2015

Introduction: A Revolution in Tropes

Jane S. Sutton
Mari Lee Mifsud

University of Richmond, mmifsud@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/rhetoric-faculty-publications

Part of the Rhetoric Commons

Recommended Citation
Introduction

A Revolution in Tropes

Jane S. Sutton and Mari Lee Mifsud

When you change the way you look at things, the things you look at change —
Max Plank

Our view of tropes is that they are rhetoric’s own unique resources, but for ineluctable historiographical reasons have been more or less closed off from the production of theory. Our “trope project” began simply enough. If the workings of tropes could be identified in a new way, then the aim and purpose of rhetoric could be retheorized in terms new to democratic deliberation. Working under the slogan “Yes, tropes—but all of them,” we attempted a new classification system based on the Greek roots of hundreds of tropes listed in various old and new sources such as Bernard Dupriez’s A Dictionary of Literary Devices, A-Z and Richard Lanham’s A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms, respectively.

Our suggestion led us to create charts of tropes. Eventually after several starts, we organized a heck of a lot of tropes in relation to their function specified by their root domain. Metaphor fell under the category of the root *phora*; *anastrophē* under *strophē*; and *antimetabolē* under *bolē*. The work was tedious. We quit working on it from time to time. Our trope project seemed to be getting us closer and closer to just compiling pages and pages of excel spreadsheets, but all the while farther from our question, *how do tropes work?*

One day, unexpectedly, we discovered through our root work that a connection exists between the trope *antistrophē* and *katastrophē*. Bascially, *katastrophē* is a subset of *antistrophē* which effectively binds them uniquely. The binding sequence appears in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and functions in a static
model straight away to originate and uphold a theory of civic discourse. When we recognized this, we were stunned and began down another route. We are jumping ahead of ourselves. We should start over, at the very beginning.

When we met some twenty years ago, Jane, writing on the history and theory of rhetoric, was immersed in the study of Aristotle’s *Physics*. Mari Lee, a doctoral student in rhetoric, wondered why. She learned that Jane was trying to figure something out about Aristotle’s view of contingency in rhetoric. Jane was finding from Aristotle’s idea of an earth at rest that his rhetoric was not only built for a *polis* but also that it was designed in the earth’s model. That is, *Rhetoric*, the *polis*, and the earth are interconnected. In one of our first conversations, we found ourselves astonished as we recognized that, to the extent that *Rhetoric* is influenced by Aristotle’s desire to bring a people to rest, Aristotle’s rhetorical theory is an art of denying contingency rather than affirming it in civic life.

We both remember how alienating our exchanges were. That contingency is the heart of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is akin to a first principle of rhetorical studies. How could rhetoric be an art of denying rather than affirming contingency? And what would this mean for future rhetorical theorizing?

As we ventured into the question of contingency, it became an object of study with respect to both rhetorical theory and the history of rhetoric. We began at the beginning, the first line of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*: “Rhetoric is the counterpart [antistrophos] to dialectic.” Our first lesson in analyzing rhetoric’s relation with dialectic is that rhetoric is prefigured by the trope *antistrophe*. The resulting insight into the “tropics” of *Rhetoric* led to our recognition that rhetoric’s *antistrophic* relationship with dialectic is not neutral, and we wondered how *antistrophē* functioned in Aristotle’s construction of contingency.

We situated *antistrophē* in a particular construction of contingency, namely one oriented toward bringing people to a rest in accordance with Aristotle’s rational account of change in his model of the earth. We discovered that when paired with contingency, particular tropes provide an interesting way of making contact with the other. The trope *antistrophē* entails a unique tropical style called *katastrophe* wherein the activity of turning (strophe) down (kata) the other occurs. Within this configuration, the slave, the barbarian, the alien, the stranger, and women embody aspects of contingency related to an unnatural change that rhetoric has expunged in its *antistrophic* model to dialectic. As Aristotle puts it, the most appropriate trope for stylizing *antistrophic* rhetoric is “*katastrophe*,” quite literally a style that “turns down” other possible meanings so that a single one can be settled upon by “all, or the majority, or the wise” among us. While we certainly see the value and significance of the majority in the conceptual context of rhetorical theory, we also see something else. We see how contact is configured in
antistrophic rhetoric also creates a way of turning down the other in an effort to achieve a single resting place settled upon by “all, or the majority, or the wise” among us. We wonder where the rhetorical theory is for unsettling this resting place when it turns out to be a place of oppression for others?

