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Chapter One

Figuring Out/In Rhetoric

From *Antistrophē* to *Alloiostrophē*

Jane S. Sutton and Mari Lee Mifsud

We begin with critical reflections on rhetoric as the *antistrophē* of dialectic.[1]
Here is the first line of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*: "Rhetoric is the counterpart
[*antistrophos*] to dialectic."[2] What this means exactly has been a point of
some controversy over centuries of study in the rhetorical tradition. As John
Rainolds said, "There are as many interpretations of this little word . . . as
there are interpreters."[3] However, we see something other, namely that these
"many interpretations" of rhetoric as *antistrophē* are actually "one." The
result is an amplification of the face of rhetoric to look, act, perform, and
affect change like dialectic. *Antistrophē* is the trope that dominates and am-
plifies the rhetorical tradition as civic discourse. Set in this conceptual con-
textualization, rhetoric's dialectical face is a "catastrophe" for rhetoric, for
difference, and for democratic deliberation. Why and how this is so involves
an inward-looking investigation into how *antistrophē* encapsulates rhetoric
in terms of argument and style. In this chapter, we also offer a way out of this
traditional sensibility by troping rhetoric otherwise. Traditionally, tropes and
figures are cast as tools to be used by agents. But Hayden White has detailed
how tropes operate on and within discourse and, structurally speaking, deter-
mine the modes—e.g., argument, style—of discourse. In our analysis, the
trope of *antistrophē*, because it defines what rhetoric is, testifies to the funda-
mental structure of rhetoric. There are other tropes. Tropes are rhetoric's
opportunity for enlarging rhetoric's structural relation with contingency
through difference. Our reliance on tropes is committed to using rhetoric's
resources so as not "to betray our opportunity," something Giles Wilkeson
Gray warned rhetoricians about as early as 1923.[4]

We begin, therefore, with *antistrophē*. Next, we explore *katastrophē*. Finally, we describe the trope *alloiostrophē* by attending to the need for a new trope as well as outlining a strategy for theorizing it. Grammatically speaking, rhetoric is the subject and *antistrophos* is the predicate nominative in the sentence: "Rhetoric is a counterpart of dialectic." What does it mean to posit, at the structural level, a transformational equivalence between rhetoric and *antistrophē*? What kind of relationship does the Subject-Predicate Nominative (SPN) signify?[5] One way the "grammar question" is answered is to posit an identical exchange: the particular subject ("[the] rhetoric") and the predicate nominative (*antistrophos*) is a convertible proposition. In his commentary on *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, E. M. Cope suggests as much. "When applied in its strict and proper sense, it [*antistrophos*] denotes an exact correspondence in detail, as a facsimile or counterpart."[6] By "strict and proper sense," Cope is referring to the grammatical structure of SPN—subject plus a predicate nominative—as a "logic."[7] So structured through *antistrophos*, rhetoric and dialectic then become "convertible," which is to say rhetoric and dialectic are "identical in meaning" and "precisely similar in all respects."[8] That rhetoric and dialectic are "identical" is intended to reveal that, in spite of specific differences, both are "opposites in the same row."[9] That is, rhetoric and dialectic live together under "one genus, proof."[10] Although they live together under "one genus, proof" and are "precisely similar," rhetoric is subordinate and, therefore, is reduced to living at "a lower level."[11]

In a lexical sense, *antistrophos* combines the preposition "*anti*," which ranges in meaning from "opposite" to "instead," with the noun "*strophē*," which ranges from "trick" to "turn." *Antistrophos* traffics in the lexical nuances of both "*anti*" and "*strophē*." Some commentators, according to Rainolds[12] consider "anti" as "opposite" and support this with Aristotle's expression that tyranny is the converse of monarchy[13] and Dionysius of Halicarnassus' illustration that evil is the converse of good.[14] This treatment of "*anti*" leads to an interpretation of rhetoric as the converse of dialectic.

Others, who rely on "*anti*" as "instead" (e.g., Averroes, Trebizond, and Alexander) indicate that rhetoric can "stand in for" or "act in place of" dialectic.[15] If this use of "*anti*" is combined with the use of "*strophē*" as "trick" the result resembles a Platonic understanding of rhetoric as a counterfeit art.[16] From this reasoning, dialectic "stands in for" rhetoric, but rhetoric may not "stand in for" dialectic.

Some commentators, however, remark that Aristotle's use of *antistrophos* is likely meant to signal his rejection of the analogy of the true and false arts elaborated by Socrates in the *Gorgias*.[17] Many commentators stage "*strophē*" as "turn," as in the choral *strophē*, or turns, in various songs and dances in drama. Along these lines J. H. Freese (a translator of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*) explains *antistrophos* as counterpart: "Not an exact copy, but making a kind of pair with it, and corresponding to it as the *antistrophē* to the strophe in a

choral ode."[18] Freese is not alone. Translators from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth century draw upon the *strophē* or movement of the choral dance, the returning of the chorus to answer a previous *strophē*, to explain the relation of rhetoric to dialectic.[19]

Despite differences with respect to "*anti*" and "*strophē*" among interpreters, one thing seems to be shared by all: Aristotle "indicates a resemblance and extraordinary affinity between the art of rhetoric and dialectic."[20] This shared view reduces "many interpretations" to one. In effect, these "many interpretations" are effusions of a single interpretive industry. This industry manufactures a rhetoric that is one with dialectic bound up in a system of creating knowledge (epistemology). The effusion of a single interpretive industry, Susan Sontag writes, "is like the fumes of an automobile and of heavy industry."[21] Sontag's technologically based metaphor brings before the eyes how a *technē* of rhetoric bound to dialectic through an *antistrophic* projection "poisons our sensibilities.[22] Promoting rhetoric as dialectic through antistrophe has, over the centuries, poisoned our sensibilities. In effect, amplifying rhetoric as *antistrophē* is rhetoric's *katastrophē*.

