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Toward a Genealogy of Aryan Morality: Nietzsche and Jacolliot

Thomas Paul Bonfiglio

While Nietzsche’s writings of the late 1880s reveal waxing interests in Hinduism, Sanskrit philology, Aryan culture, and the related Indo-European hypothesis, these interests have been remarkably understudied by Nietzsche scholarship, with the exception of a scant few articles that have recently appeared. The presence of the aforementioned topics was crucial for the configuration of the works written in 1887 and 1888: *On the Genealogy of Morality, The Twilight of the Idols*, and *The Antichrist*, as well as for some of the notions at hand in Nietzsche’s correspondence with Heinrich Köselitz, but the provenance of the ideas that codetermined those works and generated their philosophies has never been properly examined. It is imperative to analyze and interpret Nietzsche’s sources and his reception and development of them, in order to better understand the texts of one of the most complex and innovative philosophers of the nineteenth century. This study is itself a genealogy that offers an account of the etiology of some of the highly salient and fundamental aspects of Nietzsche’s work of the period in question, such as the concepts of Jewish and Christian morality and psychology, Aryan ideology, miscegenation, the caste system, and the figure of the outcast (Chandala), as well as the idea of the human as the measurer, which also offers a curious epistemological excursus on the nature of human thought.

There are several factors that recommend that this study be both philosophical and philological in orientation. First, the ideologies present in the material studied here themselves arise from Nietzsche’s philological inquiries. It was the milieu of modern comparative historical linguistics, which originated in Germany in the nineteenth century, that provided the context for
the development of Nietzsche’s ideas as examined here. This milieu was ridden with romantic notions of the prehistoric origins of European “race,” language, and culture, and it was Nietzsche’s own interest in those romantic accounts and in comparative philology that motivated the construction of some of the ideologies present in his later works. It is within the matrix of philology and philosophy that these ideas arose in a codeterminative, symbiotic relationship; in short, one may posit *the birth of Aryan morality from the spirit of nineteenth century historical linguistics*. It was Glen Most, who recently, and in these very pages, lamented the dearth of scholarship on Nietzsche’s philological writings, observing that they had “suffered a bleak existence in a remote corner of the history of philosophy and culture.”² Most reminds us that, in order to properly historicize the philosophy of Nietzsche, scholarship must not lose sight of the fact “that philology in the decades before Nietzsche’s birth occupied somewhat the same position in the German academic landscape that genetic research does now.”³ Here, the comparison with genetics is an auspicious one, as it underscores the *genealogical* models of inquiry common to both disciplines, models both performed and consciously problematized by Nietzsche.

Second, it is important to emphasize that the ideas of Nietzsche studied here are those of a philosophy *of and in* language, for Nietzsche himself was among the first to discuss the (post)modern notions of linguistic relativity and of the ineluctability of language in thought, problems that occupied subsequent thinkers from Benjamin Whorf to the French poststructuralists. Nietzsche’s primacy in the poststructuralist discourse of the late twentieth century—the discourse that relativizes and subsumes knowledge to textual language—is underscored by the fact that his essay “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense” (1873) became so frequently employed in poststructuralist circles, that it won the informal designation of “the Yale essay.”
Thus this study proceeds within the matrix of philosophy and philology, contextualizing Nietzsche’s ideas in the medium of linguistic exchange, as determined by the dynamics of reading and misreading in translation, and in translation of translation. For such an inquiry, reference to original sources is indispensable. Our inquiry begins in a situation of linguistic displacement, in France, with an anecdote that frames the problems of reference.

In 1976, the Parisian publishing house Editions d’Aujourd’hui printed a facsimile edition of *Lois de Manou*, a translation of the *Mānavadharmaśāstra* that was completed in 1830 by Auguste Loiseleur-Deslongchamps. The back cover of the book displayed the following quote from Nietzsche:

> In the past few weeks, I learned something very important: I discovered the *Code of Manu*. This entirely *Aryan* product, a sacerdotal moral code based on the Vedas, on the idea of castes, and on ancient traditions—the character of which is *not* pessimistic, although it is still quite sacerdotal—this product completes my ideas on religion in a most curious way. I must admit having the impression that everything else we know of great moral codes seems to be simply an imitation thereof, if not a caricature, beginning with Egyptian morality; and it seems to me that even Plato himself was merely *well educated* by a Brahman. In addition, the Jews give the impression of a race of Chandalas who learned from their *masters* the principles, according to which a priestly caste ascends to power and organizes a people.4

This is familiar to many as a selective translation of Nietzsche’s letter to Köselitz of May 31, 1888, a translation that would be a faithful one, were it not for one significant omission in the very first sentence. Nietzsche says that he discovered the book “in French translation, done in
India under strict surveillance by high-ranking priests and scholars.”5 It is indeed odd that a comment on the scholarly integrity of this French version is omitted, but that the antisemitic aspect is retained. This is perhaps a blind spot occluded by the enthusiasm of the contemporary ideology. This citation on the back cover reflects the sentiments of the post-1968 era that celebrated the creative energies of leftist revolution, sentiments that were interested in a narrow configuration of Nietzsche as an advocate of Dionysian rebellion, and his high profile within this ideology made him an excellent, albeit unwitting advertising agent. Coupled with the concurrent waxing interest in eastern mysticism, Nietzsche’s admiration of the Mānavadharmaçāstra offered a prime opportunity for the perspicacious bookseller. The only problem is that in the letter cited here, Nietzsche was talking about a different translation altogether. He had indeed read the Mānavadharmaçāstra in French, but not the version by Loiseleur-Deslongchamps that he was ostensibly endorsing. He had, instead, read Louis Jacolliot, Les législateurs religieux: Manu, Moïse, Mahommet,6 published in 1876. This is the translation found in his library.

