Morale maintenance in World War II US Army ground combat units: European theater of operations, 1944-45

Kevin Kane

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines how both the Army as an organization and its small unit leaders attempted to maintain the soldiers’ morale in the European Theater of Operations during World War II. Morale was critical to the Allied victory in the war, yet the morale of frontline GIs was often neglected. This occurred with such frequency that many combat soldiers suffered from a new category of wound known as “combat exhaustion.” Through an examination of what influenced combat soldiers’ morale, a clearer understanding of what the Army did well and how it failed to support combat GIs emerges, as does an explanation for why combat exhaustion caused so many casualties during the European campaign. This link between morale maintenance and combat exhaustion was critical to the efficiency of combat units during the war and ultimately helped determine the shape and outcome of every battle.
THIS THESIS SATISFIES THE HISTORY DEPARTMENT'S REQUIREMENTS FOR HONORS IN HISTORY

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Dr. Sydney Watts
Honors Thesis Coordinator

Dr. John Treadway
Content Advisor
MORALE MAINTENANCE IN WORLD WAR II US ARMY GROUND
COMBAT UNITS:
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, 1944-45

By
KEVIN KANE

An Honors Thesis Submitted to the History Faculty at the University of Richmond

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AUTHOR’S NOTE

This paper is situated within the context of the US Army during World War II, a period and experience with which many readers may be unfamiliar. It was challenging to write about the soldiers experiences because their world was very different from modern life. In order to understand much of the analysis, a substantial amount of background information is required. As much as possible, I have tried to integrate this information into the body of the text or include it in the footnotes. Also available for reference is a glossary of acronyms and terms that may be unfamiliar to the average reader, but were common in military parlance of the time. Finally, I have included a breakdown of the basic units that comprised an US Army infantry division during World War II below.

**Structure of US Army Infantry Division**

- Squads (usually nine to twelve men)
- Three squads to a platoon
- Three or four platoons to a company
- Three or four companies to a battalion
- Three or four battalions to a regiment
- Three or four regiments to a division
- Plus attached engineers, artillery, medical, and other support personnel.

An infantry division totaled about 15,000 men at full strength, but after entering combat a division was rarely at full strength due to the casualties it sustained. These casualties sometimes necessitated the reorganization or consolidation of units which accounts for the approximations above.¹

¹ Stephen Ambrose, *D-Day June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of WWII* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 12. After heavy combat it was not unusual for companies to only have enough men for one or two platoons which meant that unit designations were not always accurate descriptions of real unit strength. Sergeant Raymond Gantter recorded in his journal on January 31, 1945 that “After two days of pushing, the company now consisted of forty-seven men. Three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon—total, forty-seven men. There were twenty-nine men in the three rifle platoons. Not all of our losses were from enemy action, however: there were many casualties from illness, particularly trenchfoot and frostbite.” Raymond Gantter, *Roll Me Over: An Infantryman’s World War II* (New York: Ivy Books, 1997), 137.
Figure 1: Rifle Company Table of Organization

Source: Rush, GI, 27.
INTRODUCTION

The United States Army overcame many challenges in the Second World War, but one challenge it failed to anticipate was the importance morale maintenance would play in a long, drawn-out conflict. After the initial fervor and surge of patriotism wore off, “‘high morale’ became a substitute for all sorts of lost, valuable things—the critical spirit, for example, or even, as John Knowles says, happiness itself, which ‘had disappeared along with rubber, silk and many other staples, to be replaced by the wartime synthetic, high morale, for the duration.’”² Despite its importance, the Army struggled at times to maintain high morale levels where it was most critical: the frontlines, where the war was actually being fought by squads and platoons of GIs.³ To the frontline soldier, every day was a struggle to survive the deadly frontline conditions and high morale was often vital to his performance and survival. The fulfillment of a basic human need could make the difference between surviving another night in sub-freezing conditions in a foxhole during the Battle of the Bulge and reaching one’s “breaking point,” thus becoming a combat exhaustion casualty.⁴ This paper investigates what caused soldiers’ morale levels as well as examine whether or not the Army and its small unit leaders were able to control any of these influences.⁵ It also touches upon what was a new classification of casualty for the US Army, “combat exhaustion,” and explore how this was the ultimate failure of morale.

During World War II, the Army was engaged in operations around the world. This paper however, focuses specifically on the Army in European Theater of Operations (ETO). Since

³See Glossary.
⁴See Glossary.
⁵For the purposes of this paper, small unit leaders refers to the captains, lieutenants and sergeants that led companies, platoons and squads in frontline ground combat units. See also the Author’s note for an explanation of Army organizational structure.
environmental factors had such a significant impact on morale, analyzing all theaters, with all of their various climates, would be a substantially larger project than could be completed here.

Focusing on the ETO also allows for a narrowing of the primary time frame investigated to 1944-1945 because combat operations did not begin until the invasion of Normandy, France on June 6, 1944. In order to understand morale maintenance, a definition what morale meant to the Army during World War II, why it was important and how it was tracked is established in the first section. Following that is an examination of what affected soldiers’ morale and how the Army or small unit leaders influenced these causes of soldiers’ morale to either improve morale or unintentionally lower soldier’s morale. Lastly, the high incidence of combat exhaustion casualties in the ETO and their relationship to soldiers’ morale levels are considered.

Morale is often a factor in discussions on the American soldier’s experience in World War II. In memoirs, veterans often document how they felt during the war and describe what was most important to them while engaged in combat. These same elements can also be ascertained through careful analysis of period Army reports from the various ETO Army commands. Additionally, war correspondent Ernie Pyle attempted to convey the soldier’s experience to his readers during the war through his numerous dispatches about frontline life. The Army’s Research Branch even conducted a series of studies called the Soldier Surveys which specifically asked soldiers for their opinions on a wide variety of issues during the war.6 Samuel Stouffer and

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6 The Research Branch, tasked with studying the attitudes of America’s citizen soldiers, was the first organization of its kind. The Research Branch was formed in October, 1941 as part of the Army’s Information and Education Division and was comprised of psychology, sociology and statistical analysis experts who used the most modern social science methods available. Its job was to conduct systematic and scientific research projects and investigations on the thoughts, opinions and beliefs of US soldiers. It was noted that when being surveyed, soldiers took their task seriously as demonstrated by the “painstaking detail” with which they wrote out free-response answers. The purpose of this was to provide commanders with useful and accurate information from which they could make decisions. The Research Branch produced more than 300 of these surveys during the war and questioned more than half a million soldiers. These sources are some of the most useful, comprehensive and respected ones in the field. Samuel Stouffer et al, Studies in Social Psychology in World War II (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1949), 1:Ch. 1.
other social psychologists who conducted the surveys during the war returned to these surveys after the war and thoroughly reanalyzed them in the multi-volume work *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*. Several historians including Charles B. MacDonald, Paul Fussell, S.L.A. Marshall, Michael Doubler and John McManus have also touched on morale from various angles in their work. All of the above sources acknowledge that soldiers’ morale was an important factor during World War II but, no one has yet investigated what caused soldiers’ morale levels and the connection to combat exhaustion. All of the scattered descriptions and analysis of morale is brought together here, in order to examine all of the causes for combat soldiers’ morale levels and how the Army and small unit leaders attempted to influence these factors.
SECTION 1: UNDERSTANDING MORALE

What is Morale

In order to maintain morale or even assess it, one must first define it. The concept of morale is often understood inherently in conversation, but its intangibility makes it difficult to define concretely or express in words. Nevertheless, this essay requires an examination of the definition of morale in order to assess how it affected GIs in and how its maintenance was approached by the Army during World War II. To better appreciate what is meant by morale, several definitions from historians, a journalist and official Army publications are examined. While all of these struggle to precisely define morale in its entirety as individuals, using them collectively, allows for a thorough understanding of the expansive scope and significance the term morale encompassed.

In 1944, the US Army Service Forces (ASF) published manual M207: Building Morale in the ASF which was designed to help leaders address the issue of morale in their units. Archival research has not yielded an equivalent manual on morale published by the Army Ground Forces (AGF) that would apply specifically to ground combat units. Such a manual would be ideal, but history has left only the ASF manual. M207 can still be quite useful though because Army doctrine is passed down the chain of command starting at the top with the Department of the Army to subordinate commands like the ASF and AGF. Therefore, official positions on morale would have been in agreement between the ASF and AGF because they were both subordinate commands. Thus, the assumption is that the official commentary on morale in M207 is also valid.

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7 Army Service Forces refers to the branches of the US Army (e.g. Quartermaster, Transportation, and Ordnance) that provided logistic and infrastructure support for Army operations. These branches were not generally engaged in combat under normal wartime circumstances. Army Service Forces Manual M207: Building Morale in the ASF, 8 August 1944, box 1011, Record Group 330, Research Division Surveys on Troop Attitudes 1942 - Jun 1955: Miscellaneous Reports-Unnumbered, National Archives II, College Park, MD.
and applicable to the AGF. This assumption is reinforced with the quoting of General George C. Marshall, the Army’s Chief of Staff in the section of M207 titled “What is Morale?” As the Chief of Staff, General Marshall was the highest ranking officer in the Army during World War II and therefore, his position on a subject like morale would have influenced on the position adopted by the entire Army, including the ASF and the AGF.

In manual M207, the ASF attempts to zero-in on a definition of morale by offering several different definitions from prominent Army commanders. The Adjutant General of the Army, Major General Ulio, highlighted the qualities of pride and confidence in his definition of morale. Civil War General Sheridan equated morale with the soldiers’ level of absolute confidence. Both of these definitions, however, are rather over simplified, for if morale is really just pride and confidence, then why does the term morale even exist? The very fact that morale is important enough for the Army write a whole manual on it indicates that it was a fairly complex subject composed of more elements than just pride and confidence. Below are General Marshall’s thoughts on morale’s definition:

First in importance will be the development of high morale and the building of sound discipline, based on wise leadership and a spirit of mutual cooperation throughout all ranks. Morale, engendered by thoughtful consideration of officers and enlisted men by their commanders, will produce a cheerful and understanding subordination of the individual to the good of the team. This is the essence of the American Standard of discipline, and it is a primary responsibility of leaders to develop and maintain such a standard.8

While the manual presents this as General Marshall’s definition of morale, he only talks about it in a tangential way. This is most unhelpful because he does not aid in deconstructing the complexities of the term. Then, instead of synthesizing these three definitions into one clear and

8 Ibid., 2A-1-2.
concise definition, the manual moves on to the next section which lists the four *components* of morale as zeal, discipline, self-confidence, and satisfaction.9

The chapter in *M207* closes with the acknowledgment that “there are many definitions of morale, covering everything from the belief in why one fights to satisfaction with one’s mess.”10 No single definition can cover all the elements that constitute morale.”11 This admission reveals the Army’s overarching philosophy towards morale maintenance during World War II. In place of monitoring and regulating morale from the highest command echelons, the Army recognized the importance of morale in battlefield success and trained its junior leaders to understand this and manage it at the lowest level possible. Thus, the responsibility to maintain morale in ground combat units fell to the NCOs and company grade officers. Only in cases where the extremely poor condition of morale necessitates action did higher commands get involved in directing trying to manage individual soldiers’ morale. For example, in the Normandy campaign higher headquarters had to react to the growing number of combat exhaustion cases which were draining the manpower of combat units.