Herein begins our experience of the *katastrophē* of rhetoric. Aristotle establishes a relationship between *antistrophē* and *katastrophē*. *Katastrophē* is a subset of *antistrophē*[23] and is the figure that "turns down." Our tradition is most familiar with catastrophe through Aristotle's *lexis katestrammenē* (a participle of *katastrephō*, the verbal form of *katastrophē*).[24] *Katestrammenē* is Aristotle's word for periodic style, one that brings an audience to a pleasant end or rest. Civic discourse, for example, adopts a periodic style as opposed to the paratactic style of poetic discourse and contrasts with *lexis eiromenē* or the running style. However, because of the familiarity that *lexis katestrammenē* holds in our tradition, it has become difficult over the years of the rhetorical tradition to see how bringing an audience to a pleasant end or rest could be a bad thing.[25] The effusion of the interpretative industry has reduced the ability to see our subject—something Sontag insists we must do to fight through the smog of interpretation.[26]

We were directed to the trope of *katastrophē* by Aristotle, when in Book 3 of the *Rhetoric*, he writes that the style of rhetoric—as the *antistrophos* of dialectic—should be a *katastrophic* style. The *katastrophic* style means to turn (*strophos*) down (*kata*). For Aristotle, this turning down is equivalent to coming to a rest. This rest is commonly referred to as a period. Synonymically speaking, the *katastrophic* style is the periodic style. We take the *katastrophic* style as also implicative of a kind of argument.[27] This argument aspires toward a conclusion. This conclusion is pleasurable because one comes to a rest—or period—rather than going on and on as in the running style.[28]

If we take a closer look at the *katastrophic* style, we notice something else. As the *katastrophic* or periodic style reaches an end, it does so through

unreflective agreement. This unreflective agreement is produced by the explicit expression of logical connectors. For example, one would say, "I woke because I was thirsty" rather than "I woke, and I was thirsty." The agreement secured here—"I woke because I was thirsty"—is a causal relation. The connector *because* hierarchically organizes two experiences—that of waking and that of being thirsty. This explicit expression *because* imposes a particular conclusion. So although it may seem an exaggeration to say this agreement is unreflective and diminishes freedom, choice, and responsibility, we hold true to this claim. We see at this mundane level an eclipse of the imagination. Why bother to imagine other possibilities of why one woke after a causal explanation of thirst is expressed? The desire to engage with a trope like *katastrophē*, rather than obey it, can lead to finding other tropes capable of expanding freedom, choice, and responsibility, particularly to the extent that style and argument implicate the other.

Our example about waking and being thirsty can be passed off as trivial. Our core concern is this: that unreflective agreement secured at such a mundane and grammatical level is a foundation of *katastrophē*, of turning down the other. We insist, therefore, that the process of understanding tropes is nothing less than figuring out how human beings can use all of their senses, not just perception, and act and live within the space of rhetoric. Because as Sontag reminds us, we have to be able see more, hear more, taste more, and smell more if we are to get out of the industry and institutionalizations of our interpretations. Tropes like *antistrophē* and *katastrophē* embrace rest, and this implicates rhetoric in a system that turns down the other. To turn down the other is to organize bodies in a hierarchy, in the same manner as connectors in arguments hierarchically organize experience.

Recognizing this paradox that on the one hand rhetoric is theorized as an art of change, whereas on the other it binds change to a principle of rest, we have a heightened awareness of an opportunity to be disruptive. We are forcing a crisis here, and we do so by way of a trope called *tmēsis*, which is suggested to us by Barthes's notion of "punctum."[29] *Punctum* is a Latin term from the verb *pungo*. This verb takes a tropical or figurative sense ranging from prick to sting, vex, grieve, trouble, disturb, afflict, mortify, and annoy. Drawing from the tropical dimensions of *pungo*, we regard *tmēsis* as a way to vex the experience of rhetoric. Although Barthes is interested in how details in a photograph can vex viewers' experience of it, we are interested in how *tmēsis* can serve to interrupt the incidental relations between an earth at rest and rhetoric's systematization. As the incidental can bother how rhetoric's system is envisaged, it leads to a cut, making it possible to realize that rhetoric is not one system. There is something more. We mark this cut as "*kata-strophē*." The hyphen signifies the cut, the disruption and the space to interface otherwise. This *kata-strophē* allows us to pursue two systems of change: one system of change is bound to rest and functions through substi-

tution, the other is where change is cut from or disrupts its relation with rest to energize transmutational change.

To see *kata-strophē* we turn now to the *quadripartita ratio*, the four traditional rhetorical systems of change governed by *"kata"* (Table 1.1).For present purposes, we reframe the four systems of change as two operating systems. Such reframing allows us to focus our attention on the interactions between the operation by substitution (*kata enallagēn*) and the operation by transmutation (Table 1.2).

We see transmutation consisting of three systems of change. They are subtraction, addition, and transposition. The *quadripartita ratio* offers definitional characterizations of the types of change made possible by *kata-strophē*. The two kinds of change that provide for our broad characterization of rhetoric are derived from the tropes that govern them. The operating system of substitution is governed by *antistrophic* relations whereas that of transmutation is governed by *alloiostrophic* relations. So the operation of substitution admits one type of change, which is to no small degree ruled by the *telos*, or idealized end, of rest. In contrast, the system of transmutation demands three types of change to produce the energy required for the equal action of changing (Table 1.2).

