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“‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.”: The Power of Place and the Rhetorical Life of a Cold War Map

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In 1951, the American Federation of Labor produced a map of the Soviet Union showing the locations of 175 forced labor camps administered by the Gulag. Widely appropriated in popular magazines and newspapers, and disseminated internationally as propaganda against the U.S.S.R., the map, entitled “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.,” would be cited as “one of the most widely circulated pieces of anti-Communist literature.” By contextualizing the map’s origins and circulation, as well as engaging in a close analysis of its visual codes and intertextual relationships with photographs, captions, and other materials, this essay argues that the Gulag map became an evidentiary weapon in the increasingly bipolar spaces of the early Cold War. In particular, “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” draws on cartography’s unique power of “placement” to locate forced labor camps with authenticity and precision, infiltrating the impenetrable spaces of the Soviet Union as a visually compelling mode of Cold War knowledge production.

In the September 17, 1951, issue of Time, the magazine’s “News in Pictures” section featured a peculiar and striking image over a two-page spread—a map of the sprawling Soviet Union. The map reveals a network of red circles and pink hammer-and-sickle icons dotted all over the
topography of a stark gray and white Soviet landscape, each indicating the location of “Gulag” system prison camps. And in the bottom center of the map, entitled “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.” (fig. 1), sit three photos of emaciated bodies, with the caption “‘GULAG’ Children.” The accompanying text details how the map provoked an incident between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the 1951 San Francisco conference to inaugurate a Japanese peace treaty, “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.” became a cartographic weapon:

“Would the Soviet delegate to the San Francisco conference like to see a map of Russia?” “I’d be delighted,” said Gromyko. Unfolding the map, Missouri’s Congressman O. K. Armstrong helpfully explained: “It happens to contain an accurate portrayal of every slave labor camp in the Soviet Union.” Gromyko blinked at the map, mumbled “No comment,” and handed it to an aide who tossed it into the aisle.²

Indeed, below the imposing map are before/after-style photos of the incident. On the left, Republican Representative Armstrong unfolds the map before a
sitting Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; on the right, a stone-faced Gromyko stares ahead, as the map sits beside him on the floor of the conference room. Together the map, labor camp photos, text, and pictures of the conference on the two-page magazine spread envelop the reader in a Cold War bipolar narrative through both word and image.

Of course, the Armstrong-Gromyko exchange can be added to a long list of minor anecdotes in the history of chilly Cold War diplomatic relations, and the map can be seen as simply one small instance of the propaganda battles being waged by both sides. Yet, a deeper exploration of the active “rhetorical life” of this map reveals a compelling case about both the strategic and ideological functions of mapping during the Cold War. Before the map became a kind of diplomatic prank in the hands of Congressman Armstrong, it began as a collaboration in a global labor research project between the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and the United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESCO), authored by a Russian emigrant ghostwriting journalist and underwritten by the CIA and the Department of State. After the map’s publication in *Time*, Voice of America broadcasts publicized it internationally, leading to frequent requests for reprints across the world, and it would later be used as a training case in psychological warfare for Army personnel. The Gulag map also circulated in different versions, sometimes with its camp bodies omitted, sometimes adding photocopies of inmates’ official release certificates to the margins, and often including different iterations of accompanying captions and text. The many appropriations of the piece have led to its citation as “one of the most widely circulated pieces of anti-Communist literature.”

Thus, the story of “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.” goes well beyond the borders of the map’s frames or its inclusion in a magazine article, as it represents a nexus of institutional interests, audience values, and multimediated usages that add texture to the display of the map itself. The Gulag map has important rhetorical implications in what it actually contains on the flat page, but equally important are the rhetorical implications of its movement in Cold War culture. In her study of Federal Security Agency (FSA) photographs in the 1930s, Cara Finnegan points to the “eventfulness” of the images, which involves consideration of “their specificity as rhetorical documents, while accounting for circulation asks us to pay attention to their fluidity as material traces of history.” This duality of specificity and fluidity
also can be used as a critical inquiry into the rhetorical life of “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.” The Gulag map is not merely a map, but a network of relationships between cartographic forms, accompanying text, photographs, and the map’s “embeddedness” into the medium in which it appears, whether an AFL-CIO pamphlet, a radio broadcast, an Army manual, or a *Time* article. “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.,” then, deserves both a close analysis of its visual display and an assessment of its circulatory power.

To make this kind of analysis, I draw on cartography’s longstanding tension with the concepts of place and space. Doreen Massey argues that the act of establishing a fixed place is always an attempt “to stabilize the meaning of particular envelopes of space-time” and is “constantly the site of social contest, battles over the power to label space-time, to impose the meaning to be attributed to a space.”7 I argue in this essay that the Gulag map evidences the power of place in the Cold War, as an attempt by its various producers and circulators to give America the power to label, and thus control and contain, Cold War space.8 Merely affixing the specific location of a secret forced labor camp to a map represents a powerful political act. In the increasingly abstract spaces of missile trajectories, pacts, and blocs, both sides in the conflict struggled to marshal authentic knowledge of the other’s potentialities.9 For America, maps were a mode of attaining this power of place and for stabilizing Cold War relationships, amassing and displaying knowledge about Soviet influence in global spaces. As such, the Gulag map reflects America’s anxieties around its ability to strategically use what historian Susan Carruthers terms “the transnational politics of knowledge” in charting enemy space—and, thus, a map of the Soviet Union could say just as much (if not more) about the placement of America on the global stage as it could about the place of Soviet labor camps across Eurasia.10 Cartography was used by various Cold War institutions to contain Soviet power, and this involved mapping the capacities of that power so that it could be better-classified and managed. The Gulag map, therefore, is a rich example of how place was used in this era to say “we know what you’re doing over there.”

This analysis, then, will demonstrate the ways in which maps help establish, in geographer Matthew Farish’s words, “the contours of America’s Cold War.”11 Cartography certainly offered strategic elites and American citizens a mode of vision for *orienting* the relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union. In a conflict as inescapably spatial as the Cold
War with its domino theories, iron curtains, and three-world partitions, cartography rendered such constructs to seem naturalized, essential, and more concrete. Maps do not simply represent ideologies, however; their movement and strategic uses also suggest the importance of materiality in an abstract conflict. The unique spatial imaginary of the Cold War was produced through the meaning-making processes of material documents such as “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.” And this argument has potential significance for rhetorical scholars beyond the Gulag case, because it accentuates the centrality and complexity of visual rhetoric in the conduct of international relations and points to the necessity of tracing the “spatialization” of politics and values in our recent history. A few months after embarrassing Minister Gromyko, it was Representative Armstrong, speaking at a keynote in front of the Conference on Psychological Strategy in the Cold War, who pointed out that, “Our primary weapons will not be guns, but ideas...and truth itself.”

How a map merges such ideologies of truth into informational weaponry in both its visual display and its circulation becomes central to understanding the particular Gulag case, but also contributes to a larger understanding of cartography as a rhetorical process.

