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Transformational leadership has become one of the dominant paradigms of leadership studies since its first articulation by James MacGregor Burns in 1978.[1] In recent years, however, this formulation of leadership has come under criticism, to include the critique of its ethical implications.[2] One of the most innovative and provocative of such critiques is one by Michael Keeley in this book, grounded in his close study of the political theory of James Madison.[3] Keeley argues that Madison provides a model of leadership that opposes transformational leadership and that avoids many of its ethical pitfalls. This chapter suggests an alternative interpretation of Madison's theory and works; one that places Madison's thought squarely in the historical intellectual current that eventually yielded conceptions of transformational leadership. Moreover, I argue that Madison's continued concern with the proper roles of leaders and followers suggests a remedy for the ethical concerns over transformational leadership that Keeley and others so rightly identify.

TRANSACTIONAL, TRANSFORMING, AND TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP

The terms "transactional leadership," "transforming leadership," and "transformational leadership" entered our vocabulary with James MacGregor Burns's seminal book, *Leadership*. These terms are by now fairly well known. According to Burns, transactional leadership "occurs when one person takes the initiative in making contact with others for the purpose of an exchange of valued things." It is part-and-parcel of much of everyday leadership: the mutually advantageous exchange of economic or political or psychological assets between a leader and followers in the pursuit of a joint objective. It is important to note, however, what transactional leadership is not. It is not an enduring, or particularly uplifting, relationship. "The bargainers have no enduring purpose that holds them together," says Burns. "A leadership act took place, but it was not one that binds leader and follower together in a mutual and continuing pursuit of higher purpose."[4] Burns clearly acknowledges the reality of such leadership, but just as clearly he favors a more rewarding form of leadership relation.

The contrasting form of leadership he calls transforming leadership. "Such leadership occurs when one or more persons *engage* with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality." This sort of leadership has a powerful effect upon the leader-follower relation. "Their purposes, which might have started out separate but related, as in the case of transactional leadership, become fused." Thus leaders and followers are not incidental sojourners for the brief time that their independent purposes intersect (as in transactional leadership); there is a sense of an enduring "common purpose." Moreover, "transforming leadership ultimately becomes *moral* in that it raises the level of human conduct and ethical aspiration of both leader and led, and thus has a transforming effect on both."[5]

A closely related concept is that of transformational leadership. Although Burns sometimes uses the terms transforming and transformational leadership in his text interchangeably, the notion of transformational leadership is better identified with the work of Bernard Bass.[6] Drawing inspiration from Burns work, Bass adapted the concept of transforming leadership and applied it in the context of formal organizations. Under Bass's conceptualization of transformational leadership, leaders who demonstrate charisma, who give individualized consideration [by mentoring followers and the like], and who provide intellectual stimulation to followers, become transformational leaders. The results for the organization can be dramatic, yielding extraordinary levels of effort and organizational effectiveness.[7]

The Burns formulation and the Bass variation of transformational leadership are clearly distinct. Burns directly concerns himself with the morality of the leadership process; Bass has less of such a focus, although his contribution to this collection places him much closer to Burns than was heretofore the case.[8] For purposes of this chapter, the important point is the basic similarity between the two: both acknowledge leadership to be an important process dedicated to some common interest or common good (be it organizational or otherwise). Burns makes the point strongly: "leadership is nothing if not linked to collective purpose."[9] Similarly, Bass notes that "transformational leadership . . . occurs when . . . employees . . . look beyond their own self-interest for the good of the group."[10] That commitment to the common good links both formulations to the thought of James Madison.

In this chapter, the term "transformational" leadership is generally used to embrace both transforming and transformational leadership as portrayed here. "Transforming" leadership only appears when the moral overtones of Burns' work are at issue. Notions of "transactional" leadership come into play only in relation to the model posited by Michael Keeley.

THE KEELEY MODEL OF MADISONIAN LEADERSHIP, AND A REFUTATION

Keeley, in his intriguing essay entitled "The Trouble with Transformational Leadership: Toward a Federalist Ethic for Organizations,"[11] asserts that the existence of self-interested factions in society, organizations, and groups has been labeled by many leadership writers as dysfunctional. Leadership theories such as transformational leadership have been created, in part, to transcend such self-interest and restore a unified and productive focus to the leadership process. Keeley draws upon a close study of James Madison to suggest a different and better way to handle self-interested factions: One should embrace them (or at least acknowledge that they are inevitable) and construct a polity or organizational structure that allows for the free play of faction. In doing so, not only would one be likely to attain the best possible result, but this approach would also obviate the questionable ethics of transformational leadership, where dissenting individuals are coerced into accepting stances and values inimical to their personal beliefs.

To reach these conclusions, Keeley looks to some of Madison's most famous utterances—a key speech in the Constitutional Convention, some of his noted *Federalist* essays, and an almost equally celebrated private letter to Thomas Jefferson in the fall of 1787. From these sources, Keeley details both Madison's structural solutions to the problem of

self-interested factions, as well as the underlying beliefs that led Madison to such a formulation. In order to faithfully assess Keeley's interpretation, it is important to isolate and identify the content of both the structural solution and the underlying assumptions that Keeley posits.

Madison's identification of and resolution to the problem of faction is among the most well known in American history. In numerous venues in the years surrounding the drafting of the Constitution, Madison had acknowledged the reality that society, far from being a unified whole, was instead composed of any number of self-interested "factions." Although this may seem a commonplace in today's diverse, individualistic world, Madison's insight was nothing short of revolutionary in a world still steeped in the classical republicanism of the eighteenth century. Moreover, Madison offered a variety of solutions to this new and troubling reality. The most famous of these he sketched in *Federalist* No. 10: The pernicious effects of self-interested faction could be lessened by making it more difficult for a "majority faction" (the only truly dangerous kind) to come into being. The method for doing so was to create a polity so "uncentralized"—to use Keeley's word—that majority factions would find it difficult to form. Keeley also argues that the Constitutional system of federalism and checks and balances also served the function of limiting domination by one faction.[12]

Of equal importance to Keeley's portrayal of the Madisonian solution are the essential underlying beliefs that he attributes to Madison. Several of these can be identified. They are set out here to facilitate extended discussion later in this chapter.