The next two sources who addressed the definition of morale are war correspondent Ernie Pyle and historian Paul Fussell. Both were extremely close to the Army in World War II and understood it intimately. This allows them a special privilege to write about how morale was understood in the Army during the war. They do not have the official authority of *M207*, but provide valuable commentary on morale’s definition.

Pyle was a highly respected journalist during the war whose dispatches were widely published and read. He was also beloved by GIs for his truthful and accurate descriptions of frontline life in his dispatches. Pyle spent most of his time attached to frontline troops and while

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9 Ibid., 2A-2.
10 See Glossary.
11 Ibid., 2D-1.
he was technically a noncombatant, he had extensive experience with ground combat units.\(^\text{12}\) As a result, he could honestly claim, “I’ve been around war long enough to know that nine-tenths of morale is pride in your outfit and confidence in your leaders and fellow fighters.”\(^\text{13}\) In this case, the statements on morale from \textit{M207} are corroborated, but Pyle does not dance around his definition. Pyle also explicitly states what morale is not:

> A lot of people have morale confused with the desire to fight. I don’t know of one soldier out of ten thousand who wants to fight. They certainly didn’t in that company. The old-timers were sick to death of battle, and the new replacements were scared to death of it. And yet the company went on into battle, and it was a proud company.\(^\text{14}\)

This is an important distinction Pyle makes because it describes the mental state of GIs in combat, which in turn affected their morale and influenced what the Army could do to attempt to maintain high soldier morale.

The second source presented here is the view of historian Paul Fussell. Fussell is an important World War II historian because he was actually an Army Infantry officer during the European campaign in World War II. This means he had first-hand experience with morale in ground combat units. Fussell presents the transformation of morale’s definition during the war from simple to complex as evidence of the concept of morale’s growth and development during the war. He argues that the prewar definition was much simpler and straightforward, whereas the postwar definition is much more complete as a result of morale’s significant influence during the

\(^{12}\) A note on Pyle: Pyle was a Pulitzer Prize winner and reported on many theaters of the war, starting with the North African campaign in 1942 and continuing through the Sicilian and Italian campaigns. He then covered the D-Day landings and remained in the ETO until September 1944. Pyle’s dispatches were purposely written in a generic form which caused many soldiers fighting around the world to be able to relate to the experiences he detailed. Because he wrote about universal experiences and emotions that could transcend specific dates and locations during the war, his work has been cited often in this essay. However, care has been taken in selection of the quoted passages to ensure that they are relevant and appropriate to the topic in question. Symbolic of his dedication to telling the story of the frontline soldier, Pyle was killed in 1945 while reporting on the frontlines during the battle for Okinawa.


\(^{14}\) Ibid.
war. Further he claims that, “…raising and sustaining morale became all-important, and morale itself developed into one of the unique obsessions of the Allies in the Second World War.” The resultant definition, molded by the war and accepted by Fussel is:

*Morale:* Prevailing mood and spirit, conducive to willing and dependable performance, steady self-control, and courageous, determined conduct despite danger and privations, based upon a conviction of being in the right and on the way to success and upon faith in the cause or program and in the leadership, usually connoting, esp. when qualified by the adjective *high*, a confident aggressive, resolute, often buoyant, spirit of wholehearted co-operation in a common effort, often attended particularly by zeal, self-sacrifice, or indomitableness.\(^{15}\)

This definition best illustrates the complexity of the morale issue during World War II. It encompassed many different aspects of a soldier’s spirit and was applicable in a wide variety of situations. Fussell’s definition provides a more encompassing perspective on morale from which this paper can investigate the full scope of morale’s causes and influences. This is not to say that pride and confidence are not important to morale. That they are important is proposed by the Army and confirmed by Pyle. It is through the synthesis of all of these definitions that the investigation and analysis of morale maintenance in the Army during World War II will be most effective and complete.

The problem of morale’s definition arises from the fact that unlike this paper, the Army failed to pursue a definition that encompassed more than pride and confidence. This limited definition of morale then made it difficult to identify the wide variety of causes of soldiers’ morale levels. The lack of a thorough definition prevented the Army from effectively maintaining soldiers’ morale levels throughout the war; a fault which ultimately produced casualties and reduced the Army’s combat effectiveness.

\(^{15}\) Fussell, *Wartime*, 144.
The Importance of Morale

Despite its lack of a thorough definition, the importance of morale was not undersold by the Army during the war. M207 admonishes its audience, Army officers, from the beginning that “Morale may seem like a little thing, too, yet it determines the shape of battles and the fate of nations.” Morale was a vital component to every military operation. High morale was regarded as almost essential to success and low morale as a possible grounds for failure, which in a military context, could be catastrophic. Low morale was always a cause for concern by commanders. The good news for commanders was that, “Good morale mean[t] better performance: How well a man perform[ed] his job [was] affected by the state of his morale.” M207 provides a good example of how in an Engineer regiment, building the Alaska Highway in unforgiving conditions, had their morale buoyed through a simple organized hunt to obtain meat for their mess. This act encouraged the men in the completion of a vital defensive logistical route between the continental US and Alaska.

Not surprisingly, there are more recorded cases of low morale and its negative effects than of high morale’s positive ones. This is partially because officers were expected to build morale and maintain a positive atmosphere in their units. High morale was just another component necessary for mission success and only the absence of high morale or a failed mission were likely to attract special attention. Pyle recorded just such an incident that would have been a warning sign of low morale to this unit’s leadership:

The soldiers [Infantrymen from the 9th Division] around us had a two weeks’ growth of beard. Their uniforms were worn slick and very dirty—the uncomfortable gas impregnated clothes they had come ashore in. The boys were tired. They had been fighting and moving constantly forward on foot for nearly three weeks without rest—sleeping out on the ground, wet most of the time,

16 Building Morale in the ASF, 1A-3.
17 Ibid., 2D-1.
always tense, eating cold rations, seeing their friends die. One of them came up to me and said, almost belligerently, ‘Why don’t you tell the folks back home what this is like? All they hear about is victories and a lot of glory stuff. They don’t know that for every hundred yards we advance somebody gets killed. Why don’t you tell them how tough this life is?’ I told him that was what I tried to do all the time. This fellow was pretty fed up with it all. He said he didn’t see why his outfit wasn’t sent home; they had done all the fighting. That wasn’t true at all, for there were other divisions that had fought more and taken heavier casualties. Exhaustion will make a man feel like that. A few days’ rest usually has him smiling again.”

In this dispatch, Pyle has encountered a veteran combat soldier who has had enough of combat. This negative attitude was common among veteran combat soldiers. The soldier described was not brimming with pride or confidence and was vocalizing the low status of his morale. For a leader, this could pose a dangerous problem should this soldier chose to disobey orders and jeopardize the mission or other soldiers’ lives, although it was unlikely he would willfully endanger his comrades. The more likely outcome, if the soldier did not receive the needed rest Pyle mentions, was that this soldier would break under the continued stress of frontline combat. This soldier would then become a combat exhaustion casualty and require evacuation from the frontline.

Pyle also provides a contrasting situation. While in similarly terrible frontline conditions, he remarked, “the thing that always amazed me about those inhumane night movements of troops in war areas was how good-natured the men were about it. A certain fundamental appreciation of the ridiculousness carried them through. As we slogged along, slipping and crawling and getting muddier and muddier, the soldier behind me said, ‘I’m going to write my congressman about this.’” This passage illustrates the critical point that just because the situation was dangerous and the soldiers were miserable, there was not an automatic

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18 Pyle, Brave Men, 424-25.
19 Pyle, Brave Men, 213.
deterioration of morale levels. High morale could be maintained in even the worst conditions. Additionally, the American GI was quite resilient and took a lot of punishment. While there were certainly a wide range of factors that had an effect on morale, which the next chapter will investigate, opportunities existed for high morale even in the brutal combat faced by the Army’s Ground Forces in Europe.

**Tracking Morale**

The simplest explanation for why morale was not tracked army-wide is because it was too complicated and impractical to develop and implement a system which could have accurately evaluated such an expansive and dynamic concept as morale in ground combat units on the frontlines. It presumably would have required a huge amount of manpower to investigate morale levels for all of the units in an army millions strong. Additionally, it would have been impractical to assess the morale of soldiers and units stationed in remote areas around the world and as well as those engaged in combat. Moreover, by the time an investigation had been finished and a report was submitted, the tactical situation on the ground would most likely have changed, thus affecting morale levels and rendering the report obsolete. The Army had many pressing concerns during the war, all of which demanded manpower and resources and the Army appears to have chosen not to devote resources to comprehensive, Army wide morale tracking program.

The alternative solution adopted by the Army was to place responsibility for morale maintenance as far down the chain of command as possible (as was implied by *M207*). This meant that morale maintenance became the responsibility of small unit leaders at the squad, platoon and company levels. This approach eliminated the geographical, logistical and manpower problems that would have been posed by an army-wide morale tracking program. With this system, only major morale problems made their way up the chain of command. For
example, the 101st Airborne Division training in England prior to D-Day experienced a severe case of low morale due to a lack of confidence in the company commander among the members of E Company, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment. Confidence was so low that the NCOs of the company took drastic action to get the commander replaced before the invasion took place. All but a couple of the NCOs wrote a letter to the regimental commander stating that they no longer wished to serve as an NCO in E Company and were turning in their “stripes.” This action amounted to mutiny for which they all “could be shot.” Luckily, none were, the company commander was replaced, and morale improved immediately, but this was the type of extreme situation which necessitated the involvement of more senior commanders, in this case the regimental commander.

Junior officers were responsible for maintaining the morale of the soldiers under their command. In order to maintain morale though, officers first needed a mechanism by which to evaluate morale levels in their unit. M207 provides this guidance:

An officer can keep himself informed of the morale in his outfit by observing their attitudes and their performance. Morale attitudes are evidenced by the expression of certain opinions on the part of troops. While the officer may not conduct formal morale surveys among his men, he can watch for expressions of attitudes which indicate low morale. Performance indicative of low morale is readily perceived by the sensitive officer. Some of the many indicators are:

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20 NCO ranks were denoted on their uniforms by a series of chevrons on their upper sleeves and were often referred to as “stripes.”


22 *Building Morale in the ASF*, 2D-1-2.

* This information is presented in list form in the original source, but has been reformatted here for the reader’s convenience.
**Figure 2: ASF Indicators of Low Morale***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Excessive AWOL or desertion cases.</td>
<td>Excessive amount of company punishment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High venereal disease rate.</td>
<td>Inattention during training sessions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large number of transfer requests.</td>
<td>Large number of courts martial.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large number of malingers.</td>
<td>Large number of troop quarrels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carelessness in dress, saluting, etc.</td>
<td>Carelessness with military equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slow response to commands.</td>
<td>High sick rate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Building Morale in the ASF, 2D-1-2*

This guidance from *M207* was geared more towards garrison environments or areas away from combat zones, but it is useful in that it illustrates how officers were supposed to approach morale maintenance. Officers were trained to be cognizant of morale levels and to deal with a wide variety of situations they might encounter with their units through critical thinking and problem solving. They were not given formulaic instructions on how to react to very specific situations because it was impossible to train for every possible scenario an officer might encounter. This training program kept with the Army’s methodology of dealing with morale at the small unit level unless a special circumstance required a more senior level of involvement.