Therefore, I trace the origins and the various mediated appropriations of “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.” in popular, government, military, and academic settings while also engaging in a close analysis of the map itself, particularly in the tensions between the internal codes of the map (its colors, icons, choice of projection, and the like) and the accompanying texts, photos, and other supporting evidence. This three-tiered analysis of context, code, and mediation appropriates “place” in more than one sense; certainly, how America used its knowledge of the Soviet Union to make sense of its own placement as a fully emerged global power, but also how a map becomes an active document placed by various powers into a variety of strategic contexts. Thus, I hold the map’s material and discursive dimensions in suspension together, and I conceptualize the rhetoric of cartography as a fusion between form and content. In the process, I use the Gulag map case as a site for exploring how the Cold War constrained both the cartographic product and its modes of production and, conversely, how the products and processes of cartography constrained the ways the Cold War was visualized.
To read “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.” is, in a sense, to also read the Cold War culture in which it circulated. Such an approach is consonant with Robert Hariman’s and John Lucaites’s “sense in which visual images are complex and unstable articulations, particularly as they circulate across topics, media, and texts, and thus are open to successive reconstitution by and on behalf of varied political interests, including a public interest.” While Hariman and Lucaites were concerned specifically with the role of photojournalistic images, a map shares this complex ambivalence wherein it can visually represent political crises (like forced labor) and motivate publics, yet still be determined by media and institutional elites and serve their “grand narratives of official history.” But a map is not, alas, a photograph; both the map and the photo share tensions with their expectations to present “reality,” but a map is more obviously an abstract creation, an information graphic used to place aggregate data about the earth into a recognizably compressed and simplified emblem of what the world looks like (the familiar shapes of coastlines, political borders, and area capacities that make the world register to us visually as “the world”).

The work of rhetorical and cultural studies that scholars and critical geographers provide is a useful entry point into attending to these unique visual and material aspects of a map. Greg Dickinson, Carole Blair, and Brian Ott have noted that space and place have a “set of mutually constitutive relationships” in which space typically represents movement, openness, and abstraction, while place represents fixity, stability, and specific and located memories. As geographer Yi-Fu Tuan writes, “if we think of space as that which allows movement, then place is pause; each pause in movement makes it possible for location to be transformed into place.” But scholars have taken care not to lose the political edge that is necessary for understanding space and place as rhetorically constitutive. Important to Dickinson, for example, is the very materiality of space, as he warns that space “does not disappear behind the vale of mediatic representation. Instead, spaces become the nodes where images and imaginations come together.” Earlier, Dickinson notes that “audiences engage spatial narratives and images as strategies for remapping their ‘location’ in time and space.” This conception of space necessitates questioning how state power employs such images on an ideological level. While often seen as an empty container,
space is not bereft of ideology and politics—it is articulated through them—and, as Raymie McKerrow points out, to naturalize space is to support the status quo and uphold power. Raka Shome explains this tension eloquently: “space is not merely a backdrop . . . against which the communication of cultural politics occurs. . . . It functions as a technology—a means and a medium—of power that is socially constituted through material relations that enable the communication of specific politics.”

If we can see the uncertain international landscape of the Cold War, then, as a site of power that was continually being socially constituted and reconstituted, we will be closer to understanding how maps order, locate, and place national and international identities. A map, arguably, commands particular placements for its users and by extension offers a placement for values and public memory. Donovan Conley has traced the development of a spatial, “gridded” logic during nineteenth-century America, when increasing technologies of communication and transportation plotted a geometric grid over U.S. space, thus creating a “fantasy of democratic wholeness.” And through the gridding process of surveying and mapping, the American nation-state became “governmentalized.” After the full settlement of the U.S. frontier, the notion of American space expanded more fully into a globalized network in the twentieth century—still, the powerful framework of the cartographic grid remained and encouraged American foreign policymakers and arbiters of public opinion to spatialize American interests neatly all over the globe. Particularly at the outset of the Cold War, places, as so often defined by maps, became essentialized as knowable, relatively fixed, and commonsensical. Such a notion of place allowed strategic areas of the world to be seen as having certain unchangeable characteristics that helped to create rigid conceptions of foreign relations. The Gulag map emerges from this context as a highly charged image that represents America’s internationalization of its interests, and its investment in containment and competitive knowledge of the Soviet Union as a place.

For geographer Jouni Hakli, the power of maps remains in the seeming “immutability in the relationships that maps establish between cartographic representation and the world of practice in which they emerge.” Thus, a rhetorical analysis of a map must question these immutabilities and the naturalizing, authenticating power of the cartographic form. Denis Wood and John Fels offer a theory of map criticism that attends to this power: the
map continually advertises itself to be taken authoritatively, and that advertisement takes the form of a paramap. The paramap is a construction that goes beyond the map itself and includes all of “the verbal and other productions that surround and extend” a map’s presentation (dedications, inscriptions, epigraphs, prefaces, notes, illustrations). In addition, the paramap includes all of the elements not just appended to the map but circulating in the social space around the map (advertisements for the map, reviews, production information); for Wood and Fels, “ultimately it is the interaction between map and paramap that propels the map into action.” Thus, engaging with “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” necessitates accounting for the full display of the map itself but also the ways in which it was presented in various contexts and for various audiences, and as a medium of U.S. Cold War power. What this approach seeks to prove is that a map is never just a map but a confluence of social forces that constrains a culture’s sense of its space and its place within it.

**The Origins and Production of “’Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.”**

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s *Gulag Archipelago* made “gulag” a global household name upon its sensational publication in 1973. But 26 years before its popularization, Russian émigré turned crusading anti-communist journalist Isaac Don Levine was certainly trying his best to bring the term to public consciousness. Levine had left Russia in high school before World War I and gained a prominent name at the *New York Tribune* as the leading correspondent on the Bolshevik Revolution. He would go on to pen some of the earliest biographies of Lenin and Stalin. In the late 1930s, Levine collaborated with the famed defector Walter Krivitsky, a Soviet chief of military intelligence, ghostwriting a series of Krivitsky’s stories about his escape in the *Saturday Evening Post*. And perhaps most notably, Levine introduced Whittaker Chambers’s story of Communist infiltration to the world, bringing him to a meeting with Adolf Berle, the Assistant Secretary of State in 1939, and setting off a chain of events that would reach their full effect in the Alger Hiss trials. Isaac Don Levine, then, was a prominent exposé extraordinaire for anti-communism—the celebrity journalist with government contacts who helped make the “reveal” a staple of popular literature on communism.
It is through Levine’s editorship of the anti-Communist magazine *Plain Talk* from 1945 to 1950 that cartography becomes a factor in this revelation project. Journalist Eugene Methvin makes the claim that Levine “published for the first time in English the word *gulag*.” And in the May 1947 issue of *Plain Talk*, Levine introduced the first version of “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.,” which, at this stage was titled, “The First Comprehensive Map of Slave Camps in U.S.S.R.” Levine’s text refers to it as a “docu-map” that “is one of the most remarkable compilations of our day, and affords a graphic insight into what has been until now the most carefully guarded secret of current life in Soviet Russia.” The label of docu-map heightens the focus on authenticity; rather than the human eye-witness that a photograph can provide, the map more closely resembles the expert witness, called for an impartial opinion that studiously manages facts for the prosecutorial argument at hand. In this sense, the map packages itself as an *evidentiary weapon*, a role it would play often in the Cold War’s duration.

The year 1947 was also when David Dallin and Boris Nicolaevsky released the influential *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia*, one of the first published offensives against the Soviet Union’s prison system. Like Levine, Dallin was a Russian émigré, journalist, and frequent government consultant. His book also included maps of the reported camps; they were much barer in execution than Levine’s map, with simple line drawings of the Soviet landscape featuring black and white dots and place names, and without positioning the U.S.S.R. within the larger Eurasian continent. The *New York Times* praised Dallin’s courage in itemizing “the conditions which many deluded men insist on ignoring at the price of their own intellectual honesty,” and warned that “the inevitable conclusion which any reader must draw . . . is that the term ‘slave state’ is not mere abuse, but a precisely accurate description.”