Auguste Loiseleur-Deslongchamps (1805-1840) published the first scholarly French translation of the Mānavadharmaçāstra. He based it upon the same manuscripts used by the first great English sanskritist William Jones (1746-1794), whose Institutions of Hindu Law, or the Ordinances of Menu,7 published in Calcutta in 1794, constituted the first English translation of this major work of Hindu law. Jones based his translation upon the gloss of Culluca Bhatta from the province of Bengal. When Loiseleur-Deslongchamps decided to provide Francophone Europe with a translation, he followed Jones closely and based his work on the manuscript of Culluca, as well. Both the translations by Jones and by Loiseleur-Deslongchamps, although superseded by others since, are still well recognized by Sanskrit scholars.8
Louis Jacolliot (1837-1890) was a provincial chief justice in the former French colony of Chandernagore, which lay about 30 kilometers north of Calcutta, and he also traveled to Tamil Nadu in southern India, where he came upon the manuscript that he translated. He is unknown to the current generation of Sanskritists and has, with the exception of a recent biographical essay, all but disappeared from contemporary French historical discourse: the current French encyclopedia *La grande Larousse* makes no mention of him at all, but *La grande encyclopédie* of the 1890s says of Jacolliot, “A French writer, … he assembled during his long stay in India a mass of material that helped him publish quite interesting works, in which, however, romanesque tendencies often took him beyond scientific veracity, so that one might rather consider him to be more of a brilliant popularizer than a scholar or historian.” Also, the *Grand dictionnaire universel du xixe siècle* remarks, “We believe the author did not delve sufficiently into the fine work … of Max Müller … and that he became seduced by an overly systematic view of his subject.”

In Indic mythology, Manu is said to be the first human, the son of Brahma, and the attributed author of the *Mānavadharmaçāstra*, the date of composition of which is estimated to be sometime between the years –100 and +100. It prescribes codes of behavior, especially pertaining to interaction among castes. It is the oldest document of Hindu law, which Manu is said to have received directly from Brahma. The literal meaning of *Mānavadharmaçāstra* is “Manu’s manual on proper behavior.”

There was also, however, a German version of the *Mānavadharmaçāstra* available to Nietzsche. It was J. C. Hüttnert, *Hindu-Gesetzbuch, oder Menu’s Verordnungen, nach Cullucas Erläuterungen*, published in 1797. This was a German translation of William Jones’s English translation of the *Mānavadharmaçāstra* and not a direct conversion from Sanskrit into German.
It is a matter of great curiosity as to why Nietzsche did not use Hüttner’s German version, which would have offered him the least linguistic resistance, or the English translation done by Jones, of whose existence he would have undoubtedly learned in the course of his dabblings in Sanskrit etymology and Hindu philosophy. It is also a matter of speculation how Nietzsche came upon the translation done by Jacolliot instead of the one done by Loiseleur-Deslongchamps. Although Jacolliot’s version was more recent by a margin of more than forty years, there were several republications of Loiseleur-Deslongchamps’s well-regarded *Lois de Manou* to compete with it. Perhaps the major factor motivating Nietzsche’s preference was not the accessibility a given edition, nor its scholarly reputation, but instead the presence or absence of ideologically appropriate annotations. Neither *Institutions of Hindu Law*, nor *Lois de Manou* contains much annotation at all, but Jacolliot’s *Les législateurs religieux* is heavily and most oddly annotated, and it was upon these annotations that Nietzsche configured his notions of Aryan and Semitic cultures.

It is best to examine Nietzsche’s letter to Heinrich Köselitz in the original; Nietzsche says:

These past few weeks have offered a very important lesson: I found the lawbook of *Manu* in French translation, done in India under strict surveillance by high-ranking priests and scholars. This absolutely *Aryan* product, a sacerdotal moral code based on the Vedas, on notions of castes and ancient traditions—*not* pessimistically, though still sacerdotal it may be—has expanded my ideas on religion in a most remarkable way. I have to admit having the impression that everything else that we know about moral laws seems to be just an imitation of this, even a caricature: first of all Egypticism, but even Plato seems to me, in all
major points, to have simply been well educated by a Brahman. The Jews look like a race of Chandalas, who learn principles from their lords, by means of which priesthood becomes lord and organizes a people … and the Chinese, too, seem to have produced their Confucius and Lao-tse under the influence of this ancient classical lawbook. Medieval institutions look like a fabulous attempt to recover all the ideas, upon which ancient Indo-Aryan society was based—but with pessimistic values that have their origin in the basis of racial decadence. ——The Jews seem, here as well, to be simply “imitators”—they invent nothing.\(^{13}\) (KGB 3/5, 325)

Nietzsche first frames this French translation of the *Mānavadharmaçāstra* as one of lofty origin, having been supervised by highly educated Brahmans. It is a lawbook that is not only Aryan, but absolutely Aryan, and it is also a moral code that justifies the existence of a caste system. Nietzsche sees it as doing so non-pessimistically, that is, in an affirmative manner that only seeks to codify a system that is already in place, and not in reaction against incipient decline in an effort to insure the system against degeneration. It is thus organizational but not reactionary, while its medieval European permutation, meaning the caste system of the middle ages, enforces its own social structure in a pessimistic fashion, that is, in an act of self-preservation and in the face of the decline of the heroic nobility and the ascent of the slave mentality. Nietzsche also presents the code of Manu as being of ancient lineage, if not of ultimate anteriority and thus originality. It is the source for all derivative moralities: Egyptian, Platonic, Jewish, and Chinese. Thus here, Nietzsche does not seem to be exempt from the influence of the romantic orientalism of the nineteenth century that sought to locate the origins of European culture in Hinduism and in the Sanskrit language, an ideology that operated on a distinctly racial axis. It is interesting to note
the implicit etiology present in Nietzsche’s discourse. It is as if a romantic notion of an original point were at work, or better at play here, in an almost biblical fashion. Manu is the first human, an Adamic figure, who must also of necessity be Aryan. Moreover, India is depicted as a kind of point of dispersion not only for political, but also for philosophical, cultural, religious, and moral systems as well. For Nietzsche, the subaltern nature of Jewish origin excludes Jews from creativity; they remain middlemen.

