On the Idea of Reflexive Rhetoric in Homer

Mari Lee Mifsud Jr.
University of Richmond, mmifsud@richmond.edu

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Mari Lee Mifsud

For Henry W. Johnstone, Jr.

When Odysseus, disguised as a beggar, sees his handmaidens flirting with the suitors, he deliberates about how to punish their unfaithfulness (Od. 20.9–21). He is tempted to spring on them and kill each one. But he reasons that since the combination of endurance and cunning intelligence allowed him to escape the cave of the Cyclops, at a time when he suffered worse, it is likely to work in his present situation. He chooses to endure.

When Henry Johnstone and I translated this passage, we wondered to what extent we could say that Odysseus persuades himself to endure. Is Odysseus involved in self-persuasion, what Johnstone has termed reflexive rhetoric, when he deliberates? Answering this question led us to explore related questions such as, does Odysseus have a “self” to which his deliberation/persuasion can be addressed? If so, how do we know that Odysseus actually persuades himself when he deliberates? If Odysseus does persuade himself, can we say he practices rhetoric on himself? Can we even talk of rhetoric in Homer? Through this essay, I wish to share—at least in part—our exploration of these questions. In particular, I address how Johnstone’s idea of the rhetorical wedge moves us toward the idea of a reflexive rhetoric in Homer, a rhetoric in which Odysseus seems to be involved in his various deliberations.

I focus on Odysseus’s deliberation in the Odyssey, since his is the Homeric archetype, and since the Odyssey is the text that Johnstone and I have been enamored with since late fall of 1993.¹ Four scenes in particular are explicit, complete portrayals of Odyssean deliberation: (1) Odysseus deliberates about whether to obey the goddess Leukothea’s instructions (5.355–64); (2) He deliberates about how best to approach Nausikaa (6.141–48); (3) He deliberates about how to approach his fight with Iros (18.90–94); And (4) he deliberates about how to punish his handmaidens (20.9–11). In all four of these scenes, the process of Odysseus’s deliberation is the same. He becomes aware of a problem—obeying Leukothea, approaching Nausikaa, fighting Iros, and punishing his handmaidens—and then he generates alternative approaches to these problems. Should he take Leukothea’s magic veil or stay on his raft as

long as possible and find his own way to shore? Should he, naked and filthy \nfrom the sea, clasp Nausikaa's knees or beseech her from behind the brush? Should he fight to kill Iros or only to wound him? Should he kill the handmaidens in the heat of the moment or endure their behavior? Finally, he announces a reason for his choice. He will remain on his raft because Leukothea may be trying to trick him and because land is too far away to abandon it yet. He will persuade Nausikaa from behind the brush so that he won't anger her. He will only wound Iros so that he will not raise suspicions about his own identity. He will endure the behavior of his handmaidens to wait for a more opportune moment and a more strategic plan.

In light of these four explicit and complete scenes of deliberation, the question arises, does Odysseus's deliberation proceed as an internal suasory discourse? When he recognizes a problem before him, poses alternative future actions to himself as potential responses, and makes a choice among them based on a certain reason, has Odysseus persuaded himself?

Problems arise with an affirmative response. Most obvious is the suggestion that Odysseus has a "self" that can be persuaded. This suggestion raises questions among critics such as Bruno Snell who deny the existence of self-awareness in Homeric characters. Snell argues that no single, identifiable word for "self" exists in the Homeric epics (1953, 8). Words that might look like equivalents for "self," such as θυμάς, μένος, κῆρ, and ἰπόρος are not. Instead, they denote only the inner parts of the Homeric person, which are analogous to organs with no unifying principle to render them coherent (8–9). The problem posed by Snell is this: The Homeric person does not deliberate, and therefore could not be involved in a process of self-persuasion, because the Homeric person has no consciousness of a single self to which deliberation/persuasion could be addressed. Snell's problem arises from lexical grounds: the absence of a single word for the self that would mark the Homeric idea of the self.

