2006

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doi:10.1017/S002185370500085X Printed in the United Kingdom

'SUBTERRANEAN EVIL' AND 'TUMULTUOUS RIOT' IN BUGANDA: AUTHORITY AND ALIENATION AT KING'S COLLEGE, BUDO, 1942

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ABSTRACT: Staff petitions, sexual and disciplinary scandal and open riot pushed Buganda's leaders to close Budo College on the eve of Kabaka (King) Muteesa II's coronation. The upheaval at the school included a teachers' council that proclaimed ownership of the school, student leaders who manipulated the headmaster through scandal and school clubs and associations that celebrated affiliation over discipline. Instead of enacting and celebrating imperial partnership and order in complex, well-choreographed coronation rituals, the school's disruption delineated the fractures and struggles over rightful authority, order and patronage within colonial Buganda, marking out a future of tumultuous political transition.

KEY WORDS: Uganda, education, protest, politics.

In 1942, on the eve of the coronation of the young Kabaka (King) of Buganda, King's College, Budo, broke down as teachers and prefects rejected the headmaster's priorities, prefects passed scandalous accusations on to the headmaster, dissidents threw stones and damaged facilities and staff and prefects refused to help the headmaster restore order. Facing an embarrassing collapse of British-style hierarchy and ritual at the Kabaka's school days before the ceremonial coronation designed to mark his adulthood and assumption of full authority over Buganda, the headmaster called in the police and Buganda's regents, shut the school and dismissed all students. The governor of Uganda intervened, appointing an investigative commission of notables that produced a secret report. The school's complex, socially telling crisis was simplified for public consumption into a small strike or riot, and omitted from publicly told and published histories of the school and Ugandan politics.1

But the disruption at Budo, where Buganda enthroned its kabakas and elite youth learned to rule, was more than just a school strike. The upheaval and subsequent investigations of Budo presaged both a collapse of elite politics in Buganda as a whole, and growing tensions in the relations between Ganda

1 For example, Ernest K. K. Sempebwa (interviewed by Carol Summers at Spear Motors, Nakawa, Kampala, 10 June 2004) had both studied and taught at Budo just before the crisis, leaving to take up a new position as the Kabaka's private secretary. He remembered details of school life vividly, but described the crisis as a riot by unruly students. E. M. K. Mulira, another Budo alumnus and teacher, wrote with nostalgia for the school, but did not describe the circumstances of his departure in his book Thoughts of a Young African (London, 1945). G. P. McGregor, in the school's official history, simply passed the crisis off without discussion as a time of trouble. King's College, Budo: The First Sixty Years (Nairobi, 1967).
factions and British administrators. Budo’s conflicts involved three very different visions of power and authority: the headmaster’s liberal, reformist, imperial development model; dissident teachers’ loyalty to seniority and the school as institution; and the young Kabaka’s cronies’ vision of authority rooted in personal association, affiliation and loyalty. These clashing visions of what made a hierarchy legitimate and authoritative allowed students and staff at Budo to challenge British dominance. In 1942 at Budo, dissident teachers acted as a new class of educated Africans to make elective, democratic institutions. Students loyal to the Kabaka provoked a clash between aristocratic concepts of privilege and newer models of personal austerity and meritocratic achievement. The inability of Budo’s factions to negotiate compromise between divergent concepts of authority precipitated the school from rituals of discipline and order into the violence of stonings and riot. Publicity around the young Kabaka’s coronation emphasized the moment as one of ritualized order – with authorities including the governor, bishops and Ganda officials attending a schedule of events that gestured to history but incorporated modern dress and tea parties. Historically, though, succession in Buganda was about disorder. Mutesa II’s coronation passed off without warfare. But Budo’s disorder in 1942 fit into older patterns, and the specific forms of disorder it offered constituted a turning point toward a new public radicalism in Buganda’s politics.

In this article, I therefore seek to reconstruct some of what happened – or what observers imagined and feared had happened – at Budo in 1942, and to suggest what the crisis meant. Drawing on accounts of performances by staff, students and others, I depict Budo as a disorderly drama that unsettled and remade social and political interchange among elite Baganda, Ganda commoners, protectorate officials and missionaries. In addition, I explore how Budo’s crisis set the terms of Buganda’s politics during the 1940s, as the decade moved from elite faction fights and negotiations between British and Ganda leaders toward general strike in 1945 and mass mobilization and armed insurrection in 1949. The Budo disturbance was not just a school strike. It was a national event, and its consequences – a triumph of paternal imperialism and Ganda personal loyalties over more professional and democratic institutional values that drove educated democrats toward mass politics – continued to be felt well into the 1950s. At Budo in 1942, school administrators, staff, teachers, elite pupils, prefects and others acted out incompatible ideas of consultation, accountability and democracy. In tidying

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2 For examples, photographs and descriptions see the coverage in the *Uganda Herald* (Nov. 1942).

3 Secondary literature on the 1940s is scarce. Work done in the 1950s at the East African Institute of Social Research was overshadowed by the political crises after the deportation of the Kabaka, and must be read cautiously for insights into the mobilizations of the 1940s. David Apter’s *Political Kingdom in Uganda* (London, 1961; repr. 1967), xiii, for example, is dedicated to ‘Andrew’ (who may or may not be the controversial governor) and acknowledges help from the governor’s ‘chief antagonist during my stay in Uganda’. The 1952 Kabaka crisis, rather than any earlier political alignments, clearly shaped Apter’s interpretation of the past. Recent work on administration and policy in the 1940s includes my own and that of Gardner Thompson, ‘Colonialism in crisis: the Uganda disturbances of 1945’, *African Affairs*, 91 (1992), 605–24, and *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and its Legacy* (Kampala, 2003).
up after the riots, the protectorate government and the Church of Uganda tried, for the last time, to make private reports and settlements that would not disrupt consensus ideas of a progressive kingdom, hopeful monarchy and Christian people. The school reformed around a chastened headmaster who abandoned his ideas of reform in favor of a renewed politics of paternal leadership and personal loyalty. But stories about Budo kept recurring in the politics of Buganda as elite efforts to invoke solidarity through patronage failed in the mass politics of the 1945 general strike, mobilization of new political parties and the 1949 disturbances. And the alienated ‘Budo masters’ driven from the school in the 1942 crisis became major figures in a newly radical mass politics.

**CONTEXT**

King’s College, Budo, was a ‘public school’ in the British sense – a place for the next generation’s leadership to acquire the academic, social, political and intellectual skills they would need to run colonial Buganda with its interlocked and cooperating hierarchies of kingdom, protectorate and Protestant church. By the 1940s, Budo’s status was so clearly preeminent that Edward Muteesa could continue attending the school even after Kabaka Daudi Chwa died in 1939 and Muteesa succeeded him as His Highness Muteesa II (as a minor, under regency). The school was multi-ethnic, recruiting students from beyond Buganda, and employing teachers not simply from Britain, but from elsewhere in the protectorate. Although other schools rivaled Budo in academic results and direct access to government jobs, Budo was the country’s principal training ground for the men who would rule as chiefs, interpreters and bureaucrats. The school was not simply an alien colonial institution. From its foundation around 1905 onward, Baganda understood Budo as their school, built with their money and labor on their land – land marked by shrines and normally used for the installation of kings. Budo existed not to make young Baganda into Britons, but to provide promising young men, and a few young women, with social connections and training equivalent to what a previous generation might have achieved as pages in one of the royal courts. As a Ganda public school, Budo prepared youth as elites in the hybrid world of colonial Buganda and the protectorate of Uganda. The school was headed by a British headmaster. Students, both Baganda and those from outside the kingdom, lived in houses, were guided by housemasters and ruled by prefects. They competed in sports, organized clubs and concerts, attended chapel, threw parties and sometimes went to class.