This last point about a “slave state” is particularly important, as both Levine and Dallin make a key (re)labeling of Soviet forced labor as slavery, a frame that would take on more and more significance and dramatic weight as the Cold War progressed. As the architects of NSC-68 famously put it in 1950, slavery could be conceptualized in explicitly spatial terms:

> The implacable purpose of the slave state to eliminate the challenge of freedom has placed the great powers at opposite poles. It is this fact which gives the present polarization of power the quality of crisis. . . . The antipathy
of slavery to freedom explains the iron curtain, the isolation, autarchy of the society whose end is absolute power.40

The Gulag map exemplifies an institutional commitment to a polarized rhetoric of slavery in the Cold War, as it served to organize slavery into a spatial system that demarcated what was free and what was not, and could infiltrate the shrouded spaces behind the Iron Curtain.41

The map also participated in a key contextual shift in early Cold War culture when, according to Peter Novick, totalitarianism became a transcendent rhetorical label for industrialized state oppression, allowing for an explicit link between World War II fascism and Soviet communism.42 As Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson wrote, “ignoring the widely diverse origins, ideologies, goals, and practices of totalitarian regimes, Americans have tended to focus only on the seemingly similar methods employed by such regimes and to assume that these methods are the basic immutable characteristics of totalitarianism anywhere.”43 “Red fascism” thus became a useful and widely appropriated label in postwar American foreign policy and popular culture.44 President Truman stated in 1947, for example, that “There isn’t any difference in totalitarian states. I don’t care what you call them, Nazi, Communist, or Fascist.”45 And Representative Everett Dirksen even suggested that the “red fascists” inspired the German camp system: “Why, it was from Russia that the infamous Hitler got the technique for Dachau. Make no mistake about it, it was borrowed from the people who would create an empire of the mind in the world and destroy freedom in this country.”46 American leaders knew of Russian exile camps as early as the Bolshevik Revolution, but as Adler and Paterson wrote, “the German experience . . . seems to have stamped the image of the concentration camp, with all its overtones of mass extermination and unbridled terror, on the Russian camps.”47 Thus, the rhetoric of slavery was politicized under a totalitarian label through the iconic symbol of the camp. Rather than victims of human cruelty, camp laborers were victims of political ideology (“an empire of the mind”), a more abstract formulation that the abstract lines of a map supported well. To place a Russian camp on the map, then, was to fix it inside a war of ideas between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The potential of “Gulag”—Slavery, Inc.” to participate in this unfolding ideological volley quickly became apparent, as Levine’s map spread out from its Plain Talk origins shortly after its publication. The U.K. Tribune
adapted it and placed it prominently on its back cover in October of 1947. Next, a November editorial in the *Chicago Tribune* praised the map’s overseas circulation, as it “exposed more perfectly than a million words could do the essential character of the rulers of Russia and the creed which they espouse.” By validating the use of maps over language, the editors were prizing cartography’s ability to stand-in for a traditional argument and compress political issues into one comprehensive visual field. In addition, the *Tribune* editorial valorized the authentic production process of the map, highlighting that the *Plain Talk* editors “based their study on nearly 14,000 affidavits and other documentary material obtained from liberated slaves.” Finally, the editorial also sustains Levine’s slavery label, reminding the audience of the Soviet Union’s profit from a system built on “human material.” The Chicago editorial thus situated the map in a powerful narrative about visuality, authenticity, and placement, which all came to be seen as necessary tools in the war against Soviet ideology. What they hide, we are able to locate and display—a powerful claim to authority over Cold War space.

With these rumblings about the specific location of labor camps, the issue began to gather greater attention. In November of 1947, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) made a formal proposal to UNESCO in the hope that the Council would begin an international investigation of forced labor. By early 1949, the AFL’s Toni Sender made the official presentation of the case against the U.S.S.R. at a UNESCO convention in Chile, claiming to have volumes of testimony from escapees and marshaled evidence that “some of these labor camps are reported to be grouped together in huge clusters, with hundreds of thousands of inmates.” Later that year, the AFL collected its various publications and testimonies into a full-length volume called *Slave Labor in Russia*, which circulated widely with first-hand testimonies of camp victims, emphasizing once again the accuracy and authenticity of evidence as well as the systemic nature of slave labor.

Ultimately, while the AFL’s UNESCO project garnered a lot of attention, months passed and no official report or response came. The AFL began to try alternate routes from the UN; through its Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC), the union decided to wage a specific campaign galvanizing both domestic and international public opinion in a more innovative way, and the Gulag map offered that kind of innovation. The FTUC was covertly funded by the CIA, according to historian Russell Bartley, as a “cold war
foreign relations arm of the AFL used by successive U.S. administrations to combat communist influence in the international labor movement.” Jay Lovestone, head of the FTUC, had been a CIA operative since 1948 and was specifically using agency money to fund the research for the map. Around this same time, the State Department’s ongoing campaign since the end of World War II to combat Soviet forced labor converged with the AFL’s, and behind the scenes the State Department threw its efforts into supporting the map’s production. Lovestone’s office then corresponded with Isaac Don Levine throughout 1950 and paid him to commission a new and improved update of “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.” The new edition included updated statistics from the New York Association of Former Political Prisoners of Soviet Labor Camps, as well as new testimony originating through the AFL’s UNESCO research. The map was finished in early 1951 and was first sent out to union newspapers and newsletters advertising that copies of the map could be distributed by request.

The production of “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.” is inextricable from this complex and contentious entry of American organized labor into the U.S. government’s anti-Communist agenda. A distinct rhetorical tension emerged between domestic and international anti-communism, which material images like the Gulag map had to negotiate. For example, it is not incidental that the AFL referred to the Taft-Hartley Act’s (1947) extensive restrictions on labor activism as a “slave labor bill”; yet, while AFL leaders fought the Taft-Hartley restrictions, they also took the opportunity to shore-up their anti-Communist credentials in the wake of serious challenges by both liberals and conservatives. What resulted was a tenuous alliance between labor and government. Especially as McCarthyism began to shine a spotlight on unions and the Wisconsin senator’s investigations increased in scope, the incentive of the AFL to take stances on militant, leftist unionism in its own ranks grew to include hard-line anti-Communist stances toward their union “brothers” abroad. The AFL was quickly drafted into routing out Communists and militant unions all over the world, through initiatives like the FTUC. Some claim that this collaboration resulted in practices that benefited U.S. corporate management practices and government power to put down workers’ challenges, while union leaders received a “minor share in the decision-making process and increasing economic rewards.”
So, the irony is that while on one hand the Gulag map was most certainly a bold protest document against oppressive labor practices, it also helped to suppress political dissent by serving as an *image of commitment* for organized labor to the government’s Cold War goals—an ideological stance that did not necessarily benefit them materially. The black humor in the “Inc.” of the map’s title, then, is doubly ironic—it places the U.S.S.R. as a “corporate” slave labor system that perversely apes capitalism, while at the same time the AFL found itself increasingly *incorporated* into government policies. Still, to downplay these official government interests became part of the map’s strategy. As William Young, a consultant for Army Operations Research, pointed out, the public authorship of the AFL was key to the map’s circulation:

The authority of the AFL in many ways would probably outweigh the name of the US government, should it have attached its name to the document. It might then have been shrugged off as just another round in the propaganda battle between two governments. But here is a free trade union, the recognized spokesman for millions of American workingmen and associated internationally with many foreign labor organizations, presenting the laboring man’s case against the nation that presents itself as the sole international champion of labor.63

The Gulag map’s label as a labor project, then, allowed it to have a more fluid movement through the culture, as it could divorce itself from the top-down objectives of overt, government-sponsored propaganda and mitigate the ironies of its production. Thus, the map’s origins show an image-text becoming part of a productive rapprochement between private institutional goals, government objectives, and the public opinion function of Cold War popular media.