One way to respond to the Snellan hypothesis might be to posit lexical evidence of self-awareness (Sullivan 1988, Claus 1981, Jahn 1987). Homeric Greek has a first-person form of active and middle/passive verbs, and it has reflexive pronouns. Both of these features show that a person distinguished his/her experiences from those of another. Homeric individuals used personal pronouns as well. This reflects a notion of personal identity, an awareness of one's separateness from others. But, as Johnstone has written, \( I \) denotes a person, not a self (1970, 110). Perhaps we can posit more complex or significant lexical evidence. For example, the
oblique cases of ἐγώ suggest the person as agent. Many of the Homeric words in the “soul/self” semantic range seem to be interchangeable, used pleonastically for poetic purposes, hence revealing an implicit unity (Jahn 1987). Furthermore, the Homeric Greek case system includes the accusative of respect, which indicates that a person is aware of being affected as a whole as well as within a particular part (Sullivan 1988, 6).

Positing even this kind of lexical evidence fails to resolve the Snellian problem, though it certainly seems to come close to doing so. Ultimately, it fails because it fails to question the assumption that a culture must have a word for a thing in order to recognize that thing’s existence. It seems entirely possible that a culture could operate consciously prior to its invention of a system of names for the various operations in which they are involved (Gaskin 1990, Knox 1993, Sharples 1983). To argue otherwise would lead to the conclusion that those cultures guided by a system of abstract language are the only cultures to operate in conscious ways. This argument presupposes that only one form of consciousness counts—the consciousness that arises from an abstract vocabulary. The implications alone of this argument seem to provide grounds enough upon which to reject it. Moreover, as Johnstone once remarked to me, are we to believe, according to the Snellian approach to human consciousness, that people didn’t have egos prior to Freud calling them egos? Or that the Esquimaux do not know snow because they have no one word for it?

Johnstone’s questions highlight for us the snare of the lexical method, namely, that consciousness of a particular phenomenon can exist prior to its being named. While the abstraction of a name may allow us to think differently about a given phenomenon, it does not necessarily mark the origin of consciousness about that phenomenon. Naming presupposes a level of awareness; it does not create awareness from scratch. It seems quite possible that Homer could communicate a unity in multiplicity in a way that the intellectual culture in which Snell operates could not. While Snell might be able to say that he would be fragmented and schizoid if he didn’t operate within a language system that could provide him with the word self, this does not mean that people in the Homeric poems were portrayed as fragmented and schizoid because Homer didn’t have a word for the self (Padel 1992, 44–48). This is not to say that consciousness (Homeric or otherwise) exists prior to language, but only to say that consciousness is not exclusively dependent on an abstract language like the abstraction of a single, identifiable name for a particular concept or phenomenon.

Odysseus’s self may not be manifest lexically, but it doesn’t have to be. It is manifest operationally—through the very process of his deliberation. At this juncture, Johnstone’s work takes hold. As Johnstone has
theorized, the self emerges from a problem giving rise to deliberation (1970).

Odysseus deliberates because a situation has arisen in which his mind is torn in two. In the Homeric formula “δίχα μεριπρίζει (torn asunder, he deliberates),” the controlling word is δίχα, “asunder,” not μεριπρίζεια, “deliberate,” since it is the former that makes the latter possible (13 September 1994). Odysseus’s mind is sundered when Leukothea tempts him with the magic veil, when he must approach Nausikaa, when he must fight Iros, and when he sees his handmaidens. When Odysseus begins to deliberate, he reveals his own recognition of this sundering as problematic. He could not recognize this sundering from a fragmented perspective, but only from the unity of the self. Johnstone explains that, from the sundered mind, the self emerges as the point of view including both (or all) poles of the sundering (15 September 1994). Hence, the self “sees”—or, in other words, the person’s attention is called to—the sundering. This sight poses a contradiction for the person, what Carroll Arnold has called the “paradoxical pair of awarenesses” (Arnold 1987, 121). The paradox becomes a burden for the person who realizes that s/he cannot be both poles. Deliberation occurs precisely to respect the sundering, and it serves to unburden the self from the tension of contradiction. The incentive to deliberate arises when one realizes that one must choose.

In this way we can see how Odysseus’s sundering and resulting deliberation make manifest his self. Deliberation presupposes self-consciousness of the necessity to make a choice. In this perspective, we can also see the emerging relationship between deliberation and persuasion.