Budo was tied tightly to the elite politics of Buganda, which grew increasingly messy and open in the years after the death of Kabaka Daudi Chwa in 1939. The protectorate’s administration was stretched thin both in

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4 Julian Huxley’s 1929 visit led to his publication of this verdict on Budo, quoted in McGregor, *King’s College*, 68–9. St. Mary’s Kisubi was academically stronger in some ways, and Makerere more closely tied to government jobs.

5 McGregor, *King’s College*, provides a narrative history. For an explicit statement of ownership, see ‘Mass meeting of Budo parents and funders to Bishop Stuart’, 21 Apr. 1943, Church Missionary Society Archives, University of Birmingham (henceforth CMS), G3 A7/e1. For context on Budo as a coronation site, see Christopher Wrigley, *Kingship and State: The Buganda Dynasty* (Cambridge, 1996), 28–9.
money and manpower during the Second World War. In Buganda, the Nnamasole crisis in 1941—a fight over the Queen's marriage to a commoner—led to the Great Lukiiko's dramatic rejection of Muteesa's mother as the Queen Mother, the prosecution of her new husband, threats against the Bishop who married them and ultimately the forced resignation of the Prime Minister who had consented to her marriage. Public upheaval over the Nnamasole's marriage began the process of opening up politics, remaking it from simply a matter of patronage and affiliation with elites, to a larger public debate by a wider class of Baganda. E. M. K. Mulira, one of the dissident Budo masters, indicated the clash's destabilizing effects by pointing out that while 'chiefs forcing the resignation of a Minister had never been heard of in Buganda before', the fight over the Nnamasole showed that not only the Prime Minister, but also the Queen Mother, could be forced out of office, and that popular opinion mattered. The political world began to shift, and Buganda entered what Mulira called 'a period of slander, rumours and propaganda' as 'authority lost its hold over the people'.

The Native Anglican Church (later the Church of Uganda) also experienced challenges to conventional authority. A revival movement disrupted the church's seminary and teacher training program at Mukono, dividing those identifying themselves as abalokole—saved ones—from unrevived church members. At Budo, 'saved' staff members were among those raising uncomfortable questions about authority, discipline and sex. The abalokole argued that authority, discipline and orthodoxy could be challenged by individuals filled with the holy spirit who communicated directly with God. More conventional African Christians also began to challenge the church hierarchy, expressing bitterness over the Bishop's willingness to allow the Nnamasole's non-traditional marriage and condemning missionary manipulation of church synods.

Thus, at the beginning of 1942 the three hierarchical institutions in Buganda that structured its colonial world were experiencing new uncertainties reflected at Budo. The British empire and protectorate were enmeshed in a world war that strained their resources and personnel, making it increasingly dependent on Africans as skilled, educated, technically competent participants in direct administration and as substitutes for scarce British staff. Buganda was under a regency, a queen mother and prime

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7 Copy of letter to Bishop, Chair of Board of Governors, 28 May 1942, and the report of Mukono Commission 1943, summarize events at Mukono, CMS G 3/A7/5.


9 See, for example, Summers, 'Scandal, legitimacy and loyalty', and also the petitions from church members.
minister had been toppled and the Kabaka was a youth, leaving the kingdom without a centralizing autocrat. And the Protestant church was under attack from within and without by those who argued that it had subverted true Christianity and traditional morality, becoming yet another colonial institution.

SCANDAL AND FACTIONS

With protectorate, kingdom and church under stress, African staff at Budo sought an institutional order of respect for seniority – instantiated in clothes, manners and houses – with the staff council (lukiiko) as the school’s final authority. On 6 February 1942, 17 African teachers at Budo sent a memo to Dennis Herbert, the school’s head. These Budo masters complained about slackness of discipline – as indicated by boys’ sloppy dress and unmannerly behavior toward elders – and condemned the school’s inadequate latrines and water supply and its shoddy teachers’ quarters. They also asked for enforcement of rules against student drinking, and for regular consultations between the school’s head and a staff lukiiko. The bishop, and a subsequent protectorate investigation, considered their critique ‘reasonably worded and constructive’.10 The school’s former head remembered the protesters as ‘very good men’ who should be listened to.11

But Herbert resisted their rather prosaic recommendations. Budo trained Buganda’s political leadership, but Herbert did not view the African teachers as leaders. He was more interested in the school’s budget than in the dress code that delineated ranks within the school, and believed in ‘free discipline’ that cultivated students’ individualism and self-control, rather than in immediate expulsion for students caught drinking.12 The Budo masters considered his response to their initiative ‘evasive’. They wanted action to preserve both their prestige and the school’s reputation for rigor and morality. But Herbert clearly saw their initiative as a problem, disrupting his efforts to encourage student responsibility and leadership. As staff mobilized collectively against disorder and disrespect, Herbert perceived no crisis, later asserting ‘I had no notion that there was any ill feeling’.13 He explained tensions at the school as pre-coronation jitters.

The Budo masters understood the headmaster’s rejection of their initiative as symptomatic of British attacks on Africans’ authority, however. One of the memo’s signatories publicly criticized the second-class status that the missions had taught Africans to accept: he ended a sermon by pointing at the chapel’s stained glass memorial window, which showed Jesus with a European child on his knee and African children grouped around him in ‘positions of subordination’. A staff member and former head prefect, he rejected the ‘erroneous teaching that even in the sight of God the African

11 Note of conversation with Grace, Norman Jackson, 28 June 1943, PRO CO 536/210.
12 Ibid.
13 Herbert to Hooper, 15 May 1943, CMS G3 A7/e 1. Herbert also condemned the idea of the staff meeting on their own without his presence to chair the discussion.
must be subservient to the European'.14 Instead of kneeling to petition for British leadership, he believed Baganda should act for themselves.

The November 1942 coronation was a re-statement of both the Kabaka’s position within the kingdom of Buganda and of the kingdom’s relationship with the British authorities that dominated the protectorate and the Protestant church. It included religious and secular events, performed before both Ganda and British audiences, marking a coming of age for both the Kabaka and the kingdom as the young Muteesa II acceded to power and the regents became merely his ministers. In this charged atmosphere, students acted. By 20 October, one replaced the school’s portrait of the King of England with a portrait of the Kabaka. Herbert restored the King of England, but this did not last. Someone moved the picture again. Herbert admitted defeat and moved the King of England’s picture to a different wall, leaving the Kabaka presiding where the King of England once reigned in an unsubtle declaration of Buganda’s changed governance.15

The events that led to the school’s closure, though, evidently began on 1 November, when Miss Hamand, a missionary teacher, confronted boys loitering near the girls’ dorms after dark. They stoned her.16 She retreated, informed the head prefect and headmaster, but ‘heard no more about it’. Students at Budo regularly threw stones to express frustration with teachers. Hamand had been stoned on other occasions while policing the school’s female students and the headmaster and staff expected stonings after they made unpopular decisions. Stonings in Buganda could simply indicate discontent or opposition. But they were also a very specific way for those unable to speak to express popular opposition to outsiders’ interference in their affiliations. Hamand was stoned as she blocked young men’s courtship (or harassment) of female students. The Kabaka’s mother and her new husband were stoned at their wedding, as her marriage destroyed her position as moral guardian of the kingdom.17 Stone-throwers in 1949 aimed at officials who stood between them and their Kabaka.18 In moving the King of England’s

14 Description of Henry Kanyike’s sermon from the report, based on Kanyike’s testimony and that of witnesses, PRO CO 536/210/5, pp. 27–8. Kanyike went on to participate in politics and was deported from Buganda after the 1945 general strike. Ernest Sempebwa (2004) described Kanyike as the organizer of the African teachers’ lukiiko who, in conversation during tea breaks, kept asking the other teachers to consider whether the British teachers could have accomplished anything without the African staff, observing that they could not and concluding that the African staff should therefore run things.

