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GIVING ORDERS IN RURAL SOUTHERN RHODESIA: CONTROVERSIES OVER AFRICANS' AUTHORITY IN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, 1928–1934*

By Carol Summers

In Southern Rhodesia during the 1920s and 1930s, government officials, missionaries, and educated Africans saw African communities in crisis. Individualism threatened communal identities. Customs and values were mutating under economic, social, and political pressure from an increasingly segregationist settler-dominated state. In this context, policymakers held two potentially contradictory values: order and progressive change. And they saw schools and their surrounding communities as the most important potential sources of ordered change. The Jeanes program, imported from the United States in the wake of the Phelps-Stokes Commission, was the single most prominent effort to reconcile order and change, communal values and ambitious individualism.

This article focuses on the period from 1928 to 1935, Depression years, when Harold Jowitt was director of native development. During these years, debates over the Jeanes teacher program, and specifically over the careers of Matthew Magorimbo and Lysias Mukahleyi, exposed both the needs that drew the administration and missions toward community-based development, and the questions of power, authority, and resources that blocked community development, and more specifically the Jeanes teacher program, from achieving its stated aims.

Native Development Politics

In 1928, Harold Jowitt inherited a troubled program. Many within the administration of Southern Rhodesia had some concept of native development, but the bureaucratic structure of development programs was confusing, chaotic, and conflict-provoking. An ambitious and articulate specialist in African education and development, Jowitt’s first task as director of native education was to expand the scope of his department. He rewrote the Native Education Act of 1928 into a far more sweeping Native Development Act of 1929 and hired a staff of government native school inspectors. Native development, he argued, was based on education but extended far beyond the classroom. Jowitt’s Native Development Act defined the department’s scope as “the education of Natives and any other work primarily designed to further the agricultural, industrial, physical or social advancement of Natives.”

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1 Report of the Director of Native Development for 1929 (Salisbury, 1930), 1.
Jowitt's broad definition of native development, and his ambitious attempts to pursue it, outstripped his new department's limited funding. By the end of his first year, he was campaigning for more resources. The department's inspectors could not visit all schools. The missions could not intensify their efforts without higher government grants. And teachers needed increased and standardized salaries if missions were to promote teacher effectiveness and attract and retain teachers with higher qualifications. Jowitt quickly realized, however, like others before him, that the administration was not willing to provide more money for African education and development. He therefore attempted to pair economy with expansion by recruiting allies for his visions from outside the administration and settler elite: he attempted to produce regulations that would transform missionaries and the mission school system into a more effective tool of government; he sought to upgrade the education of African teachers to make classrooms more effective, disciplined, and regulated; and he reached out to the international educational development community to seek external models and sponsors for development on the cheap.

The Jeanes Teacher program, one of the most focused attempts at community development, brought these three sources of extragovernmental support together. It was modelled on a program that trained visiting teachers for black schools in the American South. Southern Rhodesian candidates were educated Christians, ideally with some teaching experience, nominated by their missions, and admitted to training. Jeanes programs sought to give African men and women advanced training in the basic skills of community development: hygiene, school improvement, industrial skills, medical aid, and domesticity. After a course at Domboshawa School and a community-based internship, the men would go back to the missions that sponsored them. Working under a missionary supervisor, each man would have responsibility for a circle of rural schools. He was required to visit the schools, help teachers improve their techniques, sponsor school garden plots, and direct the students in manual and industrial work. But he was to do more, reaching out from school to community: helping with cleanups, overseeing latrine digs, and providing suggestions for cooperative organizations ranging from the schools' parent committees through communal work parties. The male Jeanes teacher would be working with denominational schools, and reporting to a mission supervisor. But he would be paid by the Native Development Department at a substantially higher level than a regular mission-employed teacher. Jeanes women,

2 Report of the Director of Native Education for 1928 (Salisbury 1929), 8.

3 Unlike the Native Department's spending, which could be characterized as essential to law, order, and tax collection, education and development were discretionary expenses without strong white constituencies.

4 The mission salaries for certificated teachers ranged as low as £2 per month for nine or ten months of the year. Chibi Mission, DRC, See correspondence of George Mhlanga and Ndambi Hliziyo to A.R. Mather, National Archives of Zimbabwe [hereafter NAZ] S2307/2. Jeanes teachers, however, were paid a probationary salary of £60 per year for the first year, and offered at least the theoretical possibility of increasing, in steps of £3 per year of experience, with three grades based on merit, to a ceiling of £120 per year. They also received bicycle allowances of 7s/6d. per month and at least the possibility of a future pension. Colonial Secretary to DND, 17-7-30, NAZ S170/1225.
nominated by mission superiors, and then trained at Hope Fountain, filled a slightly different role. Their curriculum skipped training in teacher supervision. And they were not tied to specific schools. Instead, they were encouraged to live with their families, transform their homes into models of domesticity, and reach out from that home base through demonstrations of domestic hygiene, cookery, and sewing, and through providing health services ranging from dispensing through wound-dressing to midwifery. Jeanes women were also supervised by missionaries but paid by the Native Development Department.5

Ideally, the Jeanes program was supposed to be catalytic and participatory as the teachers used schools and reformed and cleaned up homes to spark off a revolution of progressive development by African observers who saw, believed, and copied the teachers' initiatives. Impressed by this vision, missions sent some of their most promising young men and women, the Carnegie Corporation provided external aid money, and the department developed the new training programs at Domboshawa and Hope Fountain.

The program provoked controversies within the administration, however. Even before Jowitt's Jeanes program, the Native Department had fought against the Native Development Department for control over the training and stationing of all Africans involved in development work, such as agricultural demonstrators. Under Native Department pressure, as the first agricultural demonstrators at Domboshawa completed what they had expected would be a two-year training program, their supervisor, E.D. Alvord, declared them woefully underprepared for the tasks ahead and proposed a third year of apprenticeship near the school with close oversight.6 Following Native Department ideas despite his own background at the American Board mission, Alvord continued the pattern of condemning mission training, standards, and achievements with scathing commentary suggesting that mission schooling was not up to standard either academically or agriculturally.7 The discussions and disagreements over the agricultural demonstration program were resolved, uneasily, by a bureaucratic rearrangement that accepted the Native Department's hegemony: Alvord, and all his demonstrators were placed in the Native Department, under the command of the chief native commissioner (CNC), and, in various localities, under the relevant native commissioner. Alvord followed an aggressive program of oversight, holding before- and after-harvest meetings with each demonstrator and monitoring plowing, planting, and land management.

The training program for Jeanes teachers began in 1929 in this context of controversy over the training and control of African agents. Even more than the agricultural demonstration program, Jowitt tailored the Jeanes program to his own notions of how the government, missions, and progressive Africans could work

5 The government established three grades of pay for female Jeanes teachers, ranging from a low of £15 per year for beginning teachers to a high of £48 per year for top-ranked, experienced, Jeanes women. It is not clear, however, whether anyone ever actually received the top salary allowed before the program was ended. Public Services Board to Colonial Secretary, 11-8-30, NAZ S170/1124.

