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Most German philosophers in the early nineteenth century were devoted to the idealistic « completion » of Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy. A few independent philosophers, however, were preoccupied with the elaboration of a non-idealistic, and less speculative, conclusion to Kant's thought. Among the earliest opponents of the speculative idealists was Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843), a philosopher of wide-ranging interests who might have had a much greater impact upon the course of German philosophy had his liberal political affiliations not curtailed his academic career. As it was, his influence was considerable anyway. One aspect of this influence is of particular interest: in his reaction against idealism, and in his own « completion » of Kant, Fries laid the foundation for the development and acceptance of psychology as an independent science.

Like the idealists, Fries acknowledged Kant as his most important predecessor. In fact, he claimed that he alone was the true follower of Kant since he alone had developed the critical basis rather than the speculative implications of Kant's philosophy. Maintaining that knowledge of the transcendent is impossible, Fries rejected the attempts of the idealists to reduce reality to a system of absolute truths. Instead he concentrated, as did Kant, upon the discovery of the critical bases of knowledge. Methodologically, he relied upon analytical, descriptive, and deductive procedures rather than the constructive metaphysical reasoning of the idealists. In the course of his efforts, he contributed new procedures and distinctions to the critical philosophy, and he came to the conclusion that psychology is the
fundamental science and the foundation of philosophy. Having established the critical foundation of knowledge by means of psychology, he proceeded, as Kant had intended, to develop a system of metaphysics which, he claimed, remained within the limits of human understanding. He also developed the «psychic anthropology» by which he hoped to establish psychology upon a steady and lasting foundation. Through all these endeavors, he brought to the fore the conceptual possibility of a scientific psychology.

THE RELATION OF FRIES AND HIS WORK TO EARLY NINETEENTH-CENTURY GERMAN PHILOSOPHY

Fries began his philosophical ruminations while a student at the Moravian Academy in Herrenhut. From 1792 to 1795, he was taught Kantian philosophy as interpreted by Karl Leonhard Reinhold. Reinhold (1971) stressed the principle of consciousness as the immediate and irreducible fact of philosophy. He also emphasized that the goal of philosophy was to give a descriptive account of consciousness, or a «phenomenology». That which is a priori in consciousness, Reinhold maintained, cannot be proven; it can only be discovered and described. These tenets of Reinhold had a very significant influence upon Fries's thought, but Fries was not completely satisfied with Reinhold's interpretation of Kant. For that reason, Fries began his own critical reading of Kant's works, seeking to discover not only what Kant himself had said, but, more importantly, how Kant had come to his conclusions. Thus, from the very beginning when Fries was first attracted to philosophy (and away from the dogmatic system of the Moravians), it was the fundamental issue of methodology that interested Fries.

This interest was further developed when Fries left the Moravians in 1795 and went to Leipzig to study philosophy. There he came under the influence of Ernst Platner (1772; 2d rev. ed., 1790), a philosopher with medical and psychological interests who stressed the importance of empiricism in the form of self-observation. Platner thus not only reinforced Reinhold's si-

1 The biographical details regarding Fries have been gathered primarily from Henke (1867) and Eggeling (1878).
milar emphasis upon self-observation, he also contributed to the psychological solution of Fries's increasing concern about the critical justification of the critical method itself. Also at Leipzig, Fries came into contact with the thought of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1787; 2d ed., 1815). Jacobi's philosophy of faith and feeling corroborated the pietistic influence which the Moravians had had upon Fries. Fries's conviction that knowledge is ultimately based upon a feeling, or immediate cognition, and that the noumenal existence of the things which appear to us can only be confirmed by faith, is a consequence of this dual heritage of Pietism and Jacobian philosophy. From Jacobi, too, came another reinforcement of the importance of self-observation. This theme, which was to be central to Fries's psychological development of Kant's critical philosophy, can thus be traced to the combined influence of Reinhold, Platner, and Jacobi. Despite Fries's objection to certain aspects of the thought of each of these philosophers, it can therefore be said that the positive basis of Fries's « completion » of Kant was provided by Reinhold, Platner, and Jacobi.

The negative basis — that against which Fries reacted at the beginning of his philosophical development — was the idealistic philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1794). Fries became well acquainted with this philosophical system in 1797 after he transferred to Jena explicitly in order to study with Fichte. From the start Fichte's speculative discourses aroused Fries's opposition. Fries habitually returned to his room after Fichte's lectures and wrote point-by-point rebuttals. This practice in written polemic served Fries well when in 1803 he wrote Reinhold, Fichte und Schelling, his very effective diatribe against the idealistic tendencies in post-Kantian philosophy. This work brought Fries a good deal of notice and a reputation as one of the more brilliant up-and-coming young philosophers.

Well before that time, however, Fries (1798a, b, c, d, e) had already established the constructive basis of his later work in a series of five articles. As a portent of things to come, all these articles dealt with psychology and, to varying degrees, with the issue of the relation between psychology, metaphysics, and the critical philosophy. The most significant of these articles, "Über das Verhältnis der empirischen Psychologie zur Metaphysik" (On the Relation of Empirical Psychology to Metaphysics), provides an excellent summary of Fries's philoso-
phical program. Fries’s later writings, particularly his major works, elaborate the themes he first expressed in this article.

Thus, at the age of twenty-five, Fries had already developed his own unique philosophical viewpoint. Though historically related to the thought of Kant, Reinhold, Platner, and Jacobi, this viewpoint was a singular departure from the various systems of these philosophers. We shall examine its methodological and doctrinal innovations in the next section, and its psychological tenets in the section after that. Here we shall continue to outline the history of Fries’s life and individual works.

Following his polemical tract, *Reinhold, Fichte und Schelling*, Fries published two early book-length expositions of his thought, first in 1804 for a philosophical audience (in *System der Philosophie als evidente Wissenschaft*, or System of Philosophy as Evident Science) and then in 1805 for a more popular audience (in *Wissen, Glaube und Ahnung*, or Knowledge, Faith, and Presentiment). In 1805 he was invited to Heidelberg as professor of philosophy and mathematics. In Heidelberg, in 1807, Fries published his three-volume masterwork, *Neue Kritik der Vernunft* (New Critique of Reason), which, as the title suggests, was intended to establish Kant’s critical philosophy on a new basis. In the second edition of this work, published between 1828 and 1831, Fries amended the title to reflect the precise nature of this new basis. It was, he indicated, a *Neue oder anthropologische Kritik der Vernunft* (New or Anthropological [i.e., Empirical Psychological] Critique of Reason).

In the remaining years at Heidelberg Fries published a number of works, including his *System der Logik* in 1811, a critique of Schelling’s philosophy of art in 1812, and several tracts on natural science in 1813. These latter tracts reflect an aspect of Fries’s work which has gone unnoted up until now — Fries’s interest in mathematics and the natural sciences. As early as his time in the Academy of the Moravians, Fries excelled in the study of both mathematics and the natural sciences, and he continued his study in these two areas at Jena. In fact, in 1802 he published “Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Theorien des Lichtes und der Wärme” (Essay on a New Presentation of the Theories of Light and Heat), and in 1803 he published a tract on *Regulative für die Therapeutik nach heuristischen Grundsätzen der Naturphilosophie aufgestellt* (Regulations for Therapeutics Set Forth According to Heuristic Principles of Natural Philosophy). This tract on physiological thera-
peutics is a largely forgotten work which merits attention for its very suggestive and innovative ideas. For our purposes, however, its major significance is that it was an early presentation of ideas which were given different, and more systematic, expression in 1822, in Fries's important *Die mathematische Naturphilosophie* (The Mathematical Philosophy of Nature).