In Johnstone’s view, if to be persuaded means to be made conscious of an object or thesis, then we can call the coming of consciousness of the necessity to deliberate self-persuasion (14 September 1994). Hence, deliberation results from self-persuasion. But can we really say that persuasion has occurred prior to the application of a deliberative calculus? One might argue that it is a deliberative calculus that allows Odysseus to generate alternative courses of action and to choose among them for the most fitting response to his problem. When Odysseus decides that he will only wound Iros to prevent raising suspicions about his own identity, he generates in himself a reason to believe—a logos, if you will—why this is better than killing him. He deliberates about his future action and arrives at a choice reasoned through a calculus. This logos might be said to persuade him into making the choice he makes. Therein, one might say, Odysseus persuades himself through the use of a deliberative calculus, and in this way deliberation and persuasion are related.
If this is the essential link between deliberation and persuasion, namely, the use of a deliberative calculus, then can we say Odysseus persuaded himself even in the absence of such a calculus? The majority of Homeric deliberation scenes contain no deliberative calculi. For example, when Odysseus lands on the shore of Scheria, he gives no reason why he chooses to sleep in the woods rather than on the beach (5.465–87). The lack of a deliberative calculus might make Odysseus’s action seem arbitrary rather than deliberate.

One approach to this problem would be to generalize from the scenes where Odysseus uses deliberative calculi to those where he does not. We could say that in these latter scenes the calculi are implicit. This seems reasonable, since we know Homer is a poet of action, not of thought. For poetic purposes, Homer does not always elaborate thought, though he does provide enough evidence of it to warrant a general description of Odysseus as deliberate, even in the absence of a calculus.

Even if we can affirm that deliberative calculi can be implicit, still we have not established whether the use of a deliberative calculus is the essential bridge between deliberation and persuasion. To re-address the issue, Johnstone asks, if we believe deliberation and persuasion to be linked primarily by the use of deliberative calculi, then are we committed to believe, for example, that Big Blue persuaded itself when it made moves against Gary Kasparov (20 May 1997 and 28 May 1997)? Johnstone explains that Big Blue’s program is said to be heuristic, “At any given point in a game, it surveys the possibilities and chooses the one that seems best. This is in effect no more than what a human player can do” (28 May 1997).

The question of whether Big Blue persuades itself can be generalized to the question of whether nonhumans communicate. This is one of the questions exercising George Kennedy in “A Hoot in the Dark” (1992). Kennedy argues that the communication present in nature shows signs of rhetorical energy. Johnstone, like Kennedy, notes, “There is clearly a sense in which bees use language. Their dances communicate the whereabouts of nectar. The sense of ‘communicate’ here is the same as that in which machines ‘communicate’ with one another. A radar beacon can communicate to the computer of an airplane the whereabouts of an airport” (1988, 128).

Johnstone, though, stops short of identifying the nonhuman and human senses of communicate in the way that Kennedy does. He contends that when one collapses the distinction between these two senses of communicate, one fails to question the assumption that communication is primarily a kind of competence. If we understand communication primarily
as a competence, then we must believe that animal communication and machine communication are fundamentally similar to human communication. And we must capitulate to the idea that machines could be more perfect communicators than humans (1988, 128). For Johnstone, though, human communication is unique and exists on a level different from that of bees or chess-playing machines. For Johnstone, communication is a consciousness, not a competence.

Big Blue is not conscious. Because of the continuity between its input and its output, Big Blue can never stand apart from its data. It can never take account of these data as objects. One might argue, though, that data have to be transmitted to and outputted from a computer via interfaces, one where data are transformed into electrical impulses, and one where the output is printed as information. But Johnstone rejects these “interfaces” as real interfaces because no gap exists between the data fed to the machine as input and the machine itself, and again between the machine and the information available as output on the printed page (1996a, 3–5). The input and output are two forms of energy belonging to the same system. A computer cannot take on a perspective other than its input and its output. That the computer translates input into output is an inevitable result of its having been inputted, the inevitability coming into question only on the occasion of a mechanical breakdown.