6 NAZ S138/69, Acting CNC to Treasury, 19-8-26.

7 NAZ S138/69, Alvord to CNC on training of demonstrators at Domboshawa, 10-10-27.
together for development. Jowitt was blunt in pointing out that he had written the grant proposal that funded the program and that the missions had sent on their best people with the assurance that these people would be returned to them.

Some early, glowing, reports provide glimpses of the types of community improvement the program was designed to produce. John Marsh, the supervisor of the American Board's Chikore mission circuit, reported that "this venture is one of the most significant single steps in the progress of Native education in Rhodesia." Other supervisors agreed, providing specific examples to back this claim. Titus Mngadi, a London Missionary Society (or LMS) Jeanes Teacher working in the Hope Fountain district, had organized materials and supervised the construction of a dispensary to be run by the local Jeanes woman. Jeanes Teacher Zhakata, working in the Selukwe Reserve, ran monthly teachers' meetings with demonstration lessons and promoted the establishment of school gardens carefully fertilized by manure. Mac Sitole pushed teachers to institute "hand work" lessons in the schools and managed a circuit of schools without European oversight while his missionary supervisor went on furlough for three months. Jeanes teacher Ndebele worked to improve roads and establish vegetable gardens for each school. He also met with parents and headmen, and, like his colleagues, gave demonstration lessons to teachers, providing academic and pedagogical suggestions of how to understand and teach the newly revised curriculum. For their missionary supervisors, Jeanes teachers' most impressive achievements were the large community meetings they called, at which they lectured on "the aims and objects of the school and the necessity of the children having proper equipment and being clean always."

Mission supervisors were impressed by Jeanes teachers' ability to involve the larger community with the school and the school with the larger community. Jeanes teachers sponsored parental involvement through parent committees and called for parents to show their support by providing manure for school gardens, helping with ploughing or roadbuilding, and buying school materials to equip their children properly. Jeanes teachers also called for students to bring the school values to the broader community by doing cleaning raids, where a group of students would go

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8 J. Marsh, Report Jeanes Teachers' work, Chikore Kraal schools, Jan.-June 1933, NAZ S1542/J1/v.3.
9 Report on Titus Mngadi, Jeanes Supervisor, Hope Fountain District, Jan.-June 1933, NAZ S1542/J1 v.3.
11 Orner, Report on the Work of Jeanes Teacher Mac Sitole, 2d half 1933, 31-12-33, NAZ S1542/J1 v.3.
13 HS Edwards, Report on Jeanes Teacher Timon Zinyemba, Jan.-June 1935 [Filabusi], NAZ 1542/J1 v.1.
out and clean up a “kraal,” sweeping away clutter, possibly building a latrine, and sometimes planting trees, flowers, or vegetables.\textsuperscript{14}

Even the most muted supervisors’ reports were positive, indicating the missionaries’ hope that the Jeanes teachers would be effective in their awkward position as trained generalists working to bridge the gap between the more elderly and reactionary elements in African communities and the mission and Native Development Department agendas of progress. Missionaries sometimes decried the “indifference of parents”\textsuperscript{15} or accepted a frustrated Jeanes teacher’s conclusion that “his people are not going to change customs over night. He realizes that he is fighting the inertia prevalent among the native people—an unwillingness to do that which requires added effort, even though they are told that benefits may be derived.”\textsuperscript{16}

Missionaries, though, generally praised Jeanes teachers’ energy, even when that energy produced such serious antagonisms that the teacher had to be transferred to another region.\textsuperscript{17} The missions expected a Jeanes teacher, after a broad training, to examine the specific area he found himself in, to work out his own goals, and do whatever was necessary to accomplish them. By the 1930s, some missionaries were disgusted with the slow pace of change in African communities. Missionaries were limited in numbers and racially conspicuous. They thus found themselves at least on occasion constrained by government involvement when they tried to push through measures ranging from compulsory attendance through unpaid community labor. Beating parents to force pupils to attend school was technically illegal. Forcing schoolchildren and their families to contribute unpaid labor to roadbuilding and gardening could not be insisted upon if the Native Department intervened. Jeanes teachers in pursuit of their goals, however, might be able to get away with such coercive acts without directly implicating missionaries.

And missionaries had compelling financial reasons for welcoming the Jeanes teachers and portraying them as successes. The program offered missions the opportunity of having the government pay salaries to teachers under mission patronage who would otherwise probably have left the mission in pursuit of wages commensurate with their qualifications. The missions were, by the 1930s, deeply concerned with the problem of attrition. Teachers’ salaries, never high, actually dropped as the Jeanes teacher program grew. Missionaries expressed their desire to retain the best and brightest of their pupils. But they also acknowledged that these pupils could earn more as clerks, dip supervisors, foremen, or even independent

\textsuperscript{14} For a description of one particularly dramatic clean-up and construction party involving several Jeanes Teachers, see J. Marsh, circular, Community Work at Mount Silinda, 1-10-30, American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions [henceforth ABC] 15.4 item 15.

\textsuperscript{15} Report on Johnson Shumba, for first half of 1935, NAZ S1542/J1 v.1.

\textsuperscript{16} Adkins, report on JT Samson Zinoire, Marange Reserve, 10-7-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.1.

\textsuperscript{17} See the Report on Jeanes Teacher Work at All Saints Mission Wrenningham for half year ending June 1934, NAZ S1542/J1 v.1, which described an “excellent” Jeanes teacher in a region of “especially bad” schools, who “may have been possibly a bit hasty in some of his methods of presentation” and should therefore be relocated.
builders. Sponsoring prize pupils into the program, however, offered the prospect of the administration paying for the missions to retain their top talent, the men and women missionaries expected to become leaders.\(^1\)

The program also offered the vision of another monetary benefit: with Jeanes teachers working to upgrade the outschools, the mission might to be able to expand further with less investment of increasingly scarce mission funds. Mission operations were expensive primarily because of the high cost of European skilled labor. A white male missionary supervising a school circuit (as required by the government in return for capitation and supervision grants) could earn a salary of hundreds of pounds a year. And in addition to salary, he would expect a substantial house, a garden, plentiful domestic help, education allowances for his children, a pension plan, health insurance, paid transport, and a salaried furlough (sometimes a year long, going as far away as the United States.) Missions might be able to economize by substituting Africans for Europeans as school supervisors and development workers. And some missionaries even admitted that Africans, fluent in the local language, and understanding the situations, might actually be more effective than European community workers.