(1) Madison (according to Keeley) opposed any attempt to transcend or merge the various factions. This was unlikely to be successful, at best, and at worst could lead to tyranny. An assumption underlying this is that there is no "common good" around which to coalesce.[13]

(2) Madison had insufficient faith in leaders to rely upon them to remedy the situation. Although some leaders (such as George Washington) would undoubtedly benefit society's interests, leaders as a whole were a lot that was not to be trusted. It was much wiser to create a system of laws and structural protections against overweening leaders.[14]

(3) Likewise, Madison had little trust in the virtue of the people (followers). Much of Keeley's discussion of Madison's concern with faction suggests such a conclusion, which is supported by Keeley's remark that the framers "chose to protect us from the misdeeds of scoundrels and the frailties of ordinary men and women."[15]

With such assumptions concerning Madison's views to drive his analysis, it is little wonder that Keeley concludes that Madison embraced what we would come to know as transactional leadership. With no common good, and leaders and followers who could not consistently be

trusted to do "the right thing," it is the only logical conclusion to be drawn from Madison's extensive commentary on the problem of factions. It makes little sense for leaders to do more than allow the factions to compete, and for the government or organization to, in Keeley's words, "manage factional interests much as a market responds to consumer preferences;" that is, to ensure a fairness in the competition. Notions of collective action are obviated by the underlying assumptions.

This analysis of Madisonian thought by Keeley is impressive in many ways. He draws upon several key documents of the Madisonian corpus, and his thesis is correct in many of its particulars. However, a reading of the entire corpus of Madison's writings spanning a long and prolific career also yields an alternative interpretation. When one views Madison's political writings in their entirety, a more complex and sophisticated picture emerges. Viewed from that perspective, a set of base assumptions contrary to those that Keeley posits appears. This modified interpretation of Madison's core beliefs, in turn, supports a quite different interpretation of his views of what constitutes appropriate leadership. The ensuing analysis, then, eventually leads us back to the concept of transformational leadership. The next sections of this chapter revisit the Madisonian assumptions posited by Keeley.[16]

JAMES MADISON AND THE COMMON GOOD

There can be no question that James Madison was mightily concerned with the impact of faction upon society, or that he constructed elaborate mechanisms to retard its impact. In doing so, however, Madison never embraced the notion that faction was a positive development, nor did he renounce belief in the possibility of transcending faction through the pursuit of some overarching common good. Indeed his very definition of "faction" inescapably implies the existence of some such permanent common interest. In his famous *Federalist* No. 10, Madison defined the term: "By faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse or passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to *the permanent and aggregate interests of the community*" (emphasis supplied).[17] Thus Madison's elaborate attempts to balance factions can only be truly understood in terms of the real threat of faction to the common good. Madison embraced such a common good, and devoted much of his life to securing its ascendancy.

The proof of Madison's commitment to a common good need not be limited to such indirect evidence as the quotation from No. 10. Indeed, such a commitment was one of two driving forces (the other being a commitment to popular sovereignty) that shaped his entire career.

Madison's conception of the public good was unmistakable and had substantive implications. Madison was heir to the republican tradition, in which, according to historian Gordon Wood, "no phrase except 'liberty' was invoked more often . . . than 'the public good.'" Indeed, "the peculiar excellence of republican government was that . . . by definition it had no other end than the welfare of the people: *res publica*, the public affairs, or the public good."[18] As Madison put it, "the public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued, and . . . no form of government whatever has any other value, than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object."[19]

Moreover, that public good was distinct, identifiable, and enduring. Madison referred to "the permanent and aggregate interests of the community"[20] and proceeded to outline what this encompassed. First and foremost, it involved "the necessity of sacrificing private opinions and partial interests to the public good."[21] In addition, a regime committed to the common good must embody liberty and justice. This, in turn, required the substantive protection of both personal and property rights. Madison, drawing from David Hume, argued that "justice is the end of government,"[22] and that this justice consisted, as historian Drew McCoy phrased it, "largely of a respect for the property rights of others." Indeed, "Madison believed, above all," McCoy went on, "in a permanent public good and immutable standards of justice, both of which were linked to the rules of property that stabilized social relationships and that together defined the proper ends of republican government."[23] "No government," Madison concluded, "will long be respected, without being truly respectable; nor be truly respectable, without possessing a certain portion of order and stability."[24]

In sum, Madison held to a conception of the common good characterized by a priority of the general interest over local or individual interests, and a polity devoted to liberty and justice in the form of the protection of individual liberty and rights of property. This, in turn, would lead to an orderly and stable regime. It was a threat to precisely these beliefs in the 1780s that spawned Madison's constitutional theorizing.

The developments of the 1780s are generally well known,[25] but Madison's "take" on these matters is important. "The symptoms . . . are truly alarming," he wrote Jefferson.[26] Although Madison was fully aware of the weaknesses of the Confederation government,[27] his real concern was at the state level: "No small share of the embarrassments of America is to be charged on the blunders of our [state] governments," he wrote.[28] In particular he was aghast at the instability caused by "new men" in government, the threat to creditors inherent in paper money and debtor relief legislation, and a general slide toward chaos.[29] Per-

haps his concern is best captured by his report to Jefferson of conditions in Virginia on the eve of ratification: "Our information from Virginia is far from being agreeable. . . . The people . . . are said to be generally discontented. A paper emission is again a topic among them. So is an installment of all debts in some places and making property a tender in others. . . . In several Counties the prisons & Court Houses & Clerks offices have been willfully burnt. In Green Briar the course of Justice has been mutinously stopped."[30]

The fact of these developments was bad enough; much worse were the implications. The activities at the state level challenged standards of property and justice, and led to a lack of "wisdom and steadiness" in government.[31] As Madison put it, "complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable; that the public good is disregarded in the conflict of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minority party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority."[32] That placed the issue in its starkest form: Popular sovereignty appeared to be undermining the public good.

Madison turned his considerable talents toward devising a solution. The key issue of the age was how to reconcile popular sovereignty and the common good. As Madison was to put it in the *Federalist*, "to secure the public good, and private rights against the danger of such a faction, is the great object to which our inquiries are directed." In his famous phrase, Americans must find "a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government."[33] His solution was to be one of the most innovative and important developments in political history—America's Constitutional system.