**Power and Placement: Reading “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.”**

To borrow from Wood and Fels, a map has spatial authority because of its use of “postings,” or “the fundamental cartographic proposition that *this is there*.”64 The map becomes an index of signs, then, that makes existence claims and asks for validation and social assent from its users. The Gulag map is an especially potent example of the power of posting: to be able to
infiltrate enemy Soviet spaces and claim that “this is there” becomes a way of vying for control through the use of spatial knowledge; writes Carruthers, “Bound tightly to new geopolitical exigencies, awareness of the Soviet camp system expanded during the early 1950s, encouraged by a state keen to spectacularize knowledge production through dramatic trials, witness testimony, and graphic representations.”65 The “spectacularization of knowledge production” is a fitting name, as the map provided the appropriate aesthetic drama to the statistical information on display.

The first visual choice to note in the Gulag map is simply how the sprawling nature of the Soviet landmass fills the entire frame itself, but also features the connection to Eastern Europe and Asia, thus contextualizing the U.S.S.R.’s placement within the Eastern hemisphere. The map draws the forced labor problem as spilling over into the spaces of Poland, implying that the Soviet Union is a continually expanding power. The landmass is slightly rounded so that the U.S.S.R. appears uncontainable and, in Levine’s early version, even spilling off the left side of the frame. The overall effect contrasts the stretch of the Soviet Union with the networks of the camps inside. We also see labor camps as far north as Franz Joseph Land in the Arctic, bordering in the south on Iran and Afghanistan, and stretching all the way to the Chukotsk Peninsula where Alaska juts into the frame. As Levine explained in Plain Talk, “The boundaries of the slave labor regions have been drawn here with a view to understatement. All the territory controlled by GULAG, if consolidated, would make a submerged empire exceeding in area the boundaries of Western Europe.”66 Such a comparison hints that the Soviet Union is potentially about to spill into the spaces of Western Europe. In addition, the higher density of sickles in the western part of Russia divorces the camps from their perceived isolation in the wastelands of Siberia and instead places the camps right inside the highly populated West. This implicitly argues that forced labor plagued the whole landscape, even the so-called civilized spaces of Europe. Such a wholeness reinforces the ability of “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.” to become a map-as-logo in Benedict Anderson’s terms and associate all of Russia and East Europe as one emblematic camp.67

In addition to these themes of size and scope, the use of iconography across the spread of the landmass marks an important rhetorical choice. In particular, the hammer-and-sickle icons in the AFL map “nationalize” the Soviet Gulag as a state system. Levine’s earlier map used only dots and
circles to associate certain networks of camps together, suggesting the

camps as more localized and isolated. But the AFL map lets the camp stand

in for the nation by mediating it with an iconic Cold War symbol. Such

iconic choices create a kind of artificiality in the Gulag map. The camps are

not to be seen as naturally occurring, but as imposed by Soviet power on the

land. The stark color contrast featuring the bold red on the grays and whites

contributes to the wider claim that the Soviets have an unnatural kind of

ideology, the colors connoting a potential rash. The AFL map also emboldens

railroad lines in deep black, with the dotted camps adhering in formation to these lines, thus heightening the focus on the corporate nature of

Soviet labor by subtly emphasizing the industrial system that relies on forced labor to perpetuate it. Supporting the “Inc.” of the title, these choices

represent an American attack on Soviet ideology as a top-down project that

forces itself on to a natural landscape. The choices of accompanying text

support these themes of artificiality. In Levine’s version, for example, the

captions feature facts about the types of materials that individual camps

produce: Sorokski produces light metal from nearby mines, Ussolski con-

tributes to war industries and “construction of underground airfields.”

The inclusion of these details about the products of slave labor serves as a parody of what a typical map of industries and natural resources would look like. A conventional map might conceal the sources of production for such resources, but the Gulag map subverts those expectations by revealing that it is slave labor that motors these engines of industry. Here, the Gulag map’s use of parody reveals cartographic form as almost inhuman—that the effect of these places all over the map is the prizing of Communist ideology over real, human cost.

Perhaps what the Gulag map visually demands, though, most of all is for the user to affirm its authenticity—to accept that these abstract dots correspond to real camps on the ground. The map producers are promoting their very ability to map such forbidden areas, and the propositional power of place allows the viewer to consent that the information constituting the map must be authentic and verifiable. But the producers of “Gulag”—Slavery, Inc.” are careful not to arrange their facts in an overly scientistic way. With its hand-drawn place names, simple use of icons, and lack of other geographic information about the Soviet Union, the overall crudeness of the presentation lacks the emphasis on cartographic technique and technology found, for instance, in the National Geographic’s Cold War-era maps.
The professional origins of the map are concealed; it looks almost as if it had been produced by a camp survivor. The collection of information is made to appear more experiential in its production, rather than compiled by institutions with large financial resources and state-of-the-art cartographic technologies. Thus, the Gulag map can appear as an authentic tour map on a death trail from camp to camp.

The map especially supports these arguments for authenticity through its use of passports, photographs, and captions in the marginalia. Here, the Gulag map builds an architecture around the frame that attempts to affirm the material “truth” of forced labor. Thus, the map’s production itself becomes a subject of the presentation. For example, the AFL widely distributed a pamphlet in 1951, *Slave Labor in the Soviet World*, featuring a pitch black cover with red writing and a stark barbed wire graphic running throughout the pages. A version of the Gulag map provided the centerpiece of the pamphlet; this edition pitted the map of the Soviet Union against the black background, divorcing it from its placement in the wider world. The photos of the camp children are absent; here, the main focus resides on the survivors’ “passports”—three of these certificates are connected by black lines to where they came from on the landscape. The focus shifts from the sheer scale of the camp system and instead foregrounds the authenticity of the map’s evidence, thus accentuating cartography’s ability to actualize forbidden knowledge. This focus is consonant with the AFL’s claim that “these bare documents, statistics, and affidavits are not addressed to scholars alone. They are addressed to the conscience of the free world. This time the world must believe.” That bareness and simplicity in the design form become the map’s content itself: that the pernicious nature of Soviet ideology is a stark, self-evident truth.

While details on each passport are difficult to make out, the documents work together to make claims of existence—that these official papers have been acquired at great peril and affirm our knowledge of what the Soviets are doing. The caption supplements this notion:

A typical “passport” in the center of the upper left section is of the Sorokski Administration. . . . It reads: “USSR—People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD)—Administration of Railroad Construction and Sorokski Correctional Labor Camp—December 15, 1951—number 4/58024/16—City of
Belomorsk.” The seals and signatures of the commanders, Kliuchkov and Georgeyev, are appended.76

These almost mundane details of state bureaucracy on the release certificates are strategically used not only to support the authentic, material existence of Soviet forced labor but also to accentuate the autocratic nature of Soviet state power. Highlighting commander signatures, for example, assigns ownership of forced labor to the Soviet leaders. The very existence of these documents, and their placement into readers’ hands, places the United States in the position to infiltrate Soviet space with the power of precise and accurate knowledge itself.