The question how might rhetoric make contact with difference? creates a responsibility to discover how the art systemically excludes the other, and then based on that knowledge, to provide not only the resources but also the means for theorizing rhetoric anew to meet the demands of civic engagement that it is called to perform in the contemporary world. Eventually, our trope project—our enormous number of excel spreadsheets—took us down a route, mostly esoteric. Then once again and unexpectedly we stumbled upon a trope whose orientation is the other—alloiōsis.

And so we pursued the trope of the other. We ventured even further beyond the tropes contained within the Rhetoric and even traditional historiography, and now offer another trope, one of the other—alloiōsis. Could this trope be figured with contingency so as to create new relations with the other? What would the trope of the other mean for future rhetorical theorizing? As should be apparent by now—after hearing about our attempts at creating a new classification system of tropes—we will barely scratch the surface of an enormous tropological terrain as we try to present possible ways for this to happen. Nevertheless, we theorize that rhetoric can cease being reductive if other tropes can emerge. For starters, such tropes could come out of the discovery that the concept of contingency built on a principle of rest has distorted perceptions of contact, the other, and authority and turn us otherwise.

This book presents a collection of sorts of the conversations we have had across two decades of working together. A small part of our conversations has seen the light of day in earlier published essays, from which we draw in this book. As our conversation evolved over the years, it began to extend beyond our interpersonal dyad to include others. In this volume, we are joined by Michele Kennerly and Marie-Odile N. Hobeika to explore alloios-trophic rhetorical history, theory, and practice. In what follows in this Introduction, we wish to give you, our readers, a fuller sense of why we write, where we are coming from, what we collectively offer in this volume, and where we aim to go.

Because a new approach to rhetorical theorizing comes out of the discovery that assumptions regarding contingency have distorted perceptions of how rhetoric functions in the civic realm, then questions of democracy and rhetoric’s relation to its ideals and practices must be engaged. Democracy is, after all, why rhetoric is claimed to have been theorized by Aristotle in the first place. In the civic realm, Aristotle affirmed that we can never know essentially or necessarily, only ever probabilistically, because the contingencies of civic life are too great. So, the story goes, he theorized an art of
rhetoric to train our deliberation and decision making in the condition of contingency to produce wise practical judgments, decisions that are likely to be best for the greater good. If rhetoric takes as its effect the denial of contingency, what hope for democracy have we?

This traditional narrative affirming the centrality of contingency in Aristotle’s rhetorical theory is conjoined with a mythic resonance of rhetoric being a gift from Zeus. The story goes something like this: The people—demos (from which the English word democracy is derived)—were living like animals. Without civilization they “at first lived scattered . . . there were no cities.” The people had fire; they had ways to get food; they could build houses. What they did not have was a way to settle their differences. Whenever “they formed communities,” they would resort to violence since the people lacked a way of making decisions. For Zeus the people’s violence was wrecking his idea of people living peacefully. Zeus wanted to create civilization. So Zeus asked one of his lackeys—the god Hermes also known as Mercury—to distribute rhetoric among the people. The gift of rhetoric would enable the demos to settle their differences by means of speech rather than by means of violence. How should we distribute this art? Hermes asked Zeus. “Shall I,” inquired Hermes, the god of rhetoric, “distribute [the art] in the same way that the arts have been distributed? For example, one physician is enough to treat many laymen, and it is the same with other craftsmen.” In other words, should rhetoric—the power to speak—be distributed to only a few? Zeus thought for a moment. Give rhetoric to everyone, Zeus said, and distribute its power equally. Zeus explained to Hermes that civilization would not come into being if only a few shared the art. It is said that democracy was born the day that rhetoric was distributed as a gift to all the people.

Rhetoric shapes democracy because, insofar as it offers people—demos—a tool, it enables them to conduct the business of living together.