15 The report noted conflicts over the King’s portrait in other schools, too, with Gayaza girls turning it to the wall or putting it on the floor on three different occasions and Ndeje girls following suit.

16 She had been stoned before, but accuracy and force had improved, and she found this assault particularly unsettling. Budo’s excursion into co-education was still somewhat controversial and one of her responsibilities was to monitor girls’ safety and sexuality. Guitar-playing men outside their windows after dark were considered a threat.


portrait and stoning Hamand, students rejected deference to Britain and declared their relationships within Buganda.

The next day, Herbert discussed discipline with Budo’s head prefect.19 The head prefect’s scandal-laden portrayal of school discipline – unlike the more moderate letter of the staff – launched the headmaster into action. Instead of dwelling on stones, the head prefect pointed to problems with sex and beer that undermined the reputation of Europeans, African teachers and some student leaders.20 Neither sex nor beer alone constituted grounds for aggressive intervention. Herbert had earlier been informed by at least three sources of affairs between men and boys, and teachers had been blunt about student drunkenness. The head prefect, though, named names. And instead of being simply a matter of sex among schoolboys, the head prefect alleged that ‘homosexuality’ at Budo involved authorities – prefects, African teachers and white government employees – and favors, money or gifts. The head prefect told of students he had caught having sex, of prefects and Europeans who were rumored to be involved and of a specific incident where he had heard a violent quarrel between a prefect and a form five student over who had been paid more for sex by a European officer. Rumor had it, he said, that the sex with students had occurred in the homes of the Europeans. Seven European men were implicated, one of whom was the young King’s tutor.21

The head prefect’s allegations were eventually backed by suggestive testimony from others, including the chapel prefect who recalled being part of a group that in 1940 confronted the Kabaka’s tutor and an African master. European missionaries testified to suspicious moments with the accused white officials and younger boys.22 Whatever had actually happened, though, sexual allegations at Budo were about more than sex. Varying ideas of affiliation, loyalty and authority were at least as important. The protectorate

(with pebbles, rather than rocks likely to do serious damage) was a regularly used form of protest.

19 ‘The head prefect was the top student representative. The masters were staff, graduates, teachers and professionals. Herbert’s consultation with the head prefect rather than with staff members was probably an effort to go directly to the source of the problem, stonings and indiscipline, but the effect was to cut teachers out of the process of management and control.

20 Sex among schoolboys, peers, does not seem to have raised concern. The head prefect’s role in the scandal was very ambiguous. He initially tried to distract the headmaster with stories of European sexual misconduct and then begun a campaign of silence and non-cooperation when the investigation struck closer to the student government he headed. His name is not given in commission records, or in Herbert’s recollections, but he seems to have been intent on placating a constituency of disparate factions ranging from the Kabaka’s party to the school’s head.

21 ‘Portions of the Budo report deleted from the version sent to the CMS’, PRO CO536/210. The oblique hints here, though, seem to indicate that those involved were not children, but men. The students and prefects may have been as old as their twenties. Colonial Office notes remark that there were major problems with evidence. Some of the testimony may simply have constituted hearsay or slander. Testimony was not taken under oath.

investigator concluded ‘There are strong suspicions ... but it has been found impossible to get beyond the suspicious stage’ as the Africans he interviewed hold the opinion that conditions at Budo were not so bad as others have attempted to make them, and that those who made the allegations did so because the Europeans named were friends of the Kabaka’s tutor, and [witnesses testified against them] to throw as much blame as possible on the European community with a view to covering up the delinquencies of the African staff and students.23

By the end of his immediate investigation, though, Herbert believed that sexual ‘subterranean evils’ had eroded students’ respect for the authority of Britons and teachers. He did not see students as molested victims. Instead he argued that the sex and drinking damaged the position of the purchasers of sex (including European officials), enhancing that of the sellers (younger Africans) and contributed to a school-wide atmosphere of secrets far removed from healthy social interaction, like games, that produced solidarity and fellowship. The Kabaka’s tutor, he noted, had been active at Budo for four or five years, though African masters and students were unwilling to discuss his affairs publicly for fear of implicating the Kabaka. Protectorate officials made sure the tutor was urgently recalled to the army.24 The colonial office blacklisted him.25 The Kabaka, though, was quite literally at the center of potential scandal as his tutor reportedly slept with him (literally) and the special house that had been built for him was the geographic center for the ‘Kabaka’s party’ of young princes (balangira) and hangers on who liked to drink, smoke and escape ordinary school rules.26 The ‘Kabaka’s party’ at Budo was publicly silent, but socially exuberant in sexual activities, alcoholic bashes and smoking. And its members’ version of authority was neither that of the liberal individualism promulgated by the headmaster nor of the loyalty to Budo as an institution put forward by some teachers. It was a personal affiliation with the Kabaka, young though

23 ‘Report of the Assistant Director of Security Intelligence’, 10 Nov. 1943, PRO CO536/210. Note that this is a complex allegation, with politics that may be difficult to disentangle. Probably, it was made by conservative Ganda irritated with upstart young masters.

24 The Kabaka’s tutor confessed quickly when questioned, whether accurately or not. He may have simply chosen to avoid a fuss on the eve of his charge’s coronation. The ironic footnote to this is that his father-in-law was upset about the sudden recall, and petitioned for his son-in-law to be exempted, as he could not possibly be needed that badly.

25 Officials sent out private explanations of events that blocked him from getting postwar jobs. For example, Eric Dutton to Seel, 14 Apr. 1944, PRO CO 536/210/5, regarding a job in Zanzibar.

26 The Kabaka’s sleeping arrangements at Budo had always been controversial. His tutor evidently emphasized that he slept with the Kabaka as a dedicated teacher and mentor. See, for example, Uganda African Welfare Association to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 8 Oct. 1943, PRO CO 536/208, and a version passed to Lord Caldecote, Dominions officer, 20 June 1940, PRO CO536/205/40080, who reported that ‘Mr. Crittenden was repeatedly given the most strict instructions that he was on no account to let the boy King out of his sight, he even had to sleep with him ... Over and over again it was brought home to Mr. Crittenden by those in authority the tremendous importance of keeping the King under the strictest supervision’.
he was, enacting Buganda’s autonomy and power in freedom from restraints and rules.