This vision of Jeanes teachers as Christian, African leaders—effective African leaders—expanding the influence of civilization and Christianity from the school to the community as a whole, was too promising for missionaries to drop, even in the face of practical difficulties. Missionaries from Southern Rhodesia did diverge from other regions' delegates to a regional Jeanes Teacher Conference and argue the need for supervision and an emphasis on practical rather than academic training for Jeanes teachers. But they encouraged as many as possible of the local men and women working as Jeanes teachers to attend, and give papers in English describing their work. Such teachers provided powerful images of Africans as experts, authorities, and professionals. And supervisors accepted the implications of this model of African leadership.\(^2\)

Despite missionary and Native Development Department hopes, however, the Jeanes teacher program ran into difficulties. The program produced community workers who arrived in areas already affected, sometimes traumatically, by the changes of the previous thirty to forty years of European interventions. Experience with other government workers and mission activities produced some acute skepticism and resentment in the communities the Jeanes teacher were supposed to serve. Communities suspected that the program served not just African communities, but European power as well. Both European officials and indigenous chiefs and messengers explicitly linked the Jeanes Teacher program, like the agricultural demonstration initiatives, with Land Apportionment and the forced resettlement of large numbers of Africans onto distant, dry, overcrowded lands.

\(^1\) See the CNC's description of meetings in 1932 with various missionaries, including the Anglican bishop of Mashonaland. CNC to Minister of Native Affairs, 12-4-34 NAZ S1542/S2.

\(^2\) See the Report of the Inter-Territorial "Jeanes" Conference Held in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia on 27 May to 6 June, 1935 (Lovedale, 1936). African delegates did, however, stay at Domboshawa, a government school for Africans, rather than in Salisbury, and their talks were far more limited in time than those of the white speakers.
Development programs allowed government officials to claim that they continued to take responsibility for the prosperity and progress of the African population even as they passed increasingly restrictive legislation on land, marketing, and cattle.\footnote{20} More immediately, however, those who lived in the reserves observed a whole series of levies, ranging from dog taxes through dip fees, school taxes, and proposed taxes on men who were not employed outside the reserves. In theory, these monies were all earmarked for development.\footnote{21} Those who paid, however, saw little immediate result, and were unable to control what forms of development the money went to.\footnote{22} Senior men may also have resented being lectured at by young teachers, and by Jeanes teachers and demonstrators. Worse yet, some senior men clearly viewed Jeanes teachers and demonstrators as government agents, sent to sniff out the best land and make new expropriations possible. Paramount Nema of the Selukwe Reserve, for example, argued that the government was only trying to take land and that people needed more land rather than development lessons.\footnote{23} Jeanes teachers were also perceived as new, higher-level, mission servants. And in areas with substantial tensions between senior men and mission youth, such as Gutu, this led directly to confrontations that damaged the teachers' credibility with elders and with Native Department officials.\footnote{24}

Jeanes teachers, therefore, could be troubling for financially stressed communities: they represented outside influences in the form of government and mission standards and rules, but they made demands on the local population in

\footnote{20} Correspondence between the Director of Native Development (Jowitt), the Colonial Secretary (Leggate), and H.U. Moffat, NAZ 170/1171/ 1933-4.

\footnote{21} As an example of this rhetoric, see the Rhodesian Agricultural Union [RAU] Committee Report on "The Growing Shortage of Native Labor," Rhodesia Herald 18-2-27 (filed in NAZ S170/164), which proposed a 30s/year surtax on all men not employed outside the Reserve, to be paid into a fund for development. The RAU development tax was merely a proposal and was not implemented. Missions, however, did extract development taxes in the form of dip fees, school taxes, and farm rents. Any mission designated as a private location (most missions) was able to raise taxes at will. And for headmen's responses to the escalating taxes, see NAZ N9/5/3, a record of official visits between the administrator and various government recognized chiefs and headmen. They complained of dog taxes, constant dipping fees, and the lack of markets for their cattle. Foggin, the director of education, claimed in 1921 that the Anglican mission had pioneered school rates. Foggin to Administrator, 21-5-21, NAZ S840/1/33.

\footnote{22} The Native Boards, headed by the local native commissioner, were in theory responsible for local development spending. In practice, they were rarely permitted to make investments that would actually benefit people: schools, cooperative shops paying for grain in cash, or subsidized bus and transit services. See Leslie Bessant, "Coercive Development: Peasant Economy, Politics, and Land in Chiweshe Reserve, Colonial Zimbabwe, 1940-1966 (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1987). Bessant focuses on a later time period, but points to a lack of community control extending back into the 1930s.

\footnote{23} E.D. Alvord (Director of Native Agriculture), "The Development of Native Agriculture in Southern Rhodesia" (undated typescript memoir, U.S. Department of Agriculture Library, Beltsville, MD), 19.

terms of labor, loyalty, and money. Rather than bringing money and resources into rural areas, Jeanes teachers called for self-help. They recruited children and parents to labor on schools, roads, gardens, and community layout. They created new political organizations in the school parent committees, which divided communities between those who sent children to school and those who did not. And they called for the use of new types of consumer goods that had to be paid for with money, ranging from the soap essential to their message of cleanliness to the slates and books required by schoolchildren, to the cloth and equipment that Jeanes women called for in lessons on sewing, knitting, and cooking.

Conflicts over Jeanes teachers made their way into archival sources when they involved more than the immediate community. Government-appointed headmen and "chiefs" could complain to their Native Department officials, and these officials responded. During 1934, two Jeanes teachers, Matthew Magorimbo and Lysias Mukahleyi, became sufficiently controversial that the entire program design had to be revised.

Matthew Magorimbo

Matthew Magorimbo was a Salvation Army Jeanes teacher, assigned to the Chiweshe Reserve in the Mazoe district under the supervision of the Salvation Army's Major Stoyle. The Salvation Army was one of the most aggressively evangelical missions in Southern Rhodesia. In 1929, it employed 120 teachers, only 28 percent of whom had passed Standard IV (approximately equivalent to the U.S. sixth grade, and the government's proposed minimum standard for teachers) or higher. This did gradually improve, so that just over half of the teachers it employed in 1931 had at least Standard IV. But at that point the educational improvements stalled, despite mission efforts to increase the recruitment and retention of higher standard teachers. Improvements in teachers' qualifications produced tensions in the school communities. According to the NC Mazoe in 1932:

During the recent past, particularly the last two years, the type of kraal school teacher has ... altered for the worse from the older responsible type of native with moral force and great personality to whom the heathen Natives could and did look up to with respect. In his stead appears a very young man who, although better educated, has obviously but little experience. He certainly commands but little respect from the elders but perhaps exerts some influence on the younger people, most particularly the girls. At any rate it can safely be said that his manners and actions are not

25 This preceded the Jeanes teachers. See CNC Report for 1927, p. 5, where he records NCs' reports of parental objections to mission teacher or schools' demands for obligatory, unpaid labor on teacher or school plots.