This mathematical philosophy, and Fries's defense of mechanical explanation in the natural sciences, put Fries into rather direct opposition to the *Naturphilosophie* of the idealists. Opposing the use of teleology as an explanatory principle in natural science, Fries went even further than Kant in philosophically justifying the «Newtonian» approach to natural science. Unlike Kant, who did not amend his evaluation of chemistry after Lavoisier's work, Fries included chemistry among the natural sciences proper, and he refused to admit the explanation of life according to teleological principles. (In fact, it was his espousal of mechanical explanation in biology that led his disciple, Matthias Jakob Schleiden, to important new results and theories in the study of plant life) 2. But the major point to be made is that Fries was very well informed in the areas of natural science and was an innovator in the philosophy of science 3. In fact, he was one of the very few philosophers whom German empirical scientists continued to respect and read during the age of idealist philosophy 4. As we shall see, his concern about the sciences of «outer nature» — which was his only concern in *Die mathematische Philosophie* — was accompanied by his interest elsewhere in the sciences of «inner nature».

2 Schleiden (1854), the founder of modern cytology, gave credit to Fries for having originally suggested the idea of explaining organic processes by analogy with crystallization processes.

3 Besides extending Kant's philosophy of natural science to include chemistry and biology, and adding morphological and phenomenological considerations to the theory of movement, Fries is credited with important innovations in the philosophy of mathematics. In fact, Nelson (1962; trans., 1970-71) has said that Fries «is the real founder of modern axiomatics; for he was the first not only to pose the problem of this science in general terms, but to work at it systematically» (Vol. 2, p. 167).

4 E.g., Schleiden referred to Fries as the philosopher of natural science; Alexander von Humboldt approved of his natural scientific works; and Carl Friedrich Gauss, the great mathematician and astronomer, told a student that his time at the university would be well spent if he but learned to understand and value Fries's *Die mathematische Naturphilosophie* (Henke, 1867, p. 226). For a review of Fries's philosophy of the natural sciences, see Nobis (1972); regarding its impact on Schleiden, see Buchdahl (1973).
Though he maintained that the natural scientific study of «outer nature» was based upon different metaphysical (i.e., conceptual or categorical) principles than the sciences of «inner nature», he did not assign to the sciences of outer nature an epistemologically different status. Both types of science, he said, were equally valid «theoretical sciences» insofar as they were both founded upon a priori principles. I shall have more to say about the principles of psychology later in this article.

Fries wrote Die mathematische Naturphilosophie and various subsequent treatises on mathematical and natural scientific topics (the most important being Fries, 1826, 1839, and 1842) under greatly changed circumstances in the post-Heidelberg years of his life. These changed conditions stemmed from his return to Jena (as professor of theoretical philosophy) in 1816 and his involvement there and at the Wartburg Festival of 1817 in liberal, nationalistic political activities. In a series of private and public addresses he encouraged the political activism of student groups and was outspoken in his desire for constitutional government. These political convictions and behavior aroused the opposition of authorities in both Berlin and Vienna, particularly after a student who was loosely associated with Fries murdered a suspected government spy in 1819: Fries had already been passed over in 1818 as a candidate for the chair of philosophy in Berlin because of his political involvement; now he lost his position at Jena. Not until 1824 was Fries reinstated at Jena, and then only as professor of mathematics and physics. Although he was allowed to have a small number of private students in philosophy, he did not receive full Lehrfreiheit (freedom in teaching) until 1838. That is, he was not allowed to lecture publicly on philosophy for almost twenty years — the twenty years in which he was at the height of powers and in which the idealism he so totally opposed conquered the German academic world in the guise of Hegelianism.

It is very unlikely that Fries could have stemmed the tide of speculative idealism even under the best of circumstances. But he might well have become better known, and his philosophy might have received greater recognition as a viable alternative to the reigning idealism, had he not suffered political repression. Indeed, if Fries had not been politically censured, he very possibly would have received the appointment to the Berlin chair that went instead to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,
who was then not as well known as Fries. Had the appointment gone to Fries the course of German philosophy might have been altered, slightly yet significantly. But as a matter of historical fact Fries did not receive the Berlin chair, and the fact that Fries was censured and lost his public audience at precisely the same time that a philosophy very different from his own was rising to dominance was too great a liability to be offset. Even though he commanded great love and respect from the academic community at Jena throughout his exile and the rest of his life, and although a small group of dedicated followers and natural scientists remained faithful to him, Fries was never able to fulfill the promise of fame and influence that was his at an earlier age.

Nonetheless Fries was very productive in the years between 1819 and his death in 1843. Besides works in mathematics and natural science, and numerous reviews and short works, Fries wrote treatises on the philosophy of politics, ethics, aesthetics, religion, and the history of philosophy. He also expanded the «psychic anthropology» that was the foundation of his Neue Kritik der Vernunft into a book-length Handbuch der psychischen Anthropologie (Handbook of Psychic Anthropology, 1820-21) with which we shall be concerned in the section on Fries’s psychology. In 1824, he wrote his System der Metaphysik (System of Metaphysics) in which he gave systematic expression to his distinctions between the metaphysics of outer and inner nature; knowledge, belief, and presentiment; and five different ways of viewing reality. And he took time to revise his System der Logik in 1819 and again in 1837, his

5 Though younger by three years, Fries advanced much more quickly than Hegel through the German academic system. Both had begun their teaching careers in Jena in 1801, and both were made associate professors (ausserordentlicher Professor) there in 1805. But Fries was a far more popular lecturer and also much quicker in developing and writing about his own unique philosophical viewpoint. By 1805 he had written three books and was offered the chair of philosophy and mathematics at Heidelberg. In 1807, when Hegel published his first book, Phänomenologie des Geistes, Fries published his masterwork, Neue Kritik der Vernunft. When Hegel finally received the call to a professorship in 1816, it was to the chair at Heidelberg that Fries had vacated in order to occupy the more prestigious chair at Jena. Only with Hegel’s appointment at Berlin in 1818 did Hegel pass Fries in status and fame. See Kaufmann (1966, pp. 92, 96, 176).

6 For a list of these and all of Fries’s published writings, see [Fries’s Bibliography] (1937). Vol. 26 of the Sämtliche Schriften, when it appears, will contain a bibliography of writings by and about Fries.

The total number of Fries's writings, which will fill twenty-six volumes in the completed modern edition of his works, is a testament to the fact that Fries was a very hard-working and very well-rounded philosopher. His interests were both theoretical and practical, scientific and religious, critical and yet constructive. Though he denied that man can know the absolute truth about reality, and thus criticized the idealists' belief that knowledge can be systematized once and for all, he did assert that man can, and should, reach a level of theoretical and practical knowledge which will help him understand and direct his life. Fries attempted to contribute to man's enlightenment in virtually every area of theory and practice. In doing so, he felt compelled to oppose the dominant philosophical trends of his day. In the following section we will concentrate on the central aspect of Fries's work that stands in particular opposition to early nineteenth-century German idealism — his psychological «completion» of Kant.