The other key pieces of marginalia, of course, are the photos of camp children, which complicate these appeals to authenticity. In most editions, the viewer sees a half-circle marked by a thick red line, containing three pie-slice shaped photographs of what look to be camp prisoners, with the simple title “‘GULAG’ Children” above the center photo.77 That central photo features the face of an emaciated child staring straight at the viewer, and the child is wearing a crucifix. The surrounding two photos feature similarly emaciated children. In very small print below the photos is a caption with more information about the photo’s young subjects: “The photographs in the insert, taken in Teheran in early 1942, show typical examples of thousands of children upon their release from Soviet concentration camps. Left to right: Barbara Sliwinska, aged 2; Jan Gorski, 14; Monek Finkelstein, 12.” The photographs participate in transferring mediated experiences of fascism onto Soviet communism. As Levine has pointed out, most of the data for the map’s compilation came from affidavit testimonies from Polish prisoners upon being discharged from the camps in late 1941.78 This “Polishness” of both the map’s data and the bodies of the children draw on recent World War II memories that link the Polish nationality with the enactment of genocide. The choice of children is particularly poignant: these are not men who could have been encamped for political purposes or for petty crimes, but are innocents who are potentially still free of Soviet ideology, which makes it easier for Americans, in particular, to identify with their victimage. According to Ziva Amishai-Maisels, the trope of the “child alone” who “stares at the spectator” in Holocaust depictions was “the symbol par excellence of the innocent victim, a prime factor in confronting the world’s conscience.”79 The focal point of the
crucifix further buttresses this moral identification, infiltrating a Christian symbol into what is seen as an atheistic space. Altogether, then, the photos’ uncomfortable corporeality disrupts the clean and abstract lines of the map.

In addition, the placement of these photos on the map is a key piece of rhetorical selection. The half-circle of photos sits within the map itself, but outside the confines of the U.S.S.R., slightly below center and to the right. In this way, the photos do not distract from the map’s main focus on the camps; yet, the photos are so striking that they cannot be merely supporting evidence—the map and the photos exist in a tense interplay. With the caption of each child’s name so small, the photos become more of a generic symbol of oppression. The Gulag map, then, argues that “these bodies can be located anywhere in this landscape,” thus equating the entire Soviet landmass with the anonymous, oppressed bodies. So, even as the photographs add specificity and emotional weight to the map, the images ultimately support a more abstract argument that the Soviets have created a vast, impersonal system. Atrocity is generalized into a “moral lesson” about political ideology.80 For Barbie Zelizer, “the repair work required in the immediate years after the war demanded a unified public, and keeping Nazi brutality at the forefront of public attention” eased the ability of the U.S. government to “move on to postwar agendas.”81 Similarly, Amishai-Maisels notes that images of atrocity moved from the contingent and particular and instead suggested “man’s condition in the postwar world, his anxiety because of pending (rather than past) catastrophes.”82 Certainly, then, “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” employs the truth-value of a photograph to document and provide witness, but it also complicates this value by politicizing holocaust visuality for a postwar agenda—with the Cold War being the very embodiment of an always “pending catastrophe.”

Ultimately, this perpetuation of a wartime mentality is a central part of the whole presentation of the map. Shawn J. Parry-Giles’s rhetorical analysis of Cold War propaganda notes a shift from a journalistic paradigm, where propaganda is posited as news, toward a centralized, militaristic paradigm, where propaganda is waged in the visual and linguistic frames of military crisis with the Soviet Union.83 The Gulag map provides an interesting cartographic extension of this paradigm shift. The producers of the map have worked hard to present the map as an authentic and journalistic eye-witness to the reality of forced labor. Yet, the Gulag map’s power to cross Soviet borders and map the “unmappable” marks, however subtly, a
more militant infiltration of Soviet space. The cartographers employ holo-
cust memory by symbolically presenting camp bodies as wartime victims
and the end results of Soviet aggression—the map goes beyond visualizing a
mere containment of Soviet space and engages in an offensive strategy.\textsuperscript{84}
The juxtaposition of the photos with the system of camps suggests that the
horrors of World War II are still ongoing: the enemies may have changed,
but there is still an enemy.\textsuperscript{85}

Finally, what compounds these connections between photos, document-
yary evidence, and captions is a key piece of the “paramap”: the centered
bolded statement at the bottom of the 1951 edition, which reads: “A Reward
of $1,000 Will Be Paid by the Free Trade Union Committee for Evidence
Disproving the Authenticity of the Soviet Documents Here Reproduced.”\textsuperscript{86}
The “reward” function redirects the map away from the merely informa-
tional and gives it a more overt kind of propositional power—the map now
demands a response by issuing a challenge to engage with its claims to
authenticity. The map-using audience is asked for its involvement,
strengthening the map’s function as an arbiter of public opinion. Still,
because of the map’s bounded completeness and claims to authority, this
engagement with public opinion is less about interactivity and more about
consensus and social assent.\textsuperscript{87} The large amount of the reward (for 1951),
combined with the authoritative authenticity of the map’s postings that
“this is there,” reminds the viewer that this display is essentially inarguable.

\textbf{THE CIRCULATION OF ““GULAG”—SLAVERY, INC.”}

While an interpretative reading of the Gulag map can assess its ideological
values and visual codes, to stop there is to fall prey to the age-old conception
of maps as mere products, to assume that they are somehow finished and
stable. But, as geographer John Pickles writes, “the whole map is a study in
suggestion, in which cartographic techniques are used to depict a particular
situation in such a way that both the intrinsic meaning and the suggested
meaning resonate with other texts and images beyond [the] single map.”\textsuperscript{88}
Maps, then, are processes of meaning-making that are “discursively embed-
ded within broader contexts of social action and power” and constrained by
their relationships with other texts.\textsuperscript{89} “Gulag”—Slavery, Inc.” exemplifies
cartography as this kind of living medium; its very material flow through
Cold War culture reinforces the power of strategic elites to \textit{place} their
incriminating knowledge of the Soviet Union in the hands of a diverse array of audiences.

Initially, the Gulag map was promoted through union channels to provide information about Soviet forced labor to members. Yet, after newspapers like the *Minneapolis Star Tribune* and the *Baltimore Sun* began to feature it prominently, the demand for the map, and the diversity of that demand, grew heavily. Headlines like “Russia’s Slave Labor Camps Hold 14 Million” strategically accentuated the sheer scale in the slave labor system; text and visuals combined to communicate a sense of capacity and volume, thus consolidating the map’s ability to abstractly project statistics across a provocative aesthetic image. Publications like the *Christian Science Monitor* and the *NEA Daily News* would take the basic Gulag map and then reproduce it in their own particular graphic style—for example, the NEA “newspaperizes” the map into simple dots, lines, and gradient shading to fit the conventions and constraints of their format. In this, “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.” was becoming an ever more fluid text, adaptable and contestable depending on the requirements of its producers. Of course, the circulation of the map reached, perhaps, its zenith after sensational reports of the showdown between Representative Armstrong and Gromyko at the San Francisco conference. The use of photos of the Gromyko-Armstrong exchange in *Time* and the *Los Angeles Times* suggested that the map had concrete effects in the “real” relations of the Cold War. In addition, the *New York Times* also prominently highlighted Gromyko’s verbal response that “It would be interesting to know what capitalist slave is the author of this map,” adding new complications to the “slave” theme. These uses once again affirmed “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.” as a Cold War weapon, designed to provoke response and counter-responses, and thus requiring continual recirculation.