26 See the statistical appendices for the Annual Report of the Director of Native Development 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933. The Salvation Army tried to retain teachers by requiring students in the upper levels to sign contracts promising to teach for the mission. For evidence of the Howard contracts, see Major Purman (SA) to Major Wane (NC), 8-8-34, NAZ S1542/S2. Students agreed to teach one year for each year of training, and remit 10/- a month to the Salvation Army until training fees were paid in full. If a teacher was dismissed, unpaid fees were to be paid immediately, rather than in installments. Fees were £6 for each year of training.
conducive to that good feeling which appears to me so necessary to a thorough understanding between the Missionary and the older and more influential natives. Whilst admitting that the present system of examination is a necessary one, I would submit that educational qualification is not the main criterion and that the older fashioned grey headed native teacher was in real Christianity and in the uplift of the Native races more successful than his more modern and more scholastically educated brother.27

Faced with these tensions between senior men and younger, educated, Christian teachers, the Salvation Army backed its converts against the elders and government, increasingly acting in ways the native commissioner perceived as adversarial rather than working toward order and cooperative development.

Under the pressures of the Depression and without increased government support for schools, the Army began to move away from the standard local school-centered mission toward a more international evangelical model. It applied to open schools that would provide only religious training, not even attempting the basic school code.28 It worked to stake out territory, even in the face of community opposition, to block the expansion of rival missions such as the Wesleyan Methodists.29 And it held revivals and night meetings to generate enthusiasm and converts, producing more than its share of parental complaints.30

Even more than some of the more conventional missions, the Salvation Army embraced the idea of the Jeanes teachers as a way for Africans to accept some of the burden of mission leadership, sparing white missionaries from school administration and teaching. Missionaries also saw these programs as ways of promoting development based on community, rather than mission, resources. Reflecting Salvation Army concerns about territory, rather than school content and quality, Matthew Magorimbo began his Jeanes work not just with school lessons, but with public works projects.31 In 1933, he coordinated the construction of roads to schools in his area. In 1934, he called up work parties to “terrace” (reinforce) the new roads to prevent them from washing away in the rains.32 He also worked to establish school gardens for each of the schools under his supervision. In the Chiweshe reserve, an area that was becoming increasingly densely settled, he marked out school plots ranging from four acres for Kanokamwe School to 8.1 acres for Gunguwe School. These school plots, most of which were nearly five

28 Assistant NC Goromonzi to NC Salisbury, 13-9-33, NAZ S1542/S2. The schools were Mupandawana and Mashambanaka. The assistant NC recommended authorizing these schools.
29 See Assistant NC Goromonzi to NC Salisbury, 8-4-35; and Assistant NC Urungwe to NC Lomagundi, 19-5-33, NAZ S1542/S2.
30 Report of the NC Mazoe for 1929, NAZ S1561/64.
31 The NC did accuse Magorimbo of laying stress on the religious and scholastic aspects of school life rather than appropriate industrial training. Annual Report of the NC Mazoe for 1933, NAZ S235/511. The scholastic and religious aspects of Magorimbo’s role, however, are not well documented.
acres, defied government regulations that a school could occupy no more than a two-acre plot with an additional five acres for the teacher. Magorimbo's designation of school plots was in addition to the private gardens cultivated by teachers and their wives.\footnote{NC Mazoe to CNC, 6-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1/v.3. The new regulations were spelled out in DND to Missionary Superintendents, circ. 1/34, 15-1-34, NAZ Historical Manuscripts, MET 3/18/1/1, a file that includes the circulars sent by the DND to missionary superintendents.} The school gardens were probably ploughed by parents and cultivated by student labor, with the proceeds going to the mission.\footnote{This was the common pattern until regulations were passed to restrict obligatory unpaid labor and specify that the pupils and/or teacher received the produce.} Magorimbo also reported constructing a new school building of Kimberly brick, an improvement over the wattle and daub of the earlier structure, and a building that provided a model for community improvement by encouraging the construction of Kimberly brick houses for several important men.\footnote{Annual Report of Matthew Magorimbo, as reported by the NC Mazoe to CNC, 1934, NAZ S1542/J1/v.3.} According to a highly critical native commissioner, Magorimbo was pushing for people to change “their entire way of life.”\footnote{NC Mazoe Annual Report for 1934, NAZ S1563/1934.}

The NC Mazoe was never really in favor of the Jeanes teacher experiment, as he worried about alien natives, new ideas, and how to maintain control. When Magorimbo first came into the area, the NC complained that he did not understand the program and had not been properly notified as it developed. And as for Magorimbo himself,

> I am entirely in the dark as to whether he is to be under my control or merely a free lance wandering at will and possibly teaching at will any subject his fancy dictates.... it is more than likely that the teacher would have been arrested by my Native Messengers for removing to this District from Charter without my permission, for I have given them strict instructions to arrest all Natives of other Districts who are resident in this district without my permission.\footnote{Ibid.}

Magorimbo's presence and authority violated the NC's ideas and methods of native administration. He went on to imply that Magorimbo was truly dangerous:

> I feel it hardly fair that a Native Commissioner should be held responsible for the behavior of the Natives of his district when individuals such as these are allowed to wander through Reserves under, as far as I am at the moment aware, no control ... certainly not under the control of the official responsible for the welfare and good behavior of the Native population.\footnote{Ibid.}

By 1934, Magorimbo's initiatives had led the Jeanes teacher into conflict with senior local men and with the Native Department, and produced a clash between the Native Department (which backed the senior men) and Native Development Department (which sided with Magorimbo and the mission). Two local men,
Gweshe and Chirwanemuka, swore out affidavits that Magorimbo had not, indeed, constructed the Kimberly brick buildings he claimed to have built. The new school, Gweshe claimed, was built by Thomas, a local builder. Magorimbo's only involvement was coming and telling Thomas to build it.\(^{39}\) In February 1934, the tension became acute when, responding to local complaints about the amount of land the schools were fencing, the NC Mazoe wrote a message calling Magorimbo into his office for discussions. Magorimbo did not show up on the appointed day, nor did the NC receive any excuse.\(^{40}\) Magorimbo's failure to respond to this summons provided the NC with a legal rationale for prosecution, and the chief native commissioner with a test case on the issue of who had what authority in the reserves.