Deliberation means the act of being deliberate, and to be deliberate is to be conscious of the freedom to make choices. This freedom is unavailable to Big Blue. Big Blue does not freely enter the game. And because Big Blue is never free to stand against its input or its output, it never faces any temptation in the course of its calculations. Whereas we can conceive of Kasparov going through a rigorous calculation, surveying the choices and selecting one that seems best for any possible move, we can also conceive of him being tempted to act in a way inconsistent with the results of his calculation. Or he might be tempted to quit the game. The coming of either temptation would call for him either to resist it or to yield to it, both of which would require deliberation. Big Blue can never face such a temptation or involve itself in the deliberation required for one to resist or yield to a particular temptation. It cannot stand against its data. It is not free. It has no incentive.

Unlike Big Blue, Odysseus is free and motivated. And he does face temptation. He is tempted to accept Leukothea’s magic veil. He is tempted to clasp Nausikaa’s knees. He is tempted to kill Iros and his handmaiden. Odysseus experiences temptation because he is aware of the possibility of doing something other than what comes automatically or impulsively.
Odysseus has perspective on his experience. Only with perspective can one say “I am tempted to do that” without simply doing what comes naturally, in other words, without always acting as a slave to impulse. The incentive to deliberate does not arise in a person (or machine) who fails to recognize him/herself as fundamentally free. This recognition forces an interruption of the unity of the transaction between subject and object (Johnstone 1978, 131). Such an interruption allows Odysseus to stand apart from his experience to observe it.

The deliberative calculus cannot be the essential link between deliberation and persuasion, though it undoubtedly figures into the process of self-persuasion to the extent that it either explicitly or implicitly brings about a particular decision. This moment of particular decision is certainly a moment of self-persuasion. But it seems that in Johnstone’s perspective, when one suddenly sees that one must choose, in other words, when one arrives at the general decision to decide, self-persuasion has already occurred; it does not lie in the calculus that yields the decision. Johnstone writes, “The calculus that ensues after the soul is ‘split asunder’ is not itself an act of persuasion, and is persuasive only in the way in which the results of any calculation are persuasive. But the use of this calculus presupposes the self persuasion entailed in the acknowledgment that there is a problem requiring deliberation” (14 September 1994). The essential moment that makes deliberation self-persuasion is prior to the use of a deliberative calculus—it is the very moment of consciousness of the necessity to deliberate.

In this perspective, the fact that Homer is frequently silent about deliberative calculi is irrelevant to the question of whether Odysseus persuades himself. Johnstone writes, “Just as the prime tactic of persuasion is to let the audience draw its own conclusions—is, therefore, enthymematic—so the self-persuasion that makes one see that there is a problem puts one in the position to reach one’s own conclusions about coping with the problem” (14 September 1994).

Since deliberation signals that an agent is conscious of a problem at hand, and is aware of the necessity to resolve this problem through (inner) speech, deliberation, like persuasion, presupposes a Bitzerian “rhetorical situation.” But deliberation, like persuasion, presupposes something even more fundamental than the rhetorical situation—the rhetorical wedge. It is this wedge that evokes one’s consciousness both of a problem and of the potential to resolve the problem through speech, whether in public assembly or through inner debate. For Johnstone, it is the very function of rhetoric to call attention to a situation for which objectivity is
claimed: “If rhetoric is an art of persuasion, it practices this art by soliciting attention. . . . A stimulus that directly excites a reflex, never emerging as an object of consciousness, is irrelevant to rhetorical transactions” (1990, 334).7

In the absence of the rhetorical wedge, no medium can be opened between consciousness and its object, whether this consciousness is manifest publicly in open forum or personally in inner debates. Johnstone notes Aristotle’s message to Democritus, that in the absence of a medium we could see nothing at all (1996a, 2). Sight presupposes μεταξύ, or an “in-between,” what Johnstone has sometimes called an interface (1996a, 2; 1982, 95–102; 1970, 122–31). We could not, for example, see an object placed directly on the eye. Johnstone writes, “Language, the medium of communication, likewise must separate the message from its recipient. Otherwise it would be as if we had opened a person’s skull and simply placed the information on his/her brain, as one might place an object on someone’s eye” (1996a, 2). Bee communication and computer communication work this way. But in human communication, information does not pass directly from its source to the storage facilities of the receiver (1996a, 5–6). And in human deliberation, the unity between impulse and action is interrupted.

