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Richard Edes Harrison and the Cartographic Perspective of Modern Internationalism

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Air-age globalism was a discursive phenomenon throughout the development of World War II that accounted for the rapid “shrinking” of the world through air technologies and the internationalization of American interests. Cartography became air-age globalism’s primary popular expression, and journalistic cartographers such as Richard Edes Harrison at Fortune magazine introduced new mapping projections and perspectives in response to these global changes. This essay argues that Harrison’s mapping innovations mediated a geopolitical shift in America toward a modern, image-based internationalism. Through recastings of “vision” and “strategy,” Harrison’s work offers an opportunity to assess the rhetorical tensions between idealism and realism in midcentury cartographic forms and the larger spatial and perceptual challenges facing U.S. foreign policy during its rise to superpower status.

Throughout the course of the 1930s and into the global and catastrophic conflict of the Second World War, cartography, like the business of war itself, took to the air. As fighter planes traversed the earth and spread their wingspans and weaponry, mapmakers were devising...
a bird’s-eye view of the world, actively changing the ways we viewed the globe and our placement in it. Americans became enamored with a new air-age global perspective. And from this vantage point, the world was now closer—an exciting and frightening prospect. In his fireside chat on February 23, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt spoke of the momentous political implications of a bold new perspective in geopolitics:

Those Americans who believed that we could live under the illusion of isolationism wanted the American eagle to imitate the tactics of the ostrich. Now, many of those same people, afraid that we may be sticking our necks out, want our national bird to be turned into a turtle. But we prefer to retain the eagle as it is–flying high and striking hard.¹

Underscoring this rhetorical move, FDR’s press secretary Stephen T. Early sent statements to national newspapers a week before the chat, requesting that Americans bring their maps and globes with them as they sat and listened to their president’s next war update, “so that they might clearly and, in that way, much better understand him as he talks with them.”² Directly appealing to armchair cartographers, FDR instructed, “This war is a new kind of war. It is different from all other wars of the past, not only in its methods and weapons, but also in its geography. . . . Look at your map.”³ The new geopolitics dictated that the oceans no longer protected us from our moral duty; the new cartographic measurement would become minutes, not miles. As Walter Ristow wrote in 1944, “All geography becomes home geography when the most distant point on earth is less than sixty hours from your local airport.”⁴ This discourse of the air was reflected in the move toward popular, journalistic cartography during WWII—maps and globes came off the walls and desks of academics and defense bureaucrats and into American homes in unprecedented ways.

Popular cartographer Richard Edes Harrison played a central role in challenging cartographic perspectives and attempting to change spatial thinking on the everyday level during America’s rise to superpower status.⁵ As house cartographer for Fortune and consultant for Life magazine, among other publications, for almost two decades, Harrison inhabited the “geographic imagination” of FDR’s fireside culture.⁶ Cartographic perspective and projection became his two innovative modes of communication; his most famous maps revived long-forgotten modes of projection that, instead
of establishing Europe as the center of the world, anchored maps around the Arctic, changing our entire spatial perception of proximity. Other maps dispensed with the “North on top, South on bottom” viewpoint, placing his readers instead at “a vantage point high above the earth so that the distances draw together in perspective, as they might to an incredibly farsighted man poised at an altitude of many thousand miles.”

Susan Schulten’s work positions Harrison as a key figure in the debates of the second half of the twentieth century that discuss geography and cartography as a discursive phenomenon. Over the last two decades in particular, a critical geography has emerged, wherein maps become implicated as iconic renderings of ideology and political power, as rhetorical constructions with their own kind of visual grammar. Well before this movement, Harrison seemed acutely aware of the discursive function of his trade, chiding his field for being rigid and precise to a fault, and calling for an acceptance of “art as a full partner of technology in the design and drafting of maps.” Harrison’s dogged amateurism evidenced his realization that maps were part of a cultural dialogue, rather than simply a top-down presentation of elite, scientific objectives. In defining cartography as “the difficult art of trying to represent the impossible,” Harrison accentuated the role of rhetoric in advancing political agendas in maps.

This essay seeks to examine this crossroads between the Harrisonian frame of “maps as discourse” and the immense spatial changes that faced American rhetoric in the mid-twentieth century air-age. I argue that Harrison’s maps mediate a historical shift in American foreign policy and spatial worldview from classic principles of political realism (with its emphasis on geopolitically defined states and concrete balances of power) toward a more fluid, abstract, and image-based internationalism. As Frank Ninkovich writes, “Interests, formerly ‘hard,’ material, and national, became by this new standard soft, symbolic, and international.” Thus, in Ninkovich’s estimation, “interpretation” became the center of focus, with strategists coming to “‘read’ the international environment as if it was a text,” and global order needing to be imagined and argued into being, not simply achieved through a “mastery of objective details.”

Harrison’s air-age aesthetic is an important part of this new interpretative paradigm, eschewing the “truths” of classical power politics and balance of interests, and positing new relationships and proximities. Particularly in their transformation of perspective and projection, Harrison’s maps project
to a flat page the anxieties and opportunities that are part of a global liberal modernism. Understanding these new high vantage viewpoints can be aided by a critical reading of Harrison’s actual maps. Although his contributions to air-age globalism and the popular “geographic imagination” have been excellently documented elsewhere, Harrison’s work as a system of visual rhetoric deserves further examination. It is not simply that his maps reflect global changes in this period, but also that the very act of mapping new perspectives and experimenting with cartographic perception helps create the interpretative ground by which the globe can be read and written by strategists. Harrison remains a vital case, in particular, to rhetorical scholars not simply because he helped broaden the geographic imagination and allowed America to “look at the world” in a new way, but because he called attention to the discursive nature of space itself, in a historical moment of a global war when the world’s very textuality was foregrounded. Harrison’s arguments for flexibility in perspective and projection accentuated cartography’s malleability and contributed to the powerful ideology that the world can be molded through the symbolic image. In the process, Harrison’s rhetoric buttressed the liberal narrative of international space and encouraged the type of visual abstraction necessary for American national interests to be cast as universal.

This essay, then, makes the rhetorical dimensions of form and content central to the analysis. On one hand, the content of Harrison’s WWII maps presents particular spatial problems that can be used to frame solutions, with the map itself becoming a strategic resource—war can be waged successfully if one “sees” correctly. Yet, at the same time, the form of the map is dramatically emphasized, with the novelty of perspective and projection itself a main feature of the map. Thus, the map’s status as strategic means is brought to the forefront. Every new perceptual angle and strange projection could spatially reveal a new strategic relationship, and thus, notions of constantly shifting visual perception, adaptation, and vigilance are implied as intrinsic to strategy. This development would have obvious repercussions on the character of America’s new internationalism during WWII and into the Cold War. John Lewis Gaddis notes that the tension between means and ends required constant negotiation for post-war strategists, and it was often the perception of power and strength that determined strategy, rather than what could actually be measured. In
Harrison’s case, we see the form of perception as a central part of the rhetorical display.

