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Figuring Rhetoric: From Antistrophe to Apostrophe through Catastrophe

Mari Lee Mifsud
University of Richmond, mmifsud@richmond.edu

Jane Sutton

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FIGURING RHETORIC:
FROM ANTISTROPHE TO APOSTROPHE THROUGH CATASTROPHE

Abstract. This essay explores rhetoric tropologically through various strophes: antistrophe, catastrophe, and apostrophe. Our purpose is to delineate problems and possibilities that these tropes pose for rhetoric in an effort to create new rhetorics. We seek to display the antistrophic and catastrophic figurations of rhetoric and then use visual lenses of photography and cinema to disrupt the figurations. Following the disruption, we seek to heighten sensibilities to other figurations, in particular an apostrophic figuration. We cast apostrophe as a figure for change because it marks a deeply felt turn toward difference and otherness. Turned as such, rhetoric becomes erotic.

As our title indicates, this essay explores rhetoric tropologically through various strophes (turns/figures). In troping or figuring rhetoric, we present possibilities of what rhetoric can become. In working through these possibilities, we interanimate rhetoric's theory and practice through figuration. To figure as such is to draw upon the unique resources from within rhetoric. Moreover, to figure as such is to invent (find and create) the possibilities unrecognized as yet in rhetoric. Such an invention committed to creating new theories of rhetoric so as not "to betray our opportunity," some- thing Giles Wilkeson Gray warned rhetoricians about as early as 1923 (266). Our aim, then, is to clear the way by engaging regions of rhetoric through figuration. Our approach is not to pin down figures, as traditional taxanomic approaches have done, but to animate them and in tum, extend the line of rhetoric.

We begin with antistrophe. Antistrophe is the figure that dominates the rhetorical tradition. As we will show, promoting rhetoric as dialectic through antistrophe has, over the centuries, poisoned our sensibilities. In effect, amplifying rhetoric as antistrophe is rhetoric's catastrophe.

Next we explore this catastrophe. We find in Aristotle's Rhetoric that a subset of antistrophe is catastrophe (1409b.23-1410a.5). Although Aristotle equates catastrophe with pleasure that comes from bringing something to an end, we, the inheritors of rhetoric, amplified by antistrophe, pay the price for this pleasure. To explore this price, we break out of the way rhetoric is traditionally talked about so as to see rhetoric from a radically different perspective.

29
Equipping ourselves with Susan Sontag, Roland Barthes, Walter Benjamin, and Boris Eichenbaum, we find photography and cinema particularly rich perspectives with which to make our break and to bring our understanding and experiences of rhetoric into focus. Photography and cinema are particularly sharp lenses from which we gain a heightened perception of rhetoric as antistrophe. We then use this perception to disrupt the amplification of rhetoric as antistrophe. Through this disruption, which we refer to as "kata-strophe," we can see anew the resources of figuration available for extending rhetorical theory. We envision kata-strophe as transposing rhetoric and getting us out of rhetoric's promotional contract with antistrophe.

If kata-strophe transposes rhetoric's catastrophe as antistrophe, apostrophe is the turn to rhetoric's new life. Apostrophe is literally turning away from rhetoric as antistrophe and its subset catastrophe. In turning away, apostrophe arouses the incidental, the other, and it is there, as Walter Benjamin suggests, that the "future is nesting" ("A Short History of Photography" 202).

**Antistrophe**

We are all familiar with the representation of rhetoric as the antistrophe of dialectic. It is after all the first line of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*: Rhetoric is the counterpart [*antistrophos*] to dialectic" (1354a.1). We are also familiar with the many interpretations of antistrophe. As John Rainolds said, "There are as many interpretations of this little word [. . .] as there are interpreters" (Green, *Oxford lectures* 105). However, we comment on how these "many interpretations" of rhetoric as antistrophe are actually "one."

Grammatically speaking, rhetoric is the subject and *antistrophos* is the predicate nominative in the sentence: "Rhetoric is a counterpart of dialectic." What does it mean to posit, at the structural level, a transformational equivalence between rhetoric and antistrophe? What kind of relationship does the Subject-Predicate Nominative (SPN) signify? One way the "gram- mar question" is answered is to posit an identical exchange: The articular subject -- "(the) rhetoric" -- and the predicate nominative -- "antistrophos" — is a convertible proposition. In his commentary *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, E. M. Cope suggests as much. "When applied in its strict and proper sense, it [*antistrophos*] denotes an exact correspondence in detail, as a facsimile or counterpart" (1.1). By "strict and proper sense," Cope is referring to the grammatical structure of SPN -- subject plus a predicate nominative -- as a "logic" (1.1). So structured through *antistrophos*, rhetoric and dialectic then become "convertible," which is to say rhetoric and dialectic are "identical in meaning" and "precisely similar in all respects" (1.1). That rhetoric and dialectic are "identical" is intended to reveal that, in spite of specific differences, both are "opposites in the same row" (1.2). That is, rhetoric and dialectic live together under "one genus, proof" (1.2). Although they
live together under "one genus, proof' and are "precisely similar," rhetoric is subordinate and, therefore, is reduced to living at "a lower level" (1.2).