It is most interesting to see how Nietzsche situates Jews in this context: he refers to them as a “race of Chandalas” (Tschandala-Rasse), a concept gleaned from his readings of Jacolliot. The term originates in the Sanskrit candāla, which refers to the lowest class of India, the outcasts or untouchables, who actually occupied a status below that of the four formal castes of brahma (sacerdotal), ksatriya (nobility), vaiśya (farmer or merchant), and śūdra (slave). A child of a brahma father and a śūdra mother, a candāla was considered to be the lowest of humans. The word literally means “the worst among,” and is from the root canda, meaning “fierce,” “violent,” or “cruel.” The candāla were literally “out-cast,” in the sense of being so low as to be outside of the caste system itself.

While Nietzsche correctly understands the caste divisions, as indicated in The Twilight of the Idols: “The task here is to raise no less than four races at once: a sacerdotal, a military, a commercial-agricultural, and finally a race of servants, the Sudras,” and Jacolliot does, as well: “The fours castes are: the Brahmans, or priests; the Kshatria, or kings; the Vaisias, or merchants and farmers; the Sudras, or slaves,” both prefer to see a rigidity and inflexibility in the Indian caste system that guards against cross-caste intermarriage and preserves an Aryan “purity,” especially in the upper caste of Brahman. Moreover, both seem to be unaware that the caste system was a later development in the history of Hinduism. In the early Vedic period, there is no
evidence of a caste system or of any restrictions on inter-ethnic marriage at all. The caste system itself was a later development and tended to solidify when Muslims started settling in northern India in the seventh century. Thus its provenance is not endogenous, but instead precipitated by the external incursions that threatened the political and economic integrity of India.

The traditional Hindu system divided the śūdra off from the other three castes, distinguishing brahma, ksatriya, and vaiśya as twice-born and the śūdra as only born once. While Hinduism did develop very complicated rules on all forms of intercourse among members of different castes and came to discourage inter-caste marriage in general, it was most condemnatory of marriage between brahma and śūdra, and it was this union that produced the candāla. Jacolliot, however, misunderstands the candāla as the offspring of any inter-caste marriage, referring to them as the people of “des classes mêlées” (99). Jacolliot’s choice of the phrase “classes mêlées” is here a very motivated one. He introduces it already at the beginning of his translation of the Mānavadharmacāstra, when the great sages ask Manu to explain the major castes (varna) as well as the antaraprabhava, a term that Bühler judiciously elects to render as “the intermediate ones.” The word literally means “those of inter-origin” and carries neutral connotations, which certainly cannot be said of the phrase that Jacolliot chooses: he clearly had at his disposal the pleasant term intermédiaire (intermediate), but the semantic field of mêlée, on the other hand, includes notions of mixture, confusion, and conflict and initiates a chain of substitutions that eventually evokes the specter of miscegenation and the abhorrence of interracial marriage.

Nietzsche largely follows Jacolliot on this theme but underscores the relative egregiousness of the combination of brahma and śūdra, all the while, however, seeking to
emphasize the Aryan purity of the sacerdotal caste: “For a Brahman who conjoins with a Sudra (from the race of servants) and has a son by her, there is no possible atonement on earth”\(^{20}\) (KGW 8/3, 302). Moreover, Nietzsche’s use of terms such as “race” (\textit{Rasse}) and “raise” (\textit{züchten}) above underscores the racial focus of his project, which is especially forceful in the term \textit{züchten}, a verb that indicates not only breeding, but also domestication, and carries resonances of discipline and punishment via its derivative \textit{züchtigen} (to punish). The keystone fabrication in the construction of the ideologies of both Nietzsche and Jacolliot, however, and the one that enables the substitutive chain of slave—Jew—Christian, is the connection between the Jews and the \textit{candāla}, which is not at all an idea that exists in the text of the Ānavadharmaśāstra itself; it is found only in Jacolliot’s specious annotations to the text, which provide a quite curious extension of the image of the outcasts. It is worth noting, however, that the connection that Nietzsche constructs between the Jews and the \textit{candāla} implies a partial sibling relationship; if Jews have their origin in the \textit{candāla}, who, in turn, are the offspring of Aryan and non-Aryan parents, then Jews are ultimately related to Aryans. This connection helps to make sense of the otherwise bewildering fragment found in Nietzsche’s \textit{Nachlass}, in which he holds “that the Semitic race belongs to the Indo-European one”\(^{21}\) (KGW 7/1, 10).