Although it is unnecessary to explore all the details of this familiar document, it is important to explore the extent to which Madison hewed to his articulated priority of securing the common good. There can be little doubt that Madison continued to view the common good, as he defined it, as the ultimate objective. Madison was well aware that by 1787 conditions were such that the public was looking for relief from the existing conditions. As he wrote to Jefferson, "my own idea is that the public mind will now or in a very little time receive any thing that promises stability to the public Councils and security to private rights."[34] This concern with what Madison would label the public good would be his guiding light throughout the convention. On May 31, in one of his first addresses before the delegates, Madison assessed his charge: "He [Madison] would shrink from nothing which should be found essential to such a form of Government as would provide for the

safety, liberty, and happiness of the Community. This being the end of all our deliberations, all the necessary means for attaining it must, however reluctantly, be submitted to."[35] This included, he added in remarks several weeks later, "the necessity of providing more effectually for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation of Justice. Interferences with these," he added, "were evils which had more perhaps than any thing else, produced the convention."[36] Madison's efforts to preserve the common good were chiefly structural, and he kept his eyes on his ultimate objective at all times.[37] When he realized that a "pure democracy" was "no cure from the mischief of faction," and that "the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties," he recommended a representative republic, which would "refine and enlarge the public views . . . and be more consonant with the public good."[38]

The examples of Madison's commitment to what he considered to be a definitive and permanent common good throughout his long career can be multiplied almost without limit.[39] For purposes of this chapter, the important conclusion is that Madison did, indeed, believe in such a common interest, and in the value of attempting to achieve it. The next sections revisit his view of the nature of leaders and followers, and their roles in this quest. After those are ascertained, the implications for Madison's connection to transformational leadership become patent.

MADISON'S FAITH IN FOLLOWERS

Madison's view of the people—who constitute the followers in the polity—was complex and nuanced. There is no doubt that at certain points in his career—most notably in the 1780s and after 1820—he was deeply troubled by the seeming lack of wisdom demonstrated by the masses. The people could (and often did) become wrapped up in their perceived short-term, selfish interests, to the detriment of their own long-term common good. Madison recognized this fact and often lamented it. However, this did not at all mean that he had no faith in the people. To the contrary, the second of his two core beliefs (the first being his commitment to a common good) was his dedication to a government stemming from the people. If this seeming contradiction can be resolved, much of Madison's thought—and its relationship to transformational leadership—becomes clear.

One of the pole stars that guided all of Madison's thought and action was an unquenchable faith in government by the people—popular sovereignty. "The ultimate authority," he argued, "wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone." All governments are "but agents and trustee of the people," he added, must be "dependent

on the great body of citizens," and "derive all . . . powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people." [40]

The era of the American Revolution had begun with the rather naive view that "the people" were a homogeneous community, peopled by "virtuous" citizens willing to sacrifice individual desires for the good of all. The events of the 1780s, with "new men" (non-elites) in politics scrambling to promote selfish interests, soon put the lie to such credulous notions.[41] That placed the issue in its starkest form: Popular sovereignty appeared to be undermining the public good.

This forced Madison to do some deep thinking about the roles and capabilities of the people and their leaders in a regime of popular sovereignty. He developed a sophisticated and nuanced conceptualization of the abilities of the people, one capable of legitimizing a multiplicity of adaptive responses to a series of challenges to the common good under the rule of the people.

Madison began by acknowledging the premise of popular sovereignty, but with a caveat. In responding to Jefferson's call for frequent conventions, Madison had agreed that "as the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter . . . is derived; it seems strictly consonant to the republican theory, to recur to the same original authority" for any revisions. Quickly, however, he hastened to add: "but there appear to be insuperable objections against the proposed recurrence to the people."[42] The problem was that the people, as a whole, were not capable of such an undertaking. As he expressed in correspondence with Edmund Randolph, "Whatever respect may be due to the rights of private judgment, and no man feels more of it than I do, there can be no doubt that there are subjects to which the capacities of the bulk of mankind are unequal,"[43] and the making of a Constitution was one of them. It "certainly surpasses the judgment of the greater part of them," he added to Jefferson.[44]

The matter went back to the issue of the public good. To expect the people as a whole to keep in mind the overarching interests of the general population, and to respect the property rights of the minority, was too much to ask, particularly in the passions of the moment. "At present," Madison commented, "the public mind is neither sufficiently cool nor sufficiently informed for so delicate an operation."[45] "The *passions* therefore not the *reason*, of the public, would sit in judgment. But it is the reason of the public alone that ought to controul and regulate the government."[46] "Under all these circumstances," he wrote to George Turberville, "it seems scarcely to be presumable that the deliberations of the body could be conducted in harmony, or terminate in the general good."[47]

In one respect, then, Madison had doubts about the people as the source of the common good. "In a nation of philosophers," Madison wrote in *Federalist* No. 49, there need be no concern for achieving the common good. "But a nation of philosophers," he went on to say, "is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of kings wished for by Plato."[48] As he put it to Jefferson, while "enlightened Statesmen, or the benevolent philosopher" might be able to rise above faction and interest and majority passion, "the bulk of mankind . . . are neither Statesmen nor Philosophers."[49]

Nevertheless, those doubts were but one part of Madison's formulation. He joined his concerns about the people with a paradoxical yet ultimately complementary underlying faith that the people had sufficient virtue to support the public good. Madison was quite candid in this regard. "As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust," he acknowledged, "so there are other qualities in human nature, which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government," he asserted, "presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form."[50] Indeed, "to suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or happiness without any virtue in the people is a chimerical idea."[51] Madison took solace from his own state of Virginia. "The case of Virga. seems to prove," he wrote to Jefferson, "that the body of sober & steady people, even of the lower order, are tired of the vicicitudes, injustice, and follies which have so much characterised public measures, and are impatient for some change which promises stability."[52]

Though these views of the people appear at first blush to be contradictory, in reality they were not, and it was Madison's view of the role of popular leaders that bridged the gap. Madison went on to articulate the nexus between such leaders and the people. Madison acknowledged his ambiguity concerning the capabilities of the people. Rejecting those in the Virginia ratifying convention who had no faith in the people, Madison stated, "I consider it reasonable to conclude, that they will as readily do their duty, as deviate from it." However, he was not naive. He could not "place unlimited confidence in them, and expect nothing but the most exalted integrity and sublime virtue." The saving grace lay in their relationship with their leaders. "I go on this great republican principle, that the people will have virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom. . . . If there be sufficient virtue and intelligence in the community, it will be exercised in the selection of these men."[53] This was the nub of it. Popular sovereignty and the common good were indeed compatible, if only leaders and followers united their particular virtues in pursuit of the common good. Much of

the remainder of Madison's career was devoted to just this endeavor (we return to this topic in the next section).