Continuing with our reflections on rhetoric figured *antistrophically* as dialectic, we see that this change happens through the operating system of substitution. The basic figure of substitution is *synonymia*. Synonym is the means by which rhetoric substitutes its relation with random change for dialectic's relation with rule-governed change. The substitution creates rhetoric's similarity with dialectic.

When synonym forges a unity between rhetoric and dialectic, difference enters the operating system or space of substitution, not as other, but as the self-same, molar, and unitary. In this way the mental habit of linearity and objectivity take hold and persist in their hegemonic power over rhetoric. As difference *as difference* collapses into the operating system of substitution,

Table 1.1. Rhetorical Systems of Change

Substitution	Subtraction	Addition	Transposition
Kata enallagēn	*Kata aneian*	*Kata pleonasmon*	*Kata metathēsin*
synonymia	*syncopē*	*epithēton*	*apostrophē*
anacoloutha	*meiosis*	*metaplasm*	*tmēsis*
acyrologia	*anesis*	*polysyndeton*	*alloiōsis*

Adapted from Gideon O. Burton, "Silva Rhetoricae," cf. Quintilian 5.38

Table 1.2.   Operating Systems Distinguished by Type(s) of Change

Operating System of Substitution	Operating System of Transmutation		
Type of Change Substitution	Type of Change Subtraction	Type of Change Addition	Type of Change Transposition

rhetoric creates a form appreciated for its power associated with democratic deliberation. Yet, by reducing the other to the self-same, the system of substitution and its accompanying tropes of *antistrophē* and *katastrophē* sustains the habit of dealing with difference in undemocratic terms, defining other as difference, diversity, strangeness and creating an exclusive conceptual context. This reduction of difference to the self-same is the eventual logic of the operating system of substitution as it orchestrates meaning, relating, and communicating to achieve the ideal of rest. By virtue of the defining and dynamic *antistrophic* relation between rhetoric and dialectic, the operating system of substitution enacts a style, the turning-down style, that, in turn, accounts for rhetoric's peculiar relation with the other. Style is not decorative but a concept that sustains flows of contact and connections.

A closer look at Table 1.1 reveals that *synonymia* is not the only figure moving the system of change signifying substitution (*kata enallagēn*). Other tropes in this system of substitution are less well known, namely *anacoloutha* and *acyrologia*. Who is as familiar with an *anacoloutha* as a synonym? Who could write an *acyrologia* with as much ease as a synonym? The comparative nonexistence of *anacoloutha* and *acyrologia* compared to the ubiquity of synonym may be on account of the potential for inconsistency and impropriety that alien tropes such as *anacoloutha* and *acyrologia* denote. Are these tropes thinkable, speakable, or writable? Ignoring these tropes only strengthens synonymic change in a system of substitution. Strengthening synonymic change works to turn down the possibility of interacting with who or what is not consistent or proper. For these reasons, what if inconsistency and impropriety were aspects of change that could inflate substitution to regenerate relations with others in ways not recognized by synonym, but nevertheless ways that support the kinds of engagement with the other that rhetoric claims for democratic deliberation? Such engagement with the other would have to account for substituting impropriety for propriety as a means of democratic change. And we have certainly seen impropriety as a means of democratic change.

By intra-animating the figures within the system of substitution—*synonymia* with *anacoloutha* and *acyrologia*—we can recognize how profound the change within this system can be when impropriety and inconsistency are connected with likeness offered by the synonym. Yet, still this encounter

with otherness is insufficient because it can only amplify the kind of change the system of substitution allows and ultimately ignores, neglects, and excludes the other systems of change, systems that can really make a difference in the equalization of democratic deliberation. A system of adding exemplary actors into the dominant structure has already been exposed for its shortcomings.[30]

Yet we need not stop at exposing this structural critique. We can see that we have other rhetorical resources of change that have gone untheorized. These resources stand by the side of the operating system of substitution governed by synonym. They are unused, rejected, and undertheorized. So, not only have we not paid attention to the figures of difference within the system of substitution, but also those from beyond this system, a total of three other systems. Whereas the bulk of rhetoric's resources lie in these multifaceted systems of change, and in these figures of difference and otherness, the rhetorical tradition has theorized only the smallest sliver of resources. The operating system of substitution then polices its boundaries of likeness and the self-same by theorizing out these figures of difference and silencing them.

We believe that the difficulty in writing an *anacoloutha* or an *acyrologia* is a good symptom of disturbance. Just to entertain the imagination with the idea of using rhetoric's tropical resource in other ways reveals limitations of rhetorical theory. But our inability to speak with *acyrologia* should not stop us from thinking of how to expand democratic change with the resources of tropes.

Thus, we imagine something other. We see that interanimating these figures within these various systems of change moves the system of substitution out of itself and into another, resulting in an interanimation of the systems of substitution and transmutation. The logic of this interanimation does not resemble the logic of representation, the logic of articulation, nor of sublimation. If the systems of change were set to operate within a logic of representation, one system of change would be indexed to govern the other. In light of the power relations and structural patterns of exclusion in which the system of substitution traffics, a logic of representation is insufficient for imagining the two systems engaged in a living and dynamic process of inter-connectedness. It is not enough to borrow from the logic of articulation and its process by which tacit knowledge and skills are made explicit. What more is needed is a theoretical compass whereby the system of substitution is de-pathologized of the pejorative treatment of change. However, a logic of sublimation, because it relies on utilizing "lower" tendencies by uplifting them, ignores the kind of contact we envision. How do the systems function? What is the specific contribution of the system of transmutation?