I begin with a brief discussion of this interpretative internationalism through the lens of air-age globalism, both in terms of key contextual changes in the discipline of geography and international relations, and its visual manifestation in maps. Next, I analyze a series of representative Harrisonian maps, particularly those seen in his “Atlas for U.S. Citizen” supplement in the September 1940 issue of *Fortune* and those published in his best-selling *Look at the World: The Fortune Atlas for World Strategy* (1944), among others found in his archive. The critique of these maps focuses on Harrison’s approach to perspective and projection and its bearing on two major themes: (1) the interplay of seeing and vision on the cartographic page, with a focus on how the maps simultaneously conceal and reveal the alternative possibilities inherent in a rhetoric of display; and (2) how the maps both uphold and challenge notions of what “strategy” means in a new air-age context, re-envisioning borders and proximities, and reflecting an uneasy globalism where goods, information, and peoples are continually in flux. Throughout, the rhetorical tensions of form and content illuminate Harrison’s emphasis on the rhetorical flexibility of cartography itself and its connection to America’s developing global strategy.

**The Tenets and Tensions of the Air-Age Shift to Global Internationalism**

In 1944, Ristow conceived of eight principles for the new air-age geography. Most important is the first tenet that “Air Age geography is global geography.” 16 With long-range aircraft and the multitude of state interests involved in the ongoing war, the traditional focus on regional geography had to be supplemented with world-minded surveys of the globe. 17 The second tenet is that “Geography is not a static science,” 18 which reflects Harrison’s view that perspectives and worldviews need to be changed and continually questioned. Thirdly, “Air Age distance is measured by time rather than space,” 19 where “there are no longer any far corners of the earth” and space is measured in minutes and hours rather than miles. 20 A fourth tenet is that “Transport by air discounts geographical barriers” as borders become more irrelevant in terms of movement and occupation of space. 21 Many air-age maps, for example,
eschew borders, sticking to the topography of rolling mountains and basins, leaving out political boundaries and highlighting the fluidity of continental land. The fifth tenet is the idea that “The world is not divided into hemispheres.” Air-age geography makes hemispheres obsolete—America is now seen as closer in proximity to the “Eastern hemisphere” of Eurasia than to Latin America, thus, questioning conceptions central to U.S. foreign policy since the Monroe Doctrine. Relatedly, the sixth tenet is that “World transportation routes are no longer restricted to east–west lines”—the seafaring mind of the Mercator projection accentuated geographical imaginaries of east and west, but in the air, travel from a given place was possible in all directions on a spherical earth. Finally, Ristow’s seventh and eighth tenets are also interrelated, positing that “Ocean basin geography is out of date” and that there is a “New significance of weather and climate in the Air Age.” The centrality of ocean basins like the Mediterranean or the Caribbean are thus challenged, while the barriers of desert and ice no longer seal off access to important parts of the world.

Texts such as Ristow’s hint at a kind of idealism in the new air-age geography, as if one could somehow fly away from borders, nationalism, and war machines; yet, the shift to globalism in practice was less about transcending such concerns and more about re-envisioning them. Geographer Neil Smith reminds us that these twentieth century shifts are not a triumph over geography, despite some of the air-age rhetoric, but are, in fact, intensely geographical. Smith points to a crucial reconception of space, concurrent with the new perspectives from the air, where absolute geography (seeing spaces as having a pre-existing identity with the common sense notion that space “is”) shifts to a relational geography where distance is relative, and space is constituted socially. In discussing the elevation of aviation-aided science in this era, Stephen Bocking has noted the power of “synoptic vision” in aiding the state’s interpretation of these new relationships, a vision “rendering territory legible and thus amenable to order.” The act of seeing global space is key here, opening up the world to interdependences that require constant, vigilant management.

In this new relational framework, transportation fluidly connects capital and communication networks and challenges the realist power politics that had established the nation-state as the key political unit. In geopolitical terms, realism posits that, rather than human agency and will, “it was the
natural environment and the geographical setting of a state which exercised the greatest influence on its destiny.” In the kind of classic realist geopolitics of Halford Mackinder, for example, maps rigidly contain the balance of power within their borders and help to codify the power of nation-states, but are often seen as natural evidence of power, rather than shapers of that power. Air-age perspectives, thus, signal a key change: geographers no longer have to travel the land and describe its contours; the power of the airplane challenges such expertise, privileging the technological means by which the perspective is obtained. Thus, the perspective of those with access to such technologies is also privileged, giving a new power to liberal government strategists’ reading of the world. Geography is advancing beyond the thorough regional description prized by titans of the field, such as Richard Hartshorne, and becomes much more politicized in the process. The sense of travel and movement through technological mastery of the air comes to serve in this era as a synecdoche for the kind of movement of ideas and capital that could be seemingly limitless in the unprecedented fusion of state and science.

As Ninkovich has noted, American statesmen, during this shift to an interpretative kind of internationalism, suffered a condition “which was the opposite of dyslexia: incoherence inhered in the text rather than in the minds of the readers.” The rhetorical world of air-age globalism fit this condition: it did not mean changing the liberal modernist approach to progress, it meant finding new ways to perceive where that incoherence was, in this case from a vantage point high above the earth. If the globe was seen textually rather than as some fixed entity, it could be molded and approached in different ways. Neglecting the balance of ends and means in the old geopolitical realism for a sharper focus on “credibility” meant that there would be constant attempts to get a more credible perception of world events. Realism was not abandoned by any means, but it was transformed and made much more nuanced. In Gaddis’s terms, a new universalism of American interests vied against the particularism of past foreign policy, forming an essential tension of post-WWII strategy.

In addition, the traditional realist dichotomy between domestic life and international relations was breaking down; the values of everyday life at home were becoming more synonymous with notions of international community. Harrison’s boss at Fortune, Henry Luce, is an integral exemplar of this complex movement to liberal internationalism. In his famous
articulation of the American Century in 1941, for example, Luce articulated
globalism as a pursuit both of economic interests and “world opinion,” both of which publications like Time and Fortune would attempt to cultivate. Pronouncing that “our world...is one world, fundamentally indivisible,” Luce saw America as the responsible steward for maintaining such a rolling, unified space. The realist isolationism of American cant was still seen as having a hold on the culture, even if it had been eroding since at least the turn of the century, and Luce and his cartographers-for-hire, such as Harrison, were making conscious attempts to break through such seeming nearsightedness.

Air transportation itself became the new dividing border, then, pitting those who would use the new power for its supposed beneficial potential—free trade, free movement, free government—against those who would use it for “evil,” including the empire-mad armies of Germany and other Axis powers. Thus, the unfolding international space of the air-age was both a site of liberal hopes for modern progress and immense anxiety at the new proximities suggested by the power of mediated images from a plane. In the introduction to the classic 1943 geopolitics text The Compass of the World (featuring maps by Harrison), Archibald MacLeish, the poet and former Fortune editor, wrote of both the awe and responsibility of the new air-age globalism:

Neither mastery of the air nor power in the air nor the airmen’s global image of the earth can make, alone, the world we hope to live in. . . . Nevertheless we know, all of us, the power of images in our lives and in the lives of nations. We know that those who think their world a free place of free movement, of free commerce both in men and words, are already free men, whatever limitations are put upon their freedom by brutality or force. . . . Men have mastered the air. And the question now...on which this terrible war is fought—is...whether the air will be an instrument of freedom such as men have never dared to dream of or...an instrument of slavery by which a single nation can enslave the earth...without the hope or possibility of rebellion and revolt.