Alcohol, however, may have been more central to the breakdown of discipline and order (and the polarization of Budo) than the sexual activities that excited European observers. Herbert pointed out that two African masters (not among the protesters) were running shops close to the school where they sold cigarettes, and probably beer, to students. Historically, youths’ alcohol consumption in East Africa was governed by norms that demanded restraint and limited drunkenness to senior men. The breakdown of these constraints under the young Kabaka Mwanga marked serious social danger. The balangira who had come to the school after their father Kabaka Daudi Chwa died, were, he noted, men accustomed to drunkenness, parties and sex. Ineligible for chiefships or most bureaucratic appointments lest they build independent power bases and threaten the ruling King, they had no incentive to follow school disciplinary practices that prepared youth for government service. Herbert was careful not to accuse the Kabaka directly of being a problem. But he noted that while he lacked ‘evidence that the kabaka himself had been in any way corrupted ... it is very sad that he chose friends of this type’. Herbert acted quickly and abruptly, with the full cooperation of the protectorate government, to deal with the question of officials’ sex with schoolboys at Budo. As far as he was concerned, the matter was history by 5 November, freeing the school to resume preparations for the coronation.

PERFORMING FOR AUTHORITY

But things did not end that simply. The school’s crisis had begun with teachers’ efforts to reinstate their professional authority, and continued with

27 For general discussion, see Justin Willis, *Potent Brews: A Social History of Alcohol in East Africa 1850–1999* (Athens, OH, 2002). For discussions of the good heir Mawanda (who obeyed his father Kabaka Mutesa I and did not drink alcohol) and the bad heir Mwanga (who plundered his elders) see Bartolomayo Musoke Zimbe, *Buganda ne Kabaka: Ebyafayo Eby’obwa Kabak bwe Buganda* (Mengo, 1939), translated by Simon Musoke.

28 Princes and princesses held awkward positions within Buganda. As late as the end of the nineteenth century, princes who did not inherit had been killed as threats to the reigning Kabaka. In any case, balangira were traditionally ineligible for responsible appointments. The protectorate government, conscious of their high status and unwilling to damage it by ordering them around, did not want to become their employer either, as the case of George Mawanda demonstrated. Thus, there was nothing for the princes to do other than drink themselves to death or attend parties, and having them do so might actually strengthen the kingdom. Their presence at Budo, among meritocratic strivers with a strong work ethic and desire for individual achievement, was therefore seriously anomalous.

29 Herbert was discussing 13 of the Kabaka’s half brothers, along with a variety of other young men who had spent time at the palace at Mengo and considered themselves friends of the Kabaka, and thus connected for life. Herbert to Hooper, 15 May 1943, CMS G3 A7/e 1. Herbert clearly did not understand the palace system of education, and its risks. Maintaining the Kabaka’s favor had classically been an ongoing process for would-be elites. But if Herbert had acknowledged this, he might have had to note that the drinking and partying may have been done at least partly to keep the Kabaka amused, pleased and happy.
prefects' scandal-mongering efforts to emphasize the personal affiliations and reputations that connected Baganda and Britons, teachers and students. But students' concerns went deeper than the flashy prospect of sexual scandal. Like the protesting teachers, students at Budo were most interested not in questions of individual behavior, but in symbolic rituals of protocol, respect, discipline and authority in a context where a new kabaka might begin to redefine the relationship between Britain and Buganda. And Herbert was awkward with local forms of dignity that made Budo a microcosm of Buganda's political world. The program of events leading up to the coronation included a concert by Budo students and a debate that included the Kabaka and senior protectorate officials. These occasions provided one moment after another in which irritated students could take offence at the headmaster's invocation of moderation and order, and staff members could reject a vision of the school that marginalized their own professionalism by standing aside and watching disorder escalate in front of an audience of kingdom and protectorate notables. Budo's prelude to Muteesa's coronation concluded not with British-style school celebrations but with disorder that transposed Buganda's historical experiences of chaotic coronations into the modern school context.30

On 6 November, Budo students performed a concert in honor of Edward Muteesa, which they viewed as their opportunity to come to the attention of the soon-to-be-crowned King, or at least to express exuberant loyalty and impress his advisors and supporters. By presiding over concerts, football matches and other public events, the Kabaka had begun to exert his presence in Buganda even before officially beginning to rule. Such ceremonial events were well attended, followed protocols to show loyalty and were reported in both vernacular and English newspapers.31 Herbert, though, framed Budo's concert as a sendoff to Edward Muteesa, Budo boy, not a celebration of Muteesa's status as His Highness the Kabaka. He thus celebrated the school through its notable alumnus, rather than the power of the young King of Buganda. To ensure an orderly celebration of the school, he managed the concert personally rather than deferring to the Ganda staff member normally in charge of concert arrangements.32 At 10:40 pm, Herbert cut off the later acts and closed the concert down, possibly concerned about hosting a late night event for an audience that included

30 Kabakas often took power with political upheaval and violence. Mwanga took over twice in contexts of civil war according to John Roscoe, The Baganda (London, 1911), 229–30. And even those who acceded smoothly such as Muteesa I, might subsequently need to conduct purges of their opponents, or assassinate their brothers. See, for example, Sir Apolo Kaggwa, Kings of Buganda, MSM Kiwanuka trans. (Nairobi, 1971), 144–6.
31 Many such listings can be seen in the English language Uganda Herald from July to December of 1942. They include concerts throughout the kingdom, and even football matches between ggombolola (district) chiefs and ssaza (provincial) chiefs ending with players prostrating themselves before the Kabaka. Press reports elaborately thanked all contributors, making clear who provided chairs, sold tickets and sang beautifully in service of the cause.
32 The usual concert coordinator was A. K. Sempa, a dissident master and old Budonian who went on to an active political career in the Buganda government. E. Sempebwa, who was not present, provides an alternative narrative of Herbert's absence from the concert, showing up only to shut the event down.
'drunken villagers'. Herbert’s curfew treated the concert as a school occasion and participants as ordinary students. In doing so, Budo prefects contended in a furious meeting two days later, Herbert had insulted His Highness the Kabaka.\footnote{Herbert’s intent seems to have been taste and moderation. But a royal celebration in Buganda was supposed to be excessive, a point E. Sempewa emphasized in his description of what went wrong, though Sempebwa emphasized the concert’s length rather than its exuberance. The point is more general, though; for Ganda performers, part of the point was excess, throwing themselves into the celebration of the new king, whose power was also supposed to be unlimited, loving and dangerous. See Ernesti Kalibala, ‘The social structure of the Baganda tribe of East Africa’ (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1946), 38–67, and Holly Hanson, Landed Obligation: The Practice of Power in Buganda (Portsmouth NH, 2003), 1.} Dissident staff, experienced with concerts, unruly students and late night events, stood back and watched Herbert incite the students’ wrath.\footnote{Report, PRO CO536/210/5. The report alleged that Sempa had not protested, but had gone on to be ‘the most disaffected, subtle and troublemaking member of the African staff’. Sempa’s history was complex. He was a protege of H. M. Grace, had been sent as a special student to Achimota ‘to save him’, as he was widely recognized as a bright man, and articulate spokesman, but one with no inherent loyalty to British rule. ‘Strictly Confidential’, ‘Disturbances at King’s College Budo report of the Board of Enquiry appointed by the Director of Education’, Mar. 1943 CMS G3 A7/e 1. On reflection, Herbert recognized that Sempa and E. M. K. Mulira had given up on managing or restraining the Kabaka and his friends, possibly frustrated with Herbert’s rejection of their advice. Herbert saw this as a betrayal, rather than as payback for his own insensitivity. Herbert to Hooper, 15 May 1943, CMS G3 A7/e 1.} Herbert apologized to students for truncating their performances.\footnote{Officials condemned Herbert’s apology as legitimizing students’ disorderly protest. Note, Sabben-Clare, 11 June 1943, PRO CO 536/210.} Unappeased – or seeking to escalate and publicize their anger – students boycotted a debate that was supposed to have included Muteesa (in his last appearance as a member of the school debating society) and the Resident of Buganda (the top British official in the kingdom). They enforced the boycott by stoning those who attempted to attend. About twenty boys harassed the arriving audience, throwing stones not just at ordinary students, but also at an African master and three prefects.\footnote{Only seven Baganda ended up attending.} Though Herbert called for the masters and prefects to restore order, he had lost control of both his staff and the student government. All refused to help him, leaving no one to identify or testify against any of the stone-throwers. It was dark, they later pointed out. The next day, perhaps to maintain the momentum of discontent, someone set the thatched roof of the carpentry shed on fire, destroying the building.\footnote{Students ‘worked splendidly’ to rescue tools and materials, but did not try to put out the fire. Arson was a classic Ugandan tactic for showing discontent with the powerful. A common joke in the colonial literature was that one could tell the difference between a strong, hard chief and a popular one by looking at the roof of their houses. A popular chief could have his roof thatched. A strong chief would have been burned out often enough to re-build with a metal roof. Within the Ugandan missionary context, too, metal roofs were seen as useful defenses against unhappy parishioners.} Students explained to Herbert that ‘some boys had made up their minds to destroy certain buildings and other property in a definite order, because of...
my action at the Friday concert’. Sometime that same night, the often-moved portrait of the King of England was damaged and left on a field near the big school. After breakfast, on 8 November, there were more meetings. Finally acknowledging a need for staff help, Herbert appointed a staff committee with four African and two European members to advise him. That committee met and advocated a 24 hour ultimatum – that the individuals responsible for the stonings at the debate be reported, or there would be consequences. Herbert announced this policy, which was both firm in the ultimatum and amorphous, as the consequences were left unspecified.