The system of transmutation entails transactional relations of three kinds of change, namely addition, subtraction, and transposition. One kind of

change cannot produce transmutation. Within the operating system of trans-
mutation, there must be activity among three kinds of change that affect and
influence the other ones. Substitution can only replace another. The operating
system of substitution replaces random change, diversity, and difference with
rule-governed change that can only eventuate in rest. Transmutation is a
system capable of relating with the other in a variety of ways. The self can be
added to the other or vice versa (change through addition). The self can be
subtracted from the other or vice versa (change through subtraction). The self
can switch places with the other, becoming other, and vice versa (change
through transposition). This is not the case in an operating system of substitu-
tion. Thus, we see the operating system of transmutation as a resource for
creating change in many ways for various purposes, none of which could be
called "rest."

Let's take a closer look at one of these categories of change within the
operating system we are calling transmutation: transposition. Transposition
is a space where inconsistency, difference, and change through otherness can
move freely. Transposition is the category of change characterized by the
figure *anastrophē*. This figure marks a disordering of an accepted relation-
ship between two elements of a proposition. *Anastrophē* traditionally marks a
change in position, but to call this change of position simply an inversion or a
reversal is to miss the opportunity for change that other figures in the system
of transposition animate, such as *tmēsis*, which creates a cut in an accepted
order. The interaction of these two figures—*anastrophē* and *tmēsis*—within
the system of transmutation creates change marked by both destruction
(cutting) and creation (change in meaning). To return once more to a consid-
eration of transmutation at the most basic level of the word, "*katastrophē*"
disrupted is "*kata-strophē*." The hyphen is a cut (*tmēsis*) that destroys an old
meaning (e.g., *katastrophē*) and creates a new meaning (e.g., *kata-strophē*).
The trope of the cut is what takes us back to a heretofore unknown, a radical
other, and the possibility of change beyond substitution.

Tmēsis offers the connection for turning to *apostrophē*. Under the pur-
view of *apostrophē*, we turn out toward something other. We find the re-
sources of *apostrophē* so expansive as to be able to turn out to difference in a
radically new way.

We look back on what we have said in relation to the two operating
systems. We want to explain how they pertain to *apostrophē* and then we can
move forward with another view of *apostrophē* from the vantage point of
transmutation. Table 1.3 shows *apostrophē* in an operating system of substi-
tution, and table 1.4 shows *apostrophē* in an operating system of transmuta-
tion. We adapt from *quadripartito ratio* the basic tropes to which *apostrophē*
is linked, and offer a vision of how these tropes are regarded in the different
operating systems.

In these tables, we see the systems of change governed by the trope of *apostrophē*. In classical rhetorical theory, these systems are designed to affirm the self-same, turn down difference, and make change behave in accordance with principles of regularity and rest. So, that which is incidental is extraneous, that which crosses over is shifty, things or people who are of a different kind present only discordance, and difference and otherness is just confusing. But *apostrophē*'s resources for change are more expansive than this. If *apostrophē* were theorized in a system of transmutation, the incidental would be experienced as new matter, that which crosses over as motion, things or people who are of a different kind becomes the child-as-other, and otherness and difference become an experience of reflexivity.

The crossing over of *metabasis* can, again, be understood as analogy, but not an analogy governed by *synonymia*. The analogic movement of *metabasis* within the system of transposition is governed instead by *anacoloutha* (inconsistency). Governed as such, the movement of *metabasis* is a transposition of subjects that hitherto seemed radically inconsistent: "O Rose, thou art sick!"[31] *Metabasis* governed by *anacoloutha* in a system of transposition creates associations through difference. Difference becomes the incidental, "the tiny spark of accident,"[32] releasing meaning from only ever being turned down by substitution. Within the system of transposition, *parenthesis* interpolates new matter, namely incidentals. In this way, *apostrophēs* cross over—move out of—the frame of the thesis. To return to "O Rose, thou art sick!" this speech differs dramatically from speech that asserts "The rose is sick!" What is inserted *apostrophically* is nothing less than a feeling, specifically, deep concern arising in inconsistency—a rose and a condition of sickness. This insertion of feeling expressed through inconsistency is a breaking out of discourse constrained by rules against the extraneous enforced by dialectic. The breaking out, which is an insertion, is a movement toward intense involvement with the situation described. The insertion of feeling, as well as the inconsistency, is so strong as to create radical change. The mood of *apostrophē* á la *parenthesis* is imperative. This insertion through inconsis-

Table 1.3. *Apostrophē* Linked to System of Substitution

Parenthesis	Metabasis	Heteroiōsis	Alloiōsis
aside	crossing over	things or people	otherness
incidental		of a different	difference
		kind; difference	
extraneous	**shifting**	**discordant**	**confusing**

Adapted from "Apostrophe" in Dupriez/Halsall; R. Dean Anderson

Table 1.4.   Apostrophe Linked to System of Transposition

Parenthesis	*Metabasis*	*Heteroiōsis*	*Alloiōsis*
aside	crossing over	things or people	otherness
incidental		of a different	difference
		kind, difference	
new matter	**motion**	**child-as-other**	**reflexivity**