Lexically, antistrophos combines the preposition "anti," which ranges in meaning from "opposite" to "instead," with the noun "strophe," which ranges from "trick" to "turn." Antistrophos traffics in the lexical nuances of both "anti" and "strophe." Some commentators, according to Rainolds (Green, Oxford Lectures 105-109) consider "anti" as "opposite" and support this with Aristotle's expression that tyranny is the converse of monarchy (Politics 1.295a.18) and Dionysius of Halicarnassus' illustration that good is the converse of evil (14). This treatment of "anti" leads to an interpretation of rhetoric as the converse of dialectic. Others, who rely on "anti" as "instead" (e.g., Averroes, Trebizond, and Alexander) indicate that rhetoric can "stand in for" or "act in place of" dialectic (Green, Oxford Lectures 105-107). If this use of "anti" is combined with the use of "strophe" as "trick" the result resembles a Platonic understanding of rhetoric as a counterfeit art (Gorgias 464b8, 465c1-3). From this reasoning, dialectic "stands in for" rhetoric but rhetoric may not "stand in for" dialectic. Some commentators, however, remark that Aristotle's use of antistrophos is likely meant to signal his rejection of the analogy of the true and false arts elaborated by Socrates in the Gorgias (Kennedy 28-29). Many commentators stage "strophe" as "turn," as in the choral strophe, or turns, in various songs and dances in drama. Along these lines J. H. Freese (translator) explains antistrophos as counterpart: "Not an exact copy, but making a kind of pair with it, and corresponding to it as the antistrophe to the strophe in a choral ode" (2). Freese is not alone. Translators from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth century draw upon the strophe or movement of the choral dance, the returning of the chorus to answer a previous strophe, to explain the relation of rhetoric to dialectic (Cope 1: Grimaldi 1-2: Kennedy 28-29).\footnote{Despite differences with respect to "anti" and "strophe" among interpreters, one thing seems to be shared by all: Aristotle "indicates a resemblance and extraordinary affinity between the art of rhetoric and dialectic" (Green, Oxford Lectures 107). This shared view reduces "many interpretations" to one. In effect, these "many interpretations" are effusions of a single interpretive industry. This industry manufactures a rhetoric that is one with dialectic bound up in a system of creating knowledge (epistemology). The effusion of a single interpretive industry, Susan Sontag writes in Against Interpretation, "is like the fumes of an automobile and of heavy industry" (17). Sontag's technologically-based metaphor brings before the eyes how a techne of rhetoric bound to dialectic through an antistrophic projection "poisons our sensibilities" (17).}
**Catastrophe**

Herein begins our experience of the catastrophe of rhetoric. As mentioned earlier, Aristotle establishes a relationship between antistrophe and catastrophe. Catastrophe is a subset of antistrophe (Rhetoric 1409a.26-27) and is the figure that "turns down." Our tradition is most familiar with catastrophe through Aristotle's *lexis katestrammene* (a participle of *katastrophe*, the verbal form *katastrophe*).\(^6\) *Katestrammene* is Aristotle's word for periodic style, one that brings an audience to a pleasant end or rest. Civic discourse, for example, adopts a periodic style as opposed to the paratatic style of poetic discourse and contrasts with *lexis eirmene* or the running style. However because of the familiarity that *lexis katestrammene* holds in our tradition, we are unable to see how bringing an audience to a pleasant end or rest misses opportunities. We miss these opportunities because the effusion of the interpretative industry has reduced our ability to see more, hear more, feel more, about our subject - something Sontag insists must happen to fight through the smog of interpretation (23). We turn to photography and cinema as providers of a heightened perception of and explanation for the catastrophe of rhetoric. In this state of heightened perception, an opportunity to disrupt catastrophe emerges. We mark this disruption as "kata-strophe."

**PHOTOGRAPHY**

In the following passage, Roland Barthes approaches photography through rhetoric.

The unary Photograph has every reason to be banal, "Unity" of composition being the first rule of vulgar (and notably, of academic) rhetoric: 'The subject,' says one handbook for amateur photographers, 'Must be simple, free of useless accessories: this is called the Search for Unity. (Camera Lucida 41)

The rhetoric which Barthes brings before our eyes is that of oral and written composition. This rhetoric is indeed driven by a search for a unity manifest in the teaching of a techne for constructing coherent messages and compelling arguments with clear theses, logical structure, solid development, and eloquent expression of the whole message. Practically speaking, this is the rhetoric of persuasion that must work to align the position(s) of the audience with that of the rhetor in such a way as to preclude all potential gaps, to prevent all interruptions and annoyances in aligning the audience with the rhetor. In Barthes' language, the search for unity is the very thing that makes both photography and rhetoric banal, vulgar, and academic. We want to use Barthes' discussion regarding the search for unity as an ekphrasis of the catastrophe of rhetoric.
To follow Barthes' discussion of the search for unity, we begin by considering what he calls "the unary character of the studium." Unary is a transliteration of the French word "unaire." This term names something that transforms reality without doubling it, without making it vacillate. The term unaire belongs to generative grammar and is used to mark a transformation where a single series is generated by the base (Camera 40-41). The interrogative, passive, negative, and emphatic transformations are examples of "unaire." A unary system, as Barthes stretches the term, proceeds through amplification, and, in doing so, enhances its power of cohesion (Camera 41). A unary system is a catastrophe because it kills incidentals, it ends possibilities, it subdues all that which undercuts the creation of a unified, compelling, and coherent human experience and understanding.