Herbert also met with prefects – one of whom was Edward Muteesa – to discuss students’ discipline. Prefects should have been able to restore order as the leaders of a student-run disciplinary system. But they were ‘truculent’. Instead of seeking discipline or order, prefects vied with each other to voice emotional outrage. In shutting down the concert, they argued, Herbert had insulted the Kabaka. Herbert might be concerned about school discipline, but they worried over the hierarchy of the kingdom, where the Kabaka’s dignity and prestige were paramount. For them, Herbert was the true threat to order and discipline. Edward Muteesa declined to intervene in what became a highly emotional meeting.

As he had with the staff, Herbert alleged that the prefects had plotted against him. Earlier in the year, he asserted, the head prefect, supported by a minority of prefects, had told the prefects’ meeting that the scandals in the school could not be stopped unless the prefects themselves stopped drinking, smoking and arranging for sex. The majority of the prefects, offended, had told the reformers they would get no support for anything, including basic discipline, if they made allegations of rule-breaking. Blocked, the head prefect had apologized to the intransigent, and accepted the status quo. With that history, the prefects’ tactical meeting on 8 November led the head prefect to reject Herbert and the staff’s belated attempt to instill discipline. Like dissident staff members, prefects mobilized in council against the headmaster’s leadership. Rather than reporting culprits, the meeting drew up a list of their complaints against Herbert.

All factions at Budo – the headmaster and his loyalists, dissident staff, prefects and students – had, by 9 November, stated and acted on distinctly

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38 The list included the carpentry shop, the king’s portrait (which had also been damaged), the headmaster’s car, Hamand’s quarters (she had a thatched roof), the lamps in the big school and Mr. Kisosonkole’s thatched house. Report, PRO CO536/210/5.

39 The glass was broken and the picture torn. The picture was brought in to Herbert before breakfast by the head prefect. This was the first time the head prefect acted in any way that might have been helpful to Herbert, so it is important to see that his action was ambiguous. He probably knew more than he reported, at the very least.


41 By taking the offense against him, Herbert later concluded, they sought to protect themselves from allegations of their own culpability in the school’s drunkenness and homosexuality. Herbert’s interpretation (not to mention his evidence) is suspect here. He did not speak Luganda, was at the mercy of what he was told and was trying to put together an explanation, but also a justification, of himself and his actions. He admitted earlier laxness, and effectively said the prefects’ rebellion happened when he decided to crack down, and the prefects came to fear him (as he had disposed of the Kabaka’s tutor and others). Herbert to Hooper, 15 May 1943, CMS G3 A7/e 1.
different visions of discipline, order and authority. Their disagreement led to chaotic disorder and violence. Students stoned a sub-prefect who had informed on them, attacking him as he ran between buildings. A teacher and her charges also became targets. Students and a prefect refused to help her, claiming that intervention in a ‘riot’ that was ‘tumultuous’ and approached ‘pandemonium’ would be too dangerous. Herbert – no longer able to rely on African staff or prefects – delegated a European teacher to calm the area. The European teacher decided ‘nothing could be done’ since, when he went into one dormitory for help, ‘no one there showed any wish to cooperate and seemed to believe that the situation was quite out of control’.

The disorder of 9 November was not simply symbolic violence by stone-throwing students. Instead, it swept up all in its path and headmaster, European staff, African staff and prefects all blamed each other. The headmaster delegated peacemaking to his teachers. The European teacher Herbert sent into the ‘riot’, the commission noted, was ‘depressingly ineffective’. African teachers declined to intervene, deploying what the commission labeled ‘very unconvincing reasons’, and leaving a former colleague to assert that they hid behind the students. Investigators labeled prefects ‘spineless or deliberately non-cooperative’. Unconstrained, students continued to throw stones at buildings until the evening drum.

Concerned about arson, violence and threats, and aware that his staff and student enforcers had turned against him, Herbert sent for police protection and set chosen masters, boys and porters as guards at various points around the school. The police arrived quickly, followed by Buganda’s regents, the Prime Minister and Finance Minister, both of whom were on the school’s board of governors. As the violence subsided, two students were found ‘smelling of beer’ and, near the bed of another, searchers found weapons, including ‘a wooden club bristling with nails’. The regents took four suspected ringleaders away.

The next day, Tuesday 10 November, the regents of Buganda met with Budo’s African staff. Discussion was in Luganda and Herbert, while present, depended on the Finance Minister for translation. Staff complained about him and the regents listened.

42 The report implies a critique of Herbert for not investigating the situation personally, and for not immediately interviewing malefactors. It also seems critical that he did not send any report to the education department. I have no idea why rioters would stop at the evening drum calling them to study, or why anyone would sound it in the midst of a ‘riot’. I would hypothesize boredom. As for the teachers, Sempebwa argued: ‘Now the teachers appear to have hid behind the feuds of the students. They supported them. They didn’t kick up a row, but they didn’t support the headmaster, and if the teachers don’t support the headmaster they are not only sitting on the fence, they must be taking sides with the students, which they did.’ Interview.