FRIES'S PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF KANT'S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

As much as Fries opposed the idealistic «completion» of Kant, he did not blame the idealists entirely for their metaphysical, or «transcendental», interpretation of the Kantian heritage. The fault, Fries felt, was to a great extent Kant's own. For

7 In opposition to the speculative idealists, Fries felt that metaphysical principles (intuitional forms, catégories of understanding, and ideas of reason) were regulative, not constitutive. They cannot, he maintained, tell us about the actual nature of reality; and systematizing them, however useful, can never lead us beyond the phenomenological limits of our knowledge to any final, absolute truth. Indeed, Fries claimed that there are different ways of «knowing», different points of view, or worldviews (Weltansichten); i.e., different «systems» of principles for understanding reality. One can view reality as physical, either explaining it according to laws or describing and classifying it phenomenologically; or one can view reality from the viewpoint of inner mentality; or according to ethico-political norms; or finally according to religio-aesthetic ideals. Each approach is valid in itself, though the religio-aesthetic view is the highest possible since it puts one in touch with the highest of values. But the religio-aesthetic view is not knowledge in the narrow sense. It provides a «presentiment» of absolute reality, not the certain knowledge that the idealists claimed to have reached.
as brilliant as Kant was, and as epoch-making as were his discoveries, he had failed in the final analysis to definitively establish the critical philosophy (Fries, 1807; Vol. 1, pp. xv, 28-31; 1820-21, Vol. 1, p. 100). That is, he had failed to clarify and justify the exact nature of the critical method. Having discovered the various a priori intuitions, forms, and ideas which characterize the human mind, he had not adequately specified and validated the means by which he had made these important discoveries. Indeed, he had not even addressed himself to the issue, and he had unwittingly complicated the problem in the second edition of *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Critique of Pure Reason) by substituting a «transcendental» (or «objective») deduction of the categories of understanding in the place of the «subjective» deduction found in the first edition. In a very short time, the development of the implications of this transcendental deduction led to speculative idealism, even though Kant himself (1781; 2d rev. ed., 1787; trans., 1965) had vigorously denied that his approach constituted a transcendental idealism and insisted that the revision of the second edition represented no change in his thought (pp. 33-37 [B]). Kant had not realized that this revision had introduced what seemed to be a fundamental ambiguity into his doctrine. By doing so, it planted the seeds of future dissent between the idealists who followed the lead of the transcendental deduction and Fries who maintained that the original edition of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, with its more subjective or psychological approach, was closer to the true critical method.

The general problem involved in this issue was one that had engaged Fries’s attention since the very beginning of his study of Kantian philosophy, namely, how did Kant come to his conclusions? Whereas Kant had sought a secure foundation upon which to establish philosophy, Fries went one step further, seeking to determine how such a foundation could be constructed. That is, Fries set himself the task of submitting the critical philosophy itself to a critical analysis in order to determine the exact nature of the critical method. Or, to express it in yet two more ways, Fries wanted to determine how the critical method provides knowledge and thus what kind of knowledge is provided by the critical method. The idealists implicitly maintained that the critical philosophy, by means of transcendental analysis, yields metaphysical knowledge about the nature of reality. Fries did not agree.
As mentioned in the historical survey above, Fries reached his own view of the critical philosophy as early as 1798 in "Über das Verhältnis der empirischen Psychologie zur Metaphysik". In this article Fries first expressed his conviction that, just as the critical philosophy is the foundation of metaphysics proper, so in turn is empirical psychology the foundation of the critical philosophy. At-bottom, Fries said, the critical method provides knowledge by a regressive analysis which begins with the empirical facts of consciousness; thus, the critical method leads to empirical, not metaphysical, knowledge. Though what comes to be known are the a priori forms of thought, the knowledge of these forms is itself a posteriori. It is the consequence of an experienced chain of analysis. In short, Fries maintained that we come to know the a priori forms in our thought only as a matter of experience. Those forms themselves are there all the time, but before our critical analysis we are not conscious of them, and they are not a matter of explicit knowledge. The critical philosophy, then, although it provides knowledge of the a priori and necessary elements in our understanding, is itself an empirical science based upon the analysis of cognitive states with which we become familiar through self-observation. Thus, the critical philosophy depends upon psychology!

This conclusion would have surprised Kant, of course, and Fries knew it. Despite the fact that Kant's earlier «subjective» deduction was more closely related to Fries's program of psychological analysis than was the later «transcendental» deduction, Fries did not claim that Kant had ever explicitly used a psychological method in the first edition of *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Indeed, he contended that Kant never properly defined and utilized the critical method (Fries, 1807, Vol. 1, pp. xv, 28-31; 1820-21, Vol. 1, p. 100). Had he done so, Fries said, Kant could have completed the critical philosophy himself. Since he had not done so, Fries published his major work, *Neue Kritik der Vernunft* (1807) in order to establish the critical philosophy upon a proper-methodological basis and thus to complete what Kant had begun.

The crucial defect in Kant's critique of reason, according to Fries, was that, although Kant's (1781; 2d rev. ed., 1787; trans. 1965) self-expressed goal had been to call reason «to undertake anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge» (p. 9 [A]), he had not understood that
this goal could be reached only through self-observation. If one wishes to establish the a priori elements in knowledge, for example, one must begin by first examining actual bits of knowledge and then by asking, as Kant did, what principles are necessary for the very possibility of this knowledge. One cannot determine what is a priori in knowledge without first having some idea of what knowledge is. Thus, one must proceed according to a rigorous, two-step program, beginning with self-observation (to learn about knowledge and the mental processes that lead to it) and concluding with a regressive analysis (to abstract from actual instances of knowledge to the innate principles of knowledge) (Fries, 1807, Vol. 1, pp. 40-41, 68). A discussion of both of these steps will summarize the essential nature of Fries's «new» critique of reason.

The basis of Fries's critical method — its first step — was self-observation. Through a careful phenomenology of the mind Fries hoped not only to determine the various types of knowledge, but also to describe and classify the general types of mental processes which constitute mental life. He viewed the establishment of an adequate theory of the mind as a necessary preliminary to a critical analysis of the innate forms of the mind (Fries, 1807, Vol. 1, p. 63). Indeed, he contended that many of the difficulties in Kant's analysis had resulted from the fact that he had not been sufficiently critical at this first stage of his critical philosophy. Instead of validating his theory of mind through an empirical investigation of mental phenomena, Kant had simply assumed a psychological theory which uncritically utilized several distinctions that had been passed down for centuries in logic and psychology. The principal distinctions to which Fries referred were those between understanding and reason and between sensibility and intelligibility. Through his own psychological observations, Fries became convinced that these distinctions were inadequate as understood by Kant and were responsible for serious problems in his «transcendental» analysis of reason.