The Army’s failure to understand fully how expansive of a concept morale was inhibited its ability to maintain combat soldiers’ morale during World War II. The choice to place the responsibility for morale maintenance on small unit leaders, affected soldiers’ morale levels because it determined what causes could and could not be manipulated in the soldiers’ favor by either the Army or the small unit leaders. This had major implications for soldiers’ and units’ combat effectiveness because morale was so critical importance to battlefield success. Unfortunately, morale would prove to pose significant problems for the Army in the ETO from 1944 to 1945.
SECTION 2: CAUSES OF SOLDIERS’ MORALE LEVELS

With morale being such a complex concept, it is no surprise that there were a multitude of influences on soldiers’ morale levels in the ETO. These influences have been broken down into four distinct categories within this chapter which are: *Pride, Credit and Camaraderie*, *Necessities of Combat*, *Tactical Concerns* and *Escape from the Frontlines*. Each of these categories deals with related sub-issues all of which affected GIs’ morale. This chapter examines how each of these elements influenced morale and how both the Army as an organization and small unit leaders were able to manipulate these elements while attempting to improve soldiers’ overall morale while simultaneously maintaining combat effectiveness of units and individuals.

This figure below is a visual guide to understanding the interplay between the influences on soldiers’ morale. This map demonstrates how a multitude of influences converged to collectively affect soldiers’ morale. While many of these elements are closely connected, they have been divided here into the four distinct categories mentioned above. The purpose for these divisions is to make the complex concept of morale easier to analyze methodically. The visual representation also demonstrates how many different facets morale encompassed during World War II.
Figure 3: Influences on Soldiers’ Morale

Pride, Credit and Camaraderie

The level of pride soldiers’ had in their outfit; whether or not a unit was receiving credit for its actions, contributions, and achievements in combat; and the atmosphere of camaraderie present within a unit were all important and constant influences on GIs’ morale levels while they were in combat. These factors are special in that they tended to affect the morale of a unit as a whole instead of individual soldiers. Therefore they had a great influence on a unit’s overall combat effectiveness as opposed to influences that affected soldiers on an individual level. Of note here is the use of the more generic term unit in place of specifying a particular size of unit.

23 Outfit was GI slang for unit.
such as a company or a division because these factors can function at multiple organizational levels simultaneously.

Pride played a prominent role in soldiers’ morale. In the following case recorded by Pyle, the company’s pride in itself promoted high morale was critical to their combat effectiveness and their repeated high performance in combat. Pyle observed, “I’ve never seen a man prouder of his company than Lieutenant Sheehy, and the men in it were proud too.” Pyle carefully clarified that the soldiers had no desire to fight because “the old-timers were sick to death of battle, and the new replacements were scared to death of it.” An important component of the unit’s high morale, he noted, was that even though they were scared and did not want to be in combat, “the company went on into battle, and it was a proud company.”

The “pervasive belief” was that “the best way to end the war was to end it as quickly as possible with a minimum of casualties while inflicting maximum damage on the enemy.” Pyle’s dispatch demonstrates that this company, having been put in a position to help end the war, were going to do their best to do so in order to maintain their own personal pride and the prestige of their company. No other company was going to be able to say that their company had failed to do their part to end the war. Thus, their pride became the foundation for their high morale which was critical to maintaining their combat effectiveness as a unit. Had this company not had pride in itself and its important contribution to the war effort, fear might have gained control over the GIs and destroyed unit cohesion which would have significantly reduced combat effectiveness.


25 Michael D. Doubler, *Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945* (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 227-8. Sergeant Gantter expressed this sentiment in a more personal way in a journal entry dated November 24, 1944 saying: “All I want now is for this to be over so I can go home and feel my kids tumbling over me like fat puppies… see you [his wife] smiling serenely from the green chair. I’ll do any kind of dirty job that will help bring that about.” Gantter, *Roll Me Over*, 37.
When Captain Charles B. MacDonald led his infantry company into the frontlines for the first time at the beginning of October 1944, he too detected the effect pride had on both himself and his company. He recalled, “I was thoroughly imbued with the spirit common among all infantrymen that ‘my outfit is the best damned outfit in the whole damned Army.’ It could boast of a record to prove it.”

He continued to note that “I had admired the unglamorous infantry before, but as the rain continued to fall and the night grew colder my pride at being part of this dirty, miserable infantry knew no bounds.” MacDonald’s baptism by fire occurred during tough fighting on the German defensive position called the Siegfried Line and in the following months, his memoir demonstrates how, when lacking in materiel support and operating beyond expected levels of human endurance, his company was still able to perform effectively in combat.

Undoubtedly, a portion of this success can be attributed to the intangible pride in their outfit that MacDonald’s company of soldiers was able to draw on for strength in the direst of situations.

Pride is interesting because it was often an indication that a unit that had high morale. Also

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26 MacDonald, *Company Commander*, 18. Sergeant Raymond Gantter, upon hearing of his assignment to the 1st Infantry Division, notes that he was “properly impressed” because he “knew something of the 1st Division record.” In this situation, the publicity and credit the 1st ID earned in combat not only increased the pride and morale of its veteran members (who briefed Gantter), but also bolstered Gantter’s confidence and morale. Gantter, *Roll Me Over*, 27.

27 MacDonald, *Company Commander*, 19.

28 The Siegfried Line was a series of defensive works including tank barriers and bunkers that ran along Germany’s western border from Switzerland to Holland. It was not a single line of fortifications, but a series of mutually supporting positions sometimes several kilometers in depth. The Allied advance across France during the summer of 1944 was halted at this line through a combination of logistical problems and soldiers exhausted from the lightening advance across France after the breakout from the Normandy beachhead. This halt gave the Germans time to man the line’s defenses which resulted in the Allies spending the fall of 1944 trying to breach the line.

Characteristic of the situation MacDonald found himself in are two questions from the Research Branch’s survey S-177, which asked soldiers of four veteran infantry divisions in Italy in April 1945, “When you were last on active duty, how many hours of sleep did you average each 24 hours?” and “When you were last on active combat duty, did you get as much to eat as you needed?” There was also a follow up question “If you did not get as much to eat as you needed, what was the reason?” Eighty-five percent of soldiers got less than the recommended 7-8 hours of sleep per day. One-third got less than four hours of sleep per night in the same survey group, only thirty-six percent of soldiers said they got enough food to eat and twenty-two percent of total respondents said the reason for this was that they could not get enough supplies. Keep in mind that these statistics are from the very end of the war when the US Army was operating at peak efficiency against a crumbling German military. It is a good assumption that the situation would have been worse earlier in the war, during more intense combat. Stouffer, *Studies in Social Psychology*, 2:78-9.
though, the collective pride of the outfit is what supported individual soldiers’ morale and this helped MacDonald’s company achieve success on the Siegfried Line. Finally, that battlefield success further increased the unit’s pride in its achievements and made it more effective in future combat operations. Pride, being an intangible influence on morale, was difficult to influence and while the Army encouraged soldiers to take pride in their outfits, it often took exposure to tough, brutal combat for soldiers to really take pride in their units and be proud of its accomplishments.

Whether a combat unit received credit for its actions could also have a serious effect on that unit’s morale. Receiving credit depended in part on public perception, an area where the Army failed miserably for ground combat units in general and the infantry specifically, even though these units did most of the fighting in Europe. The Army’s Research Branch concluded that the Army “did not succeed in giving to the Infantry the kind of status which the Marine Corps has achieved through its publicity campaign.”29 This lack of recognition was particularly insulting to infantrymen fighting in Europe because the Marine Corps was primarily made up of infantry soldiers doing the same job as infantrymen in the Army, just in a different location, under a different organization, yet the Marines received significantly more press coverage for their accomplishments in combat. The infantry and other ground combat units also struggled to compete with the inherent romance and glory attributed to the Army Air Corps, whose newness and advanced technology made it extremely popular with civilians on the home front.30

Eventually the Army realized that this was not only unfair to the frontline Army infantry, but it was also hurting their morale since they were not being credited with helping win the war like the Air Corps and Marines were. In order to counteract this, the Army “initiated a systematic program to raise the prestige of the Infantry.” As part of this program, Congress increased

30 The Army Air Corps was the forerunner to the Air Force, which was not established as a separate service until 1947.
infantry pay (an action Pyle strongly advocated), a “large-scale publicity campaign” was launched, and two special awards were created exclusively for the infantry. They were the Expert Infantryman’s Badge (EIB) and the Combat Infantryman’s Badge (CIB).\textsuperscript{31} Of these new awards, the CIB was very well received since it could only be awarded to infantrymen who had served on the frontlines and consequently it became the mark of a true combat veteran. This was one way the Army did well in helping to improve the morale of infantrymen throughout the Army by grant credit upon them through an official award.

The Army was wise to heed Pyle’s recommendations as part of their program. This was not only because he was widely respected as a spokesman for frontline GIs, but also because as Fussell explains, “It was the main concern of Ernie Pyle to confer credit upon the humble and the normally overlooked,” which were the infantry and other ground combat units. “Gen. Omar Bradley once said, ‘My men always fought better when Ernie was around.’ And the truth was that most servicemen would rather have this names appear in one of Pyle’s dispatches than a medal unless the award of the medal was very widely publicized.”\textsuperscript{32} Accordingly, these appraisals by Bradley and Fussell keep with the assessment that soldiers’ morale improved through credit gained by publicity and the issuance of the CIB which universally represented the combat service of the wearer.

Pyle demonstrated his effectiveness at giving credit where credit was really due as he demonstrated with this dispatch that publicized the actions and contributions of the 9\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division while it was fighting in the Mediterranean:

\textsuperscript{31} Stouffer, \textit{Studies in Social Psychology in World War II}, 1:309. See Glossary for explanation of EIB and CIB.

\textsuperscript{32}Fussell, \textit{Wartime}, 155-6. General Omar Bradley commanded all US Army Ground Forces during the World War II in the ETO, initially as commander of the US First Army and then, as the number of US forces on the Continent grew, as commander of the newly formed 12\textsuperscript{th} Army Group comprised of forty-three infantry divisions.
For some reason which we have never fathomed the Ninth wasn’t released through censorship as early as it should have been, while other divisions were. As a result, the division got a complex that it was being slighted. They fought hard, took heavy casualties, and did a fine job generally, but nobody back home knew anything about it. Lack of recognition definitely affects morale. Every commanding general is aware that publicity for his unit is a factor in morale. Not publicity in the manufactured sense, but a public report to the folks back home on what an outfit endures and what it accomplishes. The average dogfoot will go through his share of hell a lot more willingly if he knows that he is getting some credit for it and that the folks back home know about it.  

Pyle summed up the sentiment about receiving credit perfectly in this dispatch and more importantly conveyed this feeling to the home front so they were aware that their recognition of the contribution and sacrifices made by frontline GIs was important to their morale. Combat soldiers were not fighting for glory, but for survival. As they did so, however, they were helping to win the war and a little acknowledgement of their suffering went a long way towards sustaining them in combat. Thus, when the Army or commanders were able to produce some publicity for frontline units or recognize them for their actions in combat, morale improved. While recognition did not make closing with and destroying the enemy any less difficult or dangerous, the resultant higher morale certainly helped soldiers through it.