The air-age’s image-based values became, then, a rhetorical crossroads of national destiny—a moral choice between a path of good and a path of evil,
with air power now “considered essential not only to the security of the United States but to world peace.”

**Analyzing the Perspective and Projection of Harrisonian Maps**

Richard Edes Harrison’s cartography represents an explosive example of how form and content in maps fuse together, complicating that sense of detachment above the earth, and evidencing how air-age perspectives can house the kind of new abstractions that supported emerging, midcentury liberal internationalist values. This section critically examines a series of popular, journalistic Harrison maps from the WWII era, specifically in terms of how their uses of perspective and projection negotiate the dynamics of vision and seeing during the shift to internationalism, and represent tensions around changing values of American global strategy.

The ubiquity of news maps today is taken largely for granted; Monmonier points out that newspapers and news magazines “are the prime gatekeepers in communicating facts of location and place . . . potentially able to deliver when appropriate the maps needed to understand or interpret important world, national, and local events.” Yet, during Harrison’s ascent to popular prominence, these gates were just being constructed, and without a significant history of news cartography in American culture, cartographers like Harrison had a wide range of freedom in their design and iconography. More important than complete scientific accuracy was the map’s ability to support and complement the story it accompanied. To reach a mass audience, Harrison and other up-and-coming news cartographers sought to simplify spatial information and unburden it from the yoke of academic and elite control. Such work brought a sense of the globe into the home so that “Americans imagine and comprehend a world that most [do] not experience firsthand.” Harrison himself reflected, “It is among the weekly and monthly magazines . . . that the greatest assault on tradition has been made. . . . they have borne the burden of making the public conscious of global geography.”

These assaults on tradition in Harrison’s meticulous production techniques can be found in two notable contributions to the air-age cartographic lexicon: new perspectives that place the map user in the role of pilot, and a deliberate crusade to supplant the unstoppable Mercator projection
with a host of other, more novel projections. Life’s profile of the Fortune atlas provides a fascinating account of Harrison’s process behind the “perspective map,” which plays with dimension to make the globe appear as if it is coming off the page. He begins with a small freehand sketch of the portion of the globe to be included, and then photographs the globe from a distance of six feet (placing the mapmaker at a theoretical altitude of almost 40,000 miles over the Atlantic Ocean). Harrison then chooses a greatly enlarged, close-up of the area produced from the photograph, which provides the basis of his vividly detailed sketches, out of which he produces his trademark three-dimensional sense of the reader flying over mountainous terrain. These techniques in and of themselves were not innovative—yet, it was the sense of movement and extreme angles that evidenced Harrison’s particular ability to help “redevelop a native freshness of perception.”

“Projection” refers to the choice of focus or center of the map. In more technical terms, according to Monmonier, projections “transform the curved, three-dimensional surface of the planet into a flat, two-dimensional plane” and anchor the focus of the reader’s eye. In choosing polar centers, for example, or by showing a round globe on the flat page, these projections become a salient rhetorical choice—the selection of a particular center on a map has political ramifications with regard to the message disseminated to readers and users of the atlas; all other points and lines on the map flow from that origin point.

A representative map by Harrison from his Look at the World atlas is worth extended description. “Europe from the East” (fig. 1) is perhaps one of Harrison’s most striking and simple maps in the atlas. The map covers a full two-page spread and is unadorned by any legends or captions, save its title. The image is typical of Harrison’s “perspective maps,” thus showing the reader a rolling, rounded sliver of the globe, with three-dimensional accents to connote flying over the topography of Europe. What is remarkable about this perspective, though, is that it centers on Eastern Europe from the viewpoint of an imposing Soviet Union. The very center of the map rests in Poland. Moscow is dotted at the bottom center of the map, and the entire European continent appears to flow out of it. At the top of the map is Spain, with the Atlantic Ocean on the horizon, and in the northeast the start of North Africa through Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria is spotted at the edges. One’s first reaction, perhaps, is to see the Cold War ramifications of Harrison’s framing: it is easy to take on a Soviet-eye view of an Eastern Europe for
the taking, unfolding almost naturally before a great expanding power all the way to the Atlantic. In the corner above the perspective map, in the margins of the white space, is an inset of an orthographic projection depicting the whole globe, highlighting in red the slice of Europe and North Africa that is the subject of the larger map.\textsuperscript{55}

Yet, perhaps more important to the central argument of this essay is the very subversion of rhetorical form in the map as part of the WWII context; a simple cartographic reorientation such as this one suggests how brittle the perception of WWII alliances with the Soviet Union were, and how a simple change in spatial perspective could reveal new relationships.\textsuperscript{56} Harrison’s map resonates with these conceptions of an uneasy partnership between the two emerging superpowers. During the early days of America’s involvement in World War II, for example, Sir Halford Mackinder’s theories that the Soviet control of the “Heartland” (namely, Eastern Europe) was a potentially explosive strategic problem reached notoriety in academic, popular, and foreign policy circles. In a piece for \textit{Foreign Affairs} in 1943, he concluded that “if the Soviet Union emerges from this war as conqueror of Germany, she must rank as the greatest land Power on the globe. . . . The Heartland is the greatest natural fortress on earth. For the first time in

Fig. 1. Richard Edes Harrison, “Europe From the East,” \textit{Look at the World: The Fortune Atlas for World Strategy}, 1944 (Reprinted with permission from the Estate of Richard Edes Harrison)
history it is manned by a garrison sufficient both in number and quality.”

In addition, Walter Lippmann’s influential bestseller *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* from 1943 was passed around and praised by key members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as important reading for both wartime foreign policy and post-war planning, with Lippmann warning that once America and the Soviet Union lose their common enemies in Germany and Japan, “Russian-American relations will no longer be controlled by the historic fact that each is for the other a potential friend in the rear of its enemies. Russia will, on the contrary, be the greatest power in the rear of our indispensable friends.”

Harrison’s rendering of “Europe From the East,” then, entered a discursive air-age culture in America that was sensitive to the relationship between nation-space and perception. Typically, maps of the Heartland, including Mackinder’s own famous maps, would be indicated on conventional projections and with a standard, almost omniscient perspective. Harrison’s map, however, is rhetorically selective in offering the Soviet vantage point, thus leaving American viewers potentially vulnerable. That elimination of a so-called objective and detached view of the world suggests a potential anxiety for U.S. foreign policy; with perspectives like these, a Soviet stronghold in Eastern Europe is made to look easy.