The studium is ultimately always coded and belongs to the "vision" of the photographer (Camera 51). To attend to the studium is to attend to the photographer's attempt to transfer a vision. On the contrary, to attend to what Barthes calls the photograph's "punctum," which is never coded as such, is to attend to one's own experience evoked by the visual. "Ce "detail" est le punctum (ce qui me point)" (Barthes, la Chambre Claire 71). Punctum is a Latin term from the verb pungo. This verb takes a tropical or figurative sense ranging from prick, sting, vex, grieve, trouble, disturb, afflict, mortify, and annoy. The punctum of a photograph is an incidental or detail that punctuates, disturbs, and interrupts one's experience of the studium of the photograph. If details in a photograph do not "disturb" or "prick" him, Barthes remarks, it is doubtless because the photographer has put them there intentionally as part of the studium (Camera 47).

Barthes exemplifies punctum and studium with various critiques of photographs he loves, including Lewis H. Hine's photograph of two idiot children. Barthes comments that he hardly sees the monstrous heads and pathetic profiles which he notes belong to the studium. Instead, what he sees are the off-center details, the little boy's huge collar, and the girl's finger bandage. For Barthes, the punctum of these photographs cannot be named "idiocy," a name that can be applied readily to the studium. In point of fact, Barthes notes that the inability to name the punctum is a good symptom of disturbance (Camera 50-51).

Through the discussion of the studium as contrasted with the punctum, we have a heightened sensation of rhetoric's catastrophe, the act of rhetoric being "turned down," subdued, reduced, and concluded. Rhetoric's catastrophe is to be unary, to be only an antistrophe to dialectic. To be a servant of dialectic is a catastrophe for rhetoric in at least two ways: First, rhetoric is assimilated into the unary system of rationality to such an extent that its possibilities smolder. Then, in the smolder, rhetoric assimilates the "other,"


Whether through the practice of creating coherent and compelling accounts of the necessity of a thesis or through a tradition of emphasizing the *telos* of rationality and the service of speech in reaching this *telos*. Thus from the passive to the amplified, rhetoric transforms from a single base (the epistemological) to, in turn, "turn down" - in other words, to subdue, reduce, and conclude "the other."

How can rhetoric avoid the catastrophe of being unary? We look again to Barthes. *Camera Lucida* ends by making explicit the idea implicit throughout, namely that society's means by which to tame the madness of photography is *art* (*Camera* 117). The *art* of photography consists of techniques that can be named, like the "Search for Unity." Naming fosters coherence. The *art* of photography belongs to the photographer's vision or studium. The studium fosters control. For Barthes, photography is much less of an experience when it is transformed through a search for unity into an *art*, which is nothing less than a mechanism of coherence and control. Thus, photography is better left to *madness* than *art* (*Camera* 117-119). Perhaps the same can be said about rhetoric. Rhetoric is better when it cannot deny, ignore, or subsume who or what is idiosyncratic (the *idos* if you will.) Do we dare experience rhetoric beyond antistrophe in the same way Barthes wishes to experience photography beyond the studium? Do we dare turn away from the art of rhetoric? Do we dare experience the *eros* of rhetoric?

Incidentally, Barthes describes his rejection of unary photography in terms of erotics. Barthes' love for photography moves him to reject its reduced, unary form. For Barthes, the quintessential unary photograph is the pornographic one (*Camera* 41ff.). There is no punctum in pornography. It is all studium. An erotic photograph, on the contrary, by not making the sexual organs into a central object, takes the spectator outside its frame, and it is there that the spectator animates the photograph and that it animates the spectator. The punctum of an erotic photograph, then, "is a kind of subtle beyond - *as* if the image launched desire beyond what it permits us to see" (*Camera* 59).

Would erotic rhetoric, then, turn away from a search for unity to take the listener outside of the frame, whether the frame of a thesis being presented for the listeners' assent or the frame of rhetoric as antistrophe? Could the listener, there, outside the frame animate rhetoric and rhetoric animate the listener? Could the punctum of rhetoric in terms of erotics, then, be a kind of subtle beyond - *as* if the message launched desire beyond what it directs us to hear? What if rhetoric launched such a desire beyond that of rhetoric as antistrophe?

**EXPERIENCING RHETORIC AS CINEMA**

Barthes' critique of unary photography helps us to see the search for
unity as too controlling, too determining, too unfortunately free of
details. To apprehend the method of achieving such unity, we turn to
cinema. In turning to the most restrained of the visual arts—cinema—we
aim to frame the way in which rhetoric has been amplified and reduced by
antistrophe.

Cinema, which employs a director of photography, is even more unified
and controlled than (unary) photography. A director of photography in
cinema might shoot instances of reality but no detail is left to chance.
Film making, Robert B. Ray points out, has from the first "been shaped
by the answers proposed to a set of fundamental questions" (33). How
does the viewer make sense of a film? How does the viewer process
cinematic information? The answers that Boris Eichenbaum, a Russian
Formalist, gave during the experimental phase of Soviet cinema turn out to
be copious in their associations for rhetoric. Eichenbaum explained that he
studied "oratorical speech because it was close to practical speech" (845).9
Drawing on Eichenbaum, Ray and Paul Willemen explain how a viewer
makes sense of a film through speech. Specifically, viewers accompany
their film watching with an "inner speech." Although film theorists never
say so, the notion of inner speech suggests that processing information in a
film is analogous to that which rhetoric calls an enthymeme.10 How is inner
speech, the method of processing information in a film, enthymemetic? As
the audience supplies the connection from the suppressed major premise to
obtain a conclusion, so inner speech supplies the connection between
separate shots to make sense out of disparate ones.