In addition to pride and credit, camaraderie among combat soldiers played an important part in supporting unit and individual morale. World War II combat was a distinct experience from previous wars in that very small groups of men spent long periods of time together, isolated from the outside world. They were also engaged in exceedingly dangerous modern combat which required these small groups to fight outside the direct observation and control of their leadership. Consequently, the men in these small groups had to rely on each other to survive combat. It was this shared experience that led Pyle to write, “the ties that grow between men who live savagely

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33 Pyle, Brave Men, 421.
together, relentlessly communicating with Death, are ties of great strength.” That strength was something that did not need to be supplied by the Army, nor could it breakdown mechanically, so when in the most dire situations, combat soldiers placed great value on being able to trust their comrades and draw strength from them.

Camaraderie also provided a familial sense of comfort that was lacking from soldiers’ lives due to long deployments away from families and in foreign countries. These strong bonds often led men to make decisions for the benefit of their comrades, even at their own personal expense. Take the actions of Sergeant Frank “Buck” Eversole for example. One evening when his company was about to make an attack, Buck received the rare chance to go to a rest area for five days. His first reaction, however, was to turn down the opportunity in order to lead his squad during the attack. While his lieutenant told him to go to the rest camp, Buck was so duty-bound to his comrades that he admitted he felt “like a deserter” even after he was ordered to the rest camp. Pyle described this seemingly illogical phenomenon as a “powerful fraternalism in this ghastly brotherhood of war.”

This camaraderie among soldiers in ground combat units could have negative effects on soldiers’ morale too though. When casualties were high in frontline units, as they often were, the camaraderie among soldiers tended to suffer. This was because the “old originals,” the men who had been with the unit when it first entered combat would grow closer together as there were fewer and fewer of them left unwounded in a unit, “sometimes no more than a dozen in an infantry company” which would have started with almost 200 men. Meanwhile, new replacement soldiers would be brought in to take the place of soldiers who had been wounded.

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34 Ibid., 209.
“Unquestionably on the bottom rung of the social ladder were the latest replacements, who
arrived friendless and forlorn and stayed that way until the other men decided to accept them.” 37

It was often difficult for these “new” and “old” men to develop a close camaraderie because the
“old” soldiers were hesitant to make new friends. Gene Garrison of the 87th Infantry Division
explained the reasoning behind this after his machine-gun squad received replacements. “I
recognized that a machine-gun crew working in such proximity would lead to friendships. I had
lost enough friends.” 38 This fear of losing even more close friends what inhibited the quick
establishment of camaraderie between veterans and replacements.

On top of this fear of pain from loss, the “new” and “old” had little in common since the
“old originals” had been together for so long and had experienced the trials of combat together.
Not until the “new” replacements spent time in combat would they form strong bonds with the
“old” men and be assimilated into that group. Many new replacements, however, had little
opportunity to assimilate because they often quickly became casualties due to their inexperience.
In one typical example, a squad leader in the 318th Infantry Regiment noted in a War Department
Observers Board report that “new men have a very bad habit of bunching together in their first
battles. This draws direct artillery and mortar fire.” 39 This sort of action was a result of
inexperience and abbreviated training, and it led to very high casualty rates among replacements.
“Often more than half became casualties within the first three days on the line.” (See Appendix
A for Casualty Charts). 40

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37 Ibid.
38 Gene Garrison and Patrick Gilbert, Unless Victory Comes (New York: Penguin Group (USA) Inc.,
2007), 107.
39 “AGF Report No. 946 – Comments of Officers and Men,” War Department Observers Board,
40 Stephen Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers: The US Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the
The Army’s replacement system was extremely detrimental to the building of camaraderie in frontline units. The policy was to fill vacancies left by casualties on an individual basis rather than as full units or even as small groups of men who knew each other from training and had already developed some camaraderie. While this was an easier system statistically and logistically, it was terrible for both the replacement and for the unit receiving replacements. Receiving individual replacement soldiers presented a challenge because they had to be integrated into the unit while it was engaged in combat which was nearly impossible to do effectively. As a replacement, Sergeant Gantter had to wait to join his new unit since they were in the middle of an attack when he and many other individual replacements arrived. He remembers that “we were so green and there were so many of us [replacements] that we’d be more hindrance than help to the seasoned veterans on the line.”\(^\text{42}\) The replacement system failed to provide any time for camaraderie or unit cohesion to develop either among the replacements or between the replacements and the “old” men. Officers like 1\(^\text{st}\) Lieutenant Harry Bechel of the 318\(^\text{th}\) Infantry Regiment recognized that making “the replacements feel they are part of the platoon as much as the old men” was critical to the unit’s morale and success, but officers could only focus on this goal when the battlefield situation allowed and this seldom happened.\(^\text{43}\)

Replacements were thrown into a situation that was terrifying and that they knew very little about. One replacement described the experience as “just like being an orphan. You are away from anybody you know and feel lost and lonesome.”\(^\text{44}\) This was true both in the replacement depots where new replacements waited to be assigned to a unit and in the middle of

\(^{41}\) Ibid., 273-4.
\(^{42}\) Gantter, Roll Me Over, 30.
\(^{43}\) Ibid., 4. See also: Stouffer, Studies in Social Psychology, 2:283, for the same finding.
the battlefield once they were with their outfit.\textsuperscript{45} Replacements were often wounded or killed within just days or even hours of arriving at the front because there was no way to immediately train them on how to survive on the line. They were assigned positions on the line right away because of the desperate need for manpower.

The replacement system probably contributed to higher casualty rates because of the vulnerable position the replacements were in, nevertheless this was the policy maintained by the Army throughout the war. Small unit leaders recognized the faults of this system and tried their best to integrate replacements into their unit as quickly as possible in order to preserve unit cohesion, improve morale and sustain combat effectiveness, but this was not always feasible under combat conditions. Despite leaders’ efforts, everyone suffered under this system from the replacements to the veteran soldiers who had to shoulder the bulk of the fighting to the leaders like this sergeant described by Pyle who became demoralized after trying to take care of the new replacements he was assigned. The sergeant fell into despair because they were killed so often that he finally said to his captain, “I’ve got so I feel like it’s me killin’ ‘em instead of a German. I’ve got so I feel like a murderer. I hate to look at them when the new ones come in.”\textsuperscript{46} This feeling of responsibility for young men’s deaths quickly took a toll on leaders’ morale levels and affected their combat effectiveness. Even though it severely affected soldier and unit morale very negatively, the Army maintained the same replacement policy for the rest of the war.

The influences of pride, receiving credit and camaraderie had significant impacts on combat GIs’ morale levels during the campaigns in the ETO. Unfortunately it was likely that morale would be degraded through insufficient pride in one’s unit, a lack of credit being awarded to combat soldiers for their substantial sacrifices and contributions towards winning the war or

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{45} Sergeant Gantter, described the replacement depot as a place of “homeless misery” and looked forward to joining an outfit and becoming “a member of a family.” Gantter, \textit{Roll Me Over}, x.
  \item \textsuperscript{46} Pyle, \textit{Brave Men}, 208.
\end{itemize}
an absence of camaraderie due to the high casualty rates and perpetuated by the replacement system. The Army attempted to increase pride and confer credit on an individual level through the CIB and on the unit level via a publicity campaign. GIs still found these measures lacking, but, the CIB and publicity campaign eventually increased slightly the pride infantry soldiers had in their branch. Combat soldiers’ pride in their unit also increased as they achieved difficult objectives and won victories across Europe.\(^47\) Finally, despite the high casualty rates and a faulty replacement system, GIs continued to form strong bonds over their shared experiences on the battlefield.

**The Necessities of Combat**

The phrase, “the life of a combat soldier” creates too inaccurate a picture of the situation a combat soldier actually found themselves in. It was much more of an existence than a life. Sergeant Gantter thought that if he cracked (became a combat exhaustion casualty) it would “be from sheer physical discomfort, from too much mud and snow and water.”\(^48\) Every day was a fight for survival, and too often it was not only the enemy that soldiers had to fight. In contrast to more emotional influences on morale like pride, receiving credit and camaraderie were a soldier’s physical needs on the battlefield and often it was a struggle to fulfill the most basic of life’s necessities. This task was hard enough under combat conditions, but the difficulty was often increased by the challenges imposed by the weather of Northwest Europe. From the very beginning, stormy weather threatened the success of the Normandy invasion, thereby complicating the logistical situation through the destruction of key ports in addition to the German tactic of sabotaging port facilities before the Allies could capture them. This problem precipitated a trickle-down effect to the frontline soldiers and the supply problems resulting from

\(^{48}\) Gantter, *Roll Me Over*, 35.
inadequate port facilities would plague the ETO for months to come. In another example of the weather hindering operations, prolonged rain and military traffic produced operation stalling mud in the Hurtgen Forest during the fall of 1944. Then again during the Battle of the Bulge, a combination of snowstorms and extreme low temperatures jeopardized the entire Allied defensive front, which in turn meant miserable fighting conditions for the soldiers and an even more dangerous and precarious tactical situation than normal. So it must be kept in mind that logistical problems in the ETO were constantly complicated not only by enemy actions, but by difficult weather conditions as well.

While the weather served to compound problems, create headaches and generally lower morale, there was little anyone could do to fix the weather. In the meantime, there were a host of problems, accentuated by the weather that could have been corrected if the Army had taken a different approach. The acquisition of the necessities of life like food, shelter and clothing were all problematic for the combat soldier, but as Sergeant Gantter recalls “soldiers…are concerned with five things only. Three of them are physical: food, sleep and shelter.”\textsuperscript{49} Since GIs’ existence was generally focused on these smaller things, they’re availability or lack thereof had a substantial impact on his morale level.

Food was a daily fixation and “a major topic of conversation” for combat soldiers.\textsuperscript{50} As Napoleon once said, “an army marches on its stomach” and this remained true in World War II. Combat and living on the frontlines, required a huge volume of physical exertion which in turn necessitated large amounts of energy. The US Army during World War II had an international reputation of being well-fed in comparison to other belligerents. This reputation was in most cases well deserved. America generally fed its soldiers well throughout the war. That being said,

\textsuperscript{49}Ganter, \textit{Roll Me Over}, 11.
\textsuperscript{50}Ganter, \textit{Roll Me Over}, 12.
the combat soldier rarely had the same experience the rest of the Army had during their service in the US or behind the frontlines.

The problem of feeding the combat soldier was the inability either to prepare meals on the frontlines or transport meals from kitchens in the rear to the soldiers on the frontlines. Combat conditions and the requirement for combat soldiers to almost continually man their positions on the frontline (usually just foxholes) severely restricted their access fresh, hot food and the huge morale boost it provided. Instead, combat soldiers had to make do with prepackaged rations, often eaten cold. These meals were monotonous, the quality was only fair and the quantity not enough. So while the GI used up large amount of energy in combat and trying to survive the elements, his rations did not adequately sustain him. For this very reason, the combat soldier was always on the lookout for ways to improve his food supply. This often meant requisitioning civilian food stuffs he came across during battle or trading with local civilians when the situation allowed. In just one example of this, Gene Garrison recalls a time when he and his buddies were so focused on the fresh cup of milk a farmer had just given them (it was the first fresh milk they had had since being in the US), that they failed to notice when the battalion commander showed up at their position. This simple cup of milk boosted the squad’s morale after a day of intense combat in poor weather conditions, but it was just a drop in a mostly empty bucket.