Nietzsche’s use of the ideas of Jacolliot and the image of India is, at best, a quite selective one. While \textit{On the Genealogy of Morality} takes a condemnatory view of the ascetic and corporophobic elements in the western philosophical tradition, Nietzsche cannot, however, jettison that tradition altogether. Similarly, his Indophilia must also be problematized by paradoxes, for he must know that the culture that he is elevating above the west is also one ridden with extreme asceticism and ultimate nihilism. In \textit{Friedrich Nietzsches Der Antichrist}: 
Ein philosophisch-historischer Kommentar, Andreas Sommer offers a useful assessment of this riddle:

Is intellectualism (*Geistigkeit*) natural and affirmative, or does this intellectualism deny (as is presumably the case with the “priests” of Judaism and Christianity) this very naturalness, the world? The Antichrist’s answer to this question sounds contradictory, so that one cannot ultimately decide if the new morality of “the few”—along with its confessional “asceticism”—is life-affirming or hostile to life itself. The only way out of this trap is benevolently to take the skeptical meta-standpoint von #54 and hold isostheny to be the most essential … intellectuality would then be in principle neither life-affirming nor life-negating.  

Granting intellectualism a neutral value thus enables Nietzsche to maintain his perception of the superiority and originality of Indian thought and recover sources antecedent to those of the western tradition. Having read Deussen’s translations of the Sutras, Nietzsche wrote to Köselitz in September 1887, saying that the texts preempt Kantianism by a few thousand years and that they sound like the *Critique of Pure Reason* in spots. Of Deussen’s *Das System des Vedanta*, which he mentions only twice, he says that it preempts or anticipates “Kantianism, atomism, nihilism” (KGB 3/5, 144). Thus Nietzsche succeeds in assembling a kind of utopian composite, albeit paradoxical, of India as the source of idealism, intellect, race, and hierarchy.

Nietzsche’s credulous acceptance of Jacolliot’s speculations is indeed striking, especially in view of his relationships with the linguists of the era. Max Müller sharply criticized Jacolliot’s scholarship in his *Einleitung in die vergleichende Religionswissenschaft*, which Nietzsche borrowed from the Basel library on October 22, 1875. (This also raises the possibility that Nietzsche could have known about Jacolliot much earlier than the first attestation in the letter to
Köselitz of 1888.) Müller says, in the Einleitung, “I must note here that a book that appeared recently, and that received a curiously high degree of attention, La Bible dans l’Inde, by Jacolliot ... is a most unfortunate fabrication. As it contains passages from the holy scriptures that are not in the original, but instead in a free French translation, no scholar of Sanskrit literature would doubt for a moment that these are inventions.” Müller is referring to Jacolliot’s, La Bible dans l’Inde, vie de Iezeus Christna (1869), which contains fabulous speculations on the correspondences between India and the occident. Jacolliot actually tries to connect Zeus with Jesus via the fabricated name Iezeus, an idea that he later modified in an equally quixotic distortion. In 1874, he published Christna et le Christ, in which he claims that the laws of Manu were composed in 13,300 BC, and that Jesus Christ is an invented figure, a later fiction based on the historical personage of Krishna.

A closer examination of Jacolliot’s Mānavadharmaçāstra, the one that Nietzsche read, helps to illuminate the source of some of Nietzsche’s ideas as put forth in The Antichrist and On the Genealogy of Morality. In his introduction, Jacolliot says, “William Jones and Loiseleur Deslongchamps had translated the Manu of the north; I wanted to translate the Manu of the south … The two works certainly originate in two different eras and two different civilizations. For more than five hundred years, Muslims suppressed the cult of Brahma in the north. They burned sacred books and temples. The south, on the other hand, escaped the proselytism of the sword and was able to preserve the lawbooks in all their purity.” In the north, however, “customs became changed by contact abroad, and under the harsh law of the Koran.” He speaks of “the criticism leveled by the pundits of the south against the Brahmans of the north for having altered the sacred texts.” Thus Jacolliot sought a version of the Mānavadharmaçāstra from the south of India, because it would be farther away from the Arabs, and thus, in his opinion, “purer.” It is
indeed odd that Jacolliot, such a fervent participant in the racial ideologies of late nineteenth century Europe, would descend into southern India to seek such a manuscript, as the south has the highest concentration of non-Aryan aboriginal Dravidians, who would be seen, in the race conscious paradigm of that era, as even more removed from Indo-Europeans than the Arabs who were threatening the north.

In a volley of inductive leaps based on the most minimal of correspondences, Jacolliot then tries to show that all civilization as we know it has its source in India, has been inherited by Aryans, and either copied or corrupted by Semites. In his annotations on the figure of Narayana, “or he who moves on the waters,”32 he says, “Unconscious copyist; all the author of Genesis did was copy the Hindu and Chaldean traditions.”33 In the figure of Naya, the spirit that is divided into separate male and female parts, he sees the source of “the legend of woman from the side of man.”34 On the Hindu tradition of anointing with holy oil, he says, “The texts of these ceremonies were copied by Christianity.”35 He has a similar view on the origin of the practice of shaving the head: “All priests of the far east had tonsures already at a young age … this sign of the sacerdotal caste, preserved over the ages, became a Christian symbol.”36 On the custom of facing east while eating, he says, “Mohammed was inspired by these principles.”37 On the practice of wiping the mouth with the thumb, he says, “Catholicism has preserved these practices in certain ceremonies.”38 For Jacolliot, the Bible is simply a “code of pillage and debauchery.”39

Jacolliot’s free associations have linguistic correlates as well: “All the castes of India spoke and still speak agglutinating languages, and we know equally well that this was the distinctive trait of the original Chaldean-Babylonian idioms.”40 This is a wonderful paralogism: Indians speak agglutinating languages; Chaldean and Babylonian are agglutinating languages; therefore, Chaldeans and Babylonians are Indians. On the general customs of India, he says,
“How far removed we are from the Semitic customs, stupid and gross, customs of nomadic thugs.”