From the vision of everyone receiving rhetoric emerges the impression of equality. Since all were given rhetoric then all can speak; all can participate in the deliberative process and make decisions about what to do. Yet, we know this same mythic scene finds Penelope being shouted at by her son Telemachus when she, according to him, dared violate the norms of speaking culture by instructing the Bard Phemius to sing another song than the all-too-sad one of her husband Odysseus. Telemachus makes quite a scene shaming his mother for speaking, as such action is to be taken only by men. And we know too from this mythic scene that when Lysistrata attempts to make her great speech on why the Spartans and Athenians should make peace rather than continue their warring, the Magistrates leer at Lysistrata’s body, and jeer at her for thinking she has any place speaking on matters that are men’s. We know as well that Cassandra, a truth speaker, was dismissed as a crazy lady fated to be ignored. The idea that speech was given to all comes into question.
Against a vast mythic scene that foregrounds a complex history of ideas about speech, we come to Aristotle and his treatise *Rhetoric*. In this book, we are not drawn to Aristotle’s text and the traditions that it encompasses as an “ever receding horizon.” Rather, we are drawn to what is assumed. The prominent assumptions are that Aristotle couches rhetoric in relation to a distinctive human capacity of reason and logic to navigate with practical wisdom the contingencies of civic life. By doing so, rhetoric is theorized as governing deliberation and decision making in the contingent realms of politics, law, and culture. Based on such assumptions, rhetoric seems inclusive of all participation and thus is dubbed “the people art.” Such assumptions offer a neutral view of the art as a form of civic engagement.

For this, rhetoric is celebrated. A recognizable trend in recent political theories of democracy, in particular deliberative democracy, is a turn toward what political theorist Iris Marion Young calls “some positive political [purposes] of rhetoric.” For Young, a rhetorical perspective exposes the false belief that political deliberation is a coolly and purely rational activity. In discovering rhetoric, Young discovers a tradition of resistance to the Platonic privilege of reason over emotion. Why move away from a rational paradigm of political communication? The reason lies, as Young notes, in the fiction of rationality’s claim to be “impartial and dispassionate,” thereby transcending the “dirty world of interest and passion.” As Young argues, to the extent that democratic theory and practice privilege “allegedly dispassionate, unsituated, neutral reason, it has exclusionary implications.” The turn toward rhetoric, according to Young, allows at once a turn toward inclusion, for rhetoric can be used to get an issue on the agenda for deliberation, to fashion claims to people and people to claims, and to motivate the move from reason to judgment. In short, the deliberative turn in democracy makes room for rhetorical dimensions of communication that accompany all deliberation, and in the development of this room that has been underused, participatory inclusion can be forged.

Likewise, Danielle Allen’s *Talking with Strangers* offers Aristotelian rhetorical theory to political theorists of democracy. After exposing anew, in light of race tension and history, the problems with U.S. democracy in creating a willing minority, Allen proposes rhetoric as the solution: using an Aristotelian rhetoric, our invention of pluralistic, friend-based, civic speech will be enhanced. In this vein, Chantal Mouffe’s theory of an agonistic politics can be read as a call for a reconnection of politics to the great tradition of rhetoric. Advancing the notion of democratic deliberation being a primarily rhetorical activity, Robert Ivie quotes Chantal Mouffe’s call “to re-create in politics the connection with the great tradition of rhetoric.” For Ivie, a like Mouffe, this connection is an emancipatory means for fostering democracy for it fosters a robust and rowdy democracy, rooted in classical notions of conflict (*agōn*), yet situated, as Allen idealizes, in political friendship.
Questions of inclusion, however, vex this scene of rhetoric. While rhetoric might be the people's art, not all are included. The Athenian democracy, the cultural situation of Aristotle’s rhetorical theory, was, in terms of its time, inclusive of all. Yet, the “all” of Aristotelian rhetorical theory and Athenian democracy does not include women, let alone slaves, or foreign-born men residing in Athens. The “all” means in the main Athenian-born men. Whereas damning the Greeks for their nominal-only inclusive “all” would be anachronistic, calling out the contemporary legacy of using “all” in democratic speech in a nominal-only way would not be. The mask of inclusivity is more complicated than mere demographics: the problem of nominal inclusivity in ancient Greek rhetorical culture did not go away once others were invited to the deliberative sphere. Of late, this is evinced in scholarship in the history of rhetoric with particular consideration given to U.S. immigration practices and policies.  

Clearly, we are not the first to notice this problem. Beginning in the 1980s, feminists, in particular, from a variety of disciplines across the humanities have asked many questions and have challenged rhetoric’s terms of inclusion. In the main, critiques and challenges among twentieth-century century philosophers, feminists, and rhetoricians issue a call to pay attention to the ways in which rhetorical theory functions traditionally to exclude or deny women, rendering rhetoric effectively and paradoxically less than democratic. The judicious course, of which Doris Yoakum’s and Lillian O’ Conner’s work took the lead, was to consider how rhetoric could be theorized to include women.