The problem with Kant's distinction between reason and understanding, according to Fries, was that it kept Kant from really investigating «pure reason» as he had intended. For when he studied «reason» Kant studied only dialectical reason, the faculty of making inferences about reality. But how, Fries asked, does this dialectical reason differ from understanding, which is the faculty of judgment? Dialectical reason; he maintai-
ned, is only a particular species of judgment; and so Fries preferred, on the basis of the observed similarity between the processes of judging and inferring, to include both under the rubric of understanding, which he defined as reflective or mediated reasoning. Such reasoning, he said, falls under the control of the will and is thus a matter of voluntary choice. Reason, however, by which Fries meant pure reason, is not under the control of the will. It is an autonomous activity of knowing. That is, it is spontaneous and involuntary. It is, in short, the source of the a priori and necessary elements in our knowledge. This is what a critique of reason should investigate — not the dialectical illusions of reason, but the spontaneous activity of reason (i.e., the mind as purely active).

Kant’s failure to adequately distinguish between understanding and pure reason was directly related, according to Fries, to his acceptance of the sensibility-intelligibility distinction. This traditional distinction, Kant said, made the analysis of spontaneously active reason virtually impossible. For if the innate forms cannot come from sensibility (and they cannot if they are truly innate), then Kant could only assert that they were an innate part of reflective intelligibility. But reflective intelligibility is a faculty of mediate and voluntary, not immediate and a priori, knowledge. Thus Kant’s disjunctive distinction between sensibility and intelligibility prevented him from positing a truly innate and non-mediated source of cognition.

To solve this dilemma, Fries proposed one of his major innovations. He introduced a third source of knowledge, distinct from both sensibility and intelligibility. A priori forms of knowledge, he said, if they are truly a priori, can proceed neither from immediate sensation nor from mediated reflections. They must be immediate (though not sensations) and cognitive (though not mediated). That is, the innate forms of the mind must constitute a third source of knowledge — immediate cogni-
By making this new distinction Fries was able to solve a number of the problems he saw in Kant's analysis when he moved on to the second stage of his critical method, the regressive analysis, or deduction, of the a priori elements in knowledge. Because he had shifted the consideration of innate forms from the level of reflective thought to a cognitive level prior to reflection (i.e., to immediate cognition, or knowledge), Fries not only avoided the confusion of voluntary with involuntary mental elements, but more importantly he showed the need for a new type of regressive analysis and a purely subjective process of validation. Whereas Kant in dealing with mediated, or reflected, intelligibility (or understanding) could speak of deductive proofs of a priori forms, Fries pointed out that such «proof» is impossible in dealing with cognitive elements which are truly immediate rather than mediate. One cannot «prove» an a priori form by referring it to something prior; one can only discover and describe it. That is, in the process of regressive analysis from actual knowledge to the innate principles of knowledge, one can only point out what principles do in fact emerge at the end of the analysis. One can never justify or prove these principles since they are immediate and independent of any other type of knowledge (Fries, 1807, Vol. 1, pp. 3, 39-41, 296-314, 381-390; Vol. 2, pp. 186-213).

By thus arguing that immediate, or a priori, cognitions can be affirmed by a regressive analysis, but never proven in the same sense that one can prove mediated knowledge by reference to its logical relation to given premises, Fries prepared the way for a new «subjective» rather than «transcendental» validation of knowledge. According to Fries, knowledge that can be shown to be based upon immediate cognition is ipso facto

10 The references in the previous note are relevant to Fries's tripartite distinction of immediate cognition (or spontaneously active, pure reason), sensibility (receptivity), and intelligibility (understanding). Also see Fries (1807, Vol. 2); the entire volume is devoted to the discussion and analysis of immediate cognition (unmittelbaren Erkenntniss); see especially pp. 3-101. As Nelson (1962; trans., 1970-71) has pointed out, Fries's doctrine of immediate cognition depends upon his distinction between that which is simply immediate (but «obscure») in our knowledge and that which is simply immediate (i.e., clear and distinct) to our consciousness. The immediate cognition of which Fries spoke was immediate in the first sense. Though present in knowledge as its regulative principles, immediate cognitions must be discovered by a process of analysis (Vol. 2, pp. 177, 203, 216). Nelson claimed that Fries was the first philosopher since Plato to exploit this insight.
true, not because we can prove it but because we have no choice but to rely upon it. Stated differently, Fries claimed that human knowledge is subjectively valid insofar as it relies upon the innate forms of the mind. This « self-reliance of reason » (Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft) — the fact that reason automatically forms knowledge in certain ways — is its best and only possible validation. By an innate « feeling-for-truth » human beings grasp the phenomenological reality of the world (Fries, 1807, Vol. 1, pp. xvii-xviii, 57-60; Vol. 2, pp. 186-213; 1824a, p. 20).

With this line of argumentation Fries established the basis of his philosophy. The foundation of the certainty of knowledge, he said, was reason's immediate and implicit faith in itself. One need not attempt a circular proof of knowledge in terms of the possibility of experience; a psychological analysis of actual knowledge, combined with a regressive analysis which traces this knowledge to its ultimate reliance upon immediate forms of cognition, will reveal the basis of knowledge.

With Fries's approach thus briefly summarized, the natural question is: how did the categories of understanding which he derived by means of this procedure differ from those which Kant derived? The answer: not at all. Fries perfectly agreed with the conclusion of Kant's own deduction; he simply did not think that Kant correctly understood the psychological basis of his own philosophy, and that Kant mistakenly tried to prove what can only be described.

Thus, the chief significance of Fries, vis-à-vis the Kantian heritage, is not that he changed Kant's conclusions, but that he tried to reform the nature of Kant's method. In so doing, he radically shifted the conception of the status of psychology and its relation to philosophy. Whereas Kant had contended that psychology was only an empirical science (by which he meant that it was no true science at all) and that the proper method of empirical psychology was observation of external behavior and not introspection (Leary, 1978); and whereas the idealists felt that psychology was at best a limited and one-sided investigation of mental processes (Leary, 1980b); Fries, in investigating the foundation of the critical method itself, concluded that the critical philosophy (and thus all philosophy) was based upon the introspective science of psychology! Agreeing with Kant that psychology was an empirical science, Fries argued that psychology could nonetheless be a true science, possessing
its own unique metaphysical basis. Furthermore, he said that psychology was the science of inner experience and that therefore its proper method, Kant notwithstanding, was introspection. And since all knowledge is a matter of inner experience, Fries maintained that psychology is fundamental to any other science, including the critical philosophy. Only through a psychological investigation can the actual processes and a priori bases of knowledge be identified.

Thus did Fries revise the conception of psychology. Psychology was no longer, as with Kant, seen as «merely empirical»; nor, as with the idealists, was it seen as in need of supplementation by other more complete sciences. It was a true and autonomous science which itself supported all the other sciences. In the post-Kantian development from anti-psychologism to the emergence of a scientific psychology, this contention of Fries was important and significant. We shall investigate Fries's psychology in the next section.