These were nomads who were expelled from the garden of India: “The emigrations of the disinherited, the Hindu Chandala, … their habits of writing from right to left, imposed circumcision, which ended up passing into custom, their nomadic practices … this is the veritable source of the nations that we call Semitic.”

It is important to note that the significant image of circumcision, which facilitates the connection between the candāla and Jews, is produced by Jacolliot’s misreading a Sanskrit word as referring to circumcision. The word that he misreads is dauçcarmayam, which Bühler translates as “diseased skin.” According to Jacolliot, the law of Manu says, “Those who have been circumcised, and who thus are rejected into the impure class of the Chandala … those who can only read from right to left, are excluded from funeral rites.” Thus he concludes that “the so-called Semites would only be the descendants of the Hindu Chandala,” and that “Chaldeans, Assyrians, Babylonians, Syrians, Phoenicians, and Arabs owe their origin to the various tribes of Chandala who emigrated from Hindustan at different epochs … in turn, the Hebrews were then to become the product of Chaldean emigration.”

It is interesting to note that here, Jacolliot reveals himself as an anti-Semitic in the broadest linguistic sense of the term, disdaining not only Arabic and Hebrew speakers, but also an associative assortment of north Africans and southwest Asians. Here, however, is an important point of bifurcation between Nietzsche and Jacolliot. Nietzsche does not at all share in Jacolliot’s wholesale rejection of all that is Semitic. Almond has recently illuminated the heroic, life-affirming aspects that Nietzsche found in Islam and proposes that, for Nietzsche, “Islam forms the acceptable face of Semitism.”
In *The Twilight of the Idols*, when Nietzsche speaks of “The Improvers of Humanity,” it is clear that he is making unreflective use of Jacolliot’s ideas. He emphasizes the quarantine-like exclusion of the *candāla*:

The results of these forced hygienic measures were considerable: deadly epidemics, horrible sexual diseases and, moreover, “the law of the knife,” ordering circumcision for male children and the removal of the labia for female children. –Manu himself says, “The Chandala are the fruit of adultery, incest, and crime (—this is the necessary consequence of the concept of breeding). For clothes, they are to have only the rags of corpses, for dishes only broken vessels, for jewelry only old iron, for worship only the evil gods; they are to wander from place to place without rest. They are forbidden to write from left to right and to use the right hand for writing: the use of the right hand and the left-to-right direction is solely reserved for the virtuous, the people of race.”

It is interesting to note here how Nietzsche foregrounds the figure of circumcision, referring to it as “the law of the knife” (*das Gesetz des Messers*). It serves as a symbolic castration and disempowerment of the lowest class. The elements of disempowerment are crucial to Nietzsche’s project, which is to arrive at a hierarchic ontology, one that justifies a discourse of power and sees a caste system as crucial to the nature and emergence of the noble morality. Thus he seeks to conclude, in *The Antichrist*, that “the order of the castes, the highest, dominating law, is but the sanctioning of a natural order, of a natural legality of the highest rank, over which no arbitrariness, no ‘modern idea’ has any power” (KGW 6/3, 240). This is the ultimate locus of power that necessitates the maintenance and deployment of that very power. In *The Twilight of the Idols*, he says, “But even this organization had need to be dreadful,—not, in this case, in
battle with the beast, but instead with its opposite concept, the human of no breeding, the human mishmash, the Chandala” (KGW 6/3, 94).

One also sees here the presence of Jacolliot’s discussion of the prescriptions on writing. Jacolliot says, “We are the people of the right hand, which means that we come from the high castes and have the right to use the right hand … all the so-called Semites use the left hand.” These assertions contain word plays on the meanings of “right,” which are clearly visible in Jacolliot’s juxtaposition of right/right (droit/droite), implying that the higher castes are those who are right, and who have the right to use the right hand. Perhaps also implicit in Nietzsche’s adaptation of Jacolliot are similar allusions to the homophonies of “right” (Recht/rechts). Further along in *The Antichrist*, Nietzsche says, “The highest class—I call them the fewest—also have, as the perfect one, the right of the fewest” (KGW 6/3, 240).

Nietzsche scholarship has not exactly been speedy in assessing the source of Nietzsche’s reception of the laws of Manu. It was not until 1987 that the first formal study on Nietzsche and Jacolliot appeared. In that year, *Nietzsche-Studien* published “Nietzsche und das Gesetzbuch des Manu” by the German Indologist Annemarie Etter, who restricts her study to the accuracy of Jacolliot’s translations and the plausibility of his speculations on Hindu culture. She generally brackets the philosophical and ideological elements at hand, especially in their reception by Nietzsche. Etter points out, however, that nowhere in the *dharmaçāstra* of Manu are to be found prescriptions on circumcision, nor on writing from right to left, nor on writing with the left hand. Again, Nietzsche’s acceptance at face value of Jacolliot’s suppositions is surprising. The Sanskrit philologists with whom he was acquainted, such as Ernst Windisch, already knew that the tradition of the classical Sanskrit texts was oral and not written. There were, in fact, prescriptions against writing down the sacred works. They were transmitted orally and did not start being
transcribed until the end of the first millennium. Moreover, if these prescriptions against writing from right to left or against circumcision have any presence in the manuscript that Jacolliot purports to have used, they would be, as Etter has proposed, a “response to the penetration of Muslims into India.”

This is, however, irrelevant in any case; since Mohammed was born in the sixth century (563), there could have been no such reaction in the original dharmaçāstra of Manu. Etter holds that Jacolliot’s manuscript must have been written long after the original one.