The way Ray explains how inner speech works to create a meaning sys-
tem could be substituted for an explanation for how enthymemes work to
produce conviction. Here is Ray's explanation:

A useful example [of inner speech] occurs in Born Free's opening
scene which cuts back and forth between a woman's washing clothes
in a river and a stalking lion, apparently intent on unseen prey. With
the woman and the lion never appearing together in any frame, the
sequence culminates in three shots: the lion springs, the woman turns
and screams, and the river rushes away, now littered with clothes and a
spreading red stain. (33)

Enthymematically speaking, the three disparate shots consist of a major
premise [lion hunts prey], a minor premise [woman screams], and a
conclusion [woman is dead] that in turn creates a meaning system in the
language of film. The meaning system is an effect of images appearing
nowhere (33). There is no shot of a lion eating woman. The conclusion,
lion kills woman, occurs only in the mind of the viewer, whose inner
speech responds to the matching of images.
The enthymematic power of cinema works through what is called the "rule of matching" in film making. By matching two shots -- "lion hunts prey" and 'woman is dead" -- the director produces the effect of knowledge. For matching to work successfully, all images in each match must be controlled. The process of inner speech can be interrupted if, for example, the image, "lion hunts prey" is shot in Africa while the image of the river rushing with blood is shot by a river in North America. One incidental -- a small Eastern Redbud leaf left floating on the banks of the river -- can create a powerful disturbance in the process of inner speech. Although all images are matched, one floating leaf can disturb the meaning of a lion hunting in Africa and killing prey by a river in North America. The effect of knowledge is, therefore, a "capturing" or "shooting" of truth. What is most feared, then, in film making, is the capacity for an image to go astray, to drift, and then to perturb and finally undercut the meaning system (Ray 94-119: cf. Barthes “Third Meaning" 317-334).

What if we were to reverse the formalist method and imagine oratorical speech/rhetoric through the visual medium of film? And what if this film of rhetoric were produced in response to two questions: How does an audience make sense of rhetoric? How does an audience process its truth? As film makers answer with the idea of inner speech, we answer them with the idea of the enthymeme. The enthymeme captures probable truth through a process of providing apparently contingent premises to which the audience supplies connections and conclusions. The enthymeme invites a conclusion by allowing the audience to match contingent premises. However, the contingency of the major premise behaves as a universal, whether invariably or usually, thus inviting a particular matching (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1357b.35-36: cf. Metaphysics 1023b.29: Posterior Analytics 73b.26). Grimaldi notes "‘Children love their parents’: it is a probability because [it is] a general observation universal in form" (cited in Kennedy 43 n. 63). Although the enthymeme is said to be constructed from contingency, this contingency is a reduction and a stabilization of what all the wise, the majority (Aristotle Topics, 1.1: cf. Kennedy 41) -- believe "for the most part." Rhetoric does not theorize about each opinion -- what may seem so to Socrates or Hippias -- but about what seems true to people of a certain sort, as is also true with dialectic (Kennedy 41: n. 56). Viewed as such, a cinema of rhetoric as antistrophe to dialectic produces the enthymeme as *syllogismos* (Rhetoric 1358a.19). Once again rhetoric is amplified through dialectic.

In this production of rhetoric as film, the enthymeme matches shots of contingency with shots of regularity, repeatability, and predictability. As the film maker fears an image -- Redbud leaf -- going astray and perturbing and undercutting the meaning system, so the rhetor fears being lead astray by irregularities and unpredictabilities, which would constitute, at best, false
reasoning (paralogos) and, at worst, silly talk (paralerema) (Rhetoric 1356b.35). The core of rhetoric as antistrophe links with a fear of the accidental, the drive toward rationality, the exalting of organization. Although this "seeing" of rhetoric through the lens of antistrophe sets the standard of objective truth on which rhetoric can build its citadel of reason, it compromises the idea of the accidental and the contingent upon which rhetoric could distinguish itself from dialectic. Is not rhetoric the art most concerned with the contingent? In the process of occupying the citadel of reason, has not the interpretative industry compromised and reduced our ability to respond to the idea of contingency? We are now in a position to invoke Walter Benjamin's definition of a catastrophe: "to have missed the opportunity" ("N" 23). In other words, a catastrophe is the inverse of kairos, seizing opportunities.

Kata-strophe

Insofar as photography and cinema have heightened our perception of the catastrophe of rhetoric, they have created a disturbance in the unary system of rhetoric as antistrophe to dialectic. We imagine this disturbance at the most basic level of the word: "catastrophe" disrupted is "kata-strophe." To understand "kata-strophe" we turn now to the quadripartia ratio, the four traditional rhetorical systems of change governed by "kata." (See figure 1.1). Four our present purposes, we will focus our attention on the interactions between two of these four systems of change: substitution (kata enallagen) and transposition (kata metathesis).

Rhetorical Systems of Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substitution</th>
<th>Subtraction</th>
<th>Addition</th>
<th>Transposition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kata enallagen</td>
<td>Kata aveian</td>
<td>Kata pleonasmon</td>
<td>Kata metathesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>synonymia</td>
<td>syncope</td>
<td>epitheton</td>
<td>anastrophe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anacolouthe</td>
<td>restricio</td>
<td>metaplasmon</td>
<td>anastrophesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acyrologia</td>
<td>anesis</td>
<td>polysyndeton</td>
<td>parenthesis</td>
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Figure 1. Adapted from Gideon O. Burton, "Silva Rhetoricae," cf. Quintilian 5.38

Substitution is the system of change governing the inter-articulation of rhetoric and dialectic through antistrophe. The basic figure of this inter-articulation is synonymia which shapes rhetoric and dialectic's interchange-
ability. In the wake of a disturbance of this interchangeability (caused by seeing rhetoric/dialectic through photography/cinema), we are now in a position to see the insufficiency of this system of substitution as rhetoric’s exclusive system of change. This insufficiency is an effect of this system having been reduced to a unary system.