Both Magorimbo and his mission sponsors viewed Magorimbo's position in the Chiweshe reserve as one of authority, not obedience. And while he was nominally under the control of Major Stoyle, his local supervisor and the Salvation Army's territorial commander, Magorimbo had a substantial measure of independence to design his own projects, decide what to do on a day-to-day basis, and coordinate other Africans in projects involving semi-forced labor. When peremptorily summoned to attend on the NC, Magorimbo waited to consult Major Stoyle, who called in his own superior. The superior wrote a sharp letter to the CNC, rebuking the local native commissioner for his interference in Jeanes teacher and educational activities.\(^{41}\) And when the native commissioner began to order teachers to take down fencing around school gardens that had exceeded the two-acre limit, at least one teacher responded that he would have to talk to Magorimbo first.\(^{42}\) The NC Mazoe, who felt that Magorimbo's powers were diametrically opposed to the order necessary for proper native administration, was appalled, as were his superiors in the Native Department, and other officials.\(^{43}\)

The correspondence regarding this dispute went up the administrative hierarchy all the way to the premier, who held the portfolio of minister for native affairs. The most serious issue, the CNC emphasized, was that of control, and “as far as the Natives are concerned, Major Stoyle and his Jeanes Teacher have publically flouted the authority of the Native Commissioner.”\(^{44}\) The CNC attempted to quash Magorimbo's missionary defenders by emphasizing to Major Stoyle that “I wish it

\(^{39}\) Gweshe, Affadavit, 15-2-34, NAZ S1542/J1/v.3. See also Chirwanemuka, Affadavit, 22-2-34, same file.

\(^{40}\) CNC to Minister of Native Affairs, 9-3-34, NAZS1542/J1/v.3.

\(^{41}\) Territorial Commander, Salvation Army, to CNC, 15-3-34, S1542/J1/v/3.

\(^{42}\) CNC to Minister of Native Affairs, 9-3-34, S1542/J1/v.3.

\(^{43}\) For the NC’s reaction, see the NC Mazoe Annual Report for 1934. For the reactions of Major Wane's superiors, see CNC [Carbutt] to Minister of Native Affairs, 12-4-34, NAZ S1542/S1.

\(^{44}\) CNC to Minister of Native Affairs, 9-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2. Note that the CNC did not specify what sort of control he was concerned about. Instead, he evoked a more general (and somewhat fantastic) concept of the native commissioner's full knowledge of and authority over all happenings in a given territory.
to be clearly understood that we cannot tolerate direct interference with the orders of a Native Commissioner, which is bound to cause confusion in the Native mind." \(^45\)

For the Native Department, the problem was not Magorimbo's actual relationship with the local community or the specific programs he put in place. Instead, Magorimbo was a problem because of his independence, and his independent delivery of orders to local people. Understanding this, the Native Department officials did not block Magorimbo's initiatives or prosecute him as an individual; they sought a settlement that would address the pertinent issue of face. Stoyle and Magorimbo attended the NC in the NC's office, apologized, and then the NC "insisted on informing Magorimbo in his, Major Stoyle's presence, that he must in every instance obey my instructions in future and that unless he did so he would be prosecuted this no matter what instructions he had received from other sources." \(^46\)

**Lysias Mukahleyi** \(^47\)

Lysias Mukahleyi's experiences provided another test case for the Jeanes teacher initiative. Mukahleyi was a Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) Jeanes teacher who trained in the same cohort as Matthew Magorimbo. \(^48\) He proved even more controversial than Magorimbo. Magorimbo had gotten into trouble by following the mission line and working to implement his training. Mukahleyi apparently perceived his goals of community development in more political terms. Mukahleyi was one of the best-educated Africans affiliated with the Dutch Reformed mission in Southern Rhodesia, a mission notorious in the region for its deplorable schools. Early inspectors wrote scathing descriptions of schools where 53 out of 97 enrolled students who actually attended a rural school shared among them one teacher and six slates, where a school of 66 pupils was open for a year without a schoolroom, or where a group of 48 children spent three months staring at Chart I, to the point where they could recite it by heart, but not read it. \(^49\) In 1929, the DRC employed 425 African teachers, making it one of the most important missions in Southern Rhodesia in terms of numbers. But fewer than 10 percent of those teachers had passed Standard IV or higher. \(^50\) The mission expanded, despite its poor advanced education, through its careful use of structure. The DRC was probably the first

\(^{45}\) CNC to Maj. Stoyle, 13-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.

\(^{46}\) NC Mazoe to CNC, 22-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.3.

\(^{47}\) Lysias' surname is spelled in a variety of different ways in different sources, and in many documents he is merely referred to as Lysias. Variant spellings include the following: Mukahlehi; Mukartyei; Mukahleyi; Mukartyyoi. Lysias himself employed various spellings in different surviving documents.

\(^{48}\) Both men were in the group of Jeanes teachers given official appointments (on probation) on 15-2-33. Secretary to DND, 15-2-33, NAZ S170/1225. The most senior Jeanes teachers had, by this time, completed two years of probation. Colonial Secretary to DND, 15-2-33, NAZ S170/1225.

\(^{49}\) Lenfestey, Inspection of DRC Mission Morgenster, 9-4-23, NAZ S840/1/37.

\(^{50}\) Statistical appendices, Director of Native Development Annual Report for 1930.
mission to introduce printed schemes of work (in book form) for a three-year course prior to Standard I. These schemes were rigid, and DRC education notoriously inflexible. But with the schemes, teachers far below the government's Standard IV requirement could nevertheless expand and operate schools that at least brought children up to the level of education required for baptism.51 Under government pressure, the DRC also provided vacation courses designed to bring sub-standard teachers up to a level referred to as the "vernacular certificate"—professional preparation in teaching with academic work approximately equivalent to Standard IV, but without the training in English.52 Nor was the mission's disciplinary structure entirely academic. DRC missions employed attendance officers who went out around the schools to enforce school attendance, which was recorded carefully in the school registers submitted for the government's capitation grants in aid.53 DRC missionaries also tried to control their people's lives in ways that could be highly intrusive as they levelled fines for "moral offenses," rearranged marriages, or called for fees, fines, and tuition and book money in ways that made some DRC missionaries personally wealthy.54

By the early 1930s, under government pressure, the DRC was beginning to hire a few better educated teachers, particularly from the American Board schools. But it only gradually yielded ground to the Native Department's attempts to restrict missionary power. Despite a substantial demand for better schools in areas dominated by the DRC, a government investigation into DRC finances and usurpation of state power, and the expulsion of one missionary as a bad influence, the DRC held on.

In the early 1930s, conditions in the district changed in response to a new government program: that of the agricultural demonstrators. These were men who, like the Jeanes teachers, studied at an advanced course at Domboshawa and were then sent into rural areas to work for community development. But there the similarities ended. The agricultural demonstrators were government employees, supervised by the government agriculturist for natives, E.D. Alvord, under the direct control of the native commissioners, and the program was funded locally, through the Native Reserves Trust fund rather than through external philanthropic organizations. Agricultural demonstrators were also supposed to be independent of the missions. In the Fort Victoria District, however, they were not. Initially met in the Zimutu Reserve with skepticism and hostility, the demonstrators chose to demonstrate on the lands of mission schools, rather than following the prescribed path of recruiting cooperators from among various people in the community, each of whom was to farm an acre according to the demonstrator's directions.55

51 DND Annual Report for 1929, p. 41.

52 See Director of Native Development, Annual Reports.

53 The DRC received a grant of £7,125 in 1929, making it the largest Protestant recipient of government educational money.