Before turning to Madison's view of leaders, however, it is important to recognize that Madison's own views of the role of the people shifted somewhat as times themselves changed. A brief example from the 1790s should suffice. By the 1790s, the challenge to the common good had been turned on its head. Rather than the threat of popular passion running amok (as in the 1780s), the problem now was that a group of elite leaders, headed by Alexander Hamilton, were pursuing their selfish interests at the expense of the majority of the people and, of course, the common good.

Because the source of the threat to the common good was now reversed—rather than from unruly state democracies, it now came from a "financial aristocracy, led and encouraged by an officer of the executive department, who had acquired a dominant influence,"[54] Madison was led to rethink the proper role of leaders and the people. He recognized that the great bulk of the people agreed with his position. "On the republican [Madisonian] side," he wrote, "the superiority of numbers is so great, their sentiments are so decided, and . . . there is a common sentiment and common interest" in favor of reversing the Hamiltonian trend.[55] This led him logically to turn to the people for assistance in redressing the problem. Having established a government based on the people, Madison now argued that "to secure all the advantages of such a system, every good citizen will be at once a centinel over the rights of the people; over the authorities of the confederal government; and over both the rights and the authorities of the intermediate governments."[56]

This stance involved a seeming departure from his position in the 1780s, when he had fully trusted the people only to have virtue enough to select proper leaders. And, indeed, Madison did rethink the nexus between leaders and followers that he had posited in the 1780s, yet his final conclusions were less contradictory than might at first appear. In confronting the challenge of the 1790s, Madison returned to the issue of leaders and followers in an essay entitled "Who Are the Best Keepers of the People's Liberties?" Here, he did not suddenly abandon his concerns about the capabilities of the people; "the people *may* betray themselves," he wrote, and the lessons of history—recent history—bore this out. Yet, as in the 1780s, his was not a totally negative view of the capability of the people. Then, he had acknowledged that the people had some "virtue," certainly enough to choose enlightened leaders. Now, facing a small group of leaders who were not pursuing the common good, Madison expanded his view of the obligations of the people. Rather than followers who "think of nothing but obedience,

leaving the care of their liberties to their wiser rulers," Madison held that the new regime placed a larger responsibility upon the people. His answer, then, to the query "Who are the best keepers of the people's liberties?" was "The people themselves." He went on, "The sacred trust can be no where so safe as in the hands most interested in preserving it." But Madison attached an important addendum to his seeming reliance upon the people and their wisdom. "The people," he observed, "ought to be enlightened, to be awakened, and to be united" in their efforts at oversight.[57] And the logical candidates to guide this process remained leaders who retained a sense of the common good. Madison, then, in responding to the unexpected development of misguided leaders in control of the new polity, adapted his view of the role of the people in a regime of popular sovereignty, but did not abandon his core belief that the people needed to be directed by those who knew better. Much of Madison's activity in the 1790s reflected this belief.

In sum, far from despising the people and their capabilities, Madison was deeply committed to the long-term interests of the followers as the ultimate measure of the common good, and he maintained that the followers (the people) played an important role in securing that common interest. However, at all times the role of leaders in this quest was paramount. We now revisit the last of the assumptions about the beliefs of James Madison.

JAMES MADISON AND THE ROLE OF LEADERS IN SECURING THE COMMON GOOD

Madison's frequent outrage at leaders who placed their own interests above that of the long-term interest of their followers must not mask the important role he assigned to appropriate leaders in the pursuit of the common good. The key term is "appropriate leaders": those who could transcend their own self-interest, perceive the common good, and help followers to do so also. These leaders were the appropriate individuals to help followers rise above their immediate interests to embrace the good of society as a whole. Such leaders, who in another day and age might be called transformational leaders, were at the heart of Madison's political philosophy.

There can be no question that Madison often showed concern over the actions of the putative leaders of society. In a remarkable document written in early 1787 and titled "Vices of the Political System of the U. States,"[58] he detailed several of the abuses of the 1780s. More important, Madison contemplated the possible causes. One lay in the leaders of the era, who often placed "ambition [and] personal interest [above the]

public good."[59] Yet society needed leaders; but these needed leaders must be of a different stripe.

Madison recognized the need for leaders, even (perhaps especially) in a regime grounded in the people. "There can be no doubt that there are subjects to which the capacities of mankind are unequal," he had said. In such cases, "they must and will be governed by those with whom they happen to have acquaintance and confidence."[60] It had ever been so. Looking back through the ages, Madison noted that "in every case reported by ancient history, in which government has been established with deliberation and consent, the task . . . has been performed by some individual citizen of pre-eminent wisdom and approved integrity."[61] More recently, the example of Virginia added further proof. "In Virginia," he observed, "the mass of people have been . . . much accustomed to be guided by their rulers on all new and intricate questions."[62]

In a regime of popular sovereignty, the nature of these leaders and their relationship to the people became all-important. Madison stated the general principle to Edmund Randolph: There must be "a fortunate coincidence of leading opinions, and a general confidence of the people in those who may recommend" such opinions.[63] But the specifics were critical. Appropriate leaders must be selected. Only "the purest and noblest characters" were appropriate; those who "feel most strongly the proper motives to pursue the end of their appointment."[64] And those "proper motives" went to the heart of the matter. "The aim of every political constitution," noted Madison, "is, or ought to be, first, to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern and most virtue to pursue, the common good of society."[65] Moreover, his view of what constituted that common good remained consistent. Such leaders should be "individuals of extended views," who "will give wisdom and steadiness" to government, and who are "interested in preserving the rights of property."[66]

When Madison turned to create a new polity to resolve the perceived problems of the 1780s, he did much more than just erect a structure that would help mediate opposing factions. Such an interpretation underestimates the extent to which Madison counted upon the "right" sort of leaders to guide the new polity. Historian Gordon Wood has demonstrated the elite nature of Federalist constitutionalism, but Madison's own commitment to ensuring that the proper sort of leaders would be in place has been underappreciated.[67]

His chief vehicle for securing proper leadership was the republican form itself. By creating a representative republic, it became possible to actually improve upon popular rule. Under a republic, it was possible to "refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens [that is, leaders], whose wisdom

may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations." Under such a system, Madison concluded, "it may well happen that the public voice pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the people themselves."[68] Madison explained this startling conclusion by demonstrating that the leaders of a republic, particularly a large republic, would be "men who possess the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive and established characters,"[69] and thereby would keep the public good in view.

