall be invested with so sure and every way inviolable an immortality, that they shall not eat save when they choose, nor be under the necessity of eating, while they enjoy the power of doing so.... And so they will be spiritual, not because they shall cease to be bodies, but because they shall subsist by the quickening spirit.... For as those bodies of ours, that have a living soul, though not as yet a quickening spirit, are called soul-informed bodies, and yet are not souls but bodies, so also those bodies are called spiritual, yet God forbid we should therefore suppose them to be spirits and not bodies,—which, being quickened by the Spirit, have the substance, but not the unwieldiness and corruption of flesh. Man will then be not earthly but heavenly, —not because the body will not be that very body which was made of earth, but because by its heavenly endowment it will be a fit inhabitant of heaven, and this not by losing its nature, but by changing its quality...." De Civitate Dei, xii, 20, 22, 23. Translation, Ibid., pp. 255-257.

"But I suppose every one must see it is to be absurd to imagine that only two, namely, Abraham and Lazarus, were in that bosom of wondrous repose before the Lord descended into hell, and that with reference to these two alone it was said to the rich man, 'Between us and you there is a great gulf fixed, so that they which would pass from hence to you cannot, neither (continued on next page)
Hell is to be distinguished from "Hades." Hell is a place of everlasting punishment for sin, a place prepared for the unprepared—a state or condition in which both

can they pass to us that would pass from from thence." (Luke xvi.26)

...What benefit was conferred in that case on them by Him who loosed the pains of hell, in which they were not hold, I do not yet understand, especially as I have not been able to find anywhere in Scripture the name of hell used in a good sense. And if this use of the term is nowhere found in the divine Scriptures, assuredly the bosom of Abraham, that is, the abode of a certain secluded rest, is not to be believed to be a part of hell. Nay, from these words themselves of the great Master, in which He says that Abraham said, 'Between us and you there is a great gulf fixed,' it is, as I think, sufficiently evident that the bosom of that glorious felicity was not any integral part of hell... Therefore, if sacred Scripture had said, without naming hell and its pains, that Christ when He died went to that bosom of Abraham, I wonder if any one would have dared to say that He 'descended into hell.' But seeing that plain scriptural testimonies make mention of hell and its pains, no reason can be alleged for believing that He who is the Saviour went thither, except that He might save all whom He found held in them, or some whom He judged worthy of that favour, I still ask: that He was, however, in hell, and that He conferred this benefit on persons subjected to these pains, I do not doubt.... On that very day on which He died, He promised that the thief should be with Him in paradise at the time when He was about to descend to loose the pains of hell. Most certainly, therefore. He was, before that time, both in paradise and the bosom of Abraham in His beatific wisdom, and in hell in His condemning power; for since the Godhead is confined by no limits, where is He not present? At the same time, however, so far as regarded the created nature, in assuming which at a certain point of time, He, while continuing to be God, became man—that is to say, so far as regarded His soul, He was in hell: this is plainly declared in these words of Scripture, which were both sent before in prophecy and fully expounded by apostolical interpretation: 'Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell.' (Ps.xvi.10) [Epist. Epistolae, CLXIV, ii, 5; ii, 6, 7, 8. Translated by J. G. Cunningham, in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol. I., pp. 516-517.]
Body and soul are tortured. Hades is comparable to Paradise, being the place of punishment where the damned remain until the day of judgment. Neither Paradise nor Hades are themselves Heaven or Hell, being places where human souls remain on deposit until a future union with bodies at the time of the Resurrection. Augustine believes in a literal hell, physical, and eternal, with a material fire in which both the souls and bodies of men and devils (if devils have bodies) are burned as a punishment for sin.

21: "So then what God by His prophet has said of the everlasting punishment of the damned shall come to pass—'their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched.' In order to impress this upon us most forcibly, the Lord Jesus Himself... did not shrink from using the same words three times over in one passage (Mark ix.43-48). Now they who would refer both the fire and the worm to the spirit... affirm that the wicked... shall be burned by the anguish of... spirit: But they who make no doubt that in that future punishment both body and soul shall suffer, affirm that the body shall be burned with fire while the soul shall be, as it were, gnawed by a worm of anguish. Though this view is more reasonable,—for it is absurd to suppose that either body or soul will escape pain in the future punishment,—yet, for my own part, I find it easier to understand both as referring to the body than to suppose that neither does; and I think that Scripture is silent regarding the spiritual pain of the damned, because though not expressed, it is necessarily understood that in a body thus tortured the soul also is tortured with a fruitless repentance.... Here arises the question: if the fire is not to be immaterial, analogous to the pain of the soul, but material, burning by contact, so that bodies may be tormented in it, how can evil spirits be punished in it? For it is undoubtedly the same fire which is to serve for the punishment of men and of devils...(Matt. xxv.41) unless, perhaps,... the devils have a kind of body made of that dense and humid air which we feel strikes us when the wind is blowing.... But if any one maintains that the devils have no bodies, this is not a matter either to be laboriously investigated, or to be debated with keenness. For why may we not assert that even immaterial spirits may, in some extraordinary way, yet really be pained by the punishment of material fire, if (continued on next page)
Augustine's ideas of life and death are related in a qualitative way to his ideas of heaven and hell. To enter into the fullness of life is to participate in the kingdom of heaven on earth, the church; that is, it is to share in the redemption of Christ which the church channels. To be apart from the heavenly order is to be dead, cut off from

the spirits of men, which also are certainly immaterial, are both now contained in material members of the body, and in the world to come shall be indissolubly united to their own bodies...? I would indeed say that these spirits will burn without any body of their own as that rich man was burning in hell when he exclaimed, 'I am tormented in this flame,' (Luke xvi.24) were I not aware that it is aptly said in reply that that flame was of the same nature as the eyes he raised and fixed on Lazarus, as the tongue on which he entreated that a little cooling water might be dropped, or as the finger of Lazarus, with which he asked that this might be done,—all of which took place where souls exist without bodies. Thus, therefore, both the flame in which he burned and that drop he begged were immaterial, and resembled the visions of sleepers or persons in an ecstasy, to whom immaterial objects appear in a bodily form. For the man himself who is in such a state, though it be in spirit only, not in body, yet sees himself so like to his own body that he cannot discern any difference whatever. But that hell, which also is called a lake of fire and brimstone (Rev.xx.10) will be material fire, and will torment the bodies of the damned, whether men or devils, the solid bodies of the one, aerial bodies of the others; or if only men have bodies as well as souls, yet the evil spirits, though without bodies, shall be so connected with the bodily fires as to receive pain without imparting life. One fire certainly shall be the lot of both, for thus the truth has declared... But eternal punishment seems hard and unjust to human perceptions, because in the weakness of our mortal condition there is wanting that highest and purest wisdom by which it can be perceived how great a wickedness was committed in that first transgression. The more enjoyment man found in God, the greater was his wickedness in abandoning Him; and when he destroyed in himself a good which might have been eternal, he became worthy of eternal evil..." De Civitate Dei, XXI, 9, 10, 12, Translation, Ibid., pp. 460-463.
that which is of genuine worth and satisfaction. Death is a direct product of sin (rejection of God). Without sin there would never have been any death, for man would have continued in direct association with the heavenly order.

Life, in a more technical sense, is more directly related to the idea of light. To be alive is to embody spiritual qualities to some degree: some mental activity, some self-movement, some registration or expression of wisdom. The degree of life possessed by a thing is determined by the sort of light in which it participates. Plants share in light but not in the same manner or degree as do animals and men, the latter two having a more direct and immediate connection with wisdom through the capacities of their souls. Life is directly dependent upon the Logos in Creation, for Creation occurred when Eternal Wisdom came into expressive movement. Life was produced first when light was first separated from darkness, when the void became illuminated by the spiritual quality of deity—the beginning of the first day. To be alive is to share in the qualities possessed in party by human souls, angels, and in their ultimate degrees by God. Life, whenever and wherever it occurs, is an expression, at least to some degree, of the order
Death is the opposite of Life. Whereas life is that which results from close connection with the Logos, death is that which results from separation from the Logos. Human and animal bodies die when they become separated from the souls through which they subsist. The death of human bodies is a direct result of the fall of man and the sin of Adam. Sin always causes death, and all death is a product of sin. Death comes from "darkness," and the Devil (fallen spiritual

22. "But what Thou saidst in the beginning of the creation, 'Let there be light, and there was light,' (Gen. 1:2) I do not unfitly understand of the spiritual creature; because there was even then a kind of life, which Thou mightest illuminate. But as it had not deserved of Thee that it should be such a life as could be enlightened, so neither when it already was, hath it deserved of Thee that it should be enlightened. For neither could its formlessness be pleasing unto Thee, unless it became light,—not by merely existing, but by beholding the illuminating light, and cleaving unto it; so also, that it lives, and lives happily...." Confessionum, libri tredecim, XIII, iii, 4. Translation by Pilkington, in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol. I., p. 191.

"...They live rather in Him than under the sun who do not heedlessly hear what the Apostle saith: 'Seek the things that are above, where Christ is sitting at the right hand of God. Mind the things that are above, not the things that are upon the earth. For you are dead: and your life is hid with Christ in God' (Col. iii, 1-3). There, if our life is there where Truth is, our life is not under the sun, where is vanity...." Emnarationes in Psalmos, CXVIII, Sermon xiii, 1. Translation, Ibid. p.205.

"The life of beasts is excited with earthly pleasure, seeks earthly pleasures alone, and grovels after them with immoderate desire; the life of angels is alone heavenly; the life of man is midway between that of angels and of beasts. If man lives after the flesh, he is on a level with the beasts; if he lives after the Spirit, he joins in the fellowship of angels...." In Joanis Evangelium tractatus, XVIII, 7. Translation by John Gibb, and James Innes, in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol. VII, p. 120.
being) is the ultimate source of it, having inspired man to rebellion by means of his superior intelligence. One of the tragedies of the situation of death lies in the fact that the soul desires to be related to a body. Death is the simple dissolution of soul from body, not the deterioration of the soul. 23

23. "And neither the first death, which takes place when the soul is compelled to leave the body, nor the second death, which takes place when the soul is not permitted to leave the suffering body, would have been inflicted on man had no one sinned...." Enchiridion, XCI, 93. Translation by J. F. Shaw in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol.III, p. 267.

"Although the human soul is truly affirmed to be immortal, yet it also has a certain death of its own. For it is therefore called immortal, because, in a sense, it does not cease to live and to feel; while the body is called mortal, because it can be forsaken of all life, and cannot by itself live at all. The death, then of the soul takes place when God forsakes it, as the death of the body when the soul forsakes it. Therefore the death of both—that is, of the whole man—occurs when the soul, forsaken by God, forsakes the body. For, in this case, neither is God the life of the soul, nor the soul the life of the body. And this death of the whole man is followed by that which, on the authority of the divine oracles, we call the second death. This the Saviour referred to when He said, 'Fear Him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell.' (Matt. x. 28) Therefore we must say that if the first men were indeed so created, that if they had not sinned, they would not have experienced any kind of death; but that, having become sinners, they were so punished with death, that whatsoever sprang from their stock should also be punished with the same death. For nothing else could be born of them than that which they themselves had been. Their nature was deteriorated in proportion to the greatness of the condemnation of their sin, so that what existed as punishment in those who first sinned, became a natural consequence in their children.... For neither by sin or its punishment was he himself ((Adam)) reduced to that infantile and helpless infirmity of body and mind which we see in children. For God ordained that infants should begin the world as the young of beasts begin it, since their parents had fallen to the level of beasts in the fashion of their life and of their death; as it is written, 'Man when he was in honor understood not; he became like the beasts that have no understanding.' (Ps.xlix.12)

...Wherefore, as regards bodily death, that is, the separation of the (continued on next page)
Augustine's philosophy of Salvation is also an outgrowth of the separation of the soul from the body. It is good while it is being endured by those whom we say are in the article of death. For the very violence with which body and soul are wrenched asunder, which in the living had been conjoined and closely intertwined, brings with it a harsh experience. 