FRIES'S PSYCHOLOGY

In his earliest writings, Fries generally referred to the science of psychology as «empirical psychology» (e.g., Fries, 1798a, b). However, by 1807, in Neue Kritik der Vernunft, he preferred to call his own psychology «philosophical anthropologypo»; and in 1820, under the influence of G. E. Schulze, he changed the title of his psychology to «psychic anthropology» 11. In the second edition of Neue Kritik der Vernunft (1828-31), in which he again used the title of «psychic anthropology», Fries explained why he had avoided the use of the term «psychology»:

Although this science is usually called psychology, we will deviate from this terminology for several reasons. The word «psyche» (or soul) has been used in philosophy to designate the metaphysical, persisting, simple, and immortal essence of the spirit, and its use therefore «implies certain assumptions which we cannot now entertain. We are only concerned with developing a doctrine of the nature of the human soul based upon inner

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11 Fries (1820-21, Vol. 1, p. 5) freely admitted that Schulze (1815) had influenced his choice of the term «psychic anthropology», but it should be stressed that Fries appropriated only the title from Schulze; the substance of Fries's own psychic anthropology was developed long before Schulze's work.
experience. Thus we will deal only with inner anthropology. In thus narrowing our scope to the human spirit, we arrive at the topic of empirical psychology, or psychic anthropology. But our present task differs from empirical psychology, which is an experimental physics of inner life (eine inne re Experimentalphysik) which remains forever fragmentary. We will not be satisfied with such a science. We want to achieve a [unified] theory of inner life, a doctrine of inner nature, which will provide for [the study of] our inner psychic nature what the philosophy of nature now provides for physics. This part of psychic anthropology we want to call philosophical anthropology (Vol. 1, p. 36).

Thus, Fries called his psychology 12 «psychic anthropology» both to avoid the metaphysical assumptions of the old rational psychology and to indicate his dissatisfaction with the current «fragmentary» and mechanical empirical psychology 13. On the first account, in rejecting the old metaphysics of the soul, Fries accepted Kant's critique of rational psychology; on the second, in rejecting the merely empirical status of psychology, he disagreed with Kant's evaluation of the limited epistemological possibilities of psychology. Instead he maintained that psychology need not be «merely empirical», that it can attain the true status of a science, and, in other words, that its phenomena can be rationally organized according to metaphysical criteria. Kant (1786; trans., 1970) had denied this possibility, claiming that the metaphysical principles of natural science were not applicable to psychology (p. 8). Fries agreed that the principles which Kant referred to as «the metaphysical principles of natural science» could not be used in psychology, but

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12 Though Fries preferred to call his psychology «psychic anthropology», it is perfectly justifiable to refer to his «psychic anthropology» as psychology. He avoided the term «psychology» for the reasons given above, but he himself (1820-21) said that psychic anthropology could be «simply called psychology» (Vol. 1, p. 2). For that reason, the term «psychology» was used throughout the previous section without qualifications.

13 Fries's opposition to «fragmentary» empirical psychology illustrates his general opposition to a narrow-minded empiricism that advocated the collection of facts without any consideration of their relation to an adequate theory of mind. Although strict empiricists claimed to be free of all need for such theories, Fries pointed out that they nonetheless unwittingly assumed a theory of mechanical association (the «inner physics» to which he referred in the quotation above). Such a mechanical theory was based upon an analogy between inner and outer nature which might or might not be appropriate, but in either case it was not yet justified by the development of a critical theory of the mind. When Fries developed such a theory, he found that the psychology of association did not provide a complete explanation of mental phenomena. Most importantly, as we shall see, it failed to account for the a priori idea of association upon which associationist psychology is based.
he pointed out that these principles were really «metaphysical principles of outer nature», not natural science per se, and that another set of metaphysical criteria was possible. These alternate principles, constituting an autonomous «metaphysics of inner nature», would make possible the development of a truly scientific psychology. By means of such criteria, or «the metaphysical doctrine of our scientific knowledge of the mind» (which is what Fries called the metaphysics of inner nature in his System der Metaphysik, 1824b, p. 392), psychology could be more than a merely «fragmentary» collection of data organized in a post hoc fashion according to the mechanical analogy of association; it could unify and explain these empirical phenomena according to the rational laws proper to the mind itself. Thus, psychology could be a true science.

Fries not only felt that such a scientific psychology was possible; he offered his own «psychic anthropology» as the realization of that possibility. Through a two-step procedure he both gathered data and discovered the criteria by which these data could be rationally ordered and understood. The first task was accomplished by psychic anthropology proper, which consisted of a natural description of the various phenomena of the human mind as they presented themselves in experience. The

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14 As Fries (1820-21) put it, «we can not hope to achieve a correct treatment of psychic anthropology without metaphysics. All empirical knowledge, including empirical knowledge of inner phenomena, has philosophical forms at its foundation. There is a metaphysics of inner nature which allows us to determine the fundamental concepts of inner activity, its degrees, the faculties of the mind, etc. Its principles can not be avoided in the description of inner nature, even if one tries to disregard them. But in this case they will guide description in a faulty way» (Vol. 1, p. 10). Fries distinguished the metaphysics of «inner» and «outer» nature most explicitly in System der Philosophie (1804, pp. 286-324) and System der Metaphysik (1824b, pp 354-429). The distinctions made explicit in these works guided the development of his psychic anthropology.

15 Even in going beyond Kant by maintaining that psychology, or «psychic anthropology», could be ordered according to its own autonomous principles, Fries remained faithful to Kant's definition of a true science as a body of knowledge which is organized according to rational principles. This does not mean that Fries denied that psychology was an empirical science. Just like physics, psychology was to deal with empirical phenomena in a scientific (rational) way, using a critically validated conceptual framework.

16 Fries's «psychic anthropology» was the culmination of the psychological ideas that he began to develop in his 1798 articles and that found their fullest expression in his Handbuch (1820-21). Other important formulations of various psychological theses can be found in Fries (1803b, 1807, 1811, and 1824b).
second task of providing a theory of mind that could explain these phenomena, by means of general laws was fulfilled by the development of a «philosophical anthropology» through a critical analysis of the descriptions of mental phenomena. The distinction between the different procedures of psychic and philosophical anthropology was not as definite in practice as in theory, however, as Fries himself admitted. The two tasks of describing and explaining are not completely separable. One cannot explain something without having some idea (description) of what is to be explained. And conversely, a pure description is impossible, as Fries (1820-21) pointed out, because the understanding automatically begins to generalize about phenomena in certain ways even as it attempts to describe them (Vol. 1, p. 3). But this seeming confusion, this interconnection of description and explanation, is precisely what makes philosophical anthropology possible. By analyzing the principles implicit in the natural descriptions of mental phenomena one can discover the metaphysical principles of inner nature. Once discovered through introspection and analysis, these principles can be used — and were used by Fries — to rationally organize the observed phenomena of the mind.

The first principle of Fries’s «metaphysics of inner nature» resulted from his most basic observation: all inner phenomena must be conceptualized as activities. Beyond that, all these inner activities are experienced as unified. Taking his cue from Kant, Fries attributed this unified nature of mental phenomena to the existence of an «I», but he also agreed with Kant in denying the possibility of any knowledge of the ontological nature of this experienced «I»: Thereby he rejected the possibility of rational psychology and its goal of absolute knowledge of the soul. Instead, Fries concluded, only a «natural doctrine of the mind» built upon «regulative» or «heuristic» principles is possible, and these principles must be derived from the description and analysis of the activities of the empirical «I» or mind (Gemüth).

Observation of these mental activities leads naturally, Fries maintained, to the analytical classification of them into several fundamental categories, or «faculties» (Gemüthsvermögen).