A closer look at Madison's explanation of the specific departments of the new national government reinforces his emphasis on securing proper leadership for the new government. The House of Representatives demonstrates nicely his nexus between the people and their leaders. The House, he said, "should rest on the solid foundation of the people themselves," and direct election of Representatives reinforced "a clear principle of free Government."[70] Despite its "dependence on . . . the people," the goal remained of "obtain[ing] for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good of the society."[71] This was to be achieved by the large election districts. "In so great a number," Madison noted, "a fit representative would be most likely to be found."[72]

The Senate, through its structure and the individuals who would make it up, was even more likely to uphold the common good. Indeed, that was its essential raison d'être. In speaking of the Senate, Madison suggested "that such an institution may sometimes be necessary, as a defence to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions. . . . In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason, justice and truth can regain their authority over the public mind?"[73] Such a body required appropriate leaders, so Madison called for more stringent qualifications for eligibility, to ensure "greater . . . stability of character."[74] This would also be ensured by the indirect election of that body.[75] Given these precautions, Madison was relatively sure that the actions of its members would correlate to "the . . . prosperity of the community."[76]

The executive and judiciary could also be expected to be inhabited by appropriate individuals, with a similar positive impact on the common good. Both the executive and judicial branches could be "useful to the Community at large as an additional check agst. a pursuit of . . . unwise & unjust measures."[77] Undoubtedly the president would be an individual "of distinguished character" and "an object of general attention and

esteem,"[78] also elected indirectly. The executive could be expected to use his rather formidable powers in pursuit of the public good. "The independent condition of the Ex[ecutive] . . . will render him a just Judge," and help ensure "the safety of a minority in Danger of oppression from an unjust and interested majority."[79] The judiciary, to be nominated by that executive, who is "likely to select fit characters," will be "independent tribunals of justice [who] will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians" of the public interest.[80]

In sum, throughout the new polity one could expect to find just the sort of leaders Madison had said were necessary for the accomplishment of the public good in a regime of popular sovereignty: men of broad views who would respect the property rights of the minority and seek the good of the whole, irrespective of factional politics.

Again, it is useful to make a brief foray into the 1790s to reinforce the staying power of Madison's commitment to good leadership. Recall that the challenge to the common good in these years was a small cadre of self-interested leaders who were attempting to foist selfish policies upon an unsuspecting citizenry. It was in these circumstances that Madison sought to invoke the latent power of the oppressed followers.

Given his views of the respective roles of leaders and the people, the concept of public opinion became key. Public opinion, which Madison defined as "that of the majority," "sets bounds to every government, and is the real sovereign in every free one."[81] Madison recognized that "all power has been traced up to opinion," and that "the most arbitrary government is controuled where the public opinion is fixed."[82] The problem was that "the Country is too much uninformed, and too inert to speak for itself."[83] "How devoutly is it to be wished, then, that the public opinion of the United States should be enlightened," Madison wrote. The solution was to turn to appropriate leaders. "In proportion as Government is influenced by opinion," Madison observed, "it must be so, by whatever influences opinion."[84] Leaders were just such an influence.

Madison's tactics can best be demonstrated by way of an example. In 1793, as the policies of the Hamiltonians seemed to have reached dangerous proportions, Madison wrote to Jefferson with a plan. "If an early & well digested effort for calling out the real sense of the people be not made," he wrote, "there is room to apprehend they may in many places be misled." Having consulted with a fellow Virginia leader (probably Monroe), Madison outlined their strategy. "We shall endeavor at some means of repelling the danger; particularly by setting on foot expressions of the public mind in important Counties, and under the auspices of respectable names." He gave an example. "I have written with this view to Caroline [county], and have suggested a proper train of ideas,

and a wish that Mr. P[endleton] would patronise the measure. Such an example," he predicted, "would have great effect." Although drafted, proposed, and marshalled through by popular leaders, the result "would be considered as an authentic specimen of the *Country* temper." The only real problem with the plan was a lack of acceptable leaders. "The want of opportunities, and our ignorance of trust worthy characters," Madison concluded, "will circumscribe our efforts in this way to a very narrow compass."[85]

These examples suggest that Madison did perceive a need for leaders, but these were very special leaders indeed. They were men who could transcend their own private interests, perceive common interests salient to all members of the society, and who had the ability to arouse followers to recognize that common good and act accordingly. This sounds surprisingly like many things written about transformational leadership in our own day. It is to that connection that we now turn.

THE MADISONIAN LEGACY IN TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP

Michael Keeley has argued that "popular media, communitarian writings, and recent management literature suggest that communities and organizations are rent by factional mischief: by individuals and groups who pursue their own selfish interests without regard for the common good. An emerging solution to this problem is 'transformational' leadership, which seeks to refocus individuals' attention on higher visions and collective goals."[86] This is true. James MacGregor Burns describes transforming leadership as occurring when the purposes of the participants in the leadership relation "become fused."[87] Bernard Bass characterizes transformational leadership as a process that causes "individuals to put aside selfish aims for the sake of some greater, common good."[88] Moreover, both Burns and Bass note the key role leaders play in this process. As Burns puts it, "the leader takes the initiative in making the leader-led connection. . . . Leaders continue to take the major part in maintaining and effectuating the relationship with followers and will have the major role in ultimately carrying out the combined purposes of leaders and followers."[89]

And Bernard Bass indicates that "transformational leadership . . . occurs when leaders broaden and elevate the interests of employees . . . and when they stir their employees to look beyond their own self interest for the good of the group."[90]

Having traced the central tenets of Madisonian thought, the paralellism between Madison and the modern writers on transformational leadership should be obvious. Indeed, it could be said that transforma-

tional leadership addresses a problem left unresolved by Madison. Throughout his career, Madison struggled with the tension that often existed between his two priorities of the common good and popular sovereignty. That had been at the heart of his elitist solution to the problem of majority tyranny in the 1780s (that is, the Constitution). His answer in the 1780s had been to create a polity that assured the wise leadership of those committed to the common good. Regrettably, at the end of his career (after 1820), with the overwhelming tide of majoritarian democracy sweeping all before it, Madison despaired of ever finding a lasting solution.[91] James Madison might have been comforted had his wide circle of correspondents included James MacGregor Burns. With his transforming leadership, Burns sought to identify a process to achieve the common good, even in a democracy—by raising the followers themselves to new levels of insight and commitment in pursuit of shared interests. In this sense, then, transformational leadership represents an advanced stage of Madisonian leadership, dedicated to the same end: achieving the common good.