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51 The most common of these rations were designated K-rations and C-rations.
52 In November 1944, Sergeant Gantter recorded this sample breakfast menu while his unit was off the lines and had access to field kitchens. The meal included: “one-half ladle of hot cereal, one-third cup of coffee, one small teaspoon of sugar (you choose: either in your coffee or on your cereal), one tablespoon of milk (same choice), four dog biscuits (hardtack about the size of graham crackers, and one slice of bacon. I admit that this menu represents one of the bad days and often we at better. But sometimes we ate worse, and there were many days when even the dainties eaters wholeheartedly agreed with the wit who said, ‘In this goddamn army you don’t get enough to eat in a week to have one good bowel movement!’” Gantter, Roll Me Over, 12.
The deficiency of satisfying or even adequate rations severely hampered morale in frontline units. Soldiers tired quickly of the monotony of the cold prepackaged rations.\textsuperscript{54} Captain MacDonald remembers it was a special event when one day on the Siegfried Line, his company received steak sandwiches that even cold “tasted like food for a king.”\textsuperscript{55} A hot meal always boosted morale and was often all that was need to lift the men’s spirits. Through dedication and hard work the cooks of the ETO were able to achieve the impressive feat of providing MacDonald, and all the other troops in the ETO, a turkey dinner on Thanksgiving Day in 1944.\textsuperscript{56} He was lucky though because his was hot and most got to the frontlines cold. Had this occurred with any semblance of frequency or regularity the positive consequences for morale levels could have been dramatic. Establishing a theater-wide solution which ensured combat soldiers could receive hot meals with some regularity would have been one way for the Army to greatly improve morale in its combat units. As Pyle eloquently put it, “just one warm meal a day would have meant a great deal.”\textsuperscript{57} Yet this was rarely the case in the ETO and damaged soldiers’ morale on a daily basis.

The GI was relatively well clothed by 1944 for the summer campaign in France, but once the weather turned, “the infantryman’s clothing was woefully, even criminally inadequate.”\textsuperscript{58} With the onset of a cold and rainy fall, the demand for warm winter clothing spiked. Unfortunately for the combat soldier, “in the Fall of 1944, there was a winter uniform supply crisis brought on by squabbling between the Army Quartermaster, War Production Board, and the officers in the ETO, notably [Generals] Eisenhower and Bradley…” This led to production

\textsuperscript{54} For an overview of Army rations see: Kennett, \textit{GI: The American Soldier in World War II}, 97-102.
\textsuperscript{55} MacDonald, \textit{Company Commander}, 24.
\textsuperscript{56} The Quartermaster Corps succeeded in supplying every soldier with a Turkey dinner on both Thanksgiving and Christmas in 1943 and 1944: Kennett, \textit{GI: The American Soldier in World War II}, 101.
\textsuperscript{57} Pyle, \textit{Brave Men}, 204.
\textsuperscript{58} Ambrose, \textit{Citizen Soldiers}, 259.
and procurement delays throughout 1944 resulting in a severe shortage” of adequate winter clothing. The combat soldier suffered severely for this throughout the winter of 1944-45, which ended up being one of the coldest on record. So in addition to inadequate rations, combat soldiers had to deal with the additional stress of never being warm because they lacked proper clothing.

This problem was especially acute during the Battle of the Bulge when a German offensive and breakthrough necessitated all focus be placed on stabilizing the strategic situation, leaving clothing resupply as a low priority. The Army again failed to support combat soldiers’ morale by issuing them adequate winter clothing and small unit leaders were powerless to influence strategic logistical decisions that produced this situation. The Army’s decisions lowered soldiers’ morale by forcing them to endure sub-freezing winter weather in this inadequate clothing. Instead soldiers like Sergeant Gantter wore whatever they could get their hands on. He recalls wearing “from the bottom up: overshoes (at last!), shoes, double sole woolen socks, woolen drawers and undershirt, wool shirt and trousers, sweater, scarf, field jacket, overcoat, gloves wool-knit cap, the towel snood I described to you, helmet liner and steel helmet.” Combat soldiers like Gantter spent as much time fighting the weather as he did the Germans and many non-battle casualties like hypothermia, frostbite and trench foot were sustained because of this.

The environment that combat soldiers, especially infantrymen, were forced to live in, was particularly draining on their morale. If not actively engaged in combat, combat soldiers spent most of their time in foxholes (Figure 4). This included nights when the temperature dropped

60 The Army had actually developed an excellent winter combat uniform in 1943, but it was only issued to some soldiers before the Battle of the Bulge. It was not until the early spring that most combat units had been reequipped.
61 Gantter continues to comment: “Sounds like enough insulation, doesn’t it? Perhaps too much. But it’s betwixt and between: it doesn’t keep the chill out during the motionless hours of guard duty in [sub] zero weather, and it’s too heavy and sweat provoking for any kind of action.” Gantter, Roll Me Over, 118.
below freezing and days when it had been raining for a week straight. “Under enemy fire, mobility may literally be reduced to zero, as when a soldier is pinned in his foxhole for hours or days” at a time. Many soldiers testified “that the severest fear producing situation they encountered in combat was just such immobilization under artillery or mortar fire.” 62 This simple hole in the ground protected them from enemy fire, but was a miserable way to live. Gene Garrison had a traumatic experience sleeping in a foxhole one night. When he tried to get out of the hole the next morning, he realized he could not move. In his words: “The shelter half over the bottom of the hole was submerged in freezing cold water, which covered I had no feeling in my right arm, and none in my right leg. I felt numb all over. I struggled frantically to get up.” 63 Eventually Garrison regained feeling in his right side, but this was not an uncommon experience for GIs at all and its repetition day after day quickly eroded soldiers’ morale.

63 Garrison, Unless Victory Comes, 37-8.
A GI was lucky if he was able to spend the night in a bombed out house and considered himself a king anytime he was fortunate enough to have four walls around him and a roof over his head. Spending weeks on end in foxholes took a terrible toll on soldiers’ bodies. They were often sick and trench foot became an epidemic problem during the fall and winter. According to Ambrose, “during the winter of 1944-45, some 45,000 men” were evacuated due to trench foot and many more suffered but remained on the line. Even when GIs were suffering from these ailments though, leaders often had no choice, but to keep these men in the line. They did not do this out of cruelty, but rather because they were always “so damned short of men.” Leaders needed everyman they could get their hands on to accomplish their missions or just to hold the line against German attacks (the success of which would only produce more casualties). On top

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64 See Glossary. Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers, 260.
65 MacDonald, Company Commander, 26-7.
of that, sending the sick or those suffering from trench foot or frostbite back to an aid station only placed more strain on the few men that would be left thereby increasing their suffering and causing their morale levels to drop even further. It was an impossible situation for small unit leaders to say the least. No matter what they did, morale and the soldiers suffered physically, mentally and emotionally. The Army, for all of its power and authority, offered no solution to this problem of constant exposure to the elements so the GIs morale suffered and while they continued to rely on their foxholes throughout the ETO campaign.

Not surprisingly, hygiene standards also suffered in the primitive conditions of the frontlines. Soldiers commonly defecated (digestion problems were all too common due to the poor food quality) in their foxholes in order to avoid enemy small arms and artillery fire. In some exposed positions any movement out of one’s foxhole would draw an enemy barrage. It was safe to stay in one’s hole than to risk moving out of it to a latrine (if there was one). Soldiers were also expected to shave every day, but this regulation went out the window in combat. Soldiers rarely had the opportunity to shave while on the line due to shortages of water and their primitive living conditions. In a common example, after being on the line for a week, Captain MacDonald finally had the time and a place to shave. At this point he also “for the first time in four days” got the chance to wash his hands and face.\textsuperscript{66} Even worse though was that Captain MacDonald once went two and a half months without bathing, except the occasional sponge bath from his helmet.\textsuperscript{67} Going this long without bathing was the norm rather than the exception for combat soldiers as Army sergeant turned cartoonist Bill Mauldin often referenced in his famous “Willie and Joe” cartoon series which followed two rough and dirty veteran combat infantry men through their experiences during the war. Combat certainly made the maintenance of living conditions difficult.

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 35.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 65.
standards difficult and in some cases understandably impossible, but the Army did not make adequate adjustments to its practices to ensure even a most basic standard of living in which combat soldiers could remain healthy. The conditions combat soldiers were forced to exist in exacerbated the significant stress of combat and when combined together, quickly lowered a soldier’s morale thereby making it much more difficult for him to remain motivated and continue to do his job.
Soldiers under the constant strain of combat, who had had their morale quickly eroded by a wide variety of factors often found it necessary to find some manner of stress relief. Many GIs, being young men and knowing they could be killed in combat any day, utilized cigarettes and alcohol for this purpose. Combat soldiers placed great value on having access to cigarettes and in this case the Army did an outstanding job of meeting the demand. The Army issued cigarettes liberally to soldiers, usually at the rate of a pack a day plus the cigarettes that came in the prepackaged rations and any that were handed out to them by the Red Cross, USO and Army rest
centers. Soldiers who landed in France on D-Day were issued two cartons of cigarettes to ensure there would be no shortages in the beachhead during the initial stages of the landings when resupply opportunities were limited. “Observers who visited the beach later said the shore line was littered with cartons as far as the eye could see.” Many if not most combat soldiers made good use of all of these sources for cigarettes. Pyle related this anecdote in one of his dispatches:

Murph [Charles J. Murphy] never smoked cigarettes until he landed in France on D-day, but after that he smoked one after another. He was about the tenth soldier who had told me that same thing. A guy in war has to have some outlets for his nerves, and I guess smoking is as good as anything.

As Pyle reasons, smoking was a reasonable stress reliever for combat soldiers and they certainly took advantage of it. A cigarette at just the right time could calm and steady a soldier and could do wonders for his morale. While rarely a problem, when soldiers could not get what they deemed were enough cigarettes, that was cause for serious griping and this situation had the reverse effect of harming soldier’s morale, for he did not appreciate being deprived of something he felt he deserved and was entitled to. On the whole though, the Army supported GIs’ morale through its liberal issuance of cigarettes.

Unlike many other armies of the time, the US Army did not provide an alcohol ration to its soldiers in combat. This, however, did not stop soldiers from acquiring alcohol by other means. There was plenty of alcohol to be found in the villages and cities of Europe and combat weary GIs became experts at procuring something to drink whenever they had the chance. While the consumption of alcohol by frontline soldiers was a grey area, their officers and NCOs often

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68 Kennett, GI: The American Soldier in World War II, 94. Soldiers could also substitute pipe tobacco and cigars for cigarettes.
69 Ibid.
70 Pyle, Brave Men, p. 473.
71 MacDonald, Company Commander, 68.
72 During the war this policy was changed for officers only and they began receiving and liquor ration.
looked the other way as long as a soldier’s performance did not suffer. Leaders understood the wonders a drink could do for a soldier’s morale when they were under the immense strain of daily combat. While by no means a healthy or medically approved stress management technique, smoking and drinking certainly worked in the short term and helped soldiers to keep going just a little bit longer. The temporary relaxation a soldier found with a drink was a boost to his morale and played a large role in the experience and morale maintenance of a combat soldier.

**Figure 6:“Willie and Joe” Cartoons on GIs and Alcohol**

Left: “Nein, nein—go ahead! I would not think of interfering.”

All of the subjects covered in this section are small details on their own, but when a GI had to deal with cold rations, inadequate clothing, exposure to the elements and sickness on top of the stress and fear induced by combat, one can see how together they quickly eroded morale. The GI was part of “the best-dressed, best-fed, best equipped army in the world,” but analysis of combat veterans’ experiences clearly demonstrates that this was still not enough to provide the basic necessities of life to many frontline soldiers. This lack of adequate support by the Army exposed soldiers to needless hardships, was responsible for additional casualties and constantly degraded soldiers’ morale while they were engaged in combat.