43 Report, PRO CO 536/210/5, p. 19. Presumably the Prime Minister and Finance Minister were called because they were members of the school’s board, guardians of the Kabaka and heads of the government of Buganda. Both also took responsibility for various students at the schools, including sons, outside sons, kin and clients. The third regent, the chief justice, was Catholic, and probably not present.

44 In listening rather than ‘making quite clear to the staff the necessity of upholding authority’ the regents explicitly undermined the headmaster’s authority in favor of the authority of the staff lukiiko and school institutions. Report, PRO CO 536/201/5, p. 19.
grievances' but after meeting with staff, they addressed the students and, as students were sent home, the prefects came by the Prime Minister's home for help with transport and food. Herbert's staff committee's ultimatum provoked neither confessions nor culprits. Protectorate officials, mindful of the need for strong authority and the proximity of the coronation, refused to extend their deadline. Under pressure from the Resident of Buganda and the protectorate's Director of Education, Herbert closed Budo on Thursday, 12 November.

DISCIPLINE: THE CONVERSATIONS

The events at Budo do not fit neatly into colonial models of school strikes or African resistance to colonialism. Each group that observers might have pointed to—ordinary students, student leaders (prefects), African teachers and staff, European teachers and administrators—was split into at least two factions. And, as the commission found when trying to sort out the mess, participants had very different visions of what had gone wrong, what it meant and what structures needed to be re-built for the school to function. Factions differed fundamentally over how authority should work in the school as students and prefects sought personal ties and alliances, African teachers pursued professional and institutional status and the headmaster and his European sponsors promoted an individualistic muscular Christianity modeled on British missionary ideals. Within these differing visions of order, authority and qualified leadership the combatants’ principal convergence was over their goal. All sought to prepare for a new Buganda. The new Buganda, though, did not fit well with the hierarchy and formal practices of Budo.

Some difficulties were rooted in conflicts over what it meant to be a Budo student. Students learned politics at Budo not simply through meritocratic achievement within school hierarchies, but by marking out sharp social distinctions. Ordinary students from commoner (bakopi) and chiefly families (whether Baganda or not) had different school experiences from the privileged balangira. And, with school recognition and encouragement, students organized themselves into clubs and associations. A 1920s headmaster had emphasized ‘hobbies’ and subsequent headmasters had only strengthened support for exclusive student groups, approving a scout troop, clubs for games, music and art, as well as the debating society, evangelization teams and any other associations students cared to build up. In terms of school politics, this proliferation of clubs paralleled the political factions and personal associations that dominated Buganda's politics of affiliation. One of the school's graduates remembered athletics, student governance and other activities as critically important, providing opportunities for all to have something at which they excelled, rather than forcing everyone into a divisive

45 I have written of the politics of student, teacher and community-based school strikes in Southern Rhodesia in Carol Summers, Colonial Lessons: Africans' Education in Southern Rhodesia (Portsmouth NH, 2002), especially 3–116. School strikes differed on details but were common enough throughout the British empire to generate an orthodoxy of strike and resolution.

46 McGregor, King's College, 86, 93–5.
competition for academic marks. But clubs were about more than hobby interests; students organized a 'Kabaka's party' and even a school-recognized 'Nazi Party' which shocked investigators into incoherence. These cliques cemented members' relationships by drinking, boxing and hospitality. Beyond club divisions, students also cultivated relationships and associations within houses, each of which was supposed to have a distinctive character and build students' understandings of multilayered loyalties and rivalries. During 1942, some houses proved highly disruptive to staff authority, unrestrained by adult guidance as housemasters lived in their own homes rather than in proximity to students. The large range in ages of Budo students also produced a very heterogeneous student body, with some pupils in their lower teens and others in their twenties.

The school's disruption was less a product of drunkenness among a fractured student community than the logical outgrowth of student activists' frustration with a perceived threat to their authority and leadership within the school, and possibly to the hierarchy of Buganda. But prefects, like non-officeholding students, were divided and played ambiguous roles in the turmoil. Edward Muteesa's status was peculiar as both a kabaka around whom students enthusiastically congregated and a quiet sub-prefect disengaged from efforts to pacify the school. The head prefect's role - sometimes inciting official reactions with slanderous allegations, and at other times accepting sub-prefects' passive resistance to reform - was confusing, and his position was weak. He was only in the fifth class, not the sixth; thus he was younger and academically junior to some of his subordinates. And he had been appointed by the staff in a split vote, winning his position by one vote.

Sarah Ntiro (a female student at Budo during the 1940s), conversation, July 2002. Her perspective was local orthodoxy in the 1940s, where planners of a new elite school emphasized: 'A very important part of education is the giving of responsible tasks to individual school children' and that subdivision into houses provided more such leadership opportunities, with jobs for almost every boy in the house, including such jobs as prefects, elected councilors, clerk, store-keeper, lamp boy and sanitary inspector. 'Suggestions concerning the development of Busoga College, Mwiri, November 1945', SOAS CBMS A/T. 3/2 Box 281, Africa Committee, Uganda. Years later, Ntiro remembered beginning her leadership career with responsibility for the lamps.

The Kabaka's party included princes, and also hangers on. It seems to have been large, incorporating anyone who wanted to come by. In retrospect, the commission thought it should have been suppressed. The Nazi party was apparently less noticeable, being a social club, whose members 'went in for boxing and guitar playing' along with 'beer-drinking, smoking, defiance of authority and bravado'. Their boxing was apparently to evoke Nazi strength, and they were rumored to have swastika badges. The Nazi leader was a Kikuyu student from Kenya, though some balangira were reportedly members. Club officers were entitled 'Hitler' 'Himmler' and 'Goerring'. PRO CO 536/210/5, pp. 25-6.

For a discussion of how the house system was intended to work, see a description of its establishment at Mwiri College, Busoga, in 1945: 'By it the whole school community is divided up into smaller groups, the members of which live a distinct corporate life within the greater whole. The advantages are many. A healthy group-rivalry is possible, teaching loyalty to the smaller group as well as to the whole school, this is a sound preparation for later life when the man must not only be a good member of various communities to which he is attached by locality or interest but also a world citizen with a genuine, objective public spirit, so often still lacking'. Suggestions concerning the development of Busoga College, Mwiri, Nov. 1945, SOAS CBMS A/T. 3/2 Box 281, Africa Committee, Uganda.
on the basis of his cleverness and skill in organizing community outreach, but opposed by those who considered him young, junior and unworthy.\textsuperscript{50}

Beyond Muteesa and the head prefect were others known as the 'Budo family', prefects who, valuing Budo's prestige and reputation above all else, were a problem for Herbert's ideas of reform that rooted discipline within individuals rather than enforcing it through school hierarchies. The men of the 'Budo family', according to critical observers, suffered from a complacent sense that the school could do no wrong.\textsuperscript{51} Instead of experiencing the school as a living institution, constantly under revision and reconstruction, they emphasized precedent and glorious tradition. Prefects from this faction did not see themselves as the head's delegates and agents, but as delegates of the students and guardians of the school. Herbert listed the Budo family as his most important opponents, noting that they believed that 'a thing only had to be traditional to be good', whether that be bullying, or prefects' no-longer-affordable gray flannel trousers.\textsuperscript{52}

Non-officeholding students were split as commoners and balangira, and divided among clubs, associations, houses and cliques in ways that echoed the court politics of precolonial Buganda, and the ambiguities of prefects' action (and inaction) may be best understood by comparing the school not to a British-style bureaucracy, but to a court where officials got power through proximity and association with important men and kept power through service in a crisis. If there were no crisis, why would anyone bother to listen to a head prefect? And why would busy superiors intervene in the social and sexual shenanigans of Budo students unless scandal tied their activities to British and official personnel? The prefects' most articulate protest as a group came after Herbert shut down the concert. This was because, whatever their attitudes toward other students, the Kabaka or the school hierarchy, their success rested on their ability to be seen performing, by powerful people. Blocked from singing and skits, they performed through ceremonial loyalty to the king and through scandal and violence at the school.