The visionary nature of Johnstone’s rhetorical wedge allows us to see that it operates both from the outside and from within. To the extent that rhetoric, as Johnstone conceives it, functions to evoke consciousness—to attack unawareness—we can say that rhetoric evokes consciousness not only in other people, but also in oneself. Johnstone writes, “Public persuasion attempts to drive this wedge between the audience and some fact or thesis of which it has hitherto been unconscious; deliberation (= self-persuasion) drives it between a subject no longer unconscious of the choice s/he must make and him/herself; it brings the choice to consciousness” (13 September 1994).

In his extension of rhetoric to a private sphere, Johnstone accounts for its reflexivity, a phenomenon that he himself admits has not generally been recognized (1970, 125). He contends that what invites the interpretative act need not be external to the interpreter. “When rhetoric is capable of flowing in two directions, it can flow both from me and to me. I can, in other words, be my own audience. I can drive the wedge between stimulus and sensation that is required to evoke my own consciousness” (1990, 337).

When Odysseus asks himself whether he should kill his handmaidens or endure their behavior, he thwarts the stimulus-response behavior that
primarily characterizes nonrhetorical communication. He drives a wedge between stimulus and sensation, a wedge that makes apparent his own consciousness of the freedom to make a choice about how he wants to respond to the stimulus. He makes a general decision to decide. And when he arrives at a particular decision regarding his future action, he again has moved himself through speech.

So, in this way, we can say Odysseus is engaged in a reflexive rhetoric when he deliberates. But can we speak of rhetoric in Homer, let alone of a kind other than suasory discourse in the public sphere? Is persuasion in Homer an art that we can call rhetoric? Furthermore, is self-persuasion portrayed as an art by Homer? Again, Johnstone’s work moves us toward the idea of a reflexive rhetoric in Homer (1996b).

The idea of Homeric rhetoric is alleged to pose the problem of anachronism. These allegations hold that because no word rhetorikê exists in the poems, and because certain linguistic advances had not yet been made, like the invention of a philosophical vocabulary, rhetoric does not exist in the poems. Persuasion, then, appears to be only a knack, a random or arbitrary act, or a gift of the gods, rather than a systematic art.

One way to respond to these allegations is to show that the existence of the term rhetorikê, like the existence of a philosophical vocabulary, is irrelevant to the question of whether an art of persuasion existed in Homer. The same argument raised against the Snellian hypothesis is raised again. Johnstone writes, ‘My own view is that whether rhetorikê or (following a point made by Poulakos) oblique cases of this word (not just the nominative, but the genitive, dative, or accusative) occur before Plato is irrelevant to the question whether rhetoric as a discipline occurred before Plato. It is not altogether absurd to suppose that rhetoric was a recognized verbal art even in the time of Homer, even though no case of the noun rhetorikê occurs in Homer’ (1996b, 438).

For Johnstone, answering whether rhetoric exists in Homer depends on how we define it (1996b, 439). We might want to define rhetoric in a way that separates it from the practice of persuasion. Rhetoric then becomes armchair persuasion and operates as the analysis or theorization of persuasion and not the act itself. But we don’t have to define it this way. In fact, we usually don’t. Johnstone notes that when we talk about Newt Gingrich’s rhetoric, we are not making references to his rhetorical theory. As Johnstone suggests, if we define rhetoric as the art of persuasion, where theory and practice are inextricably linked, then, to answer the question of whether rhetoric exists in Homer, we would need to explore only whether anything in the poems suggests that persuasion is in fact an art.
To say that rhetoric is an art of persuasion is to say that persuasive practice has been acquired by some kind of method, as opposed to its being a mere knack. But it does not follow from this that the method discovered/applied has to be Aristotelian. It is very likely that people in the Dark Ages had their own understanding of a method for acquiring and practicing persuasion. Kennedy suggests that a Homeric awareness of rhetoric was nurtured by the method of listening to older speakers and acquiring formulae, themes, maxims, and stock topics such as myths and historical examples (1963, 36; see also Donlan, 5 November 1988, 1–4).