...Death, proceeding by ordinary generation from the first man, is the punishment of all who are born of him, yet, if it be endured for righteousness sake, it becomes the glory of those who are born again..." De Civitate Dei, XIII, 2, 3, 6. Translation by Marcus Dods in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol. II. pp. 245-247.

"...Every man is afraid of the death the flesh; few, of the death of the soul. In regard to the death of the flesh, which must certainly come some time, all are on their guard against its approach; this is the source of all their labor. Man, destined to die, labors to avert his dying; and yet man, destined to live for ever, labors not to cease from sinning. And when he labors to avoid dying, he labors to no purpose, for its only result will be to put off death for a while, not to escape it; but if he refrain from sinning, his toil will cease, and he shall live for ever...." In Joannis Evangelium tractatus, XLIX, xi, 2. Translation by Gibb and Innes, in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol. VII., p. 270.

"Like sheep laid in hell, death is their shepherd" (Ps. xxxii. 14) ... Yea, death is either the separation of the soul from the body, or a separation of the soul from God, and that indeed which men fear is the separation of the soul from the body: but the real death, which men do not fear, is the separation of the soul from God. And oft times when men fear that which doth separate the soul from the body, they fall into that wherein the soul is separated from God. This then is death. But how is 'death their shepherd'? If Christ is life, the devil is death. But we read in many places in Scripture, how that Christ is life. But the devil is death, not because he is himself death, but because through him is death... They who belong to him have death to their shepherd: but we who think of future immortality, and not without reason do wear the sign of the Cross of Christ on the forhead, have no shepherd but life. Of unbelievers death is the shepherd, of believers life is the shepherd. If then in hell are the sheep, whose shepherd is death, in heaven are the sheep, whose shepherd is life. What then? Are we now in heaven? In heaven we are by faith. For if not in heaven, where is the 'Lift up your heart'? ...In body we walk on earth, in heart we dwell in heaven...." Emnarationes in Psalmos, XLIX, (Lat. XLVIII) Part II, 1. Translation by Coxe, in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol VIII. p. 174.
of his doctrine of God. God, not man, is the hero in the saga of human salvation. Salvation is from God, not from man. It is a gift of God, an act of God made possible by an event in history. It is a happening, the major part of which has already occurred and been completed in the past. It is not a present process or technique. Man does not make or produce Salvation; he merely shares in the Salvation that God has made man entirely on his own initiative. Man's only activity in Salvation is that of simple acquiescence.

Augustine's general doctrine of Salvation is made necessary by his doctrine of the Fall of man. Since man was created completely good and pronounced good in the beginning, it is quite obvious that something has happened to make him otherwise since that time. Augustine feels that there is little need to argue for the depravity of man, for the fact of man's depravity appears to be universally established. It is rather the case that he needs to appeal to Revelation in order to posit the fact of man's original complete goodness. As has already been suggested, Augustine did not believe in a literal Adam, but rather took the term to signify the whole order of human nature, particularized in the singular for purposes of graphic usage. Augustine, furthermore, is not specifically concerned about "when" man fell, or how long it took for him to fall, whether instantaneously or through
a lengthy process; but he is convinced that behind it all there is the free choice of man in deliberate rebellion against God, in the deliberate and intelligent choice of a lower good in the place of a higher one. This "Fall," whenever it happened, has left its mark on man. Man, as we now find him, is significantly "corrupted." In his current natural state (but not in his true natural state), he is immoral and guilty in his sins. 24

24. "...By them((Adam and Eve)) so great a sin was committed, that it the human nature was altered for the worse, and was transmitted also to their posterity, liable to sin and subject to death. And the kingdom of death so reigned over men, that the deserved penalty of sin would have hurled all headlong even into the second death, of which there is no end, had not the undeserved grace of God saved some there from..." De Civitate Dei, XIV.1. Translation, Potts, Nicene Fathers, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 262.

"But it is a fair question, whether our first parent or first parents..., before they sinned, experienced in their animal body such emotions as we shall not experience in the spiritual body when sin has been purged and finally abolished...Their love to God was unclouded, and their mutual affection was that of faithful and sincere marriage; and from this love flowed a wonderful delight, because they always enjoyed what was loved. Their avoidance of sin was tranquil; and, so long as it was maintained, no other ill at all could invade them and bring sorrow...As happy then, as were these our first parents, who were agitated by no mental perturbations; and annoyed by no bodily discomforts, so happy should the whole human race have been, had they not introduced that evil which they have transmitted to their posterity, and had none of their descendants committed iniquity worthy of damnation...Our first parents fell into open disobedience because already they were secretly corrupted; for the evil act had never been done had not an evil will preceded it. And what is the origin of our evil will but pride? For 'pride is the beginning of sin' (Ecclesiastes 10:9). And what is pride but the craving for undue exaltation? And this is undue exaltation, when the soul abandons Him to whom it ought to cleave as its end, and become a kind of end to itself..." De Civitate Dei, XIV, 10,13. Translation, Ibid, p. 273.
The answer to man's depravity is God's grace. Specifically, the answer lies in the Mediator who bridges the gap between man's guilt and God's justice. The Mediator is Saviour, Jesus Christ, who by incarnation communicates the fact of God's love to man. By being a worthy sacrifice, He pays man's just and unavoidable penalty for his crimes of rebellion. The Incarnation is necessary in order to effect

25. "...The highest Wisdom of God designed to assume this wound, by means of a wonderful and ineffable sacrament, when He took upon Himself man without sin, but not without the condition of sin. For He was willing to be humanly born, to suffer, and to die. None of these things was accomplished by our merit, but by this most excellent goodness,"...

"And hence that true Mediator, in so far as, by assuming the form of a servant, He became the Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus, though in the form of God He received sacrifice together with the Father, with whom He is one God, yet in the form of a servant He chose rather to be than to receive a sacrifice, that not even by this instance any one might have occasion to suppose that sacrifice should be rendered to any creature. Thus He is both the Priest who offers and the Sacrifice offered." De Civitate Dei, X. 20. Translation, Dods, in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 193.

"And so the human race was lying under a just condemnation, and all men were the children of wrath. Of which wrath it is written: 'All our days are passed away in Thy wrath; we spend our years as a tale that is told.' (Ps. ec. 9) Of which wrath also Job says: 'Man that is born of a woman is of few days, and full of trouble.' (Job. xiv. 1) Of which wrath also the Lord Jesus says: 'He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him.' (John iii. 36--really spoken by John the Baptist.) He does not say it will come, but it 'abideth on him.' For every man is born with it; wherefore the apostle says: 'We were by nature the children of wrath, even as others.' (Eph. 2:3) Now, as men were lying under this wrath by reason of their original sin, and as this original sin was the more heavy and deadly in proportion to the number and magnitude (cont. on the next page)
a complete revelation of Holy God to unholy man. The sacrifice was necessary to allow an adequate justification of the strained relation between man and God, that is, to bring man and God into harmony and direct communion of one accord of will---At-one-ment. 26 Again, it is the case, that this, another

cont.
of the actual sins which were added to it, there was need for a Mediator, that is, for a reconciler, who by the offering of one sacrifice, of which all the sacrifices of the law and the prophets were types, should take away this wrath. Therefore the apostle says: 'For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son, much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by His life.' (Rom.v. 10) Now when God is said to be angry, we do not attribute to Him such a displeasure against sin by the name 'anger,' a word transferred by analogy from human emotions. But our being reconciled to God through a Mediator, and receive the Holy Spirit, so that we who were enemies are mand sons... This is the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord.' Enchiridion, XXXII, 33, Translation Shaw, in Nicene Fathers, op. cit. Vol.III, p.248.

26. "The grace of God could not have been more graciously commended to us than thus, that the only Son of God, remaining unchangeable in Himself, should assume humanity, and should give us the hope of His love, by means of the mediation of a human nature, through which we, from the condition of men, might come to Him who was so far off,---the immortal, from the mortal; the unchangeable from the changeable; the just from the unjust; the blessed from the wretched..." De Civitate Dei, X, 28. Translation, Ibid, p. 199.

"....If, as...it must needs be that all men, so long as they are mortal, are also miserable, we must seek an intermediate who is not only man, but also God, that by the interposition of His blessed mortality, He may bring men out of their mortal misery to a blessed immortality...I do not say that He is Mediator because He is the Word, for as the word He is supremely blessed and supremely immortal, and therefore from miserable mortals; but He is Mediator as He is man, for by His humanity He shows us that, in order to obtain that blessed and beatific good, we need not seek other mediators to lead us through the successive steps of this attainment, but that the blessed and beatific God, having Himself become a partaker of (cont. on the next page)
phase of Augustine's theology can be resolved finally into his idea of the love of God. The very coming of a Mediator is but an example of the love of God for man. The fact of the Sacrifice, the Justification, and the Reconciliation are but manifestations of the order of a divine love which passes into man's order and redeems man's rebellious will, frames new value-objectives, and leads towards Sanctification and Everlasting life. The Mediator is the technical means of

cont.

our humanity, has afforded us ready access to the participation of His divinity....Therefore, when He chose to be in the form of a servant and lower than the angels, that He might be our Mediator, He remained higher than the angels, in the form of God,—Himself at once the way of life on earth and life itself in heaven." De Civitate Dei, IX, 15, Translation, Ibid., p. 174.

27. This is the universal way of the soul's deliverance, which the holy angels and the holy prophets formerly disclosed where they could among the few men who found the grace of God, and especially in the Hebrew nation... In some explicit statement, and in many obscure foreshadowings, this way was declared; but latterly came the Mediator Himself in the flesh, and His blessed apostles, revealing how the grave of the New Testament more openly explained what had been obscurely hinted to preceding generation, in conformity with the relation of the ages of the human face... This way purifies the whole man, and prepares the mortal in all his parts for immortality. For, to prevent us from seeking for one purgation for the part which Porphyry calls intellectual, and another for the part he calls spiritual, and another for the body itself, our most mighty and truthful Purifier and Saviour assumed the whole human nature. Except by the way, which has been present among men both during the period of the promises and of the proclamation of their fulfillment, no man has been delivered, no man is delivered, no man shall be delivered." De Civitate Dei, X, 32, Translation, Ibid., p. 202.

"It was therefore truly said that man is cleansed only by a Principle, although the Platonists erred in speaking in the plural of principles. But Porphyry, being under the dominion of these envious powers, (cont. on the next page)
man's Salvation. The love of God is its source.