Generally speaking, we join the conversation with those who critique and challenge rhetoric’s history, theory, and practice. The “Third Sophistic” movement in rhetoric beginning in the 1980s was devoted to seeing rhetoric historically and theoretically in relation to the other, who appears in various forms as woman, alien, barbarian, stranger, or what Victor J. Vitanza calls the “the third man” or “the third woman.” Broadly speaking, “the third” designates who or what must be excluded. This is so because within rhetoric’s history there “is that which must be excluded,” as Michelle Ballif explains Vitanza. If there is one common theme among revisionary historiographical work of the past thirty years, it can be found in the phrase “must be excluded.” Exclusion in no way suggests that some are in rhetoric and some are not. Rather, the “the third ‘is symptomatic of the logic of the dialectic.’” Notwithstanding the sustained and growing research in this area, the question of rhetoric’s relationship to the question of inclusion is difficult to contend with for those who assume a neutral art.

Those who assume rhetoric’s neutrality are in a position to see its beauty and power as a force of democratic deliberation and therefore promote rhetoric for its values pertinent to participatory inclusion. To assume the art is neutral is to impose upon the other a rhetoric that transcends or denies lived
experiences. As such, those who are systematically excluded from rhetoric are invited or required to participate in the decision-making process by using a seemingly neutral tool yet one that established their exclusion and otherness. Any involvement in rhetoric, whether for the sake of history or the sake of democratic deliberation, means that "we" have an obligation to the excluded. For us, this obligation requires primarily asking two questions: How is contact configured? What resources are available within the rhetorical tradition for broadening and varying its present configuration?

The rhetoric that many celebrate and strive to renew for the sake of civic engagement is, at once, designed to function best by seeking to exclude what it cannot contain or control dialectically. Thus women and others are excluded by peculiar functionalities of rhetoric that mostly are celebrated precisely when they adhere to qualities of dialectical logic that permitted rhetoric to emerge productively to bring contingency under control. This may seem odd, and rightly so. That contingency is the invariable scene of rhetoric is axiomatic in the field of rhetoric studies, from Aristotle to modern day. Perhaps because of its axiomatic status, contingency has not had a great deal of attention paid to it by rhetorical theorists. Contingency remains the unproblematic and invariable scene of rhetoric in scholarly writings on the idea. From this scene of contingency, the trajectory of scholarship takes off, in a celebration of this art of navigating contingency that we call rhetoric.

We begin again near the beginning of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. Tracing what he calls the “contingency thesis” in the history of rhetoric, Dilip Gaonkar locates its genius in Aristotle’s domicile of deliberation, defining contingency in terms of recurrence, not randomness, and thus effectively fusing it to probability. Quoting Aristotle, Gaonkar says, “A Probability is a thing that usually happens; not ... anything whatever that usually happens, but only if it belongs to the class of the ‘contingent’ or ‘variable.’” With this definition, Aristotle creates two types of contingencies. There is contingency associated with probability, and there is a contingency associated with the accidental or random contingencies—sumbebēkos. Aristotle expunges random contingences from rhetoric.

Rhetoric seeks out in any subject those concepts and ideas which are probable to a class or group. Rhetoric perceives probabilities; it does not create them. With this in mind, Gaonkar tracks the contingency thesis to twentieth-century rhetoricians such as Lloyd Bitzer and Thomas Farrell, showing how they adhere to probability as contingency, situating deliberation in relation to “public knowledge” and “social knowledge.” In parallel fashion, Gaonkar observes how the new rhetoricians, like Kenneth Burke, and the post foundationalists, like Judith Butler, adhere to the contingency thesis, mostly by importing Aristotle’s notion of probability to the scene of “practice.” This is not to say that post-foundationalists are Aristotelians. Rather, they deploy the notion of contingency without “adequately thematiz-
and, ironically, facilitate the remaking of the foundation they sought to escape. Aristotle and post-foundationalists both celebrate contingency in the same way, albeit the post-foundationalists do not know it.

The axiom of rhetoric being an art of navigating contingency in public life prefigures the expulsion of the other, of radical contingency. That part of the contingent that falls outside of the *doxa* gets expunged, discarded, rendered invisible and without authority. And this is why we write. As it turned out, over these years of our relationship, the most intriguing aspect of our conversations about contingency led us to a place wherein we eventually set aside the prevalent view of rhetoric and contingency. Rather, in the course of our many talks we were invited by each other’s perspective to consider how rhetoric defines contingency and then relies on that definition to prefigure relations with the other in such a way as to implicate exclusion of difference through a rhetoric designed to function coherently with modes of argument.