Regardless of how Homeric people were habituated in persuasion, we know that they were. Homer tells us so in the often-cited passage at Iliad 9.443. Phoenix describes his responsibilities as tutor to Achilles: to teach (διδάσκω) Achilles to be a speaker (ῥητὴρ) of speeches and a doer of deeds. Speaking effectively in the assembly and fighting bravely in war seem to be regarded as equally teachable. In addition to this, at Odyssey 1.384–85, after Telemachus has spoken boldly to the suitors, Antinous responds that the gods must have taught (διδάσκω) him how to speak effectively. That the gods are involved in Telemachus’s education in speech does not undermine the claim that speech was considered to be taught, but rather emphasizes the point that it must be if even the gods must use instructional means—as opposed to magic—to help humans become good speakers. These seem to be the only explicit pieces of evidence that speech was taught, and Homer never expands on how speech was taught. However, he probably didn’t need to say anything more on the subject. His silence may indicate that his audience already knew that the skills involved in hunting, fighting, speechmaking, and the like, were taught. To say any more would be unnecessary.

As additional evidence of an art of persuasion in Homer, the numerous persuasive practices in the epics show a consciousness of the necessity of persuasion, of inventing potentially persuasive sayables, and of critiquing the appropriateness of persuasive messages based on an awareness of effective and ineffective speech: the deliberative debates throughout the Iliad and in book 2 of the Odyssey. Antenor’s comparison of the speaking styles of Odysseus and Menelaus in Iliad 3 (Naas 1995, 134), Prilam’s persuasion of Achilles in Iliad 24 (Naas 1995, 134), Helen’s debate over what to say to Telemachus and how to say it when she recognizes him as Odysseus’s son in Odyssey 4, and Menelaus’s critique of Peisistratus’s speech in Odyssey 15. These scenes reveal a critical awareness of language and its strategic uses and effects. They reveal not only speechmaking, but also criticism of speeches and inventional processes. Homeric
speeches even share formal structures, suggesting that they have a method (Toohey 1994).

It seems likely that Homeric persuasion was an art, prior to the coining of the term *rhetorikê* or the invention of a philosophical vocabulary. As Johnstone writes, “To speak of rhetoric in Homer is no anachronism; it is simply a way of saying what we want to say about Homer. He perhaps didn’t have the term, but we do. Having it, we can use it wherever it applies” (January 1996). And it applies not only to public persuasive practices in Homer, but to private practices as well.

In Homer, self-persuasion, like public persuasion, appears to be an art, a habituated practice. That the four explicit and complete Odyssean deliberation scenes proceed in the same way—namely, through recognizing a problem, realizing alternative courses of action, and making a choice based on a reason(s)—suggests an existing method of deliberating. But more fundamental than this, we know that Odysseus is acquainted with an art of self-persuasion because of his ability to resist temptation: “To resist temptation requires a self-directed rhetoric, which is clearly an art since it does not come naturally” (Johnstone, 14 March 1996). Furthermore, that deliberation does not come naturally is most evident in the example of Telemachus. His nondeliberate character in the early stages of the poem begins to transform when he gains exposure to deliberative models. While Homer portrays Telemachus as coming to consciousness about the necessity to deliberate and acquiring the necessary skills to deliberate, Homer portrays Odysseus as a master deliberator, one who has not only recognized the necessity to deliberate, but has mastered the method.

These are some of the ideas on a reflexive rhetoric in Homer that Henry Johnstone and I have explored. Our exploration continues though, not only to sharpen our understanding of the presuppositions of deliberation, but to see how and to what effect, by examining the idea of a reflexive rhetoric in Homer, we diversify the historical and theoretical pattern of rhetoric.

Few, if any, would disagree that public discourse takes center stage in rhetoric’s history and theory. As a result of restricting rhetoric to suasory activity of the *public* sphere, a single pattern for rhetoric has been established. But we know that a great deal of selection takes place to create such a monological narrative (Nienkamp 1994, 9). We also know, as Kenneth Burke has taught us well, that selection presupposes rejection. And with rejection comes at least marginalization, if not domination.

By recording and theorizing only public rhetoric and ignoring private rhetoric, the dominant history and theory of rhetoric seems to operate in a
suspiciously Platonic dichotomy of thought and speech, where the knowledge we see in the mind’s eye is different from the knowledge we hear in human speech. In this dichotomy, only one form of knowledge is reliable, and it is not the knowledge that speech produces. By accounting for a reflexive rhetoric in Homer, we start to dislodge the stabilized narrative about rhetoric as a public thing and to diversify it in the hope that something previously ignored and negated can be attended to and affirmed—namely, the role of rhetoric in the private sphere, and the unity of thought and speech in the beginnings of the Western rhetorical tradition.