In Herbert's discussion of the upheaval, he hinted at an intense politics at Budo, shaped around the Kabaka and the maintenance of the school's reputation, marginalizing nearly everything the head and official leaders of the school could do. Students were not against the headmaster. They were for the Kabaka, and for their ideal of Budo, sometimes to the point of irrationality, hysteria or silence, as they defended their school against outside interlopers. Ironically, the very things Budo had cultivated in students - organizations, active participation in governance and politics, intense loyalties and consciousness of status, prestige and fair play - were turned against the headmaster and staff. Budo's training in leadership allowed students to block Herbert's effort to use student leaders against other students to regain control. Students were loyal. They sought to maintain prestige and dignity for themselves, their colleagues, their offices and their organizations. And they rejected dictation, orders or even guidance from paternal authority.

\textsuperscript{50} Herbert to Hooper, 15 May 1943, CMS G3 A7/e 1.

\textsuperscript{51} PRO CO536/210/5, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{52} Herbert to Hooper, 15 May 1943, CMS G3 A7/e 1.
Staff members, including signatories of the first memo and a second ultimatum that ended the crisis, were also both divided among themselves and loyal to Budo. Not all Budo staff members signed the memos that protested the school’s direction. But both staff loyal to the headmaster and dissident staff loyal to Budo as their institution emphasized a need for order. Staff dissidents were unimpressed by rowdy students organized around the Kabaka. Some staff had previously served as Budo student leaders. They understood the system. But the African staff of 1942 was notably less enchanted with the Kabaka or the prefects than were activist students. Several went on to political careers where they actively sought to chide and restrain a kabaka they considered a problem for their ideas of democracy and progress. Their central concern was neither personalities nor royal prestige, but professionalism, ownership and democracy, which were fought over throughout Buganda in the 1940s. These teachers advocated majority rule by the staff lukiiko, and rejected the idea that race, rank or royalty should put anyone beyond the rules. They had called for the suppression of the balangira. They called for the headmaster to consult his staff rather than his prefects. And they sought to demand respect for their professional status from their students.

For these men, the conflict at Budo was a lesson, imperfectly learned, on the difficulties of combining paternalistic patronage from missionaries with newer ideas of participatory democracy and educated professionalism. It was a first, faltering step toward a new Ugandan politics for tentative activists beset by protectorate authorities, kingdom loyalties, status consciousness and nervousness about changing sources of prestige. A reflective Bishop Stuart summed up some of the tensions by noting that early church institutions in Uganda had been superficially highly democratic in that Africans and Europeans had voted as equals at synods, and Africans had funded and managed their own churches and schools. Those African Christians were guided by the paternalistic authority of the missionaries. By 1942, however, ‘The Baganda are now growing up’, seeking real power and reacting nervously when they got it. This led to tension as missionaries reacted to defend their diminishing influence.

**DISCIPLINE: RESULTS**

The events at Budo did not end with the riot and school closure of 12 November. Budo was an institution basic to Buganda, and nearly everyone

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53 E. M. K. Mulira, for example. Mulira’s career was highly convoluted. He criticized the Kabaka in the 1940s, and his brother (Enoch Mulira) sued the Kabaka as his (Enoch’s) wife’s lover. But Mulira objected vociferously to the Kabaka’s removal during the crisis in the early 1950s, and was later involved in Kabaka Yekka, a Buganda royalist political party. Mulira was practical.

54 Kanyike and several others were among the detainees deported to remote areas by the protectorate of Uganda after the general strike of 1945. They were considered organizers, and dangerous. Some were at least obliquely implicated in the subsequent assassination of Katikkiro M. L. Nsibirwa. Grace to Hooper, 4 Oct. 1945, copy of letter from A. M. Williams to Rev. Hooper, 20 Jan. 1945; Wamala, Musoke, Kanyike et al. to His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury, 29 June 1946, and HMG to Bishop, 1 Aug. 1946, SOAS, CBMS A/T. 3/2 Box 281, Africa Committee, Uganda.

responded to the turmoil by seeking creatively to re-make order. On Friday, 13 November, eighteen dissident staff members sent a second memo to the bishop complaining of Herbert's ineffectuality and stating that unless the bishop appointed a new headmaster, they would resign from the school. These teachers emphasized the importance of consultation between school head and staff, and voiced a collective right to overrule administrative acts they disapproved of in order to defend their school. Echoing the rebellion of the Nnamasole conflict, teachers argued that if Herbert, the school's katikkiro (prime minister), failed in his job of defending tradition, then they, as a lukiiko of responsible professionals doing their own work, had the right to ask for him to be replaced.

The protectorate's governor appointed a commission, with representatives from the protectorate, kingdom and mission, to investigate. The commission's report was highly critical of Herbert. One assessor described him as 'ludicrously out of place as Headmaster in a school of unruly over-sexed adolescents with a love for beer-swilling and stone throwing' and labeled him 'spineless and incompetent'. But he did not resign of his own accord, instead proffering, somewhat later, his own version of events. The Church Missionary Society (CMS) did not demand his resignation, and indeed seemed unaware of the scope of the problems. Despite clear government scorn, Herbert survived, and headed Budo until 1946.

With the school closed, the coronation proceeded and the commission came up with a set of recommendations for reform. The school opened again in February, after the 18 Budo masters had resigned, 23 students had been sent away, prefects had been stripped of their ranks, new staff had been hired and negotiations began with the government over the nature of Budo's status as a 'self-governing' school supported by government funds.