Both Nietzsche and Jacolliot valorize the anteriority and superiority of the Hindu religion vis-à-vis Christianity. In The Antichrist, Nietzsche says of Christianity, “Only bad purposes: poisoning, slander, denial of life, despising the body, the humiliation and self-deprecation of the human via the concept of sin,—and its methods are bad, too. —I read the lawbook of Manu with the opposite feeling, an incomparably intellectual and superior work; to mention it along with the Bible, even in one breath, would be a sin against the intellect.”

Similar images of decline and decadence in the biblical tradition are visible in Jacolliot, as well: “And one might say that goodness, virtue, duty, and the ideas of the unity of God and the trinity, and the immortality of the soul, have assumed, in India, the most elevated character that could be attributed to them.”

Ideas of anteriority are also observable in Nietzsche’s application of Jacolliot’s derivation of Semitic systems from Aryan ones. Nietzsche says, in the Nachlass, “The development of the Jewish sacerdotal state is not original: they became acquainted with that system in Babylon: the system is Aryan” (KGW 8/3, 178). This is a schema that is inherited by the slave class, in Nietzsche’s view, and in Jacolliot’s, as well: “The habits of slavery, of isolation, … often imposed on the Chandala … have borne among them vices against nature … all peoples called Semitic were and still are contaminated by them.” Similarly, Jacolliot speaks
of “the insurgent Egyptian pariahs who call themselves the Hebrews.” In *The Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche has similar images of an unnatural revolt of those in squalor: “It is the anti-Aryan religion par excellence: Christianity as the transvaluation of all Aryan values, the victory of the values of the Chandala, the gospel preached to the poor, the low ones, the collective uprising of all that is downtrodden, miserable, unsuccessful, unfortunate, against the “race”—the immortal revenge of the Chandala as the *religion of love*” (KGW 6/3, 95-96). One of the major theses in the *Genealogy* concerns the placement of Judaism and Christianity on a continuum and the perception of Christian morality as a more damaging and egregious derivative of the values put forth in the Old Testament. Indeed, one might characterize Nietzsche’s view of New Testament morality as a kind of “Christian Semitism,” and one finds a parallel expression in Jacolliot, as well: “In copying the Hindu traditions, Christian Semitism added whatever it wanted.”

There are also other similarities to be found between Jacolliot’s ideas and those expressed by Nietzsche in the *Genealogy* that could support the speculation that Nietzsche may have indeed been familiar with Jacolliot’s work earlier than previously thought. For instance, the following supposition by Jacolliot about the *candāla* displays some curious similarities to Nietzsche’s ideas on the slave mentality:

This class had no legal existence at all … like all races abandoned to the life of nature, the Chandala developed with extraordinary rapidity. Originating from the criminals of all the castes, even the castes of Brahmans and Kshatriyas, they wasted no time in forming a group that was a lot more intelligent and skillful than the average Sudra or even Vaisia.
In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche speaks of the psychology of *ressentiment* in the slave class, here, specifically the slave class of Judeo-Christian origin:

His soul squints; his mind likes hiding places, short cuts, and back doors, everything that is hidden looks like his world, his security, his refreshment; he knows how to use silence, how not to forget, how to wait, how to minify himself for the time being, how to discourage himself. Such a race of *ressentiment*-humans would wind up being cleverer than any other noble race, they would also honor cleverness in a very different way: namely, as an existential necessity of utmost importance.\(^6^4\) (KGW 6/2, 286-287)

There are parallel ideas here concerning a class that is coerced by the circumstances of disenfranchisement into being disingenuous and manipulative. Jacolliot’s lack of precision describes the *candāla* here as a class of criminals, whereas he had earlier characterized them as simply those of mixed class. They have become more cunning than *vaiśya* and *śūdra* but not the sacerdotal and noble castes, whereas for Nietzsche, those of Judeo-Christian *ressentiment*, whom he sees as a “race of Chandalas,” have indeed succeeded in outwitting the nobility.

Nietzsche’s reception of Jacolliot’s hierarchicalism goes well beyond simple justifications of the necessity to have castes. Nietzsche builds a hierarchical consciousness into the ontology of human nature and places it at the very foundation of human thought. In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche speaks of

the oldest and most primal interpersonal relationship there is … the one between buyer and seller, lender and debtor: it was here that people first met, here that people measured themselves against each other … setting prices, measuring value, coming up with equivalents and exchanging them—this so preoccupied the
initial human thought processes, that they constitute, in a certain sense, thinking in itself. Perhaps our word “man” (manas) still expresses something of this personal feeling: man designated himself as the being that measures values, evaluates, and measures, as the “estimating animal” in itself.\(^65\) (KGW 6/2, 322)

Nietzsche is engaged here in false etymology and seems to be conflating several Sanskrit words at once when he invokes “manas” and represents it a signifying the human as the measuring animal. The words are: manah “mind,” manu “human,” √mā “to measure,” and √man “to think.” Manah, manu, and √man are all three certainly root-related, and their cognates include Latin mens, English “to mean” and “man,” and German meinen, Mann, and Mensch. While the nuclear form to all is indeed the verb root √man, the great nineteenth century Sanskritist Charles Lanman advises as such: “The derivation of manu from √man, ‘think,’ is unobjectionable so far as the form goes, but the usual explanation of manu as ‘the thinker’ defies common sense.”\(^66\) The name Manu itself is also clearly related here, a correspondence one might have expected Nietzsche to exploit, given his inclination to explain by associative etymology. But √mā is a separate root altogether, and its cognates include Latin manus, “hand,” mater, “mother,” and English “mother,” as well. Nietzsche commits the same conflation in Human, All Too Human: “The human as the measurer. —Perhaps all human morality has its origin in the immense inner excitement that gripped the first humans as they discovered measure and measuring, scale and weighing (the word ‘man’ means the measuring one, he wanted to name himself after his greatest discovery!)”\(^67\) (KGW 6/3, 192). In misunderstanding the human as the measurer-thinker, Nietzsche is suggesting that the act of cognition itself is a measurement or estimation of self against other; ergo, a form of class or caste consciousness must lie at the root of human culture.