**Tactical Concerns**

Most combat in World War II occurred at the company level and below. Correspondingly, the world of the combat soldier was limited to this small scale. At this level, the daily focus of soldiers was on the immediate tactical situation. Rare was the combat soldier who had time to worry about the overall strategic situation. The combat soldier’s attention was focused on the events happening immediately around him as those were the ones that impacted his existence. These short-term, immediate concerns are referred to as the tactical situation. For the GI, the difference boiled down to, for example, why he cared about who his platoon leader was and not about who commanded his division. The division commander was simply too far removed from the individual soldier’s daily existence to have been relevant. The platoon leader on the other hand interacted with his soldiers daily and directly controlled all of their actions. Some of the major tactical concerns that were relevant to combat soldiers’ including quality of leadership, the nature and effect of casualties, the quality and effectiveness of soldiers’ combat training, and the outcome of combat engagements.

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The importance of good leadership in combat cannot be overstated. The Army depended on small unit leaders to accomplish missions and they were expected to do so while looking out for the welfare of their soldiers. Often though, these two objectives were at extreme odds in combat and it was up to small unit leaders to strike the most appropriate balance possible. Morale came into play because if a leader could not strike a balance he was perceived as ineffective and soldiers lacked confidence in him. This led to low combat effectiveness and could have deadly consequences for a combat unit.

The Army maintained a complex program for the acquisition and training of officers throughout the war, but the effectiveness of the Army’s approach was questionable at best. Initially, the ground combat arms branches and particularly the Infantry, got the lowest quality officer recruits because those with special skills or more education were deemed critical and assigned to “technical” branches like the Air Corps. Thus, according to the Army, the Infantry did not require highly qualified officers, but nothing could have been further from the reality on the frontlines. Leading ground combat troops on the World War II battlefield was probably the most challenging job in the war, but the Army did not acknowledge this.

On top of the low quality baseline, casualties among junior officers were extremely high in the ETO. “Casualties among second lieutenants were in some cases as high or higher than among riflemen in the line. It was not unusual to find a rifle company which after two or three months in combat had none of its original officers remaining in the unit.” Figure 7 shows the number of replacement officers sent to the ETO by month and what portion of those went to the infantry. In all but three months from June 1944 to April 1945, at least one-half of all

replacement officers went to the ETO which is another testament to the high casualty rates. Of those replacement officers, in all but two months, about 60% of them were assigned to the Infantry. These high casualty rates produced a situation where the Army had a chronic shortage of officer replacements. The In an effort to produce adequate numbers of replacements, training periods for new officers like Lieutenant George Wilson were shortened to as little as ninety days. When the situation became even more acute the Army briefly retrained already commissioned officers from the Anti-aircraft branch and transferred them to the infantry as platoon leaders.

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75 Two of these months are March and April 1945, as the war in Europe was winding down. In the third month, November 1944, there was a common feeling in Europe that the war would be over by Christmas. The potential approach of the end of the war may account for the lower figure.

76 These percentages are even more striking when one takes into account that the AGF required significantly fewer officers per 1,000 enlisted men. Per 1,000 enlisted men, the AGF required 54 officers, the ASF 97 and the Air Corps 156. Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley and William R. Keast of the Historical Section Army Ground Forces, *United States Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces: The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 1991), 93.


The combination of lower quality and undertrained replacement officers of which there was a severe shortage, meant there was significant absence of quality leadership sent to the frontlines and the GIs on the frontline were very well aware of this. This system did not inspire confidence in soldiers and lowered their morale. They were concerned that their leaders were incompetent and would not get them killed due to lack of training and inexperience. Lieutenant

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79 Ibid. 153.
George Wilson, of the 4th Infantry Division, had to deal with these retread officers as an infantry company commander. He recalled one attack through some woods on the Siegfried Line in November of 1944 when a replacement officer failed to keep his platoon advancing when they suspected a German tank was moving to their front. The platoon panicked and began to retreat, threatening the entire battalion’s assault. The “tank” turned out to be a fallen tree trunk and the lieutenant was killed less than an hour later. It was his first day on the frontline. This is not to say that all officers assigned to combat units were inferior to their peers because as demonstrated by the great success of ground combat units in the ETO there were many incredibly talented and dedicated officers in combat units. Rather officers often did not score well in the Army’s assessment system and thus by the Army’s own metric of evaluation were of lower than desired quality. Following from this one sees that the Army did not place a proper emphasis on the high caliber of officer required to lead combat units that on the surface did not require as many measurable technical skills.

Often an intense atmosphere of skepticism generally surrounded replacement officers until they proved their competence under fire. An encounter witnessed by Gene Garrison between a veteran sergeant and one of these replacement officers probably best expressed combat veterans’ initial reaction towards new officers. Garrison recalled his comrade saying the following about a new lieutenant, “‘Goddamned ninety-day wonder,’ the sergeant spat. ‘What does he know? He wasn’t here.’” Divisiveness like this could have been deadly for both the GIs and the unit’s morale. A survey conducted by the Research Branch of soldiers in the ETO, however, found that infantry companies, more so than rear echelon soldiers, felt that their

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80 These retrained officers were commonly referred to as retreads, a reference to retreading a used tire, a common practice due to wartime shortages.
81 Wilson. *If You Survive*, 143-45.
83 Garrison, *Unless Victory Comes*, 44.
officers were the kind to share the toughest experiences with them and that their officers took a personal interest in their well-being. Additionally, “the highest portion of favorable attitudes [towards officers] tended to be found among combat troops.” This can be attributed to the fact that the distinction between ranks became more blurred the closer to the fighting one got. This is the same conclusion that was drawn by the Research Branch during the war. In its report on the subject it noted that:

The fact that combat soldiers had more favorable attitudes than other towards officers could be attributed in part to the opportunity to discharge their aggression directly against the enemy. But this would be much too simple a view of the matter. Among combat troops, whether air or ground, officers and enlisted men shared the common experiences of deprivation, danger and death. Social differentiations and special privileges were at a minimum.

These shared experiences and dangers quickly exposed officers who could not lead men in combat. This process also created a strong bond based on confidence and mutual respect between veteran combat officers and enlisted personnel. A unit with these attributes would have had resilient unit cohesion, high morale and formed an effective team in combat. The challenge was to build such a team in combat before too many members became casualties and the progression stalled. Unfortunately, the high casualty rates and poor officer training often led the process to fail and failure lowered unit morale and combat effectiveness.

Essentially, the foundation of the officer corps in ground combat units was more questionable than it was in a branch like the Air Corps. This presented yet another needless obstacle for combat units to overcome in their pursuit of combat effectiveness. Small unit leaders could do little to rectify this situation either. They had to work with the leaders they had at their disposal, regardless of the quality, since they were in such short supply. The Army failed its

85 Ibid., 1:367.
ground combat soldiers in this respect by not having the foresight to adequately prepare for or anticipate the critical importance of junior officers, especially to infantry operations. Well-trained and highly-skilled junior officers, if provided in adequate numbers could have significant positive impacts on GIs’ morale levels and units combat effectiveness.

Well trained and experienced NCOs were also critical to combat effectiveness and high unit morale because they were a key part of the leadership structure of small units. NCOs ensured that the plans developed by officers were properly and skillfully executed and that the men’s welfare was looked after. They also assumed roles normally filled by officers, like platoon leader, when there were no officers available to fill these vacancies. The NCOs of combat units, however, struggled with the same difficulties that faced the officer corps: a lack of qualified NCOs due to high casualty rates. It was also not easy to replace NCOs since one of their most important qualifications was combat experience. The Army tried to transfer NCOs into the infantry from overstaffed branches like Anti-Aircraft and the Army Air Corps, but as Gene Garrison observed, “there were some ill feelings towards these new men, because they brought previous rank with them yet had no experience in the infantry.”

The alternative left to company commanders was to promote soldiers from within the company, but this was not ideal either. Private Raymond Gantter of the 1st Infantry Division found himself the recipient of one of these quick promotions and thrust into an NCO position once his unit entered combat and the NCOs became casualties. As a result of the high casualty rates, men like Gantter became NCOs simply because they had survived combat for a few months or weeks and thus had the most combat experience; something that could not be said for the incoming replacements. Either situation left a unit desperate for experienced NCOs to help

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form the backbone of the company. Without them, unit cohesion, combat effectiveness, the lives of the men and morale were all at sever risk. Again the Army failed to anticipate the requirements for strong NCOs and their replacement when casualties were suffered. Like the shortage of officers, this was severely detrimental not only to operational success, but to soldiers’ well-being.

The situation on the battlefield at any given time and the success or failure of specific operations was probably one of the more obvious contributors to soldiers’ morale. It is safe to assume that victory in battle generally correlated with high morale and defeat with low morale, but on the modern battlefield the outcome is not always immediately clear so closer analysis of particular strategic situations is required. It is helpful to understand the situations sketched in *The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath* as this work covers the most common scenarios that existed in the ETO. First, the classic rapid advance of the Army generally produced light casualties and many enemy prisoners. While this type of battle usually included close range fighting between small units, it “was favorable to high morale and a sense of group cohesion in carrying out a great achievement.” A second type of operation “was the assault on fortified positions….Such assaults always carried the threat of especially heavy casualties.” When this battle had to be executed quickly against “an alert and resolute defending force, the battle called primarily for a morale which would enable men to press on in an organized team even when casualties seemed terribly great.” Third and “probably most dreaded by experienced combat soldiers: the assault on defended beaches or across defended water barriers.” These operations sustained high casualties and required “cool and aggressive leadership.” Defensive operations were also conducted in the ETO and could “involve some of the most intensive combat…. In

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88 This is a much abbreviated overview. A more thorough description can be found in: Stouffer, *Studies in Social Psychology*, 2:66-69.
such situations there might be no hope of respite for indefinite periods.” Retreats and withdrawals could be psychologically stressful due to the yielding of ground that was hard won. “The confusion and disorganization of retreat following and enemy breakthrough was certainly among the most difficult situations a soldier could face.” Finally, the holding action during which soldiers merely had to man a stable section of frontline. Nevertheless, tedium, the harassing artillery and mortar fire, and the cumulative effects of poor living and sleeping conditions made this easiest of all combat conditions no real respite for the combat soldier.”

While each of the above strategic situations impacted morale to an extent, all of them required GIs to be on the frontline under enemy fire. As long as GIs were on the frontline, their existence was rough and precarious. A GI could be killed just as easily in a holding action as he could in an assault on a fortified position. After spending some time on the line, most soldiers believed that it was just a matter of time before they became a casualty. If nothing else, extended periods of time spent on the frontline wore down GIs physically and mentally. Both this attitude towards becoming a casualty and the degrading effects of combat on soldiers were very detrimental to their morale.