Our various turns in this book work to move contingency toward accident, otherness, alienation, generation, wonder, estrangement, natality. Collectively, we write with aspirations of democratic relations conceived through an expansive view of contingency because it enables us to configure contact with the other *alloiostrophically*. Derived from the movement, or *strophē*, of the other, *alloiōsis*, an alloiostrophic rhetoric is the precondition for staging contact with the other in terms that the tradition of rhetoric, the one which we had put aside, expunged from its own theoretical purview. What was left remained an unproblematized contingency. We explore this remainder using tropes.

We write this book as a call to revolutionize rhetorical theory via tropes. This book contributes to the theorization of rhetoric anew by first calling attention to a multiplicity of tropes of difference in the remainders of contingency—what Aristotle expelled due to his beliefs about change and his orientation to the earth. The trope of difference offers something new—a new mode of contact with the other that does not depend on moving, controlling or turning the other down. Our wager is that a book written to introduce the trope of difference to the field also offers an awaiting opportunity by which rhetoric can imagine haptic relations between people in terms of difference and re-invent itself to emerge in democracy as an art of the people.

To get started on this project, we turn to methodological considerations that started with our study of tropes. In the past fifty years, tropes and figures have acquired a status akin to a methodology. Tropes need not be and have not always been defined exclusively in terms of individual bits. They can be organized in systems. Classically speaking, rhetoric consists of four systems of change; each system is formed by and affects the world through corresponding tropes that enable the kind of change the system intends. These four systems of change, known as the *quadripartita ratio*, are substitution, subtraction, addition, and transposition. For the sake of convenience, we preview
four systems of change. Table 0.1 identifies and differentiates them by giving their Greek name followed by examples of tropes that satisfy the condition of change of each category.

Our methodology is derived from these four categories of change but we reorganize them and create two operating systems. In particular, we see in rhetoric two operating systems that we call substitution and transmutation. Each system, being tropological, is identifiable in terms of form and function by its relation with change. The systems of operation reveal their form and function by the kinds of change they enact. Operating systems reveal their intended use and functionality through a trope or tropes to provide a way to apprehend the system holistically.

We were prompted to reorganize the *quadripartita ratio* through our analysis of tropes in relation to change defined in the context of an earth at rest. The system of substitution utilizes change and motion in terms of the principle of rest. To tip it another way, the tropes within the system of substitution all, to varying degrees, turn down. Its governing figures and tropes are in the range of synonym, metaphor, and *antistrophe*.

Here is how we look at rhetoric after changing the way we looked at things. The operating systems we looked at changed from being a *quadripartita ratio*, flat and impartially related to conceptualizations of change—to a double operating system—substitution and transmutation—matching and mirroring rhetoric’s bifurcation of change—contingency/probable and contingency/*sumbebēkos* or random contingency. As such, the operating system of substitution is the frontal system of change. It is prefigured by tropes of substitution such as *antistrophe* and is in direct contact with systems of change that prefigure difference. Working in the parameters of how change happens on an earth at rest, the frontal system enacts the work of the ruler or mover. Based on the logic of *antistrophe* within the theoretical parameters of an earth at rest, the frontal system turns down the other systems of change. Specifically, we present the system operating through the tropical sequence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 0.1. Rhetorical Systems of Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Substitution</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Kata enallagēn</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>synonymia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anacoloutha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acyrologia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Gideon O. Burton, “Silva Rhetoricae.” cf. Quintilian 5.38.
Introduction

“antistrophē-katastrophi,” as it is inscribed in a static model where change is orchestrated.

The other operating system we call transmutation involves not one but three systems of change. Comprising tropes of subtraction, addition, and transposition, the system of transmutation appears to correspond to a great deal of ideas commonly associated with contingency. By virtue of the second operating system of tropes, of which alloiōsis is one, its force seemingly conflicts with the norms of change associated with an earth at rest. This trope does not work in isolation: it involves three other systems of change and does so for good reason.