One measure of the unary construction of this system is the power synonymia possesses to forge a unity between rhetoric and dialectic. However, synonymia is not the only figure moving this system of change. Others such as anacoloutha denote inconsistency and impropriety, not interchangeability, as yet other movements of the system of substitution.

By intra-animating the figures within the system of substitution — synonymia and anacoloutha — we can recognize how profound the connection is between the system of substitution and other systems of change, namely (for our present purposes) the system of transposition, in which inconsistency moves more freely.¹ The interactions of these figures move the system of substitution out of itself and into another, resulting in an inter-animation of the systems of substitution and transposition.

Transposition is the system of change characterized by the figure anastrophe. This figure marks a disordering of an accepted relationship between two elements of a proposition. Traditionally, Anastrophe marks a change in position, but to call this change of position simply an inversion or a reversal is to miss the radical opportunity for change that other figures in the system of transposition animate, such as tmesis which creates a cut in an accepted order. The interaction of these two figures -anastrophe and tmesis — within the system of transposition creates change marked by both destruction (cutting) and creation (change in meaning). To return once more to a consideration of transposition at the most basic level of the word, "catastrophe" disrupted is "kata-strophe." The hyphen is a cut (tmesis) that destroys an old meaning (e.g. catastrophe) and creates a new meaning (e.g. kata-stro-phe).

Perhaps the most common way of understanding transposition is through the image of fire. Across time and genres of inquiry into the human condition, fire is an ever-present topic of destruction, cunning intelligence, and life. In Heraclitus, fire is paradoxical, both a counterpoint theme of unity and totality (Kahn, 271-272), as well as the generative force of the cosmos: "The ordering (kosmos), the same for all, no god nor man has made, but it ever was and is and will be: fire ever living, kindled in measure and in measures going out" [XXXVII (D. 30), in Kahn 132]. In mythology, the fire-thief Prometheus stole the element from Vulcan and gave it to the human race. This gift made fire not only a resource for human beings but also for cunning intelligence. Philosophers and poets use fire to rekindle their topics. Alexander Pope, in his Preface to the *Iliad* speaks of the genius of Homeric
poetry as an unequaled fire of the most animated nature imaginable. Through the fire of Homer, "... everything moves, everything lives, and is put into action" (qtd. in Wace and Stubbings 1). And in Plutarch, "Nothing so much resembles a living creature as fire does" (qtd. in Detienne and Vernant 281). Clearly the history of ideas speaks through fire, and rhetoric should be no exception. To no small degree, fire is an apt image for the transposition of which we speak. This transposition provides new opportunities for figuring rhetoric. We will explore these opportunities provided by the system of transposition through the figure of apostrophe.

Apostrophe

While apostrophe is most commonly recognized as a punctuation mark, we transpose the punctuation mark with the rhetorical figure. As a punctuation mark, the apostrophe is a substitution marking possession and contraction (e.g., "it's" can mean either "of it" or "it is"). As a rhetorical figure, the apostrophe is a transposition, a "turning away." This turning away takes on several interactive forms, traditionally linked in taxonomies to four figures: 1) parenthesis; 2) heteroiosis; 3) alloiosis; and 4) metabasis. (See figure 1.2). To see how these four figures turn and move is like the experience of being in a hall of mirrors. To manage this experience of being in such a hall, we will divide these four figures into two sets of moves, the moves within a system of substitution first (figure 1.3), then within a system of transposition (figure 1.4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parenthesis</th>
<th>Metabasis</th>
<th>Heteroiosis</th>
<th>Alloiosis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>aside</td>
<td>crossing over</td>
<td>things or people of a different kind difference</td>
<td>otherness difference</td>
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Figure 1.2. Adapted from "apostrophe" in Dupriez/Halsall; Anderson

Apostrophe takes the form of parenthesis. In a word, parenthesis is an interpolation. Understood within the system of substitution, this interpolation introduces something additional or extraneous, wrongly inserted. Within the system of substitution, parenthesis as apostrophe is often considered puerile, marking the agency of the speaking subject as insufficient. Consider as an example the following apostrophe from Homer's *Odyssey*. When Odysseus
is thrown against the cliffs by Poseidon's enraged sea, he cries out: "Hear me, oh River, whosoever you are ... I come to you seeking to escape" (5.445). The address to the river signifies Odysseus' lack of agency, his dependence on an absent, inanimate other for assistance. From within the system of substitution, Odysseus' apostrophizing reveals him to be like a helpless child. The puerile nature of apostrophe, typical of epic, brought forth titters from later audiences accustomed to the assertive authorial voice of modern fiction (Culler 59).

If not judged to be puerile, the apostrophe moving as parenthesis in the system of substitution is judged to be deceptive and an insertion without authorization (Dupriez/Halsall 59-60). Interpolating, the speaking subject turns away from the audience and addresses someone or something, such as a rose: "O Rose, thou art sick!" This apostrophic gesture of turning away to, in this case, a rose is characterized as a conventional inherited element devoid of significance (Culler 60). Through the theme of convention coupled with a tradition in which tropes pass out of rhetoric's proper relations with dialectic, the rhetorical moment of the rose indicates the extraneous and something wrongly inserted. Apostrophe through the lens of parenthesis constitutes either an insufficiency or a deviation; either way, it is an insertion in rhetoric with neither dialectic's putative authority nor its authorization.