These faculties, he stressed, do not designate really separable processes. If they did, the basic principle of the unity of the mind would be violated. Rather, this classification of activities is only a means of expressing the regularities in mental activity. Nonetheless such a classification is an important task since the phenomena of inner life cannot be understood unless they are ordered systematically according to a rationally comprehensible scheme. And this scheme, even if only "regulative," is not at all arbitrary since it must be reached and confirmed by the analysis of the facts of consciousness. Indeed, Kant's tripartite classification, Fries claimed, and all prior divisions of the "faculties" of the mind, were inadequate. Contrary to Kant's distinction of thinking, feeling, and desire, a thorough analysis of introspective descriptions revealed to Fries that the fundamental categories of mental activities are knowledge (Erkenntniss), inner disposition (most often referred to as Gemüth or Herz), and activity (Thätigkeit). In other words, Fries maintained that Kant's distinction of feeling and desire does not withstand critical scrutiny. Both, he said, are always conflated in inner disposition. But he found reason to maintain the number of mental faculties at three when he discovered that the phenomena of willing, or self-control, are conceptually distinct from the phenomena of knowing and having a (positive or negative) disposition toward a thing. One can choose to act contrary to either knowledge or disposition, and so "activity" is conceptually distinguishable from these other faculties, or capacities, of the "I".

These three faculties, then, were the result of Fries's analysis of various mental phenomena. However, the use of the principle of mental faculties alone was not sufficient, according to Fries, for an understanding of these phenomena. Another set

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18 In fact, in the actual course of mental life, Fries said, all three faculties are more or less involved in every activity.
19 Fries was aware of the arguments against faculty psychology, but he answered that some kind of conceptual classification of mental activities is necessary.
20 This is the old Wolffian approach to feeling and desire.
21 Although Fries (1820-21) called for a clarification of psychological vocabulary as a prolegomenon to any advancement in psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 12-13), several of his distinctions are liable to cause confusion. Though all the faculties are "activities," he called the third faculty "activity" in a narrower sense. Similarly, Fries used the word Gemüth sometimes to mean mind in general and sometimes to refer to the faculty of inner disposition.
of principles was needed to account for the observed development of these mental capacities over time. A child does not think like an adult; nor does a child have the dispositions or the will-power of an adult. To account for these observations, Fries proposed another set of «heuristic» principles, a genetic scheme of developmental stages. Each faculty, Fries said, goes through three stages of development in which its activity is governed first by sensation, then by habit, and finally by understanding. That is, the faculties are first stimulated into activity by a sensual stimulus (sinnliche Anregung, or Reiz) 22. Then, in the course of ongoing experience, habitual modes of activity are developed according to «the laws of memory, custom, and association»; i.e., according to the lower mental processes. Finally, the human mind comes to rule itself by means of understanding and the laws of the higher mental processes 23. By combining the structural categories of the faculties with this genetic schema of stages, Fries arrived at a very complex and dynamic conception of mental activity.

This brief summary of Fries's «metaphysics of inner nature» points out the most important principles upon which Fries built his «psychic anthropology» — the principles of psychic activity, unity, faculties, and stages. Of these, only the schema of stages was in itself radically new 24. And of the stages that he posited, the third was the most innovative, involving as it did the distinction between understanding and thinking and an entirely new approach to understanding. Understanding, according to Fries, was not so much a particular faculty as it was the highest developmental stage of each faculty. More specifically, it was «the power of self-control» (Selbstbeherrschung) through which a man becomes capable of developing himself. This power of self-control, according to Fries (1820-21), was

22 Among the primary principles of Fries's «metaphysics of inner nature» is this proposition that reason, although it acts in a self-determined manner, needs to be stimulated into activity. This dual character of reason is expressed as its «receptivity» (openness to stimuli) and «spontaneity» (autonomous behavior, once stimulated). See Fries (1807, Vol. 1, pp. 139-148).

23 Fries's concept of the mental stages developed more over time than his other basic ideas. It is notably missing or in only seminal form in the earlier works. For the best treatment, see Fries (1820-21, Vol. 1, pp. 62-89, especially pp. 62-63).

24 As noted below, others were taking a «historical» view of «the soul» in Fries's time, and he might have been influenced by such individuals. However, Fries's own schema of stages was original.
the fundamental idea (Grandgedanke) of his psychic anthropology (Vol. 1, pp. v-vi, 16) \(^{25}\). A perusal of the structure of his *Handbuch der psychische Anthropologie* confirms his assertion. After the first part of this work, in which Fries reviewed the variety of psychic phenomena and analyzed these phenomena into faculties and stages, the next three parts are concerned with a detailed discussion of the development of each faculty to its fullest extent — i. e., to the point where the mind controls itself through understanding the goals of each of its faculties. The faculty of knowing, for instance, being the « speculative area of human life », reaches its fullest potential when it is « under the control of knowledge or [in other words] under the idea of truth ». The second, or « contemplative », faculty develops toward « the control of inner disposition or the idea of beauty »; and the third, « practical » faculty is most fully actuated « under the control of the will or [in other words] under the idea of the good » \(^{26}\). Thus, at the point of mature development the mental activities of thinking, being disposed, and willing are carried out under the guidance of a proper understanding of the « regulative » ideas which provide the « heuristic » ends towards which these various activities should be consciously directed.

This completes our brief sketch of the basic principles and propositions of Fries's « psychic anthropology ». It does not, of course, provide an outline of all of his psychological doctrines. For instance, nothing has been said about his doctrine of sensation or his theory of association, although Fries had new and important things to say regarding both of these topics (Höfding, 1894-95; trans., 1955, Vol. 2, p. 244). Nor have we reviewed his genetic theory of experience (Erdmann, 1866; 3d rev. ed., 1878; trans., 1890, Vol. 2, p. 456) or his innovative discussions of psychopathology \(^{27}\). But we have discussed the fundamental points of his psychology, enough to facilitate the consideration of Fries's development of the conception of the nature and methods of psychology in the next and final section of this article.


\(^{26}\) See table of contents, Fries (1820-21, Vol. 1, pp. xi-xii).

\(^{27}\) The major source regarding Fries's ideas about psychopathology is Fries (1820-21, Vol. 2). It is interesting to compare the mature ideas in this work with the seminal ideas about physiopathology in Fries (1803b).
Fries agreed with Kant that psychology was an empirical science, but he did not think that psychological science was «merely empirical». Even the most «fragmentary» type of empirical psychology — i.e., associationist psychology, the «experimental physics of inner life» that Fries (1807) criticized (Vol. 1, p. 36) — was not totally empirical. After all, its observations were guided and unified by the idea of association, an idea which, Fries pointed out, could not itself be the product of association. Thus, even this most elemental approach to empirical psychology was based upon a rational principle that was not a product of experience. And beyond association, additional rational principles could be discovered for psychology, Fries insisted, by means of a regressive analysis applied to the data of experience. In fact, as we have seen, he himself offered a complete doctrine of inner nature, a unified set of rational principles that would provide for psychology what the doctrine of outer nature had already provided for physics — an a priori, rational basis. Upon this rational basis, Fries said, a truly scientific psychology could be developed.