Thus, by analogy, the Indian caste system is simply a manifestation of the natural order of things,
the “sanctioning of a natural order” (Sanktion einer Natur-Ordnung). It is also important to note that the indicated relationship between “lender and debtor” (Gläubiger und Schuldner) presented in the passage above necessitates that the subjugated class feel guilty for its debt (schuldig for its Schuld(en), as in the meanings of the Latin debita), thus effecting the guilt complex of the subaltern, an idea recognizable to those familiar with the arguments in the Genealogy.

Thus one sees in Nietzsche a quite curious genealogy of Aryan morality: the ideologies of a “race of Chandalas” marked by circumcision and responsible for the generation of Jewish and Christian morals, of a caste system and the necessity of suppression as original to human culture, of miscegenation, and of India as an original point for western idealism are all codetermined by the reception of the work of a race conscious fabulist disregarded by contemporary scholarship. In addition, the genesis of the idea of the human as the measurer stems from etymological misanalyses of Sanskrit terms, which misanalyses aided Nietzsche in the construction of an epistemology that accepts a priori a perception of social difference and, ultimately, stratification; this epistemology also facilitated the ideology of caste and hierarchy. It has long been known that Nietzsche was well acquainted with several prominent indologists, among them Paul Deussen, Max Müller, and Ernst Windisch, who could have ameliorated many of the errors and fanciful etymologies associated with his reception of Jacolliot. Perhaps Ahlsdorf’s terse summation in Nietzsches Juden, neatly formulated in a noncommittal German subjunctive, is to the point: “Nietzsche’s credulous acceptance of these curious theses, as well as his own comments on them, might be dismissed as a sign of his approaching mental collapse.” 68
Acknowledgment

I am grateful to Gary Shapiro for initially suggesting the topic of Nietzsche’s reception of Jacolliot, as well as the issue of the human as the measurer.

Notes

1. This article originated as a conference paper for the 2003 IAPL meeting in Leeds, UK, and has not been influenced by David Smith’s “Nietzsche’s Hinduism, Nietzsche’s India: Another Look,” which appeared in the Autumn 2004 issue of The Journal of Nietzsche Studies. I received a copy of this article from Smith only after the present study had been submitted to NNS. I had, however, provided Smith with a copy of my conference paper in August 2002, at his request.


3. Ibid., 164.

4. Auguste Loiseleur-Deslongchamps, Lois de Manou (Paris: Editions d’Aujourd’hui, 1976). This is a facsimile reproduction of: Lois de Manou (Paris: Garnier, 1830), the original work by the same author. The original text reads: “Ces dernières semaines, j’ai appris quelque chose de très essentiel: J’ai découvert le Code de Manou. Ce produit entièrement aryen, un code sacerdotal de la morale basé sur les védas, sur l’idée des castes et sur des traditions archaïques—dont le caractère n’est pas pessimiste, quelque sacerdotal qu’il reste toujours—ce produit complète de la façon la plus curieuse mes idées sur la religion. J’avoue avoir eu l’impression que tout ce que nous connaissons d’autre en fait de grands codes de morale ne semble en être que
l’imitation, sinon la caricature: à commencer par la morale égyptienne; et Platon lui-même me paraît avoir tout simplement été bien instruit par un Brahmane. A côté de cela, les Juifs font l’effet d’une race de Tschandalas qui ont appris de leurs maîtres les principes d’après lesquels une caste de prêtres arrive au pouvoir et organise un peuple.” (All translations in this article are my own.)

5. Nietzsche to Heinrich Köselitz, 31 May 1888 (no. 1041), in Nietzsche Briefwechsel. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, eds. Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montiari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984), 3.5:325. All subsequent references to Nietzsche’s correspondence are taken from this edition and indicated parenthetically as KGB in the body of this article. The original texts reads: “In einer französischen Übersetzung, die in Indien, unter genauer Controle der hochgestellten Priester und Gelehrten daselbst, gemacht worden ist.”

6. Louis Jacolliot, Les législateurs religieux: Manou, Moïse, Mahommet (Paris: Librairie internationale, 1876). All references to this work are indicated parenthetically in the endnotes.

7. William Jones, Institutes of Hindu Law; or the Ordinances of Menu (Calcutta: Printed by the Order of Government, 1794).

8. Loiseleur-Deslongchamps’s translation was reprinted in 1996.


sorte qu’il doit être considéré plutôt comme un très brillant vulgarisateur que comme un savant ou comme un historien.”

11. *Grand dictionnaire universel du xixᵉ siècle*, (Paris, 1866-1879), 9.2: 634. The original text reads: “Nous pensons que l’auteur ne s’est pas suffisamment pénétré des beaux travaux … de Max Müller … et qu’il s’est laissé trop entraîner par une vue systématique de son sujet.”


note that the English translation of the French version of this letter differs from the English translation of the German original. The two different versions make slightly different impressions, and I wanted to retain that ambiguity in the translations, in order to highlight the problem of the ineluctability of language in the act of reception and interpretation.)


15. Freidrich Nietzsche, *Die Götzen-Dämmerung*, in *Nietzsche Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, eds. Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montiari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972), 6.3:325. The original texts reads: “Hier ist die Aufgabe gestellt, nicht weniger als vier Rassen auf einmal zu züchten: eine priesterliche, eine kriegerische, eine händler- und ackerbauerische, endlich eine Dienstboten-Rasse, die Sudras.” All subsequent references to Nietzsche’s works are taken from this edition and indicated parenthetically as KGW in the body of this article.