By placing the main focus of attention upon the work done by the Mediator in human Salvation, Augustine removes the possibility of thinking of Salvation as a human accomplishment.

cont.

refused to recognize that Christ is the Principle by whose incarnation we are purified. Indeed he despised Him, because of the flesh itself which He assumed, that He offer a sacrifice for our purification,—a great mystery, unintelligible to Porphyry's pride, which that true and benignant Redeemer brought low by His humility, manifesting Himself to mortals by the mortality which He assumed,...Thus the good and true Mediator showed that it is sin which is evil, and not the substance or nature of the flesh; for this, together with the human soul, could without sin be both assumed and retained, and laid down in death, and changed to something better by resurrection. He showed also that death itself, although the punishment of sin, was submitted to by Him for our sakes without sin, and must not be evaded by sin on our part, but rather, if opportunity serves be borne for righteousness' sake. For he was able to expiate sins by dying, because He both died, and not for sin of His own....The Principle is neither the flesh nor the human soul in Christ, but the Word by which all things were made. The flesh, therefore, does not by its own virtue purify, but by virtue of the Word by which it was assumed, when the Word became flesh and dwelt among us.' (John 1:14) For speaking mystically of eating His flesh, when those who did not understand Him were offended and went away, saying, 'This is a hard saying, who can hear it?' He answered to the rest who remained, 'It is the Spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing.' (John vi. 6-64) The Principle, therefore, having assumed a human soul and flesh, cleanses the soul and flesh of believers. Therefore, when the Jews asked Him who He was, He answered that He was the Principle (or 'the beginning' John viii. 25) And this we carnal and feeble men, liable to sin, and involved in the darkness of ignorance, could not possibly understand, unless we were cleansed and healed by Him, both by means of what we were, and of what we were not. For we were men, but we were not righteous; whereas in His incarnation there was a human nature, but it was righteous and not sinful. This is the mediation whereby a hand is stretched to the lapsed and fallen; this is the seed 'ordained by angels,' by whose ministry the law also was given enjoining the worship of one God, and promising that this Mediator should come" De Civitate Dei X, 24. Translation, Ibid., p. 194.
The work of man in working out his own salvation is meager in comparison with that which has already been done. Furthermore, the way is clear and comparatively easy. No formula must be deduced and followed from process to process. God has already done all that needs to be done to make salvation possible. Man needs only to participate in that which has already been provided. Salvation is not to be thought of as man’s affair. It is entirely God’s affair.

These teachings are consistent with Augustine’s doctrines of predestination and election. God saves whom he wills to save, because he has already elected that it will be the plight of some to be lost and some to be saved. Yet, Augustine attempts to preserve the free choice of all individual souls by insisting that each individual soul does have freedom in its choice of the nature it is to assume in this life, and hence, in the next. Augustine does not negate free will by his doctrines of predestination and election. The latter are to be understood in the sense that God does allow some to be lost and some to be saved, and in his wisdom, knows how each individual soul will choose during the time of choice.

Salvation never occurs in any complete sense during earthly existence. It has been made possible in the past, and it begins in the present, but it does not come to its fullness until its fruition in heaven. There are degrees of
its realization on earth, however, in the sense that Sanctification is a genuine human possibility. Salvation, itself, is conceived of as a positive value—the addition of other higher values to existence—rather than as a negative one, namely, the removal of disagreeable factors from human existence... None of the negative elements of human existence are removed when Salvation occurs on the human scene. They exist as potently as ever, if not more so, along with the positive values acquired. Salvation on earth can be thought of only as a meager sort of Salvation in comparison with Salvation in heaven.

It is interesting that Augustine does not think of Salvation in heaven simply as "going to heaven," but as the unlimited and complete beatific vision of God: supreme joy, happiness, and satisfaction, both soul and body (a new body) recognizing the knowledge and love of God forever. Augustine conjectures that something of this sort must have been the condition of Adam and Eve before sin and the Fall.

To summarize the development of Augustine's idea of Salvation to this point, it has been suggested that Augustine attributes human salvation solely to the work of the Mediator, Jesus Christ, so as to rule out human works or merit as its basis. Salvation occurs when the soul becomes aware of the love of God in Christ and allows that order of love to effect
a transformation of human nature, and significantly, of the human will. Some men are acted upon directly by the Holy Spirit so as to come under the revelation of the nature of God in Christ as channelled by the witness of the scriptures through the Church. The degree of response to this revelation determines the degree of Salvation, and also, the degree of Sanctification. Salvation is never adequate or completely certain in earthly life, being decidedly hampered by the depraved condition of both body and the soul (the flesh).

Passing from a consideration of Augustine's ideas as to how Salvation is obtained, we now consider in more detail what Augustine means by Salvation.

It is significant to note that Augustine appears to reduce man to the status of a spectator in his entire religious outlook on life. As Augustine sees the situation, man should never act religiously on his own initiative. Religious situations are those in which the individual is acted upon by some force or personality outside of himself, a force that is larger and better than he is. Religion is man's meek response to God's overpowering majesty and goodness. God is essentially "aggressive" in his approach to man; taking the initiative, he must overpower man with his love before man can be saved. Salvation is effected by the adjustment of the human will to the will of God.
The major efforts and energies of the individual are to be directed not toward the laying hold of Salvation but toward the expansion and development of it to its fullest degree. "Works" are not for the purpose of attaining Salvation, but rather for the purpose of enhancing the degree of Salvation once it has been attained. The development and expansion of Salvation is identical with what Augustine means by Sanctification so that the degree of Salvation is the same thing as the degree of Sanctification.

It can be said, then, that the method of Salvation, insofar as the individual can do anything about it, lies simply in "faith." Christ is the way of Salvation, and

---

28. Augustine thinks of Sanctification in terms of perfection. To some extent the stages of his mysticism may be considered as degrees of perfection and degrees of perfection.

29. "It was by faith in this mystery, and godliness of life, that purification was attainable even by the saints of old, whether before the law was given to the Hebrews...or in the periods under the law...." De Civitate Dei, X, 25, Translation, Dods, in Nicene Fathers, op. cit., V. II, p. 195.

"...Faith, by which men believe in God, is above all things necessary in this mortal life, most full as it is of errors and hardships." De Trinitate, XIII, vii. (10) Translation, Haddan in Nicene Fathers, op. cit. Vol. III, p. 171.

"But this part of the human race to which God has promised pardon and a share in his eternal kingdom, can they be restored through the merit of their own works? God forbid. For what good work can a lost man perform, except so far as he has been delivered from perdition? Can they do anything by the free determination of their own will? Again I say, God forbid. For it was by the evil use of his free will that man destroyed both it and himself....What kind of liberty, I ask, can the bond-slave possess, except when it pleases him to sin."
man's means of attaining unto Christ is by faith and faith alone. Augustine's meaning of Salvation, however, incorporates more than this. Contrary to many of his contemporary Christian theologians, Augustine gives a positive meaning to Salvation. Not only is Salvation saved from a dire consequence in the future life, it is being saved to participation in positive joys and satisfaction. Salvation begins in the present, at the time of initial faith and realization of God's love, continues all through this life, and then flourishes into an even greater positive effect in heaven. Salvation is the positive value of the direct participation in the knowledge and love of God, the intellectual delight of living under a more or less continuous beatific vision of God.

Augustine suggests that there are seven degrees, or levels of perfection, unto which the soul may attain. The first degree represents no great amount of success or accomplishment for human souls, as it is the bare principle of animation or life in bodies, the existing of bodies as a unity in the midst of their changing circumstances. It is the rudimentary unity of all organisms, common to men, animals, and plants: growth, germination, preservation, adaptation, etc. merely for the purpose of continuing to exist as an organism.

The second degree of the soul is that of sensation,
that degree significantly possessed by animal organisms.

Augustine writes of this level:

"...Notice in the higher living organism how great is the soul's power in the senses and in locomotion, which these things that are fixed to the earth by roots cannot possibly share with use. The soul applies itself to the sense of touch; through it feels and distinguishes hot and cold, rough and smooth, hard and soft, light and heavy...etc. 30 De quantitate animae, XXXIII, 71.

In this level the body itself becomes utilized for some other objective. It attains a function beyond the level of its own mere existence as an organism. For example, in this level there is more than the automatic generation of offspring. Here care, protection, and nourishment is provided for the offspring. In this level the soul functions by habit or instinct, and is directly affected or determined in some measure by its environment.

The third level of the soul may be called the "Artistic" level. It is the level of memory, measurement and speculation. It is the first level that is a distinctively human level, for the animal lower than man cannot participate completely in this level. Out of this level develops expression, honors, the state, peace and war, and social institutions. It is the level of reason, poetry, play and music. It is the heritage

shared by all rational souls, both the learned and unlearned, the good and the wicked. Herein the soul operates not of the body' or 'through the body' as in the first two instances but 'about the body.'

The fourth level of the soul is the level of Virtue. This plane of development is the level in which moral goodness occurs. Augustine writes of this level:

"From this point the soul dares to rank itself not only before its own body, if it is a part of the material world, but even before the whole material world itself, and it dares to think that the good of the world is not its good and to distinguish and despise the counterfeits of its own power and beauty. Hence, the more it becomes the cause of its own delight, the more it dares to withdraw from baser things and wholly to cleanse itself and to make itself spotless and stainless. The soul perceives more and more... how great is the difference between itself purified and itself defiled." 31

De quantitate animae, XXXIII, 73.

In this level the soul begins to become concerned not about its body, as was the case in the previous level, but about itself. It is the level in which the soul enters into the warfare against evil both against evil on the outside of it and the evil inside its own nature. It undergoes a heroic struggle to avoid attachment and allegiance to lower values, the various "allurements" of the lower, inferior orders---the world. In short, this level is the level of the battle

for justice. Virtue is an action of the soul in establishing the good instead of the bad. No divine intervention is necessarily needed at this level.

The fifth degree of the soul is the level of peace, or tranquility. After the soul succeeds in cleansing itself from all its stains, it "settlement within itself" in joy and peace without fear, and is not disturbed at all for any reason of its own. This is the level in which the soul attains confidence in itself, that is, its own inherent worth and greatness. No longer does it fight to purify itself but rather fights to keep itself pure. In this level the soul grasps the truth of its own innate or natural dignity (before the fall) and bounds forth in eagerness, with a yearning desire to know more truth.

The sixth degree of the soul is the highest level of "activity" in which the soul may participate. Augustine terms it the level of "approach." He writes concerning it:

"Now, this activity, the yearning to understand what things are true and best, is the soul's highest vision. Beyond this it has nothing more perfect, more noble, and more true. This, therefore, will be the sixth degree of activity. For, it is one thing to have the eye of the soul so clear that it does not look about idly or incautiously and see what is unseemly, and another thing to protect and strengthen the health of the eye; and it is another thing, again, to direct a calm and steady gaze upon that which is to be seen. Those who wish to do this before they are cleansed and healed are so driven back by the light of truth that they may think there is in it not only nothing good, but much of evil. They deny it the name of truth and by reason of pitiable yielding -- -- continued --"
to carnal indulgence, they draw back into the cavern of their own darkness, enduring it because they are ill and cursing the only remedy of their distemper. Whence, divinely inspired, the prophet most fittingly prays: 'Create a clean heart in me, O Lord, and renew a right spirit in my breast.' (Ps. 50:12)

The spirit is right, I believe, if it keeps the soul in its quest for truth from losing the way and going wrong. Such a spirit is not renewed in a man unless his heart fires shall have been made clean, that is, unless he restrain his thoughts and draw them off from all mundane attachment and defilement." 32

De quantitate animae, XXXIII, 75.

This is the level in which the soul focuses itself away from itself and toward God. It should be noticed that here is a difference between soul turning away from sin, evil will, or the depravities of the body into itself and soul turning away from itself. In order to get to God the soul has to get away not only from the certain evils of the body but from the inherent positive value of the soul itself.

The seventh and last level of the soul is the level of the vision and contemplation of truth which Augustine called the level of "Contemplation." Augustine's own words in description of this level are important:

"...We have come to the seventh and last step, not really a step, but a dwelling place to which the previous steps have brought us. What shall I say are the delights, what the enjoyment, of the supreme and true God; what breath of undisturbed peace and eternity? These are the wonders that great souls have declared, so far as they brought themselves to speak of these realities, great souls of incomparable greatness, who, we believe, beheld and now behold these things. This I now dare say to you in all simplicity, that, if we hold with all perseverance to the course that God lays down for us and which we have undertaken to hold, we shall come by God's power and wisdom to that highest Cause, or Supreme

32. Translation, Ibid., p. 139.
Augustine's idea of the meaning of Salvation, or union with God, is, of course, identical with his doctrine of Contemplation, the seventh and highest level of the soul. It is the level in which the soul becomes "in God" to quote Augustine's own words about the situation. The soul still is the soul and only the soul. It has not changed its nature from that nature with which it was created; it has only purified that nature from its defilement.