An appreciation of Madison and the wellsprings of his thought also provides richness and depth to our understanding of the implications of transformational leadership. For example, though such writers as Burns and Bass have been instrumental in developing the concept (and numerous others have elaborated it), having a sense of Madison's experiences—such as his deeply held commitment to securing the good of all while facing the threats of faction and self-interest on one hand, and the dangers of overweening leaders on the other—permits a new perspective on one of the most important issues related to transformational leadership: its ethical implications. It is that to which we now turn.

JAMES MADISON AND THE ETHICS OF TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP

Michael Keeley's study of Madisonian thought raises one other important issue that pertains to transformational leadership: the ethical danger of individual coercion in the interests of a perceived common good. Keeley's argument draws inspiration from his depiction of Madison's concern for oppressed minorities in the polity. The source of the difficulty remains the reality that there are different interests in society. Focusing on Madison's efforts to resolve "the problem of controlling self-interested organizational behavior," Keeley suggests that Madison's main concern was "the problems that zealots—armed by moral inspiration, mobilized and purposeful—might create for persons who disagreed with them."[92] Applying this insight to modern transfor-

mational leadership, Keeley concludes that "unless leaders are able to transform everyone and create an absolute unanimity of interests (a very special case), transformational leadership produces simply a majority will that represents the interests of the strongest faction."[93] Unethical individual coercion inevitably follows in the train of such leadership.

Keeley's ethical critique of transformational leadership extends beyond Madison. He argues that in today's world "there is no agreement or commitment to the public good, no common vision, no mutual purpose." "Transformational leadership," he asserts, "aims to get people's thoughts off distributional questions and refocus them on common goals, or communal interests." But "the ethical justification for diverting attention from individual to communal interests is unclear, given the hypothetical nature of the latter." Instead, organizational policies and stances are more likely to represent the personal interests of one or more stakeholders. That being the case, "it seems deceptive to win other persons' support by calling those [private agendas] . . . *common goals, interests,* etc."[94]

Although Keeley may have misinterpreted Madison to some extent,[95] the ethical critique of transformational leadership he articulates remains valid, perhaps more so today than ever before. It behooves us to consider that critique carefully, and to consider potential remedies. Ironically, perhaps, it is James Madison who provides the appropriate "jumping-off place"; he directs us toward a potentially viable solution.

Even though it is not necessary to fully accept Keeley's dismissal of the possibility of there being any common good in an organizational setting, the tremendous diversity in today's workplace and society cautions against a casual rejection of his concern about the coercion of individual interests and values in the name of a common societal or organizational cause. As Keeley suggests, to force group members to participate in pursuing objectives that do not mesh with their substantive needs has serious ethical implications. Given the diversity in constituent values, needs, and interests, perhaps the ultimate ethical challenge in today's organizations is to devise a process whereby the "common" objective to be pursued is congruent with follower needs and interests.

To be fair, James MacGregor Burns has never intended anything less, and Bernard Bass in this volume echoes Burns's stance. Burns has defined "moral leadership" as "a relationship . . . of mutual needs, aspirations and values. . . . Moral leadership emerges from, and returns to, the fundamental wants and needs, aspirations, and values of the followers."[96] Bass adds that "the truly transformational leader concerned with an ethical philosophy in managing an organization con-

ceives of the organization's ultimate criterion of worth as the extent to which it satisfies all of its stakeholders."[97] The key question then becomes: Is it possible to achieve this in a diverse constituency?

Interestingly, it is James Madison himself who (albeit unknowingly) points to a potential solution. Throughout his career, Madison had struggled with the tension that often emerged between his dual commitments to popular sovereignty and the common good. In doing so, he often confronted a dilemma somewhat parallel to the concern voiced by Keeley: How could one secure the common good (in which Madison deeply believed) when the followers often misunderstood its nature and hence disagreed with Madison's perception of it? Throughout most of his career, Madison consoled himself with the knowledge that there was a unitary common interest to be had, and that appropriate leaders—if only they could be identified and placed in positions of influence—could lead the polity in securing it. To his increasing dismay, developments after 1820 thwarted Madison's preferred solution. By 1820, the sweep of mass democracy had made obsolete the role of elite leadership. Most individuals now agreed with Richmond newspaper editor Thomas Ritchie: "The day of prophets and oracles has passed; . . . we are free citizens of a free country, and must think for ourselves."[98]

Despite Madison's creative attempts to ensure stability, the protection of property rights, and justice in a majoritarian democracy, he gradually recognized that none of his proposed solutions was finding favor with the populace. Worse, events of the 1820s suggested that misguided popular passion was to be an ongoing reality. At the end of a long career devoted to seeking the congruence of rule by the people and the pursuit of the common good, Madison realized that a choice between these sometimes competing objectives needed to be made. When finally faced with this stark reality, Madison did not hesitate. As early as the 1820s, he had indicated his priority. In a letter to Jefferson, he had bemoaned the new reality, and noted that "the will of the nation being omnipotent for right, is so for wrong also." Nevertheless, "the will of the nation being in the majority, the minority must submit to that danger of oppression as an evil infinitely less than the danger to the whole nation from a will independent of [the majority]."[99] Thus, although the newly emergent majoritarian democracy held profound concerns for Madison, he chose to cast his lot with the perceived interests of the followers, even though at times this came at the expense of the common good.[100]

This focus on the supremacy of follower interests points the way to ethical transformational leadership. James MacGregor Burns, though acknowledging the important role that leaders must play, has also taken care to point out that for leadership to be moral, followers "in responding to leaders . . . [must] have adequate knowledge of all leaders and

programs and the capacity to choose among those alternatives."[101] This is the key. If transformational leadership is to seek to attain a common interest among relevant stakeholders, the determination of what that good is must derive from the stakeholders themselves. Ethical transformational leadership requires no less.