The domestic response to “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.” wildly exceeded expectations. The AFL fielded requests for reprints from a wide diversity of institutions—particularly labor unions, high schools, universities, and churches, but also government and military institutions. The superintendent of the Minneapolis Public Schools wrote that the map “would be used and viewed by upward of 1,100 pupils and teachers.” A Methodist pastor in Flemington, Pennsylvania, requested the map “to use it with several study groups in the local church as we study the evils and dangers of communism to our way of life.” A Massachusetts high school debate club wrote to the
AFL for use of “Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.” in building their negative case on “Wartime Citizen Conscription.” Even individual citizens requested maps: Martin Berach of Barberton, Ohio, wrote that “my interest in it is to show it to some of my friends who argue that such a thing does not exist in Soviet Russia”; A. D. Kuzow of Los Angeles asked politely of the AFL, “Would you kindly send me the map of your slave labor camps of the atheistic Soviet Union?”; and William Chamberlain of Dayton justified that “I would like very much to have a copy for several reasons; one of the best of these is that it is a very clever way of building up American patriotism.”

Such a diverse array of requests contributed to yet a new role for “Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.”: that of an emblem for Cold War citizenship. Engaging with the map had an educational and civic function, seen as a public duty by many to spread awareness about the oppressiveness of Soviet ideology. For example, the 1951 AFL pamphlet Slave Labor in Soviet Russia, which was continually requested by schools and civic groups, activated the map as a living document that was meant to be passed around and displayed. The pamphlet urged the reader to “show this pamphlet to your friends, especially to those who are not aware of the existence of slave-labor camps” and “show this pamphlet to anyone you know who talks of or believes in Soviet ‘democracy’ and Soviet ‘socialism.’” This involved the map’s ability to showcase the knowledge production that was central to the Cold War—to know (and to quantify) the spaces of the Soviet enemy is to be a consenting participant in the conflict. Yet, the map’s employment in these various contexts suggests that this cartographic knowledge needed to be actually understood, taught, and disseminated by citizens themselves in meaningful social exchanges.

The map was also growing in utility as an international Cold War weapon, used to break through iron curtains and provoke confrontations. Not only would it find use in “official” diplomacy between actors like Armstrong and Gromyko, the Gulag map would become a key example of “public diplomacy,” characterized by Nicholas Cull as “a top-down dynamic whereby governments distributed information to foreign publics using capital-intensive methods such as international radio, exhibitions, and libraries.” For example, Voice of America broadcasts picked up the Gromyko story and described the map to viewers on the air, even offering to mail it out by request. The story circulated widely in Latin America, and Voice of America received 400 air-mail requests in the first 24-hour period
after the broadcast. The Government Printing Office then printed thousands of Spanish-language versions for distribution through the United States Information Service offices.¹⁰³ As a Chilean miner wrote to the Voice of America, “Please send me the map you offered so that I may show it to my coworkers, who, unfortunately, are influenced by the poison of Communism.”¹⁰⁴ Thus, the Gulag map could serve official government objectives in Latin America by creating the appearance of a public service function.

The map served similar purposes throughout Cold War Europe.¹⁰⁵ In West Berlin, the map was plastered strategically so that it could be seen by people crossing the zonal boundary during a Communist youth festival.¹⁰⁶ The AFL contracted for German translations, and 5,000 were specifically pressed in Germany, through the Department of State, to be posted on factory bulletin boards.¹⁰⁷ A French language version was also produced for distribution and the Swiss weekly Die Nation published the map.¹⁰⁸ A commissioner for the U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration’s Special Mission in Iceland was “anxious to use this [map] as information for propaganda in that country where there has been communistic activity” and commented that “personally I think the whole thing is the best piece of propaganda against communism that I have seen.”¹⁰⁹ Behind the Iron Curtain, the Hungarian National Council requested thousands of reprints, and the Yugoslav Trade Unionists sought copies as well, although they had to make their request clandestinely through Norwegian unions out of fear of police action.¹¹⁰

Soviet reaction to this kind of spread in Europe reached a fever pitch shortly after the Gromyko incident. In October 1951, Soviet military police seized 500,000 copies of the map, which was being printed through United States Information Service channels in Vienna for the German-language paper Wiener Kurier.¹¹¹ Officials reportedly called the map a “filthy pamphlet” and “an effort to slander,” which started a war of words with Walter J. Donnelly, the U.S. High Commissioner for Austria, who protested for the map’s “prompt release” and called the Soviet response “an uncultured piece of sophistry.”¹¹² The contracted printer for the United States Information Service lived in the United States sector of Vienna, but sent it across town to be finished by a binder and his wife, who lived in the tenth district of the Soviet sector. That ability of the map to penetrate Soviet space became literalized, as the map makes its visual arguments but also exists as a material force, with the processes of its production and even its printing
becoming part of a Cold War offensive. A *New York Times* editorial about the Vienna incident spoke to this strategic use of “placement” in engineering a Soviet response: the editors point out that up to now “there has been no effort at refutation, no denial of the map’s accuracy, no invitation to foreigners or UN observers to visit these places and check for themselves.” Yet, with the seizure in Vienna, that original silence now was disrupted by the “brute force of police,” which was, as the *Times* argues “the most eloquent proof that the map was irrefutable with logic or with facts.” The binder’s subsequent arrest prompted a letter from AFL’s Matthew Woll directly to Dean Acheson at the State Department to protest the unfair treatment of international workers and the suppression of free speech. Thus, in keeping with the increasingly militaristic propaganda of the early 1950s, the map was being mobilized in more systematic efforts to combat the Soviet Union.

As if the map had not penetrated enough into foreign policy initiatives and international incidents, there were attempts to take the map’s mediated reach even further. It was reported that a Hollywood motion picture studio was preparing a short film on the map to be released nationally in commercial houses. The American Federation of Musicians even proposed to the AFL a project run jointly with Voice of America to record an album of Russian “slave labor songs” to raise awareness of the issue, complete with the suggestion that the “album should carry the famous AFL slave labor map, as a background.” And, in a novel demonstration of organized labor drawing on the map to fight its own domestic battles, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen used copies for an organizing drive in Bakersfield, California, against the Communist-led International Longshoremen’s Union, which was headed by controversial labor activist Harry Bridges. The map, then, was employed not just in a battle against an “alien” Soviet ideology but also against a homegrown problem in the labor movement, thus showing how a map could fight the Cold War *inside* the borders of the United States as well.

The public engagement with the Gulag map eventually died down by early 1953, but the forced labor issue continued to be a frequent public and government concern during the Cold War, sparking a series of reports and hearings. The AFL also would use maps in its ensuing campaign against forced labor in China, drawing on the style of “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.,” but not reaching the same kind of international attention. Still, the map itself
continued to leave traces long after its remarkable circulation. The U.S. Army would include the map in its periodical “surveys of literature” in training its officers about the Soviet Union all the way into the 1970s, and it also was used by academics to teach effective methods in psychological warfare. The U.S. Army would include the map in its periodical “surveys of literature” in training its officers about the Soviet Union all the way into the 1970s, and it also was used by academics to teach effective methods in psychological warfare. And during Aleksander Solzhenitsyn’s famed post-Nobel prize winning tour of Washington, D.C., in June 1975, his speech brought “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.” back into public memory: “When liberal thinkers and wise men of the West, who had forgotten the meaning of the word ‘liberty,’ were swearing that in the Soviet Union there were no concentration camps at all, the American Federation of Labor, published in 1947, a map of our concentration camps, and on behalf of all of the prisoners of those times, I want to thank the American workers’ movement.” Here, Solzhenitsyn recasts and (re)remembers the map as a protest document from “brothers in labor,” dissociating the hand of American state power that sanctioned the map.