The apostrophe is potentially dangerous to the way meaning is created in the system of substitution. Through metabasis, apostrophes have the possibility to cross-over into other regions (heteroiosis) and create change into otherness (alloiosis). Because of the danger of disruption, the system of substitution governs metabasis through synonymia, so that the "other regions" to which metabasis crosses over are not "strange" and "confusing" but "straightforward" and "acceptable." When governed by the system of substitution, the metabasis of apostrophe acts as an analogy governed by synonymia. Governed as such, analogies put like things together: My love is like a red rose. Nothing incongruent occurs in this analogy. The congruence of the two-love and the beauty and depth of a rose's redness – is deemed understandable and appropriate. Deemed as such, meaning becomes unary. Indeed, incongruence, disruption of the unary, is to be avoided as a vice of metabasis. If metabasis goes astray, away from the foundation of the unary system of meaning, its movement is portrayed as shifty.

As shifty, metabasis brings forward images of the sophists, who through shifty speech cross ideas over in the minds of auditors, from a familiar position, or one that would appear to be congruent with a norm, to a different and often regarded as strange position (such as crossing over and defending Helen rather than blaming her). Substitution governs metabasis so that its possible movement away from the straight and normal is perceived as a vice, a movement that involves trickery, obliqueness, and falsity. Because the vice of
metabasis is so dangerous to the coherence and stability of the system of substitution, the system must amplify the figure of synonymia to govern movement and attenuate the figure of anacolutha. The possibilities of inconsistencies, difference, and change through otherness cannot be free within, but rather are subjugated by, the system of substitution.

Apostrophe Linked to System of Substitution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parenthesis</th>
<th>Metabasis</th>
<th>Heteroiosis</th>
<th>Alloiosis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>aside incidental</td>
<td>crossing over</td>
<td>things or people</td>
<td>otherness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extraneous</td>
<td>shifting</td>
<td>of a different kind difference discordant</td>
<td>difference confusing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.3. Adapted from "apostrophe" in Dupriez/Halsall; Anderson

Distinct from the system of substitution, the system of transposition is a space where inconsistency, difference, and change through otherness can move freely. The crossing-over of metabasis can, again, be understood as analogy, but not an analogy governed by synonymia. The analogic movement of metabasis within the system of transposition is governed instead by anacoloutha, inconsistency. Governed as such, the movement of metabasis is a transposition of subjects that hitherto seemed radically inconsistent: "O Rose, thou art sick!" Metabasis governed by anacoloutha in a system of transposition creates associations through difference. Difference becomes the incidental, the punctum, "the tiny spark of accident," releasing meaning from the unary system. Within the system of transposition, parenthesis interpolates new matter, namely incidentals. In this way, apostrophes cross-over, move out of, the frame of the thesis. To return to "O Rose, thou art sick!" this speech differs dramatically from speech that asserts "The rose is sick!" What is inserted apostrophically is nothing less than a feeling, specifically deep concern arising in inconsistence – a rose and a condition of sickness. This insertion of feeling expressed through inconsistence is, at once, a breaking out of discourse constrained by rules against the extraneous enforced by dialectic. The breaking out which is an insertion is a movement toward intense involvement with the situation described. The insertion of feeling, as well as the inconsistence, is so strong as to create radical change. The mood of apostrophe à la parenthesis is imperative.

This insertion through inconsistence, this breaking out spoken in the imperative, extends to us the possibility to cross-over. Thus metabasis is the organ of motion in the system of transposition, and it moves like the cuttle-
fish. As Detienne and Vernant portray this creature, the cuttle-fish moves obliquely, combining several different directions at once. It is polymorphic and has pliable tentacles. The *metis* of the cuttle-fish is "subtle and flexible as the coming-to-be over which they preside relate not to that which is straight and direct but to that which is sinuous, undulating and twisting not to be unchanging and fixed but the mobile and ever-changing; not to what is pre-determined and unequivocal but to what is polymorphic and ambiguous" (160). Moreover, the ink of the cuttle-fish proffers a way of moving, of getting out. Cuttle-fish carry within them a dark liquid. Aristotle notes that the cuttle-fish hides its dark liquid. It pretends to move forward but then in that forward moment, the cuttle-fish inserts its dark ink and turns back.  

Thanks to the digression marked by the ink of the cuttle-fish, apostrophe refers to the turn and threat that is polymorphic and ambiguous, the turn to a way through or crossing into different spaces (Detienne 161).

These different spaces, *heteroiosis*, within a system of substitution cause what John Schilb, albeit for slightly different purposes, identified as "heterophobia," "the sentiment that all rhetoricians must hang together if the work of rhetoric is to be accomplished" (135). Schilb argues that in the study of rhetoric, mainly for political reasons motivated by the marginalization of rhetoric within curricula, we fear difference, as if difference causes fractures in the unified front of rhetoricians in the academy. Difference as such is feared for its potential divisiveness, its destruction of the unary. But as Schilb suggests, the only way to be free as rhetoricians is to encounter difference. We figure this encounter through *alloiosis*, or becoming different, being changed, altered, and transformed through experiencing difference and otherness. *Alloiosis* is a reflexive figure, marking at once an experience of *heteros* (something other) and being radically changed by this experience, so that the self-experiencing other does not experience it through similitude and unity but through difference and separation.