In the process, the very power of maps as strategic tools becomes part of the subject of the map itself. The strategy of the air-age necessitates the flexibility of vision, and Harrison’s map promotes the value of perceptual adaptation, with the discursive nature of world space brought to the forefront. The lack of captions or any linguistic description (aside from place names) challenges the viewer to see this novel perspective as inevitable and self-evident, a kind of common sense geographical depiction that requires no explanation for the discerning viewer. In addition, having the global inset in the corner reminds the viewer of the connection of the region to the globe itself—that what takes place in one sliver of the world is just one piece of myriad strategic spatial relationships and proximities that Americans are faced with in the new era of air transportation. Such a map, then, represents the contours of the air-age’s material contributions to the evolving liberal-modern internationalism—the turn to the symbolic and interpretative in world affairs that globalized security and charted national interests on an international scale. “Europe from the East” is but one striking example of this, and thus, we now turn to a deeper engagement with Harrison’s maps to
characterize the key visual-rhetorical dimensions of cartography in this tumultuous shift.

**SITUATING “VISION” IN HARRISONIAN MAPS**

The very title of Harrison’s most famous and bestselling collection indicates the new premium during the air-age era on the value of vision and visibility itself: “Look at the World” is an imperative for clearheaded perception of new supposed realities. This plea to readers is not insignificant to a rhetorical reading of the maps contained inside: maps are bound up in complex rhetorics of truth and transparency, as vehicles of both art and science, fact and value. Lawrence Prelli notes that “displays manifest through . . . specific, situated, rhetorical resolutions of the dynamic between concealing and revealing. And such rhetorical resolutions exhibit partial perspectives—an orientation, a point of view, a way of seeing—that both open and restrict possibilities for meaning for those who become audience to them.” Thus, the act of spectatorship itself can be problematized; the method of seeing transfers a set of values, with images “always situated in complex circumstances of viewing, interpreting, and consuming.”

Harrison’s conscious subversion of cartographic form shows an implicit engagement with these rhetorical dimensions of visual mediation, but also contends with the historic role of maps as unmediated frames for reality. The map “Eight Views of the World” (fig. 2) puts these conundrums on visual display. Harrison often uses the orthographic projection throughout *Look at the World*. Air-age globalism appeared truly “global” on the orthographic maps, as this type of map attempted to represent in two dimensions the benefits of the average desk globe. Unlike perspective maps, which tried to represent the sphericity of the earth in regional fragments, orthographic views portrayed the totality of a freely rotating globe. Yet, the novelty of “Eight Views” is that there are indeed eight different projections over the two-page spread; the reader contends with eight globes, all centering and highlighting different areas of the world. In the first globe, we see a centered United States, with the tag line “The U.S.: its geographical isolation is more seeming than real,” as Harrison’s view is situated so that all continents can be seen in relation to America. The United States is highlighted in bright red on each of the eight maps, to amplify its connection to the other continents of the world. Another of the
eight maps shows Antarctica at the north of the globe, with a sharp, orange Argentina protruding toward it, complete with a caption reading, “Argentina: a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica.” Europe’s orthographic projection shows the tiny peninsula dwarfed and sandwiched by Asia to its left and Africa to its right, with a caption stating the visually obvious, “Europe: more close neighbors than any other continent.”

Prelli’s work on maps has emphasized the immediacy of a map’s rhetorical *taxis*, in that it provides a particular arrangement of space that constrains the viewer. In “Eight Views,” the total arrangement of these eight maps connotes an active, rotating, and often vulnerable earth, as if the worth of all parts of the world simply depends on the perspective (and interests) of the map user. Harrison could have perhaps provided the reader with one world map highlighting all of these relationships, but by choosing to place eight different views in succession, the rhetorical nature of space becomes integral to the form of presentation. Like the desk globe at home, Harrison allows users to flip around and choose their focus, and implicitly argues that no matter which way one looks at it, the “one world” is entangled with relationships in all directions, with isolationism easily disputed by the “spin” of the globe. Harrison’s choice to use the globe itself inside the
conventions of a flat map is key. As Denis Cosgrove writes on the complex genealogy of the “globe” in the Western imagination: “On a flat map the known can be extended to the very edges of representational space, leaving implicit the question of what lies beyond the frame; on the globe the “ends of the earth” cannot be ignored.”69 Thus, what were former peripheries become potential centers, marking a key shift in the idea of vision in the Harrison approach.

This notion of visual arrangement, of course, recalls Harrison’s particular focus on audience. His emphasis on flexibility seemingly puts the audience in charge of, but also implicated in, the “reading,” placing the user right into the pilot’s seat. But the reader also gets to assume a variety of personas in these perspectives. In a 1942 issue of Fortune, for example, Harrison contributed a map entitled, “Southeast to Armageddon,” in which the viewer is imbued with a “Hitler’s-eye view” of the Middle East and beyond from a point high above Berchtesgaden.70 The map, in its content, connotes a sense of the difficulty the Nazis would face geographically in an attack on Asia Minor; but in highlighting form at the same time, users get the sense that they can inhabit the spatial worldview of the “enemy” through the function of the map itself. Similarly, a 1943 Fortune map entitled “The Not-So-Soft Underside” (fig. 3) places the viewer in perspective from a point over North Africa, looking at the “underbelly” of Europe from the Mediterranean.71 As Harrison points out in a small note accompanying this map, “The view was selected to undermine Churchill’s insistence that Europe had to be attacked in its ‘soft underbelly.’ My working title for this map was ‘How soft is the Belly?’ The weasel-worded printed title was the selection of the editors.”72 So, in taking on Churchill’s claims of strength in attacking Germany from North Africa and accusing the Allies of misunderstanding basic geography, Harrison makes the case that the angle of vision given to the user can be used to dispute the “truths” of powerful strategists; cartographic perspective becomes a kind of strategic argument in itself.

In both of the aforementioned examples, users can assume the role of either enemy or ally from the air. In the process, each map makes a pointed argument about strategy in the spatial content, while evidencing the malleability of form in a medium often noted for its rigidity. As Harrison admits in Look at the World, most maps are seen as architects’ blueprints, and give the reader an infinite viewpoint where “one is not over a particular point on the map, one is over all points simultaneously.”73 However, Harrison’s
perspective maps foreground selectivity and partiality; in the same introduction, he notes of talking with pilots of the Eighth Air Force in Europe about their experiences: “A conventional map, they complained, only looks right when you are directly above the objective, i.e., some time after release of the bombs. The problem was solved by making maps with a finite viewpoint that shows the objective from the normal angle and height of approach. The new maps coincided with a true view of the target.”

Harrison, then, sought to immerse popular audiences within partial world-views, and his fixation on audience engagement reflected the new internationalism’s focus on world opinion and flexible, global communication for which opinion-shapers like Luce were boldly calling. His perspectives place the audience into dialogue with the cartographer, indicative of an awareness of space being constituted socially, rather than as the “givens” of power politics.