Adapted from "Apostrophe" in Dupriez/Halsall; R. Dean Anderson

tency, this breaking out spoken in the imperative, extends to us the possibility of crossing over. Thus, *metabasis* is the organ of motion in the system of transposition, and it moves like the cuttlefish. As Marcel Detienne and Jean-Paul Vernant portray this creature, the cuttlefish moves obliquely, combining several different directions at once. It is polymorphic and has pliable tentacles. The *mētis* of the cuttlefish is "subtle and flexible as the coming-to-be over which they preside relate not to that which is straight and direct but to that which is sinuous, undulating and twisting not to be unchanging and fixed but the mobile and ever-changing; not to what is pre-determined and unequivocal but to what is polymorphic and ambiguous."[33] Moreover, the ink of the cuttlefish provides a way of moving, of getting out. Cuttlefish carry within them a dark liquid. Aristotle notes that the cuttlefish hides in its dark liquid. It pretends to move forward but then in that forward moment, the cuttlefish inserts its dark ink and turns back.[34] Thanks to the digression marked by the ink of the cuttlefish, *apostrophē* refers to the turn and threat that is polymorphic and ambiguous, the turn to a way through or crossing into different spaces.[35]

Once *apostrophē* turns us out toward the other, we see more tropical resources available for orchestrating different kinds of change. We attend first to the resource of a long forgotten trope, *alloiostrophē*. We see this trope as a transmutation of *antistrophē*. In brief, *alloiostrophē* is a trope that turns toward difference, diversity, and the other. We explore *alloiostrophē* first in relation to its two parts: *alloiōsis* and *strophē*.

We see in *alloiōsis* a reflexive figure, marking at once an experience of *heteros* (something other) and being radically changed by this experience, so that the self-experiencing other does not experience it through similitude and unity but through difference and separation.

Whereas a traditional image of *alloiōsis* (the reflexive experience of being altered by the other) appears in Greek antiquity as the wet nurse nourishing and altering a child through milk,[36] a radical image of the other appears in postmodernity as a woman giving birth to a child: "The arrival of a child

is, I believe, the first and often the only opportunity a woman has to experience the Other in its radical separation from herself, that is, as an object of love."[37] We find significant the differences between Hippocrates' and Julia Kristeva's references to otherness. Hippocrates' perspective constructs the woman as nourishing the child as other, hence constructing the other as dependent. Such dependence characterizes the other as needy and attached, and creates the conditions for possession. Kristeva constructs the woman as birthing the child as other, hence constructing the other as distinct and unattached—a radical separation from the self. This point of radical separation constitutes a moment of reflexivity, where the subject (woman with child) erupts. This eruption arouses the subject into recognizing the other as distinct and separated, yet as an object of love.

From this image of woman, we turn back to *apostrophē*. The "turning away" of the *apostrophē* is a double move. To see *apostrophē* from within the system of substitution is to see the other through possession and contraction. Without being possessed and contracted, the other, from within the system of substitution, can only display silly talk and false reasoning. In turning away, *apostrophē* provokes the incidental. If we are not to miss the opportunities of the incidental, where "the future is nesting"[38] for the other, then we must see *apostrophē*'s double move, not only its move within a system of substitution but also within a system of transposition. *Apostrophē* in a system of transposition, working to effect transmutational change, invites us to encounter the other not by way of conclusion but by way of introduction. The other is therefore not reduced and subdued, possessed and contracted, but introduced as a distinct agent of difference.

From a rhetorical standpoint, the other is not a child. The other is a trope taking the name *alloiostrophē*. The scarceness of historical resources with respect to this trope are in part the legacy of working exclusively in a system of substitution coupled with a received tradition whose landscape is dominated by an operating system of substitution where metaphor drives the interaction with the other. *Alloiostrophos* is not a trope that the history of rhetoric recognizes. Despite its presence in Liddell, Scott, and Jones as both *alloiostrophos* and *alloiotropos*, this figure cannot be found anywhere in the rhetorical tradition, from Aristotle to Kenneth Burke, nor in any handbooks on rhetoric, whether in antiquity or contemporary times.[39] Yet the term resides in its adjectival form in the ancient Greek lexicon. We take this as an invitation to theorize. The infrequent textual record of this trope is not a constraint for us but an opportunity to imagine *alloiostrophic* rhetoric, why it is necessary, what characteristics it displays, and how it might be performed.

"My love is a red rose." Poets, rhetoricians, and tragedians would identify this expression as a metaphor. But who could write, speak, or perform an *alloiostrophos*? As it turns out (according to Hephaestio and later commentators), Aeschylus, Aristophanes, and Sophocles wrote *alloiostrophes*.[40] Yet,

alloiostrophos is unexplored in the realm of rhetoric. Worse yet, it is structurally eclipsed by the privileged status of metaphor.

From Aristotle's privileging of metaphor as the means to bring ideas before the eyes[41] to Kenneth Burke's privileging of metaphor as the means of identification,[42] metaphor has held a primary position in rhetorical theory. This primacy of metaphor does not seem capricious. As Hayden White explains, metaphor is necessary to the process of understanding. Understanding in general is a metaphoric process of rendering the unfamiliar familiar by asserting a similarity in a difference.[43] Moreover, White observes that metaphor is even the master of the four master tropes. As he puts it, once we recognize the metaphoric character of understanding, "we may then distinguish metonymy and synecdoche, as secondary forms of metaphor."[44]

The primacy of metaphor does not go unnoticed. Paul Ricoeur goes so far as to say that in the rhetorical tradition, tropological resources have been "progressively closed" to all but metaphor.[45] Gérard Genette observes that at the beginning of the twentieth century, metaphor alone survived the "great shipwreck of rhetoric and this miraculous survival is obviously neither fortuitous nor insignificant."[46] No one forecasts the primacy of metaphor more wryly than Wayne Booth: "I have in fact extrapolated with my pocket calculator to the year 2039; at that point there will be more students of metaphor than people."[47]