### Apostrophe Linked to System of Transposition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Parenthesis</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>aside</td>
<td>crossing</td>
<td>things or people of a different kind difference</td>
<td>otherness difference</td>
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<tr>
<td>incidental</td>
<td>motion</td>
<td>child as other</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>new matter</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>reflexivity</strong></td>
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Figure 1.4. Adapted from "apostrophe" in Dupriez/Halsall; Anderson
Whereas a traditional image of *alloiosis* (as the reflexive experience of being altered by the other) appears in Greek antiquity as the wet nurse nourishing and altering a child through milk (Hippocrates 16), a radical image of the other appears in post modernity as a woman giving birth to a child: "The arrival of a child is, I believe, the first and often the only opportunity a woman has to experience the Other in its radical separation from herself, that is, as an object of love" (Kristeva interviewed by Enthoven qtd. in Kristeva *Desire in language* 10). We find significant the differences between Hippocrates and Julia Kristeva’s references to otherness. Hippocrates’ perspective constructs the woman as nourishing the child as other, hence constructing the other as dependent. Such dependence characterizes the other as needy and attached, and creates the conditions for possession. Kristeva constructs the woman as birthing the child as other, hence constructing the other as distinct and unattached, as a radical separation from the self. This point of radical separation constitutes a moment of reflexivity, where the unary subject (woman with child) erupts. This eruption arouses the subject into recognizing the other as distinct and separated, yet as an object of love.

From this image of woman we turn back to apostrophe. The “turning away” of the apostrophe is a double move. To see apostrophe from within the system of substitution is to see the other through possession and contraction. Without being possessed and contracted, the other, from within the system of substitution, can only display silly talk and false reasoning. If we are not to miss the opportunities of the other, where the future is nesting, in the language of Walter Benjamin, then we must see apostrophe’s double move, not only its move within a system of substitution but also within a system of transposition. Apostrophe as such invites us to encounter the other not by way of conclusion but by way of introduction. The other is therefore not reduced and subdued, possessed and contracted, but a distinct agent of difference. The conditions of difference afforded by the other expand and arouse the self. Such expansion and arousal establishes a surprising, maybe even disagreeable, contact not only with the other but also with the self. Even so, the tone is celebratory (Dupriez/Halsall 60) on account of the recognition of the other as an object of love and the self as distinct from the unary subject.

In this way, apostrophe is an erotic rhetoric. This apostrophe does not construct a logos of rhetoric but an *eros* of rhetoric. As an *eros*, apostrophe turns us away from the unary subject, whether this subject is constructed as the frame of a thesis being presented for the assent of the other, or as the
frame of a theory of speech. In both cases, whether we are speaking of the rhetor/audience relationship, or the rhetoric/dialectic relationship, the change and their attendant differences heighten the possibilities of how rhetoric can avoid being unary and, thus, free to (re)discover its dynamis of change. At the very least, the discovery afforded through the figure of apostrophe is a crossing over from the frame of the unary subject to the frame of the other. This interanimation is erotic. Thus it should come as no surprise that in the space of transposition stands Aphrodite whose epithet, of course, is Apostrophia (Pausanias 9.16.3-4).

In the manner of a manifesto, we say

1. By following a tropological trajectory (as displayed in the rhetorical tradition) from antistrophe to its subset in catastrophe to its reputed trivializing gesture in apostrophe, we have gained unique insight into the constraints in which we employ rhetoric as a theory and critical practice.

2. Tropology is both a way into the tradition and a way out of it.

3. Tropology is consistent with the general trend toward the rhetorical turn, which foregrounds rhetoric after metaphysics. However, lest we forget, Aristotle’s Rhetoric has always been after Metaphysics. Tropology is the means by which we radicalize the “rhetorical turn,” nothing less than rhetoric at the end of metaphysics.

4. We have not been recovering something lost but searching for the possibility of reaching to (an) other ...

5. In an antistrophic projection the amplification of dialectic is so loud that we can’t hear the other. In apostrophe, we want to hear the other. Apostrophe provides a way to get around the tyranny of antistrophe.

6. If we in rhetoric are bound to a system of rhetoric as the counterpart of dialectic, do we as rhetoricians have agency? Do we dare write and speak otherwise?

7. Is not “rhetoric is alltistros” a choice, what Charles Pierce calls an abduction? Abduction is a moment upon which a choice is made. Hayden White identifies that choice as tropological (8). The relation of rhetoric and dialectic is a commitment that began as a free creation of our minds. We are committed to the abduction of rhetoric as antistrophe. Can we decide Otherwise?

8. If Aristotle were to return and write the Rhetoric in the United States, would he write again “Rhetoric is the antistrophe to dialectic?” And if he were to write that sentence in 2002 CE, would it make a fresh start? Would the statement advance the study of rhetoric and our relations to others in the world?

9. Isn’t the payoff of this kind of writing, then, our freedom? Or are we as rhetoricians slaves? Can we not try to make a new rhetoric for an Other world, a world that seeks to live well among idios. Can we not only care
about Hippias but also can we develop a rhetoric that takes Hippias into account?

10. Can we now think of rhetoric as rhetoric?

Department of Speech Communication
Penn State University

Department of Rhetoric and Communication Studies
University of Richmond

Notes

1 Writers in the sciences are more likely than writers in the humanities to engage in coauthored projects (Ede and Lunsford 157). However, there are good reasons to collaborate. Collaborators can achieve more together than alone (Ede, Glenn, and Lunsford). We write together because it is, in effect, a performance of the kind of change and interactions we seek in a theory and practice of rhetoric.