With ground combat units engaged in heavy fighting from 1944 to 1945 in the ETO, high casualty rates were unavoidable. With regards to an individual soldiers’ morale though, it was not the overall statistics that were important, but rather what happened on the small unit level. “…because men in combat were closely bound together by mutual dependence and affectional ties they were correspondingly shaken by the loss of comrades.” So not only were periods of heavy combat stressful by their nature, but their effects were in a sense doubled when soldiers experienced the loss of their comrades. It was traumatic enough to lose close friends through

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89 Ibid.
90 Ibid., 80.
gruesome wounds inflicted by the enemy, but witnessing death all around also increased a soldier’s sense of mortality. William Foley, of the 94th Infantry Division, experienced this feeling even before entering actual combat after seeing a dead GI who’s “one limb was black, shriveled, and footless.” The soldier behind Foley in line “gagged and then vomited against the wall” meanwhile the rest of the replacements behind him “tried to squeeze past him.” Foley described this incident as a “graphic introduction” and a “sudden glimpse at the reality of what [they] were getting into.” 91 This initial realization could be devastating to a soldier’s morale, sometimes even enough so that soldiers were unable to perform their duties. The only way to counteract these effects was being taken off the frontline, a topic which will be discussed later on.

The bright spot for morale with regards to casualties were the actions of the combat medics and the subsequent chain of medical care. Combat medics were revered for their heroism and commitment to saving the lives of their comrades, often at great personal risk. During training stateside, the term for these unarmed soldiers was medic or aid man, but as medic Buddy Gianelloni recalled, in combat he and other medics quickly became referred to affectionately as “Doc.” At the time Gianelloni, like so many of his fellow medics, was only nineteen years old. 92 Historian Stephen Ambrose recalled “On countless occasions, when I’ve asked a veteran during an interview if he remembered any medics, the old man would say something like. “Bravest man I ever saw. Let me tell you about him…” 93 The security gained from knowing that when a soldier was wounded, a medic would be there to treat him almost instantly was of supreme value in motivating soldiers to continually expose themselves to danger in order to complete missions. The medics assigned to combat units and the medical support structure behind the lines did an

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92 Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers, 312.
93 Ibid.
outstanding job as proved by the fact that “over 85 percent of the soldiers who underwent emergency operations in a mobile field hospital or evacuation hospital survived.”94 To the frontline soldier this statistic translated into the sentiment “as one lieutenant put it, “We were convinced the Army had a regulation against dying in an aid station.”95 This intangible, but very real sense of security certainly had a subtle, positive effect on soldiers’ morale. The success of the Medical Department and combat medics in supporting soldiers’ morale was one of the Army’s great achievements during the war.

The quality of training soldiers received prior to entering combat also affected their morale, especially when they faced their first test of combat. Much has already been written on the quality of training, including an entire volume of the Army’s official World War II history dedicated to the subject.96 Training quality affected soldier morale in two ways. First, it influenced the confidence level of soldiers entering combat for the first time. Many veterans detail in their memoirs how they worried how well prepared they were to handle the demands of combat. Their inexperience led them to question whether or not they would know what to do once at the front and under fire.97 These feelings were corroborated by surveys (shown in Figure 8, “Self-Confidence in Infantry Companies”) conducted by the Research Branch that indicated less than one-third of soldiers felt they had received enough training and were ready for combat just prior to the D-Day landings on June 6, 1944.98 Quality of training was a particular problem for replacements because they “had probably had briefer training than men who had trained with their combat division.” Post-combat evaluations conducted by the Research Branch in August 1944 support this since replacements who survived to become veterans self-reported higher

94 Ibid., 311.
95 Ibid., 321.
96 Palmer, The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops.
incidents of potentially deadly mistakes they made in combat which points to their lower quality of training as the problem. Finally, the Research Branch acknowledged that there was a possible correlation between lack of training and low morale in that it stated “that fear reactions in combat may be due, in part, to an attitudinal factor—the feeling that one has not had sufficient training for one’s combat job.” Clearly soldiers who lacked “adequate preparation,” suffered from lower morale from the start because it increased their chances of becoming a casualty. Unfortunately, there was nothing small unit leaders could do to rectify this problem except give crash courses in battlefield survival and on the job training whenever possible in an effort to help replacements survive. The task of adequate training fell to the Army and forced to decide between a shortage of bodies in combat outfits and sending undertrained soldiers into combat, it chose the latter, but men died and morale suffered because of it.

99 Stouffer, *Studies in Social Psychology*, 2:282-3. This survey (S-165) was of 277 soldiers recovering in England after being wounded in the ETO. It lists a variety of tactical mistakes that could get a soldier killed and asked the wounded soldiers to comment on how often they saw these mistakes made by replacements and veterans. Foley also mentions that he was a recipient of this shortened training in the rush to produce enough replacements. Foley, *Visions From a Foxhole*, xxi.


Figure 8: Self-Confidence in Infantry Companies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Percent making favorable responses</th>
<th>Percent making favorable responses</th>
<th>Percent making favorable responses</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-Confidence Among Enlisted Veterans and Replacements in Line Infantry Companies of Two Veteran Infantry Divisions and Enlisted Men In Line Infantry Companies of Three Inexperienced Divisions (European Theater, April-May 1944. S-129)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Questions:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Do you think you have been given enough training and experience so that you could do a good job of taking charge of a group of men on your own in combat?”</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>If you were given a group of men and told to take charge of them all by yourself under enemy fire, how well do you think you would do?”</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Do you feel that you are now trained and ready for combat, or do you need more training?”</strong></td>
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<td><strong>All Enlisted Men</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>605</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Veterans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replacements</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veteran Division B§</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>9,850</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Noncoms</strong></td>
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<td>178</td>
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<td>84</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>86</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Privates and Pfc.</strong></td>
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<td>Replacements</td>
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<td>66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Veterans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Replacements</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,999</td>
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<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Unmarried, H.S. Graduate</strong></td>
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<td>94</td>
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<td>63</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Veterans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Replacements</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Replacements</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4,076</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>33</td>
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The second effect of training quality was the concern of combat veterans that the replacements they received were inadequately trained for the tasks demanded of them by combat. These concerns were well documented by combat veterans in reports submitted to higher headquarters. In general, they criticize the lack of realistic battle and directly applicable training given to replacements. Veterans of all ranks observed that replacements should be exposed to more live fire drills to get them accustomed to the combat experience as early as possible. They also recommend more practical weapons training with both personal and crew served weapons. It was noted that replacements often did not have the necessary skills to properly employ machine guns and bazookas, nor were they skilled in using their personal rifles in circumstances other than the rifle range. These failures of training presented serious problems when replacements were thrown into a unit just before or as it was engaged in an action. With no way to test the replacements, the veterans of a unit had to trust that the replacements were capable of doing their jobs and watching their backs. Unfortunately, with the deteriorated quality of training, this was not often the case. The lack of confidence promoted by this situation hampered the morale of the veterans because they could not trust the replacements the Army was sending them with their lives. Essentially, they could not trust the Army to provide them with the qualified personnel necessary not only to win battles, but to ensure their own personal survival through the mutual protect one expects in a combat unit.  

“It was not the job of the front-line machine gunner or tanker to train replacements. The Army was supposed to do that and it failed.”  

This failure caused combat soldiers’ morale to suffer and as a consequence so did their performance. Even in 1944 and 1945, after the Army had seen the results of its training program firsthand on battlefields around the world,

104 Ambrose, *Citizen Soldiers*, 289.
replacement soldiers arriving in the ETO still required additional training if they were to have a chance at survival. Some divisions established official training centers for the replacements they received, but often this task fell to small unit leaders to try and train their replacements during brief lulls in combat and short rest periods. 105 Frequently, the best that could be done was a few words of advice from a squad leader the first night a replacement arrived on the line and then hope he survived the until the next morning when a little bit more knowledge could be imparted. Repeating this process and a lot of luck would in theory lead to a replacements survival and thus entrance into the ranks of the combat veteran.

**No Escape from the Frontlines**

Possibly the most significant demoralizing aspect of the combat soldier’s experience was the realization that occurred after just a short time in the line: that there was no way to escape the horrors of the frontline. Throughout the war the ground combat soldier was subject to an Army system that essentially condemned them to three possible fates: to be killed, to be wounded, or to become a combat exhaustion casualty. The only escape from these outcomes was the end of the war. There was also little opportunity for any real rest once a soldier entered combat. Once a division was committed to combat that division essentially remained on the line until the end of the war. This subjected combat soldiers to day after day of exposure to the brutal conditions of combat. Fussell, describes what this constant combat will do to a soldier:

Inevitably, all will break down if in combat long enough. “Long enough” is now defined by physicians and psychiatrists as between 200 and 240 days. As medical observers have reported, “there is no such thing as ‘getting used to combat’…Each moment of combat imposes a strain so great that men will break down in direct relation to the intensity and duration of their experience.” 106

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105 Doubler, *Closing with the Enemy*, 251-3.
106 Fussell, *Wartime*, p.281
While veteran combat soldiers understood that there was only so much stress and demoralization a man could take, the Army learned this officially in a study conducted by the Research Branch, published in April 1945. Table 4 shows how every soldier peaked in their effectiveness after a certain amount of time in combat and after that peak began a steady decline towards combat exhaustion.
The Army also maintained a policy through which few soldiers were ever rotated home for a furlough even though many spent years overseas.\textsuperscript{108} This prevented combat soldiers from

being able to look forward to a certain, measurable point at which they would officially have fulfilled their service obligation and had earned a break. This made soldiers quite bitter because the Air Corps, considered a much less dangerous and more pleasant branch by ground combat soldiers, in fact had a rotation policy in place where after a certain number of missions airmen were rotated back to the US. Captain MacDonald’s unit, had one experience with a rotation policy for the infantry in which four men were selected for a ninety-day furlough to the US. “Most men who took the time to figure, however, found that unless drastic changes in the system took place, it would be 1999 before they would see the States again—barring serious wounds, the only salvation.”

That calculation alone was enough to degrade any soldier’s morale.

The lack of an effective rotation policy added to the soldiers’ need for periods of rest off the frontline. While these did occur, they were too irregular and too infrequent to counteract the long periods of combat soldiers were often subjected to. Then if a soldier’s unit was pulled out of the line, it was often given additional tasks that prevented the men from getting the rest the desperately needed. This placed a severe strain on the soldiers’ morale. The lack of a rotation policy and inadequate rest meant that once a soldier was assigned to a frontline unit, he would almost inevitably become a casualty of one sort or another. The odds were heavily stacked against the combat soldier.

The replacement system was deeply flawed and caused many problems for combat soldiers. One of these was that it also returned wounded soldiers to their frontline units after they had recovered and “nearly three soldiers in four were returned to duty” by the medical system after being wounded. After this recovery period, the soldier would either be sent back to his

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108 The Air Corps maintained a policy by which flight crews were rotated back to the US for their next tour after a specified number of missions had been flown.
109 MacDonald, Company Commander, 78.
110 Kennett, GI: The American Soldier in World War II, 178.
unit or to a new combat unit through the replacement system depending on how long his recovery had taken. Because of this many GIs were wounded multiple times. The problem is that these same soldiers who had already been worn down by combat had to keep going back until they were wounded too badly to fight, they were killed or the war ended. Gene Garrison had several of his friends return to his unit and pick up fighting where they had left off. All the while, other soldiers enjoyed safe jobs behind the lines. This fostered even more resentment for rear-area personnel amongst combat troops who felt slighted yet again. The GI was generally willing to do his fair share and did not slink away from combat duty, but also resented the unfairness enforced by this replacement/return-to-duty system.