Ricoeur, Genette, and Booth all recognize the reduction of tropological resources to metaphor. Drawing from Chaim Perleman and Luce Olbrechts-Tyteca, we offer an explanation of why this reduction is a problem. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call attention to the argumentative role of tropes as superior to their ornamental role,[48] we recognize that a multitude and diversity of tropes would increase rhetoric's argumentative resources, not enlarge rhetoric's resources for indulging in a "useless pastime" in the "search for strange names."[49] Because each trope is a context for argumentative procedure, each one inclines us to see—to theorize—and on the basis of that context, each trope heightens our choices. Thus heightened, each trope—being an argumentative resource—puts human agency to the test. To increase the multiplicity of tropes is to strengthen the practice of argumentation precisely at the point of interaction between people and their use of language where choices and responsibility are articulated. Or to put the matter negatively, to reduce the multiplicity of the tropes to, for example, metaphor, diminishes our agency and choices as well as our responsibility and freedom.

Moreover, the primacy of metaphor in rhetoric limits the space for difference. Metaphor is a master trope of substitution. It permits difference to be substituted for all that is already familiar, thereby making it difficult to make contact with difference *as difference*. In metaphoric systems, difference enters the realm of understanding in the form of the self-same. Such understanding is compounded by metaphor's ubiquity, which irresistibly draws

difference into the form of the self-same. This ubiquity further eclipses the ability to make contact with difference *as difference*. By recognizing such problems with the primacy of metaphor, we find a need to first bracket what Ricoeur calls metaphor's "dictatorial position,"[50] and then expand awareness of the tropological resources for attending to difference. We need *alloiostrophos* to turn us toward difference and make an outside incursion into the regions eclipsed by metaphor. As outsiders, we can no longer, as Hélène Cixous writes, continue to build rhetoric as the empire of the self-same.[51] The future of rhetoric, speaking *alloiostrophically*, requires that rhetoric open itself up to a reconsideration of the tropes and the promise they hold for inventiveness, otherness, and difference.

With etymological play, we approach the question: What characteristics does *alloiostrophos* display? We see this word in two parts: *strophos* and strangeness. The "turn" of the *strophos* is defined by the "difference," "diversity," "alteration," and "strangeness" of the "other," the *"alloios."*[52] This turn is less about a gesture of cultural sensitivity and more about the alteration of that gesture. Insofar as the gesture of cultural sensitivity is prefigured by metaphor, it enacts a self-same turn, rendering the unfamiliar other familiar. Although this self-same turn is described as successful, with success measured in terms of charity or inclusion toward the other, it configures an argumentative context restricted by its procedure of rendering the unfamiliar familiar. A *strophic* gesture defined by *"alloios"* fundamentally alters the constitution of the self-same–other relation.

In order to illuminate this alteration, we return to play with etymology, this time focusing on *"alloios."* Unlike *alloiostrophos*, which does not exist in the received rhetorical tradition as a trope, *alloiōsis* does exist, yet not without marginalization. Quintilian includes *alloiōsis* as a figure[53] but unfortunately gives no examples. Renaissance rhetorical theorist Thomas Swynnerton[54] lists *alloiōsis* fifth, after metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy, and irony, which of course are known today as "the master tropes."[55] But despite Swynnerton's scriptural references to *alloiōsis*, the trope, as Brain Vickers observes, has been largely forgotten or ignored by rhetoricians since the Reformation.[56]

Such a marginal position as a trope of difference might call for a reclamation project, to excavate the material remains of *alloiōsis* to strengthen it. In this manner, we would search for examples of *alloiōsis*. As much as we would like to explore this path, this manner of proceeding is problematic. We believe that theorizing *alloiostrophos* comes before finding examples of *alloiōsis*. Without a new way of seeing (i.e., a new theory), any examples of *alloiōsis* we might find risk being understood only through the primacy of metaphor via an *antistrophic* rhetoric.

Our focus, therefore, is not on reclaiming *alloiōsis* for the rhetorical tradition but on theorizing a new turn for rhetoric, a new *strophos*, an *alloiostro-*

phos that would deviate from the normative *strophos–antistrophos* to dialectic upon which rhetorical theory is built. In his opening line, Aristotle uses the trope *antistrophos* to define rhetoric through dialectic.[57] As we detailed in the beginning of the chapter, "*antistrophic* theorizing" with rhetoric is a *katastrophē* for rhetoric, for it favors the familiar and the metaphorical, and turns down difference.

We return now to our reflections on rhetoric and dialectic in Aristotle's opening line of the *Rhetoric*. Not only is a metaphoric relation figured in this first line, it is figured in a *katastrophic* style. The *katastrophic* style here is evinced by the use of the copulative "is."[58] Note that Aristotle follows this opening line by identifying only the similarities between rhetoric and dialectic, saying nothing of their differences. Thus, from the start Aristotle "metaphorizes" rhetoric *katastrophically* through dialectic. This metaphoric rendering colonizes rhetoric's difference and puts its theory in the service of the empire of reasoning ruled by dialectic.

To return to Cixous' critique of classical rhetoric, this building of the empire of the self-same forces "the orator . . . to unwind a thin thread, dry and taut."[59] In our previous example of periodic style at both the grammatical and rhetorical levels, we experience performances of this thin thread unwinding. This thread is a symbol of the line of meaning imposed by the *katastrophic* style. The thinness of the thread is an effect of the reductive quality of logical connectors like "because" and the copulative "is." To speak *katastrophically* is "to stay the threaded course," so to speak, and avoid multiplicity and perhaps irrationality. As the orator unwinds this thin thread and makes it to the end, he or she, in Aristotle's terms, achieves a pleasurable resting place. Following Cixous, we find this resting place akin to death, namely the death of difference. Affirming life, not only for difference but for rhetoric, we turn now to explore how the trope *alloiostrophos* enacts its turn toward difference.