In an effort to explain why three types of change are crucial for the operating system of transmutation to engage difference, we consider what happens if only change by addition is employed. Addition in a system of substitution has been used as a strategy of including women in the history of rhetoric. There are at least two explanations for why addition does not work as a system of change capable of including the other or re-theorizing rhetoric in a manner that establishes a logic, tropologically speaking, through difference. Barbara A. Biesecker, for example, compares adding women’s neglected, lost, or forgotten writings to history to rhetoric’s affirmative action approach. She writes, “Despite its ostensible purpose—to move toward multiculturalism by adding new items to an ever-expanding list of ‘great works’—the affirmative action agenda conserves the putative authority of the center by granting it license to continue to produce official explanations in the designation of what is and what is not worthy of inclusion.” In House of My Sojourn, Sutton demonstrates how adding women’s bodies to the house of rhetoric creates the technological condition of their exclusion because the space is designed with tropical resources to add women by subtracting them. In both cases, adding results in exclusion due to the force of the system of substitution. Its force can be shown to exist whether one takes the critical view of history from without and in relation to public policy or whether one takes the critical view of theory from within and in relation to rhetoric’s technological impact on the body, the doer, and speaker in the civic realm.

All of this is to say that our project is not committed to opening rhetoric to difference through addition, whether the addition of difference is articulated in a multicultural sense or implicated in a technical sense by adding the trope of alloiōsis to rhetorical theory. We are theorizing a transmutational change, one that cuts across all known forms to an otherwise unknown form that serves the ends of democratic life. As long as we remain invested in change as substitution then we remain committed to the other in a particular mode of contact that “we” are trying to move beyond.

Returning to the four types of change (Table 0.1), and summarizing how we configure the complexity of the two operating systems, the system of substitution is invested in one type of change, namely substitution, while
transmutation involves the participation and interaction of three kinds of change—subtraction, addition, and transposition. Table 0.2 depicts the operating systems and connects them to the kind of change they embrace.

We return to the beginning of our introduction where we talked about rhetoric in the context of democratic deliberation and revisionary views of it. All agree that revising rhetoric is a project devoted to change. Our trope project calls for a revolution because change requires a new methodology. A new methodology is indispensable for deciphering how the turn toward difference can utilize resources that have been deferred, deflected, or diminished. Rhetoric's "other tropes" and the ability to mobilize resources formative of contingency untethered to probability must be equal to rhetoric's power to restrict change with the trope of antistrophē formative of speaking practices.

From a methodological point of view, the broad aim of this book is to take a look at both operations in terms of how they function and to consider what each operation can tell us about rhetoric's formal relation to the other as well as how this relation implicates rhetorical theory's ability to act as a resource for democratic deliberation, to engage contingency, and to effect democratic change. It is worth mentioning that the word "theory" comes from the Greek word theōrein, a word referring to seeing and observing. So our view of rhetoric and the terms and definitions we employ are derived from seeing the art from a theoretical standpoint. By introducing definitions and new concepts and tropes, we are equipped to make visible or more accurately to theorize rhetoric performing democratic deliberation as it could be. The future of rhetoric is open to democratic deliberation. The vision of democratic deliberation as it has informed the imagination of many is one such future. There are others.

Our methodology also raises theoretical considerations with respect to the two operating systems of change. Could the tripartite system held by the operating system of transmutation replace the static model? The problem, as we grasp it, is not to return rhetoric to its original domain; the problem is to recognize where the original domain no longer serves the professed aims of deliberative democracy. Could the tripartite system be inscribed alongside the "antistrophic-katastrophic" sequence to effectively produce a metamorphosis not only to radically alter how the "antistrophic-katastrophic" se-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 0.2. Operating Systems Distinguished by Type(s) of Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operating System of Substitution</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substitution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Rhetorical Systems of Change
quence functions but also mutate the static model, rendering it dynamic? These questions are already exceeding this book, but not our "trope project."

The future of rhetoric requires a forward-looking impetus that directs us to seek rhetoric's relation with a multiplicity of tropes not as ornaments or disembodied general stylistic devices but as embodied performances that are pre-figurative and operative in the functioning of rhetoric. What we offer in this book is both new yet ancient, albeit left unattended and de-authorized for too long. For the plainest evidence of its ancientness, we can turn to a standard text of the classical rhetorical tradition, Heinrich Lausberg's *A Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*. Using this reference, widely recognized as a pre-eminent handbook of classical rhetoric, we can discern that tropes in classical rhetorical theory were theorized to deviate from "correct" usage, including accepted usage and normal usage. Tropes turn away from the normal. The normal is what needs escaping, and tropes provide the means of escape. In particular, deviation, which tropes offer, makes liberation possible.