Fries’s important innovation, then, was to assert that «inner» experience is guided by «metaphysical» principles as certainly, and as knowably, as «outer» experience. Kant had not invented the distinction between the inner and outer spheres of experience, but his philosophy greatly reinforced this basic dualism. As a result of his works the problematic split between man and nature, or freedom and determinism, became part of the standard intellectual heritage of the nineteenth century. According to Kant, only external phenomena can be known according to rational criteria; i.e., only external phenomena can be the objects of true science. Fries accepted the dualism of man and nature, the inner and the outer, but he maintained that inner phenomena are equally subject to rational principles, albeit their own unique set of rational principles. Thus, Fries created a dualism of «metaphysics» (i.e., epistemology) by pro-

28 Regarding association, see Fries (1820-21, Vol. 1, pp. 33-37); also, Nelson (1962; trans, 1970-71, Vol. 2, pp. 200-202). Fries did not oppose associationist psychology per se, but only its cruder form in which no distinctions were made between the lower and higher (will-controlled) thought processes.
viding «grounds for knowledge» about man's inner life that were different from the principles which guide our natural knowledge of the external world. In this way Fries began the quest for the epistemological foundation of the human sciences which was continued by Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert and others later in the century 29.

Thus Fries defended a dualism of the «inner» and «outer» sciences. Both types of science have their own rational basis, he said, and both have a unique conceptual structure. Both are valid theoretical sciences. However, Fries did not feel that the «metaphysics of inner nature» was in every respect parallel to the «metaphysics of outer nature», and the difference is significant. For although there are principles for understanding inner phenomena just as there are principles for understanding outer phenomena, there is nothing in psychological science, as far as Fries could tell, that can replace those particular rational principles by which the forms of sensibility are made intelligible in the physical sciences. That is, there is nothing to replace mathematics. This, we should recall (Leary; 1978), was a major point in Kant's critique of psychology. Inner phenomena, having no spatial dimensions or relations, are only temporally sequential. Thus, Kant concluded, they cannot be subjected to mathematical, i. e., to ideal rational treatment. Fries agreed with Kant that any complete explanation of natural phenomena must utilize mathematics and that insofar as psychology is unable to express its observations in a mathematical form its explanatory power is limited. Thus he concluded that psychology can never offer as complete an explanation of its phenomena as can physics. However, this does not mean that psychology has no explanatory power at all. Fries's thought on this point was expressed succinctly by his twentieth-century disciple, Leo-

29 Fries also developed the concepts of worldview (Weltansicht) and value. Whether or not Fries's formulations of these concepts were a direct influence upon Dilthey, Windelband, etc., who utilized related concepts, has not been established. It should also be noted that Fries's assertion that inner life is subject to rational principles is not a defense of the possibility of a rational psychology, as traditionally defined. Fries was as emphatic as Kant in rejecting the possibility of knowing the noumenal nature of the soul or "I". When Fries claimed that psychology could be based upon rational principles he was referring to «regulative», not «constitutive», principles. Just as the principles of outer nature, as presented in Kant's and Fries's natural philosophies, were purely regulative guides to scientific thinking, so too were Fries's principles of inner nature.
Psychic phenomena cannot be measured, so theoretical explanation of them is possible only in a limited degree. But that is not to say that they cannot be theoretically explained at all, for they can, within the limits set by the impossibility of measurement (Vol. 2, pp. 258-259).

In other words, Fries argued that psychology can still offer theoretical explanations even though these necessarily lack the apodictic force of mathematical formulations. The rational principles of inner experience, though in a sense more descriptive than explanatory, do provide a framework within which to understand psychological dynamics. As pointed out early in this article, Fries denied any hard and fast distinction between description and explanation. Certainly, his developmental stages, for instance, help to explain at the same time that they categorize mental phenomena. But such conceptual explanation falls short, Fries admitted, of the ideal set by the physical sciences.

What Fries contended, then, was this: even if psychology cannot utilize mathematics, it can still be a legitimate theoretical science, although not a totally precise one. This is the major contention as far as Fries is concerned. It epitomizes his development of the notion of psychology as a science. Contrary to Kant he felt that psychology, using empirical and introspective techniques combined with subsequent « regressive analyses », can be a true science even without mathematics.

Having said this, we can add that Fries was not as totally pessimistic as we have implied regarding the applicability of mathematics to psychology. Though Fries certainly did feel that the use of any precise and sophisticated mathematical measurement of mental phenomena is impossible, he also felt, in the words of Leonard Nelson (1962; trans., 1970-71) again, that

Comparison of size can be made in this field [i.e., psychology] in terms of degrees by the metaphysical law of Quality that every sensibly perceived quality has an intensive magnitude which can increase or decrease continuously (Vol. 2, p. 259).

Fries referred to this law as the law of continuity (Stetigkeit), and he said that it was the only mathematical law which is applicable to psychology (Fries, 1804, pp. 343-344; 1824a, pp. 66-67). Since he himself never actually applied this law to express a psychological function in mathematical terms, we must
be cautious not to overevaluate his qualification of Kant's general exclusion of mathematics from psychology — all the more so since Kant himself expressed a similar qualification. Nonetheless Fries's step away from Kant's «official» position becomes significant in view of the later developments in psychology at the hands of Johann Friedrich Herbart (Leary, 1980a).

With this discussion of the possibility of mathematics in psychology our comparison of Fries's psychology with Kant's is completed. It should now be instructive to turn for a moment to a comparison of Fries's psychology with that of the idealists, for although Fries's psychology was primarily developed from Kantian foundations, it was also developed in the context of opposition to idealism. Despite this opposition, there are a number of similarities between the idealist approach to psychology and Fries's psychology. This should not be surprising given the common background of both German idealism and Friesian philosophy. Besides the common grounding in Kantian philosophy, both approaches are historically related to Reinhold's «elementary philosophy» with its emphasis upon «consciousness», and both approaches develop this theme as a central aspect of their psychology. As a consequence, both approaches also stress the role of introspection. Beyond this, there is in both approaches a common emphasis upon the activity of consciousness. In this regard Fichte, Fries's erstwhile teacher, was probably an influence upon Fries. Fries seems also to have been influenced by Fichte's stress on the will and his moralistic concerns about the individual's relation to society. And finally, there is a striking resemblance between the idealist tendency to take a genetic, «history of consciousness» approach and Fries's concept of mental stages and his concern with the genetic development of mental capacities and incapacities. It is possible, though not necessarily the case, that Fries was influenced in this regard by his reading of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling's works (e.g., Schelling, 1803).

Against this background of agreement we could place as many or more points of disagreement. Idealists generally oppo-

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30 The stress upon will is seen in Fries's view that the highest development of each mental faculty consists in its subordination to the will, or self-control, of the "I". Fries's concern with the relation of the individual to society is apparent in his works on ethics and politics (e.g., Fries, 1818-48).