As for the exact meaning, or inner meaning of the experience of contemplation itself, Augustine thinks that one word will express it: joy. In the experience of communion, or union with deity, the soul knows the highest ecstasy possible to man---it is a complete abandonment of itself, i.e. its self-direction, within the control of God. Augustine comments on his own feelings when in the state of Contemplation, viz.:

"...I marvelled that I...loved Thee, and had no phantasm instead of Thee. And yet I did not merit to enjoy my God but was transported to Thee by Thy beauty, and presently torn away from Thee by mine own weight, sinking with grief into these inferior things....Yet was there a remembrance of Thee with me; nor did I any way doubt that there was one to whom I might cleave, but that I was not yet one who could cleave unto Thee.... And most certain I was that Thy invisible

33. Translation, Ibid., p. 142.
things from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even Thy eternal power and Godhead.' (Rom. i.20) For, inquiring whence it was that I admired the beauty of bodies whether celestial or terrestrial, and what supported me in judging correctly on things mutable...inquiring then, whence I so judged, seeing I did so judge, I had found the unchangeable and 34 true eternity of Truth above my changeable mind...."

Confessionum libri tredecim, VII,16(23)

In another passage, in which Augustine is recounting a conversation he had with his mother shortly before her death, he reports an experience that might be considered the experience of Contemplation. He writes:

"...We then were conversing alone very pleasantly; and, 'forgetting those things which are before' (Phil.3:13) we were seeking between ourselves in the presence of the Truth.... We opened wide the mouth of our heart after those supernal streams of Thy fountain, 'the fountain of life,' which is 'with Thee;' that being sprinkled with it according to our capacity, we might in some measure weigh so high a mystery. And when our conversation had arrived at that point, that the very highest pleasure of the carnal senses, and that in the very brightest material light, seemed by reason of the sweetness of that life not only not worth of comparison, but not even of mention, we, lifting ourselves with a more ardent affection towards 'the same,' did gradually pass through all corporeal things, and even the heaven itself, whence sun, and moon, and stars shine upon the earth; yea, we soared higher yet by inward musing, and discoursing, and admiring Thy works; and we came to our own minds, and went beyond them, that we might advance as high as that region of unfailing plenty, where Thou dearest Israel for ever with the food of truth, and made, both which have been, and which are yet to come...And while we were thus speaking, and straining after here, we slightly touched her with the whole effort of our heart; and we sighed, and there left bound 'the first-fruits of the Spirit;' and returned to the noise of our own mouth, where the 35 word uttered has both beginning and end."

Confessionum libri tredecim, IX,x, (26)

35. Translation, Ibid., p. 137.
Perhaps still another exampl... in which he dedicates his feeling at the time of Contemplation would be instructive. While writing on the subject of God's wisdom, he exclaims:

"What is that which shines through me, and strikes my heart without injury, and I both shudder and burn? I shudder inasmuch as I am unlike it; and I burn inasmuch as I am like it. It is wisdom itself that shines through me, clearing my cloudiness..."

The primary feeling at the time of the experience is joy—supreme mental elation which is intellectual rather than sensuous in character. Connected with this joy is a certain feeling of satisfaction, or temporary peace of mind. There is also a feeling of incompleteness the inner knowledge that the intensity of the joy experienced is not of the final level of the full potentialities of the mind to experience joy.

The evidence seems to be adequate to prove that the experience itself is solely an intellectual experience. Augustine does not attempt to explain union with God except in terms of a mental awareness of other mental life. In the strictest sense it can readily be seen that no actual union between man and God can take place if God and man are to be regarded as existing in relation to one another but with quite different essences. There can be no real merger between the two because there are

36. Translation, Ibid., p. 166.
no identical entities. The difference is a difference in kind, the difference between that of Creature and Creator, matter and spirit, matter plus form (body and pure form).

"Union with God" in Augustine's mysticism can only be the existence in close relationship of two distinctly different substances, one of which exists as pure spirit, the other existing as matter somewhat spiritualized so as to be able to appreciate and enjoy the order of the spirit. It is as if some radium were brought near a piece of copper so as to affect its nature by radiation—the copper still remaining only copper and the radium remaining radium. Yet, it will also be seen, that there must exist a certain similarity between the two different essences in order for there to be any basis of understanding and appreciation. Man must be enough like God intellectually to be able to perceive an intellectual being.

Augustine's own comments in reference to his experience of the nature of God are important at this point to illustrate his doctrine of the 'Otherness' of the nature of God and the essentially intellectual character of the experience of union:

"...I entered, and with the eye of my soul (such as it was) saw above the same eye of my soul, above my mind, the Unchangeable Light. Not this common light, which all flesh may look upon, nor as it were, a greater one of the same kind, as though the brightness of this should be much more resplendent, and with its greatness fill up all things. Not like this was that light, but different, yea, very different from all these. Nor was it above my mind as oil is above
water, not as heaven above earth; but above it was, because it made me, and I below it, because I was made by it. He who knows the
and true Love, and loved Eternity! Thou art my God; to Thee do I sigh both night and day. When I first knew Thee, thou liftedst me up, that I might see there was that which I might see, and that yet it was not I that did see. And Thou didst beat back the infirmity of my sight, pouring forth upon me most strongly Thy beams of light, and I trembled with love and fear; and I fear; and I found myself to be far off from Thee, in the region of dissimilarity, as if I hear this voice of Thine from on high: 'I am the food of strong men; grow, and thou shalt feed upon me; nor shalt thou convert me, like the food of thy flesh, into thee, but thou shalt be converted into me."

Confessionum libri trdecim, VII,x, (16)

It should be noted that throughout this passage the initiative comes from God in the sense that God's light shines on man making man different, and not in the sense that man's light shines on God illuminating his nature. This is the doctrine of "Revelation" in its purest form—the simple assertion that God illuminates man by the force of his own energies, not that man illuminates himself. Our suggestion is that Augustine uses the seven stages to explain what in effect does happen when man is saved by the forces of God acting upon him from without. All of the seven stages take place in the Salvation of man, even though Salvation is to be thought of in terms of what God has done. Man must cooperate with God in the process of working out his own salvation on the basis of that which has already been done, and the seven processes are the

changes that the soul undergoes in this process. In a rather loose sense, these processes may be termed either Sanctification or Salvation, for the consequent practical meaning of Salvation in its latter stages of development is the same as what is meant by Sanctification. He writes:

"We are inquiring of course, about the power of the soul, (referring to the seven stages) and the soul has the power to perform all these acts simultaneously, although it may think that it is really doing only that act which implies some effort, or, at least, some fear. For it performs that act with greater attention than the rest." . . . In no act does God abandon the soul either for punishment or reward, for He has judged it to be the most beautiful, so that it is the exemplar of all reality. . . . To the soul, indeed, is given free choice. . . and the gift of free choice is such that, making use of it in any way whatever, the soul does not disturb any portion of the divine order and law. It is conferred by the all wise and all prevailing Lord of all creation. But, to see these things as they should be seen is the gift of a . . . few and one becomes fit for the gift only by true religion. For, true religion is that by which the soul is united to God so that it binds itself again by reconciliation to Him from whom it had broken off, as it were by sin. Religion, then, in the third act forms a link with the soul and begins to lead it; in the fourth, it purifies; in the fifth, reforms; in the sixth, it leads into; in the seventh, it feeds. And this is done rather quickly, in some cases; in others slowly --- depending upon the worth of each one's love and merits. . . ." 38

De quantitate animas, XXXV-XXXVI, 79-80.

In this passage Augustine clearly indicates that the seven processes are not to be taken in any scientific sense as a formula to follow as a way of salvation, but rather are to be seen as the manner in which the soul cooperates with God in the process of allowing its salvation to become an actualized

---

or practical reality. It is a situation in which man neither saves himself solely by himself, nor is saved from without totally and completely without any cooperation on his part. Augustine realizes the need for a harmony between the two extremes of either God doing everything in salvation or man doing everything. In this manner he preserves his basic emphasis that Salvation is to be thought of in terms of God's action, and yet brings the free will of man into the situation in a significant way. He states in the above passage that both the initiative and providence of God and man's free will apply in the situation.

Two other examples from his writing illustrate our theory. In the Confessions he clearly indicates that the vision occurs as the result of an essentially introspective process. Yet, he insists that it was not merely an ordinary instance of self-introspection. He was deliberately lead and directed into the process by the initiative of God. He writes:

"And being thenoe warned to return to myself, I entered into my inward self, Thou leading me on; and I was able to do it, for Thou wert become my helper..."  

Confessionum libri tredecim, VII. x. (16) 39

In the same book, after describing the high intensity of the joy of the contemplative experience he attempts to explain the

psychological routine leading up to it as follows:

"... thus by degrees, I passed from bodies to the soul, which makes use of the senses of the body to perceive; and thence to its inward faculty, to the bodily senses (which) represent outward things, and up to which reach the capabilities of beasts; and thence, again, I passed on to the reasoning faculty, unto which whatever is received from the senses of the body is referred to be judged, which also, finding itself to be variable in me, raised itself up to its own intelligence, and from habit drew away my thoughts, withdrawing itself from the crowds of contradictory phantasms; that so it might find out that light by which it was besprinkled, when without all doubting, it cried out, 'that the unchangeable was to be preferred before the changeable:' whence also it knew that unchangeable, which, unless it had in some known it could have had no sure ground for preferring it to the changeable. And thus, with the flash of a trembling glance, it arrived at that which is. And then I saw Thy invisible understood by the things that are made (Rom. i. 20). But I was not able to fix my gaze thereon; and my infirmity being beaten back, I was thrown again on my accustomed habits, carrying along with me naught but a loving memory thereof, and an appetite for what I had, as it were smelt the odor of, but was not yet able to eat."

*Confessionum libri* 

triedecim, VII, 16 (23).