54 See the investigation into the finances of the DRC in Gutu, NC Gutu to SoN Victoria, 28-4-33, NAZ S1542/M8, discussed in Summers, "Educational Controversies."

55 Jowitt to CNC, 11-1-32, NAZ S138/72. Jowitt was reporting Alvord's defense of this
Demonstrators' cooperation with the mission led to suspicion and conflict with the Native Department as the superintendent of natives of Victoria Circle (SoN Victoria) wrote to Alvord that it was “not good policy to allow the Demonstrator to get so involved with mission schools. This fact alone would account for his unpopularity with the kraal natives,” and went on to assert that “No demonstrator will be a success without the active support and cooperation of the Native Commissioner.”

The agricultural demonstrators did not act as a pacifying influence in the Victoria region. The SoN Victoria not only complained about their connections to mission schools, he also emphasized that they had poor manners, complaining that “I have often been particularly struck with the clownish ill-manners of those I have come across. I gather that they are often insolent to their elders and look down on those who have not been to school.” Not only did some demonstrators antagonize elders and officials through “insolence” and mission involvement, they also irritated their sponsors by becoming politically involved. At least one of the first agricultural demonstrators in the Victoria circle was an active member of the Southern Rhodesia Bantu Association, a legal organization pushing the advancement of the rights of educated Africans. Local European settlers, furthermore, apparently deeply resented any programs that helped Africans raise and sell maize on the local market.

Despite these inauspicious beginnings, agricultural demonstrators did rapidly build a following in the Zimutu Reserve. By 1932, the agriculturist was referring to demonstration work in the region as “very popular.” Demonstrators acquired this popularity by helping local farmers expand their production and sale of maize and other cash crops. Evidently they did so by de-emphasizing the crop rotations and careful soil conservation provisions of their training and becoming, according to their critics, “farm managers for those who grow maize for sale.” Alvord, on the other hand, emphasized the usefulness of a substantial market for African maize in

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56 SoN Victoria to Agriculturist, 3-2-30, NAZS138/72 1927-30.
57 Ibid.
58 Jowitt (DND) to SoN Victoria, 14-2-30, NAZ S138/72. The demonstrator was reprimed for his political involvement by both Alvord and the SoN Victoria.
59 See Alvord, “The Development of Native Agriculture.”
61 Assistant NC Gutu to SoN Victoria, 9-6-33, NAZ S138/72. This file contains other evidence from around the region that the most popular demonstrators were those who provided people with what they wanted—help expanding their maize yields—rather than the soil conservation tactics and training in intensive farming that the government thought they needed. See NC Mtoko to CNC, 1-6-33, and NC Zaka to SoN Victoria, 29-4-32. See also Alvord's statement that any rotation that did not emphasize maize would be very unpopular (reported by Jowitt to CNC 11-1-32) and also his defense against charges that he was suffering from a “maize complex,” Alvord to DND 8-6-31.
the region, especially in Zimutu, where Africans sold maize to European farmers and storekeepers who then either used it as cattle feed or resold it for higher European prices.62

After several years of successful demonstration activity, the Native Department began to use the demonstrators to coordinate the “centralization” of the Reserves. This meant that arable land would be distinguished from grazing land and land holdings would be fixed, rather than being subject to change as individuals came and went and practiced long-fallow agriculture. Centralization, however, also restricted the growth of the most successful market farmers of the region.

Beginning his work as a Jeanses teacher, Lysias Mukahleyi found himself in the midst of controversies over who was in control of the DRC-dominated regions. Being paid by the government and working for the DRC in ways that were intended to serve the African community, Mukahleyi found himself in the midst of a triangular contradiction: the government and DRC mistrusted each other, and both mistrusted Africans, who returned the sentiment to varying degrees, sometimes choosing to pursue Zionist strategies or explicit political involvement, which irritated both government and mission. The Jeanses ideal of nonpolitical cooperative development in a Christian framework was probably never a real possibility in such a politically muddled region. Mukahleyi apparently did not even try to avoid politics.

Mukahleyi was an early member of the Southern Rhodesia Native Association, becoming the secretary of the local branch even as he moved into the Victoria circle to begin his work as a Jeanses teacher.63 For conservative Native Department officials, this political involvement immediately made him suspect. Howman, the superintendent of natives of the Victoria circle, complained at the beginning of 1934 that a “Weak streak in [Lysias’] mental capacity … coupled with his political leanings, quite unfits him for any position of independence…. he lacks balance.”64

Howman complained of more than just Mukahleyi’s personal attitude, however. He complained that within the sensitive political atmosphere of the Zimutu Reserve, the Jeanses teacher was causing trouble for the community and region at large. Howman had been an early opponent of the Jeanses teacher program, responding to a query about how the program could serve his region with a scathing rejection:

I do not want the Jeanses Teacher to do anything for me so long as he remains outside my control. I do not know what community work means exactly but if it consists of pestering the village dwellers to adopt European methods of hygiene, sanitation, etc., I do not think it worthy of our support. The Jeanses Teacher comes to visit me once a month but I really

62 Alvord to DND, 8-6-31, NAZ S138/72.
63 SoN Victoria to CNC, 10-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.
64 Ibid.
would prefer that he did not do so as he will only trade on the official connection to impose his will on the villagers.65

In this context, Howman objected to Mukahleyi not because of his involvement in some protonationalist politics, but because regardless of his specific politics, the Jeanes teacher's job was to push change. Mere membership in the SRNA would not necessarily have been a problem: Mukahleyi pointed out in his own defense that a number of messengers and interpretors in government offices were also members, and that the organization was for the benefit of all, rather than being inherently hostile to the Native Department.66 Howman repeatedly expressed a desire for control and the notion that the Native Department must back its own people, whether those people were NCs, chiefs and headmen, or merely agricultural demonstrators, rather than supporting the Jeanes teachers who were semi-independent and under mission supervision.67

The situation went from tense to directly confrontational when reports began floating into Howman's office from the Zimutu Reserve that Mukahleyi was trying "to arrogate powers." Initially these reports were vague. Howman reported an absence of complaints from agricultural demonstrators of interference in the centralization program and in fact stated that while he would like to ask for Mukahleyi's removal, "it will first be necessary to procure some direct evidence of wrong-doing."68 Howman's letter indicating his desire to get rid of Mukahleyi and his lack of evidence was dated 10 March 1934. The next letter in the file, however, with the same date, indicates that Howman had found some evidence, or at least a pretext, with which to accuse the Jeanes teacher. After speaking with the agricultural demonstrators Howman accused Mukahleyi of

misleading the natives, disobeying a direct order which I gave him personally, and flouting the authority and orders of the Demonstrators who are directly responsible for the good order and wellbeing of agriculture in the reserve. I definitely instructed him not to interfere in any way with agricultural operations in the Reserve or give the natives the impression that he was carrying out orders received from me.69