Of course, Harrison’s quotation about the “true view of the target” speaks to his complex engagement with truth and transparency in maps. This complexity stems in part from the contextual framework by which Harrison was operating. Harrison was immersed in a journalistic visual culture where maps were designed to order for war problems that were unfolding daily,
and thus were judged by their ability to provide a window into a particular strategic issue, rather than their focus on fact. As an editor revealingly notes to Harrison on one of the tracing sheets found in the archive for his July 1941 map of the U.S.S.R. in Fortune: “don’t be too mathematical about centering it.” Yet, at the very same time this journalistic paradigm was firmly in place, many of Harrison’s fellow colleagues in the disciplines of geography and cartography were being drafted by the OSS to produce a monumental amount of spatial data, in what would eventually become a quantitative revolution in geography. This revolution sought to produce clear, reliable spatial facts for America’s war strategy, and in many ways was a pointed reaction to what was perceived as the deliberate distortion of geography for the ends of strength and power by the Third Reich.

Harrison’s own approach to distortion is caught in a peculiar nexus between the propagandistic, German-style geopolitics and the kind of self-conscious military-academic apparatus of spatial science that emerged from WWII. For example, *Look at the World* maps such as “Great Circle Airways” (fig. 4) feature a north polar gnomonic projection, with Harrison centering on the North Pole at the expense of dramatically distorting the shapes and
areas of lands lying on the outer reaches of the map, with Mexico in particular looking like long underwear hung out to dry.78 Another polar-centered map in the atlas, “Arctic Arena,” uses the full-globe orthographic projection, distorting the familiar shapes of continents and placing the U.S.S.R. and Europe north of the United States to illustrate the new proximities that air routes over the North Pole bring to life.79 These novelty maps are certainly not the types of sketches that would be found in the halls of the Department of State during the war. But these uses of distortion are deliberately designed to challenge the “common sense” viewpoint of the Euro-centric and East–West minded Mercator map, whose own distortions, Harrison believed, became a misleading “truth” about the way the world was supposed to be viewed.80 In Harrison’s introduction to the atlas, for example, he attacks Nazi Germany’s leading geographer, Karl Haushofer, for his almost exclusive reliance on Mercator.81 Yet, interestingly enough, Harrison was not attacking German maps for their lack of accuracy or for promoting a propagandistic viewpoint, but for their lack of flexibility; and this is a key distinction. For Harrison, Germany’s cartographic crime was not the manipulation of geographic “truths,” but a failure of vision itself.

Harrison was concerned about what S. W. Boggs, the State Department’s geographer of the early 1940s, called “cartohypnosis,” where the audience “exhibits a high degree of suggestibility in respect to stimuli aroused by the map.”82 Harrison’s answer was simply to give users a bevy of tools at their eyes and fingers, with his own new perspectives just one in a series of possible views. Writing in the Saturday Review, Harrison noted that “American geography and cartography are exhibiting growing pains. They are emerging not from infancy but from a static condition bordering on senility.”83 And later in Surveying and Mapping, he observed: “in the military agencies, I keep hearing the words ‘user requirements’ over and over again. There is only one over-riding user requirement and that is: can the poor fellow understand the map?”84 Harrison’s flexible amateurism, in this way, tweaked the classic American tenet of “common sense” philosophy, a self-consciously unpretentious construct where truths are made self-evident.85 “Geographical sense” seemed to mean that if one could universally accept that all maps distort, and that mapmakers are human, then each kind of unique distortion might actually be useful.86
In summary, Harrison’s conception of vision and perspective is both innovative as well as a product of its time. Certainly, Harrison’s notion of deliberate distortions benefiting the world of cartography did not exactly catch on, but the notion of a fluid, relational space did. Harrison provides a complex mediation of this move toward relative space. In accentuating flexibility of perspective, the map itself loses some of its power as a mechanism of control over the user, yet the audience is still constrained by the limited choice of perspectives provided by the cartographers. Harrison still remains instructive here, because he elevated the power of the user, and thus, implicitly questioned the natural equilibriums and balances of power that maps had traditionally highlighted. Relational space depends on how one looks at the world and the search for a better perception of world space. Harrison, thus, reminds us through his approach that maps do not necessarily show the world as it is, but more as it could be—the distinctly liberal notion of modern progress at work.

**SITUATING STRATEGY IN HARRISON MAPS**

Harrison’s promotion of flexible internationalism on the cartographic page shifted the focus from which maps were more accurate to which maps were more dynamic communicators. Highlighting the very techniques by which audiences can gain new perspectives became a key part of the “display.” And in these new globalist perspectives, strategy itself became a lens by which to view the entire world. As Ninkovich has written, “The perception of the globe’s unity in space and time was crucial, for it obliterated the geographical, cultural, and temporal distinctions that gave life to the historical myth of old and new worlds,” and thus, there came a need to conceptualize national interest from the standpoint of unity of global processes, rather than from the particularist frame of traditional statecraft. American liberal strategists during WWII and into the beginnings of the Cold War found space to be malleable and more universal, but in that new flexibility of perspective may have come a reductive worldview.

One of Harrison’s most celebrated maps provides a sense of how notions of “strategy” were changing at this time. For his opening world map in *Look at the World*, entitled “One World, One War,” Harrison chose to use the polar azimuthal equidistant projection, which he referred to as “the darling of the proponents of the ‘air-age.’” The use of the polar center places
North America in close quarters with North Asia and the U.S.S.R., with the world shown in one unbroken piece. In the description next to the map, Harrison entertains the idea that “if the continents were equidistantly separated . . . almost all areas of the globe would have equal strategic value.”

While a greatly distorted projection (Australia on the edges of the map is stretched beyond recognition), the visual of the polar center has important ideological connotations, equalizing world power and bringing the world into a tightly wound collection of landmasses, that, as Harrison notes, maps “the problems and the opportunities of fighting all over the world at once.” Thus, “strategy” itself becomes an ideology of being able to manage such complicated interdependences and being flexible in responses to aggression in a world that appears much closer than imagined.

A similar map, using a polar azimuthal projection, from Fortune 1941, illustrates these new continuities of space and proximities in even bolder relief: the fascinating “World Divided” (fig. 5) looks almost the same as “One World, One War,” except for some key differences. Here, the large expanse of the U.S.S.R. is actually colored in pitch-black as an Axis country, uniting it with Germany, Japan, and Italy. Over the blacked-in country is a
small caption, suggesting that the reader “count this black if Nazis win a quick and complete victory.” Not only does the projection connote a sense of dangerous closeness that changes perceptions of strategy, but the use of color as a bold tool by Harrison brings the immediacy of the situation to the reader. Coloring in one of the largest Allies as a potential Axis conquest suggests that maps could go outside their conventions of showing world space “as is” and connote future projections and strategic relationships that play with both space and temporality.