More than this, moving toward an account of reflexive rhetoric (not just in Homer, but in general) allows us to see in even greater detail the centrality of rhetoric to our human condition. This seems to me the very heart of Johnstone’s writing on rhetoric. His work reveals that rhetoric is not only the art that guides our public choices; it is the art that guides our private choices as well. The possibility for enriching our understanding of our private and public selves calls for an exploration of reflexive rhetoric. Henry Johnstone has acknowledged this call since at least 1970, and he continues to respond to it with unprecedented insight. His work in turn calls us to be students of this idea. And in Henry Johnstone, we could have no better teacher.

**Department of Rhetoric and Public Address**

**Whitman College**

**Notes**

1. By focusing on the *Odyssey*, I do not mean to suggest that the *Iliad* has fewer, or less relevant, deliberation scenes. Nor do I mean to suggest, by focusing only on Odysseus, that no other characters in the *Odyssey* (or the *Iliad* for that matter) deliberate.
2. For a recent Snellian account of the fragmented Homeric psychology, see Erbse (1990).
3. See, e.g., *Od*. 22.333; 16.73.
4. This reference and the others like it refer to excerpts from Johnstone’s daily journal. He wrote these excerpts in response to our conversations.
7. See also Johnstone (1987, 130).
8. See Cole (1991), Schiappa (1991), and Christopher Lyle Johnstone (1996). Though each has his own nuanced rejection of Homeric rhetoric, all three seem to share the assumption that the phenomenon of rhetoric could not be known prior to the coining of the term *rhetorikê*. 

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9. Hudson’s 1923 rejection of the separation of rhetoric and oratory comes to mind: “In ancient as in modern times it was found impossible to divorce theory from practice. The rhetorician and the orator were one. . . . [Rhetoric] does not satisfy itself alone with the finding of means of persuasion; it also includes the persuasive arrangement and presentation of the speaker’s material. A product of rhetoric, in this sense, then, is neither an analysis of some speech already made, with a list of figures and tropes, nor an analysis of subject upon which a speech is to be made, showing what means of persuasion can be employed. Rather it is a speech, or some piece of persuasive discourse, persuasively presented” (1965, 22–23).

10. We are told that Skamandrios was taught to hunt (II. 5.51). Eurypylus was taught to heal wounds, as was Achilles (II. 11.832). Euphorbos was taught warfare (II. 16.811). The bard Demodocus was taught by Apollo (Od. 8.488), and the bard Phemios taught himself (Od. 22.347). Antilochos was taught horsemanship (II. 23.307), and the handmaids were taught their craft in housekeeping and caring for their mistress (Od. 22.422). Homer tells us only once that each of these arts was taught. Neither does he repeat that they were taught not does he expand on how they were taught. Yet this does not negate the fact that these practices were taught in Homer; in fact, it might very well emphasize the point.

11. Naas (1995, 133–34) notes these instances of persuasion, but denies that the mere use of persuasive techniques, or the critique of them, in the case of Antenor, can be termed rhetoric (134–39).

12. See Karp (1977), who argues for an implicit rhetorical theory in Homer, and Donlan (5 November 1988), who argues that we should no longer pretend—against all evidence and common sense—that rhetoric was not fully an art at every stage in its long history, including the Homeric stage.

13. Athene explains to Telemachus how to discern the poles of his dilemma so that he can deliberate properly (1.267–69; 1.287–97); Peisistratus shares with Telemachus and others his internal debate over to whom he should pass the cup as an invitation to speak (3.47–51); Nestor, in telling Telemachus the tale of the Trojan War, mentions inner debate seven times, making it a theme (3.132; 3.151–52; 3.152; 3.166; 3.169; 3.194; 3.126–29).

Works cited


13 September 1994 Excerpt from private journal.


15 September 1994. Excerpt from private journal.

January 1996. Excerpt from private journal.

14 March 1996. Excerpt from private journal.