The *antistrophic* figure of rhetoric is a case in point. With this trope, Aristotle deviated from the past and liberated rhetoric for its systematization. Now *antistrophē* has become the front-face of meaning making. However, it is just one trope. We should do more than just amplify this one trope in our rhetorical theorizing. We have attended before to the front face of the relational dynamic between rhetoric and democracy, what we once called "the face work of freedom—the face of freedom's discourse." Drawing from Henri Lefebvre, we see these excessive amplifications of the face distort and brutalize the situation and prevent the possibility of contingency and difference. Thus, the *alloiostrophic* turn must go in many ways to return to the meaning-making process (because no one has yet figured out how to escape that return), bringing with it renewed energy that has the capacity for transformation.

This book is devoted to developing the affective, positive and dynamic structure of the operating system of transmutation by introducing a trope called *alloiōsis*, meaning difference, diversity and strangeness. A quite other trope, *alloiōsis* provides a unique vantage point for taking a closer look at how, through three systems of change, it could sustain an operating system associated with democracy without enacting systemic exclusions. At the same time, *alloiōsis* offers a methodology—an "alloiō-rhetorics"—for expanding rhetoric through quite other tropological resources that open it to making contact with difference. At this point in time, the methodology is a quest for a style of rhetoric that reflects the complexities of the process of the operating systems of change.

Toward that end, a new theorization of rhetoric must be formed in a milieu within and around multiplicity and a complexity of change where new concepts and new ways of making contact can be shaped. This bears repeating: It is not enough to build a new theory on one system of change.
To transform rhetoric in relation to change is not to theorize how the other operates in a system of rhetoric that authorizes contingency to be conceived in the double context of probability and the accidental, not in a static model of rhetoric. To say that the earth is not at rest and neither should be rhetoric is to offer an opportunity to configure contingency otherwise. More importantly, the impact of this new configuration creates a trope of difference and thus invents a way to begin a new conversation about how to turn toward the other as opposed to turning down the other. Toward that end, we organized the book in the following way.

In the first chapter, we deconstruct the figure of traditional rhetorical theory as *antistrophic*. In doing so, we expose how rhetorical theory is traditionally designed to turn down possibilities in the meaning-making process so that a position of rest can be achieved in agreement of all, or at least the majority, or the wise. Turning down such possibilities might require a wealth of rhetorical resources, and these resources can even sanction strangeness from time to time, as Kennerly in chapter 5 astutely shows Aristotle doing in his treatment of style in Book III and as Danielle Allen does in her examination of Aristotle’s rhetorical art of learning how to talk to strangers. Nonetheless, change can only go so far if rhetoric hasn’t been revolutionized beyond its *antistrophic* figuration. We show that this need to turn otherwise can be theorized through the figure of *alloiostrophē* wherein alienation is essential to transformation.

Next, we offer four études with our theory of *alloiostrophic* rhetoric. Jane Sutton works *alloiostrophically* to take us through change and contingency in the *Physics* and also, as a consequence, in the *Rhetoric*, as she takes the two to be part of an integrated corpus of Aristotle’s works. Through her study of the *Physics*, she helps us to see that Aristotle bifurcates contingency into that part aligned with the probable and that part aligned with the accidental. The probable (*eikos*) is that which is likely the case. The accidental (*sumbebēkos*) is that which is neither always nor for the most part. In this bifurcation of contingency into the accidental and the probable, the probable is privileged. This privilege then generates necessity, or better yet, produces another generation of necessity, the *doxastic* generation. This generation is not pure necessity, but rather probability, which is the closest the political realm can get to necessity, and which must function in civic discourse in place of necessity. Sutton’s work with *Physics* and *Rhetoric* exposes that change or contingency is a critical feature of rhetorical theory, but nevertheless, both change and contingency function within an economy of an earth at rest. This means expanding contingency by denying an earth at rest, which ought to be easy enough as other disciplines—physics and psychology, 35 for example—have already benefited greatly from their Copernican turns. Once we get on board with the idea that neither the earth nor rhetoric is at rest, we are free to use
the resources in Aristotle to imagine rhetoric in a way that is indebted to him but also free of him.

Hobeika’s *parataxis* of *alloiōsis* is itself *alloiōtic*, as *hypotaxis* has for a long time now been the norm of meaning making in scholarly analysis and argument. *Parataxis*, characterized by the absence of overt logical connectors between ideas, leaves us wondering at meaning. Kennerly’s essay shows forth the wonder of wonder such as when Homer tells of how Priam and Achilles, in states of wonder at each other, structure a space of trust and friendship, and how, in this space, Achilles’ anger is resolved. Wonder sparks self-awareness and solidarity. In meaning making, fresh energy is created by alienation, estrangement, and awe.