America’s shift to this image-based internationalism, though, is perhaps best seen in maps that specifically frame America’s interests in terms of the rest of the world. Harrison’s works capture this shift by simultaneously highlighting the anxieties and opportunities that are inherent in the perspectives. In the air-age world, interdependences could mean both strengths and vulnerabilities for American power. In terms of the dangers, a map like “Three Approaches to the U.S.” in Harrison’s “Atlas for the U.S. Citizen” shows three perspectives of the United States from Berlin, Tokyo, and Caracas. These maps attempt to show how vulnerable the United States is from all three locations. While the Berlin and Tokyo maps have obvious strategic implications for WWII, the inclusion of Caracas highlights the vulnerability even in our own hemisphere. Once again, the totality of the presentation is key. Rather than show each of these perspectives in their own separate maps, Harrison puts each perspective from Berlin, Tokyo, and Caracas on the same page, one on top of another, as if laying out an argument. Geography is reduced here to strategy, and vulnerability becomes an integral part of such a strategy—trust no one from any geographical perspective. While many other Harrison maps offer a more proactive vision of America, putting the American reader inside the map and at the helm of the action, the “Three Approaches” map looks at America, and the sense of juxtaposition offers the American audience feelings of vulnerability, lack of control over their “place,” and the sense of being at the mercy of potential enemies from all directions.

Such a perspective, of course, is reminiscent of the kind of realist fear of international anarchy that necessitates a balance of power perspective. For example, Harrison’s maps adorn the pages of early realist geographer Nicholas Spykman’s famous treatise, *America’s Strategy in World Politics*, which provides a power-politics plea for world strategy. Spykman used air-age principles to indict American isolationism and to disseminate the idea that
even in peace, we are unsafe and vulnerable, writing that “a balance of power . . . is an absolute prerequisite for the independence of the New World and the power position of the United States. There is no safe defensive position on this side of the oceans. Hemisphere defense is no defense at all.”98 And arguably, the choice of the polar center in many of Harrison’s maps highlights this kind of realism. For example, the historiography of polar geography has tracked how the Arctic became a key piece of “cold war psychosis.”99 Through the influence of polar maps that connected the fortunes of the United States and the Soviet Union, the icy wasteland skyrocketed to political significance, while the potential for international cooperation in the new proximities of the polar world was stifled by the culture of Cold War national security.100 In the rush to defend interests, this new geographic proximity helped to create the conditions for an ever-widening ideological distance.

Yet, despite these possible readings and appropriations of his maps, Harrison’s work is not simply reductive to the naked power of realism, as it involves a much more global appreciation of how American interests could be synonymous with world interests. In perspective maps such as “Great Lakes to Greenland,” for example, we see the air-age perspective of the Great Lakes and the Northeast United States.101 Just over the horizon, over what looks like a truncated Atlantic Ocean, Harrison has drawn in the coasts of Norway, Scotland, Ireland, France, and Spain, bringing Europe into our normally hemispheric point of view. Also contributing to this change is that Harrison downplays the rigidity of borders. While there is a line separating Canada from the United States on the “Great Lakes to Greenland” map, the eye focuses more on the continuity of the three-dimensional style landscape, and thus, the two countries appear as one mass. Air route lines on the map track the trajectory from New York through Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and on to Ireland, connecting the interests of the continents and lessening the impact of the wide Atlantic expanse. In terms of strategy and ideology, such perspectives place Canada in the forefront of American interests, as a kind of gateway to other parts of the world, and hence, the conception of manifest destiny becomes much more global in scope on the page. Similarly, the map “Puget Sound to Siberia” focuses on the proximity between Alaska and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. From Harrison’s aerial vantage point, Siberia, and hence, the burgeoning world superpower of the Soviet Union seem almost completely connected to (and
perhaps encroaching upon) American territory. Accompanying this map is a telling note about strategy:

It is . . . unlikely that Soviet Russia or Japan, indifferently equipped and operating from far distant sources of supply, should attempt to take the Pacific Northwest as the Germans took Norway. It is far more likely that the U.S. having taken steps to secure its defense, should one day find that it had in its Aleutian bases a strongly supported big stick with which to influence both Japanese and Soviet policy.

Such captions match the visual with both a fear of proximity, in hinting at Soviet and Japanese presence in our sphere of influence, with an active sense of duty to spread U.S. might. The old classical realists traditionally saw the world in terms of nation-state power, but maps like Harrison’s challenge such notions with their lack of borders—all is connected.

The introduction to Harrison’s “Atlas for the U.S. Citizen,” entitled “The U.S. and the World” and written by the *Fortune* editors, is a telling description of how air-age perspectives could mark such a multifaceted internationalism. Predating America’s entry into World War II, the article equates the new perspective of a shrinking world as a kind of call to arms:

At last, however, the great awakening may be upon us, and we may be prepared to demand that the realism we love so well in lesser spheres now rule our thought in the larger spheres where our fate will be determined. Such realism may show us that we are as unique in the world and as alone as we were in 1840. But realism cannot end there. For realism does not fulfill itself in mere recognition of facts. After recognition, realism leads to action, to a true change; and when the change has occurred, then the realistic view is different from what it was before. If, for instance, recognizing our weakness, we proceed to make ourselves strong, then a realistic view of the world may lead us to foreign policies that we cannot now consider . . . And so, facing our loneliness, we may also recapture our old aggressive spirit . . . For the atlas, which these maps make up, is so designed that the citizen of the U.S. may here, with the whole world before him, begin to make manifest to himself the outlines of his nation’s destiny.

Thus, while the word realism is used, its implications are much broader than maintaining a balance of power: modern internationalism brings forth a
new manifest destiny that prizes a relational, interpretative vision of world space—the strategist can remake the world. The classic realist operated out of an acceptance of weakness and aloneness as a natural condition; here one can see hints that this loneliness is a construct that can be disputed by using the right perspective.