The realization for a combat soldier that he was only going to escape the frontlines through the end of the war or becoming a serious casualty seriously affected one’s mental well-being and morale level. It is difficult to keep going, caring about one’s assigned job, while waiting to be wounded or killed and meanwhile watching it happen all around you. This is on top of all of the other stressors, hardships and difficulties one was subjected to on the frontlines. One’s morale can only last so long under such conditions before a soldier becomes completely drained. The system emplaced by the Army during World War II, however, forced the soldier into exactly this deadly situation and left them there. Not enough regard was given to adequate rest periods, the opportunity for rotation back to the US or a safer job, or to the plight of replacements being funneled into the frontlines on a daily basis. The Army structure that was supposed to be behind the soldiers on the frontline actually set these GIs up for failure and even after the Army had the evidence that this was the case, it continued with the same system despite the pleas from those at the front who knew that the system had to change and doing so could prevent much pain, suffering and hardship in the ranks of the combat soldier.

111 Garrison, Unless Victory Comes, 111.
What we have seen so far is that morale is an extremely complex issue comprised of many different attributes including pride, confidence, courage, aggression, dependable performance, selfless-sacrifice and co-operation. We have also seen that while there were some bright spots for combat soldiers including unit pride, occasional credit for actions, camaraderie, medical care, and battlefield success, there were many more factors that collectively eroded soldiers’ morale from every possible angle, quickly wearing them down. Recall how the replacement system, high casualty rates, the lack of a rotation policy, sub-standard training, a lack of proper clothing, inadequate rations, poor hygiene and exposure to the elements served to erode soldiers’ morale. Too often, combat soldiers who were on the frontlines for far too long without a break had their morale completely destroyed by their experiences. The result was a new category of wound: the combat exhaustion casualty.
CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF MORALE

Where the Army failed during World War II was in the prevention of these combat exhaustion casualties occurring in the first place. This paper has detailed the many on the difficulties combat soldiers faced when it came to maintaining high morale. While the Army may have realized the importance of maintaining morale, little was done to prevent combat exhaustion from occurring. In several cases, the strategies adhered to by the Army, particularly the replacement system, worked against high morale and undermined the combat soldier instead of supporting him. In doing this, the Army reduced its soldiers’ morale level and its own combat effectiveness, thereby possibly prolonging the war. It also unnecessarily increased the burden placed on the relatively small number of soldiers actually engaged in combat in the ETO.

The condition of combat exhaustion was not entirely new in World War II. It was known as “shell shock” in WWI and certainly soldiers have always suffered mentally after engaging in combat. In World War II though, progress was made in identifying and treating the condition. The first step in treating the wound though was identifying it which the Medical Department does here:

The army’s chief neuropsychiatrist graphically described the distinctive symptoms of a combat exhaustion casualty: “Typically he appeared as a dejected, dirty, weary man. His facial expression was one of depression sometimes of tearfulness. Frequently his hands were trembling or jerky. Occasionally he would display varying degrees of confusion, perhaps to the extent of being mute or staring into space. Very occasionally he might present classically hysterical symptoms.”

The triggers for this condition were generally of two types. The first was the initial entry into combat and the shock to one’s system this entailed. The second was prolonged exposure to

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112 Doubler, *Closing With The Enemy*, 242.
frontline combat. This would be the case of the combat veteran breaking after 200-240 days. The condition presented in a wide variety of ways and its symptoms were often influenced by a specific, particularly traumatic experience of the soldier. Early in the war, the Army was uncertain about how to handle the condition, but by the invasion of France in 1944, treatment was part of the planning phase.

In Normandy, there was an entire field hospital dedicated only to treating these casualties since they required special psychological treatment the rest of the system was not equipped to handle. This field hospital had more psychiatric assets and provided soldiers with the things they needed most, a warm bed, food, a chance to get cleaned up and most importantly, rest. Other techniques, however, were being experimented with throughout the ETO. For example, the 4th Division established its own rest center for exhaustion cases. They had found that keeping cases as close to their units as possible helped a great deal, as long as they were safe from any danger, which they were. Additionally, this solution ensured that recovered cases did not have to navigate the hellish replacement system and could return directly to their units. This was critical because the sense of familiarity and security were important to preventing combat exhaustion and these veterans had already established a place for themselves in their units. By the end of the war, the Medical Department and combat units in general had a better understanding of how to treat these combat exhaustion cases demonstrated by the fact that most cases were returned to duty of some kind after treatment.

True combat exhaustion was not something frowned upon on the frontlines by other combat veterans. While leaders had the say over who was evacuated as an exhaustion casualty

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and who was not, this did not stop the other men of the unit from passing judgment. In general, if the man who “broke” was a combat veteran and had a good record with the unit it was accepted that he had just reached his limit and that was all that could have been asked from him. The common consensus was that everyman had his limit, some could take more than others and a soldier was expected to take as much as he could, for to fake exhaustion in order to be evacuated was shameful and hurt every other man who would remain behind. Often men would return after they had had a brief rest, some good food and a hot shower, which is just the type of treatment Maj. Richard Winters of the 101st Airborne Division advocated for. This was seen as the mark of a good soldier who was loyal to his unit since he returned to them as soon as he was able to and continued to do his duty. He did not take the opportunity to avoid returning to combat despite its misery. There were those, however, who tried to fake the condition in order to escape the frontlines. These men were seen as cowards and lost their comrades respect and trust.

Good leaders could usually see through this charade and would simply refuse to evacuate the healthy soldier, like Lieutenant Wilson did in the Hurtgen Forest. A general measuring tool used was the level of physical incapacitation suffered by the casualty. According to observations made by the Research Branch while interviewing combat veterans, the general consensus on how to view these casualties was that “a soldier whose symptoms persisted long after the objective danged subsided was generally regarded by his fellows as a sick man…The key factor which was stressed by the interviewees was effort to overcome the withdrawal tendencies engendered by

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114 An incident like this occurred in Sergeant Gantter’s squad: “When the first shell landed he [a veteran GI] went to pieces, weeping hysterically and cowering in a dugout until a soldier led him to the haven of the C.P. [command post]. This might sound like cowardice, but it wasn’t: the man was one of the old veterans of the outfit, with a good record in Africa and Sicily. But he’d been wounded three times—he returned from the hospital only a few days ago—and had reached the saturation point. He couldn’t take it anymore, that’s all, and no one blamed him.” Gantter, Roll Me Over, 96.
115 Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers, 329-30
116 Ibid., 329.
118 Wilson, If You Survive, 155-7, 168-9.
intense fear [original emphasis]. Eventualy, the soldier faking exhaustion would have to give up the act.

While the Army structure as a larger organization failed to support the morale of the combat soldier in many ways, the same cannot be said for his small unit leaders and comrades. The tightknit group that formed at the front blurred the officer-enlisted distinction and supported itself as much as possible. Officers protected their men from the interference of higher echelon units since they had enough on their hands to begin with and looked the other way when the men indulged with a bottle of cognac on a sub-zero night. While this camaraderie was essential to battlefield success and maintenance of unit morale, it was not always enough to preserve the individual morale of soldiers, resulting in high rates of combat exhaustion. Furthermore, only so much could be accomplished at the small unit level. A company commander, as much as he might try, could not change the replacement system used by the Army. His company, he and the replacements it received were forced to work within the system. Likewise a squad leader could not send a soldier to a rest center just because he had been in the line for over 200 days and the squad leader could tell he was nearing his breaking point. In such a situation the squad leader restricted because there was always another mission to conduct with his likely understrength squad and voluntarily sending another man away would have increased the workload on those that remained on the line.

120 Sergeant Gantter “made bitter acquaintance” with this circumstance. He reflected on his time as a platoon leader: “There were long weeks when the platoon was so short of men, so skeletonized, that everyman physically capable of carrying a weapon and moving on his own two feet had to be used. There was no choice. Had I listened to my conscious and refused to put into the lines men who should have been in rear area rest centers, I’d have doubled the work, doubled the danger and risked the life of every other man in the platoon. Too many times the assigned job was too big, the sector too large, the objective too loaded with danger, and I had to use every man available, including even the recognizable borderline cases. I’d have used even the lame, the halt and the blind. And I’d pray and cross my fingers, hoping they wouldn’t break, that they’d be stiffened to one more effort by the knowledge of our need for them. I’m humble with pride to remember how few of them did break. They were great guys. Gantter, Roll Me Over, 102.
Over the course of World War II and especially from 1944 to 1945 the Army experienced many hard lessons on the practical importance of morale and the devastating consequences of its failure. The great success story is how frontline troops coped with and adapted to the hazards to high morale on the battlefield in order to persevere and accomplish their missions. To the frontline soldier though it must have seemed like the Army was often conspiring against its own troops success. One must also acknowledge, however, the multiplicity of competing interests and priorities during wartime that often prevented the Army from focusing solely on soldiers’ morale level. Simultaneously though, it is a tragedy that so many men suffered through an experience that could have been significantly improved through better forethought and planning and though being more aware and adaptable to feedback from the battlefield. Some small changes, like regular hot meals and rest periods, could have significantly improved soldiers’ morale level, combat effectiveness and overall wartime experience.
GLOSSARY

AGF - Army Ground Forces

ASF - Army Service Forces

CIB - Combat Infantryman’s Badge; World War II “demonstrated the importance of highly proficient, tough, hard and aggressive infantry, which can be obtained only by developing a high degree of individual all-around proficiency on the part of every infantryman. As a means of attaining the high standards desired and to foster esprit de corps in infantry units; the Expert Infantryman and the Combat Infantryman badges are established for infantry personnel.”121 The CIB could only be awarded after combat service.

Combat Exhaustion - technically termed just “Exhaustion” by the Medical Dept. in order to avoid worrying patients; this was the emotional or physical breakdown that soldiers suffered after having been exposed to a particularly traumatic or prolonged combat experience. It was eventually recognized and treated by the Medical Department, which found that most patients recovered after being given a few days of rest, hot food and a chance to clean up.122

Company grade officers - Platoon leaders (lieutenants) and company commanders (captains)

Dogfoot - One of many nicknames for the infantry soldier. Others include: dogface and grunts.

EIB - Expert Infantryman’s Badge; awarded for proficiency as an Infantryman; See also CIB.

ETO - European Theater of Operations; refers to France, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia and the operations that took place in these areas. Italy, although part of Europe, was included in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

GI - a slang term for the average American soldier during World War II, standing for Government Issue or General Issue, with reference to the contrast that existed between the former civilians with individuality who became just one of millions of men in the Army during the mobilization.

Mess - food, chow


Mortar - a small artillery piece organic to and controlled at the company level that could fire small shells at a high trajectory up to 1,800 yards

NCO - Noncommissioned Officer (corporals and sergeants)

Platoon leader (PL) - A lieutenant who was responsible for the training, discipline, control, and tactical employment of his platoon.\textsuperscript{123}

Platoon sergeant (PSG) - a senior sergeant who assisted the platoon leader and served as second in command of a platoon; generally responsible for supplies and looking after the welfare of the soldiers

Squad leader (SL) - generally a sergeant or staff sergeant and was “responsible for their employment, training, and sustenance”\textsuperscript{124}

Trenchfoot - Trenchfoot occurs after prolonged exposure of the feet to wet and cold conditions. GIs were susceptible because they had inadequate foot ware and lived outside in the elements with no way to get warm or dry. When a soldier got trench foot, first the man “lost his toenails. Then his feet turned white, then purple, finally black. A serious case of trenchfoot made walking impossible. Many men lost their toes, some had to have their feet amputated.”\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} Ambrose, \textit{Citizen Soldiers}, 260.
APPENDIX A

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Source: Doubler, *Closing With The Enemy*, 236-7.
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Secondary Sources