We take our first clue from the ancient Greek lexicon. According to Liddell, Scott, and Jones, *alloiostrophos* is "of the irregular strophes, i.e., not consisting of alternate strophe and antistrophe."[60] Hence, *alloiostrophos* cannot move metaphorically as antistrophe can. How then can it move? We see it move metonymically. Whereas Hayden White, as we have earlier referenced, believes metonymy to be a mere subset of metaphor (which is similar to Burke's definition of four master tropes), we follow Roman Jakobson. Jakobson believes metonymy to be a distinct figure from metaphor. In particular, metonymy signifies relations through contiguity, whereas metaphor signifies relations based on similarity.

We see this distinction readily through rhetorical effect, with metaphor producing assimilation, for example, rendering two distinct phenomena the same; and with metonymy producing association, for example, juxtaposing two phenomena rendering them distinct. In this section, we address the irreg-

ular movement of *alloiostrophos* as metonymical. We do so by juxtaposing the *antistrophic* and *alloiostrophic* movements.

The *antistrophic* movement, to the extent that it aspires to conclusion, takes conclusion as its *telos*, and in its movement toward this *telos* turns down other possibilities. The *alloiostrophic* movement is an exertion toward other possibilities, and takes the recognition or imagining of other possibilities as its *telos*. The regular movement of the *antistrophic* system is assimilative (metaphoric), where parts entering a whole lose their distinctiveness for the greater good of the whole. The irregular movement of the *alloiostrophic* system is aggregative (metonymic), where parts entering a whole do not lose their distinctiveness but exist side by side within a unity. This irregular movement transfigures the space of speech so that alterity can speak beyond the rule of metaphor. Thus, *alloiostrophic* rhetoric turns to the complexity of possibility; therein resides its end, its *telos*. This presents a paradox, because in an *antistrophic* rhetoric the end is a resting place, whereas in an *alloiostrophic* rhetoric the end is a place of possibility.

In this example, we can see that both *antistrophic* and *alloiostrophic* rhetoric might be said to begin with a wish to make contact with the other. The *antistrophic* rhetoric wishes for a contact that would gain the adherence of interlocutors and secure their assent and mental cooperation. *Antistrophic* contact prefigures the possibility of familiarity and the self-same. By contrast, the *alloiostrophic* rhetoric wishes for a contact that would recognize and attend to the complexity of other possibilities as well as diversity and difference. So *alloiostrophos* is an irregular turn motivated by a wish to take us to other possibilities in a way that would permit contact without catastrophe. *Alloiostrophos* prefigures the possibility of alterity alongside of, rather than contesting or reducing, the space of rhetoric with all its hierarchical privileges.

Thus, whereas the regularity of the *antistrophic* rhetoric is performed through a metaphor of similarity, the irregularity of *alloiostrophic* rhetoric is performed through a metonymy of difference. Whereas metaphor moves to a collective via an assimilation of difference into the self-same, a metonymy generates differences as an aggregate. As an aggregate, differences do not lose their distinctiveness in the process of coming into a collective.[61] As such, differences are related in *apposition* within an aggregate, i.e., they are differentiated from the other.[62] In appositional relations, differences form an aggregate as a collective.

Whereas *antistrophic* rhetoric is configured in the space of the *agora*, the public space for speech, *alloiostrophic* rhetoric is configured in the idiosyncratic and particular lived reality of alterity. Our challenge to the prevailing system implies a positive vision. Toward that end, we need to see more of the contingent in rhetorical practice than what the Aristotelian tradition allows us to see. If we want to create a rhetoric that can sustain the ground for differ-

ence, then we need to enlarge our sense of contingency. This enlarged idea of contingency, while it reclaims uncertainty, does so in order to reconfigure relations with the other. If we begin to think of the field or scope of rhetoric as grounded in contingency then we are expanding or reconciling that part of the field that has been partitioned off. We address difference in the next four chapters.

NOTES

1. This chapter is based on two previously published essays. They have been modified, revised, and combined for their current version. We want to acknowledge their publication details and to express our thanks to Taylor and Francis (http://www.taylorandfrancis.com/) for being able to reprint some earlier portions of our essays. Jane Sutton and Mari Lee Mifsud, "Figuring Rhetoric: From Antistrophe to Apostrophe through Catastrophe," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 32 (2002): 29–49; Jane Sutton and Mari Lee Mifsud, "Towards an *Alloiostrophic* Rhetoric," *Advances in the History of Rhetoric* 15 (2012): 222–33.

2. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, trans. John Henry Freese (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 1354a.1.

3. Lawrence G. Green, ed., *John Rainold's Oxford Lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1986), 105.

4. Giles Wilkeson Gray, "How Much Are We Dependent upon the Ancient Greeks and Romans," *Quarterly Journal of Speech Education* 9 (1923): 266.

5. See, for example, Edward Meredith Cope, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, ed. John Edwin Sandys, vol. 1, 3 vols. (Cambridge, MA: W.C. Brown Reprint Library Press, 1877; repr., 1966). William Grimaldi, *Aristotle, Rhetoric I: A Commentary* (New York: Fordham Press, 1980).

6. Cope, *Rhetoric of Aristotle*, 1.

7. Ibid. A logical tie means that Aristotle's opening line in his *Rhetoric* is read from within the Organon, which consists of six logical treatises by Aristotle: *Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, On Interpretation, Sophistical Refutations*, and *Categories*.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 2.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Green, *John Rainold's Oxford Lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, 105–109.

13. Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. H. Rackman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1944), 1295a.18.

14. Lawrence G. Green, "Aristotelian Rhetoric, Dialectic, and the Traditions of '[*Antistrophos*]'," *Rhetorica* 8, no. 1 (1990): 14.

15. Green, *John Rainold's Oxford Lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, 105–107.

16. Plato, *Gorgias*, trans. W.R.M. Lamb, vol. 3, 12 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 464b8, 465c1–3.

17. See, e.g., Kennedy's notes in Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, trans. George A. Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), n2, 28–29.

18. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.

19. See Cope, *Rhetoric of Aristotle*, 1; Grimaldi, *Aristotle, Rhetoric I: A Commentary*, 1–2; Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, 28–29.

20. Green, *John Rainold's Oxford Lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, 107.

21. Susan Sontag, *Against Interpretation* (New York: Dell, 1966), 17.

22. Ibid.

23. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1409a.26–27.

24. For commentary, see Cope, *Rhetoric of Aristotle*, vol. 3, 94–95; Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, 239–40. See also Mari Lee Mifsud, "On the Idea of Reflexive Rhetoric in Homer," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 31, no. 1 (1998), 89–107.

25. This is especially evident in light of Sutton's argument in chapter 3 that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is underwritten by axioms of an earth at rest.

26. Sontag, *Against Interpretation*, 23.

27. The position that style is implicative of argument is not new. It draws from Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969).

28. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*,1409a, 26–27.

29. Roland Barthes, *La Chambre Claire* (Gallimard: Seuil, 1980), 71.

30. See Jane S. Sutton, *The House of My Sojourn: Rhetoric, Women, and the Question of Authority* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2010), 21–50.

31. From William Blake. "The Sick Rose" in *Songs of Innocence and Songs of Experience*, 47. London: R. Brimley Johnson, 1901, 47.

32. Walter, Benjamin, "A Short History of Photography" in *Classic Essays on Photography*, ed. Alan Trachtenburg (New Haven: Leete's Island Books, 1980), 202.

33. Marcel Detienne and Jean-Paul Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society*, trans. Janet Lloyd (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1978), 160.

34. On the cuttlefish, see the discussion of Aristotle, "History of Animals," in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) in Detienne and Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence*, 161 and 174 n.142.

35. Ibid., 161.

36. Hippocrates, *Glands*, vol. 8, trans. Paul Potter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 16.

37. Julia Kristeva, *Desire in Language*, ed. Leon S. Roudiez, trans. Alice Jardine Thomas Gora and Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 10.

38. Walter Benjamin, "A Short History of Photography," in *Classic Essays on Photography*, ed. Alan Trachtenburg (New Haven, CT: Leete's Island Books, 1980), 202.

39. Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott and Sir Henry Stuart Jones, ed. *A Greek-English Lexicon* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 69–70. Our emphasis here is on the rhetorical tradition, knowing that *alloiostrophos* or words in the same declension are found in the Greek corpus. There is a technical use of *alloiostrophon* at Hephaestio's *de poëmatis* (69:15) located in Consbruch, ed. (1971), and available online at http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/ 12148/bpt6k25178s.

40. Ibid.

41. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1404b, 1406b, 1410b.

42. Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969a); Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969b).

43. Hayden White, *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 5.

44. Ibid., 72.

45. Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor*, 45.

46. Gérard Genette, *Figures of Literary Discourse*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 114. The "great shipwreck of rhetoric" to which Genette refers is the effect of the conflict between rhetoric and philosophy at the end of the nineteenth century.

47. Wayne Booth, "Metaphor as Rhetoric: The Problem of Evaluation," in *On Metaphor*, ed. Sheldon Sacks (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 47.

48. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *New Rhetoric*, 167.

49. Ibid.

50. Ricoeur, *Rule of Metaphor*, 45.

51. Hélène Cixous, "Sorties: Out and Out: Attacks/Ways/ out/Forays," in *The Newly Born Woman*, ed. Hélène and Catherine Clément Cixous (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 78–93.

52. Liddell et al., *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 69.

53. Quintilian, *The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian*, trans. H. E. Butler, vol. 4 (1921), 9.3.92.

54. Richard Rex, ed., *A Reformation Rhetoric: Thomas Swynnerton's the Tropes and Figures of Scripture, Renaissance Texts from Manuscripts, no. 1* (Cambridge: RTM Publications, 1999), 147, defines it this way, "To be shorte: Alleosis, is vnder one nature to vnerdtand the other."

55. Burke, *Grammar of Motives*, 503–17.

56. Brian Vickers, "Review of Richard Rex, Ed., *A Reformation Rhetoric: Thomas Swynnerton's the Tropes and Figures of Scripture*," *Rhetorica* 20, no. 1 (2002): 100.

57. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1354a.1.

58. The significance of the emergence of the copulative "is" in grammar unique to fourth-century language can be found in Charles Kahn, *The Verb "Be" in Ancient Greek* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2003); Eric Havelock, *The Literature Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981); Eric Havelock, *The Muse Learns to Write: Reflections on Orality and Literacy from Antiquity to the Present* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986).

59. Cixous, "Sorties: Out and Out: Attacks/Ways/ out/Forays," 93.

60. Liddell, Scott, and Jones, eds. *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 69.

61. For additional commentary on the distinction between metaphor and metonymy, see Roman Jakobson, "The Metaphoric and Metonymic Poles," in *Critical Theory Since Plato*, ed. Hazard Adams, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), 1113–6.

62. William Lily, *A Short Introduction to Grammar* (London: Buckley and Longman, 1763), 172.