In much of Harrison’s WWII work, this new internationalism visually projects interdependency and cooperation as possible outcomes. The aerial view of Europe in the “Atlas for the U.S. Citizen” makes this call for internationalism most poignantly. The map uses Newfoundland as its vantage point at the center bottom of the map, with England serving as a center-point (the equator becoming a vertical arc, rather than its traditional horizontal position). Hovering right above England is an imposing Germany with the gigantic expanse of the U.S.S.R. immediately to the left, its girth stretched all the way off the frame of the map. Turkey, Syria, and Palestine sit at the top of the sphere, making the Middle East a strategic location on the horizon. Yet, at the bottom, Harrison also lists strategically chosen American cities such as Botwood (NH), New York, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., Atlanta, and Mobile next to an arrow pointing off the map, once again bringing the affairs of the Old World into American sights. And as the use of Botwood and Mobile connote, Harrison was interested in bringing the universal into the American home. In other words, small cities and towns were just as “strategic” in disseminating the new air-age geographic information as were conventional points like New York and Washington, D.C., perhaps suggesting that we share cultural geographic similarities with other places in the world that bring us together. As the caption points out, “Since the Farewell Address of President Washington the U.S. has been trying to avoid entangling alliances with these foreign countries, and to live in isolation behind the Atlantic. Yet Europe has been somehow involved in every major war of the U.S., and 30,000 Americans lie buried in Flanders.” The caption supplements the immediacy drawn into the lines of the map and an emotional element is added into the calls to abandon isolationism. How could one be neutral with this type of perspective? These ideas represent the internationalist view that Europe is really an American concern, and that U.S. influence in the European arena must be a function of a common sense perspective.
Finally, one of the major contributions Harrison makes in visualizing the global transformation is illustrating how strategy now involves the spread of communication, economics, and culture, not simply political and military positions. For example, while the aforementioned gnomonic projection exhibits some of the greatest distortions of any type of cartographic projection, Harrison praises it as “probably the most accurate map . . . of the communication lines of the modern world, for its weird stretchings of familiar shore lines are present to achieve one objective, true great-circle direction. Any straight line on the map is a great circle and therefore the shortest route between any two points.” In his “Great Circle Airways” map, Harrison uses the gnomonic projection with a north polar center to encompass and visually display all the world’s “great” powers and to represent a large proportion of the world’s strategic routes of communication. The north polar gnomonic thus captures the interconnectedness (and interdependence) of nation-states in a wartime context, giving the feeling of mutuality and prizing communication as a new fulcrum of strategy.

Other maps in Harrison’s archive illustrate the importance of both industrial and commercial air interests in this new era, evidencing that the new internationalism was not simply a function of traditional state power, but also bound in corporations’ powers of transportation. His 1941 Fortune map, “U.S. Air Industry,” shows a freehand sketch of the United States distorted almost beyond recognition in terms of area and shape. Harrison shrinks or enlarges the size of each state according to the air power that state has in terms of commercial plants, planes, engines, and propellers. The bloated-looking shapes of states like Maryland, Pennsylvania, Kansas, Massachusetts, Texas, California, and others suggest an industry almost ballooning and expanding right in front of the reader and connotes that individual states are implicated in a global war effort. Thus, in this map, the very technology creating the new air-age perspective is offered as the subject of the map and frames America as leading the charge in commercial reign over the skies. With this approach in mind, it is telling that Harrison was hired to create a world map for Pan Am in 1946: a Harrison-style globe is rendered in blue-gray with criss-crossing deep red spider-like lines all over the map, showing the airline’s routes across the entire globe. In a post-war map such as this one, the reader sees the American global transport of air
weaponry being replaced by the transport of American capital. Such a point is a poignant demonstration of the complexities of the burgeoning air-age internationalism, as visualized in cartography: the spread of ideas and soft power, carried by technologies like the airplane, and later satellites, becomes infused into notions of global space. The form of the map’s aerial perspective connotes a sense of rolling, inevitable movement above space—a mediation of the new movement of capital, technologies, and ideas that came out of the shift to liberal American globalism at midcentury.

CONCLUSION

The whole body of Harrison’s WWII maps shows that the immense power of transportation in a world of new proximities could certainly bring empire-thirsty armies against the United States, but answers that it is the transcendent power of American “perspective” that can transform world space. There is a certain irony in the fact that Harrison bemoaned what he called the “too-long-forgotten realities of world geography,” while his novel perspectives were part of the kind of abstraction that liberal modernism needed—the air-age detachment of seeing the earth unfold from the standpoint of one’s own particular interests. The realities of world geography were, then, in fact shapeable, according to the sheer variety of perspectives and relationships that Harrison offered. It is no wonder, then, that in addition to his popular contributions to journalistic cartography, he was also appropriated as a technical consultant to the State Department throughout WWII and the early Cold War—policymakers’ interests in those fresh, bird’s-eye view perspectives showed a new flexibility and sensitivity to public opinion in the U.S. government’s approach to spatial problems on a global scale. As S. W. Boggs, the official Geographer of the Department of State, wrote to Harrison in 1941 about their collaboration on a new map of world transport problems: “I would be delighted to have your ideas. . . . In making maps which really get across to the man on the street, and to the busy statesman or executive, perhaps [your] radically different shadings would result in making maps so characteristic that they would attract attention and be easily distinguishable from the run-of-the-mill products of the present.”
Of course, despite Harrison’s pursuit of a “realistic” picture of the world, he seemed more than aware of the ironic conundrums cartographers face in making necessary distortions. For example, his archive reveals a diary containing the makings of an unfinished book he was writing from the early 1940s called *The World is Round-O!*, and it speaks to his recognition of the discursive nature of cartography. Harrison writes: “this book is subtitled a treatise on maps, but it is really about the skin of a spherical object and man’s painful efforts to take the hide off the sphere and spread it flat so that the pattern of it still remains recognizable. . . . When the attempt is made to show the entire surface of the globe on one sheet of paper, the cartographer’s dilemma is completely revealed. It is like trying to wrap a grapefruit without wrinkling the paper, or like commissioning a portrait painter to do a head showing not only the face but the sides, back and top simultaneously.”

The potential problem, though, is that in the process of abstraction, maps become metaphors for the space itself. As Prelli has demonstrated in his study of scientific maps as forensic evidence, metaphors are often visually literalized on the graphic page, but also can be de-literalized as well. By reminding viewers of the discursivity of maps through his dramatic emphasis on form, Harrison takes the map out of its traditional role as an impartial display of states and geographic information, in a sense “de-literalizing” the old classic metaphor that the “map is the territory.” Yet, still, the power of the new map becomes reified in the sense that all is now strategic and malleable, with Harrison’s perspectives and projections showing new vulnerabilities, strengths, and proximities. Without the traditional borders and orientations that we expect from maps, Harrison simplifies the globe in a new way, a kind of reductionism that encourages a common-sense liberal interpretation of American interests as commensurate with all points on the map. The dynamic of Prelli’s revealing and concealing is on display, with Harrison caught in the tension between textualizing the world and revealing its artifice versus concealing the map’s construction and making it a naturalized instrument of liberal modernist foreign policy and strategy.

Cartography during WWII was part of a larger, distinctly modern internationalism that had been taking root for decades, the implications of which
found their way into the very visualization of American power and global strategy as more fluid and relational. If one defines visual culture as the “historically situated beliefs about vision and images that influence audiences’ practices of looking,” then Harrison’s novel take on vision was a complex and fascinating entry into such a culture. His maps highlighted the perspective of vision, the means of the map, as being just as important as the content of the map itself, reminding us that perception and interpretation are a key part of how global space is transformed.

NOTES

8. Susan Schulten, “Richard Edes Harrison and the Challenge to American Cartography,” Imago Mundi 50 (1998): 174–88. Also, see particularly Schulten’s excellent characterization of the map (and more specifically the atlas as a “text”) as a


30. For rhetorical definitions of realism, see both the introduction and conclusion to Beer and Hariman’s collection in Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman, “Realism and Rhetoric in International Relations,” and “Strategic Intelligence and Discursive Realities,” in Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations, ed. Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996), 1–30, 387–414. And as Ó Tuathail and Agnew have also pointed out, to study realism and geo-strategy discursively is to study “the socio-cultural resources and rules by which geographies of international politics get written.” See Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew, “Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy,” Political Geography 11 (1992): 193.
32. See Barnes and Farish, “Between Regions,” 808–12.
33. Ninkovich, Modernity and Power, xv.
34. Ninkovich, Modernity and Power, xiv.