Playing on such energy, Hobeika’s paratactic display of *alloiōsis* alienates and thereby transforms the reader by way of making impossible (by way of not expressing connections, relations, making arguments, drawing conclusions) easy, hence restful, senses of things. Hobeika’s *parataxis* of *alloiōsis* alienates readers from the norm and opens up a wondering of what these ancient flashes of texts are, mean, do, and offer. *Parataxis* is an irony in a run-on style: it can slow down meaning, holding us in wonder with no overt logic, and no easy or ready rendering of meaning. Yet, now we are free to start playing, imagining, theorizing.

As Kennerly shrewdly discerns, *alloiostrophic* estrangement makes possible the freedom to wonder and to be born for others, hence she calls *alloiostrophic* rhetoric, too, *alloiotrophic*. The generative potential of alienation and estrangement has a redemptive effect. We know such a redemptive effect, from Kenneth Burke, as comic in genre and attitude. 36

Mifsud invites us to wonder in many ways, first at the mechanisms of correctness as a trope used to excise texts from the rhetorical tradition, then at a peculiar text that she proposes ought to be made contact with differently, *[Plutarch] Essay on the Life and Poetry of Homer*. From this wondering she is resourced well to wonder some more, next at Aristophanes’ rhetorical redemption by way of *alloiotic* gendered performances of gift-giving. This redemption is transmutative, changing war to peace, misogyny to equality, and enmity to solidarity, ending in lots of love and dancing.

Collectively, the energies of transmutation contained in these chapters evoke the question, *does anything go?* Sutton’s Afterword asks this very question. There is no simple answer. It requires reflecting on the two operating systems of rhetoric in terms of agent and agency. Is it possible to imagine rhetoric consisting of two operating systems, rather than one? Yes. There is Abraham Lincoln’s fragment on Niagara Falls, which offers a vantage point for theorizing the other as a concept central to democracy. There is Julia Kristeva’s depiction of the *chora*: The operating systems could be tropes set in the womb, engendering ways of thinking about contact not only in terms of the inclusion of the other, as is typical in critiques of classical theories, but
in terms of what inclusion of the other can offer to the retheorization of rhetoric. Lincoln and Kristeva are a start. There are others, as an exercise in a riddle even provokes us to reconsider Aristotle.

All told, this book is what it means to be open to alloiostrophic rhetoric. To be open is to be positioned to invent. To paraphrase Aristotle’s conclusion to the *Rhetoric*, I am done, but you are not. This time there are no gods, like Zeus, to deliver rhetoric anew for the kind of democracy we deserve.

**NOTES**

1. Todayinsci®. “Today in Science History.” [http://todayinsci.com/home.htm](http://todayinsci.com/home.htm). According to the Webmaster *Today in Science History*, this is a quote of dubious authenticity. Various books and websites attribute the quote to Max Planck. As the Webmaster explains it, “it appears in a few books published in recent years when quotes are readily grabbed from the web and spread virally without authentication. It is also called an ‘ancient Tao observation’ by Wayne W. Dyer in *A New Way of Thinking, a New Way of Being: Experiencing the Tao Te Ching* (2009), Introduction, v.”


3. Transliterations of Greek words throughout this book follow *The Chicago Manual of Style*. All Greek accents are omitted. The macron is used to distinguish the long vowels eta (\(\ddot{e}\)) and omega (\(\ddot{o}\)) from the short vowels epsilon (\(\epsilon\)) and omicron (\(\omicron\)). We would like to acknowledge and express our heartfelt thanks to Cory Gratias, PhD candidate and graduate teaching assistant in the Department of Communication Arts & Sciences and the Department of Women’s Studies at The Pennsylvania State University, for working with us on our list of Greek words.


6. On the figure of katastrophe being the figure most appropriate to the prose style of antistrophic rhetoric forging civic discourse, see Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1409a25–1409b1. See Sutton and Mifsud on the significance of a katastrophic style of rhetoric, in chapter 1 of this volume.


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.


13. Cassandra’s story in Aeschylus’s *Agamemnon* is of her madness arising from a combination of deep foreseeing insight with the complete lack of authority to be believed.

16. Ibid., 63.
17. Ibid.
25. Ibid.


32. Barbara A. Biesecker, “Coming to Terms with Recent Attempts to Write Women into the History of Rhetoric,” 156.