31 Regarding the development of individual differences in mental abilities and the development of mental illness, see Fries (1820-21, Vol. 2).
sed faculty psychology, for instance, while Fries staunchly defended it. And Schelling's philosophy of identity inspired many idealist psychologists to speculate on the relations between the mind and the body (Leary, 1980b), whereas Fries (1820-21) opposed such speculation on the ground that knowledge of the «inner» and the «outer», being subject to different «metaphysical» principles, is incommensurable (Vol. 1, pp. 6-7). But little will be gained by a mere recitation of random points of difference. The central issue of concern in this article is the conception of the nature and methods of psychology. Regarding this fundamental issue, the two approaches could not be more different. Fries saw psychology as an empirical science whereas the idealists considered it a rational science. To be sure; in practice the distinction might seem less drastic because Fries used methods of rational analysis and idealists sometimes used empirical observations to confirm or illustrate their dialectics, but the distinction is nonetheless quite real. Fries began with observations, then used «regressive analysis» of these observations to establish rational principles which he then used as a basis for further observations. The idealists, on the other hand, either began with speculative principles and wove their psychological systems with deductions and dialectical reasoning, or they began with empirical observations (commonly viewed as «obstacles» to be overcome by dialectical analysis) and proceeded beyond the bounds of experience (and often beyond a focus on the individual) as they developed a philosophy of the mind - which transcended the scope of psychology. In either case, they subordinated the empirical study of the individual to speculative reasoning, and this is what Fries vociferously opposed. His own analysis and use of rational principles, he claimed, was always critical and regulative, never speculative and constitutive. If at times his critical temper seems from our historical vantage point a bit lax, this was the result of the execution, not the formulation, of his methodology.

In the realm of conceptual definitions, then, Fries's approach to psychology was definitely distinct from the approach of the idealists. No matter what similarities may have existed between their approaches, idealist psychologists did not formula-

32 Fries admitted a place to «comparative anthropology», the empirical science of the correlative changes in mental and physical phenomena, but he denied any possibility of deducing from these facts anything regarding the metaphysical essence, or relation, of mind and body.
te, as did Fries, a new definition of psychology as an independent, empirical science. Their role in the development of psychology deserves more attention than it has received, but in the history of the conceptual development of psychology qua scientific they are less important than Fries. Indeed, Fries's contribution consisted precisely in producing a definition of psychology that served as an alternative to the idealist conception of psychology as formulated by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel and followed with more or less consistency by the next generation of idealist psychologists (Leary, 1980b).

As a result, Fries's psychology was not given a rousing welcome in the early nineteenth-century heyday of German idealism. Fries did have some followers, but few of these devoted themselves to developing his psychological doctrines. In fact, the most significant influence Fries had, in terms of the ongoing conceptual development of psychology, was not upon his avowed disciples, but upon two independent thinkers who, like Fries, opposed the dominant idealistic orientation of the time and acknowledged Kant among their intellectual forbears. To these two men, Johann Friedrich Herbart and Friedrich Eduard Beneke, Fries bequeathed the conception of psychology as an autonomous and empirical science based upon self-observation and utilizing regressive analysis and regulative rational principles. Neither Herbart nor Beneke accepted this definition of psychology in its entirety. Herbart (1824-25), for instance, rejected regressive analysis and attempted to make psychology into a mathematical science as well as into an empirical science à la Fries; and Beneke (1845), who accepted what he took to be Fries's « psychologistic » starting point, argued in addition that


34 Fries's influence upon Rudolf Hermann Lotze also deserves to be mentioned. For some of the facets of this influence, see Woodward (1977). A fuller discussion of this topic will be found in Woodward's forthcoming intellectual biography of Lotze, now in preparation. It is also appropriate to acknowledge the development of a neo-Friesian school of philosophy in the early twentieth century (Henry-Hermann, 1967) and the contention that Fries's theory of developmental stages (namely, sense, habit, and understanding) directly influenced Karl Bühler's later tripartite developmental scheme (Wolman, 1968, pp. 240-241); see Nelson (1962; trans., 1970-71) and Bühler (1918; 9th rev. ed., 1967).
the «New Psychology» could, and should, become an experimental science.

These developments, originating from the work of Kant and channeled through the work of Fries to that of Herbart and Beneke, have been traced elsewhere (Leary, in press). The central point to be repeated here is that these developments led to the work of Wilhelm Wundt (1874), who is generally regarded as the founder of modern scientific psychology. Since the time of Wundt, psychology has turned toward a course that is now under critical examination (Leary, 1979). It is appropriate to conclude this review of Fries’s psychology with the comment that, as the «cult of empiricism» in psychology slowly atrophies (Toulmin & Leary, in press), the work of Fries—who championed both empiricism and rationalism and saw them as intimately connected—might bear closer examination. Despite Beneke’s «psychologistic» interpretation of Fries’s psychology, Fries himself was not a simple proponent of psychologism, as has often been assumed. His blending of rational analysis with empiricism suggests at least one alternative epistemology for contemporary psychology. No doubt there are other alternatives as well. As psychologists search for these alternatives (see, e.g., Koch & Leary, in press), it might be useful for them to be reminded of Fries and of other aspects of the lost heritage of their discipline. While the essential ideas of Fries and others (including Wundt himself) will certainly not be translatable, without change, into the current, developing conception of psychology as a science, they may offer fresh perspectives that will reveal «new» avenues leading beyond the positivist framework that has dominated scientific psychology for so long, despite the rationalism of its founding fathers—and forefathers.

35 Interestingly, Edmund Husserl (1900), whose phenomenology was based on the rejection of psychologism, never mentioned Fries in his work (Welch, 1941; 2d ed., 1965), which implies that Husserl was a better reader of Fries than have been many others. On psychologism, and the assumption that Fries was the founder of this «subjectivist» approach to epistemology and logic, see Abbagnano (1967). Of course, Fries was a proponent of psychologism to the extent that he saw psychology as the most fundamental of all sciences, but he was not a simple-minded proponent of psychologism: he did not advocate the reduction of the principles of logic, epistemology, aesthetics, ethics, etc., to the status of mere accretions of psychological experience. Rather, as we have seen, he contended that these principles were discovered in (rather than produced by) experience.
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References to the works of Jakob Friedrich Fries are made to the editions contained, or to be contained, in his Sämtliche Schriften, ed. G. König and L. Geldsetzer, 26 vols. (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1967). The dates of original publication and of the edition appearing in the collected works (when different) are provided below, where all references to the collected works are abbreviated. For the sake of brevity, all textual references to Fries (1807; 2d rev. ed., 1828-31) and to Fries (1820-21; 2d rev. ed., 1837-39) have been indicated simply as Fries (1807) and Fries (1820-21). For the purposes of this article, there are no essential differences between the first and second editions of these works. Finally, all translations are by the author of this article unless otherwise noted.


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Summary - Most German philosophers in the early nineteenth century were devoted to the idealistic « completion » of Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy. A few independent philosophers, however, were preoccupied with the elaboration of a non-idealistic, and less speculative, conclusion to Kant's thought. Among the earliest opponents of the speculative idealists was Jakob Friedrich Fries, one aspect of whose influence is of particular interest: in his reaction against idealism, and in his own « completion » of Kant, he laid the foundation for the development and acceptance of psychology as an independent science. Maintaining that knowledge of the transcendent is impossible, Fries concentrated, as 'did Kant, upon the discovery of the critical bases of knowledge. In doing so, he revised some of Kant's fundamental assumptions, arguing not only that psychology could become a science but that, in fact, psychology is the fundamental science and the foundation of all philosophy, including Kant's own critical philosophy. Having made these arguments, he developed a « psychic anthropology » upon which he hoped to establish a steady and lasting psychology. His efforts inspired subsequent thinkers whose works, in combination with his own, led to the emergence of scientific psychology. Today some of his ideas are still worthy of critical review.

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