37. Henry R. Luce, “The American Century (1941),” reprinted in Diplomatic History 23 (1999): 159–71; see also Smith’s discussion of Luce in his introduction to America’s Empire.


40. Walter Ristow dates American air-age globalism to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, which became an obvious reference point for many in this new geography, “where Americans suddenly awakened to the fact that we are definitely concerned with that part of the earth which extends beyond our natural, and heretofore impregnable, boundaries.” See Henrikson, “The Map as an ‘Idea,’” 42. Hannah Arendt’s discussion of the “Archimedean Point” is a fitting expression of the moral dimension of these choices, writing about the abolishment of the “old dichotomy between earth and sky” and pointing out that “We always handle nature from a point in the universe outside the earth. Without actually standing where Archimedes wished to stand, . . . we have found a way to act on the earth and within terrestrial nature as though we dispose of it from outside, from the Archimedean point. And even at the risk of endangering the natural life process we expose the earth to universal, cosmic forces alien to nature’s household.” See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Publishing, 1959), 237–38.

41. Richard Edes Harrison hailed from turn-of-the-century Baltimore. Traveling often with his family, and led by his prominent Yale biologist father, he had a talent for field sketching and was a quick study in architecture, for which he would attend Yale in 1926. During the Depression, he found work in the art department for a products company, designing an assortment of oddities such as matchbook covers, record jackets, liquor labels, ashtrays, and lighting fixtures. Schulten remarks of Harrison that “his style owes more to the persuasive look of advertising than to cartography,”
and certainly his time toiling away at ephemeral design contributed in some part to
his sleek, streamlined, and above all, sellable cartographic style. See Wilbur Zelinsky,
"In Memoriam," 187–88; Schulten, "Richard Edes Harrison and the Challenge to
American Cartography," 178.

42. Mark Monmonier, Maps With the News: The Development of American Journalistic

43. Indeed, Richard Edes Harrison was an accidental mapmaker—essentially a substitute
cartographer in the early days, called by a friend at Time in 1932 to etch out a quick
map when the regular draftsman could not be found. His fill-in job became a fairly
regular assignment until, by 1935, he joined the permanent staff of Fortune. In that
year, Harrison made his mark by introducing the international perspective map for
the first time in what he termed the “Vulture’s View” of the Italo-Ethiopia conflict,
oriented with the southwest at the top of the page. As the European war escalated,
Harrison became a Fortune fixture and would remain affiliated there for the next ten
years-plus. Walter W. Ristow, “Journalistic Cartography,” Surveying and Mapping 17
(1957): 375.

44. Denis E. Cosgrove and Veronica della Dora, “Mapping Global War: Los Angeles, the
Pacific, and Charles Owens’s Pictorial Cartography,” Annals of the Association of

45. Ristow, "Journalistic Cartography," 374; Schulten, The Geographical Imagination in
America, 3.

Field,” Saturday Review of Literature, August 7, 1943, 26. Despite Harrison’s success,
though, he did find that his “assaults” were not always necessarily welcome.
Harrison’s archive at the Library of Congress reveals a note he wrote to accompany
the archiving of his 1938 map of Czechoslovakia, detailing how he was fired as an
official staff member from Fortune because his editor found the map “confusing.” Of
course, he would continue to be associated with Fortune, to great acclaim, but not as
permanent staff. So, Harrison was constantly navigating between his philosophy of
flexible, strategic mapping and what he thought his editors (and the public) would be
able to accept. See Harrison, Fortune 1938: Czechoslovakia, part 1, file 19, Richard
Edes Harrison Collection, Geography & Map Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C. For a useful categorized list of all of Harrison’s Fortune output, see
Joanne M. Perry, “Harrison’s Fortune Maps, 1939–1945: An Annotated
Cartobibliography,” Special Libraries Association Geography and Map Bulletin 148


49. The use of photography to create spatial, geographic representations has been noted by scholars like Joan M. Schwartz and James R. Ryan, who, in their book *Picturing Place: Photography and the Geographical Imagination*, posit photography as a key piece of the “picturing impulse” of geography, a “means of observing, describing, studying, ordering, classifying and, thereby, knowing the world.” See Schwartz and Ryan, *Picturing Place*, 6, 8.


55. These Cold War implications were borne out when Harrison refashioned his “Europe From the East” maps as “Satellites in Arms” for Leland Stowe’s 1951 *Life* article of the same name, which details the extent of Soviet influence through railroads and waterways for transporting weapons and mobilizing forces throughout Eastern Europe. Vein-like red lines wind their way all over the continent, using the Soviet-eye perspective to show the anxiety of the Soviet Union’s vantage point of Cold War power. Leland Stowe, “Satellites in Arms,” *Life*, December 17, 1951, 98–9.


58. Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1943), 145. Stoler covers some archival correspondence between JSSC members like Henry Stimson on Lippmann’s book as well as some letters to Lippmann praising his take on foreign policy; Stoler also comments on the potential influence of Mackinder and Spykman’s theories to the waging of foreign policy. See Stoler, Allies and Adversaries, 129–32.


64. Harrison, Look at the World, 52.


68. Visualizing global space typically places the observer outside of space and features the “world-as-picture,” framing the “world as apart from and prior to the places and people it contains.” See John Agnew, Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge Press, 2003), 15–16; See also: Henrikson, “America’s Changing Place in the World,” 73–100.


70. Richard Edes Harrison, Fortune 1942: Southeast to Armageddon, part 1, file 82, Richard Edes Harrison Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. This map was later reproduced with a more tame title in Look at the World as “Southeast to Asia.”


95. For more on color conventions in mapping, see Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps*, 170–71.


109. Along similar lines, an interesting Harrison map drafted for *Compass of the World* in 1944 portrays South America covered in foreign broadcasting lines from all over the globe, with the caption: “Scarcely any other region is so thickly overspread with foreign broadcasting as this continent.” Richard Edes Harrison, MacMillan, February 1944: Compass of the World, part 1, file 112, Richard Edes Harrison Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.


113. See S. W. Boggs to Richard Edes Harrison, March 3, 1943; Boggs to Harrison, December 22, 1943; Boggs to Harrison, April 17, 1946. These letters can be found in Box 19, Records of the geographer, Department of State, RG59, Cartographic & Architectural Records Division, National Archives II, College Park, MD. See also Schulten, “Richard Edes Harrison,” 178.
114. Boggs to Harrison, July 21, 1941, Box 19, Records of the geographer, Department of State, RG59, Cartographic & Architectural Records Division, National Archives II, College Park, MD.
117. Olson, Finnegan, and Hope, “Performing and Seeing,” 18.