---

40. Translation, Ibid., p. 111. Augustine also describes this process in another passage:

"With my external senses, as I could, I viewed the world, and noted that life which my body derives from me, and these my senses. Thence I advened inwardly into the recesses of my memory,—the manifold rooms, wondrously full of multitudinous wealth; and I considered and was afraid, and could discern none of these things without Thee, and found none of them to be Thee. Nor was I myself the discoverer of these things,—that is, who went over them all, and laboured to distinguish and to value everything according to its dignity, accepting some things upon the report of my senses, and questioning about others which I felt to be mixed up with myself, distinguishing and numbering the reporters themselves, and in the vast storehouse of my memory investigating some things, laying up others, taking out others. Neither was I myself when I did this (that is, that ability of mine whereby I did it), nor was it Thou, for Thou art that never-failing light which I took counsel of as to them all, whether they were what they were, and what was their worth.... Nor in all these which I review when consulting Thee, find I a secure place for my soul, save in Thee, into whom my scattered members may be gathered together, and nothing of me depart from Thee. And sometimes Thou dost introduce me to a most rare affection, inwardly, to an inexplicable sweetness, which, if it should be perfected in me, I know not to what point that life might not arrive...."  *Confessionum libri* 

triedecim, X xi, (65) Translation, Ibid., p. 161.
Continuing in the same vein of argument, he reaches a near poetic level of language in indicating that the same experience is possible to everyone:

"...If to any man the tumult of the flesh were silenced, silenced the phantasies of earth, waters, and air, silenced, too the poles; yea, the very soul to be silenced to herself, and go beyond herself by not thinking of herself—silenced fancies and imaginary revelations, every tongue, and every sign, and whatsoever exists by passing away... having only quickened our ears to Him who created them, and He alone speaks not by them, but by Himself, that we may hear His word, not by fleshly tongue, nor angelic voice, nor sound of thunder, nor the obscurity of a similitude, but that we might hear Him—Him whom in these we love—without these, like as we two now strained ourselves, and with rapid thought touched on the Eternal Wisdom which remained over all. If this could be sustained, and other visions of a far different kind be withdrawn, and this one ravish and absorb, and envelope its beholder amid these inward joys, so that his life might be eternally like that one moment of knowledge which we now sighed after, were not this 'Enter thou into the joy of Thy Lord?' 41
(Matt. xxv. 21) Confessionum libri tredecim, IX, x. (26)

Man must do something in order to hear the voice of God, in order to allow the light of revelation to shine upon him. A

41. Translation, Ibid., 137. Augustine comments in more detail concerning the nature of the mystic insight:

"...Although we see some things with the body, others with the mind, the distinction between these two sorts of sight is seen by the mind, not the body. The objects which are beheld by the mind have need of no senses of the body to let us know that they are true, but those perceived through the body cannot be included in our knowledge if there is no mind to which these incoming messages can be referred. And it is a fact that those incoming messages, which it is said, in some wise, to receive, are left outside, but it forms images of them, that is, incorporeal likenesses of physical things, which it commits incorporeally to the memory, so that from there, when it has the will or power, it may give judgment on them, after bringing them out of custody and displaying them in the sight of its thought. And when it has its full powers, it also makes a distinction between these two: what it left outside in its corporeal aspect, what it beholds within as a likeness, and it discerns that the former is not there, but the latter is. In the same (continued on next page)
Certain purification and discipline is demanded but such is not the sole determining factor in the situation. The greater determination lies outside of what man can do.

It is the distinctive mystical doctrine of Augustine that man is not made moral by his own actions in themselves alone but by the permeation of his natural and now depraved order by something superior in value and essence to that which he knows, and ever may know as his own nature. The love of God in providing redemption through the Mediator is the ultimate source of the mystical experience. By this love the individual is converted from a depraved evil self willed and self-seeking individual into a person who wills and acts according to the will and love of God.

The conclusion would appear, nevertheless, to follow that the soul does work to some extent in order to receive the full blessing of Salvation. The degree of benefit attained from

...way you think of my corporeal face, while I am absent; the image is present to you, but the face whose image it is absent; the one is body, the other the incorporeal likeness of body. Not all the Apostles saw Christ. Therefore He says: 'So long a time have I been with you, and you have not known me?' But he who knew 'what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and the charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge,' saw both Christ and the Father. For we do not now know Christ according to the flesh, but according to the spirit. For 'our breath, Christ the Lord, is taken before our face,' and may He in His mercy deign to fill us unto all the fullness of God that we may be able to See Him.' Epistolae CXLVII. 31, 38, 52. Translation by Sister Wilfred Parsons, in The Works of Augustine, The Letters, Vol. III, The Fathers of the Church, op. cit., pp. 199, 208, 221.
Salvation appears to vary in accordance with the sort of love and devotion given to God. In this manner human free will is preserved in his own choice of Salvation, the final judgment being based upon the individual's response to value, knowledge and love. Human works in Salvation become the works of religion rather than the works of Salvation or the works of morality. Faith is of continual importance in Salvation for it is by the initial response of Faith that the soul allows itself to be laid hold of in Salvation and it is by the continued response of faith that Salvation is allowed to be made continually effective. Faith accounts for the growth of the soul through its various possible degrees of development along the way of Sanctification and hence leads directly to the occurence of the... vision.42

42. "I think you now agree, after considering all these arguments, that it is correct to say that 'God is not seen in any locality, but in the clean heart; He is not sought by bodily eyes, nor limited by our sight, nor held by touch, nor heard by his utterance, nor perceived in His approach.' If there is anything of this which we do not understand, or about which we are 'otherwise minded, this also God will reveal to us if, whereunto we are come, we continue in the same.' (Phil. 3:15-16) 'For we have come to believe that God is not body, but spirit.' (John 4:24); and that 'God is light and in him there is no darkness' (I. John 1:5) and 'with him there is no change nor shadow of alternation' (James 1:17); and that 'He inhabiteth light inaccessible, whom no man hath seen nor can see' (I. Tim. 6:16); and that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God, (I. John 5:7,8) without any diversity or separateness of nature, and the clean of heart will see Him (Matt. 5:8); and that 'we shall be like to him, because we shall see him as he is' (I. John 3:2); and that 'God is charity and he that abideth in charity, abideth in God and God in him' (I. John 4:16); and that we ought to 'follow peace and holiness, without which no man shall see God' (Heb. 12:14); and that this corruptible and mortal body of ours shall be changed at the resurrection, and shall put on incorruption and immortality (I. Cor. 15:55), and that 'it is (Cont. on next page)
It must also be pointed out that the various levels of the soul do not constitute an exact parallel to a way of ascent in the way of Salvation. As has already been mentioned a number of times, according to Augustine there is only one Way of Salvation, Christ the Mediator. Life on earth is not to be interpreted as a journey on the road to Salvation, for the journey of human life on earth is not the same as the entrance into the

sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body,' (I. Cor. 15:44), when the Lord will 'reform the body of our lowness' and make it 'Like to the body of his glory' (Phil. 3:21); and that God 'made man to his image and likeness. (Gen. 1:26-27); and that we are renewed in the spirit of our mind unto the knowledge of God 'according to the image of him that created us.' (Col. 3:10) Those who walk by faith (II. Cor. 5:7) according to these and other similar authoritative pronouncements of the holy Scriptures who have made spiritual progress by an understanding divinely given or strengthened, and who have been able to assess the value of spiritual things, have seen that the mental sight is superior to the bodily sight, and that the objects of this mental vision are not limited by space; they are not separated from each other by intervening spaces and their parts are not less than the whole....But, in order to attain that vision by which we see God as He is, He has warned us that our hearts must be cleansed. As then objects are called visible in our fashion of speaking, so God is called invisible (I. Col 1:15; Tim. 1:17) lest He be thought to be a material body, yet He will not deprive pure hearts of the contemplation of His substance, since this great and sublime reward is promised on the Lord's own word, to those who worship and love God. At the time when He appeared visibly to bodily eyes, He promised that His invisible being also would be seen by the clean of heart: 'He that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him' (John 14:21) It is certain that this nature of His, which He shares with the Father is equally invisible as it is equally incorruptible, (I. Tim. 1:17) which, as was said above, the Apostle at once set forth as the divine substance, commending it to men with what words he could. But, if bodily eyes behold it, in virtue of the changed nature of bodies at the resurrection, let those who can assert this look to it; for my part, I am more impressed by the statement of him who attributes this to clean hearts, not to bodily eyes, even at the resurrection." Epistolae CXLVII, 46, 48. Translation, Ibid. pp. 214-216.
As Augustine has already stated in the previous quotation, all of the various seven stages may occur within a very short time, almost at the same instance, and do occur before there is any knowledge of Salvation at all. Significantly, in Augustine they occur when the soul first really "finds" God, in the initial dramatic encounter with the Mediator—when the individual has his first genuinely "religious" experience.

43. "As to these three modes of life, the contemplative, the active, and the composite, although, so long as a man's faith is preserved, he may choose any of them without detriment to his eternal interest, yet he must never overlook the claims of truth and duty. No man has a right to lead such a life of contemplation as to forget in his own ease the service due to his neighbor; nor has any man a right to be so immersed in active life as to neglect the contemplation of God. The charm of leisure must not be indolence, vacancy of mind, but the investigation or discovery of truth, that thus every man may make solid attainments without grudging that others do the same. And, in active life, it is not the honors or power of this life we should covet, since all things under the sun are vanity, but we should aim at using our position and influence, if these have been honorably attained, for the welfare of those who are under us.... Accordingly no one is prohibited from the search after truth, for in this leisure may most laudably be spent; but it is unseemly to covet the high position requisite for governing the people, even though that position be held and that government be administered in a seemly manner. And therefore holy leisure is longed for by the love of truth; but it is the necessity of love to undertake requisite business. If no one imposes this burden upon us, we are free to sift and contemplate truth; but if it be laid upon us, we are necessitated for love's sake to undertake it. And yet not even in this case are we obliged wholly to relinquish the sweets of contemplation; for were these to be withdrawn, the burden might prove more than we could bear.... But the actual possession of the happiness of this life, without the hope of what is beyond, is but a false happiness and profound misery. For the true blessings of the soul are not now enjoyed; for that is no true wisdom which does not direct all its prudent observations, manly actions, virtuous self-restraint, and just arrangements, to that end in which God shall be all and all in a secure eternity and perfect peace. De Civitate XIX, 19-20. Translation by Dods, in Nicene Fathers, Sp. cit., Vol. II, p.413.
As such, Augustine interprets Salvation as something that may and should occur in the beginning of human life on earth, something designed to serve as an aid in the journey of life—not as a reward for the successful completion of the journey. Religion, as he understands it, is but a series of beatific visions. It is not a search to find God—to discover what and how he is, but a relation of more or less continual communion with God—quite incompletely so on earth under the limitations of the flesh, but completely so in heaven.

In summary, we have seen that the religious approach of Augustine is one of humility and wonder in his approach to the idea of God, to the existence of things of value in the universe, and to the phenomena of life and being in general. Beyond the world as we know it he sees God and the phenomena of God is more

---

44. "But the peace which is peculiar to ourselves we enjoy now with God by faith, and shall hereafter enjoy eternally with Him by sight. But the peace which we enjoy in this life, whether common to all or peculiar to ourselves, is rather the solace of our misery than the positive enjoyment of felicity. Our very righteousness, too, though true in so far as it has respect to the true good, is yet in this life of such a kind that it consists rather in the remission of sins than in the perfecting of virtues.... In this, then, consists the righteousness of a man, that he submit himself to God, his body to his soul, and his vices, even when they rebel, to his reason, which either defeats or at least resists them; and also that he beg from God grace to do his duty, and the pardon of his sins, and that he render to God thanks for all the blessings he receives. But, in that final peace to which all our righteousness has reference...it will not be necessary that reason should rule vices which no longer exist, but God shall rule the man, and the soul shall rule the body, with a sweetness and facility suitable to the felicity of a life which is done with bondage....; and thus the peace of this blessedness and the blessedness of this peace shall be the supreme good," De Civitate Dei, XIX, 27. Translation by Marcus Dods, Vol. II of Number Four of Hafner Series, p.341.
profound to him that the phenomena of the natural world. More than he is interested in system, he is interested in the human heart. When thinking about ultimate values, he tends toward the practical, functional, immediate, common-sense meaning rather than towards speculation as the theoretical unity of things in relation. His assurance comes from the heart rather than from the head.

As such, Augustine has every right to be called a mystic. Instead of placing the numinous in the technique or phenomena of mystical experience, he places it one step removed in the nature and being of the God behind the experience. Once the mysterious is incorporated within the nature of God, the techniques and process of mystism become less profound than they would otherwise appear.

What is Augustine suggesting as to the meaning of mysticism? He is suggesting that the main concern in religious life should be that of a humble response to the evident goodness of God as it now appears naturally and normally to every man, and in a special way to certain men. He is suggesting that the fact of Salvation should be separated from the joy or degree of Salvation—that the joy of Salvation should be the object of human discipline rather than the fact of Salvation. Starting from his serious view of the necessary nature of ultimates, he concludes that man is quite incapable of causing his own salvation,
that such never could be the case for salvation is a issue much broader that the capabilities of man. As such, then, man merely cooperates with God in the Salvation that God has provided---through the gracious action of the Mediator. Salvation being essentially that which God has done for man, no tremendous effort is required to attain it---merely the acceptance of that which has been provided---an act of will. Salvation has already occurred in the past. It is a thing done, an act accomplished. By his act of will man makes a loving response to the impact of the love of God in Christ---action quite capable to every man regardless of the depths of his depravity.