Although the difficulty of achieving this lofty goal is legitimately daunting, modern leadership scholar Ron Heifetz suggests an approach to leadership that promises a solution. Heifetz introduces a creative process he calls "adaptive work," which he describes as "the activity of mobilizing a social system to face tough problems, or to adapt to challenges," or "the activity of mobilizing people to clarify their aspirations and adapt to challenges they face."[102] The key point in Heifetz's work is that the responsibility falls upon the followers to work through their differences in values, interests, and agendas. The role of the leader remains key; he or she has the obligation to keep the focus upon the central issues, to maintain a productive atmosphere for productive disagreement, and to ensure that all relevant stakeholders have a voice.[103] This move toward common ground will assuredly involve conflict, but if handled correctly, it will also yield a consensus concerning the acceptable direction of the organization. This consensus, as Bernard Bass explains, does not necessarily mean total agreement. "In true consensus," Bass says, "the interests of all are fully considered, but the final decision may fail to please everyone completely."[104] Even though not all may completely agree with the outcome, all have had their say and, ideally, are in agreement on fundamentals. If organizations have pursued such a process, ethical lapses are likely to be at a minimum.

This process of managed conflict, where leaders seek to help all stakeholders determine their own conception of the common interests to be pursued, is a far cry from a *laissez-faire* approach in which leaders merely serve as gatekeepers for contending factions who have no interest in a shared common purpose. This sort of transformational leadership fulfills Burns's notion of transforming leadership. "Every person, group, and society has latent tension and hostility," Burns acknowledges. "Leadership acts as an inciting and triggering force in the conversion of conflicting demands, values, and goals into significant behavior."[105] Thus conflict, properly managed, can lead to an acceptable version of the common good. Ethical transformational leadership, then, really involves leaders and followers working together to determine and achieve mutual interests. As leadership scholar Gill Hickman has stated, "rather than being unethical, true transformational leaders identify the core values and unifying purposes of the organization and its members, liberate their human potential, and foster plural leadership and effective, satisfied followers."[106]

CONCLUSION: JAMES MADISON, THE COMMON GOOD, AND THE ETHICS OF TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP

Transformational leadership has become a central theme of modern leadership conceptions. As such, it deserves close and critical study. Therefore Michael Keeley has done us a great service in utilizing the thought of James Madison to fashion an ethical critique of this form of leadership and to repudiate its validity. My own explorations of Madison yield a somewhat different "take" on Madison and his relevance for transformational leadership. I see Madison's thought as a legitimate precursor to today's conceptions of transformational leadership, because both seek to realize the achievement of a common good. Indeed, James MacGregor Burns may have gone Madison one better; he proposes a type of leadership that has the potential to resolve a problem Madison gave up on as unsolvable: that of creating a nexus between the desires of followers and conceptions of the common good. If this is done correctly, transformational leadership can stand as a beacon for those interested in the pursuit of ethical leadership.

NOTES

1. James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978).
2. For a summation of such critiques, together with a rebuttal, read Chapter 8, "The Ethics of Transformational Leadership," by Bernard Bass.
3. See Chapter 6, "The Trouble with Transformational Leadership: Toward a Federalist Ethic for Organizations," by Michael Keeley.
4. Burns, 19–20.
5. Ibid., 20.
6. Bernard Bass, *Leadership and Performance beyond Expectations* (New York: Free Press, 1985). For a cogent discussion of the contrast between Burns and Bass, see Richard A. Couto, "The Transformation of Transforming Leadership," in J. Thomas Wren, ed., *The Leader's Companion: Insights on Leadership through the Ages* (New York: Free Press, 1995), 102–7.
7. See generally Bass, *Leadership and Performance.*
8. Bass, "The Ethics of Transformational Leadership."
9. Burns, 3.
10. Bernard Bass, "From Transactional to Transformational Leadership: Learning to Share the Vision," *Organizational Dynamics* 18 (1990): 21.
11. See Chapter 6, p. 111.
12. Ibid., 121.
13. Ibid., 135.
14. Ibid., 117.
15. Ibid., 118 and *passim.* The quotation is taken somewhat out of context, that is, from Keeley's discussion of leaders, but the generalization seems justified.

16. Constraints of space require that the analysis here be rather severely truncated. Much of the analysis focuses only on Madison in the 1780s and 1790s. For a much more elaborate treatment of these issues, see J. Thomas Wren, "Leaders, the People, and the Common Good: James Madison and the Challenges of Popular Sovereignty" (Unpublished manuscript, University of Richmond, 1997). The best monographs on Madison are Drew McCoy, *The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), and Lance Banning, *The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); but also see Jack N. Rakove, *Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996). The best biography of Madison is Ralph Ketcham, *James Madison: A Biography* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971); but also consult Irving Brant, *James Madison*, 6 vols. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1948–1961).

17. *Federalist* No.10, in *The Papers of James Madison, Congressional Series*, William T. Hutchinson et al., eds., 17 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962–77; Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977–), 10: 264.

18. Gordon S. Wood, *Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), 55.

19. *Federalist* No. 45, in *Papers*, 10: 429.

20. *Federalist* No. 10, Ibid., 264.

21. *Federalist* No. 37, Ibid., 364. See *also* Wood, 53–54.

22. *Federalist* No. 51, in *Papers*, 10: 479.

23. McCoy, 41–42.

24. *Federalist* No. 62, in *Papers*, 10: 540.

25. See generally Wood, 391–425.

26. Madison to Jefferson, 19 March 1787, in *Papers*, 9: 318.

27. Madison to Edmund Randolph, 25 February 1787, Ibid., 299.

28. *Federalist* No. 62, Ibid., 10: 538.

29. Ibid., 538–39. *Federalist* No. 44, Ibid., 421. "Notes for Speech Opposing Paper Money" [c. 1 November 1786], Ibid., 9: 158–59.

30. Madison to Jefferson, 6 September 1787, Ibid., 10: 164.

31. Madison to Caleb Wallace, 23 August 1785, Ibid., 8: 350.

32. *Federalist* No. 10, Ibid., 10: 264.

33. Ibid., 267.

34. Madison to Jefferson, 6 September 1787, Ibid., 164.

35. Speech in Constitutional Convention, 31 May 1787, Ibid., 21.

36. Speech in Constitutional Convention, 6 June 1787, Ibid., 32.

37. *Federalist* No. 37, Ibid., 360.