Lysias Mukahleyi, according to Howman, had told people to violate the centralization land use plan by granting permission to plough in the land designated for grazing. Later, Howman went on to state that eight groups of men that he had seen had stated that Mukahleyi had given them permission to plough.70

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65 SoN Victoria (Howman) to CNC, 6-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.
66 Lysias Mukahleyi to DND, 16-4-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.
67 SoN Victoria to CNC, 10-3-34; Alvord to CNC, 24-2-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.
68 SoN Victoria to CNC, 10-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2. Howman admitted that he had "received no complaints from the Demonstrators in regard to Lysias interfering with their work, neither have I had any reports from them that the Natives are ploughing land reserved for grazing.
69 SoN Victoria to CNC, 10-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.
70 SoN Victoria to CNC, 29-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.
Howman's acute hostility makes this case somewhat difficult to sort out. But there are several odd features of this file. First, unlike the files compiled on most complaints, especially with regard to mission malpractice, or teachers' malfeasance, there is a notable lack of affidavits sworn out by witnesses and an equally notable lack of specific names given as references. Howman implied that he was responding to local complaints but his early letters indicated a desire for any pretext on which to expel Mukahleyi. Once he had his pretext, Howman acted bluntly, with all the power his position gave him: he sent Mukahleyi, in the custody of a messenger, to go about in the communities where he had worked, and ordered the Jeanes teacher to publically proclaim himself "an untrustworthy person." Acknowledging that this would destroy Mukahleyi's ability to do his job, Howman went on to ask for his removal.  

Mukahleyi tried to defend himself and mobilize potential support not merely among the SRNA (which might have been counterproductive as it would emphasize his political connections) but from his mission supervisors and the Department of Native Development. He pointed out in the official record that the SRNA was a legitimate organization, with many government-employed members. And he flatly denied Howman's most serious charge, that he had "interfered in any way with the administration of the Reserve...." Howman made the charge of interference explicit by pointing to several violations: Mukahleyi, he said, had allotted land for trees and school gardens; persuaded children to weed his own garden; and "constantly organizes meetings" to discuss the work of headmen and the division of land by the headmen and chiefs.  

These charges, however, are notable for how easily they can be explained within the prescribed work routine of the Jeanes teacher. Jeanes teachers were supposed to encourage the planting of trees and school gardens. Persuading children to weed was also well within their duties, especially, as Mukahleyi's diary indicated, when the weeding was not on private land but on demonstration plots for community benefit. And calling meetings of parents and community members to discuss how the community could improve itself was essential to improving schools and providing the workforce necessary for larger community projects involving hygiene, roads, or anything else. Mukahleyi himself complained that Howman and others apparently misunderstood his attempts to create parents' groups for school improvement and community discussions of development. Mukahleyi described some of the meetings in his diary as being to encourage obedience to chiefs and headmen. Apparently some of the discussions at Mukahleyi's meetings got fairly heated. Mukahleyi himself, however, was  

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71 SoN Victoria to CNC, 10-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.  
72 SoN Victoria to CNC, 29-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.  
73 Ibid.  
74 Mukahlehi Diary, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2. This heavily underlined document in English does not provide the evidence Howman asserted it did. All Jeanes teachers were required to keep professional diaries of how they spent their time, and submit these regularly to their mission supervisors.
apparently more important as a facilitator who provided community members with a venue to express their disagreements than as an agitator who told them that they should feel dissatisfied.\textsuperscript{75}

Howman's efforts to get rid of Mukahleyi did not work smoothly. Mukahleyi not only defended himself in petitions to the Native Development Department, he also mobilized supporters among his employers. His missionary supervisor tried to retain his services by appealing over the native commissioner's head to the chief native commissioner that "Lysias has had a good training and is undoubtedly intelligent and progressive ... [concerning] the education and uplift of his own people. This may have made him too self-confident to the Natives in the Reserves...." But this moderate admission of problems was as far as Reverend Louw was prepared to go. He went on to critique the Native Department's handling of the situation, at least implicitly, by arguing that a minor incident had been blown out of proportion by agricultural demonstrators who were from different missions and regions and by authorities who had acted without seeking reconciliation. "Lysias has ... always been most submissive," and would have listened if the authorities had asked rather than ordering him about.\textsuperscript{76} Jowitt, the director of native development, also intervened with the CNC, complaining that "it is difficult for me, without clearer evidence, to appreciate that the actions of the Jeanes Teacher warranted instant dismissal without reference to those primarily concerned."\textsuperscript{77}

Both Louw and Jowitt, like Major Stoyle in the Magorimbo case, were attempting to defend a notion of the chain of command that ran from the Native Development Department through the missions to the Jeanes teachers and finally the community. The Department's opposition to any loss of the native commissioner's authority in the reserves was clear from both Major Wane's response as NC Mazoe and Howman's response as superintendent of natives of Victoria. The head of the Native Department, Colonel Carbutt, stated the supremacy of his department forcibly when he argued to Rev. Louw that the Department had to act immediately and was unable to inform the mission in advance because "I cannot foresee when any person is going to misbehave."\textsuperscript{78}

The most serious issue, however, was not that of consultations, but of whether Africans, even educated and prepared as Jeanes teachers were, could be allowed to wield actual authority, or whether they must remain as supervised underlings. On this, the Native Development Department and the mission sought to portray Mukahleyi as an actor, an educated, responsible human being who should be granted some autonomy. But the CNC argued that Africans' autonomy was inherently suspect:

\textsuperscript{75} He repeatedly asserted that while many people had spoken at the meetings, and all sorts of comments were made, that he had only encouraged obedience and had done nothing that could be construed as obstructing the demonstrators' program. Lysias Mukahleyi to DND, 16-4-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.

\textsuperscript{76} Rev. Loew to CNC, 11-4-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.

\textsuperscript{77} DND to CNC 18-4-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.

\textsuperscript{78} CNC to Rev. Louw, 18-4-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2.
the system under which the Jeanes Teachers work will always be fraught with the danger of their exceeding their legitimate functions, because experience has shown that Natives, when clothed with any sort of authority, nearly always abuse it, unless they are kept under the closest supervision, which is not possible in the case of a Jeanes Teacher.79

CNC Carbutt stated that he was willing to allow Mukahleyi to continue to work only under direct supervision at a mission station.