The joy of Salvation comes, at least, at first---in the initial divine encounter---in the realization that a way has already been provided, that the labor for salvation has already been undergone by Christ in the Sacrifice. It continues as the same order of love is expanded by the training of the will into a greater degree of harmony with the will of God---hence further purification and moralization.

The high peak of joyous union of God is entirely God controlled unmerited by man---entirely a gift of God. It is not a payment but a reward, and not so much a reward for righteousness as it is a response for love. This high peak is the communion of man's highest nature, which is still quite meager compared to God, with God's nature. It is a communion possible only to men
and angels as only angels and human souls are in the image of God.

In the final analysis, the mysticism of Augustine appears to be entirely a product of revelation. It is something that comes to man, not because of what he does or what he deserves, but because God desires to reveal his own nature. Nothing of the dignity of man is violated by the outreaching and willful action of God. To the contrary, that which is highest in man recaptures something of the order of the angels, some of the elevated order of life on which the soul must have existed before it entered into its current evil state. As the light of God shines on man, man is once again illuminated, so that his value becomes more apparent just as man is: not God, but a creature of the dust formed so as to incorporate within his being values and meanings that image that which is Ultimate Value.
Chapter VI

Comparisons and Conclusions

I. Metaphysics

Although there are no exact parallels between the items of the systems of the two men, there does appear to be an undertone of the teachings of Plotinus throughout the writings of Augustine. As has been indicated their world views differ considerably both in the nature of the items within the system and in the way of their relation to one another. They do not have the same ideas of the nature of God, or of ultimate reality, or of the world, or of the origin of life, man, and being. Yet, there is some similarity in their doctrines of being, their meanings of value, and their descriptions of the practical life of man on the earth.

Perhaps the major points of difference in the metaphysics of Plotinus and Augustine rest in their difference of opinions concerning the nature of ultimate reality and in the difference between emanationism and creationism. Augustine's idea of God
appears to the writer to be a merger of the Creator-Yahweh of
the Old Testament with the One of Plotinus. There is a vague
similarity in his insistence that God is really the meaning and
force behind the meaning of reality\(^1\) with the Plotinian doctrine
of the resolution of all being into the One.\(^2\) Yet, Augustine
must make one dramatic difference: God is not just the world and
the world is not of the same nature as is God.\(^3\) God is essen-
tially different from the nature of the world in his own funda-
damental order of being.\(^4\) He is self-existent apart from the
same order of our physical universe, which is by definition in a
state of change, deterioration, and general depravity.\(^5\) Whereas
Plotinus defines ultimate value within our own known scheme of
things and insists that we may see it if we but clear our vision,\(^6\)
Augustine insists that it is located outside of anything that
may be termed human or physical or matter.\(^7\) Plotinus makes God
and reality one and the same thing. Augustine thinks of reality
in terms of God but does not see all reality to be of the same
kind.

2. pp. 18-19.
5. pp. 97, 151-161.
6. pp. 18, 94.
In many respects Augustine's idea of God seems to incorporate certain ideas and meanings involved in the One, the Divine-Mind and the World-Soul, yet, his trinity is not at all parallel to the trinity of Plotinus. The Son incorporates many meanings and concepts found in Plotinus' idea of the Divine-Mind, namely, Light, Life, Truth, and in some sense, Being. The Divine-Mind is almost identical with the concept of the Logos. One major difference is love. Plotinus never speaks of the Divine-Mind as benevolent or compassionate. Augustine's doctrine of the Holy Spirit's dwelling in the heart of the believers is reminiscent of Plotinus' doctrine of the indwelling of the World-Soul within the life of the world. Augustine's idea of the Father incorporates ideas found in all three items of Plotinus' trinity. Augustine's God appears to be more directly involved in and concerned with the personal affairs of men. Whereas the One of Plotinus is beyond knowledge, beyond truth, and beyond human feeling, the God of Augustine is capable of being felt and known in the heart and mind of man. Augustine considers God to be a mind, and there is little or no evidence to show that he ever thought of him as existing as anything beyond the level of mind. Augustine also thinks of God as spirit, an idea in-

---

8. p. 18.
corporated within Plotinus' idea of the Divine-Mind. Augustine seems to enlarge the idea to include something of Plotinus' idea of pure unity. Augustine teaches that only God (entire trinity) is purely spiritual—the only pure spirit. This would make God as a mind superior to Plotinus' idea of mind. Apparently Augustine broadens the concept of God as a mind by developing the concept "spirit" into proportion similar to Plotinus' One rather than restricting himself to Plotinus' idea of mind.

Plotinus' God is identical with the total reality of the natural order. Reality exists only as a superficial division of the being of God. Everything that is real is God and God is everything that is real. There is a vague mention of this latter doctrine in Augustine's insistence that the reality of the world is to be associated with God, and in some vague sense considered as God, but he also asserts a fundamental difference between the nature of the world and the nature of God. Instead of one essence in the universe, there are two basic essences, according to Augustine, spirit and matter. God is spirit, and God alone is spirit. All else that is, is matter. Between matter and spirit there is an everlasting difference and never are the two

11. P. 134.
13. P. 96, footnote 1; P. 98, footnote 3.
15. P. 116-117.
the same. Spirit cannot be explained in terms of our material or natural order. Plotinus, on the other hand, considers our natural order to be in actuality of the order of spirit and attempts to explain the natural order in terms of the spiritual. Plotinus makes the natural and the spiritual one and the same order. 16

The differences in the idea of God and ultimate reality makes other differences in the metaphysical order. If the world is identical with God, and hence eternal, as Plotinus teaches, 17 its beginning does not need to be explained, because of course, it would have no beginning. Only the basis for its maintenance, or continued existence, would need to be explained; and this Plotinus does by his theory of emanations. 18 On the other hand, if the essence of the world is fundamentally different from the essence of God, the beginning of the second essence must be accounted for. This Augustine does in his theory of creation. 19

There is a certain sense in which both are somewhat similar in their doctrines of the maintenance of the world---both teach that it is sustained by God, or the ultimate reality in the universe. Plotinus teaches that the One is the power behind the

16. pp. 18, 57
17. pp. 19
18. p. 17
being of the lower orders, mind, soul, and matter,\textsuperscript{20} and Augustine suggests that if God were to withdraw his support of the world it would collapse into nothingness.\textsuperscript{21} Augustine seems to see God as continually sustaining the being of the world as a world. But the routines of emanation are quite different from the routines of creation. Neither emanation nor creation is particularly connected with the question of time. Time makes no difference in reference to emanation one way or the other, since the universe is eternal. It does make a difference, in the case of the historicity of the world, according to Augustine, for time came into being at the time of the coming into being of the world. However, even the creation did not involve time as it occurred before time came into being.\textsuperscript{22}

Emanation is primarily a process, an eternal process involving the relation of eternally fixed orders of being.\textsuperscript{23} Creation occurred all at one time, at one instant.\textsuperscript{24} Creation is more to be conceived of as an event than as a process, although it is an event that incorporated a process—a process that began and ended in the same one day, or seven days, of creation.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{20} p. 18.
\textsuperscript{21} p. 96.
\textsuperscript{22} p. 102.
\textsuperscript{23} p. 17.
\textsuperscript{24} p. 101.
\textsuperscript{25} p. 101.
If things were created all at one time, no process other than creation is needed to explain their realations. Things are as they are simply because they were created in their now fundamentally fixed relations. The practical result of emanation and creation in this respect: appears to be nearly the same, the issues of the eternality of the universe and the precise nature of God's role in accounting for the world. He is the cause of the world in both instances.

Emanationism and creationism make a difference in the consequent order of the items within the world. According to Plotinus, the whole world is ensouled and possessed with a mind, and is the One in all its reality. Technically, according to Plotinus, the world is a soul, is a mind, and is God. He suggests that the world in which we live and move and have our being is really a spiritual world, in actuality beautiful, noble, and good. He further suggests that we may be able to see the true inner value of the world if we but scrape off its ugly crusts in order to be able to see its true value at its center. Augustine, on the other hand, does not believe that the world is ensouled except in the loose sense in which God might be considered as the soul or directing power of the world. Then, it is not the case of the world itself being a soul, as is the case

26. p. 43; pp. 18, 22, 32.
in Plotinus. Matter and soul nature are never considered identical in Augustine. Rather, it is the case that souls have their own unique form and matter apart from the form and matter of bodies. Since God made both matter and form both are good, according to Augustine not just form only, as in the case of Plotinus. Contrary to the thought of Plotinus, bodies are also good. All created things have bodies, including angels. Granting the separation of matter from spirit Augustine still considers matter and bodies to be items of value, but secondary to the value of spiritual things. It is not necessary that all bodies be souls or have souls associated with them. Furthermore, in the thought of Augustine, all souls are not of the same kind, human souls being different in kind from animal souls, and angel souls being different in kind from human souls. Life is a property of souls, in Plotinus, but it is a quality of deity, in Augustine, being directly connected with the meaning of light.

Although Plotinus and Augustine appear to be rather similar in their common sense opinions about the life of man, they vary somewhat in their interpretation of human life. Essentially, Plotinus makes man a part of God, a participant in that which

27. p. 111-112.
28. p. 112.
29. p. 37.
constitutes the ultimate value of the universe. Augustine finds this idea repulsive, but yet admits that man mirrors or images the nature of ultimate value and reality, specifically in his soul, even in some minor sense in his body, as well. \(^{31}\) Augustine does not consider man as distinctively a soul, as does Plotinus, but rather considers him a combination of soul and body. Both admit that man is prominent in his position within the universe, poised essentially midway between its extremes of value and disvalue. Both agree that the soul of man (or man as a soul) is immortal, but Augustine also thinks that body is in some sense immortal. \(^{32}\) Augustine thinks of death as the separation of the soul from the body \(^{33}\) whereas Plotinus thinks of it as but the generation of another individual body. Contrary to the teaching of Plotinus, Augustine teaches that souls desire normally and legitimately to be united with bodies. \(^{34}\)

There is some similarity in their teachings concerning angels and demons, both granting them as spiritual beings, more spiritual than man. Plotinus considers them purely intellectual beings, or possibly minds only, since they are not souls, \(^{35}\) whereas Augustine considers them spiritual in the sense of

\(^{31}\) p. 122.  
\(^{32}\) p. 127; p. 158, footnote 21.  
\(^{33}\) p. 159, 168.  
\(^{34}\) p. 127.  
\(^{35}\) p. 46.
having purer wills and holier actions than men, and regard angels as having souls and bodies of their own kind.

Metaphysically, Plotinus appears to be most concerned about ontology and cosmology, whereas Augustine is concerned about psychology and theology. Plotinus attempts to give a strictly systematic total world view that will account for all our experience in a strictly rational way. Augustine, on the other hand, does not seem to be quite so technically concerned, preferring rather to appeal to the nature of psychial life and revelation for the grounds of the formation of his world view. Perhaps, Augustine was not so much rebelling against the metaphysics of Plotinus as he was enlarging upon it. We conjecture that he would think that Plotinus' system was not adequate in the sense that it was designed to satisfy the head instead of the heart. Starting from the inner life; of man, Augustine would attempt to construct a system based upon the greatest and richest meaning man can affirm, namely, "God". From a God-centered core he would reconstruct all other meanings and so make all other ideas and values relative to the meaning of God. Whereas Plotinus would make psychology subordinate to a particularly suggested rational ontology and cosmology, Augustine would be willing to forego a rational ontology and cosmology in favor of psychial reality.
It is conceivable that the world view of Plotinus could be placed within the world view of Augustine, without a great deal of clash being involved, if its center as an end-in-itself is transported outside of the center core of the world to the God beyond the created universe and Creationism is substituted for Emanationism. This would amount to the adaptation of the views of Plotinus to the world view of Augustine, which could occur much more easily than could the contrary. See chart on next page.