And, finally, as the Cold War re-ignited in the early 1980s, with renewed institutional rhetoric by the U.S. government against the Soviet Union, “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.” would continue its flow through Cold War culture. In 1982, the U.S. Senate adopted Resolution 449, which expressed fears that human rights violations were being committed in the construction of the trans-Siberian pipeline. The State Department’s report included a map detailing the extent of the camps in the Soviet Union; the original ideological zeal of the AFL maps had been subverted into the familiar State Department cartographic style, resulting in a more staid, “scientific” political map of the Soviet Union. The report also featured an aerial perspective map of the inside of a forced labor camp. Thus, in the evolution of the Gulag map, the State Department could now dramatically hyper-focus on infiltrating Soviet space with more sophisticated and precise technologies, a stark departure from the crude but effective hammer-and-sickle propaganda of the old AFL map. And yet, coming full circle, the AFL-CIO devoted a spread to its old classic “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.” in November 1982, reprinting the map and reminding its members that “American Labor was first to raise its voice against the slave labor system in the USSR.” In one of its final public appearances, then, the Gulag map was being appropriated for a new purpose—for the AFL to reclaim the map as part of its institutional memory and commemorate organized labor’s role in waging Cold War.
CONCLUSION

It is perhaps the footnote status of “Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.” that makes it a compelling case. The map has long been buried as a curio in the cultural propaganda exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union, and was ultimately only an isolated kind of success—there were no more systematic attempts to use maps as propaganda documents on such an international scale. But a revisiting of this often-overlooked map allows rhetorical scholars and historians an entry into the everyday flow of Cold War culture. This culture actually draws the map and gives it meaning beyond what the map simply displays on the page. The State Department could use the Gulag map as a diplomatic weapon in its mission to cultivate international opinion, the AFL could use it as evidence of its commitment to anticommunism around the world (and in its own ranks), while citizens could use it as a frame for Cold War citizenship. To paraphrase Finnegan, the Gulag map was an “eventful image,” materially working its way through many contexts and marshaled into Cold War skirmishes both public and private—and it reminds us that any reading of a cartographic image must negotiate maps as both product and process. That tension is what gives mapping an explosive dimension in a highly spatialized conflict such as the Cold War.

“Why a map?” remains a viable question in this case. If the focus is on having the authentic evidence to prove the existence of forced labor camps, then why not make the camp photos or the release certificates the main subject of the display? A plausible answer lies in this competition for the locatory power of placement between the United States and the Soviet Union. The photos and the release certificates need the map to anchor them in a particular spatial network—that act of mapping commits the existence of forced labor, as authenticated through photos and documents, into the international, bipolar geopolitics of the Cold War. And in an era of heightened ideological conflict between two nuclear superpowers, the need for scientific abstraction and management grew. A map could manage facts with efficiency and cleanliness in ways that photographs could not and could “place” its information through the use of aggregate forms. Young wrote that the Gulag map contains

no direct call for righteous indignation, no appeal to forswear communism or close one’s ears to the siren call of the Soviet. Instead, it is largely almost placidly
informative. The reader may draw his own conclusions as to whether he is for or against such a system. Thus it is not surprising that the Gulag map has been one of the most widely circulated pieces of anti-communist literature.\(^{127}\)

Young, thus, directly attributes the map’s commitment to authenticity as key to its circulatory success. This suggests that the Gulag map’s power of placement in making an incendiary argument necessarily draws on cartography’s own perpetual story of itself as a self-evident reflection of truths about the world. As Wood and Fels write, “The most fundamental cartographic claim is to be a system of facts, and its history has most often been written as the story of its ability to present those facts with ever increasing accuracy.”\(^{128}\)

And, yet, the Gulag map has a peculiar relationship to both accuracy and authenticity. The entire story of the map revolves around a constant defense of its evidentiary claims and attempts to affirm the validity of the abstract visual evidence (the reward for disproving its authenticity; the New York Times defense of the map after its seizure overseas, and so forth). This consistent reinforcement of the Gulag map’s authenticity by a variety of agents leads to an important conclusion: that there existed an obvious anxiety about the potentially provocative artificiality of this map. Producers and audiences were tacitly acknowledging that the Gulag map was a highly charged rhetorical document that bared its ideological convictions, not a self-evident scientific aid. The map’s agents, then, put in a considerable amount of discursive work to support the map, making for a fascinating, multilayered circulation.

Ultimately, the anxiety around “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.” reflects a larger anxiety about the artificial, abstract nature of the very Cold War conflict that the map helped (re)produce. The active “rhetorical life” of this map can be read as a demonstration that the Cold War had to be continually manufactured and readapted, and truly required a dynamic, material engagement with a host of international audiences. As the United States produced knowledge about the Soviets, it had to place that knowledge with authority. America is nowhere to be seen on this map, but outside the margins, the map’s content, its production, and its circulation very much concern the placement of American values in the Cold War—the power of knowledge in the where of the Cold War. The Gulag map starkly “reveals” what was not supposed to be known, a visual rendering of forbidden and lurid knowledge; in this way, the map attempts to spatially infiltrate the usually impenetrable land-
scape of the U.S.S.R.. The archetypal Cold War map of the early 1950s, often found in newspapers and magazines such as *Time* and *Newsweek*, shows an expanding Soviet Union with arrows (or, infamously, tentacles) tracing its “reach” across the earth. Yet, typically, the Soviet Union is presented in these maps as one homogenous mass, with legends and captions admitting that there exists a lack of knowledge in what its borders contain. The Gulag map, instead, subverts this homogenization by locating the Cold War *within* the borders of the U.S.S.R.—a kind of rhetorical coup for the United States.

Still, this subversion can, perhaps, only go so far. Geographer Sanjay Chaturvedi points out that in Cold War geopolitics, often “the singular attributes of a particular place were subordinated to its perceived position in the abstract spaces of the Cold War.” The Gulag map remains an interesting case because while it emphasizes the placement of particular camps and even includes the human connection to those places (children’s bodies, signatures on passports), it still serves the abstract objectives of the Cold War, allowing the Soviet Union to become “pure negative space” on the map and blunting America’s ability to socially protest against forced labor. Much of cartography’s service during the Cold War was for strategic management of increasingly abstract and technologized international spaces, and the Gulag map was inextricable from this context. The map might poignantly protest the plight of prisoners, but the map is equally situated as a tool of surveillance that affirms the era’s essential bipolarity. In the end, “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.” does not just display the Cold War, it commits its audiences to it and locates them within it. For Lawrence Grossberg, a map is “a geography of becomings” and thus “the places marked as history, time and reproduction can be invested with a great deal of intensity or even power.” In the case of “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.,” by filling Soviet space with points representing labor camps and then circulating the map into actual Soviet territory and at home, the U.S. coalition of labor unions and foreign policy elites spatialized and literally projected their power on to the flat page and into the culture of the Cold War.

**NOTES**

3. See also the photo in “Gromyko Given Russ Map With Slave Camps,” *Los Angeles Times*, September 7, 1951, 2.


33. The foldout, distributed version of Levine’s *Plain Talk* map can be found at the George Meany Archives, which house the historical records of the AFL-CIO. See “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.: *Plain Talk* Version,” RG98, Box 55, Vertical Files 1881–1999, Folder: Slave Labor 1919–1950, George Meany Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, MD. Hereafter, these Archives will be referred to as GMM.