38. *Federalist* No. 10, Ibid., 264, 268.

39. See generally Wren, "Leaders, the People."

40. *Federalist* No. 46, in *Papers*, 10: 438–39. *Federalist* No. 39, Ibid., 379–80. See Marvin Meyers, *The Mind of the Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison*, rev. ed. (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1981), 408; Robert A. Rutland, *James Madison: The Founding Father* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987), 33.

41. See generally Wood.

42. *Federalist* No. 49, in *Papers*, 10: 461.

43. Madison to Edmund Randolph, 10 January 1788, Ibid., 355.
44. Madison to Jefferson, 9 December 1787, Ibid., 313.
45. Madison to Jefferson, 10 August 1788, Ibid., 11: 226.
46. *Federalist* No. 49, Ibid., 10: 463. See also *Federalist* No. 50, Ibid., 471–72.
47. Madison to George Turberville, 2 November 1788, Ibid., 11: 331–32. Madison to Edmund Pendleton, 20 October 1788, Ibid., 307.
48. *Federalist* No. 49, Ibid., 10: 462.
49. Madison to Jefferson, 24 October 1787, Ibid., 213.
50. *Federalist* No. 55, Ibid., 507–8.
51. Speech in Virginia Ratifying Convention, 20 June 1788, Ibid., 11: 163.
52. Madison to Jefferson, 9 December 1787, Ibid., 10: 313.
53. Speech in Virginia Ratifying Convention, 20 June 1788, Ibid., 11: 163.
54. Madison to Jefferson, 8 August 1791, Ibid., 14: 69.
55. "A Candid State of the Parties," in *National Gazette*, 26 September 1792, Ibid., 372.
56. "Government," in *National Gazette*, 31 December 1791, Ibid., 179. See also "Charters," Ibid., 191.
57. "Who Are the Best Keepers of the People's Liberties?" in *National Gazette*, 20 December 1792, Ibid., 426.
58. *Federalist* No. 48, Ibid., 9: 348–57.
59. Ibid., 354.
60. Madison to Edmund Randolph, 10 January 1788, Ibid., 10: 355.
61. *Federalist* No. 38, Ibid., 365.
62. Madison to Jefferson, 9 December 1787, Ibid., 313.
63. Madison to Edmund Randolph, 10 January 1788, Ibid., 355–56.
64. "Vices of the Political System of the United States," Ibid., 9: 357. See also Speech in Constitutional Convention, 23 June 1787, Ibid., 10: 74.
65. *Federalist* No. 57, Ibid., 521. See Ralph Ketcham, "Party and Leadership in Madison's Conception of the Presidency," *Quarterly Journal of the Library of Congress* 37 (1980): 249.
66. "Vices," in *Papers*, 9: 355. Madison to Caleb Wallace, 23 August 1785, Ibid., 8: 350. "Observations on Jefferson's Draught of a Constitution for Virginia" [sent to John Brown, 15 October 1788], Ibid., 11: 287.
67. Wood, 471–518.
68. *Federalist* No. 10, in *Papers*, 10: 268.
69. Ibid.
70. Speech in Constitutional Convention, 31 May 1787, Ibid., 19. Speech in Constitutional Convention, 6 June 1787, Ibid., 32.
71. *Federalist* No. 52, Ibid., 484. *Federalist* No. 57, Ibid., 521.
72. *Federalist* No. 57, Ibid., 524.
73. *Federalist* No. 63, Ibid., 546.
74. *Federalist* No. 62, Ibid., 535.
75. *Federalist* No. 39, Ibid., 378.
76. *Federalist* No. 63, Ibid., 545.
77. Speech in Constitutional Convention, 21 July 1787, Ibid., 109.
78. Speech in Constitutional Convention, 19 July 1787, Ibid., 108.
79. Speech in Constitutional Convention, 4 June 1787, Ibid., 25.

80. Speech in Constitutional Convention, 21 July 1787, Ibid., 110. Speech in Constitutional Convention, 8 June 1787, in Gaillard Hunt, ed., *The Writings of James Madison*, 9 vols. (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1910), 5: 385.

81. Madison to Jefferson, 24 October 1787, in *Papers*, 10: 213. "Public Opinion," in *National Gazette*, 19 December 1791, Ibid., 14: 170.

82. "Charters," Ibid., 192.

83. Madison to Jefferson, 2 September 1793, Ibid., 15: 93.

84. "Public Opinion," Ibid., 14: 170.

85. Madison to Jefferson, 27 August 1793, Ibid., 15: 75. For similar examples, see Madison to Archibald Stuart, 1 September 1793, Ibid., 87–88; Madison to Jefferson, 2 September 1793, Ibid., 92–93.

86. Keeley, abstract of "The Trouble with Transformational Leadership," in *Business Ethics Quarterly* 5 (1995): 67.

87. Burns, 20.

88. Bass, *Leadership and Performance*, 187.

89. Burns, 20.

90. Bass, "Transactional to Transformational," 21.

91. Wren, "Leaders, the People"; McCoy, *The Last of the Fathers*.

92. See Chapter 6, pp. 140–41.

93. Ibid., p. 124.

94. Ibid., p. 129.

95. Although Madison had a deep and abiding commitment to the protection of individual liberties, he was less concerned with the problem of political minorities—unless that minority articulated the common good. Madison believed that there was a common good, permanent and identifiable. This was what must be protected against majorities and minorities. He was concerned with the treatment of minorities only insofar as they represented that common good. Other minorities could be dealt with "through the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat [minorities that did not conform to common interests] . . . by regular vote." *Federalist* No. 10, in *Papers*, 10: 266.

96. Burns, 4.

97. See Chapter 8, p. 184.

98. Richmond *Enquirer*, 3 January 1829, in McCoy, 121. See Wren, "Leaders, the People."

99. Madison to Jefferson, 17 February 1825, in *Letters*, 3: 483.

100. Madison to Thomas Ritchie, 18 December 1825, Ibid., 507.

101. Burns, 4.

102. Ronald L. Heifetz, "Leadership with and without Authority" (unpublished ms., John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1992), 37, 39.

103. Ronald L. Heifetz, *Leadership without Easy Answers* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 127–28, 138–44.

104. See Chapter 8, p. 178.

105. Burns, 38.

106. Quoted in Bass, see Chapter 8, p. 188.