II. Religion

It has been noted that Plotinus tends to merge his religion with his philosophy in all but the last stages of religion. Augustine, on the other hand, makes a clear distinction between religion and philosophy. The religion of Augustine does not itself constitute a system of philosophy or deal with its own first principles.

We have also noted that Augustine in his religion emphasizes the meaning of God as an experience more than he emphasizes the intellectual or rational meanings of God. In the case of Plotinus, it is difficult to determine what he would consider "the God of experience" to be. Man experiences all three of his deities, the World-Soul, the Divine-Mind, and the One, which he tells us are really one thing—-one ultimate substance or

37. p. 132.
Perhaps the combination of the world views of Plotinus and Augustine would be diagramed as follows:

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
  \node (universe) at (0,0) {UNIVERSE};
  \node (god) at (0,2) {GOD};
  \node (heaven) at (1.5,3) {Heaven---};
  \node (mediator) at (1.5,2) {---Mediator};
  \node (earth) at (0,-3) {Earth---};
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}
essence. It is conceivable that Augustine might have taken his argument for the one essence and three persons of God\textsuperscript{38} from Plotinus' idea of the one essence of divine reality. As has been indicated, however, no exact parallel may be between the items of their two trinities.

One notable religious difference is the role of God in the salvation of the individual. In Augustine, salvation is by action of God and in Plotinus it is by action of man, each individual man. Plotinus' God is removed from the work of Salvation, whereas Augustine's God performs the major work of Salvation.

In Plotinus we find nothing of the "warmth", intimacy and benevolence of God so highly emphasized by Augustine. Typical of Plotinus' religious attitude toward deity is his satirical remark "the gods must come to me, not I to them," by which he really means to imply that gods do not come to men. However, in another sense he is teaching that men do go to God---not to the gods, but to the One---by themselves. His way of salvation is a teaching concerning the way men may go to the One. In another sense, he would say that God is with us always by the fact of the constant immanence of the orders of his trinity in every man. Knowledge of the experience of God---something of what Augustine means by the experience of the Holy Spirit---however,
is reserved only for the high peak of the final stages of the mystic way. For Plotinus it comes only at the time of union with the Divine-Mind and union with the One. 39

The role of free will in religion is essentially the same for both Plotinus and Augustine. Both deny indeterminism and think of determinism in the sense of self-determinism. However, there is one difference in their views. In the case of Augustine the ideal is that the self should be directed from without, by the will of God, even though it does have its own power of choice. Man's determination then is determined by God's free choice. In the case of Plotinus no choice whatsoever is involved. Man's plight is rigidly determined by the general nature of the universe, by the unvarying principle of things in their fixed orders. Nevertheless, both views are essentially optimistic. Plotinus says that man possesses the inherent ability to work for his own salvation. Augustine says that man has the power of choice to allow God to convert him.

Sin, according to Plotinus, is the choice of a lower good, attachment to body instead of attachment to mind and unity. 40 Sin, according to Augustine, is also the choice of a lower good but it consists in the choice of a great number of lower goods instead of a possible higher good. Loosely speaking, it is

40. pp. 60-61.
attachment to the things of the "flesh" instead of to bodily things that Augustine objects to. Here we may see a certain intimation of Plotinus' doctrine of the primacy of spiritual things as value objects. In Augustine, sin is the choice of the less spiritual type of good. Augustine, however, has more to say about the nature of sin. He identifies it with the will of man more than he identifies it with bodily things. Sin is always an act of will. Man possesses a depraved or corrupted will that must be dealt with before his salvation can become effective. The same doctrine is implicit in Plotinus in the fact of his emphasis upon man's ordinary attachment for bodily things, but it is not nearly so technical and well developed as it is in the thought of Augustine.

Both Plotinus and Augustine had keen sense of justice and believed that there will be adequate reward and punishment for human behavior. Both taught that life as we know it does not provide adequate rewards and punishments for human behavior. Both teach a future life of the soul in which justice will be more completely effected. For Plotinus this is reincarnation, or the determined generation of a new body from the soul—a body determined in type and value according to the merits stored up in the previous existence. For Augustine, this would be a

41. pp. 150-156.
42. p. 60.
future existence of the soul and body of man in either heaven or hell, if in heaven with a new or purified body not subject to the depravity of earthly bodies and with a sanctified soul also not subject to wrong choices; if in hell, with the same type; body and soul even more corrupted and under more positive pains than those felt in earthly life. As has already been indicated, Plotinus' idea of life is that it is a quality of souls and Augustine's idea is that it is a quality of deity. Augustine feels that life varies qualitatively according to the proportion to the individual participation in the things of the spirit—according to his faith and religious behaviour. Again, this idea is implicit in Plotinus in the very fact that he suggests that human life can be improved. Plotinus, also, suggests that human life grows better as it becomes more like the order of the One but he does not see the possibility for as great a change in the order of human life on earth as Augustine appears to see.

Both Plotinus and Augustine have doctrines of Salvation. Plotinus essentially merges his idea of salvation with his meaning of mysticism and his meaning of religion. All three are separate and distinct in Augustine, yet related.

Plotinus conceives of salvation as a work of man.

---

43. pp. 157-158.
44. pp. 159-160.
45. p. 64.
Augustine sees it as significantly the work of God. Both Plotinus and Augustine agree that salvation demands certain works on the part of man to be made completely effective in his life. In a sense, this is what they both mean by religion: that which man can do in effecting his own salvation. Augustine is careful to give the credit for salvation to God; Plotinus gives the credit to man. Their difference in opinion as to how the major work of salvation is accomplished is a fundamental difference in the religious thought of Plotinus and Augustine. The hero of salvation according to Augustine, is the Mediator. Plotinus' hero, however, is man, himself—man is his own mediator. The answer to man's problem, according to Augustine, is God's grace: redeeming and regenerating love made effective to man through the life and work of Christ and communicated now in immediate experience through the power of the Holy Spirit. The answer to man's problem, according to Plotinus, is education, or possibly philosophy—dedication and self-discipline to a new idea and way of life, a way which incorporates optimistic assertions about the meanings and possibilities of human life and puts supreme emphasis upon the value of intellectual life and a specialized religious experience. Plotinus and Augustine have

---

46. pp. 163-165.
47. pp. 166-170.
48. p. 92.
quite similar meanings of the inner nature of salvation, although there is a technical difference in the meanings of their final stages of union. However, there is a fundamental difference in their doctrines of the means of salvation.

III. Mysticism

We have considered the mysticisms of Plotinus and Augustine under the headings of their religion but it is well to point out that metaphysical meanings as well are involved in their meanings. Whether or not the religion is built upon the metaphysics or the metaphysics is built upon the religion varies according to the views of the particular philosopher. We suggest that the former is true in the case of Plotinus, and the latter, in the case of Augustine.

We have also distinguished between the method of mysticism and the meaning of mysticism. We have indicated that in certain instances mysticism has been identified with the meaning of salvation, and in others there have been more technical distinctions made between the two.

We suggest that the mysticism of Augustine was only indirectly influenced by the mysticism of Plotinus, being more than significantly determined by his own religious doctrines by the direct influence of the mysticism of Plotinus. Many of the methods of mysticism taught by Plotinus appear within Augustine's
We shall now compare the meanings of their mysticism.

In the first place, the two theories of mysticism are similar in that they regard mystical union as a worthy end in itself. The psychological meaning of salvation is apparently the same for both Plotinus and Augustine, namely, a beatific vision wherein there is a believed to be direct knowledge of God. Augustine sees the beatific vision as the finest experience that can happen to man on earth, but even so, regards it as only a foretelling of the greater degree of joy and satisfaction that is to result from the same sort of union in heaven. Plotinus regards the beatific vision as the final and most important experience possible in the life of man and is more cautious in assertions about its possibility in future life. Both regarded the experience as a "spiritual" experience—an experience contrary to the ordinary involvement in material affairs. In the case of Plotinus, it is a situation of pure spirit becoming identical with pure spirit. In Augustine's case it is that of being acted upon by pure spirit. Both describe the experience

49. pp. 88, 171.
50. pp. 90, 181.
51. pp. 86, 178.
52. pp. 71, 176.
53. p. 90.
as a time of joy, rest, and peace. Both suggest that there is pain at the time of the waning of the high peak of intensity of the experience. It is a time when the soul feels at one with God, the world, and all men. Both regard the experience as a time when that which was possessed previously, but lost, is regained. In the case of Plotinus, the individual soul itself regains its knowledge of its previous state of communion with God before it fell into body. In the case of Augustine, man has a sort of intuitive awareness or recognition of the blessed state of communion with God enjoyed by the first pair in the Garden of Eden.

Both Augustine and Plotinus argue rationally about their mystical theories. The theories themselves are essentially rational in the sense that they are consistent within themselves--true to their own first principles. The way of ascent in the doctrine of Plotinus is rational in every phase but the last, when it must be admitted that irrationality occurs. It would be difficult to call any part of Augustine's mysticism "irrational." Both Augustine and Plotinus have developed their mystical theories into philosophies of mysticism. They have well related their mystical doctrines to their metaphysical and religious

55. pp. 86, 179.
56. pp. 86, 186.
57. pp. 82-83.
systems—a situation that is rare, indeed, both in the history of mysticism and in the history of philosophy. Both Augustine and Plotinus deal directly with most of the major problems of philosophy in reference to their mysticism, and their theories are philosophical in the sense that they have not avoided giving some answer to normal philosophical queries. Both Plotinus and Augustine were schooled in the meaning of abstract concepts and in the terminology of philosophy. Both theories are carefully worked out theories, given cautiously, with the intention of being taken seriously at face value.

The difference in the mysticisms of Augustine and Plotinus should be quite apparent. In the first place, their mysticisms start from different sources. In Plotinus, it starts in the will of man, as man decides to try to save himself by entering into the process of the way of salvation. In Augustine, it starts in the will of God, actually in the love of God, when God, realizing that man is a sinner, decides to save him, elects the particular man to be saved, and suddenly comes to him with the revelation of his nature as love.

In the second place, the time of the occurrence of the beatific vision is different. In Plotinus, it occurs at the end of a long and rigorous process involving hours, days, and years.

---

59. p. 65.
60. p. 172.
possibly as a reward for the effort rendered. In Augustine, it occurs at the beginning of religion as a gift, apparently designed as an aid in the living of life on earth. In Plotinus it is an end-in-itself as it occurs in human life. In Augustine, it can be an end-in-itself only in heaven. In Plotinus, it occurs rarely. In Augustine, it occurs quite frequently, almost constantly among the pious.

In the third place, the type of the union is not the same. In Plotinus, there is the merger of two identical substances. In Augustine no virtual union occurs or can occur due to the difference of the nature of the two essences. Augustine's union appears to be roughly similar to the type of union Plotinus means in the union of the soul with the Divine-Mind. Yet, even this similarity is not strictly accurate, for in the case of the union of the soul and the Divine-Mind, in Plotinus, the union takes place, even then by virtue of the soul literally becoming mind so as to allow a mind to mind relationship. Augustine teaches that man is a mind and that God is a mind but the two are not the same sort of minds. God as a mind is so superior to man as a mind that the mental communication between them can occur

61. p. 86.
63. p. 86.
64. p. 193.
65. p. 191.
66. p. 89.
67. p. 181.
only meagerly. This is one reason for the need for the Incarnation. It might be conjectured that God differs from man even in
the essence of his mind if His general essence is to be considered different from man's essence. The type of union cannot be the
same, for there is not the same type of God with whom the union occurs. Augustine's "union" is minds in one accord, Plotinus' "union" is a merger, a union beyond intellection.