34. Levine, “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.,” 237.


37. Dallin and Nicolaevsky, *Forced Labor*, 55–57, 60, 64–65. It is difficult to say whether Dallin or Levine influenced each other’s map, but it is clear that both are based around the map in the 1945 volume *La Justice Sovietique* by two Polish military officers, Sylvester Mora and Pierre Zwierniak—one of the first books to bring in firsthand accounts by prisoners and to feature some of the first attempts at quantifying slave labor. The etymology of the Polish map’s origins and how it came to influence Levine is unclear. Dallin directly cites *La Justice Sovietique*—his map of “The Corrective Labor Camps, 1942” contains a note that simply says, “After Mora and Zwierniak, *La Justice Sovietique*.” And in his suggestions for further reading, Dallin mentions *La Justice* as “one of the most important books ever to appear on Russian prison camps” and that “the map attached to the book is of great interest and value.” Levine never explicitly cites Mora and Zwierniak, but does mention that most of his sources are Polish. To make the matter more confusing, a *Catholic Digest* article from 1952 says that the “map had been compiled by a former Soviet citizen and was first published in Rome in 1945 in a book, *La Justice Sovietique*. American Federation of Labor investigators revised it the next year to include information obtained by questioning inmates and officials.” This article makes no mention of Levine. And none of these sources indicate how the design firm Sigman-Ward compiled and drew their version of the map that ended up in *Plain Talk*. See Dallin and Nicolaevsky, *Forced Labor*, 60, 313; Paul Wohl, “Seven Million Soviet Slaves,” *Catholic Digest*, March 1952, 44. The only available copy of *La Justice* is the Italian version at the Law Division of the Library of Congress. Silvestro Mora and Pietro Zwierniak, *Giustizia Sovietica* (Rome: Magi-Spinetti, 1945).


39. A good example of the cross-flow between popular and government perspectives on the forced labor issue is in Mississippi Representative John E. Rankin speaking on April 15, 1947, about the need to make a complete break with Communist Russia, where he also inserts Max Eastman’s 1947 *Reader’s Digest* article “The Truth About


45. President Harry S. Truman, “The President’s Special Conference With the Association of Radio News Analysts,” *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1947* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1963), 238. This quote is also cited in Adler and Paterson, “Red Fascism,” 1046.


47. Adler and Paterson, “Red Fascism,” 1053.


50. “Slavery in Russia,” 20.

51. In the meantime, the AFL issued various manifestos and editorials protesting Soviet labor camps at its various conferences and in several of its publications, also working on a controversial “International Bill of Rights” for the UN to outlaw involuntary servitude and concentration camps all over the globe. Young, “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.,” 599. See also: GMM, RG98, Box 55, Vertical Files 1881–1999, Folder: Slave Labor 1919–1950.


53. Young, “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.,” 599.

54. For more on the Free Trade Union Committee and its work during this time, see GMM, RG18, Series 1, Box 35, Folders 19–27.


57. Department of State Decimal Files 1950–1954, 861.064, Box 5157, Record Group 59, National Archives II, College Park.

58. The Free Trade Union Committee’s correspondence with Levine can be found in GMM, International Affairs Department, Jay Lovestone Files, 1939–1974, RG18, Box 47, Folder 11.


63. Young, “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.,” 601.

64. Wood and Fels, The Natures of Maps, xvi.

65. Carruthers, Cold War Captives, 133.


68. For a discussion of how iconography works in the internal “codes” of maps, see Denis Wood and John Fels, “Designs on Signs/Myth and Meaning in Maps,” Cartographica 23 (1986): 73–78.


70. For a discussion of how parody has been used in maps of social change, see Barney, “Power Lines,” 421–22.


72. A representative example can be found in National Geographic Society, “World Map 1951,” Library of Congress, Title Collection, World International Relations Folder.


75. The George Meany Archives contains a sizable amount of these original documentary passports and testimonies from former prisoners. For example, see GMM, International Affairs Department, Irving Brown Files 1943–1989, RG18, Box 59, Folders 14 and 15.

76. See the caption on AFL, “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.”

77. The pictures of the camp victims were omitted from the AFL Slave Labor in the Soviet World pamphlet, and a few of the newspaper reprints would also omit the photos.

78. Levine, “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.,” 238.


80. Amishai-Maisels, Depiction and Interpretation, xxxii.


82. Amishai-Maisels, Depiction and Interpretation, 145.


85. A story from the AFL Weekly News Reporter from 1953 extends this Polish connection to slave labor even further, noting that the International Federation of Free Journalists had created a map showing the location of 74 forced labor camps in Poland, and noted that “escaped Poles said the food and organization of the camps are very similar to the original Nazi system.” The actual map, though, in reference, could not be found. See “Modern Slave Camps Exposed,” AFL Weekly News Reporter, January 2, 1953—located in GMM, Vertical Files 1881–1999, Folder: Slave Labor 1951–1984, RG98, Box 55.

86. AFL, “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.”

87. Wood and Fels, The Natures of Maps, xvi.


95. For example, the diplomatic mission in the Netherlands, the U.S. Air Defense Command, even the Mayor of Atlanta, all requested maps. See GMM, International
Affairs Department, Jay Lovestone Files 1939–1974, RG18, Box 59, Folder: Slave Labor-Maps, Requests For, 1951.

96. GMM, International Affairs Department, Jay Lovestone Files 1939–1974, RG18, Box 59, Folder: Slave Labor-Maps, Requests For, 1951.


100. For more on contemporary connections of geography and citizenship, see the *New York Times* geography surveys of 1950 and 1951, which revealed a lack of geographic knowledge in high schoolers and college students, and featured interviews with professors who believed this type of knowledge made one a better citizen, particularly in an internationalized Cold War world: Benjamin Fine, “Geography Almost Ignored in Colleges, Survey Shows,” *New York Times*, December 18, 1950, 1, 28; Benjamin Fine, “U.S. College Students ‘Flunk’ in Knowledge of Geography,” *New York Times*, June 11, 1951, 1, 22.


103. Young, “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.,” 601.

104. Young, “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.,” 602.


107. Memorandum, Wolf Von Eckardt to Free Trade Union Committee, GMM, International Affairs Department, Jay Lovestone Files 1939–1974, RG18, Box 59, Folder: Slave Labor in Russia 1949–1951. Also, the archive indicates that the International Graphical Federation was being contracted for German translations of
the map from a June 28, 1951 memo. See RG18, Box 59, Folder: Slave Labor—Maps, Requests For, 1951.

108. The French translation of the map can be found in GMM, International Affairs Department, Jay Lovestone Files 1939–1974, RG18, Box 59, Folder: Slave Labor—Newspaper Reactions 1951. The Swiss version in Die Nation was included in its July 29, 1951 issue. See RG18, Box 59, Folder: Slave Labor—Maps, Requests For, 1951.


118. “Russians Arrest Austrian Binder of AFL Slave Map,” GMM.


120. The archives reveal several references to Chinese slave labor maps, but I could not locate any copies. Press Release, Free Trade Union Committee, June 25, 1952, GMM, International Affairs Department, Jay Lovestone Files 1939–1974, RG18, Box 59, Folder 6.


123. And Isaac Don Levine himself would continue to take ownership and pride in his connection to the map; Methvin’s interviews with Levine before his death in the late 1970s revealed that he “kept a copy of that map hanging on the wall of his study in his Maryland home, and often pointed it out to the stream of distinguished visitors who came to enjoy his company and hospitality and conversation.” See Methvin, “Isaac Don Levine,” 247.


127. Young, “‘Gulag’—Slavery, Inc.,” 601.