18. Ibid., 91.


einer freien französischen Übersetzung gegeben sind, so würde doch kein Kenner der Sanskrit-Literatur einen Augenblick darüber in Zweifel sein, daß sie Erdichtungen sind.”


30. “Les mœurs s’étaient modifiées au contact de l’étranger, et sous la dure loi du Coran” (ii).


32. “Ou celui qui se meut sur les eaux” (5).

33. “Copiste inconscient; l’auteur de la Genèse ne faisait que copier les traditions indoues et chaldéennes” (5).

34. “La légende de la femme formée de la côte de l’homme” (15).

35. “Ces cérémonies ont été copiées textuellement par le christianisme” (42).

36. “Tous les prêtres de l’extrême Orient, sont tonsurés dès le bas âge … Ce signe de caste sacerdotale, conservé à travers les âges, est devenu un symbole chrétien” (44).

37. “Mahomet s’est inspiré des ces precepts” (47).

38. “Le catholicisme a préservé ces pratiques dans certaines cérémonies” (48).
41. “Comme nous sommes loin de ces mœurs sémitiques, stupides et grossières, mœurs de brigands nomades” (91).
42. “Les émigrations des déshérités, des tchandalas indous, … leurs habitudes d’écriture de droite à gauche, la circoncision imposée qui avait fini par passer dans les mœurs, leurs habitudes nomades … voilà la véritable source des nations dites sémitiques” (113).
43. Jacolliot, Les législateurs religieux, 439; Mānavadharmācāstra, 11.49.
44. “Ceux qui ont été circoncis et qui se trouvent ainsi rejetés dans la classe impure des tchandalas … ceux qui ne peuvent lire que de droite à gauche, ne doivent pas être priés aux cérémonies funéraires” (145).
45. “Les prétendus Sémites ne seraient que des descendants des tchandalas indous” (145).
46. “Chaldéens, Assyriens, Babyloniens, Syriens, Phéniciens et Arabes doivent donc leur origine aux différentes tribus de tchandalas qui émigrèrent de l’Indoustan à des époques différentes … à leur tour, les Hébreux furent le produit d’une émigration chaldéenne” (119).
Lumpen von Leichnamen haben, zum Geschirr zerbrochne Töpfe, zum Schmuck altes Eisen, zum Gottesdienst nur die bösen Geister; sie sollen ohne Ruhe von einem Ort zum andern schweifen. Es ist ihnen verboten, von links nach rechts zu schreiben und sich der rechten Hand zum Schreiben zu bedienen: der Gebrauch der rechten Hand und des von Links nach Rechts ist bloss den Tugendhaften vorbehalten, den Leuten von Rasse.”


51. “Nous sommes des gens de main droite, c’est-à-dire issus des hautes castes et ayant le droit de nous servir de la main droite … tous les prétendus Sémites se servent de la main gauche” (119-120).

52. “Die oberste Klasse—ich nenne sie die Wenigsten—hat als die Vollkommne auch die Vorrechte der Wenigsten.”


54. Ibid., 349. The original text reads: “Antwort auf das Vordringen der Mohammedaner in Indien.”

55. A recent article on Nietzsche and Manu is Thomas A. Brobjer, “The Absence of Political Ideals in Nietzsche’s Writings: The Case of Manu and the Associated Caste-Society,” Nietzsche-Studien 27 (1998), 300-318. Brobjer, however, only mentions Jacolliot in a quite cursory fashion,
reaching the insufficient conclusion that “Nietzsche probably was very little influenced by the comments in the footnotes” (304).


57. “Et qu’on nous dise si le bien, la vertu, le devoir et les idées d’unité de Dieu et de trinité, et d’immortalité de l’âme, n’ont pas revêtu dans l’Inde le caractère le plus élevé qui puisse leur être donné …” (94).


60. “Ces pariahs égyptiens révoltés qui s’appelèrent les Hébreux” (218).


62. “En copiant ces traditions indoues, le sémitisme chrétien y a ajouté quoi que ce soit” (94).
63. “Cette classe n’avait aucune existence légale … comme toutes les races abandonnées à la vie de nature, les tchandalas se développèrent avec une extraordinaire rapidité. Issus des criminels de toutes les castes, même des castes brahmes et xchatrias, ils ne tardèrent pas à former un ensemble beaucoup plus intelligent, plus capable que la moyenne des soudras et même des vaysias” (100).

64. “Seine Seele schielt; sein Geist liebt Schlupfwinkel, Schleichwege und Hinterthüren, alles Versteckte muthet ihn an als seine Welt, seine Sicherheit, sein Labsal; er versteht sich auf das Schweigen, das Nicht-Vergessen, das Warten, das vorläufige Sich-verkleinern, Sich-demüthigen. Eine Rasse solcher Menschen des Ressentiment wird nothwendig endlich klüger sein als irgend eine vornehme Rasse, sie wird die Klugheit auch in ganz andrem Maasse ehren: nämlich als eine Existenzbedingung ersten Ranges.”


67. “Der Mensch als der Messende. — Vielleicht hat alle Moralität der Menschheit in der ungeheuren inneren Aufregung ihren Ursprung, welche die Urmenschen ergriff, als sie das
Maass und das Messen, die Wage und das Wägen entdeckten (das Wort ‘Mensch’ bedeutet ja den Messenden, er hat sich nach seiner grössten Entdeckung benennen wollen!).”