All in all, the actual events of the Budo upheaval were minimal—protest letters and meetings, stones thrown, minor arson and the symbolic displacement and destruction of the King of England's portrait. The Budo conflict, though, was significant not for casualties or destruction, but for the way it forced a range of actors in Buganda's increasingly complex political environment to state publicly what they wanted and thought about a central theme of colonialism: authority and discipline. Even as the Budo report was finished, and government and missionary officials began to contemplate its implications, Baganda, missionaries and protectorate officials recognized that the events of 1942 marked a new sort of uncertain politics that would not immediately settle down into social peace. Baganda protestors, even those unaffiliated with the school, connected Budo's troubles to their sense of grievance against mission and protectorate policies and their belief that British paternalism was unreliable. A missionary observed, 'I can say there

56 Here I draw on the commission's conclusion regarding the African teachers. I lack a copy of either of their letters to Herbert and the Board. PRO CO 536/210/5, p. 21.
57 Note, Sabben-Clare, 11 June 1943, PRO CO536/210.
58 For example, see Semakula Mulumba's diatribe to Bishop Stuart, 'you had the honour and privilege of bringing up our young Kabaka ... in your Church; were you at all particular about the character of the tutor of our King? Was not that tutor kicked out of Budo College for homosexuality? Can you feel proud of your sense of responsibility to our nation the character of whose King was being ruined without your concern? Were not other Europeans suspected of such filth? Can you then blame the Africans for distaining
are many and unhappy signs of discontent from a growing number of Baganda with Europeans in every shape and form. How far this attitude is shared by the masses it is difficult to say, but I would say that agitators could influence the masses against Europeans, should they set out to do so’.59 And Uganda’s governor, reading the report, noted ‘The lesson to be learnt from all this is that such a school may become a public danger and therefore cannot be regarded as the sole concern of those who conduct it. A full measure of control by public authority is demanded’.60

Ultimately, from Herbert’s perspective and that of mission and government officials, the staff was split between those who stayed loyal to Herbert, and those who signed the November letter asking for his resignation, or (as some of his white missionary colleagues did) sent doubtful letters to investigators and colonial authorities, casting aspersions on his competence. Herbert, though apparently unconscious of exactly how furious some of his critics were, eventually formally proffered his resignation; but, reconfirmed, he continued as Budo’s headmaster despite new unrest in 1943. When the school re-opened in that year, he informed all students that their application to Budo implied an ‘unconditional obedience to the Headmaster and his representatives, an assurance of unswerving loyalty to the King [of England], and an acknowledgement of the Headmaster’s right to refuse admission without necessarily supplying a reason for his decision’.61 And this emphasis on loyalty and unconditional acceptance of headmasters’ orders went beyond the students to the staff and the often-reluctant parents.62

The Budo crisis therefore ended with the expulsion of dissidents, including 18 bright, highly trained teachers, and the reassertion of mission and government control. The school’s new rhetoric emphasized loyalty, obedience and acceptance, rather than initiative and leadership. It blocked the input of a mass meeting of parents and supporters, and once again reduced Africans on the governing board to tokens. Officials aggressively interpreted problems at Budo in September and October of 1943 as apolitical despite a renewed mutilation of the King of England’s portrait, since this time the staff and prefects supported the headmaster’s authority.63 An investigative committee even speculated that disruptions might have been planned by enemies from outside Budo to discredit the resurgent school.64


59 A. Williams to Hooper, 10 Sept. 1943, CMS G3 A7 d1.

60 Governor to Colonial Office, 16 May 1943, PRO CO536/210.

61 Report, PRO CO536/210/5 p. 31.

62 They were particularly nervous lest students be required to take oaths of allegiance to the King of England.

63 Other events included a loiterer with a panga (machete) who unnerved some observers but was adjudged a deranged ex-cook; a man’s invasion of a girl’s dorm, possibly an attempted rape; and damage to a thatched shelter and to a school drum. Report on Incidents at King’s College Budo Sept.–Oct. 1943, PRO CO 536/210.

64 ‘Knowing that the College has many enemies, in consequence of the events of 1942, we think it possible that these incidents have been instigated, or perpetrated, by people outside the College’. Ibid.
The most significant political result of the Budo upheaval was a legacy of exclusion of dissidents. New loyalty tests and a re-structured staff and prefect system excluded dissident teachers, organizing students, embarrassing government officials and activist parents. Some prominent missionaries and officials tried, using the tactics of patronage and quiet reconciliation that had worked in the past, to mend the divisions the crisis forced open. Under pressure from both Bishop Stuart and CMS officials back in England, Dennis Herbert attended E. M. K. Mulira’s wedding. Bishop Stuart pointedly contacted dissidents and employed some dissident teachers in other church schools. Former headmaster H. M. Grace went even further, consulting from London with his Baganda contacts both by mail and in person, and emphasizing to the conservative the need for flexibility and communication rather than any rigid insistence on loyalty. The ineffectuality of Grace’s benign efforts to pull everyone back together, however, like Bishop Stuart’s increasingly frantic attempts to cultivate popular approval, demonstrated that after Budo, politics in Buganda had changed.

New political clashes over schools, kingdom offices and cotton markets were public. Instead of private conflict among the people of the Ganda court, schooled at Budo, Uganda’s subsequent history was punctuated by unions, general strikes and mass insurrection. Legitimacy in protest no longer arose through membership in a patronage network. Instead, the new activists organized and reached out to constituencies ranging from motor drivers to immigrant unskilled workers, frustrated clerks and ambitious but unsuccessful businessmen. Innovation, and even alienation from the structures of the powerful, increasingly became a source of pride.

The 18 dissident Budo masters, many of whom went on to teach at Aggrey School and remain politically active, were exemplars of a profound political shift. The masters at Aggrey taught at a poor, underfunded private school that emphasized manual work as a path to individual betterment. Anything further from Budo’s elite philosophy would be hard to imagine. Ernesiti Kalibala, an American-educated Muganda inspired by Booker T. Washington, founded Aggrey School as a private enterprise, and named it for the most visible African advocate of Phelps-Stokes Commissions’

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65 Dennis Herbert to Hooper, 30 May 1944, CMS G3 A7/e 1.
66 Mulira, for example, was hired to teach at the Bishop’s school, Mukono. E. Mulira, ‘My life since 1930’ (undated) Richards Papers, 6/24.
67 Grace’s most pointed correspondence on these themes emerged in 1945-6, after a number of Budo activists were implicated in the general strike (and subsequent assassination of the Prime Minister) and detained. Grace wrote supportively to the radical A. K. Sempa, chidingly to the conservative Kawalya Kagga na provocatively to ‘Simon’, noting, ‘This unrest is that which emerges from teaching protestant Christianity and the principles of democracy in the schools’. See the varied correspondence SOAS CBMS A/T 3/2 Box 281, Africa Committee, Uganda.
68 Court scandals, such as the fight over the Kabaka’s marriage to a woman of the Nkima (monkey) clan, continued. But even the sensationally dramatic Mulira divorce case lacked the political significance of the Nnamasole controversy and other, earlier, infighting.
69 Here I point specifically to groups that became prominent in the 1945 general strike, many (apart from Banyarwanda workers) remaining notable in the unrest of 1949.
educational philosophy, which emphasized curricula adapted to African communities rather than Budo's effort to cultivate gentlemen. Radical and seriously frustrated by lack of funds, Aggrey exemplified the new awkward politics of cross-class alliance, alienation from the powers of the old kingdom and interest in leadership by the alienated; the school became a stronghold of radical politics in the late 1940s.

Older styles, including the petition, slanderous assault and appeals to the pride of Baganda, continued to recur in the new politics of the 1940s. But increasingly they were public relations, not private maneuvers. And the agitation at Budo, inconclusive and censored as it was, launched Baganda into political dramas where assumptions about the authority of headmasters, officials and senior men died, processes of negotiation and reconciliation faltered and stones, public insults, boycotts and contested visions of democracy and popular leadership re-made public debates.

70 See J. C. Ssekamwa, History and Development of Education in Uganda (Kampala, 1997), 60, 94–6, 98, 111, and J. G. Zake (Aggrey's headmaster), memo submitted to the Committee on African Education (De Bunsen Committee), 1952, in Makerere University Library AR 35/8.