In the fourth place, there is a difference in the manner and meaning of purification. Essentially, purification in Plotinus means "flight." In Augustine, it means the negation of the lower values. According to Plotinus, the soul is itself superior to the nature of the world about it, superior to all bodies and sense life, so that its object in purification consists of its being connected with and concerned about only itself. Plotinus writes:

"The purification of the Soul is simply to allow it to be alone; it is pure when it keeps no company; when it looks to nothing without itself; when it entertains no alien thoughts---be the mode or origin of such notions or affections what they may,---when it no longer sees in the world of image, much less elaborates images into veritable affections. Is it not a true purification to turn away towards the exact contrary of earthly things?" III. 6. 5.

In Plotinus, purification is by means of isolation. Granting the evilness of matter and the limitation of body, purification

---218---
amounts to a higher degree of introspection in which matters of sense are forgotten. Augustine, on the other hand, not being convinced that matter as such is evil or that bodies or sense life are evils as such, interprets purification in a positive way—in the rigid use of the body and the senses for the purpose here and now for which God intended them. 

Conceiving of defilement as the prostitution of a value rather than as its limitation by the presence of foreign elements, purification consists simply in the return to the usage for which a thing was intended.

Related to this difference in the idea of purification is another difference: difference in ascetic ideal. From the point of view of Plotinus the employment of the civic virtues was for the purpose of the improvement of the self—civic virtues were but a means of self-purification. Civic duty in the mysticism of Augustine, on the other hand, results from a love for one's fellowmen, not as a means to salvation but as a product of it. Plotinus's reason for suggesting a lack of close association with other men is due to the bad influence they are likely to exert in distracting a person from the process of salvation, in particular, away from the next higher phases of introspection.

Purity in heart for Plotinus means the purity of the heart—

---

71. p. 176.
72. p. 72.
73. pp. 144-146.
complete singlemindedness of intention.74 Purity in heart for Augustine means goodness in the heart—a holy intention or proper attitude.75 The struggle for purity results from the effort to recall the true nature of the soul, in Plotinus.76 In Augustine, it comes as a result of the battle against Satan, against the depravity of the will of man, the allurements of the flesh, etc.77

A sixth difference in their mysticism is a difference in their opinion as to the power by which the soul is able to come into union with the divine and sustain itself in union. In Plotinus, the soul moves under its own power. It is its own guide and source of energy and inspiration.78 In Augustine, the soul moves along the way of ascent led on by a power not its own.79 Salvation comes from without, even within the mystic process. Augustine insists that the improvement of the soul within its various levels is possible only by the extra power of religion.80 In Plotinus, this power is the power of introspection—the releasing of the remarkable powers latent within the mind.81 In Augustine, this power is grace—the grace of God.

---

74. p. 71
75. pp. 176-177.
76. p. 20.
77. p. 187.
78. p. 65.
80. pp. 185-186.
81. p. 20.
which takes over in the midst of man's realization of his own weakness, and which comes more or less as a reward for his humility. Little introspection in involved in the mysticism of Augustine.

The seventh, and last difference that should be noted is their difference in opinion as to the nature of the self at the time of union. Plotinus sees individuation as a vice and suggests that in the final stage the soul loses consciousness of itself as an individual existing item. There is no suggestion at all that this happens in the view of Augustine. As has already been shown, in Augustine's case the soul cannot lose its identity by becoming God in all its being, because, of course, the soul never really changes in its fundamental order at all: it never becomes anything that it was not or ceases being what it already was. In the case of Augustine we might almost argue that the condition of the soul in the union is contrary to that which Plotinus suggests, that is, that the soul is made more acutely aware of its own individuation. In the beatific vision the soul sees itself in its true perspective—it sees itself as it really is in relation to God, the world, and other souls.

Time and time again Augustine asserts that there is a fundamental difference between God, man, and the world in essential natures.

---

82. p. 166.
83. p. 87, footnote, middle.
and essence. It would appear that this would be one of the facts of insight that the soul would be aware of in its time of illumination. The conclusion is at least implicit that the experience of union tends to make the soul not only increasingly aware of its own particular nature, a nature which can be accepted once it is understood, but also increasingly aware of the true nature of other individual things—even as individuals.  

The mysticism of Augustine—indeed, even his mystical theory of being—is closely related to his concept of "light". His high peak of religious ecstasy is itself a revelation, the coming of light into the world and creation itself is by virtue of the shining of "the Unchanging Light," to use Augustine's own term. To speak of God as light, as Augustine does, and to think of the origin of the world, truth, wisdom, and goodness, in terms of the radiation of a light, as Augustine also does, is to identify mysticism and revelation in abstract terms, and in a manner strongly reminiscent of the metaphysics (but not the mysticism) of Plotinus. It is the concern of Augustine's mysticism that God does reveal himself to man, though the coming of light in the form of Christ, the Mediator, in whom the light of God remained steady. The goal of life is the finding of the truth: that which is itself of supreme value because it is steady

---

84. pp. 182, 183, 187.
85. p. 182.
and redeeming. God as the unchanging source of revelation, as the epitome of light itself is the major item of concern in the mysticism of Augustine. We may assume that Augustine was strongly influenced in his formulation of these abstract notions by Plotinus' concept of the unchanging One, the absolute of being, value, and meaning.

The mysticism of Plotinus is the mysticism of naturalism and humanism. By its appeal to values beyond the ordinary and material, it seeks to encourage man with the assurance that the world is better off than it appears to be, that that which appears to be meager and lowly is really noble, after all. This mysticism teaches the dignity of the natural order and locates evil not in the nature of the order itself but in man's false opinion of it. Salvation, hence, lies in a process of re-education: purification, self-discipline, and introspection until the new opinion is reached in the merger of self-consciousness with the All.

The mysticism of Augustine is the mysticism of humility and otherworldliness. Granting that the present world order is bad, it adds that it should not be so, because it was not created bad; and suggests the possibility of its redemption. The values to which it appeals are not within the world order itself but over and beyond it in a realm that does not exist in such a state of depravity. Man is really a rather helpless creature, he cannot
save himself. If he and his world order are to be saved something from this other order must come into his own and arrange for its transformation into the order that it should be—the order that it once was. Even so, man's final salvation is not in reference to this natural order but in his existence in an order apart from this one—in the journey of his soul to heaven, to live everlasting with God, in direct knowledge and communion with his essence, apart from the limitations of earth.
Appendices

I. The Works of Plotinus

The works of Plotinus consist of six series each of which contain nine essays, hence the name "Enneads" (ennead is the Greek word for nine). These essays have been further numbered according to paragraph. The fifty-four essays are titled as follows:

I. The Ethical Treatises
   1. The Animate and the Man
   2. On Virtue
   3. Dialectic (or the Upward Way)
   4. On Happiness (or the Authentic Good of Life)
   5. On Happiness and Extension of Time
   6. On Beauty
   7. On the Primal Good and its Secondary Forms
   8. On Evil, its Nature and Source
   9. On "The Reasoned Dismissal".

II. Psychic and Physical Treatises, Part One
   1. On the Kosmos or on the Heavenly System
   2. The Heavenly Circuit
   3. Are the Stars causes?
   4. Matter in its Two Kinds
   5. On Potentiality and Actuality
   6. Quality and Form-Idea
   7. On Complete Transfusion
   8. Why Distant Objects appear Small
   9. Against those that affirm the Creator of the Kosmos and the Kosmos itself to be Evil (Against the Gnostics.)

III. Psychic and Physical Treatises, Part II
   1. Fate
   2. Providence: First Treatise
   3. Providence: Second Treatise
   4. Our Tutelary Spirit
   5. On Love
   6. The Impassivity of the Unembodied
   7. Time and Eternity
   8. Nature Contemplation and the One
   9. Detached Considerations

continued--
IV. Concerning the Nature of the Soul
1. On the Essence of the Soul (I)
2. On the Essence of the Soul (II)
3. Problems of the Soul (I)
4. Problems of the Soul (II)
5. Problems of the Soul (III)
6. Perception and Memory
7. The Immortality of the Soul
8. The Soul's Descent into Body
9. Are all Souls one?

V. The Divine Mind, Being
1. The Three Initial Hypostases
2. The Origin and Order of the Beings following on the First
3. The Knowing Hypostases and the Transcendent
4. How the Secondaries Rise from The First: and on The One
5. That the Intellectual Beings are not Outside the Intellectual Principle: And on the Nature of the Good
6. That the Principle Transcending Being has no Intellectual Act. What Being has Intelligence primarily and what Being has it secondarily
7. Is there an Ideal Archetype of Particular Beings?
8. On the Intellectual Beauty

VI. On The One and Good
1. On the Kinds of Being (I)
2. On the Kinds of Being (II)
3. On the Kinds of Being (III)
4. On the Integral Omnipresence of the Authentic Existent (I)
5. On the Integral Omnipresence of the Authentic Existent (II)
6. On Numbers
7. On the Origin of Multiplicity in the Ideal Realm and on the Good
8. On Free-Will and the Will of the One
9. On the Good, or The One

II
English Translations of the Works of Plotinus:


III

The Works of Augustine

There are no complete works of Augustine available in English. The most comprehensive edition now available is the eight volumes of his works in the Post Nicene Fathers, First Series, Phillip Schaff, editor, of the Ante-Nicene the Nicene and the Post-Nicene Fathers Series. S. P. C. K. 1889.

A new English translation is now in preparation under Roman Catholic auspices. The series is entitled Fathers of the Church and is by Clima Publishing House. About four volumes on Augustine have now been released.

The three major Latin editions of the Works of Augustine are:

Sancti Aurelii Augustini, Opera


IV

Major Writings of Augustine

De Civitate Dei - The City of God
De Trinitate - Concerning the Trinity
Confessionum libri tredecim - The Confessions
Enchiridion - The Handbook
Eristulae - The Letters
Sermones - Sermons
Rectractationum libri duo - Retractiones
Ennarationes in Psalmos - Exposition of Psalms
Contra Academicos libri tres - Against the Academicians
De Doctrina Christiana, iv libri - Christian Doctrine
De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim - Genesis word for word
De Genesi ad litteram, liber imperfectus - "Imperfect
Contra Pelagium - The Anti-Pelagian Writings
De Musica - Concerning Music
Soliloquiorum, libri ii - The Soliloquies
In Joannis Evangelium tractatus - The Gospel of John
De Quantitate Animae - The Magnitude of the Soul
De immortalitate animae - Concerning the immortality of Soul

etc.
Select Bibliography

I

Articles


II

Books


Bennett, Charles A. A Philosophical Study of Mysticism. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1931.


Bibliography cont.


Bibliography - cont.


III

Texts Used


and other translations otherwise noted.
Vita

Ransom Baine Harris

The writer was born June 5, 1927 in Hudson, North Carolina, the son of Ransom Zelah Harris and Hettie Lee Crouch Harris. He entered Mars Hill College at the age of seventeen and was graduated with the Junior College degree in 1946. In 1948 he entered the University of Richmond and was graduated with the Bachelor of Arts Degree in English in 1948. Subsequent to his graduation he entered the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in Louisville, Kentucky and attained the Bachelor of Divinity Degree in 1951.

In August, 1949, he was ordained as a Baptist minister by Sardis Baptist Church of Hudson, N. C.

In January, 1952, he entered the Graduate School of Philosophy of Duke University and remained in study until June, 1953. Studies pursuant to the Masters Degree at the University of Richmond were completed mainly in the summers between 1948 and 1952.