2 Figuration marks a departure from that method of rhetorical-theory building which imports resources at a significant cost (to its identity) from other disciplines (e.g., philosophy, literary criticism, etc.) and exports its tropes to a variety of disciplines (e.g., psychology, business, etc.) for free. The figures we employ are part of the tradition of rhetoric from Anaximenes to Quintilian. Our work on the tropes is adapted from Anderson, Burton, Dupriez/Halsall, Preminger, and Sloane.

3 Bekker numbers follow the quoted text parenthetically.

4 Presumably, a logical tie means that Aristotle’s opening line in the Rhetoric is read from within the Organon.

5 Kennedy, Grimaldi, Cope, Rainolds . . . these points of entry are but just a few cynosures in a string of interpretations.

6 For commentary, see Cope, III 94-94 and Kennedy, 239-240.

7 Cf. the “unary subject” in Kristeva’s Desire in Language. In his “Introduction” to Kristeva’s Revolution in Poetic Language, Leon S. Roudiez writes, “[Various] theoretical concepts had previously been formulated in essays written as early as 1966-1967 before being brought together in more systematic fashion in Revolution in Poetic Language. They are roughly contemporaneous with some of the seminal works published by Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, and others; she is indebted to some, just as they, in tum, have profited from her work” (6). At Kristeva’s public ceremony for the State Doctorate, Roland Barthes is quoted as saying to Kristeva, “Several times you have helped me to change...” Roudiez notes that Barthes’ remarks display an “unusual acknowledgment of indebtedness” (10).

8 Barthes’ notion of “punctum” may collapse the sexual (pinning down) with the incidental (see “Third Meaning”). Our work on the punctum redresses the sense of pinning down with Benjamin’s sense of the incidental (punctum) as the tiny spark of accident. That tiny spark of accident, that fire of life, is our image of erotics.

9 Practical speech is the very rhetoric that Barthes identifies as vulgar and academic.

\n
m Insofar as the enthymeme is a figure of speech, the enthymeme’s move can
be understood figuratively (Quinn 27-37; White).

11 Dance and music are two examples of how the system of substitution can be moved to a system of transposition. Supposing that the meaning of the word antistrophos borrows from choral song and dance, we wonder which choral dance(s)? In other words, to what dance(s) might rhetoric apostrophize? There are many. Lillian Lawler details a multiplicity of dances and corresponding schemas (which bears more resemblance to an attitude, a gesture, or pose than a figure of speech) that may have led to distinct motifs in the ancient Greek theater. Drawing upon the scholarship of Lawler, Green notes that if the strophe denotes a movement of the chorus in one direction, and the antistrophe its wheeling in the opposite direction, the structure of the choral tum requires an epode or “still point.” If the relation of rhetoric to dialectic is like a choral dance, what or where is the epode? No one knows; no one asks this question; no one has found the epode. Whatever the case, it is at the epode, Green explains, that the “parallels between ancient Greek choral practice and Aristotle’s use of [antistrophos] at 1354a. I fall apart” (“Aristotelian Rhetoric” 8). Given this understanding, the relation of a dance between rhetoric and dialectic may well act as a stage metaphor or a stage direction if you will. Being antistrophos to dialectic, rhetoric might address the owl. In this apostrophe, rhetoric might be staged or performed according to the “dance of the owl.” This particular schema, Lawler invites us to believe, eventually led to the plot motif of “search” (“Dance of the Owl” 482). As such, might a schema of the owl pose a unique choral movement between rhetoric and dialectic that turns meaning toward a “search for . . . ?” Rather than finding the sayables, perhaps such an owlish posture might give to the language of rhetoric and dialectic a different sense of what it means to search for knowledge. The diversity of dances or schemas invites us to experience rhetoric as antistrophos in other ways as well. Perhaps the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic enacts the dance of the “snub-nosed hand,” a gesture especially common in tragedy (Lawler, “A Snub-Nosed Hand”). If this particular schema stage or directs the meaning of antistrophos, could rhetoric’s relation to dialectic be such that each snubs the other? What would it mean for rhetoric to “snub nose” dialectic and vice versa? In India, for example, the snub-nose gesture introduces good intent. It welcomes and shows peace. Can attending to music, a subject incidental to those areas traditionally involved in rhetoric (ethics, politics, knowledge, justice) provide an opportunity to reconstitute another system of the rhetoric/dialectic unity? Aristides Quintilianus wrote On Music in 3 C. E., and in this text he speaks directly to the rhetoric/dialectic unity (1.1.26). He writes that dialectic and its antistrophos, rhetoric, profit the soul with judgment (phronesis) only if the soul has been purified first by music. Without musical purification, the soul cannot benefit from dialectic and rhetoric. Instead the soul will be led astray, for only music adorns the soul with the beauties of harmony and proper rhythm. The view of Aristides Quintilianus that develops from this passage in On Music creates an opportunity to reconstitute the rhetoric/dialectic unity from the incidental of music. When rhetoric and dialectic come into contact with the incidental of music, their relationship changes so that at minimum dialectic has no greater claim to moral high ground than rhetoric. This change might allow rhetoric to be as free to profit the soul as dialectic—albeit differently, nonetheless equally. Moreover, when music is acknowledged as taking primary care of the soul, phronesis (judgment) loses its privilege as the primary means by which the soul is profited. Hence the
incidental of music shifts the very foundation of the rhetoric and dialectic unity.

Fire is that "tiny spark of accident" that allows for a system of change (Benjamin "A Short History of Photography," 202).

The cuttle-fish in Aristotle is from *The History of Animals* and is discussed in Detienne and Vernant 161; 174 n. 142.

Works Cited


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