Yet by the beginning of the 1935 school year, even that compromise was falling apart. Rev. Louw proposed to move Mukahleyi back to the Zimutu Reserve to work directly under Rev. Moller's supervision. But both the CNC and DND concluded that such a move would be unwise as it would put Lysias directly back into the midst of a battle over centralization and the authority of agricultural demonstrators.80 And Lysias himself acknowledged the difficulties of his position when he noted that he did not like and probably could not work with Reverend Moller and that key native messengers, especially the head messenger, Mahachi, were planning to get him expelled from Zimutu if he went back.81

Bureaucratic Squabbles

Magorimbo and Mukahleyi provided sharp examples of cases where the Jeanes teacher program became controversial. Both cases ended in ceremonial gestures to the Native Department. Magorimbo was forced to make a formal apology to the native commissioner. Mukahleyi was put under direct mission supervision after being forced to declare himself an untrustworthy person. Neither man had a long career in the program, though both survived initial attempts to oust them and Magorimbo, at least, went on to a successful career as one of the first African school supervisors.82 But neither Magorimbo nor Mukahleyi, nor any of the other Jeanes teachers who confronted local powers, was immediately and permanently dismissed for disrespect to white or black Native Department authorities or to traditional authorities. Individual Jeanes teachers held their jobs amidst accusations of forcing labor, illegally mediating disputes, and reallocating land.

Individual Jeanes teachers survived episodes of Native Department opposition not through community support, or even mission support, but due to intensive interdepartmental conflict between the Native Department and the Native Development Department. The wars were fought in minor battles over Jeanes teachers such as Magorimbo and Mukahleyi, over teachers who had not paid taxes or appeared to a NC as too young to teach and over depictions of teachers and schools in annual departmental reports. The friction between the two departments

79 Ibid.
81 Lysias Mukartyoyi to CNC, 10-3-35, NAZ S1542/J1 v.1.
may have been partially due to personal animosity between two rival strong-willed heads of department, Col. Carbutt and Harold Jowitt. But it was also institutional, sparked by the two departments' fundamentally different notions of how authority should be constructed in the African communities of Southern Rhodesia.

The Native Department cultivated and defended a concept of authority in which communities were headed by “traditional” elders, headmen and chiefs, who were, if suitable, granted official recognition by the Department and kept in line through a steady diet of ceremonial gestures ranging from salaries through native board meetings and official visits. On a daily basis, the native commissioner would coordinate the population by using his native messengers as go-betweens to deliver his directives to the “traditional leadership.” The Native Department pushed legislation that made the native commissioner of the 1930s effectively supreme within his territory: the Native Affairs Act mandated that all Africans must obey his reasonable requests. Above the native commissioner was the regional superintendent of natives, the chief native commissioner, and then the nonprofessionals: the governmental ministers and their staffs. Native commissioners appear to have seen this structuring of power and authority as effective and strong, but also somewhat brittle. They feared damage to any one of the system's key points, whether that be the prestige of the elders, the menace of the messengers, or the independent superiority of the native commissioner. The structure was not designed to bend and move. It had no place for ambitious young men who sought to gain power through their achievements or expertise as teachers, skilled craftsmen, prosperous farmers, or mission employees.

The Native Development Department, on the other hand, was built around a goal of change. It promoted a concept of development and progress rather than Native Department ideals of order, and sought to reconfigure notions of authority within communities from a static value determined by age and inherited position, to authority as a function of schooling, skill, way of life, and achievement. Order and good administration were not the highest values of the Native Development Department. Instead, the Department valued its own concepts of progress and improved quality of life.

**Participation and Development**

The program's problems, however, were not merely at the level of interdepartmental bureaucratic competition: they involved the very notion of authority in rural Zimbabwe. In its ideal form, the Jeanes teacher program was supposed to be highly voluntary as parents and community members observed, decided what they wanted, and then developed their community's resources and institutions. This model of consensus-based voluntary development, however, did not fit the realities of reserve communities. Within the increasingly controlled and segregated context of Southern Rhodesia, authority and economic well-being in the reserves did not come from popular cooperation and consensus but through preferential access to outside patrons and connections. The idyllic assumption that rural communities would automatically work together to promote better lives was quite simply fantastic within a context where individuals and families increasingly
competed for land, access to markets, jobs, building contracts, labor, and government positions.

Jeanes teachers, and indeed the other demonstration programs as well, were based on the idea that rural communities merely needed to see what was possible and they would voluntarily sacrifice and work to achieve better lives and conditions. But the principal demonstration that younger, educated men observed was that of Europeans’ accumulation of goods and ostentatious display of status.

When the idea of teaching by demonstration and voluntary emulation failed, therefore, the Jeanes teachers and demonstrators followed the model of authority that dominated the region's culture, society, and economy: they claimed authority based on position and connections, and gave orders, regardless of whether they actually had the legal authority to do so. Though the program had been initiated as a cooperative, voluntary, development initiative, it rapidly became an early exercise in what Leslie Bessant calls “coercive development,” relying on orders and force rather than education and collective interests.83

Community development programs in Southern Rhodesia suffered because they were based on an ideal of community that failed to fit the realities of Rhodesia. Community efforts to mobilize, efforts that involved both senior men and younger men and women, had been repeatedly blocked by mission and government efforts to reinterpret demands and actions. When senior men called for better schools and offered to pay for them—as Ziki and his people on the Devuli Ranch, who worked for American Board schools—government underfunding and the depression of the economy through maize control, destocking, and restrictions on cattle sales thwarted their aims. When younger and older men mobilized through the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union to petition for useful education in the Umchingwe block of Insiza District, government reinterpretations of their wants led to the imposition of a project that failed to meet their goals.84

The Jeanes teacher initiative was designed to encourage communities to develop suitable goals and then provide them with nonpolitical, nonthreatening ways of pursuing these goals. In a politicized environment, however, where goals could only be achieved by demanding more or taking from one group to give to another, the Jeanes teachers’ close ties to the administration and missions hampered their ability to build coalitions with local parents and community leaders. And teachers’ mobilization of communities to discuss political problems created suspicion in administrative officials, ranging from the chief native commissioner to the staff of messengers who coordinated the information flow into local native commissioners' offices. Caught between the various interests they were intended to serve, Jeanes teachers resorted to orders and force to produce results, increasing antagonisms in the process, antagonisms that further broke apart the communities they were supposed to coordinate and build.

83 Bessant, “Coercive Development.”

The most successful Jeanes teachers proved to be among the least ambitious. The female Jeanes teachers who provided classes, one-on-one medical help, voluntary information, and hygiene advice proved little threat and provoked little controversy. The male Jeanes teachers who focused on the mission schools and functioned strictly as teacher supervisors, rather than large-scale development workers, survived to be promoted into African superintendents when the Jeanes teacher program was phased out in favor of more specialized education and development workers. This sharply delimited pattern of success, however, raised questions about the program's central logic. The Native Development Department and the missions failed to develop and sustain a program capable of allowing cooperative, voluntary rural development to produce changes in the power structure and ways of life of rural Africans. Rather than bringing Africans together or taking advantage of any common interests they might have, development programs such as the Jeanes teacher program split them into groups battling with each other for control of time, labor, resources, and authority. Ultimately, the programs promoted faction and dispute about obligations and the distribution of existing resources, rather than providing mechanisms through which communities could bootstrap themselves to comfort and affluence. And even the program's controversies revolved around the question of power and who had the authority to give orders, rather than around any question of what would benefit the most people or create new communal institutions for development.